Master’s Programme in Sustainable Management Class of 2020/2021
Master’s Thesis 15 ECTS
Desperate times call for responsible measures
Understanding responsibility through the stories of academic activists
Uppsala University Campus Gotland Giorgia Dalla Libera Marchiori
Juho Liimatainen
Supervisor: Matilda Dahl
Abstract
In recent years, activism movements have shaken public consciousness, waking us up to the fact that there is no time to waste in light of the Social and Environmental Crises humanity is facing.
Since the pivotal role of science and technology has in both creating and trying to solve those Crises, scientists’ political engagement has been the topic of an increasing number of publications.
A number of authors call for academics to engage in activism, reasoning it with the responsibility academics have towards society as professionals and human beings. However, what this responsibility itself means in the context of academic activism has been largely overlooked. We identified Hans Jonas’ ethics of responsibility as the most apt theory to analyze the phenomenon.
In fact, according to Jonas, science has unleashed the uncontrolled power of technology by only seeing the benefits of technological innovations, while forgetting to consider its costs. Therefore, ethical reflections should be brought back into science to move from a retroactive towards a future- oriented responsibility that focus of preserving the existence of future generations on Earth.
Through semi-structured interviews with academics who are engaged in academic activism, we investigate the concept of responsibility in relation to their engagement. Our findings indicate that academic activism is a manifestation of individual future-oriented responsibility, sparked by the fear for a doomed future. Unfortunately, the attempt by academic activists to bring ethical reflections into the wider institutional context is faced with resistance by the prevailing neoliberal system, which prevents academia from taking collective responsibility and re-establishing its social mandate.
Keywords: academic activism, responsibility, ethics of science, ethics of responsibility, neoliberalism
Acknowledgements
Throughout this journey, we have been holding on to each other. It would be a lie to say it was easy and we now love each other even more. We do, but at times it was though. Nevertheless, this thesis is a product of two minds working together, therefore we need to thank firstly, each other’s brains for supporting the other, in the reading, writing and all the personal moments of joy and discomfort.
Then, there are the other people. A lot of other people. We definitely do not want to forget all of you out there who in one way or another contributed to this piece of work. Starting from our participants who gave their time to share their personal stories with us. Thank you. We are also grateful for all the encouragements you gave us throughout the process.
Furthermore, we thank our brilliant supervisor, Matilda Dahl for her uncomfortable questions and on-point comments. She never left us sit on our asses but always encouraged us to do more. We also thank also our fellow classmates who took the time to read so many different versions of this work (such a patience!) and gave us important feedback to ensure our work was both coherent and interesting for you, the reader, to read.
Finally, we would like to thank all the other people in our lives that supported us during this journey. From our friends here on the island (you know who you are), the friends we have elsewhere (particularly Rachele), our families and our partners. The latest probably had to endure a big chuck of our complains. Thank you for your service.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ... 4
1.1 Political engagement versus objectivity... 5
1.2 Beyond advocacy – a stand against the status quo ... 6
1.3 It is about responsibility ... 8
2. Theoretical background ... 9
2.1 The concept of responsibility ... 9
2.1.1 Science’s responsibility ... 10
2.2 Hans Jonas’s Responsibility theory ... 12
2.2.1 The Role of Fear ... 12
2.2.2 Losing control: how scientific knowledge unleashes power ... 13
2.2.3 Power to control power – a very different approach to scientific knowledge... 16
2.3 Power in practice: academic activism ... 17
2.3.1 One or two steps further than advocacy ... 18
2.3.2 Dealing with neoliberal power... 20
2.4. Theoretical conclusion ... 23
3. Methodology ... 23
3.1 Research approach and philosophy ... 23
3.2 Data Generation ... 24
3.2.1 Planning our semi-structured interviews ... 24
3.2.2 Our participants ... 26
3.3 Data analysis ... 27
3.4 Data limitations ... 28
4. Empirical results ... 29
4.1 The inner crisis ... 30
4.2 Rewriting the (academic) job description ... 32
4.3 The struggles ... 37
5. Analysis and Discussion ... 40
5.1 What is behind action? ... 41
5.2 Responsibility in practice – applying the third-degree of power ... 42
5.3 Collective responsibility? Yes, but outside academia ... 44
5.4 Clash of powers... 46
6. Conclusion ... 47
1. Introduction
In recent years, concepts like environmental degradation, Climate Change, and sustainability have increasingly come into mainstream awareness, largely thanks to civil movements such as Fridays For Future (FFF) and Extinction Rebellion (XR). However, these notions are not new. Spikes of attention to environmental issues and the urges for change can be traced back decades, being triggered by publications such as Rachel Carlson’s Silent Spring (1962), the Club of Rome’s report The Limits To Growth (1972) and the Brundtland Commission’s report Our Common Future (1987). More recently, in 2019, similarly to previous environmental movements of the 1980s-90s, activists took over the streets around the world demanding change. Thousands of scientists endorsed these protests by writing, signing petitions and publishing letters in scientific journals and newspapers (Cologna et al., 2021). Some even decided to walk side by side with the activists during those protests, including one of us, Giorgia.
Back then I was a health researcher at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. During that time, I clearly remember my will of getting out of the ivory tower of academia and taking action. A feeling, however, that was not shared by all my colleagues, some of whom were saying that scientists could go to marches in their “personal” time, but should not go as representatives of the university, as academics. In fact, they further described that this is not their role as scientists, who instead must be neutral and objective. Reflecting upon those interactions:
The mantra of objectivity I must be objective
I must.
I am a scientist after all I am the human form of objectivity
Wrong It just feels wrong…
Indeed, the validity of science is generally connected with its value-free and apolitical connotation. Conducting unbiased research is considered fundamental in science in order to produce objective knowledge (Grey, 2013; Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2020; Green, 2020).
Therefore, political engagement, especially in the case of activism, is seen by some as jeopardizing
scientific work and its validity, because it requires taking a position and acting accordingly (Pickerill, Chatterton and Hodkinson, 2010; Flood, Martin and Dreher, 2013), and consequently, leaving this value-neutral space (Jones, 2020).
1.1 Political engagement versus objectivity
Let us not be confused by the term “political” here – the position one takes is not necessarily correlating to a specific political party, because taking a position on any public issue can be considered as a political act. For example, as Green (2020) notes, the root causes of wicked problems such as Climate Change are political in nature, due to which attempts to address them can be deemed political too. Along the same lines, Low and Merry (2010) reason that if action itself on such issues is considered political, then inactivity should be as well. So, pretending not to have an opinion on controversial issues can be seemed as taking a stance against rival discourses that insist addressing the problem at hand in some way (Peterson, 1994, as cited in Stricker, 2020).
Nevertheless, the positivist scientific tradition considers having an opinion and taking position, in this case through political engagement, as being against the neutrality and objectivity academics should have (Vecchione et al., 2015; Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2020).
Indeed, the loss of objectivity is a major concern for scientists. Studies have shown that scientists, even if they think it is important to politically engage when it comes to pressing issues such as Climate Change, believe that they would potentially lose their objectivity and credibility, if they were to do so (Cologna et al., 2021). Several scientists from this school of thought have argued it to be a mistake for academics, defined as the people “who teach and/or do research at a university or college” (Oxford University Press, 2021), to involve themselves in political actions, because that would mean developing biases and losing their ability to do research properly, in an objective manner (Low and Merry, 2010; George, 2012; Jones 2020). However, firstly, there is no evidence of the supposed credibility loss within the public when scientists are politically engaged on such imminent matters. On the contrary, people would actually prefer scientists to be more engaged in such issues (George, 2012; Cologna et al., 2021). Secondly, even academics, or at least some of them, have been increasingly questioning the concepts of neutrality, objectivity and being
value-free within science. Jones (2020), for instance, argues that science cannot be impartial because we, as scientists, constantly have biases.
Indeed, our believes and values influence us, they influence which topics we would like to research and how we research them. For instance, we, the authors1, decided on the topic of academic activism because we agree on the notion that academics should engage in activism.
Therefore, we acknowledge that we are biased towards the topic. The point is, as Jones (2020) remarks, not to get rid of biases completely, as that would not be possible, but instead to recognize that we have them, clearly state them, and be critical towards them (Green 2020; Jones 2020). This allows the audience to make their own critical assessment of the work and thus nourish transparency. Saying that we as researchers are neutral if we remain within the academic walls would be lying to ourselves and would give us credit for something that is not achievable (Green, 2020).
1.2 Beyond advocacy – a stand against the status quo
The role of academics is to participate in society and to use their knowledge in guiding social change (Evers, 2000; Rhodes, Wright and Pullen, 2018; Kobylarek, 2019). Therefore, publishing papers and doing research is not necessarily enough (Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2020). In fact, research in different fields has shown the urgent need for a drastic paradigm shift, namely away from the capitalistic mainstream system towards one that prioritizes social and environmental sustainability, in order to prevent further environmental degradation, mitigate the effects of the damage already done, and to reduce mounting social inequalities (Markard, Raven and Truffer, 2012), the Crises of today. Many, if not most, social and environmental problems and imminent Crises are arguably result of “systemic failure of our dominant [neoliberal] political economy”, namely of its obsessive quest for profit and boundless growth (Ergene, Banerjee, Hoffmann, 2020, p.6). Furthermore, these calamities incorporate grievous inequalities – the least responsible for them are the ones who are suffering the most. Indeed, as phrased by Rhodes, Wright and Pullen (2018, p.143), “the inconvenient truth [is] that our [neoliberal] economy is at war with
1 From now on, “we” refers to us the authors, unless it is differently specified.
a habitable future”. Thus, wicked problems such as the Climate Crisis, and even the current Covid- 19 pandemic (Saad-Filho, 2020), are making us, humans, seen the failure of the capitalist mainstream system forcing even scientists to confront and rethink their role in society.
For instance, Backhaus (2019, p.310) calls for more open-minded culture of advocacy in order to embrace the “controversial debates in which even the subject-matter experts can openly acknowledge their political bias without being discredited”. He sees scientists as being obliged to provoke attention to the often unpalatable and conflicting sustainability issues, as the “society would benefit tremendously if scientists, as a stakeholder group, engaged more in the political debate […]” (Backhaus, 2019, p.310). However, some scholars regard advocacy and its achievements hitherto modest at best, as decades of research on issues such as climate warming, biodiversity loss, and social inequalities have not had any pivotal influence “on shifting the course of society’s damage to the natural and social worlds” (Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2020, p.6).
Rather, they see advocacy as working within the prevailing power structure, or status quo, therefore limited to work with the established system’s terms and as a result, insufficient to truly challenge the ‘business as usual’ (Rhodes, Wright, and Pullen, 2018; Green, 2020).
We [as scientists] delude ourselves to think that reasoned analysis will dislodge the powerful. We have brought a knife to a gun fight. To stubbornly insist that the truth will prevail or that we must simply “speak truth to power” ignores four decades of climate inaction. Such an approach overestimates our authority and thus undermines our credibility. (Green, 2020, p.157)
Instead, to drive change, working outside the system is required. Engaging on this path manifests as activism. Activism can be seen as “strategic action […] in a conflict over democratic decision making” (George, 2012, p.3), with the ultimate aim of inducing “political or social change” (Oxford University Press, 2021). As Grey (2013, p.701) phrases, “activism involves deliberately and consciously dissenting against the status quo, against hegemonic discourses”.
Indeed, several authors call for academics to engage in activism, arguing that it is our responsibility as scientists to do so (Grey, 2013; Contu, 2018; Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2020; Green, 2020).
1.3 It is about responsibility
We personally relate with such thoughts. Indeed, as identifying as activists ourselves, we see academic activism as paramount and urgently needed in order to spark real change, both within and outside academia. We are particularly interested in activism as a form of political engagement, due to the fundamental role it has historically played in society, and more specifically in driving social transformation. Nevertheless, regardless the vast palette of various actions, which different authors list and argue upon, the core message seems to be about responsibility (Grey, 2013; Contu, 2018; Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2020; Green, 2020).
Choosing not to have a view, in the name of preserving our [academics’] expertise, is an abdication of our responsibility. That abdication works in favor of powerful interests, and against those seeking to reorganize power relations. […] We have a professional responsibility to act. (Green, 2020, p.159).
However, the notion of responsibility is rarely investigated any further, leaving room for interpretation around its meaning. Therefore, we questioned, what does ‘responsibility’ actually mean in the context of academic activism?
In 1984, German philosopher Hans Jonas wrote his book The Imperative of Responsibility – In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, urging the need of an ethics of responsibility within science. He claims that the oblivion of asking important ethical questions has brought science and technology to rule the world at the cost of the environment, and consequently, of the humanity’s future on Earth (Mantatov and Mantatova, 2015). Science and technology have given us, humans, a power we never experienced before, a power that allows us to control and influence nature. We have ‘developed’ into the homo faber, whose only interest is to control nature, both our own and the one surrounding us (Chernilo, 2016, p.117). However, with power comes responsibility.
[…] the nature of human action has de facto changed, and that an object of an entirely new order – no less than the whole biosphere of the planet – has been added to what we [humans] must be responsible for because of our power over it. (Jonas, 1984, p.7)
Since academic activists are those taking responsibility, as suggested by various authors, we decided to talk to several academic activists working in Western countries and hear their stories of activism. Through these stories and their interpretation through Jonas’ theory, we were able to portray what responsibility means in academic activism and reflect upon the importance of this concept in the light of the role academia should play in society, especially when humanity is faced with many Crises and a difficult, if not doomed, future ahead.
2. Theoretical background
The conception of responsibility could be intended and interpreted in myriad of ways. It certainly was not novel, in ethical terms, when in 1984, Hans Jonas wrote his book The Imperative of Responsibility. Since we apply his approach as a lens to examine academic activism, it is important to have better understanding of the wider conception of responsibility to clarify why Jonas’ notion is so relevant for this context.
2.1 The concept of responsibility
The origins of the word responsibility are in the Latin word respondeo, which hints towards duality in its meaning. The word as a whole means responding to someone for something, while it is based on its suffix, spondeo, which means committing to someone for something (Arnaldi and Bianchi, 2016, p.16). The former relates to what in Jonas’ terms is retroactive responsibility. In fact, responsibility has been seen throughout history mainly as something to be allocated after a certain event has occurred. This is very well exemplified by law: one commits an act that leads to a negative outcome and consequently, the law assesses if the act had the premises to be irresponsible, which means that it already had clear, acknowledged chances to lead to the negative outcome in the first place. Generally, the outcome is quite close in time to the act, and the closer it is, the easier it is to allocate responsibility, correspondingly (Jonas, 1984 p.90).
The British philosopher Herbert L. A. Hart reflects upon this type of responsibility explaining that it can be assessed by understanding what caused the fact (causality), and if the person who acted was actually in the mental and physical state (capacity) to be taken accountable for the fact (liability). However, he also highlights that differently from this retroactive responsibility, there is also what he calls role-responsibility. This is a forward-looking notion, because it relates to a person to “be responsible for the performance of [her/his/their] duties, or for doing what is necessary to fulfill them” (Hart 1968, 212, as cited by Arnaldi and Bianchi, 2016, p.
18), which is comparable to the meaning of spondeo. However, a person’s duties can vary, in terms of what they are and what specific time span they cover. The more the time span is stretched towards the future, the more uncertainty plays a role. Indeed, the long-term implications of actions can easily result in not knowing what to do, paralyzing action, or using ignorance, due to uncertainty, as an excuse for not to act at all. However, Jonas (1984, p.107) says that “as there is no complete knowledge about the future, neither is there complete ignorance”, therefore “an agent's concrete moral responsibility at the time of action does extend farther than to its proximate effects. How far ahead depends on the nature of the ‘object’ and on our power and prescience”
(Jonas, 1984, p.107). For Jonas, the “duties” of humanity has changed due to scientific and technological progress, and along with it, the extension of our responsibility.
2.1.1 Science’s responsibility
When the power of humans was still insignificant in comparison to the one of nature, there was no need to think of long-lasting effects, and responsibility could be mostly used in its retroactive form.
In the modern world, however, humans have acquired such a power through technological development, that our responsibility has expanded over time and space (Jonas, 1984, p.7).
Science and technology are major forces of socio-economic change. They empower humankind to change its social and natural environment at a breaking speed. As an integral part of this process, science carries serious responsibility. (Evers, 2000)
Similarly to Jonas, the International Council of Science (Evers, 2020) recognizes that science has given humanity power over nature, that enable us to influence the biosphere with
severe long-term consequences. It also remarks that in the name of maintaining scientific objectivity, the scientific world has been isolating itself away from society, while the problems humanity face today would require ethical considerations on the responsibility science has towards society (Evers, 2000). Indeed, this is what Jonas’ theory is advocating for – a different type of responsibility that is rooted into a new ethical reasoning, rather than merely in legislation and past ethical theories. This kind of responsibility, called substantive, expands further than Hart’s role- responsibility, because it is collective in nature and its future orientation reaches the extent of future generations, who are not existing yet (Jonas, 1984, p.106).
The International Council for Science highlights that even though the entire scientific community should take responsibility, this collective responsibility actually stems from individual scientists (Evers, 2000). However, it is the power of collective responsibility that can change things, as shown historically by many activist movements driving social change. In science, as Piet Strydom remarks, responsibility has to be understood as a collective since the mere nature of science and technology is indeed collective (Arnaldi and Bianchi, 2016). Furthermore, as Jonas argues, the task of preserving the existence of future generations is both overwhelmingly massive for any single individual to achieve, and requires continuity, which no single individual by oneself can ensure (Jonas, 1984, p.106). Indeed, for Jonas, humanity has a responsibility to ensure the
‘right to be’ for both nature and, consequently, future generations. In other words, the substantive responsibility puts the needs of the object (nature and future generations) on which the subject (humanity) has power on, at the center, making the latter more sensible and thus less selfish.
First comes the "ought-to-be" of the object, second the ought-to-do of the subject who, in virtue of his power, is called to its care. (Jonas, 1984, p.93)
Applying this idea means changing the approach to science itself. In fact, from an anthropocentric view, on which scientific progress is seen as evermore beneficial while nature as instrumental to the needs of humanity with no intrinsic value of its own, to “an ethics of preservation and prevention” (Jonas, 1984, p.139). Indeed, even though science and technology have brought great achievements to society, they have also been detrimental by contributing to environmental degradation and increasing social inequalities (Evers, 2000). Nevertheless, still
today, technological innovation is appointed as ‘The Solution’ to humanity’s wicked problems, such as Climate Change, even though this means using the very same tools that created the problems in the first place (Kopnina and Blewitt, 2018, p.89). This is simply making science “a servant” of the prevailing neoliberal power which makes science “devoid of [the] commitment and value” it should have (Evers, 2000, p.134; Rhodes, Wright and Pullen, 2018). Whereas Jonas’
ethics of responsibility advocates for reinstating wider ethical reflections back into science (Mantatov and Mantatova, 2015; Chernilo, 2017, p.125) re-establishing the social mandate science and scientists should have (Contu, 2018; Kobylarek, 2019).
2.2 Hans Jonas’s Responsibility theory
Responsibility, so we learned, is a function of power and knowledge, with the mutual relation of these two not a simple one. (Jonas, 1984, p.123).
Regarding those consequences that are imminent enough still to hit ourselves, fear can do the job – fear which is so often the best substitute for genuine virtue or wisdom. (Jonas, 1984, p.123)
These two quotes, taken from Jonas’s original publication of his theory, summarize the conceptions around which he developed his ethical theory. In fact, humanity has been empowered through scientific knowledge, but knowledge has also unleashed uncontrolled (technological) power. To regain control over this unleashed power, we must reflect upon the costs, not mere benefits, of science and technology. Jonas argues that it is fear, rather than hope, that can make us see those costs and act accordingly, thus taking substantive responsibility. He further states that no previous ethical theory has prepared humanity to have this role of “stewardship” (Jonas, 1984, p.139).
2.2.1 The Role of Fear
The benefits brought by science and technological innovation are indeed plentiful, from improving our health to having a better understanding of the world around us. They also have the potential to contribute to understanding and mitigating problems like Climate Change. However, the scientific
community should also recognize the other side of the coin. That science, directly or indirectly, has also contributed to create those problems in the first place (Evers, 2000). Therefore, the problem is not science itself, but rather how it is used. Jonas recognizes the lack of ethical reflection within science as the root problem (Coyne, 2018). He claims that this deficiency has made us, humans, see mainly the benefits of technology, while being blinded to its costs, consequently leaving its power unleashed (Mantatov and Mantatova, 2015). Assuming science to be ethical in itself will mean claiming that ‘the search of truth’ is enough to make scientists themselves better people.
Unfortunately, we know that this virtue is not always the case (Jonas, 1984, p.169). Indeed, as scientists are alienated and disconnected in their ivory tower, away from society, they fail to ask relevant questions like if their research is needed, or if it is even harmful to the common good.
This can be considered as oblivion of their social mandate (Evers, 2000). Here, one might ask:
What could then spark this ethical reflection? Jonas’ answer is fear. He argues that being afraid of
“not-being” (i.e. nothingness) has double value: it prevents taking reckless risks, while also valuing what one has in comparison to losing everything, even the life itself (Mantatov and Mantatova, 2015). Jonas (1984, p.203) recognizes the value of hope, too, but considers it insufficient in light of the wicked issues humanity is facing. He argues that fear helps us to better evaluate the possible consequences of our actions, by first considering the evils those actions could produce, rather than the potential benefits (Mantatov and Mantatova, 2015; Arnaldi and Bianchi, 2016, p.7). That is, cons before pros, or what he calls “precautionary principle”, which allows humans to avoid catastrophic consequences by making sacrifices that are smaller in comparison (Coyne, 2018).
Therefore, Jonas points out that those who are defined as “alarmists” have a great merit to create momentum to both prepare for the worst possible scenarios and to appeal for policies to avoid disaster. If these predictions prove overestimations at the end, i.e. the outcome is better than original predictions, being wrong was probably their merit (Jonas, 1984, p.120).
2.2.2 Losing control: how scientific knowledge unleashes power
The knowledge humanity has acquired over time has been mostly regarded in positive terms, but, as we have explained, there are costs that should be taken into account, too. Jonas (1984, p.203) admits that the favors science and technology have done for humanity are evident and does not need anyone defending that point of view. However, there is an urge to ethically question the negative implications of (ab)using such technologies, because these problems do not stem from knowledge per se, but rather from how the knowledge is managed and put into practice.
When it comes to knowledge, Jonas explains that humanity is facing a conundrum. On one hand we know much more about the reality we live in than any previous generation did. On the other, however, we know much less. What he means with the latter is that the accumulation of huge amount of information has made it basically impossible for any single individual to contain all this knowledge. Therefore, humanity has created different disciplines, consequently compartmentalizing the knowledge. This has eventually led to the fragmentation of the wider knowledge humanity has acquired, which drastically hinders comprehension of interconnections between different phenomena. As a consequence, the knowledge of each individual actually shrinks. This can be exemplified with today’s scientists, who tend to become experts of very specific topics, which however represent tiny fractions of the overall knowledge. As explained already in 1955 by Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, known as the ‘father of Systems Thinking’, science has created silos that scientists have difficulties to break, because different disciplines literally speak different languages (Ramage and Shipp, 2009, p.61). Moreover, this communication problem extends further, because these languages are even less comprehendible by the lay(wo)men (Jonas, 1984, p.167).
Only the interdisciplinary pooling and integration of all these [sciences, from ecology, to economics] will lead to the global environmental science that is needed [to solve the global issues].
(Jonas, 1984, p.189).
Despite this fragmentation, natural science and technology have become the center of what is considered as progress. In fact, technological development is how we measure progress (Jonas, 1984, p.163). However, there is another, very different type of knowledge, that Jonas calls
“knowledge of things human”, which is less cumulative than the one derived from natural sciences, and very specific to each generation. This type of knowledge cannot be comprehended in the same
way as natural science related knowledge can be. Rather, it is about understanding of human him/her/theirself in a particular historical context and generation. Therefore, when measuring how much is known about this knowledge by using the same parameters as if measuring "value-free, scientific-manipulative knowledge of nature”, this different type of knowledge seems to fall short (Jonas, 1984, p.164). This misunderstanding is certainly expected considering the very distinctive nature of the “knowledge of things human”. It can be considered as being closer to ethical reflections and to the concept of humanity’s moral progress, which is something that the positivist science cannot comprehend and correspondingly, what mere technological progress fails to provide (Jonas, 1984, p.164; Chernilo, 2016, p.120).
What science and technology have provided though is a level of power that humanity has never experienced before in its history. Jonas explains that all living beings possess some form of power, for their sole existence, but this first-degree of power is limited by nature itself, which holds a power greater than any single individual or specie. Then, there is a second-degree of power that belongs only to those living beings who are able to use some kind of tool(s) to influence their environment (Rosół, 2020). Certainly, this power is very limited for most species, and used to be for humans too for the most part of our history. However, the accumulation of knowledge and its application through technology have drastically changed the second-degree of power for humans.
We are now the only specie able to influence nature in a way that is potentially fatal to ourselves and to others. Technology and science have given us power, but they have also made us slaves of the power itself. Indeed, greater the power, the higher the risk it could get out of control (Rosół, 2020). Nevertheless, the accumulation of this power can be seen in what today’s society consider its greatest achievement. Through science, humanity was able to improve its economy, by producing more goods and in higher variety, while also reducing the need for manual work.
Moreover, science also brought great improvements to human life quality and length. Indeed, now people are living longer and healthier lives.
However, these also translate, as declared by Jonas (1984, p.140), in what are the major issues of modern society: the exponential rise in production, consumption and population. In other words, growth. Indeed, in the contemporary society, growth is the meter of success, that all governments shoot for. A growing population to support a growing economy – the growing
economy to support the growing population (Kopnina and Blewitt, 2018 p.42). Nevertheless, several publications echo Jonas in appointing massive production and consumption, and population increase as severe threats to the environment and consequently, humanity’s future (Kopnina and Blewitt, 2018 p.37). Jonas recognizes capitalism as the economic model that has established the prevailing neoliberal growth paradigm. Nevertheless, he also adds how both capitalism and socialism praise the power of technology in their pursuit for a successful society, while idealizing human skills as ‘The Solution’ to any calamities that would be brought upon humanity. As embodiments of anthropocentrism, both ideologies overlook the limits of the natural world (Jonas, 1984, pp.155-160).
2.2.3 Power to control power – a very different approach to scientific knowledge
That which binds will and obligation together in the first place, power, is precisely that which today moves responsibility into the center of morality. (Jonas, 1984, p.130).
As mentioned before, Jonas suggests that blinded by the second-degree of power, the human species has ‘developed’ into the homo faber, who values the control it has over nature, more than nature itself (Chernilo, 2016, p.117). Nevertheless, as humans, we also have the capability to reflect upon the tools we use, and their ensuing effects. This is a unique form of power that only our specie possesses (Rosół, 2020). For Jonas, the only way to solve the issues of power is through harnessing a different form of power, rather than its renunciation. This is referred to as third-degree of power, which serves to regulate the second-degree of power, allowing humanity to control the power technology has provided it, in order to ensure we are not dominated and distracted by it (Jonas, 1984, p.142). In fact, exercising this power is how humans take substantive responsibility, and more precisely, put it into practice.
Since science can be seen to have unleashed the power over nature, science itself has the responsibility to control this power (Arnaldi and Bianchi, 2016, p.55). This responsibility starts by questioning the scientific knowledge and its application. For example, scientists can exercise the third-degree of power by questioning, what research should be pursued for the sake of society, rather than what should be pursued for the sake of the economy (Evers, 2000; Grey, 2013).
Kobylarek (2019) clarifies that it is not about restricting scientific curiosity, but rather connecting it with the world beyond the academic walls to promote real life impact – to help scientists see how their research could actually help society.
[…] the first object of [human’s] obligation […] [is] not to ruin (as he well can do) what nature has achieved in him by the way of his using it. (Jonas, 1984, p.129)
Moreover, the approach to knowledge can be changed when scientists start to interact with society (Contu, 2018; Kobylarek, 2019), namely by breaking the communication barriers created by the compartmentalized knowledge. Here it is important to acknowledge that in contrary to the patronizing ivory tower syndrome, the information flows in both directions, from academia to society and vice versa. Indeed, this would provide science with tremendous learning opportunities (Evers, 2000) while simultaneously contributing to building trust, the latter of which is needed to work within and with society (Kobylarek, 2019).
The average person feels a special kind of respect for representatives of the world of science because they regard them as knowledgeable and responsible (Kobylarek, 2019, p.5).
“Increased knowledge dearly implies increased responsibility”, as famously verbalized by Dutch-American physicist, Nicolaas Bloembergen. Indeed, when scientists get involved in activism, they are acknowledging that they have a responsibility towards society and future generations because of their role as academics (Osberg, 2010; Mantatov and Mantatova, 2015;
Green, 2020).
2.3 Power in practice: academic activism
‘Academic activism’ may sound somewhat antithetical term. Indeed, the two words seem like two worlds very distant from each other – their merger might not make much sense because of the distinctive images we associate with either of them. Maxey (1999) suggests this to be result of the term’s discursive nature, whereby diverse discourses provide varying connotations to it. In other words, academic activism can be perceived differently by different entities and in distinctive
contexts. For example, Martinez-Alier et al. (2011, p.17) describe one possible connotation as follows: “activists are motivated by interests and values, […] [while not being] dispassionate as scientists are supposed to be”. Indeed, scientists constrained by the positivist paradigm are criticized to be “notoriously unwilling to take a stand against [the pressing] issues” that society faces, much due to the politically charged nature of those issues (Robertson and Hull, 2011, as cited in George, 2012, p.4). However, this inactivity can be deemed somewhat paradoxical when considering the fundamental role academia has in knowledge production in societal context (Evers, 2000; Contu, 2018). Moreover, academics have “professional obligation to witness” that is more salient than what they would have as mere citizens (Thompson, 2020, p.69). Considering this social mandate science has towards society, the merger of the two terms certainly seems less antithetical.
2.3.1 One or two steps further than advocacy
Indeed, as the imminent calamities that menace humanity are becoming evident, calls for scientists to break the positivist norms are becoming more vocal. Already in 1992, American biologist David Ehrenfeld appealed to scientists to take political action:
Many specialists in a host of fields find it difficult, even hypocritical, to continue business as usual, blinders firmly in place, in a world that is falling apart (as cited in George, 2012, p.7)
Namely, he called fellow academics to engage in advocacy. In academic context, taking this stance often materializes as conveying scientific findings to inform policymakers to promote a change in specific areas or issues (George, 2012). An example of this is the Intergovernmental Panel’s on Climate Change (IPCC) annual report, another is the United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 2030 Agenda. Considering the prominence of these initiatives, academic engagement in advocacy can be seen somewhat substantial. Indeed, based on their knowledge and values, many academics today use their research to inform policymakers and the civil society (Kobylarek, 2019), and by incorporating a slight hint of criticism towards the way things are. However, as mentioned before, some scholars are skeptical about the true leverage
potential of advocacy, mocking it to be “a knife [in] a gun fight” in the political arena (Green, 2020, p.157). They urge the engagement to be taken beyond this, calling for academic activism.
Activism can be considered as a more radical approach than advocacy. Here the ‘radical’
does not imply that activism would be limited to the most flagrant actions such as street marches and civil disobedience, but rather refers to tendency of activism to operate in contrast to some of the society’s established values and principles, and thus being perceived as radical (Moyer, MacAllister and Soifer, 2001). However, while going against ‘values and principles’ of society may sound nefarious, it is important to note here that especially the latter can be a result of long- standing history of the prevailing power imbalance, therefore somewhat imposed by the status quo to maintain itself (Contu, 2018). Black Lives Matters and #MeToo are clear examples of ‘radical’
actions against social mainstream ‘values and principles’. Indeed, throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, fighting for civil, women’s and animal rights; against wars and conflicts; against deforestation and toxic pollution; and addressing various other social and environmental issues have been crucial part of academic activism. In fact, as it aims to address these issues by promoting equality and stewardship, and while it challenges the prevailing power dynamics in academic institution and more widely in society, it can be seen as having a double role (Pickerill, Chatterton and Hodkinson, 2010; Rhodes, Wright and Pullen, 2018). Indeed, academic activists go a step or two further than their advocate counterparts, by engaging in activities that want to disrupt the status quo as it is. Furthermore, considering the value-laden nature of the double role, it can be inferred that their engagement follows the realization that the issues at hand are morally wrong (Green, 2020).
We [as academics] have a collective moral duty to address these injustices with all the tools at our disposal. […] It is our moral duty as human beings to end this injustice, even if that means sacrificing some degree of credibility in the minds of our colleagues. (Green, 2020, p.156)
Therefore, integration of the academic figure with the activist figure requires academics to both use their knowledge to fight for change even within academia and to apply ethical reflections to rethink their own practice as scientists (Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2020; Green 2020). For instance, both changing the way of how academics teach, and challenging universities’
structures and academic traditions could then be seen as forms of academic activism (Flood, Martin and Dreher, 2013; Green 2020). However, as Green (2020) suggests in the above quote, backed by Contu (2018), this fight should happen on all fronts, not only in research and education, but in everything academics do as professionals and as citizens. Not only do academics possess profound expertise in their respective topics, but their position further contributes to activist role by fostering legitimacy for their voice and having unique access to resources such as scientific journals (Flood, Martin and Dreher, 2013). Indeed, Contu (2018, p.286) calls academics to “become aware of [this]
role and [their] position in social reproduction and social change”.
[Academic activism] invites us to make a clear stand on which kind of world we want and what kind of people we want to be by making our everyday work at the service of progressive social, economic and epistemic justice, in whatever way we can and in the issues that are most salient in the conditions where we live. (Contu, 2018, p.286)
2.3.2 Dealing with neoliberal power
For long, academia has been pervasively wrapped around by the tentacles of neoliberalism (Evers, 2000; Green, 2020). Indeed, the former has been subjected to the neoliberal values whereby:
“equality, liberty, inclusion and constitutionalism are [...] subordinate to the project of economic growth, competitive positioning and capital enhancement” (Brown, 2015, as cited in Rhodes, Wright and Pullen, 2018, p.141). Deploying these values has over recent decades had drastic consequences in how academic research and education is conducted (Evers, 2000; Kobylarek, 2019).
As a result, contemporary academic inquiry is often mainly assessed in monetary value, resulting in it being heavily directed towards technologies and concepts that promote business efficiency, and which can be further turned into saleable innovations. This dynamic is mocked to mainly serve private (corporate) interests, at the expense of common good (Jonas, 1984, p.121;
Martin, 2009; Kobylarek, 2019). Agreeing with Kobylarek, Martin and Jonas, several other authors (Pickerill, Chatterton and Hodkinson, 2010; Rhodes, Wright and Pullen, 2018, p.141) are concerned of this overemphasis of the market value in assessing work output, arguing that it results
in “steady corruption” of other values, thus undermining the very foundation of academia as an institution. Rhodes, Wright and Pullen (2018, p.141) go further by stating that “if political ideals are stripped out of the criteria used to assess the public value of research, then the important democratic function of the University is neutralized”. What they mean is that when greed for growth is harnessed as the main motivator for research, it substantially distorts what kind of research is pursued. Furthermore, because the wicked problems can be recognized as structural faults of the current socio-economic system driven by neoliberalism, applying neoliberal logic to address these issues is inevitably inferior, if not even paradoxical (Kopnina and Blewitt, 2018, p.89). When considering these characteristics, scientific research tends to be measured in quantities instead of quality – in numbers instead of relevance.
[…] universities [should be] less sausage factories and more institutions where critical thinking is not grist for the next peer reviewed article. (Castree, 2002, as cited in Pickerill, Chatterton and Hodkinson, 2010, p.250)
Besides research, neoliberalist takeover has also influenced academic pedagogy.
Neoliberal dynamics are intertwined with the traditional positivist paradigm that has prevailed in sciences. This emphasis on objectivity, value-neutrality and apoliticality further fosters neoliberal virtues of competition and individualism, namely by leaving them unchallenged (Pickerill, Chatterton and Hodkinson, 2010; Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2020). As a result, critics argue academic education to be falling short on providing valuable skills such as “critical self-reflection, political empowerment and collective mobilisation” (Flood, Martin and Dreher, 2013, p.18).
Indeed, Stricker (2020, p.1366) refutes this positivist pedagogy by noting that “all teaching is political”. Acknowledging this contributes to abdicating the positivist paradigm and recognizes that knowledge is produced in social interactions, and it is inconstant, susceptible to amendment (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Dumitraşcu, 2015). This shift in research and pedagogic philosophies is fundamental to foster valuable skills that Flood, Martin and Dreher (2013) promoted above.
Additionally, learning in social environments cultivates collaboration and communication skills, while gives weight to other perspectives, predisposing students to the real world (Dumitraşcu, 2015).
Since the prevailing neoliberal system and positivist paradigm are so entrenched into fabric of academia, challenging them can prove extremely difficult. As Rhodes, Wright and Pullen (2018, p.141) argue, neoliberalism follows “the logic of consensus” in an attempt to legitimize its status quo while suppressing any “alternatives to the existing distribution of power”. Following both the de facto neoliberal coup d’etat of academia and the unwieldy academic institutions that are bound by their traditions, there are persistent “intellectual and organizational barriers”, as argued by Low and Merry (2021, p.212). They further assert that most of these barriers can be considered as institutional, relating to conventions of employment and work practicalities e.g. funding, while especially disciplinary traditions may pose conceptual impediments that enforce ideas how science should be done. Efforts to break away from these barriers tend to face myriad of repressive countermeasures. This suppression can, and in many instances already has, manifested in various forms of social pressure, censorship, threats and even attacks. For example, academic activists often experience exclusion in their workplace, while many have been publicly ridiculed in e.g.
social media, or have been subject to complaints through their institution in attempts to take them down. These undertakings tend to directly target individual academic activists themselves, adding a fear factor to hinder their engagement. Indeed, academic activism can result in substantial setbacks, especially on one’s career. (George, 2012; Flood, Martin and Dreher, 2013; Low and Merry, 2021).
Academic activism […] comes with a potentially high cost for individuals, particularly in an era of government funding cuts to higher education and when the issue at hand […] fundamentally challenges the economic agendas of powerful elites. (Rhodes, Wright and Pullen, 2018)
2.4. Theoretical conclusion
Figure 1: Bursting the balloon – the third-degree of power in action.
Scientific knowledge and technological innovation, nurtured by the neoliberal capitalistic mindset, have been pumping the humans’ second-degree of power letting it grow dangerously, to the extent of threatening the mere survival of humanity on Earth. However, the fear of this doomed future could trigger academics to take action, using their third-degree of power to blow off the second- degree of power, reducing its power over us and its negative impact on future generations.
3. Methodology
3.1 Research approach and philosophy
In our study, we are interested in the personal stories of academics who are engaged in some form of activism in their role as academics. More precisely, in what initially sparked their activism and what they are pursuing with it. As we attempt to understand the fundamental perceptions of actors in academic social construct, we need to epistemologically position ourselves as interpretivist – we as researchers become part of our own study as we interpret the qualitative empirical data (Bryman and Bell, 2011, pp.16-18). Following the reasoning presented in Introduction, we acknowledge that especially in the setting of academic activism, a subject that is close to us, it is
impossible for us to remain objective. The driving interest in this topic is our personal conviction, backed up by several authors, of academic activism to be paramount to drive social change and to be topical for the times we live in (Contu, 2018; Rhodes, Wright and Pullen, 2018). This is something we would like you, our reader, to be aware of, as you could make your own conclusions out of the data we have generated and analysed. Indeed, while on the Empirical results we have only included insights relevant for our analysis and discussion, further insights are attached in Appendix C to invite you to make your own inference and to further encourage to explore this subject.
3.2 Data Generation
Our empirical data generation is based on qualitative in-depth interviews. A total of 12 interviews were completed. As we took the interviews separately due to limited time available, we preferred semi-structured method to ensure comparability of the data. The interviews are based on pre- formatted questions (Appendix A), but the format was flexible enough to leave room for the interviewees to share their thoughts, meaning that new questions could emerge during the conversations. The emphasis is on the interviewee’s perspectives and experiences (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.467). The interviews were conducted online in April 2021, via a recorded video call using Zoom video conference software. They were intended to last approximately an hour, with the eventual interviews running between 50 and 65 minutes. We divided the interviews between each other, with both of us conducting 6 interviews. Besides an interviewer, only one interviewee was present at each interview.
3.2.1 Planning our semi-structured interviews
The selection of possible interviewees was done by applying several methods. Our initial target group was academic activists i.e. academics who are engaged in activism as professionals, not only as citizens. However, we decided not to use the term “academic activist” when reaching out to people, but instead we remained more generic by using the following statement “we are exploring the topic of academic activism, and we are looking for academics who would like to discuss with us and share their story of activism”. We made this decision to not to scare people away by putting
a label on them but instead, to allow them to make their own considerations. We also decided not to restrict our research to a certain scientific discipline, academic position, or to demographical factors such as age or country of origin (even though the focus was eventually delineated to Western countries in terms of country of employment), because we believe them to be irrelevant for the wider topic of academic activism and for the sake of answering our research question.
Instead, we decided to leave the concept open in order to see who would respond to our interview request.
We started with a couple of names that were suggested by our thesis supervisor, and also, by looking for online channels (mainly used in Western countries), that were either dedicated for academic activism or which we perceived as potential to host academic activists in their ranks, such as Extinction Rebellion and the Wellbeing Economy Alliance. We supplemented that with brief online research, looking for news articles, videos or social media posts that could lead us to identify possible interviewees. To get in contact with potential participants, we ended up doing two things: i) we sent direct e-mails to participants we wanted to talk to, asking her/him/them to suggest any other person we should consider, i.e. utilising the snowballing methodology, and ii) we prepared an interview invitation in form of social media post to be shared on several platforms that we had identified as ideal for reaching out to potential participants (Appendix B).
Additionally, we emailed one local academic movement, that we knew to be involved in activism, and asked them to forward the invitation to their mailing list.
Before contacting anybody to schedule an interview, even if it was a person her- /himself/themselves reaching out to us, we conducted brief online research via several search tools (Google, LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube) to look for any traces that could confirm that the person indeed has been engaging in some type of academic activism. However, we acknowledge that this might lead to bias. In fact, more established one is as academic activist, the more likely there is information available of her/him/them online. Additionally, not all engagement activities are visible enough to be found online in the first place. Nevertheless, for our sample, this double-check approach did not have much of an influence, because we could find some traces of activism for each of our participants.
3.2.2 Our participants
All our participants were anonymized, to allow them to speak freely. For this purpose, we use pseudonyms and do not share their specific field of work. Out of the 12 academics we met, 5 were from social science related disciplines and the remaining 7 from natural science related disciplines (Table 1). They are all on later stage of their career, from Postdoctoral Researcher to Professorship positions, while their age range spans from 36 to 66 years. The country of employment varies, but all participants are/were employed by institute in a Western country (Table 1). However, we did not ask for their nationalities. Here, it is important to clarify that we purposedly decided to focus on the Western countries because i) we could more effectively reach out to more people through our selected methods of search, and ii) we had a particular interest in Western academic activism, since we as students are based in Sweden. Also, both the means of snowballing and posting invitations on Western-based social media groups were likely to end in this result.
Pseudonym Pronoun Field Country of work Career level
Ludwig he/him Natural Science United Kingdom Lecturer
Noam he/him Social Science Sweden Assistant professor
Donella she/her Social Science Switzerland Professor
Kate she/her Social Science Sweden Professor
Rachel she/her Natural Science Sweden Lecturer and researcher Thor he/him Natural Science Australia Honorary professor Cassandra she/her Natural Science Sweden Associate professor
David he/him Natural Science Sweden Professor
Mara she/her Natural Science Sweden Researcher (postdoc) Michael he/him Social Science United Kingdom Professor
Elliot he/him Social Science Germany Out of academia (researcher) Andrea they/them Natural Science United States Lecturer
Table 1. Participants’ information.
We had 6 participants identifying themselves as he/him, 5 as she/her, and one as they/them (Table 1). For the latest, we made a conscious decision to use the single form of the verb, in contrary to the grammar. Indeed, even though the English language (unfortunately) does not provide a neutral third person pronoun, we believe that the participant should still be referred to as a single person. So, when you encounter seemingly awkward forms such as “they is” or “they
