THE UNITED NATION AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

THE UNITED NATION AND THE THREAT OF

CLIMATE CHANGE

Axel Västermark

Axel.Vastermark@gmail.com

Umeå University

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

COP Conference of Parties

CSS Critical Security Studies

IO International Organizations

GHG Green House Gas

IPCC International Panel on Climate Change

MEA Multilateral Environmental Agreements

NDC National Determined Contribution

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

UN United Nations

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Abstract

This thesis examines the language of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement through the lens of security. It departs from the observation that the securitized rhetoric on climate change is not matched with the kind of policies such rhetoric would suggest is necessary. Previous research on the impact of framing climate change in security terms have either argued that the security discourse has been rejected and thus also policies such an understanding would entail – or that the paradoxical nature of climate change as a threat (to continue the way we live we most change the way we live) makes a securitized understanding not yield in extra-ordinary policies. I argue that neither of these explanations are sufficient to explain the lack of ‘extra-ordinary policies’ on climate change.

Table 1 International Organizations and Securitization Theory ... 22

1. Introduction

This thesis departs from an empirical puzzle, namely the discrepancy between the statements about the threat of climate change among policy makers and the lack of implemented policies such utterances would suggest.

Climate change is often described as an ‘existential threat’ facing human kind from a wide variety of actors. The Secretary General of United Nations Antonio Guterres stated in his opening statement to the 25th Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC) that

by the end of the coming decade we will be on one of two paths. One is the path of surrender, where we have sleepwalked past the point of no return,

jeopardizing the health and safety of everyone on this planet (Guetteres cited by Dickie, 2019)

The Sunrise Movement, Extinction Rebellion and Friday for Future among others non-governmental organizations (NGOs) all describe climate change in security terms; as an urgent and existential threat (Gunningham, 2019). Famously, the climate activist Greta Thunberg prominently stated

People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is

money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you! (Thunberg, 2019)

The president of United States, Joe Biden, have stated that “climate change is the number one threat facing humanity” and that “Unchecked, it is going to actually bake this planet. This is not hyperbole. It’s real. And we have a moral obligation” (Biden, 2020).

John Kerry to be the country’s first-ever climate envoy (McKenzie, 2020). In 2020, the European Union agreed to cut their collective greenhouse gas emissions by 55 percent from 1990 levels by 2030 and become climate neutral by 2050 (Pronczuk, 2020). Recently, China pledge to “cut carbon emissions per unit of economic output by at least 65 per cent by 2030” (Geman, 2020). While these pledges are ambitious, they are not adequate if the objective is to honor the Paris Agreement goal of a 1.5 ºC world (United Nations Environment Programme, 2019). Not only are the pledges not ambitious enough to reach the goal of the Paris Agreement, the climate policies that are in place, as well as policies under consideration, are not enough to reach these pledges (Burck et al., 2020).

The majority of the general population in most countries agree with the framing of climate change as a threat. Security statements about climate change seem to have had an effect on the general population with increased percentage of the population viewing climate change as an immediate threat and an overwhelming majority believing that their government do not do enough to address climate change. The project Climate Change in the American Mind by Yale University most recent report shows a growing alarm and awareness among adults in United States. The report states that “About half of Americans think global warming poses either a “high” (14%) or “moderate” risk (37%) to their community over the next 10 years” (Leiserowitz et al., 2020, p. 14). This is in line with the number of Americans who fear a terrorist attack (Haner et al., 2019). In Europe 47% consider “climate change a major threat to society” according to European Investment Bank Data. According to the same report 73% of the citizens of China consider climate change a major threat to society (European Investment Bank., 2020).

Despite this sounding of alarm and public support for more ambitious policies, climate policies that would actually address the challenge are nowhere to be seen. Climate policies range from regulation, such as mile-standards on cars, taxes on pollution and governmental subsidies for environmental friendly options such as making installing sun-panels cheaper and investing in research1_{. The United Nations Environmental Program’s latest Emission Gap} Report 2019 reports conclude that the global temperatures are on course to rise by as much as 3.9 ºC by the end of the century. The report states that

There is no sign of greenhouse gas emissions peaking in the next few years; every year of postponed peaking means that deeper and faster cuts will be required. By 2030, emissions would need to be 25% and 55% lower than in 2018 to put the world on the least-cost pathway to limiting global warming

to below 2 degrees and 1.5 degrees, respectively (United Nations Environment Programme, 2019, p. XV)

To conclude, the language of security is widely used from a variety of different kind of actors and the ‘policies’ that are the logical extension of such an understanding of the problem is lacking. The majority or close to a majority of the general population in Europe, United States and China see climate change as a threat and want their government to act more swiftly to address climate change. This prompts the question that why when a wide arrange of actors and policy makers are advocating for more immediate respond to climate change and the general population view climate change as a threat are the implemented climate policies not more forceful?

To provide part of the answer to this broad question, I depart from securitization theory. Securitization theory is not a comprehensive theory but a part of what has been become known as critical security studies (CSS). Securitization argues that “security” is a uniquely powerful discourse that lends itself to a certain type of logic and policies. The Copenhagen School of securitization from which subsequent theories departs, postulates a chain of events that explain how securitization works - ‘speech acts’ in which a ‘securitizing actor(s)’ invokes ‘securitized language’ (stating that an issue poses an existential threat to something) will, if accepted by an audience, yield ‘extra-ordinary’ policies2. In other words, a security discourse allows securitizing actors to side-step normal political proceedings.

To study under which circumstances such understanding occur and when it engenders ‘extra-ordinary’ policies is thus at the core of securitization studies. From the theory, we can deduct the hypothesis that: the framing of climate change as an existential threat to human kind if accepted by an audience would then lead to ‘extra-ordinary’ policies. While ‘extra-ordinary’ policies are a vague in its definition - one can imagine policies such as mass-surveillance of individuals to prevent them from polluting, or to use military power to destroy coal plants in other countries (Gaan, 2015, p. 65). The discrepancy between what the securitized rhetoric on climate change would entail and the policies is a problem for the Copenhagen Theory. It seems

to suggest that an issue can become politicized by securitization, rather than securitized. Why, when there is a wide arrange of actors securitizing climate change and the audience accept climate threat as an existential threat are the policies attached to the rhetoric not ‘extra-ordinary’?

Research on securitization of climate change has yet to offer a satisfying answer to this paradox. Many authors have either focused on the role of the ‘audience’ arguing that climate change is a failed securitization attempt (Ide et al., 2019; Karafoulidis, 2012; McDonald, 2012). If extra-ordinary policies are not put forward or adjacent to the rhetoric how do we know if they have been rejected? That there are no ‘extra-ordinary policies’ cannot in itself be an argument for that ‘extra-ordinary policies’ would not be supported. Other researchers have argued that we should understand it as a widening of security rather than a securitization of climate change (Gaan, 2015; Oels, 2012, 2012). These researches argue that climate change poses a different kind of threat. Rather than posing an immediate threat which would engender reactive extra-ordinary policies, securitization of climate change leads to pre-emptive policies. The threat of climate change is potential and therefore engender a different logic and policies than threats that are immediate. The reason for pushing climate change on the security agenda by actors is therefore not to gain legitimacy for policies that would without securitization be rejected, but rather to increase the legitimacy of institutions. The logic, of securitization is to protect Self from Other, while climate change provides a logic for creating institution and establish behavior (Gaan, 2015). This explanation, ignores the constructivist nature of what poses a threat. While climate change has engendered a different kind of logic, I argue that this is not due to the kind of threat climate change poses but rather how that threat is being constructed. There is nothing inherent in the structure of climate change that would not create a Self and Other dynamic. For example, one can imagine sanctions against Russia by the United States and Europe being motivated by inaction of climate change rather than the annexation of Crimea.

1.1 Delimitations

1.2 Research Question

As previously stated, this thesis departs from an empirical puzzle, namely the discrepancy between the statements about the threat of climate change among policy makers and the lack of implemented policies such utterances would suggest. What explains this discrepancy? Can securitization theory help us understand part of this empirical puzzle?

1.3 Disposition

Firstly, I will give a brief background to what I refer to the MEA process. The background provides the context for the analysis. Secondly, I will discuss previous explanations for the lack of policy implication. Thirdly, I construct theoretical framework from Barnett and Finnemore (2004) theory on international organizations, as well as Balzacq (2019) ideal-type of securitization. Fourthly, I discuss my methodological choices. Fifthly, the theoretical framework is then applied to the MEA, as well as, statements from Parties to the Convention that choose to not honor the agreements. Sixthly, I present the result is presented as a text, as well as three tables. Seventhly, I analyze the result before giving concluding remarks, as well as suggestions for further research.

2. Background

To provide the context and for analyzing the securitization of climate change through the MEA process, I start by providing a brief overview of the key events in the MEA process. The following chapter is based on the following sources Governing Climate Change: Polycentric

in Action? edited by Andrew Jordan, Dave Huiteman, Harro van Asselt and Johanna Forster

(Huitema et al., 2018). Core documents, statements and background information is also available at UN Secretariat webpage (UN Secretarian, 2021).

The UNFCCC is at the core of the MEA process. The UNFCCC is the first global treaty on climate change and is, as the name implies, a framework for international cooperation to combat climate change. In 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro the international environmental treaty was signed. The Convention entered into force on the 21 of March 1994. 197 countries have ratified the Convention. These states are referred to as Parties to the Convention.

Environmental Programme (UNEP). The goal of the IPCC is to assess the scientific literature and provide vital scientific information to the climate change process. The IPCC prepares comprehensive Assessment Reports about the state of climate change. These reports have been fundamental in starting and shaping the MEA process.

Firstly, the UNFCCC sets the goal to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. To define which and when human induced interference with the climate system is dangerous assigned to the IPCC. Secondly, it gives Parties to the Convention different responsibilities in lowering the GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. The Annex I countries are the countries that are part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as well as twelve countries who are defined as ‘economies in transition’. These countries have greater responsibility to act (according to the Convention) and are expected to “by the year 2000 reduce emission to 1990 levels”. Thirdly, the convention directs new funds to climate change activates in developing countries; by setting up a system of grants and loans managed by the Global Environment Facility. Annex-I countries agree to financial assistances, as well as technology assistance, to help the developing countries act strongly on climate change. It states that economic development vital to developing countries, and that the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission produced by developing nations will therefore grow in the coming years. Fourthly, it kicks off MEA process by establishing the UNFCCC secretariat, also known as UN Climate Change.

The Secretariat helps facilitate the intergovernmental climate change negotiations. The UN Climate Change support the ‘bodies’ that serve to advance the implementation of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. It organizes and supports the Conference of the Parties (COP), which is a conference held annually with all the Parties to the Convention participating. The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention. All Parties to the Convention are represented at the COP, at which they review the implementation of the Convention and any other legal instruments that the COP adopts and take decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention. First the COP (known as COP 1) was held in 1995 in Berlin.

While the Kyoto Protocol was initially a success in that it reached a consensus among the Parties – by May 2012, the United States, Japan, Russia and Canada had indicated they would not sign up to second Kyoto commitment period. Canada choosing to formally withdraw from the agreement. In the aftermath, there were some attempts to revile the Kyoto Agreement (most notably the Doha Accords). At the Doha Accords the COP agreed to an eight-year extension of the Kyoto Protocol. However, withdrawal of the previous mentioned countries (and other large emitters of GHG such as China, India and Brazil not being subjected to the agreement) the extension was limited in scope to about 15% of the GHG-emissions globally.

Instead of continue trying to expand and reinforce the Kyoto Protocol, in 2015 the COP agree to the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement is within the UNFCCC, but is not a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement follows a different logic than predecessor. The Paris Agreement sets the target for the global temperature to rise “well-below 2 ºC of pre-industrial levels”. The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change. It was adopted by 196 Parties at the 21st COP. While a lot of the social mechanisms are the same as the Kyoto Protocol, the biggest different is that the Paris Agreement does not set specific targets. Instead, it relies on National Determined Contributions (NDC). In their NDC, countries communicate actions they will take to reduce their GHG emission. The NDC should also include actions the Parties to the Convention will take to increase resilience to adapt to the impacts of climate change. As of 2020 NDCs have been submitted by some countries, with much of Europe as well as China having not yet submitted. The COVID-19 pandemic has been given as the reason for the delay. The Paris Agreement continue to emphasize “equal but differentiate responsibility”, continue to call on developed nations to assist developing nations, both financial and technology aid. It also calls for an “enhanced transparency framework” which will start in 2024.

To conclude, the MEA process have not been straight forward. Because of this the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are two separate agreements to the UNFCCC. The COP and the IPCC and the agreements are at the core of the MEA process.

3. Previous Research

While offering a comprehensive review on the research on climate change and securitization is beyond the scope of this thesis3 this chapter reviews some previous attempts to explain the

discrepancy between rhetoric and action in regards to climate change. Previous research has either argued for viewing the ‘security attempts’ on climate change as failed securitization or alternatively explaining the lack of ‘extra-ordinary measures’ on the unique global nature of climate change as a threat. A third explanation is that we should understand climate change as a collective action problem. The first mentioned explanation for the divergence between rhetoric and action leaves the theory of Copenhagen School of securitization intact but fails to account for the level of which climate change have influenced policies, as well as people’s everyday life (Lejano et al., 2013; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). The second explanation argues that securitization can be used to politicize a threat which contradicts the original theory. The third explanation fails to account for the constructivist nature of the concept of security.

3.1 Climate Change as Failed Securitization

According to Copenhagen Theory, the security utterances on climate change would yield ‘extra-ordinary policies’ if the securitization attempts made by the securitizing actor is accepted by an audience. As stated above, in keeping with the theory some scholars have argued that the reason for the detachment between securitization attempts and climate change is that the ‘audience’ does not accept the securitization attempts on climate change (Karafoulidis, 2012; McDonald, 2012; Ruzicka, 2019).

Karafoulidis (2012) in his article Audience: A Weak Link in the Securitization of the

Environment? identifies the same discrepancy that guides this research, stating that

A quick but inclusive look at the securitizing actors and the speech acts used in order to raise the issue of climate change on the security agenda has shown that although there is a surprisingly wide and still increasing spectrum of actors and acts working in different fashions but towards the same goal, the outcomes are noticeably disproportionate to the efforts put

into this project (Karafoulidis, 2012, p. 269)

In other words, the input (securitization) does not match the output (lack of extra-ordinary policies). The reason for the author suggest is that the audience have not accepted that definition of climate change and would therefore not accept ‘extra-ordinary’ policies. He argues that the failure to securitize the audience shows that

representations of the phenomenon’s harmful consequence (Karafoulidis, 2012, p. 269)

In the above quote, the underlying argument, in keeping with securitization theory is that the securitizing actors want to use the security discourse to push for extra-ordinary policies. However, the securitizing attempts have not been accepted by the audience and thus not engendered extra-ordinary policies.

Karafoulidis’ article is not alone in arguing that audience is the reason we do not see more forceful acceptance of ‘extra-ordinary’ policies in regards to climate change. The argument that the policies needed to reduce climate change is going to have a negative effect on economic growth and is going to be costly in the short-run and therefore would not be accepted by the general population is making a similar claim – that what stands in the way for ‘extra-ordinary’ policies is the ‘audience’ (Frieden & Lake, 2002, Chapter 28; Keefer, 2007). The argument that the audience does not accepted climate change as a security threat that requires ‘extra-ordinary’ policies cannot be supported by the lack of ‘extra-ordinary’ policies. That research arguing that the audience do not accept securitization have failed to show which ‘extra-ordinary” policies that have been rejected. To move past this argument, we need to look not only at the securitization language but also adjacent rhetoric and proposed solutions, in order to evaluate if they have been rejected or not and whether actors are trying to raise the issue climate change on the security agenda.

3.2 Securitization of Climate Change or a Widening of the Security Agenda

create a ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ such as the threat of a military threat (Gaan, 2015). While these perspectives are providing some explanation for the empirical puzzle; we cannot assume that securitization of climate change would automatically lead to politicization of the subject rather than securitization. This argument contradicts the constructive understanding of security - it would be possible to create Self and Other through securitization of climate change. One can imagine using punitive measures, such as sanctions or military against other countries motivated by their lack of commitment to transitioning from a fossil-based economy.

3.3 Collective Action Problem

One explanation for the inaction on climate change, is that ‘the climate’ is a common pool resource, which lends itself to several collective action problems. In his article, The Tragedy

of the Commons, Garett Hardin (1968) encourage us to consider a pasture open for all. If we

consider the rational herder, he receives the direct benefit of his own animals and bears only a share of the costs resulting from overgrazing. He is therefore encourage “increase his herd without limit” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244). Another related problem, is the problem of free-riders. A country could ‘free-ride’, in other words receive the benefit of other actors’ actions without themselves paying for those actions. In her book Governing the Commons, Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom sums it up as:

Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to

free-ride on the efforts of others. If all participants choose to free-ride, the collective benefit will not be produced (Ostrom, 1990, p. 6)

In the case of climate change, it would mean that if all countries payed the cost for reducing green-house gases (GHG) except one country, that continued to do business-as-usual that nation would still enjoy the benefits of the other countries’ action. If all countries choose to “free-ride” on other countries reduction of GHG than the collective benefit of reducing GHG will not be produced.

implemented in many European countries as well as proposed elsewhere (Helm, 2011). While addressing the threat of climate change is going to take sacrifices, it does not explain the lack of policies that do enjoy public support. In other words, the unique character of climate change is a given, but how that interacts with policy-making is not. The collective action problem cannot alone explain the lack of ‘extra-ordinary’ policies.

The insights provided by Copenhagen School is that a security discourse can be used to push for policies, including policies that would not otherwise be accepted. The gap in previous research is that there is an assumption of what these policies must entail. This leads to the two central flaws discussed here, firstly, an argument that the audience does not accept the securitization of climate change. Secondly, the nature of climate change as a threat will inevitable result in ‘human-security’ or a ‘collective action problem’. Instead, I argue that human security is an active narration of climate change, and not the only one imaginable.

To conclude, I have identified three explanations for the divergence between the rhetoric on climate change and policies. Firstly, explanation is that we should view climate change as a failed securitization. Secondly, cannot be securitized because of the global character of climate change. Thirdly, the lack of policies can be explained by that climate change being a collective action problem. The first explanation is to narrowly focused on the utterance as securitization attempts. Narrowly defining securitizing attempts as utterance can lead to mistakenly including all utterance of security discourse as security attempts. The second and third reason instead ignores the constructive nature of security. To find an alternative explanation for the discrepancy, I research the MEA through a more comprehensive understanding of securitization.

4. Theory

4.1 Critical Security Studies

Critical security studies began as a reaction to traditional state-focused security studies (Buzan et al., 1998). As pointed out by Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2014a, p. 1) in their introductory book to CSS, no school of thought would consider themselves ‘uncritical’. We should see the term critical as a deliberate rhetorical choice of word to differentiate itself from conventions of ‘traditional’ security studies. While the understanding of security within ‘traditional security studies’ includes research on non-state violence, civil war and other armed conflict it has been reluctant to focus security as something beyond armed conflict and violence (see for example Kurki, 2007; Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001; Sayer, 2000; Waltz, 2008). It is useful to distinguish between more ‘traditional’ security studies that focuses on military threats and state security and CSS that take a wider approach to security that includes researching the very concept of security (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21).

CSS should not be seen as a theory, but rather an orientation that includes many different theoretical approaches to the study of security (Krause & Williams, 2002; Mutimer, 2007; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). CSS includes but is not limited to constructivist theories, critical theory, feminist security studies, postcolonial perspectives, post-structuralism and international political sociology and securitization theory (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 11). Issues that have been studied includes, but is not limited to, environmental security, health, human security, migration, technology, artificial intelligence. What sets CSS apart from more traditional approaches is that it does not view (in)security as an objective reality but rather a intersubjective concept that is constructed by a securitizing actor and audience (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 21).

4.2 Securitization Theory

While the aim of this research is to study the ‘securitization’ of climate change, I do not neatly place the research within the Copenhagen School of thought. In the following chapter, I try to identify the ‘essence’ of securitization theory. I will begin by explaining the Copenhagen School approach to securitization.

4.3 The Copenhagen School

The term ‘securitization’ is mostly used by the Copenhagen School, the central work Security:

A New Framework for Analysis authored by Buzan, Wæver and Wilde (1998). The book

identifies three core concepts that are part of the securitization process; actors, speech acts and audience. The securitizing actor(s) securitize an issue through speech acts and the audience either accepts or rejects the securitization attempt. If the securitization attempt is accepted by the audience the issue becomes securitized, in which the actor has the authority to act with “extra-ordinary measures” and that are “beyond normal politics” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 20). Consider, the issues of migration. What is considered a security issue is shaped by a securitization process and expand beyond state security and territorial and sovereignty issues (Buzan et al., 1998; Trombetta, 2008). This framing of migrants as a security concern have increased security measures such as surveillance and more severe vetting of migrants (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002; Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005). This example illustrates two points. Firstly, securitization argues that threats should not be understood as objective but as an intersubjective commitment between the securitizing actor and the audience. Secondly, the process of securitization has real world implications, invoking security by an actor is not only a rhetorical function but something that lends itself to certain practices. I will start by examining the three core concepts of the theory.

4.3.1 Speech Acts

The Copenhagen School views ‘speech acts’ as an action. In Wæver’s words “the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done”. Wæver continues “By uttering ‘security’ a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Wæver, 1993, p. 52). There are two main criticism that have been leveled against this understanding of speech act.

account for other mechanisms through which an issue can be securitized. The meaning of the ‘uttering of security’ is going to be determined not exclusively by the use of security but also the context in which is it used. Karafoulidis (2012) states that speech acts is one of many “indispensable ingredients” for a “successful securitization”. Williams (2003) argues for that images are an important part of the securitization of an issue. Balzacq (2011) argues that that speech acts must resonate with the audiences feeling; needs and interest and we therefore should pay attention to the setting, historical context of the audience in relation to the securitizing actor. The link, historical or cultural, between the actor(s) and the audience(s) and the issue that the actor is trying to securitize is therefore significant if we want to understand securitization. In other words, if we want to understand why certain issues are successfully securitized while others are not, we should not look at ‘speech acts’ as the only securitizing mechanism. This is why the Balzacq (2011) choose to define the mechanism of ‘securitization’ as “a set of interrelated practices, and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation” (Balzacq, 2011, p. 10)

The second critique against the original theory of securitizations is that the authors’ theoretical understanding of ‘audience’ is incompatible with its definition of a ‘speech act’. Balzacq (2019) argues that there is a tension in the Copenhagen School between a subjective understanding and an intersubjective. He states that “An emphasis on speech acts support a subjective approach to securitization, whereas a concern with audience advocates the intersubjective, negotiated aspects of threat construction” (2019, pp. 334–335).

4.3.2 Securitizing Actor

There is a limit to what can be defined as an actor according to the Copenhagen Theory. An actor must have the “power to securitize through speech acts” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 17). While I have argued for an expansion of the mechanisms that securitize, it would be a mistake to not acknowledge that different actors have different possibilities to push security agendas.

Speech acts by their nature requires the utterance to be spoken by someone with the power to make that utterance a speech act. As an illustrating example “I now pronounce you man and wife” is a speech act only if spoken by someone with the power to wed. However, even if we include mechanisms that “bring threats into being” beyond speech acts, the power relation will still be the deciding factor of who is the audience and who is the securitizing actor. Balzacq defines actors within the securitization theory as “elite – that through speech acts (as well as context exercise their power on an audience)” (Balzacq, 2011, p. 15). Huysmans (2011, p. 375) argues that securitizaton theory “implies an elitist vision of politics”. The divide is theoretically important to differentiate between those who can push for certain actions in relation to a threat and those who can accept or reject or push for other kinds of actions, but do not have the ultimate power in constructing these actions. In other words, expanding the theory beyond ‘speech acts’ does not mean that we should not understand securitization as an action that do not require some form of power.

4.3.3 Audience

Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998) defines an audience “as the target of the securitization act that needs to be persuaded and act the issue as a security threat” in order for an issue to become securitized. This definition assumes that it is enough for an audience to be persuaded to act on an issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 6). Karafoulidis (2012), being “convinced about the condition does not always prompt action” by the audience (Karafoulidis, 2012, p. 259). Instead we should understand that an “empowered audience must give its approval (either formal or moral backing)” for an issue to become securitized (Balzacq, 2011, p. 332).

intersubjective understanding of security should view the “audience” not as passive recipient, but rather as an active contributor to the security discourse.

Whether speech act or other measures are used by the securitizing actor, it requires us to analyze how securitization attempt is linked to the cultural context of the audience. As demostrated, the audience cannot only reject or accept a security claims, but can help the actor redefine it. However, I still want to stress that we cannot conclude that power is not important for a securitizing actor, decision-making power is the dividing line between actor(s) and audience(s) within securitization theory.

Securitizing Actor Extra-ordinary Policies

Audience

Figure 1 Successful Securitization (The Copenhagen School)

In order to analyze securitized language in the multilateral environmental agreements, it would be preferable to have a theory of securitization that identifies the semiotic structure, and processes that affect the way something is securitized. I therefore will use a more processes oriented understanding of securitization. Balzacq (2015), develops an ‘ideal type’ of securitization that fits that purpose. Before presenting the ideal type, I will briefly discuss the ideal type as an analytical tool.

4.4 What is an ‘ideal type?’

Ideal types provide a framework from which we can sort the empirical data. The ideal type was prominently developed by Max Weber as a method to perform sociological studies. Ideal types are not utopian constructions, but rather a pure structure, a reduction of a set of phenomena to

Speech Act Accepts

its fundamental elements, which we use as an analytical reference point to sort and understand the empirical chaos of reality (Bartels, 2009, p. 450). Ideal types are constructed inductively by the researcher based on the ‘typical’ elements that are shared by a set of phenomena. As an example, the shared elements of set of actions by democracies we can construct an ideal type of what a “pure” democracy should constitute. Ideal types are not used to predict, rather to denote the essentialism. As pointed out by Balzacq, “this suggests that a crucial attribute of an ideal type is the internal coherence, which is to say that the features that an ideal type encompasses are logically connected” (Balzacq, 2015, p. 105).

Consider the use of rational self-interest which is a common “ideal type” within economics. It is based on two assumptions (1) we act rationally and (2) we act to maximize our own gains (Gauthier, 1970; Miller, 1992). If we view this theory as a hypothesis about how individuals make decisions, the theory is easy to refute. Individuals do not make rational decisions when they play the lottery or an activity such as voting would be considered irrational by a strict definition of self-maximization. However, if we understand the models of rational self-interest as an ideal type of decision making, these empirical objections are less relevant. Whether, rational self-interest model is empirically true is less relevant than whether it is theoretically useful in analyzing the empirics. If we move beyond economics and look at international relations, there have been proponents of trying to understand the states as rational self-maximizing actors. The approach of realist to base the state-system is anarchic, which inevitable leads states to pursue a maximization of security. Waltz explicitly used economic theory to build his ideal type of how the international system works in his Theory of

International Politics (Waltz, 2008).

In other words, ideal types are important theoretical frameworks that help us sort empirical data. By reviewing the literature on securitization theory Balzacq is able to construct an ideal type of securitization.

4.5 Ideal Type of Securitization

Balzacq (2015) gives an ideal typical account for securitization theory. By reviewing the literature on securitization theory, he includes the following aspects in his ideal type of securitization theory.

• Securitizing moves and context are co-dependent

• The drivers of securitizing moves are knowledge claims about an existential threat to a referent object

• Power relations among stakeholder structure both the processes and outcomes of securitizing moves

• Securitizing moves are engraved in social mechanisms (persuasion, propaganda, learning, socialization, practices, etc.)

• Securitization instantiates policy changes – for example, ‘deontic powers’ (rights, obligations, derogations exceptional or otherwise, etc.)

• Securitization ascribes responsibility

I find it helpful to think about securitization attempts through the following structure.

(A) poses an existential threat against (B) ergo (C) need to (D)

A: The issue at hand B: Referent Object

C: Ascribed responsibility D: Solution

4.6 International Organization as Actors

Having authority is necessary in order for IOs to be considered independent actors. In much of IR-theory IOs are “treated as structures of rules, principles, norms, and decision-making procedures through which others, usually states, act” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 2). Instead of this structural understanding of IOs Barnett and Finnemore

develop a constructivist approach to understanding IO behavior that provides a theoretical basis for treating IOs as autonomous actors and helps explain the power they exercise in world politics, their propensity

toward dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior, and the way they change over time (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, pp. 2–3)

bureaucracies that have certain types of authority that affects the social realities in which states operate. The authors argue that:

Bureaucracy is a distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic and behavioral proclivities. It is because of their authority that bureaucracies have autonomy and the ability to change the world around

them. Bureaucracies exercise power in the world through their ability to make impersonal rules. They then use these rules not only to regulate but also to constitute and construct the social world (Barnett & Finnemore,

2004, p. 3)

The above quote highlights three important aspects of IOs. First, IOs have their own internal logic and practices. Secondly, they have authority. Thirdly, they have mechanisms through which they help construct the social world. Note that the mechanisms available to IOs are not those of coercion but rather legitimacy. Their legitimacy is depended upon appearing rational, technocratic, non-violent and impartial and thus can be “trusted”. Therefore, IOs need to show independency from its member states in order to be considered legitimate by its members and non-members.

4.6.1. The Power of International Organizations

Barnett and Finnemore identifies three ways in which IOs help construct the social reality – (1) classification of the world, (2) the fixing of meanings and (3) diffusion of norms. I do not make a clear distinction between these mechanisms in this thesis. By having the mandate to classify categories of actors, problems and required action IOs help shape the social world in which states operates. By fixing meanings IOs “orient action and establish boundaries for acceptable action” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 32). IOs can use their authority to help define problems and thus solutions to specific problems.

4.6.2 The Authority of International Organizations

as binary, or as necessary for a IOs to entail in order to exercise ‘authority. The authors argue that

Different organizations will be constituted by a different mix of these types of authority and will be guided by this mix in carrying out their tasks. Although this mix can be mutually reinforcing, quite often IOs are forced to

navigate conflicting imperatives that come from different sources of authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 27).

The three identified authorities are of IOs are:

• Delegated authority - authority is delegated to the IOs by the members of the organization. States often confer tasks that they are unable or unwilling to perform themselves. According to the authors mandates “to IOs are often vague, broad, or conflicting” leaving it up to the IOs to interpreted their mandate.

• Moral authority - IOs gain moral authority by being seen as impartial and clearly defined moral goals such as promoting human rights.

• Expert authority – by establishing themselves as expert IOs can increase their authority in a particular area-

The theory argues that “IO officials similarly believe that their expertise and professional training make them well suited to advancing the community’s goals” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 28). By conducting research and as well as performing certain tasks IOs view themselves and are often viewed as impartial expert, which gives them authority. The authority of IOs is dependent on them being viewed as legitimate by states. IOs power is what can be referred to as soft power, and is dependent upon states ascribing authority to the IO. IOs power stem from the organization being viewed as legitimate.

As previous argued, ‘security’ is a powerful discourse that have certain causal properties. Establishing a certain topic as security concern, that is urgent and an existential threat, can engender the use of ‘extra-ordinary polices’. The theory assumed that IOs are independent actors, the mechanisms argued for in this chapter, namely “classification of the world’ and ‘fixing meanings’ is a way through which IOs can invoke ‘security language’. The intended audience of the ‘securitization attempts’ can be considered the members of the organization. However, there are other stakeholders and audience for the UN to consider, NGOs, CSO, citizen of member states.

The outcome of the securitization attempt does depend on the power relation between the IO and its members. How the threat is understood or presented should be seen as a intersubjective understanding between the IO and its members.

5. Theoretical Framework

5.1 Securitization by International Organization

Securitizing Actor International Organizations

Audience Members to the Organization

Other Stakeholders Civil Society Organizations, Businesses, Non-governmental Organizations

Social Mechanisms Constructing social reality through

classification of the world, the fixing of meanings and diffusion of norms

Power Relation Depends on the authority of the international organization (expert, moral and delegated) and the independency of its members Security Concern An intersubjective commitment between the

Criteria for Securitization attempt Knowledge claim, Urgency, Reference Object, Existential Threat

Table 1 International Organizations and Securitization Theory

To conclude, IOs can be securitizing actors (that is, can push for an issue to become securitized) and member states to those IOs are understood as the audience. If we apply this on the multilateral environmental agreement. I understand the UN (or more specifically United Nation Secretariat) as the securitizing actor and the members to the party as audience. Securitization moves are according to the theory “intersubjective commitments between the ‘audience’ and the ‘securitizing actor’ and are the result of ‘social mechanisms such as persuasion and negotiations’. When applied to multilateral environmental agreement, we can understand the actual text of the agreement as a result of social mechanisms of negotiations between the stakeholders. Whether we should consider something a security attempt is dependent on if it is an “knowledge claims about an existential threat to a referent object”. In other words, in order for an utterance to be seen as a ‘securitized move’ it categories the threat as existential and urgent. In order for us to understand analyze process and outcome of “securitization move” we should consider the context in which the securitization move is made as well as the power relations among the stakeholders.

6. Methodology

41). I propose that we place securitization as a theory within methodology assumptions of Critical Realism. The terminology of ‘(neo)positivism’ and ‘analyticism’ is based on To

Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics by Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2016).

I will begin this chapter by discussing the contrast between (neo)positivism and (neo)realism. I use (neo)positivism as a contrast to analyticism because (neo)positivism is the dominating methodology in international relations.

6.1 (Neo)Positivism

(Neo)Positivism aims to test hypothesis against empirical findings to research causality between variables. A useful analogue that is often made is to that of natural science. For example, one of the main figures in logical empiricism. Carl Hempel draws a parallel between the study of history and what he refers to as ‘physical science’. He makes the argument that historian should focus on trying to find general laws in order to explain historical phenomena (Hempel, 1942). In his article, The Function of General law in History published in 1942, he argues against the idea that historians should be concerned with “description of particular event of the past” but rather should try to establish general laws, what he defines as “a statement of universal conditional form which is capable of being confirmed or disconfirmed by suitable empirical findings” (Hempel, 1942, p. 35). In a similar way that we can through experiments draw the conclusion that if water is heated up to more than 100 degrees Celsius it will evaporate (if we omit how altitudes and other atmospheric circumstances can affect the boiling temperature of liquids), we can through various methods try to find similar generalizable deductions within the world of political science. In other words, knowledge is to know how different variables interact. One example of an (neo)positivistic approach to research is the method book in international relations Designing Social Inquiry by King, Koehane and Verba (1994).

To do this, (neo)positivism need to make certain assumptions. Jackson (2016) terms the ontological and epistemological assumptions within (neo)positivistic research world-mind

dualism and phenomenalism. Mind-world dualism suggest that there is a mind-independent

researchers to test hypotheses; phenomenalism tells researchers to seek indicators of causal relations in constant conjunctions of objects or factors or qualities” and that the researcher should “not to go beyond the evidence of experience in seeking those indicators” (Jackson, 2016, p. 70). In other words, the method for observing the mind-independent world is by examining things we can experience.

Research on securitization on climate change traditionally make (neo)positivistic methodological choices. For example, securitization theory assumes a causal relationship between ‘securitized attempts’ and the ‘audience’. We can see this in studies such as, Ide, Detges and Leimeister (2019) who studies the securitization of climate change by reviewing the security discourses in school textbooks in Germany and its effect on the “audience” of German students. They conclude that “textbooks using alarmist logic are indeed likely to conceive climate change as an urgent threat necessitating extraordinary measures, and are thus likely to accept the securitization of climate change” (Ide et al., 2019, p. 532). Similarly, Schäfer, Scheffran and Penniket (2016) investigates media reporting in nine countries over 15 years and conclude a that climate change is being discussed in security terms. Both of these studies make the assumption that “security” is a concept that is possible to observed and that it will have a causal effect on the audience.

I propose we take a different methodological approach and method design, namely critical realism. In other words, the aim of my research is not establishing such an empirical connection between ‘securitization’ and “climate change’ but rather help us understand the concept of security, what it means, not only by what it means empirically but also how we understand it as a concept.

6.2 Critical Realism

In the helpful terminology of Patrick Jackson’s book The Conduct of Inquiry in International

Relations, the philosophical ontology and epistemology of critical realism is a combination of

‘mind-world dualism’ and a ‘transfactualism’. The mind-world dualism is the assumptions that we can generate knowledge about the mind-independent world (Jackson, 2016, p. 72). In other words, there is a world independent from our knowledge of it. This is the same assumption that (neo)positivists make.

(Jackson, 2016, p. 77). In contrast to, (neo)realism, critical realism does not limit the process of knowledge creation to objects and entities can be experience, but argue that we can generate knowledge about “causal properties” of social phenomena (Jackson, 2016, p. 77). Andrew Sayer in his book Realism and Social Science argues that “critical realism provides an alternative to both hopes of a law-finding science of society” and the “anti-naturalist or interpretivist reduction of social science to interpretation of meaning” (Sayer, 2000, p. 2). However, by accepting transfactualism critical realists can design research to investigate real- but-undetectable dispositional causal powers of objects and entities. Realists reject the positivistic undertaking of discovering universal laws in social science. This is a result of that critical realist does not only want to research what have happened, but also powers that may exist unexercised. Sayer argues that “what has happened or been known to have happened does not exhaust that could happen or have happened” (Sayer, 2000, p. 7). Critical realist seeks to identify both necessity and potential power in the world. In conclusion, critical realist takes a mind-world dualistic approach to research but rather than supporting that knowledge in only in things that can be experienced (as positivists would do) realists argue that we can gain knowledge about the mind-independent world through researching the causal properties of entities or social phenomena. I place my research within critical realism, that is I see securitization discourse as having causal properties.

6.3 Method

‘Critical security studies’ is an interdisciplinary researcher approach. The issue of securitization can be researched from a range of different disciplines – critical studies, institutionalism, sociological, feminists or post-structural studies to name a few (Salter & Mutlu, 2013). I take an inter-disciplinary approach and rely on previous research from all above-mentioned fields.

This thesis is a qualitative case study of the MEA. As stated, this thesis departs from the empirical puzzle of the use of security language but the lack of extra-ordinary policies with regard to climate change. It more narrowly focuses on how we should understand the security discourse in the MEA. I will construct a textual analysis that is grounded on the theoretical framework present above. The questions I aim to answer is

• Should we understand it as a securitization attempt? • What are the implications of this framing?

• Does the security move differ between the MEAs?

6.4 Textual Analysis

The ontological and epistemological choices I described above informs the method. The research does not attempt to explain the causative progression of securitization, but rather tries to highlight the causal properties of security language. The focus of my research is not the process of securitization of climate change, but rather how security language is used with regard to climate change. In other words, the research does not focus on the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience, but rather defining the text in the MEA as an intersubjective understanding of the threat of climate change between the United Nations and Parties to the Convention. While the process of developing this intersubjective understanding could be the interest of further research – questions such as which actors push for which understanding, how does the power relation between the different actors interact and similar questions are beyond the scope of this research. Rather, I try to identify reasons for the inconsistency of rhetoric and policy in the text of MEA.

In analyzing the data there are several different methods available. To apply the theoretical framework on the empirical material I conduct textual analysis. While a discourse analysis could be fitting, a textual analysis is less time consuming and can serve as an inductive technique for further studies and development of the theoretical framework (Mckee, 2001).

6.4.1 Identifying security moves

(A) poses an existential threat against (B) ergo (C) need to (D)

A: The issue at hand B: Referent Object

C: Ascribed responsibility D: Solution

Note that the this does not have to be a sentence but can be found in different part of the agreement. What is at the center of this research is not the wording – but rather the logical structure of the security moves in the MEA and the implication of this.

6.4.2 Analyzing implication of security moves

After identifying the overall security understanding in the different agreements following the method outline above, I will try to find how this understanding of the threat of climate change is motivated. The understanding of international organization is outlined above and based in the works of Barnett and Finnemore (2004). The authority of international organization stems from internal logic, as well as delegated, expert a and moral authority. What authorities are used to motivate this understanding? What is the reasoning behind the particular understanding of the threat of climate change? Does the understanding have an internal logic? The overall question that I try to answer in doing this is what does this understanding of climate change as a threat mean for the ‘securitized logic’ and the need for ‘extra-ordinary’ policies? What are the limiting factors? Motivated reason for non-compliance? These theoretical concepts inform the analysis of the result.

6.4.3 Comparative Analysis

UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement view climate change through the lens of security will offer us data as a starting point in evaluating in what way the increased focus on climate change as a security threat have changed the consensus of the world community over time.

6.5 Case selection

The UN is an odd fit as a securitizing actor. Firstly, it is founded on the idea of de-escalating security threats – through arms deals, peace missions and through mediating conflict and post-conflict issues. The UN have simultaneously pushed for an understanding of security that runs counter to ‘state-security’ as well as a security discourse to gain authority to act. By doing an analysis on the UNFCCC and the following protocols, we can analyze how the UN is squaring these two contradictory wills. While the theoretical framework can be used to study other international organizations that deals with threat and security – it requires to ask the question of authority, power relation to its member states and how it is tied to legitimacy of the organization.

The advantage of focusing on MEA is that the intersubjective nature of securitization is already a given, that is the agreements are an agreed upon understanding of the securitizing actor and the audience. While research on the process of the construction of these agreements could be used to analyze the social mechanisms and power relation between the actors, by focusing on the MEA, this research focus on the result rather than the process.

6.6 Data

Applying the theoretical understanding outlined above to the multilateral environmental agreements we can highlight some important aspects of how the context and process shape how security concerns. The text that I will analyze are as follows:

• The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992)

• The Kyoto Protocol to The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998)

• The Paris Agreement (2015)

official statement from Trump about the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (available at the White House official website (see Trump, 2017), as well as other statements made by the UN Secretariat (all available at the website of the UN Secretarian, 2021).

6.7 Ethical Aspects

The ethical aspects of research are often discussed in the negative, that is the absent of negative ethical consequences. However, in an aspirational custom, one can ask whether research have any ethical positive aspects. This question is often not asked, either because one believes that research, in the sense of the creation of knowledge, is in itself always a force for good or that making any moral claims or aspiration makes the researcher visible, which in turn breaks the illusion of an impartial researcher. These reasons underplay the role of the researcher. I want to challenge this view of the research. First, the moral good in researching for example how to develop more lethal weapons can at least be questioned even if it is generating knowledge. Second, the researcher is often understood as an objective observer of “facts”. That is, it is according to this assumption, possible for the researcher to observe the world in an objective fashion.

However, the main reason why I think it is quite useful to make moral aspects of one’s research explicit, is that it helps not only me as a researcher to make it explicit for myself to what it is I am looking for, and by that helps the reader evaluate the research. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the underlying questions in most research on the challenges of the global environment is how bad is it going to get and is there any reason to believe that we will be able to mitigate the worse effects of the climate change.

and processes (Wæver, 1993). Whether we think climate change should be addressed with ‘extra-ordinary’ measures or not, securitization of any issue carries with it a moral aspect.

7. Result

7.1 UNFCCC

7.1.1 Threat and Referent Object

When ratifying the UNFCCC, the Parties to the Convention agreed to a reduction of ‘dangerous’ human interference with the climate system. The treaties goal is specified in Article 2 in the UNFCCC treaty. It reads:

The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse

gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level

should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not

threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2).

We can understand this statement as a security move, i.e. a knowledge claims about a threat to a referent object (Balzacq, 2015, p. 106). However, it does not use securitized language as it does not see it as ‘existential’ or ‘immediate’ threat. In other words, it does not fill the criteria of securitization attempt.

is a different logic to it than the need for extra-ordinary policies. From previous research, we can note that firstly, this ties in to human security rather than national security. To conclude, the above statement is even though it views climate change as a threat not a securitization attempt.

7.1.2 Ascribed Responsibility

The treaties UNFCCC ascribes responsibility to the developed countries; they are the primary actors that should address the threat of climate change. The UNFCCC establishes the “developed countries” as more responsible for the situation and argues that they should take the “lead”. Further, it establishes less developed countries and least developed countries are the Parties to the Convention that will be suffer the most from the adverse effects of climate change. As previously noted, the treaty makes a difference between what it calls Annex I, Annex II and non-Annex countries, and least developed-nations. Annex I consists of developed countries and “economies in transition” (EIT). The EIT consists of the Russian Federation and several other Central and Eastern European countries such as Slovenia and Romania. Annex II consists only of OECD-countries (also included in Annex I). Non-annex countries are developing countries – while least developed countries are states with limited capacity to respond to climate change and adapt to its adverse effect. Annex-II countries are according to the treaty required to provide financial and technical support to less developed nations. The convention motivates this from a moral standpoint:

Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share

of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 2)

And

Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective

and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their

These two paragraphs highlight two things. Firstly, that the convention seeks a broad appeal with as many Parties joining the convention as possible. Many parties to the Convention gives both the UN and the process more legitimacy. Secondly, UN is adopting a moral argument for the “responsibility”. It uses its moral authority to push a certain understanding of the threat. Similarly, emphasizing justice and morality goes against a securitized understanding of climate change. Rather than pushing immediate action, it lends itself to an establishing institutionalized behavior in which certain Parties are responsible for other Parties.

7.1.3 Solutions

The mechanism that the convention suggests to get Parties to the Convention to abide by the agreement is peer-pressure and transparency. The UNFCCC mandates that the Parties to the Convention develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the COP national inventory of GHG emissions by sources. The agreement also mandates the Parties to the Convention to formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and when appropriate, regional programs containing measures to mitigate and facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change (UNFCCC, 1995, Article 3-6). In other words, the UNFCCC does not have binding commitments but establish intentions for the Parties to the Convention, and a regime of expertise to monitor the behaviors of the Parties.

7.1.4 Conclusion

UNFCCC should not be seen as a securitizing attempt. It is careful to push for a certain understanding of climate change, in which supporting human security and development in developing countries is the moral responsibility of developed nations. The UNFCCC is internally logical, and pushes an understanding that fits together, emphasizing the risk climate change poses to economic development for developing countries. The argument in the UNFCCC can be summarized as following: the effects of climate change pose a threat against developing nations therefore, developed nations (who is the cause of GHG emission both historically and per capita) need to reduce their own GHG emission as well as assist developing nations develop without stressing the climate to an unnecessary extent.

7.2 The Kyoto Protocol

below their 1990 emissions levels (Kyoto Protocol, 1997, Article 3). The aspiriation of the Kyoto Protocol is to specify the meaning of Article 2 of UNFCCC for the Parties to the Convention and establish a set of practices and tools to reach that goal.

The Kyoto Protocol is often described as a failure for the global community to address the adverse effects of climate change. The Protocol lost legitimacy when United States stated its intention to not ratify the agreement. Subsequently, Canada withdrew from the agreement in 2011. On 31 December 2012, the first commitment period under the protocol expired. The developed nations that were still part of the agreement choose to comply with the protocol. Despite that 36 developed countries complied with the Kyoto Protocol, the global GHG emission still increased by 32 % between 1990 and 2010 (Shishlov et al., 2016). The text of the Kyoto Protocol emphasizes technical solutions, establishes market-based practices in which countries can trade with other countries for the right to pollute, highlights that any solution to the adverse effects of climate change should be cost-effective, argues for exemption for developing countries and countries in “economic transition” from the obligation to reduce GHG emission. Eight of the developed nation who abided by the binding agreement did so by trading the right to pollute domestically with reducing pollution elsewhere.

7.2.1 Threat and Reference Object

Since the Kyoto Protocol builds on the UNFCCC, it can be seen as a continuation of the framing of the problem as GHG emissions threaten human security. The protocol states that The Parties included in Annex II

Shall strive to implement policies and measures under this Article in such a way to as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade, and social environmental

and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing country Parties (The Kyoto Protocol, 1997, Article 2:3)

In other words, solutions cannot hinder economic development, especially developing countries’ economic development.