Protector or oppressor?
A comparative case study of internal conflict and military influence in Myanmar and the Philippines
Author: Beatrice Chamberlain Supervisor: Joakim Kreutz Word count: 11 920 Number of pages: 34
Spring semester 2020 Bachelor’s thesis, 15 credits Political Science C
Department of Government Uppsala University
Abstract
This thesis aims to test the causal connection between internal security threats and political intervention by the military in states which have recently transitioned to democracy. In order to investigate this, a comparative case study is conducted between the recent case of Myanmar and the case of the Philippines in the 1980s with the aim of investigating how the presence of internal conflict in the two countries has impacted the level of military influence post-transition.
This is investigated through a qualitative analysis of the countries’ constitutions as well as statements by political and military leaders in order to investigate how the issues of internal conflict and the role of the military are defined, perceived and portrayed. The results of the study demonstrate that differences in these areas may explain why the military in Myanmar has managed to intervene more successfully.
Keywords: civil-military relations, military influence, military intervention, internal conflict, internal threat, Myanmar, Philippines
Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 4
1.1. Top-down democratic transition ... 4
1.2. Purpose and research question ... 5
1.3. Thesis outline ... 6
2. Previous research and theoretical framework ... 7
2.1. Previous research ... 7
Civil-military relations ... 7
The civil-military problem ... 7
Military influence as a dependent variable ... 8
Explanatory variables for military influence ... 8
2.2. Theoretical framework ... 9
Internal threat as an explanatory variable ... 9
Securitisation theory ...11
2.3. Expectations...11
3. Methodology and material...12
3.1. Research design ...12
3.2. Case selection ...12
3.3. Analytical method ...13
Discussion on validity and reliability ...13
3.4. Material and source triangulation ...14
3.5. Methodological shortcomings ...15
4. Contextualisation ...16
4.1. Country profile: Myanmar ...16
Political context ...16
Society and economy...16
Internal conflicts ...17
4.2. Country profile: The Philippines...17
Political context ...17
Society and economy...18
Internal conflicts ...18
5. Analysis ...19
5.1 Internal security and national unity ...19
5.2. Internal conflict and government capability ...21
5.3. The military and political intervention ...23
5.4. Discussion ...27
6. Concluding remarks ...30
7. References ...31
Scholarly books and articles ...31
Newspaper articles ...32
Other sources ...32
The civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: The very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity. (Feaver, 1999, p. 214)
1. Introduction
1.1. Top-down democratic transition
After nearly 50 years of military rule, Myanmar1 took international observers by surprise when a process of political reforms was introduced in 2011. The media was liberalised, political prisoners were released and talks began between the regime, the opposition and the country’s ethnic groups (Bünte & Portela, 2012; International Crisis Group, 2011). The European Union and the United States reacted by suspending sanctions, resuming development aid and re- establishing diplomatic ties with Myanmar (Bünte & Portela, 2012). In November 2015, general elections were held and the results gave rise to further hope and expectations that a democratic transition was underway. An oppositional political party under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi contested the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). This oppositional party – called the National League for Democracy (NLD) – won the elections by a landslide, thereby bringing an end to military rule. The result was recognised by the military and a peaceful transfer of power was promised (BBC News, 2015a). Nearly five years later, the prospects for democracy in Myanmar are less favourable. Although the NLD is the ruling party, the constitution from 2008 grants the military extensive rights. Most notably, 25 percent of seats in parliament are reserved for military representatives. The NLD campaigned on the promise to change the constitution, but here is the problem: amendments require more than 75 percent of the votes, which effectively creates a catch-22 situation where the military has veto power over any constitutional changes (Bünte, 2014). Military rule may have officially ended in Myanmar, but the military still has a firm grip on political power.
Myanmar’s transition is the latest example of a democratic transition in Southeast Asia. 35 years ago, a somewhat similar development took place in the Philippines. Between 1972 and
1 The name was changed from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 by the military government, who claimed that the new name was more ethnically neutral and would provide a sense of national unity and independence from the country’s colonial past. The change of name was not recognised by the opposition who viewed the government as illegitimate. Choosing whether to refer to the country as Burma or Myanmar therefore became somewhat of a political standpoint. (Steinberg, 2001). In more recent years, the names have become less politically charged and Myanmar is common practice, although the US notably still uses the name Burma. Following the practice of the UN, I will refer to the country as Myanmar.
1981, martial law was imposed on the country under the rule of Ferdinand Marcos. During this period the military became increasingly politicised. However, after Marcos had been overthrown and Corazon Aquino was elected new president in 1986, a new constitution was passed which significantly limited the military’s rights (Chambers, 2012). Why was this possible in the case of the Philippines but not in Myanmar? What explains continued military influence in newly democratised states?
David Brenner and Sarah Schulman are among those who argue that what has happened in Myanmar has been misunderstood as a case of democratic transition when it is in fact better understood as a case of military rule adapting to survive in a changing environment. They describe the reforms of the past decade as a top-down process, planned and executed by the military. From this point of view, the reform process was not intended to reduce the military’s political power (Brenner & Schulman, 2019). When looking at Myanmar’s reform process as driven by authoritarian forces, not democratic ones, attention can be turned to the question of why the military is reluctant to let go of political power in this case.
1.2. Purpose and research question
Previous research on civil-military relations has identified conditions which are more or less favourable to military rule and points to various factors which may explain the persistence of military influence. One such factor is the existence of an internal threat in the country (Bünte, 2014, pp. 748–749; Feaver, 1999, p. 222). This explanatory factor is particularly interesting in the case of Myanmar, where violent internal conflicts have been present ever since the country’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1948 (Landguiden, n.d.-b). In the years since the 2015 election, the issue of internal conflict in Myanmar has risen to the surface in light of the escalating persecution of the Rohingya, who are a minority group in the state of Rakhine in western Myanmar. The persecution of the Rohingya has placed Myanmar under heavy criticism from the international community, with UN human rights chief Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein calling it a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (UN News, 2017). Although several previous researchers have identified Myanmar as a case where there could be a connection between internal conflicts in the country and the military’s strong position, there is a lack of empirical studies that test this theoretical claim. Moreover, the Philippines has also struggled with internal conflicts throughout its modern history. Yet the outcome in the two cases is different. The causal relationship between internal security and military influence therefore needs to be further
investigated. By writing this thesis, I hope to be able to fill a small part of that gap. As Brenner and Schulman (2019) argue, furthering research on the nature of democratic transitions remains a crucial mission within political science in order to avoid unintentionally aiding the survival of authoritarianism, which it can perhaps be argued that the international community did in the case of Myanmar by lifting sanctions in response to the reforms.
Specifically, this thesis will investigate whether the presence of internal conflicts in Myanmar and the Philippines has been used to justify political intervention by the military. In order to investigate this, I will examine how the internal conflicts and the militaries’ roles are described both in the constitutions and in public statements by political leaders in Myanmar and the Philippines. This is thus a comparative case study where Myanmar’s recent transition will be compared with the Philippines around the time when the country transitioned from martial law and a new constitution was passed. By doing so, the broader purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the empirical research concerning the explanatory power of an internal security threat as a causal factor for continued military influence. To that purpose, the research question is as follows:
How does internal conflict affect military influence in newly democratised states?
1.3. Thesis outline
Following this introduction, the second chapter will introduce the field of civil-military relations and give an account of previous research relating to the focus of this study. After that, a specific theoretical framework for the study will be presented, from which the expectations for the results of the study will be derived. Chapter three will describe the methodological approach and analytical method of the study and discuss the selection of cases and material, source criticism and methodological shortcomings. Chapter four will provide the reader with some context in the form of country profiles on Myanmar and the Philippines. Following that, chapter 5 is dedicated to the analysis, which is centred around three themes and concluded by a discussion on the results and implications of the analysis. Finally, chapter 6 contains my concluding remarks regarding the results of the study, its contribution to the field of civil- military relations, as well as implications for future research.
2. Previous research and theoretical framework
This chapter will provide the theoretical foundation for the study. The first section of the chapter will briefly cover previous research within civil-military relations. This is followed by a theoretical framework which will describe the causal connection between internal security and military influence as well as an insight from securitisation theory. Departing from this, I will conclude the chapter by presenting my expectations for the results of the study.
2.1. Previous research Civil-military relations
The subfield of civil-military relations is interdisciplinary and broad. It combines work from political scientists, historians and sociologists and explores the interaction between military and civilian society. Research in this field dates from before the second world war, with Harold Lasswell’s article “The Garrison State” being a highly influential piece of work. The Cold War period gave rise to a new wave of literature, of which the landmark contribution is Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. After this, the field diverged in two branches; one more institutionally oriented, focusing on postcolonial civil-military relations in developing countries. The other branch was more sociologically oriented and focused on the relationships between civilian societies and militaries. A significant contribution to the literature within this branch is The Professional Soldier by Morris Janowitz (Feaver, 1999, pp. 211–213).
The civil-military problem
The core question within civil-military relations is this: “Who will guard the guardians?”.2 In order to defend the interests of the state, its armed forces must be strong enough to ward off enemies. In creating a strong military there is however an inherent risk that the military will use its power to harm the very society it is intended to protect. This is the civil-military problem;
that the military in order to protect the state must have substantial power – yet such an amount of power is enough to make the military a potential threat to society and civilian leadership. In the words of Peter Feaver: “The two central desiderata – protection by the military and protection from the military – are in tension because efforts to assure the one complicate efforts to assure the other” (Feaver, 1999, p. 216). As Feaver writes, the civil-military problem can be viewed as a specified version of the governance problem which is fundamental to political
2 Originally: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”, a statement attributable to the Roman poet Juvenal.
science: that the government should be capable of protecting its citizens without becoming tyrannical (Feaver, 1999, p. 215).
Military influence as a dependent variable
Historically, much of the research within civil-military relations has focused on military coups;
how frequently they occur and how likely they are to be successful. Coups have been an obvious point of interest because they so clearly illustrate military abuse of power. However, military coups have become less common in more recent times. Moreover, a focus on coups may underestimate military strength since the military can exercise influence in less obvious ways.
As Feaver argues, a coup is not necessarily an indication of a powerful military. A coup can also be an indication of a weak military in the sense that it cannot exert its influence without the use of force: “[…] in this way, the dog that does not bark may be the more powerful […]”
(Feaver, 1999, p. 218). Some have preferred to study military influence, which as a continuous variable has the advantage of being able to capture more nuance than the dichotomous coup- variable – although it has the disadvantage of being more difficult to measure.
This thesis, however, is less concerned with the dependant variables (things that need explaining or predicting, i.e. the degree of military influence), and more concerned with the independent or explanatory variables (i.e. what explains the degree of military influence?). In this thesis, the explanatory variable of interest is the presence of an internal threat. Before turning to the research which has concerned itself with the connection between internal threats and military influence, I will attempt to give a brief overview of other explanatory variables.
Explanatory variables for military influence
Previous research has distinguished between explanations which are external versus internal to the country. It has also distinguished between explanations which are external versus internal to the military itself. The reader should note that these distinctions may cause confusion because explanations which are external to the military can still be internal to the country. In the following paragraphs, I will attempt to differentiate between the various explanatory variables as clearly as possible. I will extract these primarily from the work of Marco Bünte, who in turn has drawn on the research of Samuel Finer and Ulf Sundhaussen on military influence and military withdrawal from politics.
As for explanations which are external to the country, Bünte (2014) speaks of security threats.
This is an obvious explanation for military influence because an external security threat provides the military with a strong incentive to stay in power in order to defend the state. Feaver (1999) also mentions foreign targeted aid and “advice” which is perhaps a less obvious type of external security threat. Among explanations which are internal to the country, Bünte mentions the strength of political parties and civilian society as well as economic development. This is echoed in the work of Peter Feaver, who brings up social cleavages, the nature of the political system and the distribution of wealth (Bünte, 2014, pp. 748–749; Feaver, 1999, p. 222). Both authors also mention the significance of internal security and internal threats. This, as previously stated, will be further explored under “Theoretical framework”.
When it comes to explanations which are internal to the military itself, a significant factor is internal cohesion. In the case of Myanmar, Bünte highlights the importance of the strong organisational structure of the Burmese military, which he argues facilitated the controlled transition to quasi-military rule after the 2011 reforms (Bünte, 2014, p. 756). Other internal explanations are the personal and corporate interests, self-confidence and ideology of the military. Militaries may be reluctant to let go of political power if they fear persecution for previous human rights violations or if they have economic interests which they wish to safeguard (Bünte, 2014, p. 748). Moreover, Brenner and Schulman have identified the Burmese military’s ceasefire agreements with ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) as something which gave the military enough confidence in its monopoly on power to initiate the reform process (Brenner & Schulman, 2019, p. 22). Finally, militaries which believe they are acting in the national interest may see it as their moral duty to intervene politically (Bünte, 2014, p. 749).
This brings us closer to the explanatory power of an internal threat, which is the focus of this thesis, and to which I will now turn.
2.2. Theoretical framework
Internal threat as an explanatory variable
It is a well-established idea that external threats make states stronger. Charles Tilly famously said: “War made the state, and the state made war” (Tilly et al., 1975, p. 42). According to Dan Slater, however, internal conflicts can also “make the state”. Slater argues that some types of internal conflicts trigger elites in the country to act collectively which in turn can have a strengthening effect on authoritarian regimes (Slater, 2010, p. 5). More specifically, Slater’s
argument is that when a group of elites perceive an internal conflict to be endemic and uncontrollable under pluralistic political arrangements, they are likely to come together in protection pacts. He defines protection pacts as broad elite coalitions which are united in their support for a powerful state and the use of authoritarian measures to prevent mass unrest (Slater, 2010, p. 5). Slater builds this theory on the research of Michael Hechter and William Brustein, who have suggested that internal conflict can act as a “functional equivalent” for external warfare. As Slater argues, it is important to investigate whether internal conflicts can have the same strengthening effect as external ones since the former has been the more common type of conflict in the post-World War II era (Slater, 2010, pp. 38–39).
The impact of internal threats has also been emphasised by Michael Desch. Desch’s research in this area concerns civilian control over the military. He argues that the level of civilian control is determined by structural factors; especially threats (Desch, 2001, p. 11). Desch challenges Harold Lasswell’s idea that civilian control is more difficult to achieve in a challenging international threat environment and argues that the opposite is true (Desch, 2001, p. 2). Desch identifies four threat scenarios that can be faced by a state: (1) a high external threat to the state’s interests in combination with a low internal threat to the state’s stability, (2) a low external threat in combination with a high internal threat, (3) high threats externally and internally, and (4) low threats externally and internally. Desch argues that civilian control of the military works best in the first scenario because the presence of an external threat unites civilian and military leaders in the common interest of defending the state. In the opposite scenario, when a state is faced by a high internal threat and a low external threat, Desch argues that civilian control of the military does not work well because the military will tend to occupy itself as a political actor or protector of the state. In reference to Desch, Damien Kingsbury argues that this scenario applies to both Myanmar and the Philippines (Desch, 2001, pp. 13–17;
Kingsbury, 2017, p. 17). In other words, it may be the case that the military does not trust civilian leaders to uphold stability in the face of internal conflict.
So far, we have established that there is research which points towards internal conflicts as an explanatory factor for military influence. However, a question which needs further attention is to what extent internal conflicts pose an actual threat to national security versus to what extent the portrayal of internal conflicts as a security threat can serve the interest of the military to stay in power. For this purpose, I will draw on insights from securitisation theory.
Securitisation theory
Securitisation theory is usually said to have originated with the work of Ole Waever in the late 1980s, in the Copenhagen School within international relations. Weaver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde defined securitisation as follows: “’Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). Briefly stated, the main idea is that something can be portrayed as a an existential threat even if it represents no actual threat to security.
Securitisation theory holds that security issues are constructed as a result of the interaction between a securitising actor (e.g. a political leader) and an audience (e.g. public opinion), whereby the actor wishes to highlight the importance of a certain political issue and gain the support of the audience to use extraordinary measures to deal with the issue (Balzacq et al., 2016, pp. 495–496). The concept of the audience is an important part of securitisation theory because of the underlying idea of securitisation as an intersubjective process, wherein the securitising actor needs the support of the audience in order to legitimise extraordinary action (Balzacq et al., 2016, p. 499). However, in a regime such as the one in Myanmar, the military as a securitising actor does not require the support of an audience to legitimise its actions because the military’s authority is established in the constitution. Therefore, securitisation theory in its entirety is not applicable and will not be applied in this thesis. The analytical tool which I wish to bring with me from securitisation theory is simply the awareness that something can be portrayed as a security threat regardless of whether or not it is an actual threat.
2.3. Expectations
Departing from the research of Dan Slater and Michael Desch, the expectations for the results of this study are that in the case of Myanmar, the internal conflicts are considered to be uncontrollable which explains why the military continues to have political influence – whereas at the time of transition in the Philippines, the internal conflicts were considered to be controllable which explains why the military’s political influence was limited after the transition. Drawing on insights from securitisation theory, this could further imply either that the internal conflicts in Myanmar are actually severe enough to be perceived as a threat to the survival of the state, or else that they are portrayed as such a threat in order to justify the military’s continued political influence.
3. Methodology and material
In this chapter, the choice of methods, cases and material for the study will be presented.
Validity and reliability issues, source criticism and methodological shortcomings will also be discussed.
3.1. Research design
The methodological approach in this thesis is a comparative case study between two countries:
Myanmar and the Philippines. As Esaiasson et al write, any attempt to draw conclusions about causal effects requires comparison (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p. 109). Ideally, in order to truly uncover the explanatory power of a certain variable one would turn back time and run the exact same chain of events once again, changing only the variable of interest and thus creating a contrafactual situation. Because of the impossibility of such experiments within the social sciences, no conclusions about causal effects can be absolutely certain. This is a dilemma known as “the fundamental problem of causal inference”.3 One cannot be absolutely certain about causality – but with comparative studies, one can sometimes come close. (Esaiasson et al., 2017, pp. 91–92).
3.2. Case selection
An advantage of small-N studies (studies of few cases) is that the researcher can pay more attention to detail and context. When choosing cases for comparison, a guiding principle is therefore to choose strategically (as opposed to choosing randomly). In order to be able to observe causal effects, it is common practice within the case study-tradition to choose cases where the dependent and explanatory variables differ. For this purpose, John Stuart Mill developed two methods which have become widely known: the method of difference and the method of agreement. The research design of this thesis follows the logic of the method of difference. According to this method, the researcher selects cases which are as similar as possible except in the dependent or explanatory variables. By neutralising differences between the cases in this way, the researcher hopes to be able to isolate an explanatory variable which explains whether or not a certain outcome (the dependent variable) takes place (Teorell &
Svensson, 2007, pp. 222–226). For this study, the choice of which country to compare Myanmar with was guided by the value of the dependent variable. Setting out, I know that the dependent
3 A statement attributable to Paul Holland.
variable – military influence – differs between the two chosen countries: the military in the Philippines does not have the same rights to intervene politically as the military does in Myanmar. What remains unknown is thus the value of the explanatory variable: the level of internal threat.
3.3. Analytical method
When seeking to extract meaning from material for scientific purposes, the researcher must process the material using an interpretative method. There are different ways to go about this and the various methods go by many names within the social sciences. By a common name, such interpretative methods can be referred to as a hermeneutic approach. Teorell and Svensson describe four steps in a hermeneutic approach: (1) presenting a hypothesis, (2) deriving empirical indicators which should be observed in the empirical material if the hypothesis is supported, (3) testing to see if these empirical indicators can indeed be observed in the material, (4) a conclusion as to whether the hypothesis is supported or not (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p.
99). In this study, what I am seeking in the material are empirical indicators of the actual existence of an internal threat, as well as perceptions of the presence of an internal threat. To find these indicators, I have searched for speeches, public statements, interviews and articles which mention words relating to internal security and the military’s role in Myanmar and the Philippines. The following words have been used to filter through the material: “military” (and synonyms such as “army”, “armed forces”, “defence services” “Tatmadaw”4 and AFP”5). I have also searched for “threat”, “security”, “conflict”, “peace”, “insurgency”/”insurgents” and related context-specific words: “Rohingya” and “Rakhine” in the case of Myanmar,
“Mindanao” and “communism”/”communist” in the case of the Philippines.
Discussion on validity and reliability
Good validity in research can be defined as the absence of systematic errors or in other words;
that what is measured empirically corresponds to what the researcher theoretically intends to measure. Good reliability can be defined as the absence of unsystematic or random errors in the study (Esaiasson et al., 2017, pp. 59–64). According to Esaiasson et al, validity problems usually arise when the relation between a theoretical definition and its empirical indicators is not clear (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p. 60). In this study, the operationalisation of the explanatory
4 Tatmadaw means “armed forces” and is the official name of the Burmese military.
5 Armed Forces of the Philippines.
or independent variable – internal threat – is fairly straightforward as this is mentioned explicitly in the material either by use of the word “threat” or in connection with closely related words such as “conflict”, “security” or any of the other related words mentioned above. I therefore consider the validity of this study to be fairly good. Of course, there may be implicit mentions of threat in the material which are overlooked in this study. However, in my view, explicit mentions of threat provide sufficient empirical evidence to test the explanatory power of the theory within the scope of the study. Concerning reliability, it is important to discuss that a great deal of statements have of course been made concerning internal security in the two countries during the relevant years and the material analysed in this study reflects only a selection of such statements. With a different selection of material, it is possible that a different result could be achieved. I have attempted to counter this effect by triangulating sources and making sure that the statements I analyse are supported in several sources; more on this below.
3.4. Material and source triangulation
The material analysed in this thesis consists primarily of the constitutions of Myanmar and the Philippines as well as speeches and public statements made by political and military leaders in the two countries. When searching for material for this thesis, I have encountered a few main problems which should be mentioned. The first one is language. In the case of Myanmar, several of the speeches and interviews to which I refer were originally made in Burmese and I have accessed versions where there is an English translation provided. There is therefore a risk that the statements which I analyse may differ slightly from the original statements. In the case of the Philippines, I have looked at events which took place in the 1980s which means that there is less material available than in the case of Myanmar. The main challenge with the Philippines was therefore to find a significant amount of material which corresponds well enough to the material I found on Myanmar in order to make it comparable. With regard to source criticism, it is important to discuss authenticity (is the source genuine?), time (how much time has passed between the event and the written account of it?), dependency (is the source dependent on other sources?) and tendency (is the source neutral or does it favour a certain perspective?).
(Esaiasson et al., 2017, pp. 291–297). The authenticity of the constitutions of Myanmar and the Philippines need not be questioned and the time criteria is not a problem either as the constitutions are in vigour as of the time of writing and were so also during the times in which the statements I have analysed were made. They are primary sources and should not be expected to reflect the views of any specific actor which also deals with the tendency issue. Regarding
the remainder of the analysed material, it is a mix of primary and secondary sources; mainly transcripts of speeches and interviews and articles from various newspapers. In most cases, the newspaper articles which I have consulted have been published shortly after the events which they describe. Speeches and public statements which are analysed can be expected to be tendentious, especially as political leaders have an interest in conveying themselves and their actions in a favourable way. This is however not a problem in itself as their perceptions and opinions are of interest for the purpose of this study. In general, in order to manage the problems of authenticity, time, dependency and tendency, I have as far as possible attempted to triangulate sources. This means that I have consulted a wide range of material in order to ensure that the statements I analyse appear to be consistent in different sources.
3.5. Methodological shortcomings
The obvious problem with Mill’s method of difference is that in practice, it is impossible to find two cases which are similar in every aspect except for the dependent and independent variables. According to Teorell and Svensson, Mill’s method should therefore be viewed as an ideal type which can be approximated (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 227). In reality, there will undoubtedly be other variables than the ones of interest which differ more or less between the cases. This study is no exception from that reality. Therefore, as was previously mentioned, conclusions about causal effects from a comparative study like this one cannot be certain.
However, in combination with other studies, comparative studies of few cases can still contribute to better understanding of a phenomena by clarifying causal mechanisms (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p. 106; Teorell & Svensson, 2007, pp. 245–246).
4. Contextualisation
This chapter contains two country profiles to provide the reader with context which will facilitate the reading of the analysis. A full background will not be given, as that would be unfitting for the scope of this study. Rather, the intention is to provide a brief background and account for the main characteristics of Myanmar and the Philippines which demonstrate that this selection of cases approximates the method of difference.
4.1. Country profile: Myanmar Political context
Myanmar is a unitary parliamentary republic with a population of about 54 million. The country became independent from the United Kingdom in 1948. In 1962, the military gained power through a coup. What followed was nearly 50 years of military rule. In 2008, a new constitution was passed which allowed for a civilian government but simultaneously granted the military extensive rights. 25 percent of parliamentary seats are reserved for the military, and they also have the right to appoint several ministers. Constitutional amendments require more than 75 percent of the votes, which means that the military has veto power. In 2011, as was described in the introduction of this thesis, a process of reforms was surprisingly initiated. The National League for Democracy (NLD), an oppositional party under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, was allowed to participate in the 2015 elections and won against the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). This formally ended military rule. The constitution prevents Suu Kyi from becoming president, but the specific position of State Counsellor was created for her which in practice allows her to serve as Myanmar’s civilian leader (Landguiden, n.d.-b).
Society and economy
Myanmar is a religiously and ethnically heterogenous country. The majority of the population (more than two thirds) is Buddhist and belongs to the Bamar/Burman6 ethnic group. There are more than a hundred indigenous ethnic groups and minority groups adhering to Christianity, Islam and Hinduism among other religions (UCDP, n.d.). During the many years of military rule, the society developed in an unequal direction with an elite of military officials and bureaucrats at the top and the rural population and ethnic minorities at the bottom. About 25
6 When the military government changed the country’s name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, several other geographic names and names of ethnic groups were also changed.
percent of the population is estimated to live in poverty. There are formal and informal sectors of the economy. The formal sector is dominated by agriculture and forestry. Other significant sources of income are oil and natural gas and in recent years, tourism and the construction industry (Landguiden, n.d.-b). In 2018, total GDP was estimated at about 71 billion US dollars with an annual growth rate of 6,2 percent (World Bank Group, n.d.-a).
Internal conflicts
Ever since the country’s independence, there have been issues with minority rights and discrimination, and several ethnic groups have been fighting for autonomy. Due to these circumstances, Myanmar has been more or less in a state of civil war throughout its modern history. In recent years, fighting between the country’s Buddhist majority and Muslim minority has increased. The Muslim Rohingya minority – which has long faced serious discrimination – has been heavily persecuted in the last few years. In 2017, 750 000 Rohingyas were driven out of the state of Rakhine in a military operation. Since 2012, two thirds of 1,5 million Rohingya in Myanmar have been driven from the country, mainly into Bangladesh (Landguiden, n.d.-b).
4.2. Country profile: The Philippines Political context
The Philippines is a unitary presidential republic with a population of about 109 million. The Philippines has been colonised by both Spain and the United States, and became independent in 1946. Democracy was instituted, but the political situation has since been turbulent and the regime took an authoritarian turn under the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s and 1980s. From 1972 to 1981, the country was under martial law (Landguiden, n.d.-a). In the lead- up to presidential elections in 1986, the opposition came together to support Corazon Aquino as candidate for the presidency. Marcos proclaimed himself the winner of the elections, but this was massively protested in what is known as the People Power revolution or the EDSA revolution. Aquino was supported by a faction of the military called the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and she was eventually recognised as the winner of the election, which brought democracy back to the country. In 1987, a new constitution was passed which clearly limited the military’s rights to intervene politically. However, in the years between 1986 and 1989, several coups were attempted by factions of the military. Although the country has remained under civilian leadership since 1986, the level of civilian control has fluctuated and the military has continued to be an influential actor (Chambers, 2012, pp. 58–59). During
martial law, the armed forces grew in numbers and the defence budget was increased. Military officials held positions of influence in the civil courts, in the financial sector and in the media.
They were also occupied with fighting both communist insurgents and Muslim separatists in Mindanao; see “internal conflicts” below. (De Castro, 2012, p. 120).
Society and economy
The majority of the population is Christian (Catholic) and there is a Muslim minority in the south, mainly on the island group of Mindanao. While a small elite dominates financially and politically (Landguiden, n.d.-a), poverty and inequality have been significant issues for decades with a slow and uneven decline of poverty. In 1985, 44 percent of the population was estimated to live in poverty (Asian Development Bank, 2009, pp. 7–13). The economy was long based mainly on agriculture, forestry and fishing, with growing service and manufacturing industries in later years. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Philippines suffered from economic stagnation which left the country behind its Southeast Asian neighbours (Landguiden, n.d.-a). In 1990, total GDP was measured at about 44 billion US dollars with an annual growth rate of 3 percent (World Bank Group, n.d.-b).
Internal conflicts
There has long been tension between Muslims and Christians in the southern part of the Philippines. In the 1960s, the conflict became violent when a separatist movement declared an independent Muslim state. Since then, other and more militant groups have appeared and there has been an ongoing conflict between Muslim separatist organisations and the military in the south. This has resulted in much internal displacement and loss of life. Peace talks and negotiations about autonomy have been initiated and interrupted by renewed violence during the last 50 years. Since the country’s independence, there has also been a recurring violent conflict between the government and communist insurgents (Landguiden, n.d.-a).
5. Analysis
In this chapter, the analysis of the selected material is presented. As the methodological approach of this thesis is a comparative case study, the findings on Myanmar and the Philippines will continuously be compared. If the analysis shows that the internal security situation appears to influence laws, statements and opinions concerning the military in Myanmar, this could confirm the expectation that the conflicts are considered to be uncontrollable. Conversely, if internal security does not seem to have influenced laws, statements and opinions concerning the military in the Philippines, this could confirm the expectation that the conflicts in this case are considered to be controllable. Such findings could further implicate either that the internal conflicts in Myanmar are more threatening to national security than the ones in the Philippines, or else that the internal conflicts in Myanmar for some reason are portrayed as an internal threat in order to justify military intervention in politics. The analysis will be structured around three themes which appear to be significant in the analysed material. The chapter is concluded by a discussion of the results and implications of the analysis.
5.1 Internal security and national unity
In Myanmar’s constitution, the military’s role is specified as follows in articles 20, 339 and 341:
20. (e) The Defence Services is mainly responsible for safeguarding the non-disintegration of the Union; the non-disintegration of National solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty.
(Myanmar Const. Chapter I art. 20 e)
339. The Defence Services shall lead in safeguarding the Union against all internal and external dangers.
(Myanmar Const. Chapter VII art. 339)
341. The Defence Services shall render assistance when calamities that affects the Union and its citizens occur in the Union.
(Myanmar Const. Chapter VII art. 341)
This can be compared with article II, section 3 of the constitution of the Philippines which defines the role of the military in the following way:
Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
(Philippines Const. art. II section 3)
When comparing how the role of the military is defined in the two constitutions, it is interesting to note that in the case of Myanmar, the military’s role is connected to the concept of national unity. The principles of non-disintegration of the union and non-disintegration of national solidarity are core principles of the constitution and appear in several other articles. For example, article 383 states that it is every citizen’s duty to uphold non-disintegration of the union and of national solidarity. In article 65, it is also specified that presidents and vice presidents must make an affirmation in which they promise to honour the principles of non- disintegration. Furthermore, article 404 states that all political parties must make these principles their objective. National unity is also something which has many times been brought up by political leaders in speeches and public statements. For example, in a speech on September 19th 2017 where she addressed the Rohingya crisis, Suu Kyi said: “We would like you to think of our country as a whole. Not just as little afflicted areas. It is as a whole only that we can make progress.” (Aung San Suu Kyi, 2017). A possible interpretation of this focus on national unity is that the internal conflicts in Myanmar are perceived, by both military and civilian leadership, as an actual threat to the sovereignty of the state. Referring back to Dan Slater’s research, the fact that both the military and civilian leaders in Myanmar place emphasis on national unity could signal that the military and the government have come together as a protection pact.
When comparing with the Philippines, in the 1980s, the military was divided in different factions. As previously mentioned, some factions conducted coups against the government, which was defended by other factions of the military. In speeches from around this time, Aquino expresses her discontent with the oppositional factions within the military. This can be illustrated with the following quote, which was made in a speech on July 24th 1989:
[…] Democracy is our faith and the root of our strength to defend it.
Added to that faith was the will to stand for no more nonsense from military adventurers who thought that failure to shave qualified them for national leadership. Some people don’t like the way I dress. Well I didn’t like the way they looked. I am in power and they are out.
[Applause] Surely there is a lesson here to be learned about delusions of self-importance and the realities of power (Aquino, 1989).
Considering that the military at this time was divided and that Aquino spoke out against the oppositional factions of the military shows that in contrast to Myanmar, there does not appear
to have been a narrative of national unity in connection with internal security in the Philippines.
This can possibly indicate that there was no protection pact among elites in the Philippines.
Elaborating on this, it should also be noted that according to Myanmar’s constitution, any political representative can be removed from duty for reasons such as misbehaviour (article 396). Therefore, another way to interpret the focus on national unity in Myanmar is that Suu Kyi is going along with the military’s narrative in order to be able to stay in power herself. If this is the case, it is possible that the internal conflicts are publicly portrayed as more threatening than they actually are. This could further imply that both the military and Suu Kyi have an interest in using the narrative of national unity as a way of maintaining internal security, because they want to protect their political power. In the case of the Philippines, considering that civilian authority over the military is protected by the constitution and that Aquino also had the support of a faction of the military, it can be assumed that she did not feel that her political power would be threatened when she condemned the military coups. This indicates that despite the attempted coups, civilian control of the military remained in place. When analysing this through Desch’s theory of threat scenarios, this could perhaps be taken to mean that the internal security situation in the Philippines at this time did not amount to an internal threat in the same way as in Myanmar.
5.2. Internal conflict and government capability
To further investigate whether there appears to be a protection pact among elites in Myanmar and whether there was no such protection pact in the Philippines, it can be fruitful to compare how political leaders speak of internal conflicts. In December 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi held a speech at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague where she defended the Burmese military against genocide allegations in connection with the persecution of the Rohingya. Suu Kyi made the following comments:
Please bear in mind this complex situation and the challenge to sovereignty and security in our country when you are assessing the intent of those who attempted to deal with the rebellion. Surely, under the circumstances, genocidal intent cannot be the only hypothesis.
[…]
We pray the Court to refrain from taking any action that might aggravate the ongoing armed conflict and peace and security in Rakhine (Al Jazeera, 2019).
In her speech on September 19th 2017, addressing the Rohingya crisis, she said:
I understand that many of our friends throughout the world are concerned by reports of villages being burnt and of hordes of refugees fleeing. As I said earlier, there have been no conflicts since 5 September and no clearance operations. We too are concerned. We want to find out what the real problems are. There have been allegations and counter-allegations and we have to listen to all of them. And we have to make sure that these allegations are based on solid evidence before we take action (Aung San Suu Kyi, 2017).
Thein Sein, a retired military general who was the president of Myanmar between 2011 and 2016, also emphasised the difficulty of dealing with the internal conflicts. On July 15th 2013 he gave a speech at Chatham House, a London-based NGO working to promote discussion of international affairs. In this speech, he said:
The remaining conflicts all have an ethnic character and are rooted in long-standing ethnic grievances and aspirations. And in Myanmar there is not just one non-state armed group but more than a dozen. Please imagine the complexities of any peace process then multiply it by twelve (Thein Sein, 2013).
These statements can be compared with statements made by Corazon Aquino in 1987 when she had recently been elected and the new constitution had been passed. In reference to the ongoing internal conflicts in the Philippines, she said the following in a speech on March 22nd 1987:
To our enemies, let me say that nothing will intimidate this President. Death holds no fear for us, neither for the Commander-in-Chief nor for the soldier in the line. One nation, one Armed Forces, acting with the energy and direction of a single hand will smite the foe, on the left and the right, and permanently end all threats to freedom before my term as President is over.
This is my solemn oath (Aquino, 1987b).
Similarly, in another speech on the same day, she said:
To a terrorist act the immediate answer is not social and economic reforms but police and military action. I told you when we were discussing the peace initiatives that when they fail, as we feared they would, and when it becomes necessary to take up the sword of war, that I want a string of honorable military victories to follow my proclamation of war. Victories of which we can all be proud. Clean victories, aimed straight at the core of the enemy, be it Left or Right, with a minimum of collateral damage to the civilians we are supposed to protect and avenge (Aquino, 1987a).
When comparing speeches and public statements by leading political figures in the two countries, there appears to be a difference in how they speak of ongoing internal conflicts. In the case of Myanmar, the above quotes exemplify that the conflicts are described as complex
and difficult for the government to manage. Although the speeches often mention various steps which the government has taken to manage the conflicts, they consistently also make the point that the conflicts are difficult to understand and to manage and that the peace process will be long and difficult. In the case of the Philippines, the internal conflicts are described as threatening and difficult. However, Aquino uses noticeably harsher language and she emphasises the government’s capability in managing the conflicts, as exemplified by the quotes above. Drawing on these findings, it is possible to elaborate on what was said in section 4.1.
about protection pacts. According to Dan Slater, protection pacts occur when internal conflicts are perceived as endemic and uncontrollable under pluralistic political conditions. In the case of Myanmar, statements from political leaders can be taken to indicate that the conflicts are perceived as uncontrollable. In the case of the Philippines, by comparison, Aquino’s statements can be interpreted as meaning that the internal conflicts in the Philippines at the time were perceived as controllable.
Moreover, in defining protection pacts, Slater states that they are defined as elite coalitions which support the use of authoritarian measures to suppress mass unrest. This characteristic can perhaps be observed in the case of Myanmar, because the statements indicate that leaders tend to describe Myanmar’s situation as unique and they ask the international community to refrain from criticism. Whereas in the case of the Philippines, one can note that Aquino mentions the importance of defending freedom and civil rights, perhaps indicating that democratic values are of greater importance and that there is not support for authoritarian measures in dealing with the conflicts.
5.3. The military and political intervention
Moving on, the level of civilian control needs to be further investigated in order to determine the level of internal threats in the two countries. In order to do this, I will look at how the military’s role is defined and described in Myanmar and the Philippines respectively. As I have indicated earlier in this thesis, the military’s political participation is firmly protected by the constitution in Myanmar. This is made clear in the first chapter of the constitution where the core principles of the country are established. In article 6, six “consistent objectives” are presented. These include the principles of non-disintegration of the union and of national solidarity, the perpetuation of sovereignty, the practice of democracy, the values of justice, liberty and equality, and:
(f) enabling the Defence Services to be able to participate in the National political leadership role of the State.
(Myanmar Const. Chapter I art. 6 f)
The conditions for the military’s political participation are further specified in several articles, for example article 14:
The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Region Hluttaws and the State Hluttaws7 include the Defence Services personnel as Hluttaw representatives nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services in numbers stipulated by this Constitution.
(Myanmar Const. Chapter I art. 14)
These articles can be compared with article XVI, section 5 of the constitution of the Philippines:
(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people’s rights in the performance of their duty.
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government- owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
(Philippines Const. art. XVI section 5, 2-4)
In article 40 of Myanmar’s constitution, it is established that the military has the right to assume executive power in a state of emergency:
(c) If there arises a state of emergency that could cause disintegration of the Union, disintegration of national solidarity and loss of sovereign power or attempts therefore by wrongful forcible means such as insurgency or violence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services has the right to take over and exercise State sovereign power in accord with the provisions of this Constitution.
(Myanmar Const. Chapter I art. 40 c)
7 The Hluttaw is the Burmese parliament.
Under a state of emergency, the military is granted extensive rights to act as it sees fit. For example, article 420 states that:
The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services may, during the duration of the declaration of a state of emergency, restrict or suspend as required, one or more fundamental rights of the citizens in the required area.
(Myanmar Const. Chapter XI art. 420)
This can be compared with article VII, section 18 of the constitution of the Philippines which states that the president – who acts as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces – is authorised to declare a state of martial law for a maximum period of 60 days, when it is necessary to protect public safety from invasion or rebellion. Congress may revoke or extend such a proclamation by majority vote. Moreover:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
(Philippines Const. article VII section 18)
In observing these excerpts from the constitutions, it is clear that the politicised role of the military is explicit and constitutionally protected in Myanmar and the concept of civilian control does not appear to be supported in Myanmar’s constitution. In the Philippines, the constitution defines the military’s role as strictly professional and civilian control mechanisms are constitutionally protected.
Having established this, it will be interesting to compare how the militaries’ roles are defined in the constitutions versus how they have behaved in practice. In the case of Myanmar, military leaders’ perception of the military’s role can be well observed in quotes from Thein Sein and Min Aung Hlaing, who is Commander-in-Chief of the military since 2011. In his inaugural speech as new president in 2011, Thein Sein spoke of external threats in this way: ”If we do not take national defence seriously, we will fall under the rule of neo-colonialists again.” (Thein Sein, 2011). With regard to internal security, he said that the military had saved the country on many occasions and mentioned 1988 as an example – a year in which there were massive student-led protests against the military regime in the city of Yangon. The military responded to these protests with force, leaving thousands dead (Landguiden, n.d.-b). In a filmed interview with the BBC published on March 20th 2015 and translated from Burmese, Thein Sein was
