IMPACTS OF COVID-19 ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ACTORS:
The case of Lebanon and the 4 August 2020 Beirut Port Explosions
By: Jonathan Self
Supervisor: Dr. Lisbeth Larsson Lidén, Uppsala University May 2021
Abstract
This thesis analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on relationships between international and local humanitarian actors responding to the 4 August 2020 Beirut Port Explosion. The concepts of “the local”, localization, inequality, and remote management provide a theoretical framework for this analysis. Data collection for this case study research includes a review of published and grey literature, and five video interviews with staff of local and international humanitarian organizations in Beirut. Empirical findings show that local-international inequalities—in the forms of limited access, recognition, and control—have been observed in Beirut and Lebanon for decades, and persisted during the port explosion response.
This research further suggests that COVID-19 has contributed to an increase in inequality, most notably by reducing the participation of local actors in humanitarian coordination meetings, and disproportionately transferring risk from international to local actors due to a reliance on remote management. Findings also show that the port explosion caused an influx of funding that was disproportionately directed to international actors, and the economic crisis created a currency devaluation that has exacerbated local-international wage disparities and threatened to limit the reach of local NGO activities. Despite the strength of the civil society—shaped by a strong education system, decades of working through crisis, and government inaction—local actors have often been excluded from humanitarian practice in Beirut and Lebanon.
At the same time, findings highlight increases in equality: some local actors adapted more quickly than international actors to COVID-19 and were able to leverage their strengths to receive more funding and greater leadership in the port explosion response. These movements demonstrate adaptability in humanitarian practice that would be critically required in any future reform. This thesis concludes with two recommendations: (1) the use of remote management due to COVID-19 is likely problematic and requires further research to identify best practices; and (2) critical localization provides a useful framework to analyze and mitigate the persistence of local-international inequalities in future humanitarian responses, and helps to find a meaningful way forward.
Table of Contents
Abstract 2
List of Abbreviations 6
Chapter 1: Introduction 8
1.1 The research problem 8
1.2 Aims and research objective 9
1.3 Research question and assumptions 10
1.4 Previous academic research 10
1.5 Relevance to the field of humanitarian action 13
1.6 Methodology 14
1.6.1 Case study research 14
1.6.2 Data collection 14
1.6.3 Data analysis 16
1.7 Limitations 16
1.8 Ethical considerations 17
1.9 Thesis outline 18
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 19
2.1 Problematizing the local-international distinction 19
2.2 “Localization” as a contested term 22
2.3 A theoretical approach to local-international inequalities 24
2.4 Remote management in humanitarian practice 26
Chapter 3: Secondary Source Empirical Findings 30
3.1 Social, political, and economic context of Beirut and Lebanon 30
3.2 The COVID-19 pandemic in Beirut and Lebanon 32
3.3 Humanitarian perspectives in Beirut 33
3.3.1 A local perspective: Middle East Revive and Thrive (MERATH) 33 3.3.2 An international perspective: Danish Refugee Council (DRC) 33
3.3.3 A United Nations perspective 34
3.4 The Beirut Port Explosion: 4 August 2020 34
3.5 Humanitarian responses to the Beirut Port Explosion 37 3.5.1 The state’s role in the port explosion response 37 3.5.2 The civil society’s role in the port explosion response 37 3.6 Humanitarian funding for the Beirut Port Explosion 39
Chapter 4: Primary Source Empirical Findings 43
4.1 Summary of interview informants 43
4.2 Thematic coding analysis of interview findings 44
4.3 Event-based themes 46
4.3.1 COVID-19 pandemic 46
4.3.2 Beirut Port Explosion 46
4.3.3 Economic crisis 47
4.4 Key theme 1: inequality 48
4.4.1 Access to humanitarian funding 50
4.4.2 Humanitarian coordination mechanisms 51
4.4.3 Wage disparities 52
4.4.4 Control over decision-making 53
4.4.5 Remote modalities 54
4.5 Key theme 2: equality 55
4.5.1 Control over decision-making 57
4.5.2 Humanitarian coordination mechanisms 58
4.5.3 Access to humanitarian funding 58
4.5.4 Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 59
4.6 Additional themes 60
4.6.1 Localization 60
4.6.2 Humanitarian programming 61
Chapter 5: Discussion 63
5.1 Local-international relations: one of equality or inequality? 63 5.2 A comparative analysis of empirical and theoretical views of inequality 67 5.3 Inequality in humanitarian action: the case of the Beirut Port Explosion 70 5.3.1 Has COVID-19 increased local-international equality? 70 5.3.2 Has COVID-19 deepened local-international inequality? 71 5.3.3 Other factors influencing local-international inequality 73 5.4 What does inequality tell us about localization? 74
Chapter 6: Conclusion 76
6.1 Summary of research findings 76
6.2 Lessons and recommendations for humanitarian theory and practice 78
6.2.1 A critique of the use of remote management 78
6.2.2 “Critical localization” as a guide for humanitarian actors 79
6.3 Constraints and limitations of the study 81
6.4 Concluding remarks 82
References 84
Appendix 1: Overview of Interview Informants 91
Appendix 2: Interview Guide 92
Appendix 3: Thematic Coding Analysis Results 94
List of Abbreviations
CD Country Director CEO Chief Executive Officer DRC Danish Refugee Council
EC European Commission
FER Forward Emergency Room FTS Financial Tracking Service
GHA Global Humanitarian Assistance Report INGO International Non-Governmental Organization KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LBP Lebanese Pound LRC Lebanese Red Cross
MERATH Middle East revive and Thrive MSF Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PM Project Manager
PPE Personal Protective Equipment RLO Refugee-Led Organization UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East
USD United States Dollar
WASH Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WHO World Health Organization WHS World Humanitarian Summit
Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 The research problem
On 19 December 1991, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) published Resolution 46/182 to “strengthen the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations” (UNGA 1991, p. 1). This resolution emphasized, among other things, “the use of all locally or regionally available relief capacities” (p. 9). In the three decades since, numerous other international agreements—such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, and the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008—have further emphasized the importance of strengthening and relying on local capacities (OECD, 2021). Today, humanitarians refer to this as the “localization agenda”.
This agenda was a key topic at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS)—a conference held in 2016 with states and global leaders in the humanitarian sector. One of the conference’s key commitments was to “invest in humanity”, which included “invest[ing]
in local capacities” (Agenda for Humanity, 2016). The Grand Bargain—a series of recommendations from humanitarian donors and actors developed during the WHS—
emphasized the need for “strengthening local capacity” and recognizing “the comparative advantages of local, national and international implementing organisations for delivery of services” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2016, p. vi). At the same time, a group of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) published the Charter for Change—eight commitments, including directing at least “25% of humanitarian funding to National NGOs” (Charter4Change, 2019).
Despite clear commitments by states, donors, and humanitarian actors to strengthen local capacities and direct a greater level of humanitarian funding to national and local humanitarian actors, significant gaps remain. The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2020 (GHA) highlights that of the US$29.6 billion in international humanitarian assistance distributed in 2019, only 2.1% was directed to local and national actors (Development Initiatives 2020, p. 11). Yet, the GHA writers suggest that the COVID-19
pandemic may provide an opportunity to address the inconsistencies between humanitarian policy and practice:
“The response to the Covid-19 pandemic also highlights ongoing efforts to reform the delivery of humanitarian assistance. There is evidence of significant changes in how humanitarian financing is being delivered, perhaps most notably the greater flexibility of funding. We wait to see if these positive changes will become routine practice and whether progress can be accelerated in other areas of reform, particularly the empowerment and increased funding of local and national actors”
(p. 7).
The humanitarian impact of COVID-19 is clear: in one year, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has increased by 40%—from 167.6 million to 235 million (UNOCHA, 2019). Nonetheless, does this pandemic offer humanitarians an opportunity to rethink and improve humanitarian practice? Far from the “wait and see” approach described in the GHA, this thesis examines the impact of COVID-19 on humanitarian practice in order to better understand whether fundamental changes have occurred.
1.2 Aims and research objective
Specifically, this thesis uses the case of the 4 August 2020 Beirut Port Explosion as a means to analyze the impact of COVID-19 on the practice of localization. The Beirut Port Explosion was chosen as a valid case to study the topic of localization for two reasons.
First, local actors played a significant and observable role in the humanitarian response.
Second, COVID-19 has created discontinuity in the practice of humanitarian action, and the Beirut Port Explosion provides a clear example of an emergency response during the pandemic. The objective of my research, therefore, is to:
1. understand the context of the Beirut Port Explosion and the resulting humanitarian response;
2. draw conclusions on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on relationships between local and international humanitarian actors responding to the Beirut Port Explosion; and
3. make concrete recommendations on strengthening the practice of localization in Beirut, and elsewhere.
1.3 Research question and assumptions The following research question directs this study:
● What effect has COVID-19 had on observed inequalities between local and international humanitarian actors responding to the Beirut Port Explosion that occurred on 4 August 2020?
Several initial comments about the research question should be made at the outset. First, key concepts including inequality, local, localization, and international are defined in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2. Second, the research question presupposes that there are observable inequalities between local and international humanitarian actors responding to the Beirut Port Explosion. A theoretical basis for this presupposition is provided in Chapter 2, and its empirical reality is determined in Chapters 3-5. The primary interest of this study is how these inequalities shape the practice of humanitarian action in Beirut.
In order to establish a context for this research, empirical data collection is guided by three sub-questions:
1. What actors were present, and how were they responding to humanitarian emergencies in Beirut and Lebanon before the COVID-19 pandemic began?
2. How did humanitarian actors in Beirut respond and adapt to the COVID-19 pandemic from March 2020 onwards?
3. How did the explosion unfold in Beirut, and how did humanitarian organizations respond to the explosion?
1.4 Previous academic research
Considerable research has already been done on the topic of localization and the existence of inequalities between local and international humanitarian actors. However, there are
limited studies on the topic of localization in Beirut or Lebanon. Further, as the COVID- 19 pandemic continues to unfold, no studies were found that specifically discuss the impact of COVID-19 on the relationships between local and international humanitarian actors in Beirut. It is therefore necessary to explore the nature and presence of inequalities as observed in the case of the Beirut Port Explosion. This thesis uses research from other contexts to triangulate and build on the empirical findings of this case. Three areas of previous research are particularly relevant: local-international inequality, remote management, and humanitarian action in Beirut and Lebanon.
In a study of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) staff in Russia (Shevchenko & Fox, 2008), and of aid workers in Angola (Peters, 2016), the nature of inequalities between local and international aid workers are highlighted. Similarly, in an analysis of MSF programming in Iraq, Fassin (2007) highlights inequalities between local and international aid workers.
Elkahlout and Elgibali’s (2020) article on localization and remote management of humanitarian programming in Syria observed inequalities through the differences in pay between local and international staff. Likewise, a study in Kampala argued that Refugee- Led Organisations (RLOs) face systematic exclusion from the humanitarian sector in Kenya, focusing particularly on barriers to humanitarian funding (Pincock, Betts &
Easton-Calabria, 2020). A follow-up study during the COVID-19 pandemic on many of these same RLOs found that in the absence of international humanitarian actors, RLOs are stepping up to provide key public health support, creating opportunities for local actors to receive greater levels of funding (Betts, Easton-Calabria & Pincock, 2021).
In a study on the professionalization of the aid sector, Roth (2012) similarly argues that international and predominantly Western aid workers have greater access to the production of professional knowledge than their local counterparts have, and are unequally benefiting from the humanitarian sector’s trend towards professionalization.
Sundberg (2019) observed these inequalities through the differential treatment of international and national technical desk officers working for aid agencies in Dar es Salaam. In an article analyzing localization, Roepstorff (2020, p. 287) argues: “the
localisation agenda hopes to redress these [local-international] power imbalances by empowering local humanitarian actors and the affected population” (Ibid.).
Crewe and Fernando (2006) write about the structural racism present in the development sector, arguing that there is a profound inequality between predominantly white aid workers from Europe and North America, and their non-white counterparts from Asia, Africa, and South America. Similarly, Hilhorst and Jansen (2010, p. 1117) analyze the production of what they call “humanitarian space” through the cases of humanitarian responses in Kakuma refugee camp, and to the 2004 Indonesian Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka, arguing that these spaces are “shaped by social negotiations over inclusion and exclusion” (p. 1133), and often observed cases where “international actors developed a tendency to brush local actors aside” (p. 1130). A more substantial review of academic literature on localization and local-international inequalities is discussed in Chapter 2.
Though there is limited published academic literature on the impact of COVID-19 on humanitarian action, operating in conflict zones has created similar challenges of access, and literature on remote management in humanitarian programming offers valuable insight. For example, in a study based on research with security managers and senior NGO staff based in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria, Kalkman (2018, p. 7) identifies the ways in which humanitarian technologies such as remote management, used for security purposes, are contributing to a “shift [in] political power to local staff”.
In a review of best practices for remote health and nutrition programming, Chaudhri et al. (2019), find that there are clear benefits of handing control to local staff when access by international staff is impossible and remote management is necessary.
Academic literature on the context of humanitarian action in Beirut and Lebanon is also available, though limited research is available on relationships between local and international actors. Professors from the American University of Beirut offer a critical perspective on sectarian politics and corruption that exists in Lebanon, emphasizing the importance of including local perspectives in humanitarian practice (Geha, Kanaan &
Saliba, 2020; Khaddit Beirut, 2021), and other research describes the aid sector in Beirut and Lebanon from the 1975-1990 Civil War to present (Carpi, 2014; Samad & Moschini,
2016; Abouzeid et al., 2020; Sivaraman & Varadharajan, 2021). Due to their recency, there is limited academic literature on the port explosion and the impact of the pandemic on humanitarian action in Beirut.
1.5 Relevance to the field of humanitarian action
The primacy of debate on localization in humanitarian theory and practice is illustrative of this study’s relevance. Moreover, the particular timing of this study is important because it seeks to analyze two key moments of discontinuity. First, the port explosion offers an opportunity to learn more about international-local humanitarian relations during a humanitarian response in Beirut, an understudied context. As humanitarian needs in Beirut will likely remain high for years to come, the findings of this study are highly applicable (UNOCHA, 2020a). Second, the Beirut Port Explosion offers a unique case study as it is one of the few large-scale coordinated international humanitarian responses that has occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 has forced humanitarians to adapt their work significantly and this research provides an opportunity to analyze how these adaptations may have affected relationships between local and international humanitarian actors.
The importance of equality between all actors in the humanitarian sector is reflected in the four humanitarian principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Gordon & Donini, 2015). It is, therefore, deeply concerning that humanitarian actors who commit to uphold these ideals have been found to be guilty of perpetuating inequalities within their own organizations, and between other similarly principled organizations. For these reasons, an analysis of observed inequality present in humanitarian responses to the Beirut Port Explosion has profound relevance to humanitarian theory and practice.
1.6 Methodology
1.6.1 Case study research
To delimit this study, I use the case study research method and focus on the single case of the Beirut Port Explosion. Harrison et al. (2017, p. 11) suggest that the central tenets of case study research are “the detailed inquiry of a unit of analysis as a bounded system (the case), over time, within its context.” They also suggest that case study research is
“suitable for a comprehensive, holistic, and in-depth investigation of a complex issue [...]
in context, where the boundary between the context and issue is unclear and contains many variables” (p. 9).
Creswell et al. (2007, p. 245) highlight that case study research commonly includes
“multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports) and reports a case description and case-based themes”. It is clear that the case study method—that supports a rigorous, mixed-method study of a complex environment—is helpful for research on the Beirut Port Explosion. The following section describes the two-stage approach to data collection used in this study.
1.6.2 Data collection Secondary source data
Secondary source research provides a rich qualitative and quantitative description of the case of the Beirut Port Explosion over time, and within the broader context of both Beirut and Lebanon. This literature review is based on data from five categories:
● Academic literature: Using the Uppsala University Library database, I searched for peer-reviewed articles relevant to humanitarian action and the COVID-19 pandemic in Beirut and Lebanon, and the Beirut Port Explosion.
● Newspapers: I conducted a review of relevant articles published by three reputable Lebanese news agencies: The Daily Star, Al-Akhbar, and An-Nahar (Doyle,
2012). Al Jazeera, The New York Times, the Guardian, and Reuters provided international perspectives to this research.
● United Nations (UN) Situation Reports: I reviewed all sixteen Beirut Port Explosion Situation Reports published by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) between 5 August 2020 and 20 January 2021 for details about the humanitarian response.
● Humanitarian publications: The publications of three humanitarian actors operating in Beirut provided insight on responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Beirut Port Explosion.
● UN Financial Tracking Services (FTS): To develop a quantitative data set related to funding for humanitarian programming in Beirut and Lebanon, I reviewed all financial data recorded on the FTS since 2011.
Primary source data
Semi-structured in-depth video interviews with staff of international and local humanitarian organizations responding to the Beirut Port Explosion were used to triangulate and elaborate on secondary source data. According to Robson and McCartan (2016, p. 281), snowball sampling “is a useful approach when there is difficulty in identifying members of the population.” Since I was unable to travel to Beirut and conduct in-person research, it was difficult to identify a detailed list of informants. Therefore, as per the suggestions of Robson and McCartan, snowball sampling was selected as an appropriate technique.
To identify initial informants, I used professional connections from my work with a Canadian humanitarian organization responding to the Beirut Port Explosion. Initial informants then recommended other individuals to participate in interviews. In total, I conducted five in-depth interviews with a balanced sample of Lebanese and non- Lebanese informants from local and international NGOs. The guide for these semi- structured interviews, found in Appendix 2, was developed after the secondary source literature review was completed in order to ensure that the interviews elaborated on data
already collected. A pilot interview was conducted with a colleague involved in similar humanitarian settings in order to test and adjust the interview guide.
1.6.3 Data analysis
A mixed-method approach was used to analyze the primary and secondary source data, with greater emphasis placed on qualitative analysis, as the majority of data collected for this thesis was qualitative. This analysis took place in two main stages. First, secondary source research was analyzed for relevance to this thesis’ three sub-questions. Financial data on humanitarian funding flows to Beirut and Lebanon provided a helpful quantitative element to the analysis.
The second stage of analysis was carried out using thematic coding analysis on transcripts from the interviews conducted. I followed the process of thematic coding analysis described by Robson and McCartan (2016), including grouping data into “codes” built around meaningful categories, identifying patterns in these codes and grouping them together in “themes” (p. 471), and analyzing the findings “to try and understand what the data is telling you” (p. 476). Interviews were transcribed using Otter.ai and thematic coding analysis was conducted using NVivo.
1.7 Limitations
This thesis’ research and analysis has several limitations. First, the focus of this case study is the relationship between humanitarian actors in Beirut, and a detailed description of this case should be derived from Beirut-specific data. However, due to gaps in available data, some findings are only provided at the national level. Nonetheless, a description of events shaping the broader social, political, economic, public health, and humanitarian contexts in Lebanon are highly relevant as these events may influence the relationships between local and international humanitarian actors in Beirut.
Second, due to travel restrictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, primary data collection was conducted remotely. By carrying out remote data collection, some tools, such as direct participant observation, could not be used. To mitigate the negative effects
of remote data collection, I conducted video interviews. Though in-person interviews may provide different perspectives, video interviews still offer a meaningful medium for gathering detailed verbal and non-verbal findings. Furthermore, informants may have been more comfortable to share openly and honestly during remote interviews than if interviews had been conducted in person.
The snowball sampling method provides a further limitation. This method is effective in identifying respondents in unfamiliar contexts, and due to the scale and scope of this research, it was one of the few sampling strategies available. However, it is important to note that it can create a bias, as its reach is partly dependent on the first few contacts that the interviewer knows. Snowball sampling is also non-representative, limiting the generalizability of findings. To mitigate these effects, I ensured that the sample included a balance of local and international NGO representatives. Further, I triangulated interview findings with secondary source research and academic literature from other contexts to strengthen the validity and reliability of conclusions.
1.8 Ethical considerations
Prior to each interview, informants provided verbal informed consent, which included an understanding that participation was voluntary, that they may choose to skip questions, that their identity would remain anonymous, that they would receive the transcript of the interview afterwards to provide clarifications as desired, that they were able to withdraw their consent at any time, and that interviews would be recorded.
A second consideration is related to the “ethical principles of transparency and accountability” (Robson and McCartan 2016, p. 90). I have aimed to detail the data collection and analytical process in this chapter extensively, so that it is replicable. In line with principles of transparency and accountability, Harrison et al. (2017, p. 6) suggest that case study research can be limited by the researcher’s own bias, emphasizing the need to adopt “a reflexive stance”. Therefore, I acknowledge that my own bias—as an international humanitarian worker, educated in North America and Europe, and with no personal or professional experience in Lebanon—has the potential to limit my findings. I
have endeavoured to derive my research from the empirical findings, and I call the reader to embrace reflexivity by considering the findings of this research and identifying for themselves its validity and applicability.
1.9 Thesis outline
The first chapter of this thesis has introduced the research problem, the aims of the research, the research question, relevant previous academic research, the relevance of this topic to the field of humanitarian action, and described in detail the data collection and analysis methodology. This chapter also described methodological limitations, and ethical considerations that have been made. Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the theoretical framework of this thesis, namely the concepts of “the local”, localization, inequality, and remote management. Chapter 3 presents the social, economic, and political context in Lebanon, and describes humanitarian action in Beirut and Lebanon historically, during the COVID-19 pandemic, and in response to the Beirut Port Explosion. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the interviews with staff of international and local humanitarian organizations present in Beirut. Chapter 5 includes a critical and comparative analysis of the empirical findings in light of this thesis’ theoretical framework. Chapter 6 summarizes the key findings of the research and provides recommendations relevant to humanitarian theory and practice in Beirut, Lebanon, and elsewhere.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
2.1 Problematizing the local-international distinction
In the field of humanitarian action, the terms “local” and “international” are typically used to distinguish geographic categories. This is seen in the UNOCHA definition of non- governmental organizations (NGOs) in the FTS. INGOs are those “not based in an aid recipient country”, whereas national NGOs are those “operating in the aid recipient country in which they are headquartered”, and local NGOs are those “operating in one specific, geographically defined subnational area of an aid recipient country” (UNOCHA, 2021).
In her analysis of aid workers in Angola, Peters (2016, p. 498) suggests that the local- international distinction has been made along geographic lines:
“The central social distinction within professional development work [...] is whether a staff member is classified as being ‘from here’ (or of here) or ‘not from here’ (not of here) in relation to the work, which is imagined to exist nonspecifically within the developing country rather than in a particular site or community within that country.”
Peters goes on to suggest that the idea of the local is “personified in the local staff member and in opposition to ‘the international’ as personified in the expatriate worker” (p. 499).
However, academics problematize the ways in which this binary categorization homogenizes and erases differences within groups. For example, in an analysis of the localization agenda in humanitarian action, Roepstorff (2020, p. 289) argues that “in the various international aid intervention contexts, a wide range of actors is subsumed under the notion of the local, including national and local NGOs, local and national government representatives or local staff of foreign NGOs and agencies.” In a report exploring locally- led responses to humanitarian crises, Wall and Hedlund (2016, p. 15) voice similar concerns, emphasizing that “to an international organisation, a national government is seen as ‘local’, but to someone living in a remote part of the country in question, the
national authorities may be distant and unfamiliar.” Roepstorff (2020, p. 290) identifies the importance of properly defining the local, writing: “depending on the definition of the local, certain actors can end up being excluded from the localisation reform agenda.”
The local-international distinction also affects the humanitarian and development sectors in a less obvious way. Peters (2016) argues that the construction of the local as the binary opposite of the international is necessary in the aid sector because it is the ruler upon which progress—from the traditional and local, to the sophisticated and international—is measured. From this perspective, the international is seen as preferential to the local.
Roepstorff (2020, p. 291) asserts that:
“Certain attributes are ascribed on the basis of an underlying ontological distinction that juxtaposes the Global North as the international, universal, modern and technocratic and the Global South as the local, particular, traditional and parochial. With this comes a tendency to either romanticise or vilify the local.”
Roepstorff further argues that this binary categorization “risks reproducing (colonial) thought patterns and results in blind spots in the analysis of exclusionary practices of humanitarian action” (p. 285). Peters draws out a similar postcolonial critique, suggesting that national staff have come to occupy a position similar to the anthropological trope of the “savage” (2016, p. 497). She further writes that this local-international distinction “is neither an empirical reflection of the spatial, demographic facts of its workforce nor an instrumental reflection of the pragmatic demands of its work; instead, it is an imposition of the development industry’s relational worldview onto its own institutional structures”
(p. 498).
If, then, the empirical foundation of the local-international distinction is in question—and such a distinction even recreates colonial thought patterns through the construction of local humanitarian actors as uncivilized, traditional, and savage—how should these terms be defined? The concept of critical localism provides a helpful guide.
Critical localism is a theoretical approach that questions and problematizes the construction of “the local” as a static category. It aims to understand “the local” through
the experiences and perspectives of those who are “local”. In an article tracing the role of localism within the peacebuilding sector, Mac Ginty (2015, p. 850) argues that critical localism makes it possible to “see the local in its own right—not always from the vantage point of the global North, which tends to see the local as remote and ‘over there’.” This approach sees the local as “a site of construction and reconstruction” (Ibid.), and as “a sphere of activity” that is “made, remade and negotiated through the everyday actions of inhabitants, as well as those of exogenous and institutional actors” (p. 851).
Lambek (2011, p. 197) adopts a similar theoretical approach as he seeks to “conceptualize the local neither in exclusive relation to the global nor as a specifically spatial phenomenon but in terms of ethical life, as a conjunction of activities and their consequences.” He suggests that the local should be defined “with reference to [...] our labour, our practice, our mutual acts” (p. 200). He goes on to suggest that “activities and concerns can be considered ‘local’ precisely insofar as they are understood as internal rather than external to the practices that engage people, even when such practices entail the ostensibly global” (p. 216). By understanding the idea of the local as fluid and defined by the actions of a particular entity, Lambek writes that, “the dyad global-local becomes nonsensical as a nested or spatialized opposition” (p. 197). Instead of conceptualizing the local as “the stillness of land”—that is, the borders and boundaries that divide states, communities, and organizations—critical localism perceives the local as the product of
“the liveliness of human activity” (p. 206). In other words, critical localism provides a theoretical framework by which we can view the “local” not as the binary opposite of the
“international”—nor as the product of state borders—but as the dynamic product of a particular entity, in a particular time.
This is very similar to the “de-internationalising” of humanitarian action proposed in a report published by Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, a French think-tank (Obrecht 2014, p. 1). This report proposes that:
“Defining humanitarian space around ‘them’ instead of the international system and its defining principles reflects a different sense of borders, in which humanitarian action is not colonised in distinct locations around the globe by
international visitors but instead is manifested from the ground up by local actors in response to vulnerability” (p. 9).
By adopting a critical localism, which conceptualizes the local as fluid and dynamic, localized humanitarian action is seen as something particular to a specific time and place.
To borrow the words of Lambek, the “local” in humanitarian action may be seen as that which is “internal rather than external to the practices that engage people” (2011, p. 216).
Said another way, it is possible to understand the “local” in humanitarian action not merely as individuals or organizations from a certain geographic location, but as the collective actions that engage and include all relevant stakeholders without establishing exclusionary practices that distribute power unequally.
2.2 “Localization” as a contested term
If we understand “local” to be a dynamic and fluid category—and if our understanding of the local affects who is included and excluded from humanitarian practice (Roepstorff, 2020)—we must revisit our understanding of localization. In the first chapter, I provided an overview of key events and actions that have shaped the localization agenda. Broadly understood, academics have highlighted multiple benefits of localization, including improved aid effectiveness, increased knowledge of the local context, and a reduction in local-international power imbalances (Elkahlout & Elgibali, 2020; Roepstorff, 2020;
Betts, Easton-Calabria & Pincock, 2021).
However, Pincock, Betts and Easton-Calabria (2020, p. 14) assert that “localisation is a contested concept with no agreed upon policy definition, even in the humanitarian context.” In a policy paper published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) after the WHS, localization is defined as the:
“process of recognising, respecting and strengthening the leadership by local authorities and the capacity of local civil society in humanitarian action, in order to better address the needs of affected populations and to prepare national actors for future humanitarian responses” (Fabre 2017, p. 1).
In their literature review on localization in humanitarian action, Wall and Hedlund define localization:
“As the wider, generic term referring to any process that is seeking to involve local actors (governments, NGOs, and communities) in the design and implementation and coordination of humanitarian responses. Rather the term
‘locally-led’ refers more specifically to responses that are conceived or shaped by the affected populations themselves that may be supported or strengthened by outside assistance” (2016, p. 8).
There are some differences between these definitions, but most noticeable is that Wall and Hedlund’s definition of “locally-led” more closely aligns with Fabre’s definition of localization.
I build upon this literature, defining localization as a process that seeks to return agency and control to affected populations, such that humanitarian programs are conceived and—
to borrow the language of Lambek—“understood as internal rather than external to the practices that engage people, even when such practices entail the ostensibly global”
(2011, p. 216). In other words, a truly localized humanitarian agenda is not determined by the citizenship of staff, or location of a head office, but by the activities and practices that improve aid effectiveness, increase knowledge of the local context, and break down power imbalances between humanitarian donors, providers, and recipients. In its truest sense, it ought to be led by those from affected communities, and “supported or strengthened by outside assistance” (Wall & Hedlund 2016, p. 8).
By understanding that the localization agenda has the power to include and exclude, it is possible to create a new definition that understands the particularities of time and place.
If this is done properly, it might then be possible to address some of the ethical dilemmas faced by localization, including the transfer of risk when operating in conflict zones—or in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic—and the perception that local actors cannot maintain neutrality and impartiality (Elkahlout & Elgibali, 2020; Roepstorff, 2020). In this sense, localization is conceived as an idealized form of humanitarian practice, and
the persistence of inequalities between local and international actors is demonstrative of its failure.
A study by Betts, Easton-Calabria and Pincock on the impact of COVID-19 on RLOs in Kenya shows that the pandemic has created an opportunity for RLOs to step “into the vacuum left by inadequate national and international assistance” (2012, p. 13). In other words, some academics are beginning to suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic may be contributing to the strengthening of localization in humanitarian practice.
2.3 A theoretical approach to local-international inequalities
In a study of MSF’s actions following the United States’ invasion of Baghdad in 2003, Fassin argues that humanitarian action is not merely a practice of good intentions, but is a politics of life that both empowers and disempowers aid workers and the recipients of aid. He presents a clear case that humanitarianism systematically perpetuates inequality.
First, he argues that MSF’s decision to evacuate its staff from Baghdad due to concerns for their safety demonstrated a “dialectic between lives to be saved and lives to be risked”
(Fassin 2007, p. 500). MSF was unwilling to risk its own staff, while at the same time abandoning the Iraqi people. Second, Fassin describes the clear distinction that MSF makes within its own staff, between “expatriates who come almost exclusively from Western countries are volunteers of the organization”, and “nationals [...] who are considered as mere paid employees” (p. 515). He argues that the distinction between the two involves differences in “salary”, “rights”, and “social and political protection” (p.
515).
Fassin is critical of the inequalities that humanitarian action constructs, suggesting that:
“hierarchies of humanity are passively established but rarely identified for what they are—politics of life that at moments of crisis, result in the formation of two groups, those whose status protects their sacred character and those whom the institutions may sacrifice against their will” (p. 516).
Fassin problematizes the ways in which a “complex ontology of inequality unfolds that differentiates in a hierarchical manner the value of human lives” (p. 519). He even argues that such inequalities are “constitutive of the humanitarian project and effectively insurmountable within the value systems of Western societies” (Ibid.). Fassin offers an important critique of humanitarian action and makes a clear case for the importance of addressing the “hierarchies of humanity” that are perpetuated by the current humanitarian politics of life (p. 516).
In a study on the relationships between expatriate and national MSF staff in Russia, Shevchenko and Fox (2008, p. 120) provides a similar critique, arguing that inequalities between these two staff groups are “intrinsic to the structure and conditions of international humanitarian action.” This study identifies various examples of inequalities present in the international-local relationship, including the undervaluing of local staff knowledge, the exclusion of local staff from management meetings, and wage disparities between local and international staff.
In an article critiquing structural racism in the development sector, Crewe and Fernando (2006, p. 46) similarly emphasize the ways in which the “abilities, knowledge and skills”
of aid workers from the “south” are questioned by those from the “north”. They also describe how the flow of aid funding from donor countries in the global “north” to recipient countries in the “south” also places decision-making control in the hands of international actors (Ibid.).
Peters (2016, p. 499) describes inequalities present between international and local staff as “hierarchical and unequal forms of belonging.” In her study of aid workers in Angola, she observes how international actors receive higher salaries, are eligible for employee benefits, and are evacuated during emergencies. These findings are similar to those of Sundberg (2019, p. 259) who, in a study of aid workers in Dar es Salaam, observes “the inferiorization of national staff’s professional authority.” Despite having many of the same qualifications and educational backgrounds, Tanzanian staff were denied recognition and the same levels of authority and decision-making power as their international counterparts (Ibid.).
A study of RLOs in Kampala concluded that these organizations often have less access to funding streams, are not formally recognized by UN agencies and INGOs, and are even perceived as competitors by international actors (Pincock, Betts & Easton-Calabria, 2020). This study describes how RLOs receive “no institutional support for activities, let alone capacity building” (p. 11), and are excluded “from hierarchical structures of humanitarian governance” (p. 13). Finally, a study about the perspectives of aid workers regarding the presence of inequality between national and international staff highlights the ways in which the aid sector has constructed “a discourse privileging Western forms of knowledge” (Roth 2012, p. 1462) The knowledge of local actors is seen as “particular and traditional”, whereas that of international actors is “universal” (Ibid.).
Three categories of local-international inequalities emerge from this literature review:
access, recognition, and control. Access refers to discrepancies regarding the ability to reach project sites, attend and participate in coordination meetings, and receive humanitarian funding. At the organizational level, recognition is given by UN agencies, international actors and donors, and coordination forums. At the individual level, it refers to acknowledging—and at times prioritizing—the knowledge and expertise of local staff.
Individual recognition also encompasses providing fair wages, capacity building, and professional development opportunities to local staff. Control describes the extent to which local actors are given decision-making power over the design and implementation of humanitarian programs.
2.4 Remote management in humanitarian practice
In a podcast published by The New Humanitarian, Danny Sriskandarajah, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Oxfam Great Britain, suggested that COVID-19 has created
“impediments to travel leading to a fundamental rethink to how NGOs and the entire aid sector works” (Konyndyk & Aly, 2020). In the midst of this global “rethink”, Sriskandarajah said that local actors are “better placed than ever before because of the mobility constraints” that international actors face. One of the main mechanisms used by humanitarian actors to address this “rethink” is remote management. My goal in this section is to discuss the practice of remote management in humanitarian action,
emphasizing the ways that it influences relationships between international and local actors.
In 2020, the Red Cross responded to Tropical Cyclone Harold, which devastated the islands of Vanuatu and Fiji. A report published by the Australian Red Cross states that these responses “provided a rare example of locally-led humanitarian response to a natural disaster where in-country international response was largely absent” (Australian Red Cross 2020, p. 4). The report highlights that international Red Cross movements provided remote support through “technical advice, logistics support and funding” (p. 6).
Remote communication strengthened partnership and transformed the way international and national staff collaborated, creating more open and informal channels. However, the report also describes how “the inability to deploy surge personnel to the country had an impact on the timeliness of the response”, and that “despite overall strategic leadership from the National Societies, international partners retained a high level of control over finance and logistics” (p. 6). A survey in another report published by the Australian Red Cross on the impacts of COVID-19 on programming in the pacific highlighted that “70%
of actors identified an increase in remote support in the context of COVID-19”
(Australian Red Cross, Humanitarian Advisory Group & Institute for Human Security and Social Change 2020, p. 7). Despite the increased presence of remote support, this report describes how, “in some cases remote working has exacerbated pre-existing disparities in systems and structures” (Ibid.).
However, remote management is not a new practice in humanitarian action, as it has been widely used in conflict settings. Literature from these areas provides a helpful understanding of how remote management may be used in the context of COVID-19.
Donini and Maxwell (2013, p. 384) write: “remote management implies the withdrawal of senior international or national humanitarian managers from the location of the provision of assistance or other humanitarian action as an adaptation to insecurity or denied access”. Kalkman (2018, p. 3) similarly defines remote management as:
“a mode of operation in which (inter)national staff, either after relocation, after evacuation, or by design, manages a project from a distant location because of
high or increasing security risks, while local staff members or local partners implement the project on the ground.”
Various benefits of remote management are described, including increased “acceptance by local communities” (Elkahlout & Elgibali 2020, p. 238), and the leveraging of local actors’ “greater knowledge of local context” (Chaudhri et al. 2019, p. 2) in order to provide humanitarian assistance “at a reduced level of risk than that faced by international staff” (Ibid.).
Donini and Maxwell (2013, p. 388) suggest that remote management became a more regular practice in humanitarian settings in the late 2000s, “as access within both Somalia and Afghanistan became extremely limited”. In the years since, remote management has become an increasingly common practice. They describe how:
“Remote management is now commonly associated with the decade-long retreat of international aid workers—especially those operating in contested or fragile states—into fortified aid compounds. Such bunkerisation is a visible means of reducing exposure to an aid environment that is now judged uncertain and prone to surprise, if not hostile” (p. 411).
They are critical of the bunkerisation of aid, and argue: “the normalisation of remote management and other distance technologies, rather than their use as a last resort, carries potentially huge risks for the very nature of the humanitarian endeavour” (Ibid.). Not only is the process of bunkerisation illustrative of Fassin’s (2007) distinction between lives to be saved and lives to be risked, but it has a tendency to transfer risk to local humanitarian actors.
In a study based on research with security managers and senior NGO staff based in active conflict zones, Kalkman (2018, p. 3) argues that “the technology-facilitated international and national staff removal from the field has been criticized by scholars for resulting in a risk transfer to local staff members.” Chaudhri et al (2019, p. 14) suggest that risk transfer is often justified because local actors “are assumed to be at lower risk for targeting and therefore safer when implementing”. However, they assert that “this is often a false
assumption as they face unique threats that are often not acknowledged in security assessments and may accept a greater degree of risk than is deemed appropriate” (Ibid.).
Donini and Maxwell (2013, p. 385) suggest that the transfer of risk onto local actors is especially concerning as these actors may “have fewer security resources, less training and scant alternatives for other gainful employment”.
In contrast to this argument, Kalkman (2018, p. 9) finds that:
“The idea of shifting risks appears too simplistic as the same technologies that enabled senior staff to withdraw from the field may also reduce risks to local aid workers […] Relatively speaking, local staff face a higher exposure than those that are not bunkerized, but in absolute terms, local staff may still be better off after the implementation of humanitarian technologies in security management”.
In other words, it might not be that local staff face an increase in risk due to the use of remote management, but that in contrast to those staff who are remote, they become more vulnerable. Though technologies of distance offer an opportunity to increase the timeliness, effectiveness, and relevance of aid, the transfer of risk and the further entrenching of inequalities between international and local actors must be given further consideration.
Chapter 3: Secondary Source Empirical Findings
3.1 Social, political, and economic context of Beirut and Lebanon
While the Beirut Port Explosion is the main case, a general overview of the nation-wide context is important for two reasons. First, the Lebanese social, political, and economic context shapes the Beirut context. Second, more pragmatically, some of the data and research available does not disaggregate between the city of Beirut and the state of Lebanon.
An estimated 1.5 million Syrian and 500,000 Palestinian refugees live in Lebanon, a significant proportion of the nearly 7 million inhabitants (UNHCR, 2021; UNRWA, 2021; The World Bank, 2021). Beirut is Lebanon’s capital and largest city, with a population of 2.4 million (CIA, 2021). Though official numbers are unavailable, a large segment of the refugee population lives in Beirut, with many living in working class neighbourhoods near the port (Sukarieh, 2020; Ibrahim, 2020b; El Husseini, 2020).
According to the International Encyclopedia for Education, Lebanon has a strong education system and “highly qualified human resources” (Mneimneh 2010, p. 637).
Though the official language in the country is Arabic, French is routinely spoken, and
“English language popularity as the first foreign language and the second language after Arabic in schools has increased” (p. 641).
As the capital of a highly educated country that has received significant foreign investment, Beirut has become a socially and culturally diverse, transnational, and cosmopolitan city (Finckenstein, 2021; Burkhalter, 2014; Seidman, 2012; Levitt, 2020;
Geha, Kanaan & Saliba, 2020). In addition to being the core of Lebanon’s education and political systems, Beirut is also the location of many humanitarian organizations’ head offices. Informants interviewed for this thesis emphasized the ways in which the country’s education has strengthened the capacity of local and international humanitarian actors in Beirut (see Chapter 4).
Despite these strengths, a myriad of challenges have affected Beirut and Lebanon in recent decades. From 1975-1990, Civil War created enormous humanitarian needs (Kobeissi et al., 2008; Waage & Huse, 2020; Samad & Moschini, 2016). Finckenstein (2021, p. 2) argues that an estimated “$170 billion of capital inflows” to Lebanon from 1993 to 2012—aimed at post-war recovery and reconstruction—artificially propped up the economy. This became clear as the economy began to collapse following protests against government corruption in October 2019 (Ibid.). In the months since, an economic crisis has brought about severe devaluation of the Lebanese Pound (LBP), with multiple exchange rates now actively used. The official rate remains at 1,500 LBP per US dollar (USD), though the central bank allows the use of an unofficial rate of 3,900. A black market rate—that reached over 11,000 in April 2021—is also used. This devaluation is having significant impacts on the daily lives of those living in Beirut, including humanitarian organizations (Vohra, 2021).
Local and international humanitarian actors, many of whom are based in Beirut, have long assisted vulnerable families. In response to extensive humanitarian needs caused by the 1975-1990 Civil War, local civil society—including organizations, communities, and volunteers—were the first providers of assistance, and continued supporting those in need long after international actors had left (Kobeissi et al., 2008; Waage & Huse, 2020; Samad
& Moschini, 2016). Similarly, in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in July 2006, local actors were seen as “reconstructers of first resort” (Mac Ginty & Hamieh 2010, p. 39), even though they only received “a small portion of funding when compared with international humanitarian actors” (Samad & Moschini 2016, p. 11). The historic exclusion of local actors from donor funding, coordination mechanisms, and humanitarian leadership, was again prevalent during the Syrian refugee response when Syrian actors in Lebanon, who provided more than three quarters of the assistance in 2014, received “just 0.3 per cent of direct cash funding and only 9.3 per cent of indirect cash funding” (Mansour 2017, p. 2).
3.2 The COVID-19 pandemic in Beirut and Lebanon
Lebanon’s first COVID-19 case was recorded in Beirut on 21 February 2020 (Reuters, 2020b; WHO, 2021). On 15 March 2020, Lebanon declared a state of emergency and announced a two-week lockdown, and three further extensions to the lockdown were announced in the following weeks (Jamal, 2020; Yassine, 2020; Reuters, 2020b; BBC, 2020). Beginning on 18 May 2020, Lebanon began to slowly exit lockdown and “reopen its economy” (Reuters, 2020c). Figure 1 provides a visualization of the cumulative cases of COVID-19 in Lebanon using data from the World Health Organization (WHO).
Figure 1: Cumulative COVID-19 cases in Lebanon, 3 January 2020 - 26 February 2021 (WHO, 2021).
While there is no official data disaggregating COVID-19 cases in Lebanon by location, with over one-third of the country’s population, it is reasonable to expect that cases are significant in the city of Beirut. Hospitals in Beirut reaching capacity due to surging COVID-19 cases give credence to this argument (Sherlock, 2021). The following section provides insight into how COVID-19 has affected humanitarian actors in Beirut.
3.3 Humanitarian perspectives in Beirut
3.3.1 A local perspective: Middle East Revive and Thrive (MERATH)
MERATH is a local faith-based humanitarian organization located in Beirut that provides support through churches to vulnerable Syrian and Lebanese families in Beirut, and across the country (MERATH, 2021b). On 24 March 2020, as lockdowns were put in place across Lebanon, MERATH published an update on their website, stating that:
“When they [vulnerable families] need our support the most, isolation and lockdown measures seem to tighten by the day, forcing us to put many of our programs on hold and leaving many families at high risk in front of the coronavirus threat. We love our local partners and we don’t want them to take any risk, but we are very concerned that the coronavirus might prove disastrous for the most vulnerable in Lebanon” (MERATH, 2020a).
In order to make ongoing programming possible MERATH developed protocols to safely operate, equipped staff and volunteers with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), and distributed hygiene kits to families at risk of COVID-19 transmission (Ibid.). COVID-19 forced the temporary suspension of some programs, the adaptation of others, and the beginning of new activities specifically targeted at addressing the pandemic (MERATH, 2020c). In a quarterly update published on 2 July 2020, MERATH describes how they restarted educational programming through remote teaching, and with increased support from donors have increased the scale of emergency food assistance that they provide (MERATH, 2020b).
3.3.2 An international perspective: Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
The DRC is an INGO that has been present in Lebanon since 2004. With 155 staff in the country, they provide humanitarian assistance to Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, as well as “migrant domestic workers, and vulnerable Lebanese host communities”
(Danish Refugee Council, 2021). In 2020, their programming totaled US$3,216,815, a
notable increase from US$2,716,684 in 2019, and US$2,549,519 in 2018 (UNOCHA, 2021).
A report released by the DRC in July 2020 describes the “partial or full suspension and resumption of services” during the COVID-19 pandemic (Danish Refugee Council, ECHO & UNICEF 2020, p. 5). This same report highlights the increased reliance on
“remote work modality” (Ibid, p. 4). A guidance document published in June 2020 describes the challenges that government lockdowns placed on humanitarian referrals, and provides best practices on remote management (Danish Refugee Council et al. 2020, p. 1).
3.3.3 A United Nations perspective
According to the UN Financial Tracking Service, 70.8% of funding for the Lebanon Intersectoral COVID Response Plan 2020 was directed to UN agencies for a broad range of programming, totaling US$70,064,600 (UNOCHA, 2021). The WHO has published regular updates online about the spread of COVID-19 in Lebanon (see WHO, 2021), and an article published by the UN Resident Coordinator summarizes the COVID-19 responses of different UN agencies. These include: (1) health responses by WHO, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); (2) social media campaigns led by the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and WHO, and Lebanon’s Ministry of Information; (3) a report by UN Women on increasing rates of gender-based violence; (4) online education by UNICEF; and (5) the scaling up of existing cash assistance programs (Resident Coordinator’s Office Lebanon, 2021).
3.4 The Beirut Port Explosion: 4 August 2020
On the evening of 4 August 2020, just after 6:00pm local time, an enormous explosion in Beirut’s port created enormous devastation, including the deaths of over 200 people, 6,500 injuries, and the displacement of 300,000 more (UNOCHA 2020a; Geha, Kanaan
& Saliba, 2020). Figure 2 illustrates the extent of the damage caused by the explosion, and shows the location of Hangar 12, where the blast occurred. Damage was particularly
significant in the three neighbourhoods directly southeast of the explosion: Karantina, Gemmayzeh and Mar Mikhael (Al-Ghussain, 2020). The impact on already vulnerable communities, including refugees, and migrant workers, was significant.
Figure 2: Map of heavy, moderate, and minor damage caused by port explosion in Beirut (Hubbard et al., 2020).
Investigations identified that the cause of the explosion was ammonium nitrate stored in Hangar 12. Bags of ammonium nitrate had been left in the port for six years after a ship carrying 2,750 tons of the chemical was seized in 2014 and denied permission to leave the port (Sivaraman & Varadharajan, 2021; Hubbard et al., 2020). An article in The New York Times argues that a series of events between 2014 and 2020—involving major political parties, the military, the offices of the President and Prime Minister, the port authority, Lebanon’s security agency, the judicial system, and various other actors—
resulted in the explosion (Hubbard et al. 2020).
On 5 August 2020, the Lebanese government declared a state of emergency, and a lockdown was announced on 21 August in an effort to stop the spread of COVID-19, though aid workers were exempt from this lockdown (The Daily Star, 2020; Al-Akhbar, 2020, Reuters, 2020c).
Figure 3 highlights the rising COVID-19 cases over this period. A red circle on the graph marks the occurrence of the Beirut Port Explosion. While there is no official data on COVID-19 cases in Beirut, Lebanon’s case numbers clearly began to increase at an even more rapid rate following the explosion, with the head of the Lebanese parliament’s health committee suggesting that the port explosion “caused people to mix and hampered our efforts to contain the virus” (Azhari, 2020). Further, UNOCHA situation reports following the blast highlighted the impact that COVID-19 had on the operations of both local and international actors responding in Beirut (UNOCHA, 2020c; UNOCHA, 2020d).
Figure 3: Cumulative cases of COVID-19 in Lebanon, July-August 2020 (WHO, 2021).
3.5 Humanitarian responses to the Beirut Port Explosion 3.5.1 The state’s role in the port explosion response
On 6 August 2020, the European Commission (EC) “released 33 million euros to finance emergency aid for Lebanon” (Agence France Presse, 2020b), and a further 30 million euros was announced by the EC on 9 August (European Commission, 2020). As of 8 August, at least 32 other donor states had made commitments to provide assistance (Reuters, 2020a). On August 9, French President Emmanuel Macron and UNOCHA organized the International Conference on Assistance and Support to Beirut and the Lebanese People, which garnered over $300 million in pledges from donor states (Al Jazeera, 2020; Chadwick, 2020). Despite commitments during the Conference that aid would benefit those directly affected by the explosions, it was the Lebanese government, and not members of the civil society, who were invited to attend (Al-Akhbar, 2020).
The Lebanese military, under the name of the Forward Emergency Room (FER), provided coordination to the humanitarian response, but following the resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister on 10 August 2020, significant delays and gaps in humanitarian leadership and coordination resulted in civil society actors stepping in to fill the gaps (UNOCHA, 2020b; Agence France Presse, 2020a; El Khoury, 2021; Kaymakamian, 2020).
3.5.2 The civil society’s role in the port explosion response
According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon, Najat Rochdi, “the United Nations has been able to track the disbursement of $285 million dollars of the $300 pledged in August” (El Khoury, 2021). This amount includes “$161 million dollars sent to the United Nations, and a further $124 million in kind or directly to NGOs” (Ibid.).
UNOCHA’s first situation report after the blast describes how “volunteers have started to clean streets and remove debris from the explosions as part of a wider clean-up operation”
(UNOCHA, 2020b). Many Lebanese families opened up their homes to those who had become homeless (Ibrahim, 2020). An Al Jazeera report gives a description: “there is incredible solidarity between people coming together to help each other. Feeding each other, providing shelter, patching up this shattered city. Any real official help on the
ground has been notably absent” (Dekker, 2020). Even in the most severely affected neighbourhoods, such as Karantina, some reporting suggests that in the immediate aftermath it was local volunteers, and not official aid organizations, who were helping each other (Al-Ghussain, 2020). Rana Sukarieh, a Lebanese-Canadian PhD student, says she witnessed “thousands of volunteers” responding to the Beirut Port Explosion (Sukarieh, 2020).
While many have expressed criticism of the lack of response from humanitarian organizations, UNOCHA situation reports, documents published by other humanitarian actors, and newspaper articles describe a significant response by UN agencies, INGOs, and local NGOs.
A review of publications from the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC), MERATH, and DRC provides a helpful snapshot of post-explosion responses. In regular updates posted to their official Twitter account dated immediately after the blast, the LRC describes how ambulances and medical teams from across the country were mobilized to provide support to affected families in Beirut (LRC, 2021). According to an 18 December 2020 press release, the LRC also provided “300 USD per month, for a period of 7 months, to at least 10,000 of the most vulnerable affected families” (LRC, 2020). In response to the port explosion MERATH provided hot meals, distributed hygiene kits and cash vouchers, and repaired homes (MERATH, 2021a). A press release from the DRC on 24 August 2020 outlined their multi-sectoral response, which included the provision of psychosocial support, cash, hygiene supplies, assistance repairing and rebuilding homes, rehabilitating businesses, and more (DRC, 2020).
Several updates from UNOCHA situation reports are also relevant to this study. On 17 August 2020, the fifth report highlighted the worrying trend of rising COVID-19 cases, saying that “a general state of fatigue and anger is leading to a relaxation in, and de- prioritization of, the application of COVID-19-related preventive behavior” (UNOCHA 2020c, p. 6). The eighth report emphasized on 28 August that “the COVID-19 pandemic is preventing organizations from adhering to a full in-person capacity; as such, many services are offered remotely” (UNOCHA 2020d, p. 7).
3.6 Humanitarian funding for the Beirut Port Explosion
The UN FTS provides extensive data and insights on humanitarian funding, disaggregated by country, donor, and funding recipient. Funding recipients are categorized as government, inter-governmental, NGO, national or international Red Cross society, private organization or foundation, UN agency, financial institution, or other. The NGO category is further subdivided as international, affiliated, national, and local (UNOCHA, 2021). FTS data is only available at the country level. Though the focus of this case is Beirut, FTS data for Lebanon is highly relevant as the majority of humanitarian actors receiving assistance have head offices in Beirut. This data can also provide helpful insight as many of the actors responding to the explosion are also responding elsewhere in the country, and are represented in the aggregated financial data.
There are two specific elements of FTS data that are of interest for this research:
humanitarian funding flowing into Lebanon, and the recipients of this aid. I have pulled all relevant data for the years 2012-2020, and have further aggregated FTS data on aid recipients using five categories: national, international, UN, government, and financial institution. Included in the category “national” are all national and local NGOs, the national Red Cross society, and national private organizations or foundations. The
“international” category includes affiliated and international NGOs, international Red Cross societies, and international private organizations or foundations. While the government funding is subdivided in the FTS as national and local, I have included this as one category. The UN refers to all UN bodies receiving humanitarian funding, and financial institutions refer to Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) Development, a German development bank (KfW Entwicklungsbank, 2021). Table 1 summarizes the total funding over this period and Figures 4 and 5 provide a closer look at the recipients of this aid.
