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Juristprogrammet Master Thesis 30 ECTS-credits 17

th

of June 2012 University of Gothenburg

Faculty of Law

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THE LEGALITY OF MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE

ENVIRONMENT - The case of Fallujah-

Författare: Sandra Centerwall Handledare: Joachim Åhman Examinator: Mikael Baaz

Ämne: International Humanitarian Law

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ABSTRACT

It is generally recognized that the environment merits protection even in times of war. In spite the fact that it even merits protection for its own sake, International Humanitarian Law is only concerned with the anthropocentric basis of the environmental protection.

History has shown that the provisions that are supposed to directly protect the environment have failed to do so. Because protection that exists today leaves much to be desired, the aim of this thesis is to identify the basic principles of IHL and apply them to the protection of the environment. The case of Fallujah is used as an example that tells the story on how the conduct of war scars the fragile environment when certain means and methods of warfare are used. In this analysis, it seems that the long-term effects on the environment may not be included in the assessment of collateral damage. Because the global

environmental ecosystems are interacting, such damage may very well affect us all.

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Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS V

1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 PURPOSE 2

1.2 METHODOLOGY 2

1.3 STRUCTURE 3

1.4 DELIMITATIONS 5

1.5 THE ALLEGED FACTS OF THE BATTLE IN FALLUJAH 6

2 A SHORT HISTORY ON DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

WITHIN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 9

3 THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENT AND

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 12

3.1 WHAT IS ENVIRONMENT? 12

3.2 WHAT IS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE? 13

4 DIRECT PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT APPLIED TO FALLUJAH CASE 16

5 THE PRINCIPLES OF IHL AND THEIR APPLICABILITY ON THE ENVIRONMENT 21

5.1 THE DOCTRINE OF MILITARY NECESSITY 21

5.2 PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION 23

5.3 THE UNDERSTANDING OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE 27

5.4 MILITARY ADVANTAGE 30

5.4.1 MILITARY ADVANTAGE IN RELATION TO PROPORTIONALITY 32 5.4.2 MILITARY ADVANTAGE IN RELATION TO MILITARY NECESSITY 34 5.4.3 MILITARY NECESSITY IN RELATION TO PROPORTIONALITY 37

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5.4.4 PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AS A PART OF MILITARY NECESSITY ASSESMENT 41 5.5 MARTENS CLAUSE –PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 46 5.6 ”MEASURING”EXCESSIVENESS – IS THERE A WAY? 48

5.7 INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS 51

5.8 ENVIRONMENT AND PRECAUTIONS 53

6 CCW IN RELATION TO MEANS AND METHODS USED IN FALLUJAH 56 6.1 THE LEGALITY OF MK77 AS ALLEGEDLY USED IN FALLUJAH 60

7 CWC IN RELATION TO MEANS AND METHODS USED IN FALLUJAH 65

7.1 IS WP TOXIC TO THE ENVIRONMENT? 67

7.2 LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY WP

TOXICITY 69

8 CONCLUSIONS 72

CASE INDEX VI

SOURCES AND MATERIALS VII

ACKNOWEDGMENTS XIV

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AP I Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry CCW Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of

Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects CWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FOI Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut (Swedish Defense Research Agency)

HPCR Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research

ICJ International Court of Justice

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

IHL International Humanitarian Law

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SC Security Council

UK JSP United Kingdom Joint Service Publication

UN United Nations

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

WP White Phosphorus

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1 Introduction

In April 2004, in Fallujah, the US Army started Operation Vigilant Resolve following the killing of four American private security specialists.

1

Later that year, on 8th of November, US forces (together with the UK forces) launched Operation Phantom Fury, also known as Al Fajr.

2

Fallujah was a city completely controlled by insurgents whose number the US forces estimated to be between 5000 and 6000.

3

Fallujah was seen as the epicenter of the Iraqi insurgency and was US top priority in a broader campaign of their security strategy.

4

Between 50 000 and 60 000 civilians were believed to still remain in the city when the attack was launched.

5

The city was said to be completely in ruins after the attacks.

6

The last year’s reports about the rise in birth defects and cancer among the population

7

and the symptoms that American soldiers who came home after serving in Iraq showed

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, triggered the allegations suggesting that the US forces had used weapons that potentially could have contributed to the seriousness of the today’s situation.

1 Garamone, Jim, ”Coallition working to Pacify Fallujah, Destroy Sadr Militia”,

American Forces Press Service April 8 2004 : http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=26905 See also ”The High-Contracting Business”, Private Warriors, Frontline, PBS:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/highrisk.html

2 Garamone, Jim, ”Iraqi, U.S. Troops Begin 'Al Fajr' Operation in Fallujah”, American Forces Press Service November 8 2004: http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=24900

3 Ibid.

4 Karon, Tony, ”The Grim Calculations of Retaking Fallujah”, Time Magazine, November 8 2004:

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,768590,00.html

5 Ibid.

See also Monbiot, George, ”Behind the phosphorus clouds are war crimes within war crimes”, The Guardian, November 22 2005: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/nov/22/usa.iraq1

6 Ali Fadhil, Guardian Films for Channel Four news, ”Fallujah-the real story”, 2005, See also ”City of Ghosts”, by Ali Fadhil, The Guardian, January 11 2005:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jan/11/iraq.features11

7 Cockburn, Patric, ”Toxic Legacy of US assault on Fallujah worse then Hiroshima”, The Independent, July 24 2010:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/toxic-legacy-of-us-assault-on-fallujah-worse-than- hiroshima-2034065.html

8 ”We track soldiers´sickness”, New York Daily News, September 29 2004:

http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/track-soldiers-sickness-article-1.568815 http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/small-victory-ailing-g-i-s-article-1.550397

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1.1 Purpose

On the basis of these attacks in Fallujah, my aim is to identify the potential effects on the environment due to the means and methods used in Fallujah by US forces. It can certainly be so that the means and methods used in Fallujah have been used in other places of armed conflict. However, the usage has not necessarily been in the same way. The primary aim is to explore what environmental effects are conceived with the way these means and

methods were specifically used in Fallujah.

Due to given allegations of this case and many uncertainties that are still

overshadowing the factual background, my aim is to come a step closer to the possible legal outcome if the actions that allegedly occurred where not in conformity with the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). If the attacks on Fallujah could presumably be linked to the effects on the environment and human health in that area over the last decade, how would that comply with IHL? Are the means and methods chosen and the way they were used in Fallujah within the framework of IHL? If not, has their use provoked damage/injury that is disproportionate or/and militarily unnecessary for the military advantage anticipated?

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1.2 Methodology

The research for this thesis was conducted in order to find out whether the usage of certain means and methods of warfare, such as weapons containing white phosphorus (WP), and the way they were used in Fallujah, is contrary to the principles of International

Humanitarian Law (IHL).

First, it is important to identify the principles of IHL and in what international conventions they can be found. I have also looked at whether the certain principle is

9 For the sake of this paper, damage and injury are used synonymously.

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perceived as customary rule of IHL. This part of the research, used throughout the thesis, is the traditional legal method, analyzing the existing and accepted sources of law in order to find out what the given rule is and how to fill out the interpretation of its text where necessary.

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Second, the traditional legal method also incorporates the different case law that was examined to analyze how the given rules, important for my case, were used and interpreted.

The existing jurisprudence was then compared to the facts in my case for the sake of conceiving the possible outcome if the rules were to be interpreted in the same manner as given jurisprudence.

Third, the weapons and munitions containing WP demand an understanding and interpretation of the scientific information available. Therefore, I have collected data from different research agencies and interviewed scientists and research analysts in order to better understand the scientific information and create better conditions for optimal applications of the scientific findings to the legal principles of IHL.

1.3 Structure

The second chapter of this thesis is a short historical introduction to emergence of the protection of the environment and its molding into the form as we recognize it today. In chapter three, I have assessed how the notion of environment is understood in the legal discourse of IHL and what environmental damage might be perceived as.

Despite the fact that some legal protection exist for the environment in the area of humanitarian law, armed conflicts of last decade show that this protection is not sufficient enough to really make a difference.

11

The provisions of Art 35(3) and Art 55 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) set a very high threshold for environmental damage to be met. Given the likelihood that the effects on the environment from the attack

10 Lomio, Spang-Hanssen and Wilson, ”Legal Research Methods in a Modern World: A Coursebook, Djof Publishing 2011, page 233 and 235.

11 Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict, An inventory and Analysis of International Law, United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 2009, page 4.

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in Fallujah would not reach that threshold of these two provisions for a number of reasons, this area of law might not help us in concluding the legality of the attack. In chapter four, I will assess why Art 35(3) and Art 55, directly protecting the environment, seem not able to assist us in analyzing environmental damages in Fallujah.

There are also other rules that could be helpful for protection of the environment in law related to armed conflict. Although it has a different threshold test, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) deals with environmental modification techniques that might be beneficial where ENMOD can be applied. Unfortunately, the characteristics of the events in Fallujah is not likely to be something considered to fall within the definition of

modification techniques where only conventional weapons have been used.

Notwithstanding that there may well be harm that has been caused to the environment and environmental harm that indirectly affects the civilian population, there are other mechanisms within IHL that we may have to rely on in order to challenge the legality of the actions in Fallujah. These mechanisms would be the rules of military necessity, principle of distinction, proportionality principle and the meaning of military advantage.

The interplay between these rules may help in properly addressing the consequences of both environmental damage and environmental damage that affects the civilian population that these events in Fallujah gave rise to. In order to answer the question whether the usage of chosen means and methods (such as weapon MK 77 and other munitions containing white phosphorus) were excessive and/or unnecessary, we need to raise questions about the relationship between military advantage and military necessity.

In chapter five, I will explain the meaning of the basic principles of IHL and analyze

the relationship between the military necessity and military advantage in order to shed

some light on whether what occurred in Fallujah and the damage that was created was

excessive and/or unnecessary within the meaning of IHL. The chapter also incorporates

Marten Clause and the principle of humanity that problematizes the issue of dealing with

the balance between what is humanely acceptable and militarily necessary. The prohibition

on indiscriminate attacks and precautionary measures are applicable when environment is

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being targeted, therefore, I will address them in order to shed some more light on the possible environmental protection that they might provide.

The chapter six will deal with Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and how this Convention might also help us in

determining the legality of the damage caused to civilians and the environment. The Convention incorporates the cardinal principles of IHL and complements them with explicit prohibition on certain conventional weapons. It is also how the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) functions which will be explained and compared to the facts in Fallujah in chapter seven. Finally, the thesis ends with concluding comments in chapter eight.

1.4 Delimitations

The thesis will focus on the legality or illegality of the damages presumably caused to the environment and that indirectly had an impact on the lives of civilians, due to the weapons that presumably have been used.

Whilst the aim of the paper isn´t to speculate on the possibilities of individual criminal responsibility for those alleged facts, I will raise question about individual criminal responsibility in an explanatory manner where this might help understanding the complex interaction between different principles of IHL. The aim is, nevertheless, to point towards legal questions that have arisen in the aftermaths of the battle in Fallujah.

I will concentrate my research to two allegations made by various sources following

the attacks in Fallujah and which continue to be made. These allegations claim that the US

forces deployed MK 77 against combatants and civilians during the attacks in Fallujah. MK

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77 contains white phosphorous (WP) that has certain effects on its own.

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Other weapons containing WP have also allegedly been deployed against the city.

I am aware that I am handling mostly allegations when it comes to usage of MK 77 and other WP in Fallujah, and that there is very little undisputed facts put to the test. We know that the attacks took place and we see that the situation has developed in a certain way.

Whether this can be linked to that specific attack in Fallujah still remains very uncertain.

However, I do see a possibility to present my point of view of the attacks and the possible results of these attacks in a broader perspective. If these allegations were true, given the consequences of the attack, in what way is this in compliance with the law? Because of the factual uncertainties surrounding the happenings in Fallujah, I will concern myself with the case of Fallujah as if I were to use a fictional scenario. The way the newspaper sources are used is to help me in managing the jigsaw puzzle of the alleged scenario. They are, strictly speaking, guidelines to better understanding of the possible legal outcome, if the

allegations were to be accurate.

There are also certain limitations in scientific uncertainties. The aim is not to

establish scientific accuracy of the effects and find out whether these facts can be linked to the means and methods used in Fallujah. I will concentrate on the legal outcome if the linkage were to be established.

Lastly, due to the limitations of time and space for this paper, I will not put any emphasis on explaining the international environmental law and the associated conventions for the protection of the environment in peacetime and their possible influence on

international humanitarian law.

1.5 The alleged facts of the battle in Fallujah

In November 2005 the Italian public television network Rai, broadcasted a controversial documentary called “The hidden massacre” by Sigfrido Ranucci and Mauricio Torrealta.

13

12 International Peace Bureau, Disarmament for development program: http://ipb.org/i/disarmament-and- development/III-E-01-DADP-ipb-appeal-us-white-phosphorus-use-iraq.html

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The documentary stated that the insurgence and civilians left in the city witnessed that the US forces had used chemicals and poisonous gas during the attacks. This conclusion was drawn due to the esthetics of the corpses they saw. Later on, this description, seemingly supported by individuals in the US military, explained what happens to human flesh when it comes into contact with specific substances from the weapons that contain white

phosphorus (WP).

14

On the Fallujah Coverage site of Rai television network, it can be read that the Al- Quds Press who published the allegations had only anonymous sources to rely on.

15

The US State Department denied that the white phosphorus was used for any other then illumination purposes.

16

When the March-April issue of “Field Artillery” magazine suggested that it was used a bit more offensive, the US officials corrected the information admitting that they were used against enemy combatants.

17

As far as Mark-77 (MK 77) is concerned, it is a part of the incendiary bombs family, a direct evolution of M-47, the napalm bomb used in Vietnam.

18

While the traditional napalm consists of a mixture of gasoline and benzene, the MK 77 contains kerosene-based jet fuel, a smaller concentration of benzene.

19

Therefore, it is referred to as napalm-like incendiary weapon. The usage of this weapon in Iraq was first brought to the world’s attention when the Herald Correspondent Lindsay Murdoch reported from one of the first battles in Iraq suggesting that the napalm-like weapon had been used.

20

Another article

13 Fallujah Coverage, RaiNews24:

http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/en/body.asp

14 ”A Debate: Did the US Military Attack Iraqi Civilians with white phosphorus bombs in violation of the Geneva Conventions? Democracynow.org, November 8 2005:

http://www.democracynow.org/2005/11/8/a_debate_did_the_u_s

15 ”Did the U.S Use ”Illegal” Weapons In Fallujah”, Fallujah Coverage, RaiNews24:

http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/en/illegal_weapons.asp

16 ”US used White Phosphorus in Iraq”, November 16 2005:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4440664.stm

Popham, Peter, ”US forces used chemical weapons during assault on city of Fallujah”, November 8 2005:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/us-forces-used-chemical-weapons-during-assault-on- city-of-fallujah-514433.html

”Did the US Use ”Illegal” Weapons In Fallujah, Fallujah Coverage, RaiNews24:

http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/en/illegal_weapons.asp

17 Field Artillery, ”The Fight for Fallujah”, March-April, 2005.

18 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk77.htm

19 Ibid.

20 Murdoch, Lindsay, ”Dead bodies everywhere”, Sydney Morning Herald, March 22 2003:

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/21/1047749944836.html

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from San Diego Union Tribune alleged the same facts.

21

These allegations turned into facts when Adam Ingram, UK defense minister of that time posted a letter where he confirmed that MK 77 had in fact been used in Iraq.

22

Napalm is not prohibited when used against military targets but used against civilians it falls under the CCW Protocol III.

21 Crawley, James W., ”Officials confirm dropping firebombs on Iraq”, San Diego Union-Tribute, August 5 2003: http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030805-firebombs01.htm

22 ”US lied to Britain over Use of Napalm in Iraq War”, by Colin Brown, The Independent, June 17 2005:

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0617-01.htm

”The US used chemical weapons in Iraq and then lied about it”, by Monbiot, George, The Guardian November 15 2005: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/nov/15/usa.iraq

Read the letter here: http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/foto/documento_ministero.jpg

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2 A Short History on Development of Environmental Protection within International Humanitarian Law

From the first ban on weapons that cause unnecessary suffering in the 1868 Declaration of St Petersburg, IHL has been developing throughout the 20

th

century, trying to meet and cover new emerging needs in the area of war conduct.

23

The application of the IHL consists today of four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols (AP I and AP II) from 1977, the second came to include IHL for non-international armed conflict. The purpose of the Laws of War is not to completely hinder the damages done to the civilians and civilian objects during armed conflicts. It is not possible to absolutely avoid that those not taking part in hostilities are spared from any harm. Every armed conflict harvests civilian victims and provokes damage to civilian objects. The primary purpose of humanitarian law is to

“alleviate as much as possible the calamities of war.

24

In other words, IHL defines the limitations on the use of violence in armed conflicts.

The “wanton destruction” in times of war has its roots in 1863 provisions of Lieber Code but these are in turn inspired by previous writings on the very new emerging concept of environmental protection in times of war.

25

The importance of environment is by all means, not a new statement. Even the ICJ, In the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons

23 Greenwood, Christopher (in Fleck), The handbook of International Humanitarian Law, second edition, 2010, page 23.

24 Dinstein, Yoram, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, second edition, Cambridge University Press 2010, page 5, (Taken from the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. The same Declaration stated that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”).

25 Hulme, Karen, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, page 3.

She explains that both Vattel and Locke have written about military tactics that included destroying food stocks and being harmful to non-combatants, clearly stating an anthropocentric view but it offered an indirect protection for the environment.

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case, stated that environment should not be looked upon as something abstract but the very important part of humanity, including generations to come.

26

Today, there is no doubt that the humans are dependent on the status of their surroundings for their survival. The status of the importance of environment has grown from 1972 Stockholm Declaration to 1992 Rio Declaration creating implications that global environmental responsibility is an erga omnes obligation.

27

The nature of attacks of modern warfare highly impact upon the environment that can last for decades. It is not surprising then that the environment as an indispensable component of the wellbeing of humans is targeted in times of armed conflict. Direct and indirect attacks on the environment can form a part of a strategy of a military attack. The 20

th

centuries conflicts have brought the

question of inclusion of environmental protection into the International Humanitarian Law.

Geneva Conventions also provide some protection both to the environment for the good of humans and environment per se but the threshold seems to be set to high to meet the standards required. Toxic air pollution to slightly radioactive agricultural fields and drinking water dams affect the people’s possibilities of livelihood and present challenges for rebuilding peace. In order to address these issues we need to explain and understand what basic principles operate within IHL and indirectly affect the understanding of environmental protection in times of war. Some examples that have been discussed intensely are forest destruction and loss of wildlife in Vietnam and Iraqi Oil-well fires in 1991, causing both air and sea pollution. It illustrated the need for serious considerations on how to protect the fragile environment. Other examples of importance is chemical warfare by Iraq during the 1980ies, the extensive destruction of cattle and farmland following the

“ethnic cleansing” of Serbian villages in Croatia and NATO attacks on industrial facilities in Pancevo releasing poisonous gases effecting the inhabitants and causing death of all aquatic life along Danube River.

28

The handling of Agent Orange and other herbicides during Vietnam War that resulted in immense degradation of forest and its impact on civilians gave rise to inclusion of Art

26 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ 1996, page 241, para 29.

27 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law & the Environment, third edition, Oxford University Press 2009, page 131.

28Advisory Opinion, ICJ, supra n. 26, at p. 241, para 29.

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35(3) and Art 55 API as the States agreed that the environment merited more protection than what was previously available.

29

The aftermaths of chemical warfare by Iraq on Kurdish population resulted in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) that was adopted during Paris Conference in 1989. Other convention that can be of importance for environmental protection are Biological Weapons Convention from 1972, the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and its five Protocols from 1981, with latest amendments in 2001 and the Landmines Convention which absolutely prohibits possession or use of anti-personnel landmines to which 153 states were party to, on May 2007.

30

As history shows, damage done to the environment can therefore be intentional or may be the expected result of the methods and means chosen.

31

Environment usually suffers extensive destruction and degradation during armed conflicts and in their aftermaths.

32

The rules that are limiting or prohibiting certain weapons and methods of warfare are also influencing the impact the warfare has on the environment, directly and indirectly.

29 Hulme, supra n. 25, at Chapter 2 and p. 71.

30 Greenwood, (in Fleck), supra n. 23, at p. 33.

31 See for instance in more detail the case study; Iraqi Oil-Well Fires in Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 163.

32 Bothe, Bruch, Diamond and Jensen, International law protecting the environment during armed conflicts:

gaps and opportunities”, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 92 Number 879, Cambridge, September 2010, page 570.

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3 The Understanding of the Concept of Environment and Environmental Damage

3.1 What is Environment?

According to certain dictionary interpretations, environment incorporates both non-living and living environmental elements. Hulme states that there is no single accepted definition of the term “environment”, even within environmental law.

33

The concept of environment, in the legal meaning of International Environmental Law, has been said to incorporate two distinct parts: the human environment and the natural environment.

34

What has been recognized as “natural” environment in treaties protecting the environment, according to Hulme is “flora and fauna, air, soil, water, vegetation, habitat, forests, marine living resources, ecosystems, organisms, climate and agriculture”.

35

The definition included in a specific treaty will be specifically adopted for the functions and objectives of that particular treaty. The generalization of each term is therefore not recommended as a definition. When it comes to interpretation of the environment within the meaning of armed conflicts,

Security Council has created a definition in the SC Resolution 678 from 1991, for the specific purpose of interpreting the environmental damage caused by Iraq to Kuwaiti Oil Wells.

36

The Resolution included air, soil, water, flora, fauna and the ecosystem formed by their interaction.

37

Hulme is suggesting that “natural environment” acts upon an organism to the extent that it determines that organism´s fate. The biological interdependence, in

33 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 12.

34 Ibid. at p. 18.

35 Ibid. at p. 12.

36 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 13.

37 Ibid.

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other words, is of fundamental importance with regard to the severity of environmental damage.

38

This is due to the creation of global mesh of climatic system where the

ecosystem in one place can affect the ecosystem in another. ICRC´s Commentary offers a similar interpretation:

“The concept of the natural environment should be understood in the widest sense to cover the biological environment in which the population is living. It does not consist merely of the object indispensable to survival…but also includes forests and other vegetation…as well as fauna, flora and other biological or climatic elements”

39

People are also part of the environment and dependent on a healthy environment in which to live. The starting point of human environment is, not surprisingly, human beings. It is the environment that gives the human “his physical sustenance and affords him the

opportunity for intellectual, spiritual, moral and social growth”.

40

The concept is also based on inter-generational equity and the rights of future generations to a healthy environment.

However, these two concepts are interconnected in the sense that when protecting natural environment, one is also protecting people. The two are indivisible.

41

3.2 What is Environmental Damage?

The assessment of environmental damage is a complex question. There is no strict legal, nor strict scientific concept of what environmental damage is. When it comes to the definition of environmental damage, the word “damage” has a criterion of its own. As Hulme explains it, a damage, harm or injury requires the causation of some negative impact on the environment.

42

The 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral

38 Ibid.

39!Koppe, Erik, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment during International Armed Conflicts, Hart Publishing 2008, page 156.!

40 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Preamble, para 1.

41 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 16.

42 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 23.

She refers to Oxford English Dictionary when interpreting the word “damage” and the wordings “damage”,

“harm” and “injury” she uses as synonymous. For the sake of simplifying the meaning of “Damage” in this paper, I will use the same wording as synonyms.

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Resource Activities defined damage to the Antarctic environment as “any impact on the living or non-living components of that environment or those ecosystems, including harm to atmospheric, marine or terrestrial life”.

43

The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change has an even broader definition of what constitutes environmental damage that includes the effects on socio-economic systems and welfare.

44

This implicates that different wordings are intended only as definitions for the different purpose of each treaty. This is also the base for the meaning of environmental protection, making it predominantly anthropocentric.

The Conventions regulating the laws of armed conflicts are no exceptions as they too provide for their own criteria when assessing environmental damage. What we know today is that damage can be caused by various different changes in ecosystems and can be strictly natural. But they are also caused by human activities, especially when it comes to the effects of waging war. The problem is determining what causation is responsible for which damage. Hulme suggests that first and foremost scientific determinations of damage are generally first made. When this is accomplished, the legal terminology is introduced within which the damage is either reduced or prohibited.

45

Scientific testing can help in measuring the degree of the damage caused to a particular environment or ecosystem by the

introduction of a specific substance. As the case is in Fallujah, when white phosphorus was introduced as a substance used in weapons that were deployed in Fallujah, the scientific measuring that would be needed is how much of that specific substance is present in the soil, water and air in Fallujah and what are or what would be the negative effects of such presence. What the outcome would be of such measurements might not be the subject to the same limitations as the legal regulations, on both national and international level. As Hulme points out, the definition of environmental damage found in treaty law and in domestic regulations will differ from a purely scientific assessment of damage in such way that the level of damage required before any legal regulation will be applicable will often be far higher than the actual term utilized by the particular treaty or domestic instrument.

46

43 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra n. 27, at p. 7.

44 Ibid. at p. 6.

45 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 17.

46 Ibid.

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The various regulations on environmental protection use different kinds of alternative terms such as “effects”, “harm”, “damage”, “pollution, and “injury”. They all can be understood differently and have different legal outcomes, dependent on where and how they are used.

This paper will only concern itself with the damage caused to the environment as human

causation of harm due to the deployment of specific substance through certain means and

methods of warfare.

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4 Direct Protection of the Environment applied to Fallujah case

The provisions in API, Art 35(3) and Art 55(1), in my opinion, seem to have been an innovation for the IHL at the time of their adoption. This is of course due to the large-scale destruction that took place in the Vietnam Conflict. There was the recognition by state parties for the need to at least limit environmental damages during warfare.

47

Art 35(3) and Art 55 of the AP I offer limitation to the damage done to the environment both when environment is a direct target in itself and as a part of collateral damage.

The principal concern for international humanitarian law are human beings so the protection of the environment and the interpretation of the existing rules naturally take an anthropocentric point of view, which has been criticized.

48

However, the Art 35(3) AP I suggests that environment in fact has some value per se. The article reads:

“It is prohibited to employ methods and means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”

This is one of the basic rules of AP I and does not directly refer to the survival of civilians.

The prohibition is repeated in Art 55(1) AP I but has an additional reference to health and survival of the population. The article says:

“Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods

47 Ibid. at p. 71.

48 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 204.

For example, it has been stated that the treatment of the environment as a civilian object is too

anthropocentric. Dinstein here considers that the criticism in fact misses the point. Dinstein explains; “as long as it is classified as a civilian object, the natural environment must not be the object of an intentional, direct, attack irrespective of the presence of civilians in or around it.” In my opinion, as a civilian object,

environment seems to merit protection because it has an importance to civilians, not necessarily because it has a value per se. One can imagine that there are certain cases where the environment merits protection for its own sake. This is where I find that the criticism still makes sense.

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or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population”

The ICRC Commentary explain that the very essence of these two provisions is the concept of ecosystem (natural environment as opposed to human environment) which merits

protection from means and methods of waging war that upset the very balance of the natural living and environmental conditions.

49

In Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, ICJ reaffirmed that Art 35(3) and Art 55 of AP I embody a general obligation to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage.

Such a protection could be achieved by prohibition of methods and means of warfare, which are intended, or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment.

50

The wording of the provisions suggests that the damage is only prohibited above a specified threshold of harm. Indeed, to constitute a breach, damage has to be widespread, long-term and severe, which means that the damage done must have a cumulative effect (my emphasis). Although the terms are not specifically defined in the API, there is a general agreement that together, they establish a very high threshold because all three requirements need to be met. But because Art 35 lacks the reference to the human injury, it entails a lower threshold of harm than Art 55.

51

How long-term, widespread and severe the damage has to be in order to fit into the meaning of provisions is highly uncertain. There is even disagreement whether the oil spills and fires caused by Iraq to Kuwaiti oil wells during the 90/91 Gulf War crossed the triple standard requirements in the two provisions.

52

Even though the outcome from those attacks resulted in emissions of several toxic particles that gave rise to acid rain and global warming and even though the smoke screen over Kuwait caused a ten degrees Celsius drop in temperature resulting in the coldest winter on record, there is an uncertainty whether those effects on the environment and harm related to them were “significant”.

53

At least there is still a debate over the significance of that harm.

49 ICRC Commentary to the AP I, page 409, para 1444.

50 Advisory Opinion, ICJ, supra n. 26, at p. 242, para 31.

51 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 72.

52 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): ”Final report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, page 7, para 15. http://www.icty.org/sid/10052

53 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 165.

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As far as the wording of the provision is concerned, there is some indication that states considered the term “widespread” to refer to the area greater than several hundred square kilometers.

54

The notion of “severe damage to the natural environment” seems to refer to the intensity of the resulting environmental damage and it incorporates the prejudicial effect of the damage to the civilian population, according to the Hulmes´

interpretation of travaux préparatoires.

55

If this means that the environment can´t be severely damaged unless humans are affected, then the Art 35(3) looses its credibility to be protecting the environment for its own value.

Art 55(1) has a wording that points to the protection designed to guarantee the survival or health of human beings. It suggests that if an action is a threat to humans, the Art 55 is applicable even if the human survival is not at stake.

56

By survival, it is

understood in terms of both present and future generations. There are opinions that only the long-term consequences are intended by the reference to “health”.

57

A long-term

consequence would indicate a standard of very serious harm, which was intended by that wording.

58

Threat is not just meant for the civilians, the provision explicitly states

“population”, meaning all humans regardless of their combatant status.

59

This would be a logical explanation as a “long-term” environmental damage is likely to outlast the war.

What is certain is that the damage, besides being widespread and severe, has to last for a period of decades, twenty or thirty years the minimum, for the provision to be

effective.

60

If the intention is to hold a party responsible for the environmental damage as a war crime, the damage is more obvious if the outcome quickly reaches the threshold of the provision. But the scenario of responsibility can be much more uncertain as the effects of the damage might take time and a full scale destruction become obvious, first after two

It is worth mentioning that in the resolution 687 from 91, UN Security Council affirmed Iraq´s responsibility under international law for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources in Kuwait.

!

54 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 98.

55 Ibid.

56 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 203.

57 Tarasofsky, Richard G., Legal Protection of the Environment during International Armed Conflict, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Volume XXIV, 1993, page 51.

58 Desgagné, Richard, The Prevention of Environmental Damage in Time of Armed Conflict: Proportionality and Precautionary Measures, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 3, 2000, page 112.

59 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 203.

60 Ibid. at p. 94.

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decades have passed. When evaluating NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, ICTY Committee stated that the notion of “excessive” environmental destruction from the attack is imprecise and the actual impact is yet unknown and difficult to measure and therefore ICTY refrains from investigating further into the issue.

61

Even if one can think that ICTY erred in coming to such a conclusion, that a difficulty today should mean not investigating at all, they do have a point that the overall environmental harm is too early to tell if one is agreeing with the meaning of the notion “widespread and sever”. As Desgagné concluded in his paper, ICTY based their evaluation on the notion of criminal responsibility. For this to rise, the damage needs to be “clearly” and “manifestly” excessive.

62

He argues further that for state responsibility to rise, it would be enough for the actions to produce excessive

environmental damage. It is, however, still very uncertain how this excessiveness is to be measured in order to establish state responsibility for environmental damage. For the applicability of the provisions in API, the destruction and effects of the damage need to clearly indicate that it will last for at least two decades. If it does not make such an indication then there is nothing else to do then to wait for time to tell if the damage will come to fit into the wordings of the provision. If the damage reaches the triple requirement, the damage is considered to be in breach of the two articles, as it would be regarded as excessive. A part from the requirements in the provisions of the articles, the damage needs also to be committed willfully and been foreseeable result of an attack. Hulme considers also the wording of the two provisions as intentional (with a purpose to cause) or expected damage of the means and methods chosen (it was not the purpose but it is known that such damage will occur). Summing up the wording, the needed mens rea would be intent or a foreseeable result of such damage.

63

In our case, it has been about eight years since the battle in Fallujah. Even though we can see certain evolvement of the effects on the civilian population, it is highly uncertain whether these effects can be expected to last two decades or more. It is also highly

uncertain that these effects can be linked to the usage of conventional weapons in the first place without proper scientific evaluation. For such reason, there is a high uncertainty that

61 Final Report, ICTY, supra n. 52, at p. 23.

62 Desgagné, supra n. 58, at p. 117.

63 Hulme, supra n. 25, at p. 74.

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these provisions could be applied in our case. The city of Fallujah is said to measure 30 square kilometers that does not fulfill what is required for widespread damage.

64

Even if the Art 35(3) can be found under the chapter on means and methods of warfare, it is very doubtful that such a threshold can place any constrains on the use of conventional means and methods of warfare.

65

In fact, with such a high threshold, it is doubtful that the provisions offer any significant protection, except in most serious cases. Bothe explains that the major flaw of the two provisions, interpreting the qualifying wordings, is the fact that they are written in an era reflecting considerations for protecting the environment at that specific time in history. Today the needs look different and the wordings are being

“more and more considered inappropriate.

66

To this day, the environmental damage that fulfills all three requirements of these two provisions, hasn´t been acknowledged and we can conclude that it is highly doubtful that the case of Fallujah would be the first to meet the applicable standards for these two

provisions. We can only turn towards the basic principles of international humanitarian law in order to find some guidance in qualifications of environmental damage caused in

Fallujah and possible establishment of its excessiveness.

64 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/fallujah.htm

65 Desgagné, supra n. 58, at p. 113.

66 Bothe, Michael, The Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, German Yearbook of International Law, Volume 34, 1991, page 57.

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5 The Principles of IHL and their applicability on the Environment

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules that are designed to regulate the combat of war in international and non-international armed conflicts. In Public

International Law, IHL is regarded as lex specialis as it is concerned with this specific situation of armed conflict. Sometimes, it is referred to as The Law of Armed Conflict.

This body of law regulates the treatment of the individual, both civilians and military, in times of armed conflict. It also regulates the treatment of civilian object and military objective. It does so determining restrictions to the use of force against the enemy. These restrictions of Jus in Bello involve how the war is conducted, what means are chosen and what methods are best suited for the conduct of war to achieve the military purpose desired.

5.1 The Doctrine of Military Necessity

Military necessity can be explained as a necessity to achieve the very purpose of a specific attack, such as the submission of the enemy that will give the military forces definite military advantage. Military necessity means what needs to be done in order to achieve a specific military purpose. It implies identification of certain realistic measures in the course of action that will accomplish the desired military purpose in most efficient way.

67

Military necessity is also interpreted strictly as an exception where “military necessity exempts a measure from certain specific rules of international humanitarian law prescribing contrary action to the extent that the measure is required for the attainment of a military

67 Hayashi, Nobuo, ”Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law”, Boston University International Law Journal, Vol. 28:39, 2010, page 44.

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purpose and otherwise in conformity with that law”.

68

The rules that prohibit a certain action do so independent of military necessity if the rule does not explicitly state that exception due to military necessity is allowed. For instance, the IHL prohibits direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects. Such attacks are prohibited at all times and no

military necessity can allow for any exception from that rule. On the other hand, when destruction of a civilian object is necessary to achieve a military purpose, the object could be considered to change into being military objective. In the Hostage Case, judge Carter remarked:

“The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law”

69

This is just another way of saying that military necessity needs to be established in order to make destruction of property lawful. Such necessity needs to be proven inevitable in order for its destruction to be justified. The word “imperatively” is taken from Hague Convention IV, Art 23(g).

70

What it exactly implies is uncertain, especially when words such as

“urgent”, “absolute” or “unavoidable” have been used as synonyms.

71

However, we can understand that it is some sort of justification for the damage done. The Fourth Geneva Convention expresses the same prohibition in Art 53 but here the destruction refers only to the Occupying power, other belligerents are not mentioned. The provision of Hague Convention still remains valid for the destruction not carried out by the Occupying power and can be used in a much more broader sense.

72

It is important to point out that Hague Convention codifies the laws and customs of war more as guidelines to the military. The Fourth Geneva Conventions’ primary aim is

68 Ibid. at p. 59.

69 Hostage case (USA v. List et al.) American Military Tribunal Nuremberg, 1948, passage 1253 http://werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/Hostage%20Case090901mit%20deckblatt.pdf

70 It says; ”It is especially forbidden...to destroy or seize the enemy´s property, unless such a destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”.

!

71Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 7.

72 ICRC, 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocols and their Commentaries; Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Part IV: Execution of the

Convention #Section II: Final Provisions, Article 154-relation with the Hague Convention.

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first and foremost the protection of civilians. Hague Convention is considered the written embodiment of customary international law.

73

Whatever the meaning of the word

“imperatively”, it gives a clear understanding that destruction just for the sake of it, in certain cases, can hold the military party liable for the violation of IHL. It gives us an idea that there is a difference between civilized and uncivilized way to wage war and IHL points out the limits, which are not to be crossed. Criminal liability for the destruction of the enemy´s property is stated in Art 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the Rome Statute and has a reference to the word ”imperatively” in its travaux préparatoires but was then replaced by “military necessity”.

74

As far as the Rome Statute is concerned, no other destruction of property but the “enemy´s property” includes the reference to the military necessity.

When the military necessity is established, in order to proceed further in the planning of the military action, military forces need to know how to make a distinction between objects that are prohibited to target directly and objects that are considered to be military objectives.

5.2 Principle of Distinction

A rule of paramount importance in Jus in Bello is the principle of distinction between military objectives and civilian objects. Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Convention Art 48 states;

“in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between civilian population and civilian and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives”

73 Ibid.

74 Dörmann Knut, ”Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Sources and Commentary”, Art 8(2)(b)(xiii), page 249.

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The objects in wartime are either civilian objects or military objectives. In order to respect the provision of IHL that only military objectives can be attacked we need to know how to make such a distinction. Art 52(2) AP I sheds some light on the issue stating that military objectives are limited to those objectives, “which by their nature, purpose, location or use make an effective contribution to the military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization offer a definite military advantage” (my emphasis). Military objectives refer particularly to armed forces personnel of the adversary (apart from when they are hors de combat),

75

military transports, buildings used for military purposes but they can even be commercial objectives that contribute to military action, such as industrial plants.

76

Apart from this, there is no specific list on what constitutes a military objective and it is mostly up to the commander’s discretion to interpret and decide. The clause, even though having tremendous importance is just formulated in general terms.

77

Even when assessing cases from latest decade, we can find the generalization of this norm.

78

The status of an object in wartime depends on the context in those particular

circumstances and can change during the course of events. Even an object that is normally considered to be civilian object can become military objective if the object, by its use or purpose, would make an effective contribution to the definite military advantage. Professor Dinstein gave the example of a church that would normally be protected as it makes part of the civilian object but if the church, during the time of the attack, becomes a hiding place for the adversary party, than the church becomes a lawful military objective.

79

In the same sense are civilians not protected if they are present in buildings that constitute a lawful military objective. For the sake of protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, an attack is legitimate only when directed towards a military objective. If the object is not considered to be a military objective then the object is considered civilian and protected

75 Referring to those ”out of combat”, i.e. wounded and sick or prisoners of war.

See Kolb and Hyde, An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflict, Hart Publishing 2008, page 15. 76 Oeter, (in Fleck), supra n. 23, at p. 181.

77 Bothe, Michael, Legal Restrains on Targeting: Protection of Civilian Population and the Changing Faces of Modern Conflicts, Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 2002, page 39.

78 Prosecutor v. Blaski!, Judgment of 2000, ICTY Trial Chamber, para 180, it is stated that ”Civilian property covers any property that could not be legitimately considered a military objective”. Unfortunately the Chamber did not elaborate further on what is legitimately considered to be a military objective.

!

79 Dinstein, supra n. 24, at p. 98.

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under international humanitarian law. An attack that is directed at civilians or civilian objects constitutes an unlawful attack.

80

The principle of distinction is a norm of customary international law and it is applicable in both international and internal armed conflicts.

81

This general principle of IHL is also applicable to the natural environment.

82

Even in this aspect, the environment is seen as part of customary international law and supported by states military manuals.

83

Natural environment may not be attacked unless it is a military objective and whose destruction is imperatively required by military necessity.

It is possible to imagine that environment in itself could constitute a military

objective if it by its use, purpose or location becomes the only way to gain definite military advantage.

84

A certain military action might be necessary to achieve the military advantage desired. For instance, during Vietnam War the forest was targeted as a military objective and it was broken down so that the enemies would be more exposed in their hiding places.

This required usage of herbicides that had disastrous consequences for the environment.

The environment is still recovering from the aftermaths of that degradation.

Another provision in Art 54 AP I contains a prohibition on attacking, destroying or rending useless “objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population”

and there is a high risk to leave the civilian population without adequate food and water “as to cause its starvation or force movement”. This prohibition appears also as Rule 54 in ICRC Customary rules and is explained to be of a customary character.

85

However, this prohibition is not absolute. As already mentioned, civilian object can in certain

circumstances become military objectives and this is also applicable to objects

indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, if and for such time the object

80 Art 51(2) AP I states: ”The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack” see also Art 52(1).

81 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, ICRC, 2005, page 25.

82 Ibid. at Rule 43, p. 144.

83 Ibid.

84 Art 52(2) AP I.

85 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 81, at Rule 54, p. 189.

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offers direct support or sustains solely armed forces.

86

But if destruction of such object would result in starvation of the population, the attack against such an object is prohibited regardless of the support to the enemy forces, given starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited.

87

Equally, natural resources, cattle, agricultural fields and drinking water dams could very much be referred to as objects of such a basic importance that they become indispensable to the human survival and fall under the meaning of Art 54 AP I.

88

The qualification of an object as military objective usually requires a link to the military action and to the circumstances ruling at the time. According to the provisions of IHL, military objective needs to make effective contribution to military action. Further, the total or partial destruction of such an objective needs to offer a definite military advantage.

In other words, one could argue that there is no point in destroying an object if it really does not fulfill a military purpose for the adversary. There simply could not be any advantage gained from the destruction.

In our case, the city of Fallujah could contain several military targets whose partial or entire destruction would give the US forces desired military advantage, such as submission of the enemy. This would mean that the US forces need to evaluate which objects in the city would contribute to the overall purpose of the attack in order to make them lawful targets. It could also be argued that Fallujah as a city creates a military objective per se. If the insurgents are scattered over the entire city area and hide in various buildings and the circumstances at that time are such that its destruction is unavoidable to fulfill the military purpose, according to the provision of IHL, Fallujah might be considered a lawful target. It could be argued that the entire city could lawfully become military objective if it is the only way to neutralize the enemy. The other scenario is that Fallujah as a city is destroyed because lawful military objectives within the city were targeted and such targeting resulted in the complete destruction of the city. Of course, both scenarios would require that other equally important provisions of IHL protecting civilians and civilian objects have been assessed and are not breached. Under such circumstances where no other provisions of IHL

86 Art 54(3)(a) and (b).

87 Art 54(1).

See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 81, at Rule 53.

88 UNEP, 2009, supra n. 11, at p. 17.

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have been breached, the civilian casualties and damage to the civilian objects, as well as environment, become collateral damage.

Nothing in the facts about this case suggests that environment was targeted directly as a military objective. What the facts suggest is that the US forces were interested in capturing and/or disabling the terrorist leader al-Zarqawi and about 6000 insurgents that were accompanying him. This could make for two individual military objectives, the capturing of a leader and disabling his troops. But it could also be treated as a single military objective as the leader and his insurgents usually operate side by side. When the insurgents establish hiding places in one or several buildings, the buildings are than targeted as military objectives. Nevertheless, such targeting would require that other equally important provisions of IHL protecting civilians and civilian objects have been assessed and are not breached. Under such circumstances where no other provisions of IHL have been breached, the civilian casualties and damage to the civilian objects, as well as environment, could constitute collateral damage.

5.3 The understanding of Collateral Damage

Civilians and civilian objects are protected under the wordings of IHL from being directly attacked. However, the damage or injury to the civilians and civilian objects can very well be unavoidable and incidental casualties as a result of a lawful attack. The damage that is not purposely caused but occurs as a result of the attack is called collateral damage. It is incidental. And it is lawful if the overall military attack is lawful.

Military necessity, proportionality assessment and military advantage go hand in hand. What military advantage is seeking to achieve is crucial in deciding upon what can constitute a military objective.

89

The military advantage can be explained as being tied to the qualification of the military objective in those particular circumstances prevailing at the time. If there is no military advantage gained from destruction of a particular object then it

89 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR), Commentary on Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Harvard University 2009, Section A: Military Advantage.

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cannot be considered as a military objective. Further on, what is necessary to do to fulfill a military purpose needs to be in proportion with the damage that the attack is expected to cause during the military operation. When it comes to environment and collateral damage, as it is with all other civilian objects, the harm caused to the environment must not be excessive in relation to the military purpose. Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons case, ICJ explains:

“States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objective. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality”

90

What ICJ is suggesting is that the environment needs to be taken into account when calculating collateral damage. When a military objective is under attack, the environment should already be included in the calculation of the excessive damage v. definite military advantage. In their review of the NATO bombing campaign, even the ICTY Committee stated that the “military objectives should not be targeted if the attack is likely to cause collateral environmental damage which would be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage which the attack is expected to produce”.

91

How this could be achieved is up to every military force to decide respecting the given provisions on laws of war.

The principle of proportionality is part of customary international law and equally applicable in relation to the environment.

92

It is there to balance what is necessary damage in a military action and what is humanly acceptable.

93

Here, the advantage anticipated is weight against the level of losses and damage done to the civilian objects. This status makes military advantage central to the proportionality assessment. Even though civilian lives will be lost during the military attack, it is legally acceptable if this loss is in

90 Advisory Opinion, ICJ, supra n. 26, at p. 30.

91 Final Report, ICTY, supra n. 52, at p 8, para 18.

92 Holland, Joseph ”Military objectives and collateral damage: Their relationship and dynamics, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 7 2004, page 51

See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 79, at Rule 43, p 146.

93 Holland, supra n. 92, at p. 46.

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