The Social Representation of Populism in Europe

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The Social Representation of Populism in Europe

A cross-sectional case study of populist supporters across four European states.

Ameer Hassan Farooq

Political Science Research: Dissertation (15 credits) Department of Government

Uppsala University, Spring 2019

Supervisor: Andreas Gottardis

Word count: 11,353

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Abstract

The following paper focuses on the relatively new rise of populism which has seen a surge across states across the western world. Populism refers to governance of and for the people, as opposed to the ruling elites. As the sensation of democratic deficits and partisan cleavages increase, the reaction is populism which aims to restore the fundamental democratic values back to the people, advocating a more transparent form of democracy, where power moves away from the ruling elites, back to the people.

We explore what populism entails through defining it through its theoretical identifiers and analyzing which political and social attitudes are present in supporters of populist parties.

This study is meant to complement Staerkle and Greens study about the social representation of right-populists. By using the same research methodology as Staerkle and Green but also including left populists. This means looking at the social representation of left-right populist supporters and identifying mutual conventions and relations through a cross sectional case study of four countries which have seen a rise in populist parties.

The findings lead us to see convergence in left-right populist parties toward institutional distrust and divergence in opinion towards globalism and multiculturalism. In essence, we compare and present the social representation of populist supporters of left-right populist parties and

investigate which attributes cause the divergence in their political and social identities.

Key words: Populist Parties, Social Representation, Identity Politics, Trust, Institutions,

Democratic Deficit, The Elite

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Introduction

Populism has recently become more visible in politics across the western world. Successful populist leaders such as Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen and Alexis Tsipras are all gaining electoral support because of their successes in utilizing populist ideologies and connecting to the people. The vocal point for the populists’ agenda is being representative of the people's best interest, which also raises the question: if democracies are about pursuing the will of the people, is populism an indicator of democratic deficits, or even the failure of democracies?

The key for populist success has been linked to certain attributes: a strong leader whom is representative of the people¹, anti-establishment sentiment ², economic restrains ³, role of social media⁴ and most importantly, relating to the electors’ struggles through direct communication⁵. Recognizing and relating to the social representation of the target market of electorates is fundamental for any populist to exploit and gain power, legitimacy and mobilization⁶. In this paper we analyze the social conventions through a cross sectional study of four populist parties’ supporters from different European states. We aim to identify indicators which are mutually exclusive for all populist party supporters and the

differences between left-right populists.

We investigate the social and political identities of the people voting for populist parties. Giving complementary value to previous research on the social representation of populism by Staerkle and Green, who focused on the social representation of right-populists and provided meaningful data, operationalization’s and results for right-wing populist supporters. However, Staerkle and Green did not do a comparison between left-right populists which this paper aims to do by focusing on rise of populism in countries which have recently seen a rise in left and right populism.

By the end of this paper we aim to understand the conventions of populism that are mutual through four European populist parties as well as conventions which diverge populism into left-right ideologies. We will confirm if Staerkle and Greens results were correct Additionally, we get to view the social

representations in gender, ethnicity and age amongst other variables that are behind the populism.

1 Moffitt, Benjamin. "Introduction: The Global Rise of Populism." In The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation. Stanford University Press, 2016. University Press Scholarship Online, 2017. doi:

10.11126/stanford/9780804796132.003.0001.

2 Canovan, Margaret. “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy.” Political Studies 47, no. 1 (March 1999):

2–16. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00184.

3 Poli, Maria Daniela. "Contemporary populism and the economic crisis in western Europe." Baltic Journal of Political Science 5, no. 1 (2016): 40-52 doi: https://doi.org/10.15388/bjps.2016.5.10335

4 Engesser, Sven, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, and Florin Büchel. "Populism and social media: How politicians spread a

fragmented ideology." Information, communication & society20, no. 8 (2017): 1109-1126. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697

5 Müller, Jan-Werner. 2017. What is populism?

6 Engesser, Sven, Nayla Fawzi, and Anders Olof Larsson. "Populist online communication: introduction to the special issue."

(2017): 1279-1292. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328525

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4 Our research question is therefore set as:

- Are there any social characteristics or relations that differ between the left-right populist supporters besides the political ideology they align with?

The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore the social representation of populist supporters. By doing so we analyze populism as an ideology and operationalize the empirical material according to the populist ideology.

Successfully meeting this purpose will deepen our knowledge on what populism means through the social representation affiliated to populist supporters. This would also give us a meaningful

understanding on what type of people the populist leaders and parties exploit for electoral support. The research should provide valuable knowledge to the study of political science with regards to the rise in populism and social psychology through the analysis of political and social attributes affiliated with populism.

The paper begins with a review of populism and its social representation. Previous research is then discussed, accompanied by relevant theoretical framework for us to investigate and understand the relationship of social representation with respect to populism. Thereafter is a chapter on the research design, following straight into the results, analysis and limitations of the study.

1.1 Populism

Populism is a term thrown around by politicians and within social media, but seldom does it retain a concrete definition. We analyze populism as an ideology as political scientist Cas Mudde describes:

‘Thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people” ⁷

This ideology can naturally be deconstructed to two definitive groups: “us” the pure people who are taking a stance against the antagonist elites “them”, who are liable for instability through bad governance. The people are the vocal point for populism and there is a whole discourse on what is categorically identified as being a part of “the people”. Ethnicity, sexuality, religion, socio-economic class, cultural differences all play fundamental roles in the political and social identities of the people vis- a-vis the elites and the ostracized other.

There is also focus on the subjective nature of electorates. On matters of trust towards political

institutions from the ‘pure sovereign people’ within the society. These two conventions differentiate the left-wing populist into two groups the right-populist ideals are based on mistrust and anti-elitist

sentiments where the governing elites are not fulfilling and delivering on the will of the people, which can be identified on the national level and supranational level through Euroscepticism⁸. Secondly, the

7 The Problem with Populism | Cas Mudde - Access: 2019-04-27

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/problem-populism-syriza-podemos-dark-side-europe

8 Kneuer, Marianne. “The Tandem of Populism and Euroscepticism: a Comparative Perspective in the Light of the European Crises.” Contemporary Social Science 14, no. 1 (2018): 26–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/21582041.2018.1426874.

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“ostracized other” is seen as a threat to the people because of the identity politics which come into play against the “ostracized other”. Anti-immigration sentiment is seen to be high, usually complemented by ideologies of nationalism and protecting the sovereignty of a nation. The left-populist also has the anti- elitist attitude to differentiate itself from the antagonist, but the key difference is that there is lesser exclusion of marginalized groups and the “ostracized other”. Cultural rejection plays less of a role for liberal populists, but the key antagonist remains as the elitist.

1.2 Social Representation

Social representation is a study from social psychology where different collective cognition, schools of thought and common sense are connected to different groups of people for representation. Social representation allows us to identify and categories certain people or objects. Allow comparison of different behaviors. There is no concrete definition for social representation of a specific group because of the ever-changing fluid nature of sociological beings but Serge Moscovici, a social psychologist describes it as:

“Social representations […] concern the contents of everyday thinking and the stock of ideas that give coherence to our religious beliefs, political ideas and the connections we create as spontaneously as we breathe. They make it possible for us to classify persons and objects, to compare and explain behaviors and to objectify them as part of our social setting. While representations are often to be located in the minds of men and women, they can just as often be found “in the world”, and as such examined separately. (Moscovici 1988: 214)” ⁹

The social representation of populist supporters would provide us with knowledge and disciplines of populist parties and their ideology. As discussed in the definition of populism, there is a clear distrust from the people towards the elitists and “ostracized others” in society for right-populists. Likewise, distrust towards the elites and institutions for the left-populists. These sensations of distrust are therefore central for analysis of the representation in citizen’s subjective realities and identities¹⁰

1.3 Deconstructing Populism and Social Representation

Social representation of populism will be analyzed together but will be split into distinct parts.

First, we aim to identify the beliefs and trusts of the populist supporters towards political institutions and the elites. Since all populist supporters have a similarity in institutional distrust, it would allow us to see a common discipline and convergence across all left-right populist parties across the populist

demographic.

Secondly, we aim to explain the differences of the populists by filtering down their political identities to right-left parties. This allows us to see what factors matter most when it comes to subjective realities, in terms of trust in multiculturalism, economic insecurities and interpersonal trust. These subjective realities

9 Moscovici, Serge. “Notes towards a Description of Social Representations.” European Journal of Social Psychology 18, no. 3 (1988): 211–50. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420180303

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6 also allow us to categorize differences in the social identities of left-right populists. This will be the

factors that explain the divergence of the political identities.

Thirdly, the social position and profile of all the populist supporters will be viewed to give us

representation in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, education and unemployment status. Allowing us to have specificity when referring to populist supporters as a narrow demographic. We will have no analysis in the third part.

The research framework is picked up from a previous study conducted by Staerkle & Green from the faculty of Social and Political Science in Lausanne Switzerland. Staerkle & Green investigated the social representation of right-wing populism through a cross-national comparative case study¹⁰. Staerkle &

Green did not include left-wing populists in their study, which gave us the opportunity for this study to be inclusive of left-right populism in a cross-sectional case study of four European states. Bringing a

broader understanding to the social representation of populism as a whole and complementing Staerkle and Greens research on right-populists and testing if we get the same results for right-wing populists.

To conduct this research on social representation of populism, we set our four objectives:

1) Populism ideology will be defined in two dimensions in the same way as Staerkle and Green.

The first dimension focuses on attitudes towards institutional trust. We aim to analyze the convergence in attitudes and relations towards political institutions and the elites for a pair of left-right populist parties’

supporters through the cross-sectional analysis.

2) The second dimension will focus on globalism. We aim to analyze the divergence in attitudes and relations toward culture and economic threats for the pair of left-right populist parties’ supporters through a cross-sectional analysis. Staerkle and Green used the name “Pluralism” on this dimension- but that limits Staerkle and Greens study to a vocal point for right-populists. Globalism is more inclusive definition of political, economic and cultural development, relative to pluralism for left-right populists.

3) The political and social identities of the respondent will be analyzed to view if there is any clear distinction between the left-right populist supporters through what previous literature suggests. Such as the role of the economy, multiculturalism, political efficacy.

4) The social position of the populist supporters will be presented to view the genders, age, ethnicity and other factors relevant to our research. These social positions are shown to give us an outlook of the populist supporters included in our dataset.

10 Staerklé, Christian, and Eva G.t. Green. “Right-Wing Populism as a Social Representation: A Comparison across Four European Countries.” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 28, no. 6 (2018): 430–45.

https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2369.

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Theoretical Framework

This chapter will deepen on the central measures of our research objectives. Increasing our knowledge in what is included in the social representation of populism, social and political identities. A literature review towards the end of the chapter will summarize and lay the foundations for our research, what variables we will look at and what our expectations are from previous research.

2.1 Social Representation of Populism

Populism carries no clear-cut definition or relations since its basis of antagonizing and marginalizing specific groups are purely subjective, which allows the populists to introduce their own ideology such as nationalism or socialism¹¹. Previous research also shows that we cannot define populism in single dimensional of the ‘pure sovereign people’ and ‘the elites’ but rather, the focus is on two dimensions of

‘us’ and ‘them’¹². The first dimension focuses on distrust between the ‘pure sovereign people’ and the

‘ruling elites’. This dimension is mutual in all populist ideologies. The second dimension is based on the divides in the ‘sovereign pure people’ where certain groups such as ethnic minorities and immigrants are marginalized and seen as the ‘ostracized other’.

We name the first dimension which measures distrust between the ‘pure sovereign people’ and ‘the elites’ as the Institutional dimension. The focuses of this dimension are on the cleavages between the people and the elites and their institutions. This dimension measures the separation between the ruling elite and the ordinary people. The elites are seemingly more interested in personal gain and benefitting immigrants and failing to be representative of the commoners.

The fundamental elements of the institutional dimension are seen represented in the distrust and negative attitude between the ‘pure sovereign people’ towards the elitists¹³, which is inclusive of the media, the judiciary and other related institutions associated to the elitists. We focus therefore on institutional trust, which will measure the populist supporters’ level of trust or rather distrust towards parliament, the legal system, politicians and political parties.

Besides institutional distrust, the institutional dimension also highlights the importance of democratic deficits which allow populism to thrive. Democratic deficits are defined as democracies lacking accessibility and transparency for the ‘pure sovereign people’¹⁴ The democratic deficit will focus on questions regarding how much the political system allows people to engage in politics. We aim to measure how inclusive the democratic system is to the people as how satisfied the people are with the way the democratic political system works. Through measuring democratic deficits, we can identify and highlight the responsiveness and successfulness of democratic processes when contributing to

populism.

11 Engesser, Sven, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, and Florin Büchel. "Populism and social media: How politicians spread a

fragmented ideology." Information, communication & society20, no. 8 (2017): 1109-1126. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697

12 Mudde, Cas, and . “Populism: A Very Short Introduction,” 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001.

13 Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan Mcdonnell. “Conclusion: Populism and Twenty-First Century Western European Democracy.” Twenty-First Century Populism, 2008, 217–23. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230592100_14.

14 “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Accessed April 27, 2019. https://eur- lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/democratic_deficit.htm

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8 The institutional dimension will be measured through these two points: institutional trust and

democratic deficits. We should expect a convergence across our cross-national comparison. All populist parties’ supporters should theoretically have minimal institutional trust alongside a democratic deficit.

The second dimension which focuses on the divides within the “pure sovereign people” is called the Globalist dimension. The divide on this dimension is between “people like us” and the “ostracized other”. The differentiation and otherness are created due to a rejection of globalism. The focuses are therefore on the people themselves, where the subjective element of ‘us’ and ‘the others’ plays when identifying the role of cultural diversity and acceptance of pluralism as well as rejecting cultural diversity simply because of economic reasoning such as immigrants stealing the sovereign natives jobs and exhaust their economy.¹⁵

There will be specific focuses on economic threats and cultural acceptance which will explain our anti- globalist stances. The globalist dimension also aims to explain the role of complimenting ideologies such as orientalism, nationalism, socialism which assist in diverging the left-wing populists, since their political identities are no longer aligned but their social identities come to play.

Economic threats gain their basis on the globalist dimensions because of an untested hypothesis brought forward by Inglehart and Norris. The hypothesis stipulates that left-populists are more likely to attract support from ‘economically insecure’ people whereas the right-populist focuses on targeting people who reject cultural diversity.¹⁶ Naturally, we have two indicators of right-left populism here from economic security and acceptance of cultural diversity which are measurable within the globalist dimensions and this hypothesis will be tested.

The economic insecurity brings relevance to the right-wing populists arguing that ‘others’ are being prioritized to the sovereign people for jobs. Prioritization and outsourcing jobs leads to a decrease in employment within the sovereign state which implicates a sentiment of rejection towards globalism. A contemporary example of this is seen during the Brexit campaign where immigrants were blamed for increasing competition and as a consequence decreasing the wage levels due to the surplus in labour supplies.¹⁷Likewise, the left-wing populist can take economic insecurity to address issues regarding economic inequalities and unemployment caused within the sovereign state itself.

Cultural acceptance is another element which is highly debated by right-wing populists. Sovereign identity and the motherland are prioritized to add-on identities such as nationalism. Going back to Brexit’s discourse in rejecting their European identity and wanting to ‘Make Great Britain Great Again’¹⁸.

15 The Sun. “Brits Are Suffering from Immigrants Taking Their Jobs for Half the Price.” The Sun. The Sun, Accessed April 03, 2019. https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2876121/brits-are-suffering-from-immigrants-taking-their-jobs-for-half-the-price-we-need- an-immigration-deal-that-works-for-everyone-not-just-bosses-who-want-cut-price-labour/.

16 Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659.

17 Travis, Alan. “Are EU Migrants Really Taking British Jobs and Pushing down Wages?” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, Accessed April 03, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/20/reality-check-are-eu-migrants-really-taking- british-jobs

18 Haynes, Gavin. “UK Trump Fans Gathered to 'Make Britain Great Again'.” Vice. VICE, Accessed April 10, 2019.

https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/3kyq45/uk-trump-fans-gathered-to-make-britain-great-again.

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9 Cultural backlash is important for populists who feel ignored, colonized or devalued.¹⁹ this measures a rejection of pluralism is common, specifically amongst right-wing populists who see outsider “others” as people “who threaten our way of life”.²⁰The threats are seen to be a negative attitude towards the elites from the populist supporters.

It is important to highlight the role of the populist leaders due to their role in being ‘the voice of the people’ and utilize the globalist dimension since it is exclusive of certain groups, playing on the subjective distrust of the electorates towards globalism²¹. Whether it is based on economic or cultural reasoning’s. We do not explicitly focus on populist leaders in this study since our focuses is on the supporters, but it is of great importance to mention how populist leaders such as Donald Trump utilize this specific dimension to exclude Muslims²² or Mexicans²³ from exploiting ‘his sovereign’ nation, the United States of America.

2.2 Political and Social Identity

The identities of the populist supporters are central for social representation. To identify mutual attitudes, we narrow down to two sorts of identities. The political and social identity, which are operationalized to several measurements.

The political identity, or partisan identity is highlighted through party affiliation. The political identity of populist parties enables us to categorize electorates that hold similar political preferences. This is measured through which party one votes for, or has the most favor for, even if they do not to vote.

Although the political and social identities are compounded together in the electorate, they have different implications for our analysis. The social identities for populist supporters may be similar but the political identity could vary and vice-versa.

Our research aims to find if there are indeed cross-national similarities in populist supporters so the political identity for our data will be narrowed down and filtered through two populist rhetoric: a) left-wing populist and b) right-wing populist. The measure of political activity is central in identifying the electors’

faith in the government. We expect low levels of political activity due to the lack of faith in government. It is also important to highlight this measurement was not included in Staerkle and Greens study

(explicitly), this measurement should deepen understand on the faith in government per left-right populist. The political activity measures if the populist electorates have engaged in politics in the most basic way by taking part in a petition. We expect a somewhat low result here too due to the distrust in political institutions.

19 Bang, Henrik, and David Marsh. “Populism: a Major Threat to Democracy?” Policy Studies 39, no. 3 (April 2018): 352–63.

https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2018.1475640

20 Brubaker, Rogers. “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: the European Populist Moment in Comparative

Perspective.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 40, no. 8 (March 2017): 1191–1226. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700

21 Rodrik, Dani. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization." Journal of International Business Policy 1, no. 1-2 (2018): 12- 33. 18). https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-018-0001-4

22 “Trump Says Executive Order Is Not a Muslim Ban.” BBC News . BBC, Accessed April 10, 2019.

https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-38786462/trump-says-executive-order-is-not-a-muslim-ban

23 “'Drug Dealers, Criminals, Rapists': What Trump Thinks of Mexicans.” BBC News. BBC, Accessed April 10 2019.

https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-37230916/drug-dealers-criminals-rapists-what-trump-thinks-of-mexicans.

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10 The social identity focuses rather on the conventions that divides people into different social groups creating the ‘us’ and ‘them’. Social identities are based on categorical differences such as ethnicity, gender, age, and social class and subjective and socially constructed. Since there are infinite types of social identities, we narrow our research down to the subjective nature of the social identities attributed to the populists. We focus therefore on measuring materialistic insecurity and interpersonal trust.

Material Insecurity focuses on the self-appraisal of the populist supporters’ economic status. If the feeling is that ends are being met by household incomes, then there should be very little material insecurity. On the other hand, if ends are felt to be not met, then there is a high level of material

insecurity leaving the respondent vulnerable. The material insecurities allow us to see if the populist are satisfied with the status quo in their everyday living and any differences can be highlighted due to the role of material insecurity due to economic climate or just sensation.

The social identity also opens up subjective affiliations where trust plays a major factor. Interpersonal trust or rather distrust of other people is subjective to the electorate and plays in populist agendas of ostracizing others when creating a divide between sovereign people and people of other social groups.

The measure of interpersonal trust should indicate how trusting the right-populists are vis-à-vis the left- populist with people in general. Since the ideology of populism is based on distrust, we should be able to analyze if this distrust of elites or others is extended onto people generally for the right-populist or if its exclusive for specific groups in society and right-populists are trusting generically.

Our research question is to see if social characteristics play a role in differentiating the left-right

populists, so any differences highlighted under the social and political identity would signify that there is indeed a factor beyond the political ideology which separates the left-right populist supporters. Staerkle and Greens study concludes that right-populists retain lower levels of interpersonal trust and political efficacy.²⁴ Likewise, the left-wing populist are restrained by materialist needs due to their economic struggles.²⁵ So, these become central factors for us to test in the political and social identities of left-right populists.

2.3 Social Position

Social position of the populist supporters will be presented to give a profile of what populist supporters are represented as. These social categories are not part of the analysis. These categories consist of the following:

- Gender: Measured dichotomously to either male or female - Age: Average age of the entire survey sample

- Ethnicity: Measured dichotomously to either ethnic minority or not - Education: Average years of education of the entire survey sample

- Unemployment history: Measured dichotomously to yes or no by viewing unemployment status of the respondent in the time span of the previous 12 months

24 Ibid. (Staerklé and Green)

25 Ibid. (Inglehart and Norris)

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2.4 Literature Review

Staerkle & Greens study provides a great framework to test our data for the right-populists social representation. We want to therefore review the literature relevant to left-right populists and apply Staerkle and Greens framework to see what we should expect in the data for the left-right populists.

The Institutional dimension should show us clear signs of distrust between ‘the people’ and the elites.

High levels of mistrust should be seen from all populists because they have been neglected, betrayed or exploited by the ruling elite^26.Left-right populist ideologies have this common trait in this dimension and utilize the ever-growing mistrust between the elites and the people. This distrust is used by populist leaders to gain popularity and legitimacy to be advocating for the people in ways the elites do not.²⁷

There should be clear patterns of association between the left-right populist because the elites are the ones solely responsible for the problem-making, although to different degrees. The institutional dimension is referred to a thin populist ideology, where there are only two homogenous group and the divide in between them will be a democratic deficit.

The Globalist dimension should show some divergence between the left-right populists. Cultural cleavages and backlash are used by right-wing populists ²⁸ to create mistrust towards anyone that advocates for something foreign to the sovereign nation, specifically immigrants who fail to assimilate into society of the sovereign state. Right-populists also question if they’re endangering their identity ²⁹ through this cultural backlash. The role of the economy plays into the left-wing populists, where immigrants taking jobs is not seen as the threat, but rather the way the elites have dealt with the economic crisis is the core issue³⁰. The populist leader plays on distrust against the elites in pushing their own fiscal policies to deal with the economic issues, usually with along other promises such as tax cuts and increased wages. The globalist dimension can be developed into a thick populist ideology the moment add-on ideologies are asserted into the political identity.³¹

The Identity Politics of left-right populists shadows the ideologies the populist roots itself from. Since right-populism is usually complemented by nationalism vis a vis left-populism with socialist ideologies. It is therefore important to filter populists into two distinctive groups (left-right). The political efficacy and activity on the other hand should be relatively low, further fueling the willingness to support populism since the rise of identity politics have been linked to the decline in collectivist organizations, such as trade unions.

Social Identity and positions are also intertwined with the political identity in creating different categories

26 Rooduijn, Matthijs. “Why Is Populism Suddenly All the Rage?” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, Accessed April 10 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/political-science/2018/nov/20/why-is-populism-suddenly-so-sexy-the-reasons-are- many.

27 “The Rise and Rise of Populism?” OpenMind. Accessed June 8, 2019. https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/the-rise- and-rise-of-populism/.

28 “Cultural Backlash.” Pippa Norris. Accessed May 18, 2019. https://www.pippanorris.com/cultural-backlash.

29 Traub, James. “The Economic Crisis Is Over. Populism Is Forever.” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, Accessed April 12, 2019.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/31/the-economic-crisis-is-over-populism-is-forever/

30 Ibid. (Dani)

31 Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. “Vox Populiorvox Masculini? Populism and Gender in Northern Europe and South America.” Patterns of Prejudice 49, no. 1-2 (2015): 16–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.2015.1014197.

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12 of ‘us and them’. The role of gender predicts that left populism is more favorable amongst women.³² Likewise, right-populists should be exclusive of ethnic minorities due to the sensations toward “others”.

We should expect to see unemployment play a greater roll for the left-wing populists due to their economic insecurities³³

Research Design

This chapter focuses on the research model and design, we start with the methodology and data selection for the research. Explanations of formulas and data models will be discussed and then the scales and limitations as well as operationalization and case selection of the study will be discussed.

3.1 Method and Analysis

Using cross-sectional case study as our method was based upon what we were comparing from our survey. Due to survey data being frequently employed within the cross-sectional analysis this was matched to be the best method for us to pursue our research.

A cross-sectional case study design was derived from Bryman’s Social Research Methods³⁴ and consists of the following conventions:

- A small demographic of population: left-right populists

- More than one case: four nations and subsequently four parties

- At a single point in time: The survey was carried out in the same time period for all our cases (2016) - Retain quantitative or quantifiable data: Yes

- Aim to find patterns of association: Through our covariation and correlation analysis

External validity will be high since we are analyzing multiple cases and aiming to find mutual patterns of association across all cases. Meaning we can generalize our results if we see clear convergence in attitudes across our four nations selected for populism, especially with regards to Staerkle and Greens study who employed the same method.

3.1.1 Analysis

The analysis of the datasets was carried out on Microsoft Excel to allow us to manage the multiple tasks and commands simultaneously to give quick and reliable results and tables with minimal human error.

We calculate the gradients, standard error, covariance and correlation of left-right wing populism for every operationalized variable to get bivariate results required for our analysis. The operationalized variables are highlighted in the Theoretical Framework chapter and are brought forward through

32 Clarke, Seán, and Sam Jones. “Guardian Quiz Finds Women More Populist than Men.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media Accessed April 10, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/30/guardian-survey-suggests-women-are-more- populist-than-men.

33 Ibid (Inglehart and Norris)

34 Bryman, A. (2016). Social Research Methods (5th ed.). London Oxford University Press. - References - Scientific Research Publishing.

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13 qualitative research of academic articles and online articles.

The gradient of each dataset will be separately calculated for us to view the specific attitudes of the left- right populist. These are important statistics, allowing us to see the differences independently, before viewing the covariance and correlations which focus on the similarities and variances of both datasets.

Covariance shows the relationship between two variables, where neither can be categorized as independent or dependent. If the relationship between the variables should be reciprocal then we get values which are large relative to the scales of measurement.³⁵Negative covariance values indicate that the relationship between the variables is negative and the variables move in inverse directions.³⁶Positive covariance values indicate that the relationship between the variables is positive and they move in the same direction. Null covariance (and values close to zero) indicate no relationship or at all, thus confirming the null hypothesis. It is also worthwhile highlighting that if all the values of the compared variables are the identical then we could get 0 covariance, since there is no variation. The variables incremental changes are identical to one another. To monitor this limitation, we have another control measure through correlation.

Correlation also measures the relationship and direction of bivariate correlations. The key difference in correlation is that it also indicates the strength of this relationship. All values of correlation are given in a numerical value within the interval: -1 < x < 1.³⁷Rather than being infinite because of the scales. The extreme points -1 and 1 indicate a perfect negative and positive correlation relationship between the variables. All other negative and positive numerical values are reflective of the strength and direction of the correlation. Null hypothesis is confirmed when there is no correlation at all, and this occurs when the correlation coefficient is very close to or equal to zero.

The formula and definitions for covariance and correlation:

Xi = Variable X value | X̄ = Mean of X variable Yi = Variable Y value | Ȳ = Mean of Y variable

Stdev = Standard deviation | n = Total number of observations

Covariance analysis and correlation are the most suitable methods to analyze the datasets because we are comparing the same operationalized variable for two different demographics (left-right populists).

There is no differentiation on what could be classified as an independent or dependent variable between these variables since they are the same and our focus is solely on the variation, direction and strength of

35 Michael, Ajith, and Aniruddha Ingle. “Difference Between Covariance and Correlation (with Comparison Chart).” Key Differences. Accessed May 18, 2019. https://keydifferences.com/difference-between-covariance-and-correlation.html.

36 “Covariance - Definition, Formula, and Practical Example.” Corporate Finance Institute. Accessed May 18, 2019.

https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/covariance/.

37 Ibid. (Ajith and Ingle)

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14 correlation between them. Having no definite independent or dependent variable immediately rules out regression analysis and Pearson's r, because they require measurements on independent and

dependent variables which we do not have in our study.

The analysis does not consist with Staerkle and Greens analytical tools due to the inclusiveness of both left-right populists which makes us lose that mutualism which was retained in Staerkle and Greens case selection.

3.2 Data Selection

The analysis consists of survey data available from European Social Survey 2016 (ESS8). ESS conduct biennial cross-national surveys of attitudes and behavior throughout European states.³⁸ This data is useful to utilize since the surveys consists of political and social attitudes, personal, economical and geological traits of European respondents over the age of 15.

Since the dissertation is regarding social representation, the dataset allows identification of populist conventions in a quantitative manner across four European countries, when we filter for the specific niche populist demographics to increase our external validity and ability to generalize results for that specific demographic. Staerkle and Green also used the same data source but their data was derived from ESS7 which was conducted in 2014.

3.2.1 Scales and Centrality Measurements

We operationalize the survey data from ESS8 to be analyzed individually in our methodology. Since the data source is the same, we can establish and define the scales, centrality measures and variables together.

The ESS8 data is survey answers from Populist Party supporters. Since the data is primarily of a subjective nature it is measured as an ordinal variable. Thereby can we rank the ordinal variables but not measure the incremental changes between the subjective choices made by the respondents.

The x-axis for the bar charts is therefore subjective and representative of the subjective opinions of the respondents (with the exemption of certain charts in Social Position).

The y-axis represents the frequency of answers in percentage. This gives a relative measurement based on the frequency of the same answer rather than an absolute measure on the number of respondents (N) who answered in the same way. This relative measurement allows us to a) generalize for the entire left-populist relative to right-populist and b) combat the issue of uneven observations N from either of the populist parties.

For centrality measures we selected the averages of the two right-left populist parties since averages

38 “About ESS.” FAQ | European Social Survey (ESS). Accessed April 10, 2019.

https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/faq.html.

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15 are the most accurate fit for ordinal variables. The centrality measurement of averages was given in relative terms.

3.3 Operationalization

Operationalization is the process of defining abstracts concepts into measurable variables.

For our ESS8 data set it means changing the survey data from ordinal variables into statistics through covariance and correlational analysis. Allowing us to compare ordinal variables in relative terms.³⁹ For higher reliability with regards Staerkle and Greens study, we have decided to operationalize the same questions which measure trust. The differences come in the measurements of Cultural

acceptance where we measure acceptance of European Unification and Democratic deficit where the measurements sensation toward political change.

The reason for these additional operationalizations in Cultural acceptance was to confirm our suggestive factors for instances such as Brexit and view if the right-left populists have a common view to

supranational governance beyond national governance. For the democratic deficit it was important to see the sensations toward political inclusion of the left-right populists to see if there are any patterns of association present.

3.4 Country and Party Selection

Selecting appropriate countries for the analysis is central for representation and generalization of

populism. The dataset is derived from a survey conducted in 2016, at a time of austerity and uncertainty due to the war in Syria and terrorist threats and attacks across European nations.

We have therefore selected four parties that have populist rhetoric used or ingrained in their manifestos, have been implicated by the European refugee crisis or the Eurozone debt crisis and have seen a rise in support in the past two decades. Since the named reasoning were contemporary issues in public debate at the time of the survey, they are acknowledged in the correct context for us to measure populism.

Spain and Netherlands have been selected to represent left-wing populism. Spain has been implicated by the Eurozone debt crisis which led to an increase in government debt amongst other economic challenges. This gives the perfect breeding ground for populist parties such as Podemos to thrive representing left-wing rhetoric. Netherlands’ Socialist Party on the other hand has had populist rhetoric and anti-elitism⁴⁰ in the election manifestos of 2012 which led to the party to retaining their 15 seats in parliament, some elements of Euroscepticism have also been observed by the party regarding

39 Social Research Glossary. Accessed August 12, 2019.

https://www.qualityresearchinternational.com/socialresearch/operationalisation.htm.

40 Otjes, Simon, and Tom Louwerse. “Populists in Parliament: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism in the Netherlands.” Political Studies 63, no. 1 (2013): 60–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12089.

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16 supranational governance.⁴¹ Due to the ideological add-on of socialism to the anti-elitist sentiment, the Socialist Party naturally fits into the left-wing rhetoric.

United Kingdom and Sweden are selected for the right-wing populism. The Swedish Democrats (SD) have had strong anti-immigration stance, which grew throughout the refugee crisis in 2015 where Sweden had ‘open borders’ for refugees. This subsequently allowed SD to push the anti-immigration stance further and led to an increase of SD MPs in the general election of 2018.⁴² United Kingdom's Independence Party (UKIP) has had similar stances towards immigration but also towards supranational governance in the EU. UKIP has been a strong advocate for Brexit and has MPs in the European

parliament, but only one MP in the British Parliament⁴³. The anti-elitist sentiment is mutual across all these parties but that doesn’t mean all these parties have populist leaders.

Due to time restrains for the thesis and limited countries who have both left and right populist parties. An interesting case would be to view Greece which has both – since the ESS8 did not include Greece when the survey took place, we cannot focus on specific countries.

3.4.1 Populist Parties and Populist Leaders

Filtering these countries down to populist parties is a necessary step of identifying the right demographic for our social representation. It is also extremely important to distinguish populist leaders from an

‘ordinary’ party and a party with populist rhetoric ingrained.

The reason we have chosen pairs of populist parties from different countries opposing to left-right populist parties in the same country is for us to be able to generalize our results from the specific segments of four diverse populations, rather than two. Besides external validity, not all states have a left-populist and right-populist party. If that was the case, then we have another limitation which arises if with finding reliable data or any data at all on ESS8 which can allow us to include that country in our analysis.

Populist leaders play a central role in which they claim to represent the voice of the sovereign people.

We must therefore create a clear differentiation between the populist leader and the Populist Party to be accurate in our research when studying the representation of the electorates. The limitation with our party selection is that ordinary parties can see increases in popularity due to populist leaders, this cannot be disentangled from populist rhetoric internally within the party, or externally within the media.

Therefore, the limitation of party selection not being fully representative cannot be passed as trivial because party loyalty and identity politics can cause electors to favour a party even though they

41 “Dutch Euroscepticism Moves Mainstream.” EUobserver. Accessed May 19, 2019. https://euobserver.com/eu- election/123923.

42 “Election Results 2018.” Till startsidan. Accessed June 13, 2019. https://www.val.se/servicelankar/other-languages/english- engelska/election-results-2018.html

43 Traynor, Ian. “'A Sad Day for Britain' as BNP Members Take European Parliament Seats.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media. Accessed June 15, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/14/nick-griffin-andrew-brons-bnp-european- parliament.

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17 may not agree with the populist leader. A contemporary example of this would be to view the populist Donald Trump. Trump’s leadership and views on immigration and the EU aren’t universal across the entire Republican partisans. Hence using such a party to measure populism would lead to low validity.

Table 1 presents information regarding the selected countries and parties for the analysis.

Country Party Leader (in 2016) Type of rhetoric Respondents (N)

Sweden Swedish Democrats Jimmie Åkesson Right-wing populist

80

United Kingdom

United Kingdom Independence Party

Nigel Farage Right-wing populist

57

Spain Podemos Pablo Iglesias Left-wing populist 159

Netherland s

Socialist Party Emile Roemer Left-wing populist 100

3.5 Filters and Limitations

Party identification was filtered through which party the survey respondents felt closest to. This filter was used as opposed to which party the respondents voted for in the last election because it was inclusive of a greater number of respondents. Respondents over the ages 15 but under the legal age of voting in their respective state. The sentimental attachment of feeling closer to a party may also not be reflective of the voting behavior of the respondent. Party loyalty, voting for different parties and not believing a party will win with your vote can therefore be combated through this filter for a more accurate

representation and external validity.

Due to filtering, the total number of observations became limited, specifically for the right-populist parties whom had a combined N= 137 whilst the left-populist parties had a combined N= 260. This leaves us with an under-represented right-populism and an over-represented left-populism with approximately 48% margin. This limitation can therefore cause low reliability since the quantity in the subsets of comparable data are inconsistent with one another. We dealt with this limitation in the methodology by measuring the frequency of observations (N) in percentage, rather than the observation N in absolute measures. This led to the relative representation of answers, which would combat the limitation we have with the absolute measures.

Results and Analysis

Results and analysis are set in four parts to go through key parts of the research: Institutional and Globalist dimension aim to identify what converges and diverges for the left-right populists. The Political and Social Identity view the material, political and interpersonal trust of the left-right populists. Social position and profiles of populists are discussed.

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4.1 Institutional dimension:

The two subsections for this dimension are Institutional trust which measures the ‘us’ and ‘them’ mistrust towards political institutions and Democratic Deficit, which measures the sentiment of inclusiveness and satisfaction of democratic political systems.

Institutional Trust

Institutional trust is the basis for these tables where we operationalize the ‘elite’ as the parliament, legal system, politicians and parties. The four tables and figures below show sensations toward the respective institute. The x-axis for each bar chart represents the ordinal scale answers 0-10 on sensation where 0 signifies no trust and 10 complete trust. The y-axis represents the quantity of the respondents who answered in percentage.

Table of analysis on Trust in Parliament.

Trust in Parliament Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -1,10 -0,70 -1,50

Standard Deviation 5,30 5,82 6,33

Covariance 19,44 N/A N/A

Correlation 0,58 N/A N/A

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19 There is a clear negative view towards the parliament from the populist supporters but more so by the right-wing populist supporters. The correlation between the left-right populists is relatively strong and positive, thereby confirming that the mistrust in the country's parliament is present for left-right populists.

Table of analysis on Trust in the Legal system

Trust in the legal system Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -0,66 -0,49 -0,82

The negative gradients indicate a mistrust towards the legal system with slightly higher trust levels towards the legal system from the left-wing populists. The correlation is strong and positive between the parties, confirming the mistrust towards the legal institutions in the left-right populists.

Table of analysis on Trust in Politicians

Trust in politicians Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -1,93 -1,54 -2,33

The negative gradients are steep when it comes to mistrust in politicians for the left-right populists with a strong positive correlation. There is again a higher mistrust from the right-wing populists toward

politicians. The mistrust towards politicians is the highest in this subsection leading us to believe that individuality is a major factor when facing distrust towards the political institutions. It is the people, rather than parties which retain the most distrust.

Table of analysis on Trust in Political Parties

Trust in political parties Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -1,65 -1,39 -1,91

The negative gradients indicate that the right-wing populists lose trust in political parties in a faster pace

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20 than the left-wing populist. There is a strong positive correlation between the left-right populist,

confirming the mistrust in political parties.

Democratic Deficit

Democratic Deficit aims on measuring the inclusiveness of the democratic systems in place for the left- right populist. There are two tables and figures below show sensation towards governments’

inclusiveness in decision making and how satisfied people are with democracy. The x-axis for both bar charts represents the ordinal scale answers ranging from 0-4 & 0-10. 0 represents No

inclusiveness/Dissatisfied and 4/10 Inclusive/Satisfied. The y-axis represents the quantity of the respondents who answered in percentage.

Table of analysis on Political Inclusiveness - Political System allows people to have a say in what gov.

does

Political System Inclusiveness Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -7,63 -6,95 -8,31

There are extremely steep negative gradients for the left-right populists, some of this steepness could be accounted to the limited 5-answer scales. The covariance coefficient is extremely high considering the 5-answer scale and there is an almost perfect correlation between the left-right populists. These results indicate that there is indeed a very strong sensation of exclusion of the people from political processes which plays right into the thin political ideological definition of populism.

Table of analysis on Satisfaction with Democracy - How satisfied with the way democracy works in country

Satisfaction with Democracy Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -0,62 -0,49 -0,76

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There is a minute negative gradient from the left-right populists but with very low covariance and well spread out results. The correlation shows a positive correlation showing these attitudes are mutual for populist representation. Thereby, we see a negative sentiment towards how democracy works in the four countries involved in the cross-sectional study from the populist supporters.

Findings:

The democratic deficit shows clear convergence between the left-right populists. There is both

sentimental insecurities toward how democracies work and lack of political inclusiveness. This exclusion from political processes can explain the negative view towards democracy. This lack of intervention is what decreases political efficacy and explains why populist leaders tend to advocate for direct

democracy and easy solution to complex issues such as being inclusive in a democratic system.

The institutional dimension shows clear convergence between the left-right populist. There is institutional distrust toward political institutions. Interestingly, the politicians are seen with the most distrust and the legal system the least, this result is interesting because the ‘othering’ of individual politicians as opposed to political parties shows a greater distrust. Future research focused on trust in key leaders could shine further light to explain this attitude. The institutional dimension confirms that institutional distrust is across all populists.

4.2 Globalist dimension

There are two subsections for this dimension which focus on the people themselves as well as ostracizing others. Economic threats measure the economic threat posed by globalism and Cultural acceptance focuses rather on the cultural and identity roles for the sovereign people, if immigration and supranational governance bring value to the sovereign nation.

Economic Threats:

Economic threats measures the sentiment towards immigrants, whether they are exhausting the economic resources of a nation or enriching it. The table and figure below show the sensation towards immigration and their enrichment of the economy. The x-axis represents the ordinal scale ranging 0-10, where 0 means immigrants are bad for the economy and 10 vise-versa. The y-axis represents the quantity of the respondents who answered in percentage.

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Table of analysis on Economic Threats - Immigration good for the Economy

Economic Threats Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -0,26 1,00 -1,52

There is a negative gradient from the right-wing populist whereas the left-wing populist retain a positive gradient. Factoring the right-left populist into one still leave a slightly negative gradient at -0,26 so there is a stronger anti-immigration sentiment due to economic threats from the right-wing populists then the pro-immigration sentiment for economic development from the left-wing populists. The interesting result in this analysis is the extremely minute positive covariance coefficient and positive correlation coefficient which both indicate little to no relationship and thereby indicating a null hypothesis between the dataset.

Whereas the gradients and bar charts indicate a clear strong negative correlation.

Cultural Acceptance:

Cultural acceptance focuses on the culture of the sovereign nation being enriched by immigrants. There is also a measurement on how much the European Project of ‘Unification’ can stample on national identities through Euroscepticism. The x-axis represents the ordinal scale ranging 0-10, where 0 means immigrants are bad for culture/EU gone too far and 10 for Immigrants enrichen cultural life/EU should go further. The y-axis represents the quantity of the respondents who answered in percentage.

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Table of analysis on Cultural Enrichment - Cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

Immigration to culture enrichment

Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient 0,19 1,75 -1,37

Covariance -21,67 N/A N/A

Correlation -0,54 N/A N/A

As expected from left-right wing ideologies there is a divergence of opinion regarding immigration to cultural enrichment. The left-wing populists’ gradient for cultural enrichment sensation is stronger than the right-wings leaving the gradient representative for all populists to be positive. There is also a negative covariance coefficient and a strong negative correlation indicating the inverse relation of the left-right populists thereby proving that there is a divergence in opinion for cultural diversity from the left- right populists.

Table of analysis on Euroscepticism - European Unification, go further or gone too far

European Unification Project Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -0,69 0,54 -1,92

Covariance -2,46 N/A N/A

Correlation -0,08 N/A N/A

There is a clear divergence in opinion towards the Unification project of the European Union. The right- wing populist have a negative gradient whereas the left-wing positive. This is reflected in the covariance analysis which has a negative number, likewise in the correlation coefficient. Both coefficients are relatively small. It is noticeable in the bar chart that a large proportion of the left-right populists are neutral towards the EU project. We can therefore deduce that Euroscepticism does indeed exist within the right-populist but not in the left-populist.

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24 Findings:

Economic threats gives controversial results in the analysis. We can see from the bar charts and gradients that there is a clear inverse and negative relationship showing divergence between the left- right populists. The data also passes with general views associated towards immigration enriching the economy, being negative from typical right-populists and positive from left-populists. Due to an

extremely low correlation and covariance, the null hypothesis is proven for this specific measure.

The cultural backlash gives interesting results and shows divergence once again between the left-right populists. Right-populists are more Eurosceptic and find cultural life to be undermined with immigration as expected from the literature review. This shows that the anti-elitism exceeds above and beyond national governance and relates to our democratic deficit results. On the other hand the left- populists are a positive attitude towards immigrants’ value in enriching the culture for cultural diversity.

This positivity extends to supranational governance. This demonstrates that the anti-elitist sentiment for left-populist is limited to national governance and that the democratic deficit is an ‘inside’ problem of only the sovereign state.

4.3 Political Identity and Social Identity

The Political and Social Identity views the left-right populists to see if the insecurity and negative attitude towards political institutions is extended in their everyday living in interpersonal trust, materialistic needs.

Political activity and efficacy will also be viewed to measure their political engagement. The table and figure below show political efficacy, political activity, material insecurities and interpersonal trust. The x- axis represents the ordinal scale and varies per table. The y-axis represents the quantity of the

respondents who answered in percentage.

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Table of analysis on Political Efficacy - Able to take active role in Political Group

Political Efficacy Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Gradient -7,12 -7,52 -6,72

Political efficacy is the only factor in this research which shows almost perfect correlation. There is a high positive covariance relative to the 5-scale answers indicating a positive relation in the same direction. The left-wing populist are slightly more negative towards political participation than the right- wing populist.

This proves that political efficacy is very low, meaning the belief, understanding and intervention into politics is mutual across all populists. This plays hand in hand with the Democratic Deficit measurements indicating the gap between the democratic political system and the marginalized populists.

Table of analysis on Political Activity - Signed petition in the past 12 months

Political Activity Populism (Entirety) Left-Wing Populism Right-Wing Populism

Yes (Average %) 44,48 47,85 41,10

No (Average %) 55,53 52,15 58,90

Number of observations (N) 394 259 135

Measuring political activity in forms of petitions which is the most user-friendly method and direct method to bring political or social changes. It is also another indicator on how much we can measure political activity. Due to the dichotomous answer options we had to change the table of analysis to suit the data.

Approximately 45% of the sample have engaged in a political activity in the past year across left-right populist groups.

The Social Representation of Populism in Europe