A Life in War and Peace

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A Life in War and Peace

A structured focused comparison on the behaviors of the warring parties in the Kosovo conflict which are dependent on the veto of one or more of the permanent members in the UNSC.

Jude Sharbin Word count: 16980 Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Peace and Conflict Studies C Bachelor Thesis

Fall 2020

Supervisor: David Larsson Gebre-Medhin

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Abstract

The aim of this research was to find out whether or not the use of the veto by one or more of the permanent members in the UNSC had an impact on the behaviors of the warring parties by looking at the interventions that would be imposed by the Council. Much of the research on this topic looks at what it takes for a conflict to get to the UNSC and what happens after sanctions are put into place, but what about if the resolution does not receive support and is not adopted?

Two cases are looked at using the structured focused comparison method in relation to two conflict periods in the Kosovo conflict, before the veto (during-UNSC) and after the veto (post- UNSC) asking the question how can the use of the veto in the UNSC by one, or more, of the permanent members of the Security Council impact a conflict? The evidence collected shows that the hypothesis was not supported due to there not being a large change in the behavior of the warring parties from one conflict period to the next. The conclusion shows that the impact by the UNSC on the conflict was not severe.

Key words: United Nations Security Council, permanent members, conflict period, veto, warring party behavior, interventions.

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List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Theory ………....….… 11

Figure 2. Causal Mechanism ………...….….. 12

Figure 3. Hypothesis ………... 12

Table 1. Dependent Variable Results ………..………... 30

Table 2. Independent Variable Results ……….. 34

Table 3. Mediating Variable Results ………...…… 36

Table 4. Summary of Results ………. 41

Table 5. Population of Cases ……….. 48

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1. Introduction

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) causes a chain reaction. How exactly does a political body do this? There is always a chance that the UNSC will get involved in an internal conflict if the warring parties cannot solve it because that is one of the reasons why the UNSC came to be. Five members in the UNSC – otherwise known as the P5 – were given a power that no other country has; the power to veto – the ability to block any resolution from moving forward, preventing peacekeeping missions or interventions in any way, shape, or form. The veto impacts many aspects such as the actors in the conflict, the neighboring states, the international community, civilian displacement and many more. It starts with the adoption of an agenda, they discuss the agenda, they vote on the agenda and then one of two outcomes can happen. Firstly, the resolution is adopted, and interventions take place, or secondly, the resolution is not adopted, and nothing is put into place. Either of these outcomes will have an effect on the parties involved in the conflict.

There are different factors that can lead one, or more, of the P5 to veto a proposed resolution, merely seeing the correlation between two variables is not enough of a justification that would imply causation. However, could the involvement of the UNSC impact a conflict? If one of the P5 uses their veto, does that change much in the conflict? Could the veto itself have an effect on the warring parties?

There have been many authors who have looked into the quantitative side concerning the UNSC and the veto, for example Chan (2003), who looked at how the veto changed throughout the years from post-Cold war and the pre-Cold war. Previous research shows, according to Frederking and Patane (2017), that refugee flows and number of battle-related deaths impact whether or not the UNSC takes up the conflict in their agenda. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) also find that the UN getting involved in conflict depends on the number of deaths.

Conducting a study involving the UNSC in a qualitative way is not enough of a contribution.

Many authors have contributed to the field and filled in many gaps, however one of the gaps that remains is looking at the effects of the veto itself on a conflict. By doing a qualitative analysis, evidence on what occurred before and after the veto will help to fill this gap. The addition that it would show through theoretical justifications with the help of empirical evidence is that the effect of the veto on interventions in terms of sanctions and peacekeeping operations, impacts the behavior of the warring parties. The method that this paper will follow is a structured focused comparison of one conflict in two different conflict periods. This is why the research question that

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this paper posits is: how can the use of the veto in the UNSC by one, or more, of the permanent members of the Security Council impact a conflict?

With this question, the same conflict that at one point in time had not been taken to the UNSC and another point is taken to the UNSC, can show if and how the use of the veto impacted it. There are many different factors that can lead to a change in behavior by the warring parties, be that as it may, involving the UNSC with the notion that the use of the veto could lead to a change in behavior is not a large part of research. The purpose of this study is then to add to the current literature about the impact of the UNSC on conflicts. Different authors have mentioned what kinds of impacts the UNSC could have, one of which being Blätter and Williams (2011, p.303) who mention the Responsibility Not to Veto, otherwise known as RN2V. This means a P5 not blocking a resolution that includes one or more of the crimes outlined by the UN¹.

The design of this paper begins with the theoretical framework where the different concepts and terms are defined, and the literature review which includes what gaps exist in the literature and how this paper will contribute to filling it. Next is the research design where the method of the analysis is explained, the operationalization of the variables, and case selection is looked into.

Then the results and analysis of the research which will show how the analysis was conducted and whether or not the hypothesis is supported. The paper wraps up with the summary and conclusion which will discuss the findings of the research and the avenues for future research.

The analysis shows that a veto from one or more of the P5 in the UNSC is not enough to change the behaviors of the warring parties. While there are different variables that were taken into consideration for this research, they did not show the causal mechanism. However, that is a result in itself, just because these variables, this causal mechanism did not turn out to be correct, does not mean that the theory is flawed, it suggests that there are more factors that need to be taken into consideration in order to determine even more results and answers. Conflict analysis can be beautiful that way, analyzed from different perspectives gives different answers and each of these answers opens the door which allows even more research to bloom, a never-ending cycle of knowledge which allows the world to expand and grow.

1 Crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.

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2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Previous Research and Gap

The UNSC has been vastly researched since they handle the conflicts and issues in the world that the conflicting country itself cannot solve. Throughout the history of wars and conflicts, there have been many that could not be solved by the conflicting parties which has warranted the involvement of the UNSC. There are different kinds of gaps found in the literature from how research is conducted to a missing gap in the information. To an extent, this paper will try and target both kinds of gaps. Previous research discusses what it takes for a conflict to be taken to the Council, and then if the resolution is adopted, the next part of literature looks at peacekeeping;

there is a clear gap where research has not been filled or has yet to be filled. While many of the research done on the UNSC and conflicts is done in a quantitative way, this paper aims to conduct more of a qualitative study. However, one of the gaps in the literature highlighted by Frederking and Patane (2017) and Gilligan and Stedman (2003) discuss what it takes for a conflict to get to the UNSC. Nonetheless, there has not been much research about what happens after the conflict has been taken to the UNSC. Is conflict intensity impacted? Has the behavior of the warring parties changed? In what way has the behavior changed? What is the causal link between these two variables? The following literature review will highlight the different pieces of key research conducted on this subject and what the gap is and how it will lead to the contribution that this paper aims to make.

Frederking and Patane’s (2017) research looks at how different variables impact a conflict going to the UNSC. Four independent variables are analyzed: conflict-related deaths, refugee flows, arms sales, and trade. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) do a similar kind of research however under slightly different circumstances. While Frederking and Patane (2017) conduct their research on which cases go to the UNSC, Gilligan and Stedman (2003) conduct their research in relation to peacekeeping and where peacekeepers go once a resolution in the UNSC has been adopted.

Frederking and Patane (2017) outline four different hypotheses for their finding that involve the four variables. They find that both conflict-related deaths and refugee flows directly impact the behavior of the members of the UNSC, and there is not much support found for arms sales, nor trade. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) on the other hand have many findings in their analysis, one of which is the same as Frederking and Patane (2017), the number of deaths in a conflict heavily impact whether or not the UNSC intervenes in a conflict. Beardsley and Schimdt (2012) also find

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that the number of deaths in a conflict impacts the decisions of the P5 regarding their involvement.

It is clear that the timing of when a conflict is taken to the UNSC is important. However, the question of ‘what happens next?’ does not offer the same kind of clarity. While this data on conflicts and the UNSC is very important, it still fails to highlight what happens afterwards.

These authors have a main concept in common, conflict intensity. This makes sense for their research since it is being done quantitatively and using conflict intensity and measuring that variable using battle-related deaths is an optimal way to carry out the analysis. However, using only conflict intensity as a dependent variable for this paper may not yield a great outcome since it is a qualitative analysis. The following sections will highlight the different indicators used to gather the appropriate evidence for the dependent variable. With different indicators for the dependent variable, a holistic analysis can be performed.

The research mentioned above also opens another gap, which is that it looks into resolutions that have not been vetoed, resolutions in which the UNSC does intervene. The gap of what happens when a resolution is vetoed has not yet been explored. However, there is more to conflict intensity increasing than only the veto at the UNSC, behavior of warring parties can also be impacted.

While the previous literature seems to be in consensus about what it takes for a conflict to be taken to the UNSC and what it takes for a resolution to be adopted, Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) focused their research on filling a different gap. This gap has already taken into account the ‘why’ aspect of what it takes for a conflict to be taken to the UNSC, however, they also look at the overlap of interests with the P5. Their research aims to answer two questions, whether or not the private interests of the P5 in the UNSC impact a resolution being passed or not and how much a conflict is a threat to international peace. Fortna (2004) finds that the number of deaths in a conflict also impacts whether or not the UN gets involved and sends peacekeeping missions to that area. Nonetheless, Fortna’s (2004) work looks at the step after the conflict intensity has seen an increase and shows that the deployment of international personnel has an effect on peace. In short, the more violent and the more deaths there are in a war, the more difficult it will be to maintain peace.

Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) fill in one of the gaps that is present in this field however they also fail to account for the aftermath of the involvement of the UNSC. They find that the private interests of the P5 tend to be seen more in the Council, as Edward Luck (2006) put it, the

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UNSC is a political body and not a judicial one. However, Beardsley and Schmidt’s (2012) research also finds that the how and why of the P5 involving themselves in a conflict is not of great interest, it is actually the degree of the overlap in the interests between the P5 that is more interesting to these researchers.

Mullenbach’s (2005) research looks at the conditions in which peacekeeping interventions by a third-party actor is established or not. The research finds that peacekeeping missions being established by third-party actors are more likely to occur when the conflict has exceeded 12 months (Mullenbach 2005, p.548). Peacekeeping missions are also more likely to occur by the UN if the state in the conflict has an alliance with a major regional power (Mullenbach 2005, p.549).

The key literature on the subject has shown that there are quite a few gaps in the field. The main consensus in the literature is that the number of battle-related deaths has an impact on both the conflict being taken to the conflict and when an intervention by the UN is put into place.

However, how can this be looked at in terms of behavior by the warring parties?

Finding out what happens between the stages of a veto being given and the overall change in behavior that eventually leads to the possibility of the conflict increasing in terms of battle- related deaths, may be of interest to study. The use of the veto, or possible use of the veto, indicates that there will be different interventions put into place which can change the dynamics of the conflict for the warring parties. The main gap that this paper wishes to address is how the use of the veto, which directly impacts whether or not interventions are put into place, can impact the conflict in terms of the behaviors of the warring parties. The results of this research will help to show whether or not the causal pathway is true. The following sections will highlight the concepts and terms and the theoretical argument used in order to find an answer to the research question:

how can the use of the veto in the UNSC by one, or more, of the permanent members of the Security Council impact a conflict?

2.2. Concepts and Terms

This research follows the same pathway as all research papers, an independent variable, a dependent variable, and control variables. The unit of analysis for this study is conflict period.

This is because this study will look at a conflict in two different time periods and measure the independent and dependent variable and how they were during that time and then compare it to how the two variables look like after the UNSC. It is important to note the two different time

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periods in which this research will take place. Looking at the period during the UNSC meeting is difficult to measure since the meeting takes place in one day and finding data on what happens in one day is slightly impossible. As such, the two different time periods are 6-12 months before the veto was given and up until the meeting which is during-UNSC. This will allow for more data to be collected and analyzed, instead of having the impossible task of collecting data on events that happened in one day. This will be the first case that is looked at. The next case is post-UNSC which means that point in the conflict that comes after the veto has been given. This makes data collection easier and applicable to the wider set of cases in the population.

One of the scope conditions is that the incompatibility in which the conflict is based on is about territory or government, this is because many of the cases and agendas brought to the UNSC are either about territory or government, this will allow for a larger population in order to help to decrease selection bias when it comes to selecting the cases. Another scope condition will be that the conflict has to have had at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year which is, according to the UCDP (2020), parameters of what constitutes measurement of conflict. By having this as a scope condition, the UCDP dataset can be used to gather general information about the conflict along with determining the changes in the dependent variable. The post-Cold war era, after 1991, is another scope condition used in order to find these cases. This is because world politics have changed greatly after the Cold war ended and considering the cases after that can help with determining how present-day cases can be affected by the UNSC.

The independent variable is use of the veto by one or more of the P5 in the UNSC. This means that if one of the P5 on the Council does not agree with the proposed resolution, they can use their veto in order to prevent it from being passed. This can impact a number of things such as peacekeeping operations, medical supplies, and sanctions.

Another concept is the mediating variable which is interventions, in terms of sanctions and peacekeeping operations. These interventions are put into place in the agenda presented to the Council, in hopes that it will be taken to the Council and a resolution will be approved. The mediating variable is the link between the independent and dependent variables which shows their connection.

The dependent variable is warring party behavior. While Frederking and Patane (2017) and Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) have used conflict intensity in their research, this research is qualitative which looks at the other side of the coin of conflict intensity. In specific, what it takes

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for conflict intensity to change is for there to be a change in warring party behavior as a way of deducing what it takes for a conflict to be sent to the UNSC. One broad way to define this concept is by using the definition of conflict intensity outlined by the UCDP (2020). There are two parameters, ‘minor’ and ‘war’. Minor refers to a conflict in which there are at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year, while a war refers to there being at least 1000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (UCDP 2020). In order to keep with the type of research paper this is, conflict intensity will be one of the indicators used to determine whether or not there has been a change in the warring party behavior. In addition, the change in behavior can come from different types of intervention that can be put into place by the UNSC such as sanctions on fighting material. These indicators will help in highlighting how and to what extent the behaviors have changed after the UNSC meeting has taken place.

2.3. Theoretical Argument

A gap in the literature does not mean a gap in the theories used, which means that an existing theory can be used for this study. There is a gap in the literature that does not show whether or not behaviors of warring parties change due to the veto in the UNSC. Scholars, such as Beardsley, Cunningham and White (2015), go into the topic of how the UNSC decreases the likelihood that a conflict will escalate into a civil war.

Beardsley, Cunningham, and White’s (2015) research will be the main paper that the theory for this study is built on. Their theory looks at what happens in a conflict when the UNSC is involved. They want to examine whether or not the actions of the UN have an impact on a conflict turning into a civil war (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2015, p.676). They perform a large- N study and find that the use of sanctions, targeted at the importation of fuel and decreasing the benefits of fighting, and the authorization of force indirectly impacts the conflict and decreases the fighting which then decreases the likelihood of a civil war (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2015, p.690). This leads to the capability of the fighting to decrease and thus overall decreasing the fighting completely preventing a civil war. They claim that the direct effect on fighting capabilities happens when embargos are set on fuel (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2015, p.680). Since Beardsley, Cunningham, and White (2015) look at how the adoption of a resolution impacts the onset of conflict, this paper looks at how the opposite impacts the behavior of the warring parties.

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The theory for this study will look at how the veto by one, or more, of the P5 led to a change in the behaviors of the warring parties. By the UNSC not adopting a proposed resolution, this means that no sanctions would be placed which also means that an embargo on the fuel importation and no decrease in fighting material would occur, this means that the warring parties in the conflicts do not need to worry about the increase in costs that they would need for travel, from one place in the conflict to another, and they do not need to worry about the incentives for fighters decreasing since there would nothing performing that task. In a way, the use of the interventions would be a proxy for fear and worry since fear and worry cannot be measured. This means that the warring parties can increase their fighting capabilities without having the worry that peacekeepers would enter the conflict and prevent the escalation of the conflict. Furthermore, this means that the impact on the dependent variable comes from the mediating variable which is impacted by the independent variable.

Figure 1. Theory

Nonetheless, Beardsley, Cunningham, and White (2015, p.690) also take into account that it can be a conflict increasing in intensity that would lead to the UNSC adopting the resolution and authorizing a peacekeeping mission; a notion that has already been researched. This theory means that when a proposed resolution has received a veto from one of the P5, it does not allow for sanctions or the authorization for force to be put into place. Thus, the warring parties no longer need to worry about a peacekeeping mission being put into place which would effectively prevent any fighting behavior from escalating into violence. After this, the behavior of the warring parties would be bound to change since no sanctions have been put into place to prevent the conflict from escalating in terms of battle-related deaths.

Draft agenda is written and presented to

the UNSC which is adopted and

discussed

The proposed resolution not adopted

by the Council since

a P5 used their veto

No sanctions are put into place which

directly impacts the

warring parties

Behavior of the parties has changed after the vote at the UNSC

With this change in behavior due

to no interventions,

fighting continues Conflict

begins to threaten the

stability of peace and number of casualties increases

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Figure 2. Causal Mechanism

Overall, this theory takes from Beardsley, Cunningham, and White (2015) the notion that with the veto being used by one of the P5, it causes an indirect change. This change, which has not been highlighted in the literature, is the change in the warring party behavior. This change in behavior comes from the independent variable impacting the mediating variable would impact the dependent variable. In sum, the veto by one or more of the P5 directly impacts the use of interventions which would directly impact the behavior of the warring parties. Conflict intensity is often used as a determinant in quantitative research, however, with qualitative analysis, warring party behavior as the dependent variable can offer contextual evidence for the theory. This will also allow there to be more than numerical data collected since different indicators will be used in order to determine the complex variable which is the warring party behavior.

2.3.1. Hypothesis

Figure 3. Hypothesis

H1: When a P5 vetoes a resolution, warring party behavior changes.

The theory and hypothesis will highlight the answer to the research question: how can the use of the veto in the UNSC by one, or more, of the permanent members of the Security Council impact a conflict?

Use of veto by one or more of the P5

Warring party behavior

Intervention in terms of sanctions and peacekeeping

IV DV

Mediating variable

+ Veto cast by P5 member

+ Warring party behavior

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3. Research Design

3.1. Choice of Method

Quantitative studies have many good qualities that make it a good method to use, however, since the field already contains a lot of research using quantitative means, doing a qualitative study would offer a new perspective to this ever-growing field. The type of qualitative study that this paper will use is the structured focused comparison. The structured focused comparison is a kind of qualitative research that has a pre-established set of questions which are asked to the cases, the independent and dependent variables. By having these pre-established questions, the data collected on the cases can increase the knowledge about the phenomena being studied (Powner 2015, p.105).

George and Bennett (2005, p.69) explain the structured focused comparison method in steps; the first step is to find the universe in which the population exists and highlight that; these are the population of cases in which the case will come from. The next step is choosing the case based on the objective of the study and not only because a case can seem of interest to choose (George and Bennett 2005, p.69). The third aspect is that the variables should be of theoretical interest, variables that allow policymakers to help influence their outcome (George and Bennett 2005, p.69). The questions created for each variable should be tailored to it in order to be able to highlight the importance of that variable and how the variable is adding to the research (George and Bennett 2005, pp.69–70).

As with many methods, there will also be control variables which will ensure that the main effect on the dependent variable is coming from the independent variable and not from other variables in the cases. The structured focused comparison method allows for many details about the conflict to be collected in order to have more of an understanding about the case as a whole instead of having a narrow focus on the variables. The time period for these cases will be post- Cold war era in order to limit the population just enough for generalizability, and not have the theory and results be applicable to every case.

3.2. Operationalization

3.2.1. The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this study is warring party behavior. The different indicators used for this variable are violence, conflict intensity, supplies, and recruitment of fighters. The aim

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of these indicators is to gather data on the dependent variable holistically in order to show indicators that can have an effect on the dependent variable.

The analysis of the indicators will help to show how warring party behavior changed throughout the conflict periods. By looking at the changes between the indicators in the two conflict periods, the behavior of the warring parties before and after the veto can be holistically analyzed.

The question remains on how these indicators will measure the dependent variable. With qualitative analysis, it may be difficult to use the indicators since it is a matter of perception and looking at the aftereffects of what happened when an indicator has increased or decreased. The first indicator is violence, using the general umbrella term of violence is of use here since it can help with the qualitative analysis when it comes to analyzing the conflict from all angles as opposed to only one, the battle-related deaths. While violence in itself is a difficult concept to define and measure, some instances that will be used to measure this variable are those of torture, beatings, rapes, kidnappings, and other instances that would be the classified as violence (Rutherford et al. 2007, p.676). This will help in approaching the dependent variable in a holistic manner.

The second indicator is conflict intensity, this indicator, while measured in terms of battle- related deaths, can be helpful in determining the overall change in behaviors. When the number of battle-related deaths in a conflict increases, this can show that the behavior of the warring parties has become more aggressive which has led to battle-related deaths.

The third indicator is supplies, which is the warring parties purchasing/gathering weapons and fuel in order to aid themselves in the conflict. A show of aggression, a type of behavior, is the purchasing of more weapons in order to be well equipped in the conflict. By purchasing fuel, it helps the warring parties with things like travel, but it can also help them by preventing the opposing side from purchasing that fuel in order to support themselves. As the theory outlines, without sanctions imposed by the UNSC, both sides have the capability to purchase weapons and fuel to aid in the fighting.

The next indicator is recruitment of fighters by the warring parties. This is a relevant indicator since the theory outlined by Beardsley, Cunningham, and White (2015) showed that when a resolution is adopted, it prevents the recruitment of fighters due to the presence of the peacekeepers. Without the adoption of the resolution, this means that there are no peacekeepers to

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prevent the recruitment of fighters by the warring parties which means an increase in the number of fighters on either side can be a sign that they have been recruited in order to aid with the fighting.

The behavior with this indicator, as the behavior in the previous indicator, shows that the warring parties are not being limited in terms of recruitment and are trying to gain the upper hand by having more members than their opposing side.

These indicators will aid in the analysis of warring party behavior since they each target different aspects of behavior. A change in behavior connected to the UNSC decision could help to prove the theory; that the use of the veto by one or more of the P5 causes a change in the warring party behavior.

In accordance with the structured focused comparison, the questions asked to the dependent variable are the following.

• Violence

○ Were there different types of violence committed, such as kidnappings, rapes, torture, etc.?

■ This will be measured by looking at different reports by organizations that have reported on the conflict in order to determine what kinds of violence have been committed in order to better measure what the warring parties did.

• Conflict intensity

○ What is the number of battle-related deaths?

■ Since this is a numerical variable, it will help to showcase the number of battle-related in a concise way.

• Supplies

○ Have the warring parties purchased/gathered more weapons and fuel in order to carry on with the conflict?

■ This will be measured by looking at different reports and commentators and monitoring how the purchasing/gathering of weapons and fuel happened.

• Recruitment

○ Have the warring parties recruited more fighters to their cause?

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3.2.2. The Independent Variable

The independent variable is use of the veto by one or more of the P5 in the UNSC. There are various aspects of the variable that need to be taken into account which can help with its operationalization.

In order for there to be a veto an official meeting had to have taken place which would warrant the use of a veto. The cases compared occur in two conflict periods, one before a veto has been given and one after the veto has been given. Any case that is brought to the UNSC is published online for the public to see what happened and what decisions were being made including the results of the vote. In order to accurately measure this variable, the cases used will be looked up and asked a series of questions in accordance with the structured focused comparison in order to determine if they fit in with the theory, the variables, and the scope conditions. Measuring this variable in relation to the method used in this analysis will happen in the form of questions.

The use of the veto is not only in relation to whether or not one or more of the P5 used the veto, but whether or not the Council discussed intervention in terms of sanctions and peacekeeping.

This is because the effect on the warring parties by a veto being used is not a clear explanation, however the effect that the independent variable, use of the veto, has on a mediating variable, intervention in terms of sanctions and peacekeeping missions, that then has an effect on the dependent variable, the warring party behavior, can offer a better explanation of the causal mechanism.

The following questions will be asked to each of the individual cases in terms of their independent variable in order to determine whether or not there was a veto and in turn, whether or not the veto impacted the mediating variable.

• UNSC

○ Has the conflict been taken to the UNSC?

■ The adoption of the agenda; there is a difference between the agenda being adopted and the resolution being adopted

• Veto

○ Has one or more of the permanent members vetoed the resolution?

■ In order to determine if the resolution been adopted by the UNSC.

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3.2.3. The Mediating Variable

The effect on the independent variable which affects the dependent variable is the use of interventions by the UN in terms of sanctions and peacekeeping missions. The way in which this variable works is that the circumstances of the independent variable are coming into play, the meeting is being held, and the discussions during the meeting are relating to interventions in terms of sanctions and whether or not a peacekeeping mission will take place. This variable then affects the dependent variable, which is the warring party behavior. This one variable can show that when discussions including interventions are being held during the UNSC meeting, the warring parties will have a change in behavior and after the UNSC meeting, this behavior will change again since the outcome of the meeting has been released. With the cases to be analyzed, the result will be that one or more of the P5 has vetoed the resolution.

The mediating variable is quite important in this study since it is what helps to explain the outcome in the cases. In order to appropriately use the mediating variable, the operationalization is of the most importance. The warring parties in the conflict already anticipate that the UNSC could involve themselves in the conflict, since as previously mentioned, the increase in intensity of the conflict increases the likelihood that it will be taken to the UNSC (Frederking and Patane 2017; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). As such, it would be easy to deduce that the talk of interventions implies that the warring parties are fearful of what could happen if the UNSC gets involved. However, measuring fear is not feasible since no leader will claim that they are afraid.

However, what could be measured is the pathway which could lead to the fear, the causal mechanism’s mediating variable. By the UNSC adopting the resolution that would allow for peacekeeping missions, the sanctions and peacekeeping missions in place can in themselves be proxies for fear, and as such cause the warring parties to have a change in behavior.

The questions asked to the mediating variable are the following.

• Interventions

○ Has the UNSC discussed different types of interventions that could take place?

■ This question will be answered by looking at the meeting details outlined by the UNSC in order to determine what the UNSC was looking at and considering when the cases came to the meeting table.

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○ Are these different interventions tailored specifically towards sanctions on fighting material and peacekeeping missions?

■ The meeting details of the UNSC look into what actions can be taken if an intervention were to take place.

3.2.4. The Control Variables

Control variables allow for the research that is being conducted to ‘control’ for possible variables that may have an impact on the dependent variable (Powner 2015, pp.112–113). Since this research is looking at how the veto in itself has impacted the behavior of the warring parties, controlling for alternative explanations is important in order to show the variation.

The first control variable is controlling for the political interests of the permanent member states, controlling for whether or not they have stakes in the conflict. This is an important variable to control for since the UNSC is a political body and members do want their own interests represented, as such, controlling for it can show that the variable affecting the dependent variable is the veto, and not the interests of one of the P5. Morphet (1990, p.358) concludes in her research that while the interests of the P5 are represented in UNSC, the aura of legitimacy that is brought by the UNSC makes sure that the peacekeeping missions’ resolutions are still adopted in order to avoid the catastrophes of what a veto could do.

The next control variable is refugee flows. Frederking and Patane (2017) have researched what it takes for a conflict to be taken to the UNSC, and one result was that refugee flows impact the decision. As such, controlling for this variable will be of importance. This is because the more refugees that are generated due to the conflict increases the likelihood that this conflict will be taken to the UNSC and a resolution will be adopted by the Council. This means that controlling for this variable will allow for the study to show how it is not the refugee flows impacting the behavior of the warring parties since controlling for it means the conflict is sent to the Council due to other characteristics of conflicts, for example one of the scope conditions which is 25 battle- related deaths.

3.3. Validity and Reliability

An important aspect of any research is the validity and reliability of its concepts. Validity is the accuracy of the indicator to measure the concept while reliability produces the same results

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for the given cases when multiple researchers preform the analysis (Powner 2015, p.168; pp.170–

171). In quantitative research, reliability is quite high since the analysis is being dealt with in terms of numbers, which can be repeated and yield the same outcome. However, qualitative research generally has a high validity since the concepts are discussed more thoroughly. The method of structured focused comparison gives a kind of edge to this research since the questions can offer greater insight to the variables and help with having more of a holistic perspective on what these variables mean and what it is that they are measuring.

To begin with, if the measurement of a concept measures something other than what was supposed to be measured, then the validity of that concept is low. For the validity of the independent variable, use of the veto by one or more of the P5 in the UNSC. This variable is the act of the veto being used by the P5, who are the only members in the UNSC that can use the veto.

In line with the method of structured focused comparison, there are a set of questions that are asked that ensure that what is being measured, is truly the use of the veto and not another variable. The straightforwardness of this variable means that the measure of it is valid since there is no mistaking what the use of the veto by one or more of the P5 can mean.

For the validity of the dependent variable, warring party behavior, this variable is a little more complex. Since this research is looking at the contextual information that is found on the variables, using different indicators in order to aid with the understanding of the dependent variable can be of use since these indicators highlight how the behavior has changed from one point in the conflict to the next point in the conflict. These different indicators try to be holistic in the sense that they try to capture the different areas in which the behavior of the warring parties can be seen.

Since this variable looks at more contextual data instead of numerical data, having different indicators to help with highlighting the change in the behavior can give relatively high validity.

Moreover, with the structured focused comparison method having the set of questions that are asked to the variables present, with these questions being thorough, that will also help with how the dependent variable is understood while showing that the validity of the variable is high.

Next is reliability; while the concepts that are being used in this research have been outlined in terms of definitions and how they intend to be measured, doing qualitative analysis means that there are certain trade-offs when it comes to reliability. Reliability is yielding the same results for the cases when multiple researches preform the analysis (Powner 2015, pp.170–171), however without numerical data, this might be difficult since concepts in themselves vary in definition and

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interpretation depending on what is being studied. The independent variable in this study is use of the veto, and while this is a simple variable to look at since it is a ‘present/non-present’ variable, its reliability seems to be relatively high. Nonetheless, this is a structured focused comparison which means that there are also questions that are asked to the variables in order to determine if they are present or not. Ensuring that these questions are referenced and explicitly mentioned in the study, taking into account the location of these questions, the reliability for the independent variable remains relatively high.

The dependent variable, warring party behavior, is a different case. Not only are there a set of questions which to an extent provide a certain level of reliability, but there are specific indicators in order to measure the dependent variable itself. These indicators are not often used when looking at warring party behavior due to the fact that different research looks at different variables in their analyses. The indicators for the dependent variable try to show a holistic perspective of what can be taken into account when looking at a change in the behavior of the warring parties while also keeping in consideration the generalizability factor, which means that there are not a lot of indicators as to limit the generalizability of the results. Nevertheless, ensuring that the questions being asked to the dependent variable are easily available to future researchers, and all the data collected on the dependent variable, the reliability of this concept would be relatively medium which can mean that while the results may not be the same every time, they will be in close proximity to one another.

3.4. Case Selection

There is an inherent risk during case selection since these cases will be found using a purposive sampling which means that they are chosen because of their variation in the independent and dependent variables (Powner 2015, p.116); this creates a selection bias in the research since the cases are targeted specifically. However, considering the different control variables and scope conditions, there is a large set of cases in this sample in which one conflict in two different conflict periods will be looked at in order to compare the changes in behavior. Moreover, taking into consideration time constraints, it is important to purposively choose a case.

It is important to keep in mind the difficulty when it comes to selecting these cases. The UNSC does not only look at conflicts with more than 25 battle-related deaths, if it did, the world of conflicts would be very different. According to Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) the UNSC

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considers different types of situations in which the number of the battle-related deaths may be taken into consideration however those are not the only issues brought up to the Council. Records of meetings held at the UNSC including resolutions that have been adopted and those that have not are available online.

One-way selection bias can be handled is by looking at the cases that have been vetoed and randomly selecting one case, ensuring that the scope conditions, mediating variables, and control variables, are taken into consideration. While looking at all of the cases that have been taken up by the UNSC is an important step in order to minimize selection bias, this will take a lot of time.

As such, the meeting draft that is available to see online will be looked at and drawing conclusions from the draft and what is being expected from the resolution will be the way in which a case is selected, in simpler terms using purposive sampling. This is because looking at all of the cases in order to determine what happened, will take a large amount of time. As such, having an overview will allow for there to be less selection bias since that in itself limits the chances that one case is chosen over the other due to greater information being present, more research being done, or a larger focus being placed on one case. Since the end of the Cold war, there have been forty-three vetoes used as a whole by the P5 in the UNSC (Dag Hammarskjöld Library n.d).

In order to find the appropriate cases to use, the record of the draft meeting will have to be looked at, and then checked by the UCDP for the number of casualties in order to keep with the scope condition of 25 battle-related deaths. Since it is unknown how the veto would impact the behavior, any case and agenda that has both the scope conditions and the mediating variables will be taken into consideration. The forty-three cases had discussions of interventions, which is the mediating variable in which this theory is built on. As for the control variables, without going in depth about the cases, in some cases it might be difficult to find out whether or not one of the P5 has a stake in the conflict.

3.4.1. The Cases

The agenda item that was taken to the UNSC which will be the conflict and cases that are looked at in this study is titled ‘the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’; this is otherwise known as the Kosovo conflict of 1998–1999. This agenda was adopted in the UNSC in 1999 in hopes to renew the mandate that was put into place in 1998 which stated that there would be a peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

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(UNPREDEP), and interventions imposed in order to prevent the parties from gathering more supplies (United Nations: Meeting Coverages and Press Releases 1999). While this conflict has a history of being in the UNSC agenda, this is not one of the control variables or scope conditions which makes it an appropriate case to study.

This conflict was selected on the basis of the different independent variable, during-UNSC in which the veto had not been given and post-UNSC in which the veto was given. The dependent variable is the one that will be more thoroughly researched which is why accurate results on the behavior of the warring parties cannot yet be compared. The main reason the cases are not being selected based on the dependent variable is because the dependent variable is what this research is trying to explain. However, using the independent and mediating variables and the scope conditions in order to aid with case selection can help with analyzing the dependent variable in order to make a valid comparison and find accurate results for the research questions. The main difficulty in measuring the dependent variable for this conflict is that soon after the meeting at the UNSC took place, NATO took part in the conflict. This means that the data found on what happened after the conflict is limited to one-month after the UNSC meeting and prior to NATO’s involvement in the conflict since there is roughly a one-month difference between the veto being given and the involvement of NATO.

The way in which this conflict is a representation of two cases is by looking at the unit of analysis, conflict period. The first case is looked at during the UNSC meeting, which is in relation to the meeting which took place on 25 February 1999 (UN Security Council 1999a). Since this meeting is pertaining to the renewal of a mandate that includes intervention, this means that information for this case, during-UNSC, will be collected from 6-12 months prior to the meeting which includes the time in which the first mandate was issued six months prior to the UNSC meeting being studied. This is because the time frame for the duration of the meeting is less than one day and collecting data about what happened in that time is impossible, however collecting data on the events leading up to the meeting, in which the warring parties know what the agenda will be since it is about a mandate renewal that was originally six months long that was issued in August 1998 is manageable. This means that the behaviors of the warring parties must have been on one side while after the meeting in 1999, they were on another side.

The second case in this conflict is the period after the UNSC meeting took place. As aforementioned, the time between the involvement of NATO in March 1999 in the conflict and

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the end of the UNSC meeting in February 1999 is approximately one month. Since the data being collected is on the primary parties of the conflict, including the behavior of NATO would not be of importance. Which means that the collection of the data on the warring parties will have to be collected in the span of one-month, the time between the end of the UNSC meeting and the involvement of NATO. Considering NATO had little to no involvement in the conflict prior to their intervention, data collection and a comparison on how they acted would not be applicable or relevant for the analysis since they had no role prior to the UNSC meeting. Qualitative studies ensure time order which means the collection of data on what happened in the one-month between the veto given and NATO’s involvement gives a richer understanding of the results and analysis.

The following section will look in depth about the background of the conflict and compare the cases to one another in order to determine whether or not the theory is correct and find the answer to the research question: how can the use of the veto in the UNSC by one, or more, of the permanent members of the Security Council impact a conflict?

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4. Results and Analysis 4.1. Background

The roots of this conflict span beyond 1998, however the main issues that will be addressed are about what happened during the conflict years of 1998-1999 that caused a change in the behavior of the warring parties. This section gives a brief overview of the conflict being researched since it is one conflict being studied in two conflict periods.

The main actors in this conflict are the ethnic Albanians which comprise the Kosovo Liberation Army/Ushtria Clirimtare ë Kosovës (KLA/UCK), ethnic Serbians, and the government of Yugoslavia. In 1989, the ethnic Serbs in the area were opposed to the fact that the ethnic Albanians were in demographic control over a region that is held sacred to Serbs (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020). Furthermore, in 1989 leader of the ethnic Albanians initiated a nonviolent protest against the fact that a province in the Serbian province of Kosovo, where the ethnic Albanians were, had constitutional autonomy which was declared by the president of the Serbian republic (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020). Throughout the years, tensions between these two ethnic groups increased and in 1996, the KLA was formed (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020).

In 1998, the KLA could be classified as an armed uprising; various groups in the area were committing various crimes, from paramilitary groups to the Serbian special police (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020). The Yugoslav armed forces intervened in hopes to lessen the violence in the region, however to no avail (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020). One of the long-term aims of the KLA was to unite the Albanian populations in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania; however, the official goal was to make Kosovo independent (UCDP 2019b). In 1998, the conflict escalated quickly, Serbian armed forces were sent to Kosovo in order to help with suppressing the KLA, during this time the number of battle-related deaths rose quickly and became a large issue of concern (UCDP 2019b).

It was after the conflict had increased in intensity that it caught the attention of the international community, the Contact Group, and the UNSC where the UNSC decided to impose an arms embargo on Yugoslavia (UCDP 2019b). The number of battle-related deaths that was recorded by the UCDP (UCDP 2019a) in 1998 is 1235 which classifies it as a war. The meeting in which this was decided happened in July 1998 and it would take effect in August 1998 up until February 1999, the proposed resolution that was presented to the Council stated that there would

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be an increase in UNPREDEP troops and to extend that mandate for six months, in which their task is to monitor the area and borders and to report back to the Secretary-General any developments in arms sales, and other activities that are prohibited under resolution 1160 (UN Security Council 1998a). Resolution 1160 was adopted in March 1998 which regarded an arms embargo in the conflict (UN Security Council 1998b). Despite an embargo being put on the weapons, the violence in the conflict continued which is evident in the number of battle-related deaths recorded by the UCDP.

After six months, the Council was to meet again in order to vote on whether or not the mandate would be renewed since the first mandate which imposed the first UNPREDEP troops was coming to an end. The Council met on 25 February 1999 and discussed the issues that were on the proposed resolution. The same issues applied to the resolution as the past one, troops of the UNPREDEP and still an embargo on weapons would be put into place (UN Security Council 1999b). Unlike the past mandate, this one was not renewed. This agenda, which was not adopted, signified no embargo on weapons and no troops from the UNPREDEP in order to help with the conflict de-escalating.

4.1.1. During-UNSC

With the cases of this analysis being in one conflict, the best way to approach their analyses would be to look at them chronologically. The first stage to look at is 6-12 months prior to the vote at the UNSC. This means that the first item that needs to be looked at is resolution 1160 that took place on 31 March 1998. The representative of Brazil, Mr. Valle stated that sanctions are very important when imposed by the UN, and sanctions have to be approached with caution and only when other options that are outlined by the UN Charter are not enough (UN Security Council 1998c, p.7). The representative from Slovenia, Mr. Turk stated that a solution to the conflict had to come from the parties themselves, however not necessarily by themselves; the push from the international community would help to facilitate the solution (UN Security Council 1998c, p.8).

The representative from China, Mr. Shen Guofang stated that if the international community were to get involved in the conflict without the consent from the conflicting parties, that it would set a bad precedent and may cause complications; he also stated that the draft of the agenda would not help with starting negotiations between the warring parties (UN Security Council 1998c, pp.11–

12).

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The president of the meeting, Mr. Sallah, put the draft resolution to a vote and the resolution received a vote of 14 for the resolution with one member, China, abstaining due to the draft not conforming to the principled position of China (UN Security Council 1998c, p.12). Overall, the meeting is considered to be successful since it ended with the resolution being adopted by the UNSC which meant that interventions in terms of an embargo being placed on weapons was put into place and being placed on all of those involved in the conflict.

The next agenda that was brought to the table 6-12 months before the veto was one that occurred in July 1998 which also resulted in the resolution being adopted by the UNSC. The draft outlined two interventions, sanctions and increasing the number of peacekeeping troops in order to keep the conflict escalating (UN Security Council 1998a). According to the representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the government of Macedonia endorsed the notion of increased troops UNPREDEP (UN Security Council 1998d, p.2). The representative from China, Mr. Qin Huasun stated that China had always been concerned with the conflict in the area of the former Yugoslavia and supports the resolution that would have more peacekeeping troops in the region however acknowledging the sovereignty of and independence of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UN Security Council 1998d, p.2). All fifteen members supported the agenda, and the resolution was passed.

The third meeting that happened took place on 25 February 1999, almost six months after the last meeting in which increased UNPREDEP troops were authorized. The draft of the resolution outlined that the mandate that was issued six months prior which called for more troops should be extended again, however, this resolution was not adopted by the UNSC (UN Security Council 1999a). While the resolution had thirteen votes from the members, the Russian Federation chose to abstain from voting, however China used their veto and blocked the resolution from being passed (UN Security Council 1999a p.5). The Chinese delegation’s representative, Mr. Qin Huasun, explained that while China supports what the UNPREDEP has been doing in the region, they do not support resolutions without an endpoint; conflict had stabilized in the past few months and other regions in the world also required the assistance of the UN and what the UN can offer (UN Security Council 1999a, pp.6–7). Moreover, China holds the stance that each country is sovereign, and the country should be the one to decide their own position (UN Security Council 1999a, p.9). The meeting was concluded with the use of the veto by China, the resolution was not adopted.

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4.1.2. Post-UNSC

After the international community was unable to find a solution to bring the conflict to an end, NATO became involved in the conflict as a secondary party in 1999 (UCDP 2019b). During the time of the conflict, armed fighters from Kosovo managed to illegally enter into Macedonia and hide among the ethnic Albanian population (Hristova and Petkovski 1999, p.76). Weapons were also being illegally smuggled from Albanian to Kosovo which crossed through Macedonia (Hristova and Petkovski 1999, p.76). The case of the Kosovo conflict itself showed that the ethnicity of the citizens played a large role in determining the relations between the parties.

One of the largest issues that comes from looking at this case is that the datasets present give an overview of the deaths which include those that happened when NATO joined as the secondary party in the conflict. Nevertheless, by using the qualitative method, time order can be established which helps in determining exactly what happened in the time after the veto was used and before NATO became involved.

Since there is little information to be found on what happened after the veto and before the involvement of NATO, there is not a lot of information to go through for the background of post- UNSC conflict period. The next section will look at the dependent variable in this study and analyze it. The dependent variable will be looked at on a case-by-case basis. This is because the dependent variable is the variable being thoroughly researched and looked into in order to find an answer to the research question: how can the use of the veto in the UNSC by one, or more, of the permanent members of the Security Council impact a conflict?

By unorthodox means, the next variables will be measured as they are on a variable-by- variable means. The reason that the dependent variable is being measured on a case-by-case basis while the other variables are being looked at as there are is due to the complexity that comes from the dependent variable.

4.2. Warring Party Behavior 4.2.1. During-UNSC

The draft proposal outlined that the renewal of the mandate first issued in 1998 meant there would still be sanctions on weapons and supplies which would limit the warring parties. In

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February 1999 (prior to the UNSC), there were also the negotiations that happened in Rambouillet, France which also did not seem to aid the conflict (Kim 1999).

To begin with, the warring parties themselves must be established. Overall, the relevant warring parties are three; the KLA/UCK which are an Albanian insurgency (HRW 1998), then there is the Yugoslav National Army, the JNA, and the Serbian special police. During this conflict, the JNA and the Serbian police were fighting against the KLA in order to drive out the ethnic Albanians from the region.

The KLA emerged in 1996 in order to stop the Yugoslavian government from occupying Kosovar territory (UCDP 2019b). In order to accurately analyze the behavior of the warring parties, since the independent variable is looked at 6-12 months prior to the UNSC meeting of the veto, the behavior of the warring parties will also be looked at 6-12 months earlier.

The first conflict period to be discussed is during-UNSC in order to determine what the behaviors were like prior to the use of the veto. The behavior of the KLA during this conflict is tricky to summarize since one Human Rights Watch report (1998) states perspectives from the KLA themselves, including what it looked like from an outsider's perspective. From the perspective of the KLA, they did not support the kidnapping of journalists and civilians and when an instance like that occurred, they intervened and set the captives free (HRW 1998). Nevertheless, even with the interventions put into place by the UNSC, there were still various forms of violence taking place. During 1998, the Yugoslav army and the Serbian special police attacked many villages that bordered Kosovo and Albania, this was done as a way to cut off supply routes which up until that point, the routes were being used as a way to bring in arms and new recruits (HRW 1998).

The Human Rights Watch report (1998) goes into detail about the different atrocities that were committed, mainly by the KLA, during the conflict. Many of the violent instances that occurred were rapes, torture, kidnappings, beatings and other forms of violence against the civilians (HRW 1998). Not only were there attacks on civilians, but also on children in the conflict as young as thirteen-years-old (HRW 1998). Moreover, there were also many instances of violence done by the Yugoslav army and the Serbian special police including destruction of infrastructure (HRW 1998). Civilians of Albanian ethnicity were being detained by the Yugoslav army and the Serbian special police (HRW 1998), which shows that the actions taken by the different warring parties was not only those of killings but different forms of violence as well. The different forms

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of violence that happened in this conflict are many, and many of those broke the International Humanitarian Law which states that torture of any kind in a conflict is not allowed (HRW 1998).

The Yugoslav army placed anti-personnel and anti-tank mines across the border shared with Albania, which shows how they were trying to cut off routes into the region and prevent supplies and recruits from aiding the KLA. In mid-1998, those detained were more than just civilians, but also doctors, lawyers, humanitarian aid workers, activists and more; these detainees were abused while being detained (HRW 1998). The Serbian special police also attacked aid convoys which were filled with medical supplies and food which were donated by ‘Doctors of the World’ (HRW 1998).

While the Human Rights Watch (1998) documented what happened by asking those in the KLA, the Yugoslav army and the Serbian special police. Since the information is coming from the side of the warring parties, how accurate can their information be? According to all of the information seen in the report, it can be deduced that the behaviors of the warring parties before the veto took place in 1999 were violence filled, they managed to gain supplies illegally despite the resolution that was put into place, there were various counts of torture despite it being illegal under International Humanitarian Law, civilians and combatants were still being killed, and in terms of recruitment, the KLA were still recruiting people and bringing them over from Albania through illegal routes which were also used for transporting supplies (HRW 1998).

Overall, looking at the different instances that happened prior to the veto by the UNSC, despite different forms of interventions being put into place, the sanctions on weapons and the UNPREDEP troops, weapons were still being smuggled into the conflict regions, the number of the captives increased, many were held captive and suffered different forms of abuses, people were still being recruited and the deaths increased dramatically from 1997 when there was no resolution or conflict in place (UCDP 2019a). Moreover, despite the Human Rights Watch report (1998) looking at the different forms of violence committed by the parties, the dependent variable is the behavior of the warring parties as a whole. Looking at the events prior to the UNSC veto, the behavior shows that despite different interventions and discussions held by the international community, neither side was willing to back down and let the conflict end.

Prior to the involvement of the international community in 1998, there was little action done by them within this conflict as a whole (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2020). There were the Rambouillet talks that happened regarding the Kosovo conflict that

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occurred in early February, prior to the UNSC meeting which held the veto (Kim 1999). However, these talks were not successful since afterwards the UNSC vetoed the resolution and NATO became involved as a secondary party.

4.2.2. Post-UNSC

After the veto in 1999, the UNPREDEP mission ended on February 28^th which meant that there would no longer be any troops in place to help prevent the escalation of the conflict. While much of the data found on the Kosovo conflict after the veto however before the involvement of NATO is scarce, there is still information that can help with the research.

According to NATO, before their involvement in early 1999, the conflict was escalating, the Yugoslav army and the Serbian special police were both using excessive force during the conflict (NATO 1999). During this time there were also efforts of mediation happening in order to help and diffuse the situation, however when these efforts did not see an outcome, the escalation continued to happen (NATO 1999). After the first rounds of the talks in Rambouillet did not succeed, there was a second round in which there was a high chance that the situation would be solved. However, no agreements were signed since those from the Serbian delegation pulled back and did not sign the agreement, unlike the Albanians of Kosovo (NATO 1999). Shortly after this happened in early March 1999, the incompatibility between the parties did not dissipate, the Serbian special police stepped up the attacks against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo which caused many of them to flee the region (NATO 1999). Soon after this happened, the mission by NATO was scheduled on 23 March 1999 and scheduled to begin on 24 March 1999 (NATO 1999).

While there may not be a lot of information to help with collecting the data on what was going on with the warring parties before the invasion on NATO, since their invasion is one of the largest events that took place in 1999, the information that is present in this one-month span of after the veto but before the invasion of NATO is enough to draw some conclusions about the behavior of the warring parties.

4.2.3. Comparison Dependent Variable: Warring Party Behavior

During-UNSC Post-UNSC

A Life in War and Peace

A Life in War and Peace

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables