The impact of populism on foreign policy discourse
A qualitative text analysis of the Brazil-China bilateral relationship before and after the election of Jair Bolsonaro
Lilian Hamill-Keays
Uppsala University, Autumn 2020 Department of Government
Development Studies C (Bachelor Thesis) Thesis Supervisor: August Danielson Word Count: 11 575
Page Count: 38
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ... 4
1.2AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTION ... 5
1.3DISPOSITION ... 5
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 6
2.1POPULISM ... 6
2.2POPULISM IN FOREIGN POLICY ... 9
2.3ROLE THEORY ... 12
2.4HYPOTHESES ... 13
3. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN ... 15
3.1METHODOLOGY ... 15
3.2RESEARCH DESIGN ... 16
3.3SELECTION OF MATERIAL ... 17
3.4ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ... 18
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ... 20
4.1ANALYSIS ... 20
4.1.1PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS ... 20
4.1.2 The Bolsonaro Administration ... 22
4.2RESULTS ... 28
5. CONCLUSIONS ... 33
6. REFERENCES ... 34
Abstract
This study seeks to examine the how populism impacts foreign policy discourse. The study applies role theory to the empirical case of the Brazil-China bilateral relationship in order to observe changes within role conceptions or role prescriptions before and after the election of populist leader Jair Bolsonaro. The research question put forward is
As a result of the election of populist president Jair Bolsonaro, in the case of the bilateral relationship between Brazil and China, has
1) the role conception of Brazil’s own role changed, and if so, how?
2) the role prescription of Chinas role changed, if so, how?
3 hypotheses are developed, based on the chosen definitions of populism, and tested on the material. The chosen materials for the study are speeches and tweets by incumbent presidents or other high-ranking officials. The data has been collected from Brazil’s ministry of foreign affairs website, or the official government website of Brazil. The chosen methodology is a qualitative text analysis. The study finds support for two out of the three hypotheses. These relate to anti-pluralism and anti-elitism as central aspects of populist discourse. The study does not find bad manners to be a key aspect of populist foreign policy discourse. The analysis reveals that the role conception has changed in some ways whilst the role prescription has remained strikingly similar.
Keywords: populism, foreign policy discourse, Brazil, Bolsonaro, role theory
1. Introduction
How do populist leaders conduct their foreign policy? Whilst there is a rapidly growing body of literature discussing and studying populism, the effects of populism on foreign policy remains notably understudied. Plagemann & Destradi (2019) find in their paper “Populism and Foreign Policy: The case of India” that populism actually does not affect the substance of foreign policy as much as it does the style of foreign policy. This study’s basis is built on this conclusion of Plagemann & Destradi by asking the question - how is the style of foreign policy is impacted by populism? What differences can be found in the foreign policy discourse between populist and non-populist leaders?
In order to examine this research problem, it will be applied to the empirical case of Brazil’s bilateral relationship with China, their biggest trade partner. In January of 2019, Brazil elected Jair Bolsonaro, who has been widely titled as a far-right populist president (Daly, 2019). China and Brazil have a long, stable relationship and China has been the number one trade partner for Brazilian exports and imports for the last decade (Zhou, 2019). In 1993, Brazil was the first country to introduce China as a strategic partner and Bolsonaro’s first trip as president was indeed to China (ibid, Cong, 2019). This case is thus fitting for the research problem because (1) The findings of Plagemann & Destradi applies to this empirical case, which makes it a fitting case to further investigate in relation to foreign policy discourse and (2) because of the deep rooted relationship between the two countries, the study is able to adopt a least likely case design.
By closely observing the produced roles in foreign policy discourse, this paper can systematically study if populist leaders produce different sets of roles than non-populist leaders in order to investigate how populism affects foreign policy discourse. The decision to apply role theory is based on the relational aspects of discourse. By applying such a perspective to the international context of foreign policy discourse, the study can consistently measure the construction of roles which directly speak to the actor’s position in the world. It allows for comparison of the discourse produced by Bolsonaro, and the discourse produced by former Brazilian presidents, by highlighting ideas such as authority and hierarchy. Given that previous constructivist research within international relations has shown the effects of foreign policy discourse on the social construction of the states’ national interests, the impact of how states are talked about should not be seen as shallow or unimportant. Rather, it matters because how
state leaders talk about their national interests can eventually constitute what those interests are (Weldes, 1996).
1.2 Aim and Research Question
This paper aims to examine how foreign policy discourse regarding the Brazil-China bilateral relationship has changed as a result of the election of a populist leader, in order to contribute to the existing knowledge on the effects of populism on foreign policy discourse. In order to examine this, the study will adopt a role-theory based analysis and compare Bolsonaro’s foreign policy speeches to those of previous administrations. This will allow us to compare the change in foreign policy discourse regarding the relationship between Brazil and China. All data will be collected from Brazil’s ministry of foreign affairs website, the official government website and tweets from the incumbent presidents. The results will be compared in order to identify changes within the discourse.
The study applies the analytical approach of role theory to measure and compare foreign policy discourse. Furthermore, the study first develops three hypotheses regarding the link between populism and the national role conception, derived from the chosen theoretical definition of populism. The study aims to apply the theoretical background on the empirical data in order to develop categories of interest within populist foreign policy discourse and thus draw conclusions on the accuracy of the hypotheses. The research question put forward is:
As a result of the election of populist president Jair Bolsonaro, in the case of the bilateral relationship between Brazil and China, has
3) the role conception of Brazil’s own role changed, and if so, how?
4) the role prescription of Chinas role changed, if so, how?
1.3 Disposition
Following this introduction, previous research and the current academic debate will be summarized. First, key concepts will be defined, and the theoretical framework used will be explained. Second, the methodology and research design will be discussed before the analytical work is produced. Lastly, the results and some suggestions for further research will be discussed and the conclusions of the paper will be presented.
2. Previous Research and Theoretical Framework
This section is dedicated to give an overview of the academic debate in regard to the research field. Firstly, the theoretical definition of populism will be discussed and why Bolsonaro is considered populist will be justified. Secondly, the academic field in regard to populism in foreign policy will be presented. Finally, role theory will be presented as an analytical tool for the analysis and three hypotheses, derived from the theoretical framework, will be developed.
2.1 Populism
In order to study the effects of populism, it is first necessary to define what populism is.
Populism as a concept is so widely (mis)used when describing vastly contrasting politicians, it almost seems as if anyone could be deemed populist (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Within the academia there are several established definitions commonly used to describe populism, although some scholars argue that the concept should be abandoned altogether (Weyland, 2001). As a result of the theoretical disagreements, populism has ended up as one of the most contested concepts within the social and political sciences, simply because there is a lack of a clear understanding of what populism is (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). In turn this leads to the possibility of authors talking past each other and avoiding criticisms (Weyland, 2001).
Furthermore, populism has been especially influenced by Latin American politics, traditionally alongside of state-centred development and socialism (ibid). Weyland further demonstrates how Latin American populism actually is compatible with a range of different economic doctrines and conceptualizes populism as “a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, noninstitutionalized support from large numbers of unorganized followers” (ibid, p. 18).
Authors like Moffitt & Tormey define populism as a “political style” with features such as
“appeal to ‘the people’; crisis, breakdown, threat; and ‘bad manners’”, which allows for clarifications within common disparities that previous definitions have encountered (Moffitt &
Tormey, 2014, p. 382). Further the authors discuss how populism as a style usually involve a
“proclaimed rapport with “the people”, a “them-and-us” mentality and (often, though not necessarily) a period of crisis and mobilization” (ibid: 387). These concepts will be further elaborated upon in table 1.1. The authors point to the political arena, claiming that it is increasingly stylized, as “aesthetic or performative” features grow more important, and that is
how one can identify populism (ibid: 388). The academic debate regarding whether populism is best defined as a strategy or a style relates to the intention of the populist; whilst style emphasizes aspects of discourse and expressive language, strategy refers to the utilized methods and instruments of gaining political power and as Mudde & Kaltwasser (2012, p. 9) point out, if the populist truly believes in their message or whether it is merely a strategic tool is a question empirical research will never be able to answer (Weyland, 2001, p. 12).
Other influential approaches to populism has been as a political discourse that divides society into two camps “the power bloc” versus “the people” (Laclau, 1977) or a set of ideas that entails two core elements: anti-elitism and anti-pluralism (Müller, 2016). These definitions have all contributed to the study of populism, and our collective understanding of what populism is.
Whilst many scholars disagree on what definition is most useful, they agree on some core ideas and characteristics of populism. Based on such logic, Mudde & Kaltwasser identify that, at least in part, all established definitions of populism share a notion of a confrontation between
“the people” and “the establishment” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 8). In this regard, the authors embark on defining populism in minimal terms as
“a thin centred ideology that considered society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt political elite’, and
which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte générale (general will) of the people” (ibid).
The authors further explain “thin ideology” as “a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts, which implications are that populism can be attached to other ideologies, be they thick (e.g. liberalism, socialism) or thin (e.g. ecologism, nationalism)” (ibid, p.9). It is critical to separate populism from the host ideology it may attach itself to, such as radical right parties in Europe or state-centred development in Latin America (e.g. Perón) and thereby distinguish populism from features that might often arise with it, but is not a part of it - admittedly not an easy task (ibid, p.2).
For the purpose of this study, all though all definitions will be present within the analytical work, the two main definitions used will be that of Mudde & Kaltwasser, as a thin-centred ideology and that of Moffitt & Tormey, as a political style. These two definitions correspond with the logic of this study, by relating populism to foreign policy discourse in a fruitful
manner. Considering that a leader can for example use “bad manners” more or less, this paper will analyze patterns of discourse to discover how these concepts may affect foreign policy discourse, and thereby it is important to assess the “level” of populism in the analyzed statements, as one statement may be more or less “populistic” in character. As Moffitt &
Tormey state -their definition is not an ideal type, rather, it is the sum of the parts that constitute a populist leader.
In the case of Bolsonaro, he is widely considered populist, not least in the media. The most obvious point is Bolsonaro’s attempts to represent himself as a political outsider, despite his long career in Congress (Daly, 2019). His presidential campaign presented a narrative of a political outsider that will reform the corrupt political system in Brazil, the same system that Bolsonaro has not only been part of, but thrived within for many years (ibid, p.18). During his election speech, Bolsonaro constructed a clear image of the corrupt political elite in Brazil and promised to “clean up politics” (Miranda, 2019). He has furthermore been titled populist for undermining democratic ideals, for example by stating his admiration of the military dictatorship or suggesting that police officers should earn bonuses for each person they shoot (ibid, 19). He is also known for bad manners, because of endless sexist statements and tweets (Forrest, 2018). Because of these reasons, Bolsonaro falls under the given definitions of populism.
TABLE 1.0 CONCEPTS:
Main aspects of Mudde & Kaltwasser’s aswell as Moffitt & Tormey’s definition of populism Anti-elitism Fierce critiques of (political) elites.
“two homogeneous and antagonistic groups,
‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’”
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012).
Anti-pluralism Populist leader claim to speak for the
people, and that they alone can represent the people (ibid)
Bad manners “A function of the appeal to ‘the people’ as
the arbiters of ‘common sense’, the ‘way forward’, and of the urgency of the matters with which populist figures are concerned is a coarsening of political discourse. Much of populists’ appeal comes from their disregard for ‘appropriate’ ways of acting in the political realm” (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014:
392)
Crisis, threat, breakdown “Populism gets its impetus from the perception of crisis, breakdown or threat”
(Moffit & Tormey 2014 see Taggart, 2000).
“This relates to a more general distrust of the complex machinery of modern
governance” (Moffit & Tormey, 2014: 292) Appeal to the people “’The people’ is both the central audience of
populists, as well as the subject that
populists attempt to ‘render present’ through their performance.” (ibid: 391).
2.2 Populism in Foreign Policy
Even though studies regarding populism are more and more common, the effects of populism on foreign policy is notably understudied. Populist foreign policy is often the topic of news
articles and debates, but there is a clear lack of systematic analysis of populism in foreign policy. Plagemann & Destradi (2019, p. 283) investigate in their study “if there actually is anything like a specifically “populist” foreign policy, and if so, what its features might be”.
Aiming to find out what can be expected as the outcome on foreign policy as a result of populism, the authors examine the case of India qualitatively.
The study concludes that populism does not have an immediate impact on the “substance” of foreign policy. However, it seems to impact the style and processes of foreign policy making (ibid, p. 297). Communication can for example be expected to occur in new formats, as marginalization of traditional media may diminish foreign actors’ capacity to understand state action. As populists are superior in using direct communication primarily through social media, aimed at a domestic audience, the style and the process of foreign policy can eventually impact the substance of foreign policy. In this way the discursive nature of foreign policy can have consequences in the substance of foreign policy.
The authors define populism based on Mudde & Kaltwassers definition, as a thin centred ideology with core elements of anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. Plagemann & Destradi state that
“Given the “thin” character of populism, its impact seems to be filtered by other structural factors, such as a state’s position in the global political and economic landscape” (ibid, p.298).
It seems as though the “thick” elements of ideology, for example Hindu Nationalism, interplays with the populist elements of politics. Furthermore, structural factors such as the degree of international authority a populist state is subjected to is found as a key aspect of populist skepticism of multilateral institutions. For example, western populists often regard multilateral institutions like the EU as a limitation, portraying themselves as defenders of sovereignty against a transnational, elitist bureaucracy. In contrast, non-western populists find it much more difficult to portray multilateral institutions in this manner, especially in countries’ where multilateral engagement can be shown to further the country’s international status (ibid, p.297).
The focus on the “needs of the people” is found to be a rhetorical tool, and in the case of India, this is displayed by the populist government's willingness to compromise on issues regarding global governance (ibid, p. 297). Quoting Müller (2016), the authors point out that populists adopt a caretaker attitude towards a more or less passive people, and claim this might be even more relevant in the case of foreign policy, as it is even further from the political base and public scrutiny than domestic politics (ibid, p.297). To clarify, populist governments can use
the needs of the people as a rhetorical tool, despite it not holding much substance in actual policies, especially as it relates to foreign policy. The desire to be respected in the international community is prioritized over the promise to the people.
Furthermore, the authors find communication style and personalistic leadership as an important factor of populist foreign policy which may in fact affect the outcome of policies. They conclude that the centralization of decision-making needs more systematic research. Because the strategy of populist leaders to circumvent traditional and established ministries and bureaucracies, it may have certain effects on the foreign policy. Personalistic leadership will incentivize foreign governments to establish a personal relationship with the populist leader.
Centralization can also lead to prioritization on foreign policy issues and bottlenecks as a result of fewer decision makers and “[...] populist’s foreign policy may become less comprehensive and consistent in terms of both the effective pursuit of issues globally and the cultivation of bilateral relationships, when compared to a non-populist government” (ibid, p. 298).
Similarly, Verbeek & Zaslove (2015) have studied the influence of populist radical right parties on foreign policy in Italy. Specifically, they investigate how populist radical right (PRR) parties that are part of a coalition government affect foreign policy. One key finding is that PRR parties do not always adopt a clear position in regard to foreign policy, because the party may give concessions in order to facilitate other political goals, such as protecting farmers and industries (ibid, p. 543). At the core of populism is “the people”, and so foreign policy is not inherently anti globalist, rather, it seeks to accommodate what globalization can do to protect the people.
Therefore, populist parties may change position in regard to foreign policy issues because of what it can do for their core interests. When investigating the foreign policy, one must consider the core ideology of the populist party. The findings of Verbeek & Zaslove is largely in line with that of Plagemann & Detsradi, as both studies find that populism does not directly influence foreign policy in an expected, or predictable manner.
Populism does not seem to have a direct effect on the substance of foreign policy, instead communication and style of foreign policy is considerably influenced. It is thus interesting to identify how the communication or style is affected. The state, represented by individuals who inhabit offices within state positions, play a key role in the construction of the states’ position in the world. In order to study how the communication is influenced, the study examines the construction of role conceptions and prescriptions.
2.3 Role theory
Role theory is commonly used within foreign policy analysis. This essay will use the definition of Harnisch et al. of role theory, who claim that in any given social situation, there are patterns of expected behavior and purpose in that situation (Harnisch, 2011). This purpose is what becomes one’s role, which is further influenced by one’s own expectation of the role, coupled with what others expect your role to be. Other’s expectations of your role are titled role prescriptions. Once an actor has a perception of their role and a perception of other roles in relation to theirs, they will have established their role conception. Lastly, role performance refers to the actual policy behavior of the actor. This study focuses on role conceptions rather than role performance.
Role theory as an analytical tool analyzes agency and behavioral patterns in relation to social structures. It is especially useful when studying language, as changes within roles are signaled through language. This essay works from a constructivist understanding of role theory. Arguing that international relations are produced through interaction between state actors, constructivists mean that leaders base their decisions on their social relations, rather than the
“material hardware”. In Wendt’s (1992) “Anarchy is what states make of it”, he argues that the international system is anarchical, but states’ interpretation of what the anarchical structure does to state behavior is flexible. The influences on national interests are social and, in part, products of the identities states acquire through participating in the international system (Wendt,1992; Hurd, 2008). As Bengtsson and Elgström (2012) discuss, role theory has an advantage in that it allows for an analysis of a state’s foreign policy within international relations. As an analytical concept it clarifies and defines agency and behavioral patterns in relation to social structures. And through the constructivist approach it explores interpretations of contexts, allowing us to focus on one or a few leaders to analyze foreign policy (Breuning, 2011). In summary, a leader’s perception of the state’s goal will determine how the state acts in a given social situation, even if the perceived national interest of the leader differs from that of its people. Through mapping discursive patterns of a leader, these perceptions convey the states’ role conceptions within a social situation.
Thus, drawing on these assumptions, this essay examines discursive patterns to investigate whether populist leaders produce different sets of roles than non-populist leaders. By systematically examining the discourse of Bolsonaro, and comparing it to previous leaders, this
essay hopes to convey how populism effects foreign policy discourse. Through studying the relational aspects of discourse, role theory can illuminate elements such as power-relations, that directly impact the states position in the world and states relation to each other. By understanding power as a concept that can be applied within foreign policy analysis and role theory, this essay can compare and measure an actor’s position in the international arena. For example, power as a concept highlight’s ideas of authority and hierarchy, by describing a super- subordinational system, where those with legitimate power stand above their subordinates in the social hierarchy. By applying power to the Brazil-China case, it illuminates Bolsonaro’s own role perception of the state of Brazil in relation to China and to the world.
2.4 Hypotheses
Based on the main definitions of populism used in this thesis, populism is best analyzed by observing two core elements: anti-elitism and anti-pluralism, which incorporates the other three concepts presented in table 1.0. These core elements could be expected to express themselves through certain types of characteristics, thus creating a clear role conception of the state itself, and role prescription of others. It is likely that the roles produced by populist leaders are distinctly different from those of non-populist leaders. Considering the international context, anti-elitism (conceptualized as the separation of society as two antagonistic group and the
“tendency to depict the will of the “people” as good and elites as “evil”), may take on new
“international” forms; thus this paper hypothesizes that populist leaders may abandon the strategy of presenting themselves as “one of the people”, in favor of presenting their state as
“one of the good one’s”. Therefore, the confrontation between the establishment and the people may translate into a confrontation within the international arena, where a populist leader seeks to divide the world into two antagonistic groups and depict them as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ states.
The first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: populist leaders will adopt a bipolar world view by dividing the international system into two separate and antagonistic groups; good and bad states.
Secondly, based on Moffitt & Tormey, this thesis theorizes that populists should be more likely to involve “bad manners” in their rhetoric, which refers to “their disregard for ‘appropriate’
ways of acting in the political realm” (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 392). In the international context, this may refer to the titles used when addressing other world leaders or other ‘polite
manners’ that are used in international relations to reflect respect between countries. Thus, the role prescription may change drastically as a result of a populist leader, by involving “bad manners” in the form of unconventional role descriptions. The disregard of ”traditional behavior” does not necessarily always refer to being rude or mean – it can be expressed in many ways, as long as the statements includes some sort of disregard of the political norms it is considered to be “bad manners”. The second hypothesis is:
H2: Populist leaders are more likely to disregard traditions within foreign policy etiquette.
Lastly, due to the anti-pluralistic nature of populism, and the so called “appeal to the people”
as a core element of populism, described in both definitions, it is likely that populist leaders will be less willing to prioritize global goals over those of their own interests, even if it results in costs to the state in blood and treasure. Based on Kinnvall (2004), who theorize that nationalists experience ontological security by upholding stable identities and settled truths, this study applies such logics to the nature of anti-pluralism and its appeal to populists. E.g. in order to seek “security of the self”, the populist leader desire a stable national identity of its people. Based on such logic, coupled with the idea that multilateral institutions stand in the way for the populist leader and their people by including rules that may constitute further constraint for the leader to maneuver, this paper hypotheses that multilateralism and multinational institutions may be less prioritized as a result of a populist leader. Therefore, one might expect to see critical statements in regard to any multinational cooperation or organizations. It may also be present within the non-discursive analysis by being ignored completely. The third hypothesis is:
H3: Populist leader favor bilateral relationships over multilateral ones, by undermining multilateral organizations’ or ignoring them completely.
3. Methodology and Research Design
This following section will present and discuss the methodology itself, the selected material and the analytical framework. As presented in the theory section of this study, the study builds on a solid theoretical base. All methodological decisions will be justified throughout this section, in order to answer the research question in a satisfactory manner.
3.1 Methodology
The chosen method for this study is a qualitative text analysis. Qualitative text analysis is beneficial for two main reasons, firstly, because the core of the text is assumed to be something different than the “sum of the parts”. Secondly, the chosen methodology is useful when the investigator is searching for hidden meanings that require close and detailed examination of the data (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 212). Qualitative text analyses are generally beneficial when analyzing the process of creating different meanings. Further, meanings are not given, but produced in a social context (ibid). This study does not intend to analyze whether or not meanings and ideas are true in the sense that they represent the world in a correct or good manner, rather the study is interested in the meanings themselves and what they mean for the social context (ibid).
This study specifically employs a systematic text analysis, which aims to bring order to a research problem by systematically categorizing results in an understandable manner and highlighting structures of meanings and ideas. This can be done in various ways, first some parts of the text are identified as most important to the analysis than others. This is done by asking the text a set of questions that will together constitute the solution to the research problem (ibid). In this case, the questions will be presented in the analytical framework part of this section. The questions are designed to highlight role conceptions and role prescriptions within the data and are related to the proposed hypotheses – e.g. what evidence can be found within the text to negate or confirm the hypotheses. The evidence found in the text will be considered in relation to the role it represents and the context in which it takes place. Evidence can also be the lack of statements. Role theory and systematic text analysis are both useful within qualitative case studies, such as this.
3.2 Research Design
The study is of a comparative case study design in which the construction of roles in foreign policy is compared over time in a descriptive manner. The case of Brazil's role perception and role conception within the bilateral relationship with China will be systematically studied in order to answer the research question. The public discourse of the Bolsonaro administrations will be compared to the previous three administrations in order to ensure reliability in the results.
The qualitative design of the study enables the study to distinguish between the aspects of discourse that directly relates to populism, and broader ideological elements. The design of the study does lend some of the work to the researcher’s imagination, for example by subjectively interpretating the material. The analytical framework is designed to minimize problems that may follow, but it is still important to mention the risks with employing this method and through transparency and open discussion of findings and reflections the study decreases chances of negative effects (ibid: 224-228)
There are some limitations to this study. Firstly, the study is limited in its ability to empirically generalize the results to other cases. Because of the strong economic and structural ties between the two countries and their long relationship, this study argues that the study can claim some generality to the results. It follows the “least-likely” logic, presented in Esaiasson et al. (p. 160), which concludes that in critical case studies, if the empirical case is considered to have the worst possible circumstances and still holds true, it can be argued to have some generalizing capacity. To clarify, this study argues that because of the strong and stable relationship between Brazil and China, it is most unlikely to change drastically as a result of Bolsonaro’s election.
If this study can prove that populism in fact did result in differences within foreign policy discourse – it is more likely to be the case even in other cases. However, the study is still limited in its ability to generalize, it has a basic generalizing ambition. There is always a clear risk that this case cannot reflect other situations, which often is the case in qualitative case studies. The study is still valuable in its contribution to the current knowledge within the research field.
Another limitation relates to the data. Even though all available data from the state websites is considered, speeches from the current administration of Bolsonaro is vastly more accessible than from previous administrations. For example, only two speeches are included from the Lula
administration. In addition, the data is not examined in the original language of Portuguese, instead the study relies on the translation of the government website. Moreover, Bolsonaro has occupied office for just over one year, which renders the material available limited. Because of the time frame, the study is limited in its ability to identify long term trends in discourse and relies on speeches from within this limited time frame to find compelling evidence as a base for the study’s conclusions. Lastly, the analysis will be limited to the president him or herself and high-ranking officials of the administrations, such as the minister of foreign affairs. The included administrations are those of Lula (2003-2010), Dilma (2011-2016), Temer (2016- 2018) and Bolsonaro (2019- current).
3.3 Selection of Material
The selected material of this study is speeches and tweets from incumbent administrations during their time in office. The selected material are all available speeches that mention or deal with the bilateral relationship between Brazil and China. Even speeches with a slight mention of their relationship are part of the study. The speeches are found by searching for “China” on the website and sorting through all results. Speeches are transcribed and available on the official government website of Brazil and the ministry of foreign affairs of Brazil’s website.
The speeches are considered to be especially significant for several reasons. The biggest one is that the speeches are considered to be official remarks made by the president or other high ranking officials, thereby they are considered to be more representative of the “actual” foreign policy position of the current administration- in other words, the Brazilian foreign policy decision makers’ role conception. Furthermore, the speeches are comparable over time in the sense of language, length and importance. Finally, by collecting data from the source directly the study ensures that misinformation and misquotes are avoided. By including all available speeches, the chance of missing something relevant in minimized, however, not all speeches are weighted equally. The speeches that directly add to the role conception of Brazil, or the role perception of China, are of most importance to the study.
To contribute to the study, tweets will be included in the analysis as well. To enhance and possibly nuance the analysis of populists influence on foreign policy, it is beneficial to include all available data which informs the study of discursive trends. Furthermore, including tweets enables the analysis to consider how the discourse changes in relation to the intended audience which will improve the possibilities for complex analysis. The speeches are taken from a
controlled and institutionalized setting, whilst the tweets are widely more accessible and open, which likely will significantly influence statements; an aspect taken into consideration throughout the analysis. Furthermore, including tweets allows for further triangulation by comparing material from several sources, which will nuance and enhance the analysis of the study. It is of importance to point out that some tweets are included that were posted before Bolsonaro was elected office, these are simply included to illustrate discursive changes in rhetoric. Tweets from politicians who are not elected at the time of the tweet, are not part of the study itself. In conclusion, the analytical scope is far larger if both sources of data are included.
There are no statements included from interviews or news media. The main reason is that the study is interested in the intended narrative constructed by the administrations directly. That is why all included data is directly from the source itself and therefore it is not filtered through the narrative of a reporter or other types of media. Secondhand sources may influence or affect how the speaker is able to present their intended narrative and thereby affect the outcome of the results. Furthermore, it avoids the material to be misrepresentative by a secondary source that could affect how or what narrative is being told.
3.4 Analytical framework
As discussed in the methodology section, most critical text analysis needs to prioritize certain statements of the text as the most valuable parts of analysis. Esaiasson et al. (2017: 216) describe asking the text a set of systematic questions, derived from the research problem and aim of the thesis. The questions that have been created are based on the hypotheses and are designed to highlight role-relations of the actors. All questions are asked in an open-ended manner, in order to allow for diverse and authentic analysis. In such a way, the questions enable the analysis to systematically identify empirical indicators.
H1: Populist leaders will adopt a bipolar world view by dividing the international system in to two separate and antagonistic groups; “good” and “evil” states.
• What subjects are represented, mentioned or produced?
• How is the world depicted in relation to China and Brazil?
• What characteristics are represented?
These questions are designed to capture elements of super – subordination within the relationship. Its open approach also allows for unexpected roles to be identified and analyzed in relation to populism. Subjects include countries, people, organizations and other actors.
H2: Populist leaders are more likely to disregard traditions within foreign policy etiquette.
• How do the leaders address each other and does is change in regard to the incumbent president?
• How is the bilateral relationship portrayed?
• What goals are represented? What are presented obstacles to the goals?
These questions relate directly to bad manners as a theoretical concept. As bad manners can take different forms, the questions are designed in a very open manner. With this design the analysis can capture descriptions related to political norms.
H3: Populist leader favor bilateral relationships over multilateral ones, by undermining multilateral organizations’ or ignoring them completely.
• What multilateral engagements are mentioned and in what context?
• From what perspective are actors and ideas represented?
• Within what (historical) context are ideas produced?
These questions are also designed to identify what is left unsaid. All references to multilateral engagements are included in the question in order to capture all possible empirical indicators. The questions provide an understanding for historical context that may affect role conceptions and prescriptions.
4. Results and Analysis
The analysis will be structured as follows: first, all roles found within the data will be presented and justified through quotes from the material. Roles found in the data from previous administrations will be presented first, followed by roles found in the data from the current Bolsonaro administration. The roles will be categorized and compared. Secondly, results of the proposed hypotheses and research question will be presented. Finally, the paper will present its final conclusions.
4.1 Analysis
4.1.1 Previous administrations
CHINA AS AN INVESTOR –
“And with that in mind, I invite all Chinese investors to join us in building this new Brazil”
(Temer adm., 2/9/2016).
The bilateral relationship between China and Brazil is first and foremost described as a business relationship. It is clear that the aim of most meetings and speeches is to increase trade between the countries. China is given the role of “the investor”, and areas of investments are discussed such as infrastructure, science and technology. The bilateral relationship is portrayed as strong and full of potential for further economic opportunities. It is of interest to note that no extraordinary differences can be found in this role prescription, when comparing the Dilma, Lula and Temer administration. All administrations construct the same relationship, consistent of the same identities - a strong business relationship with Chinese investment at the core of the relationship. The statements demonstrate that China has been Brazil’s main trading partner and a strategic partnership. The two countries have a deep-seated relationship that has anchored itself in Brazilian markets through deep economic ties and intertwined investments as well as exports and imports.
“China is Brazil’s first trading partner and with a view to intensifying our exchange, we have approved several important measures” (dilmabr, 2015)
“The United States continues to be a very strong and important partner. No longer the most important. The most important now is China; the second one is Argentina [...]” (Lula adm., 22/11/2010).
CHINA AS A POLITICAL ACTOR AND ROLE MODEL
“We hope that we will all be, as China already is, very successful” (Temer adm., 2/9/2016).
It is telling to contrast the self-representation of Brazil, to the presented role of China.
Presenting Brazil as an “improving” state in regard to domestic politics, by mentioning internal struggles within the country, asserts the position of Brazil in the international arena in contrast to China, who is portrayed as a role model or a powerful actor. There are some indicators that China is portrayed as superior (to some degree). Within this construction of the world, a power dynamic can be identified, where China is identified as a strong player, and the national interest of Brazil is thus to befriend China and expand businesses between the countries. However, there are some contrasting statements in the data. For example, Temer tweets “A year ago, here in China, I was talking about the Brazilian economic recovery. I can say that the mission is being accomplished. Brazil is back” (micheltemer, 2017) which does not necessarily contrast to a hierarchical relation between the two countries, but it indicates changes within his own perception of the world and Brazil's place in it.
Temer also addresses policy areas such as Brazil’s commitment to multilateralism and the Paris Agreement in speeches. These policy issues and broader statements in regard to the domestic politics show how previous administration have put emphasis on the internal politics of the country in the construction of their relationship with China. By presenting aspects of domestic policies that relate to the states foreign policy, the broader ideology of the administration is exposed.
CHINA AS AN ALLY
“Ladies and gentlemen, you will always have an ally in the Brazilian government” (Temer adm., 2/9/2016).
By stating allegiance to China, Temer signifies a “special relationship” beyond economic ties.
Explicitly stating Brazil as a Chinese ally sends a clear message in regard to their bilateral relationship. It displays a trust in the relationship. Only Temer addresses China directly as an ally, but Dilma speaks of China as a friend and “an important strategic partner for Brazil” and Minister José Serra of the Dilma administration states that “priority will be given to the relationship with new partners in Asia, particularly with China,[...]” (Dilma adm., 8/1/2015).
Lula, as mentioned before, states that that China is Brazil’s most important partner, before Argentina and the United States. The relationship is labeled as a “friendship” in almost all of the speeches, which of course could be polite tradition, but it also indicates that the relationship between the countries goes beyond their business ties.
CHINA AS PART OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH
“I mean, there was no one from Mars or from the Moon that would see the world as necessarily the north being on top and the south being at the bottom. This is purely prejudice.” (Lula adm., 22/11/2010).
Lula opens one of his speeches by telling a story about a map that hangs in his office where north is at the bottom of the map, and south is at the top, in order to promote the South-South cooperation. The bilateral relationship of Brazil and China is considered, and addressed, as a part of the South-South cooperation. The name “South-South” cooperation implies that China is considered to be part of a “us” subject-position, where north is considered to be “them”. An implication is the underlying narratives of a world representation that is divided between
“south” and “north” or “developing” and “developed”.
“It should be noted that we have designed the CELAC-China Forum as a new instrument of South-South cooperation, a cooperation modality to which the Brazilian government gives clear priority and whose validity and importance are increasingly recognized.” (Dilma adm., 8/1/2015).
“The fact is that the search for development is a trait that unites us all” (Temer adm., 5/9/2016).
4.1.2 The Bolsonaro Administration
CHINA AS AN INVESTOR
“The Brazilian government will continue to welcome Chinese investments in Brazil”
(Bolsonaro adm., 13/11/2019).
In regard to their business relationship, China is primarily portrayed as an investor and Brazil as an investment opportunity. The policy issues mentioned in the data are many; expansion and cooperation on the development of graphene & niobium, privatizations, railroads, ports, airports, oil production, gas, mining and energy projects. In all of these areas the narrative presented is that of a growing business relationship and expansion of the already existing cooperation and trade between the countries. Furthermore, Bolsonaro portrays Brazil as a world leading country through statements like “Brazil has been regaining its confidence in the world.
There is no country that does not want to talk to us” (Bolsonaro adm., 25/10/2019) and “Brazil expects, in the coming decades, to be among the largest oil producers in the world” (Bolsonaro adm., 13/11/2019), confident statements that portray Brazil as an equal to China. It is of interest that Bolsonaro portrays China as both an equal and an investor, as opposed to previous administrations that indicated a more hierarchical relationship.
Minister of foreign affairs Ernesto Araujo outlines the approach of the current administration, stating “But I am convinced that a much more assertive Brazil, a country speaking with its own voice and not just dubbing in someone else’s, will be a much better partner-in trade and in any other area” (Bolsonaro adm., 7/1/2019). These statements support meanings found throughout speeches; Brazil is a growing global power. The construction of such an identity has implications for Brazils position in the world; it displays a desire for further international influence, by being more assertive. By constructing these two narratives; China as an investor and Brazil as a global player, the administration can represent the power dynamics within the relationship as equal. Brazil and China are equally dependent on each other, and therefore Brazil does not have to take the role of a “developing country”, instead it enables Bolsonaro to portray China as both an investor and as an equal.
XI JINPING AS A FRIEND
“I will have the pleasure of personally shaking hands with President Xi” (Bolsonaro adm., 25/10/2019).
Throughout the speeches Bolsonaro and his administration portray the bilateral relationship between the countries as positive. Bolsonaro speaks directly to a personal relationship between the two presidents that goes beyond the country’s borders. He describes a personal relationship between the two presidents. As Plagemann & Destradi (2019, p.298) discuss in their paper, populist leaders tend to prefer personal relationships and can circumvent traditional institutions in favor for establishing a “a personal rapport on the leadership level”. These statements are indicators of such a personal style of discourse, which can affect the process of policy making.
Prioritizing a personal relationship undermines the traditional institutions of democracy, furthermore - a personal relationship between top leaders is highly unpredictable in nature and thus increases uncertainty (ibid, p. 298). Whilst the other administrations also dub China as
“friend” or “friendly state” the emphasis is not on the leader’s personal relationship.
“This morning, in a telephone call with the President of China, Xi Jinping, we reaffirmed our bonds of friendship, exchanging information and actions on the covid-19 and expanding our commercial ties” (jairbolsonaro, 2020)
CHINA AS A ROLE MODEL
“No one respect such behaviour, and you don’t reach good trade deals when there is no respect.
Look at China. China unapologetically defends its system, asserts its national interests and identity, it's specific ideas about the world-and everyone does more and more trade with China.
Why should other countries be required to sign up to certain ideas before being considered good trade partners?” (Bolsonaro adm., 7/1-2019).
This speech is arguably aimed at the domestic audience, by the use of the word “our”. The administration clearly portray socialism as the biggest threat to Brazil, mentioning Venezuela and Cuba as threats to “peace and security” whilst China is portrayed as a role model or model state for behavior within foreign policy. Furthermore, Araujo attacks western states and claims that western states, academia and media are controlling the people’s “thoughts”, which represents some of the typical trends within populist discourse. For example, attacking traditional media outlets and circumvention of established institutionalized bureaucracies whose purpose it is to manage and guarantee continuity within foreign policy. By attacking western states, Araujo creates an antagonistic narrative. Bolsonaro further adds to such a
narrative in his UN speech, where he refers to some states as having a “colonialist spirit” which can be an indication of populist discourse in foreign policy. China, in contrast to the west, respects sovereignty- according to the produced representations.
“First of all, I would like to say, Mr. Chunhua, I want to thank the words of your ambassador in Brazil recognizing our sovereignty over the Amazon region, in the episode that took place recently, on the occasion of the G7 meeting” (Bolsonaro adm., 25/10/2019).
“I thank, once again, Your Excellency, the position adopted by the Chinese government on the occasion of recent question about Brazilian sovereignty and the Amazon Region” (Bolsonaro adm., 13/11/2019).
In summary, there are several important findings within the data. First, many striking similarities are found within the speeches conducted by leaders within foreign policy and the presidents themselves - the most striking similarity is that in all speeches, regardless of administration, China is considered as an investor in Brazil. Encouraging and nurturing the business ties between the countries is presented as the number one priority throughout the data - constructing a clear role perception; China as a close business partner, and important future relationship.
TABLE 2.0: ROLES FOUND IN THE DATA Previous
Administrations
The Bolsonaro
Administration Summary of the results China as the
“investor”
China as the
“investor”
All administrations consider China as an investor. Business is at the core of the bilateral relationship. The national interest is to trade with China. It has not changed as a result of the election of Bolsonaro.
China as a regional political actor
- Previous administrations are more likely to discuss multilateral engagements. Some indicators point towards Bolsonaro preferring bilateral relationships, like the lack of acknowledgment of multilateral engagements.
China as a role model
China as a role model
China is addressed as a role model by both the Bolsonaro administration and previous ones. The way in which the administrations construct the relationship differs in some ways - e.g. previous administrations describing a hierarchical relationship, and Bolsonaro describing the countries as equals.
China as an ally China as an ally All administrations construct a relationship of allegiance in different ways through clear statements that go beyond that of a business relationship.
China as part of the global south
- The “South-South” cooperation is never mentioned by Bolsonaro.
Instead, he refers to the relationship as a bilateral relationship between Brazil and China, whilst the South-South cooperation include multilateral engagements.
- Xi Jinping as a friend Some indications are found that Bolsonaro prefer a personal relationship with Xi Jinping. Whilst all administration mentions the states friendship, Bolsonaro seems to focus on the leader’s personal relationship, rather than the states.
ROLE CONCEPTION - BRAZIL’S POSITION IN THE WORLD
One clear finding within the data relates to the role conception of Brazil, referring to the actor’s own consideration of its place, position and behavior; Bolsonaro clearly portrays Brazil as a world leading state, confident that Brazil is an important actor in the international arena.
Statements such as “There is no country that does not want to talk to us” (Bolsonaro adm., 25/10/2019) and “Brazil expects, in the coming decades, to be among the largest oil producers in the world” Bolsonaro (13/11/2019) is able to portray a clear image of a powerful Brazil.
Political discourse is always a tactical behavior, representing Brazil as more successful than ever before can be a political strategy. It enables Bolsonaro to achieve two goals at the same time - portraying to the domestic audience that he is a superior leader and that it is in the people's best interest to keep him in power for longer, and secondly to the international community that Brazil is an important international actor. These two goals directly correspond to the intention of Bolsonaro and his administration - to keep power for as long as possible, and secondly - a desire for a more prominent global role.
Through the repetition of the slogan “Trust back to Brazil” (Bolsonaro adm., 20/1/2020) Bolsonaro reiterates the point made in one of his speeches where he states “Brazil has been regaining confidence in the world. There is no country that does not want to talk to us. After all, Brazil has changed and changed for the better” (Bolsonaro adm., 25/10/2019) - a slogan and statement that is reminiscent of Trump's “Make America Great Again” - slogan. Through this short slogan Bolsonaro captures a pathos (emotional appeal) that indicates that previous political leaders have not represented the authentic needs of the people, and during his presidency Brazil has gained confidence, trust and respect in the world. Instead of highlighting only what has been done well, Bolsonaro emphasizes that it has not been done well previous to him. The same tactic that Trump uses in his slogan, the underlying message of “Make America Great Again” and “Trust Back to Brazil” is that the country was once great or trusted, but someone (in this case, the left leaning administrations before him) failed- the country and the people, now he will be the leader that can guide the country back to where it once was
In regard to the bilateral relationship with China, these statements also contribute to Bolsonaro’s portrayal of Brazil as an equal to China. Even though China is presented as a role model within foreign policy, the Bolsonaro administration successfully portrays Brazil as a major international player, equally powerful as China. In comparison to previous
administrations, Bolsonaro does not adopt the role of developing country that some previous administrations have. The depicted relationship is thus represented slightly differently in regard to the power dynamics within the relationship. Where the Bolsonaro administration attempts, and perhaps succeeds, to display an equal relationship between two world leaders, previous administrations display a hierarchical relationship by presenting Brazil as a country on its path to development, and China as a world leading economy.
ROLE PRESCRIPTION - CHINA’S POSITION IN THE WORLD
Despite these differences in role conception, the role prescription given to China is strikingly similar. All administrations clearly state that China is one of the most, if not the most, important business partner Brazil has, and beyond that - naming China as a close friend, strategic partner and ally. There is no support found in the data that Bolsonaro has distanced Brazil from China discursively in regard to the portrayal of the relationship. There are, if anything, some indicators that Bolsonaro is more friendly towards China and even warmer in his style of discourse between the countries. These indicators are for example, the emphasis of a personal relationship, but also the lack of acknowledgement of any challenges within the relationship.
In contrast to Temer for example, who goes into detail about how the relationship is based on trust and responsibility, and focuses almost all of his speech on the necessity of responsibility, Bolsonaro does not mention any type of challenge or necessity within the relationship - instead he speaks about China, and about the bilateral relationship as near-to-perfect already. This could be an indication of less substance in his statements. If “the needs of the people” is found to be a rhetorical tool (Plagemann & Destradi, 2019, p. 297), a consequence of populist discourse could be lack of substance in statements, which enables populist leaders to make claims that do not necessarily represent the substantial politics of the administration.
4.2 Results
H1: Populist leaders will adopt a bipolar world view by dividing the international system in to two separate and antagonistic groups; “good” and “evil” states.
In the speech delivered by Bolsonaro to the UN, he addresses some European states as
“colonialist”, and in another speech the minister of foreign affairs states that western states, media and academia conducts mind control. The word “colonialist” is used as a linguistic
resource1. In the case of Brazil, colonialism is a concept that is widely understood, and the characteristics of colonialism is already accepted by the masses. The construction of the world state could thus be that European powers or the EU have a colonial mindset - which includes absence of respect for others sovereignty, and so the implications of this construction is that of necessity for peace and security to protect Brazil’s sovereignty. This type of representation can be found within populist parties in Europe, who portray the themselves as defenders of sovereignty against an elitist bureaucracy. It further connects to populism as a discourse. As populism considers society to ultimately be divided in to “the pure” and “the corrupt”, this style of rhetoric can be a mirroring of these beliefs within foreign policy discourse, meaning that the western powers represent the elite, the traditionally powerful and the corrupt establishment, whilst the “south” represent the pure, good, hardworking nations that have been taken advantage of for too long. Furthermore, it relates to China who is portrayed throughout the data as a state that respects Brazil’s sovereignty. For this reason, we can identify indications of anti- elitism and anti-pluralism in the foreign policy discourse of the Bolsonaro administration.
In regard to changes from previous administrations, some of these tendencies can be found in a speech made by Lula in 2010 as well. The tendency to construct Brazil’s role in contrast to western identities and claiming that there is still “a very strong colonial mindset” in the world (Lula adm., 22/11/2010). However, Dilma and Temer do not use colonialism or the division between “west” and “south” in their rhetoric, even though the “south south cooperation” is promoted. There are however some stylistic differences in addressing the states colonial past between the Lula and the Bolsonaro administration. The Bolsonaro administration presents an antagonistic narrative in some speeches between “south” and “north”. There are no indications in the speech by Lula that Brazil should protect its sovereignty against the west or that there is an “elitist” western mindset. It is not inherently populist to highlight the states colonial history.
The populist aspect arises within the construction of an antagonistic relationship between the
“pure south” and the “corrupt west”. Contrasting the statements exemplifies this further:
1 By using “linguistic resources” such as ‘colonialist spirit’ the speaker can create association and thus produce representations of the world (Weldes, 1996). Weldes describes the phenomena in the United States, where using the notion of “red fascism” to describe the Soviet Union constructed collective understandings. A concept that was already widely understood in the United States since long before 1962, and as Weldes writes “As Thomas Paterson has argued, what was important in this construction was that ‘many Americans took the unhistorical and illogical view that Russia in the 1940s would behave as Germany had in the previous decade[...]’” (ibid, p.296).
“South South cooperation is part of an attitude, a broad attitude that has to do with trade, with investment and with politics. And as I said, and have being saying some times, not to confront the north, or not to ignore the North” (Lula adm., 22/11/2010)
“[The world] also has countries, mainly in the West, where thought is indirectly and insidiously controlled by the media and academia, leaving very few places untouched by Wittgensteinian death-of-the-subject oppression.” (Bolsonaro adm., 7/1/2019)
H2: Populist leaders are more likely to disregard traditions within foreign policy etiquette.
There is little support found in the data to support this hypothesis, which was surprising. In relation to formal etiquette and traditionally accepted behavior, there was no clear difference between the Bolsonaro Administration and the previous administrations. Instead the formal attitude was strikingly similar. There was, as discussed, some indicators of Bolsonaro constructing a narrative of the two leaders as “friends”, which could arguable be a form of bad manners as it strays from the traditional norms, in some ways. However, more evidence for this narrative is needed in order for the hypothesis to be confirmed. Furthermore, the statements discussing the president’s friendships where within parameters of traditional foreign policy rhetoric. It could be interpreted as a “friendly style of foreign policy discourse”, however, it is not clear that it relates to the populist aspects of discourse.
In comparison to previous administrations, the change in discourse and “style of communication” is not substantial enough to support that Bolsonaro includes bad manners as part of his foreign policy discourse. It is of interest that this, essential part of populism, is so absent in foreign policy discourse. It seems as though some parts of populism is more present within domestic politics, which could indicate that some aspects of populism indeed is strategic in the sense that it can garner voter support. Further research is needed to investigate why this is the case, and a comparison of discourse in domestic politics contrasted to the same issue in foreign policy discourse could further confirm whether this finding is a general trend or not.
H3: Populist leaders favor bilateral relationships over multilateral ones, by undermining multilateral organizations’ or ignoring them completely.
There are some indicators found in the data that Bolsonaro prefers bilateral engagement whilst previous administrations often discuss multilateral engagement and global governance in
regard to the relationship with China. Previous administrations are more inclined to discuss environmental issues and other global issues than the Bolsonaro administration, who criticized institutions like the UN. In relation to populism, the degree of international authority a state is subjected to relates to the populist governments ability to portray multilateral institutions as elitist projects (Plagemann & Destradi, p. 297). The authors discuss in their paper how international institutions (e.g. EU, UN) or multilateralism can hinder populists to maneuver by introducing rules and regulations. Populist parties in Europe can portray international organizations as a threat to the nation’s sovereignty and a product of a “transnational elite”
(ibid, p. 287). In the case of Brazil, there is an increase of bilateral focus, but not necessarily a decline in multilateral engagements. Instead - multilateral engagements are not mentioned at all (excluded from the narrative). This could indicate that Bolsonaro prefers bilateral relationships and more specifically, the personal aspect of the bilateral relationship, over multilateral engagements. To clarify, there are some indicators that Bolsonaro prefers bilateralism over multilateralism, compared to previous administrations.
So, what can we learn from these results? Two out of the three hypotheses found support in the data. Considering the least-likely case design of the study, it strengthens the possibility that populism does impact foreign policy discourse even in other cases. However, as is often the case, it is not quite so black and white. Even though some support was found in the data to support the third hypothesis, further research would have to establish if the evidence found in the data is part of a larger trend or a case-specific finding in relation to the chosen material.
The second hypothesis was not confirmed, which indicates that foreign policy discourse might be protected from certain aspects of populism, such as bad manners. As foreign policy discourse is generally further from the voters’ attention, populists may not see any benefit in upholding bad manners in the international context. Other possibilities are simply that the benefits of trading with China and keeping the relationship strong is prioritized more than the populist aspects of discourse. It is also likely that populists do not always employ every aspect of populism within the international context, as existing in the political arena is a tactical behavior. It is still possible that populist leaders include bad manners in foreign policy discourse in other cases. Finally, the first hypothesis found the most substantial evidence in the data. It is likely that this finding will be present in other cases as well, due to the least-likely case design as well as the evidence presented in this study. If a mixed-method study could confirm this as a part of a larger trend within other populist’s foreign policy discourse, it would
