Department of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University Master’s Thesis, 2016
RETURN OF AN EMPIRE OR STRIKE OF A ROGUE?
- Russia Proceeds With Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Author: Lola Biverstedt Supervisor: Erik Melander
Abstract
The current political fraction between Russia and the West has led to the breakdown of the cooperative post-Cold War security order. Russia’s dramatic reliance on its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal is of concern for how Moscow might shape its foreign policy. Based on the gap in the existing literature on the role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) and regional influence, this paper aims to examine the role of TNWs for Russia’s regional influence by answering the following research question: What changes in the nuclear doctrines, with regards to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s increased regional influence?
This thesis uses the theoretical frame of Coercive Diplomacy, with focus on compellence, which provides an alternative explanation to one state’s behavior against another in the pursuit of influence. In order to test the hypothesis, offensive changes in the doctrines, with regard to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s likelihood of increasing its regional influence, this qualitative study examines the cases of Georgia and Armenia. The implementation of the analytical framework on the empirical material occurs through the method of structured focused comparison. The findings indicate that despite Russia’s engagement in compellence against Georgia and Armenia, the cases show very different outcomes.
Keywords: Coercive diplomacy, compellence, non-strategic nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, military doctrines, Russia, Armenia, Georgia, NATO
Author’s words
I would like to start by expressing my gratitude to my supervisor Erik Melander for believing in the thesis from the very start. I would also like to send my gratitude to Fredrik Westerlund at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, FOI, for all the raised questions that always led to a great thinking process.
Last but not least, thanks to my loving husband for his patience during a five-month period of living in a nuclear-Russian-bubble, and for bringing a ‘face’ into military definitions and arms
Admittedly, the title of the thesis is inspired by Star Wars but there is much more to the title than the world of cinema. Scholar and policy makers argue differently about the status of today’s Russia. There are those, such as Matthew Kroenig and Vera Efron that argue of Russia’s quest of once again becoming as great as the Soviet was once, and earning a true international super-power status. But there is also a perception of Russia being nothing but an actor that seeks to challenge the free world at any cost. The war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, being a frequent obstacle in the UN Security Council and above all, to once again set a rhetoric based on the possibility of using its nuclear arsenal - and risking Cold War 2.1, are some of the arguments people such as, Mats Johansson, use to describe Russia. With this as a background one cannot help but ask, whether if we are witnessing the return of an empire or of a rogue that is willing to strike whenever necessary? During the last decade Russia has proceeded with the help of its Conventional Forces, it has proceeded with maneuvers based on misdirection (Maskirovka) and the strategic use of the Spetsnaz its special forces – the men in green that ‘took over Crimea’), and now it proceeds with threats of Tactical Nuclear Weapons.
Nuclear weapons are the deadliest weapons human beings posses. They are not only a severe danger to the human existence but to the very existence of our wildlife and environment. It is our task, at individual-, military- and political level to do our best so that these weapons can never be used as means to achieve aims and victories. With that being said, I would like close this section by referring to the “Peace Speech” (1963) and using great words from one of the good ones:
“What kind of peace do we seek? I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build better life for their children – not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women- not merely peace in our time but peace for all time… Our problems are man made and therefore they can be solved by man…So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be solved. And if we cannot end our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish all children’s futures. And we all are mortal” (JFK).
Contents
Abbreviations ... 5
Introduction ... 6
Defining Tactical Nuclear Weapons ... 8
Background ... 9
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ... 14
Research Gap and Contribution ... 15
Limitation ... 17
Theoretical Framework ... 18
Conceptualizing Coercive Diplomacy ... 18
Compellence – A Forceful Persuasion ... 19
Argument and Causal Mechanism ... 22
RESEARCH DESIGN ... 23
Structured Focused Comparison Method ... 23
Case selection ... 24
Time Frame and Sources ... 25
Operationalization And Analytical Tools ... 26
Independent Variable: Changes in the doctrine (of TNW) ... 26
Dependent Variable: Regional influence ... 29
Changes in the Nuclear Doctrine (of TNW) ... 32
Doctrinal Changes and the aim of TNW ... 32
Military Exercises – Impact and Participation ... 34
Deployment of TNW ... 38
Regional Influence ... 41
Bases, arms (equipment) and cooperation ... 41
NATO-‐cooperation ... 45
Analysis ... 48
Case Analysis -‐ Georgia ... 48
Case Analysis -‐ Armenia ... 50
Case Comparison ... 52
Conclusion ... 56
Alternative Explanations ... 57
Appendix ... 59
Map 1 – TNW: range from Kaliningrad ... 59
Map 2 – Russia’s new military districts ... 60
Map 3 – Russia’s old military districts ... 61
Bibliography ... 62
Abbreviations
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States Organization CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization
CSTO - Russia’s Central Asian Allies
DEEP - Defense Education Enhancement Program DWP – Defense White Paper
EU – The European Union EEU – Eurasian Economic Union FPC – Foreign Policy Concept
IPAP - Individual Partnership Action Plan
INF Treaty - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ISAF - International Security Assistance Force
MD – Military Doctrine
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSC – National Security Concept
NSS – National Security Strategy NPT – Nuclear nonproliferation Treaty NSNW - Non-strategic nuclear weapons Partnership for Peace (PfP)
Resolute Support Mission (RSM) SPA – State Program of Armaments
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization SNW – Strategic Nuclear Weapons
TNW – Tactical Nuclear Weapons UN – The United Nations
WTO – Warsaw Treaty Organization
Introduction
The cooperative post-Cold War security order has faced breakdowns due to the current political fraction between Russia and the West. At the same time there is a dramatic change, from strategic to tactical nuclear warheads, in the balance of Russia’s nuclear forces. This change has led to concerns about Russia’s sudden reliance on its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) arsenal, and the role they play when Moscow shapes its foreign policy. (Westerlund, Dalsjö, Lindvall in Sandö et al., 2015, 21). These short-ranged weapons can be used against conventional armed forces (in a battle), as well as against cities and other specific targets, with the aim of destroying the will of the adversary. Russia relates its reliance on TNWs to how the West, in particular the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is expanding into the East – an action perceived as a direct threat to the Russian homeland (Arbman and Thornton, 2005, 4; Zagorski, 2011, 400–401).
There is an overall shortage in previous research about the role of TNWs and their relation to regional influence. The majority of previous research argues of Russia’s nuclear forces as a strategy of deterrence in order to keep NATO away from a further expansion into the East.
Thus, this study argues that there is a gap in existing literature that focuses on the role of TNWs and whether if Russia is using these weapons as means to increase its regional influence. With this as a background the aim of this paper is to examine the role of TNWs for Russia’s regional influence. Russia has changed its Military Doctrines (MD) (from now on referred to as MD or doctrines) three times since President Vladimir Putin took office in year 2000. The military exercises have intensified drastically, where scenario-based nuclear weapon- exercises with the presence of the Russian political has increased. TNWs have been given an increased role in the country’s defense policy and political language. At the same time as drastic changes have occurred within the Russian military, Moscow has sharpened its language about NATO’s expansion and interest in Russia’s backyard. To answer the puzzle of how Russia is using TNWs to increase its influence this paper seeks to examine the following research question:
What changes in the nuclear doctrines, with regards to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s increased regional influence?
The timeframe of this paper is between 2008-2014. The independent variable, changes in the nuclear doctrine (of TNW), is measured by examining Russia’s implementation approach in
relation to its nuclear doctrines. By implementation approach this paper refers to how implantation of the MDs occur in reality, which means that the term is operationalized by looking at factors such as actual changes concerning the role of TNW in Russia’s MDs from year 2000 and 2010, military exercises, deployment of TNW, and current treaties on TNW.
Regional influence, as the dependent variable, is defined as Russia’s pursuit of increasing its relative power, which is through military means. This study seeks to examine Russia’s influence in its own region where the former-Soviet states are of focus. The cases that are going to be examined are Georgia and Armenia, belonging to Russian southern region, namely South Caucasus. This paper seeks to examine Russia’s influence in respective country during the period of 2008-2014; the variable is operationalized through Russia’s military presence and cooperation in each of the cases. Both variables will be thoroughly explained in the chapter of research design.
This paper used the theoretical frame of Coercive Diplomacy, with focus on the strategy of Compellence. Coercive diplomacy conceptualizes diplomacy as bargaining and by using a certain strategy a state can benefit from that bargaining. The strategy of compellence is used by one state (the coercer) to make another state (the adversary) to halt, or to agree to a certain decision that is favorable to the coercer. Thus, due to the aim of this study, compellence provides an alternative perspective to one state’s behavior towards a neighboring country in pursuit of influence. In line with the theoretical frame this study seeks to test the following hypothesis: “offensive changes in the doctrines, with regard to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s likelihood of increasing its regional influence”.
This paper is a qualitative study, and in order to implement the analytical framework on the empirical material, the method of structured focused comparison is used. A set of basic variables has been designed for each variable, as well as a set of questions that reflect on the aim of the paper are asked of each case, namely Georgia and Armenia, during data collection.
The data comes from both primary and secondary sources.
The main findings of this thesis suggest that Russia did engage in compellence against Georgia and Armenia and that compellence increased after the release of the 2010-doctrine.
The collected data implies that through a combination of increased reliance on TNWs, rhetoric concerning Russia’s rights of using these weapons and providing a perception that anybody could be a “would-be” enemy, increased military exercises with a high probability of
practicing nuclear readiness of the Armed Forces, and the fact that the Russian political elite increased their presence during the military exercises are all indications that compellence have occurred. However, the cases show different outcomes.
The paper proceeds as follows. This chapter will continue with a description of what TNW are and it will also provide a historical background to Russia and its relationship with its neighbor. The second chapter reviews the existing literature on TNW and regional influence, which is an important description for the research gap of this thesis. The third chapter presents the theoretical framework and the causal mechanism and the forth chapter provides the research design. In the empirical chapters, a structured focused comparison is carried out.
The findings of the cases will be presented in accordance to the variables of this paper, namely changes in the doctrine (independent variable) and regional influence (dependent variable). The reason for the combined data presentation is to avoid repetition. Finally, a comprehensive analysis of each case will be provided and the chapter will be followed by an analytic comparison of both cases. The thesis will end with a chapter of presenting conclusions and alternative explanations
Defining Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Defining TNWs (also referred to as Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons, NSNW) is somewhat difficult. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) offer exact definitions of the nuclear weapons they cover where the definitions are established on the delivery systems allocated to the nuclear warheads. With that being said, one major problem related to TNWs is the lack of definition concerning these weapons (Arbman and Thornton, 2003, 9). Which is why this study uses the NATO-Russia Council agreed definition that states (NATO, 2007):
Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons
Non-strategic nuclear weapons include all nuclear weapons, which do not fall into the class of strategic nuclear weapons, that is, weapons with less than 5500 km ranges, to include Tactical and Operational nuclear weapons.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons Tactical nuclear weapons are designed to engage objects in the tactical depth of enemy deployment (up to 300 km) to accomplish a tactical mission. Under certain conditions, tactical nuclear weapons may be involved in operational and strategic missions.
Figure 1. The NATO-Russia Council definition of both Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Tactical Nuclear Weapons.
Easily put, TNWs are defined as “weapons developed for use on the battlefield” and have historically maintained of weapons such as “nuclear mines, artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs and air-to-surface missiles for tactical aviation, depth bombs or nuclear torpedoes” (Zagorski, 2011, 400). While an extensive report from the Swedish Defense Research Agency, FOI, from 2005 indicates Russia possessing a total stockpile of 8.000 tactical nuclear warheads, where 3.000 of these are considered of being “operational”
(Arbman and Thornton, 2005, 7). These weapons can be delivered to the targets they aim for in a number of ways – one method that has been discussed frequently is through the 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile (Majumdar, 2015). Another example is the S-300 air- defense system that is being upgraded, which just like Iskander makes it capable of being used for nuclear weapons. This is a unique characteristics of Russia’s TNW forces, they are dual-capable, meaning they have the capacity of being armed with nuclear- and conventional weapons (Kristensen and Norris, 2015, 95).
So far nuclear weapons, whether strategic or tactical, have been controlled. No weapon have been used since the atomic bombs were dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (Falk, 2010, 139). And the political goal has been to make sure that no war would involve using these weapons, which is why deterrence has come to play such magnificent role for controlling these weapons (Schelling, 1977). International treaties have also played their part.
Therefore, if these treaties are to be ignored by nuclear states we could face issues concerning the deployment, proliferation, and the future (illegal) possession of these weapons (Falk, 2010). TNW are short-ranged weapons that can be used against conventional armed forces, in a battle, they can be used against cities and other specific targets. The purpose of using these TNWs is to destroy the will of the adversary without causing massive injuries, as strategic nuclear weapons would (Zagorski, 2011).
Background
The following section will shed light on the role of TNWs in Russia’s security policy, since the end of the Cold War. It will also present a short historical background of Russia’s relations with the cases of this paper, Georgia and Armenia. And bring up important details - with regards to security issues - about the cases, since their independence from the Soviet
Union in the early 90’s. With that being said, no separate background will be provided for each case in the empirical section.
The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) started as an announcement made by President George H. W. Bush, where he in September 1991 stated that the United States would remove a great majority of its tactical nuclear forces from deployment in hope of Russia taking similar action. What were specifically in focus were the elimination of the nuclear artillery shells and short-range nuclear ballistic missile warheads, and the removal of all non-strategic nuclear warheads (tactical) from land-based naval aircrafts, surface ships, as well as attack submarines. Although President Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocated the initiative in October the same year with the pledge of Russian cooperation, the initiative was never successful (Arms Control Association - Fact Sheets, 2014). The current state of TNWs is that neither the United States nor Russia has revealed any governmental reports on whether they have fulfilled their pledges to the PINs. Thus, any available calculation about TNWs are based on indirect estimations, and not actual facts released from the respective government (Zagorski, 2011, 401).
In the late 90’s President Boris Yeltsin opened the Russian Security Council meeting – with focus on TNWs by saying (Arbman and Thornton, 2005, 2):
“For half a century the nuclear forces have been the decisive factors in the stability of the situation in the world as a whole.
That is precisely why maintaining the combat readiness of our nuclear potential at a high level is one of Russia’s priority states interests”
The statement by President Yeltsin makes it obvious that Russia’s reliance on its TNWs is vital for Russia’s security concept. And although the strategic role of these weapons might take different role, they maintain as a primary tool for preserving the Russian state’s priority interests. The end of the Cold War and the break up of the Soviet Union resulted in a military collapse in Russia. And compared to NATO and the United States forces, Russia’s conventional forces were obsolete and in a need of a reform (Elfving, 2014, 8-10). Vladimir Putin’s role as Russia’s President started a new military era in the country, where the adoption of a new security concept and a new military doctrine (from now on also referred to as doctrine) came to play a significant role for Russia’s new security power. The Russian Armed
Forces have since then gone through the most comprehensive transformation of its kind (Elfving, 2014, 10) with military exercises that have become greater in nature, and have involved scenario-based nuclear attacks with the involvement of TNWs (Holmström, 2013).
In fact, despite the Russian Conventional Forces’ need of modernization and reform, the nuclear arsenal and forces were still a reliable part of Russia’s overall security. And experts argue of a paradox in Russia’s military decline: the conventional forces’ deterioration meant a heavier reliance on TNWs (Arbman and Thornton, 2003, 7).
The Baltic States’ NATO-membership has intensified NATO military exercises in the Baltic Sea region, since 2004 (Efron, 2015, 97). Moscow perceives the expansion as a limitation of Russia’s geopolitical interests (Elfving, 2014, 20-23). The NATO expansion and its increasingly interest in the former-Soviet states has created a frustration in Moscow, who is concerned of the occurring military activities in its backyard (Van Herpen, 2011, 10).
Russia’s renewed interest in TNWs is of concern since these weapons can be used as battlefield-weapons during a limited war (Nichols, 2014). And while some scholars and analysts express concerns, others argue of Russia’s art of maskirovka – the art of misdirection and ‘cover’ up - a term, once developed by the Soviet Union and still used by Russia, and often time placed in the center of Russian art of war. This places Russia’s policy and warfare strategy at a level of achieving successful outcomes by never really letting external actors to gain complete awareness of Russia’s capabilities and combat readiness (Ulfving, 2000).
Analyzes show that there is an overall agreement that Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and annexation of Crimea in 2014 were tactical strategies used by Russia to put a stop to NATO’s expansion. However, the incidents in Georgia and Ukraine cannot be seen as isolated incidents, rather than parts of the Russian decision-making, indicating Moscow’s post-Cold War ambitions. Ambitions that involve creating a sphere as great as the Soviet Union’s (Efron, 2014, 41; Kroenig, 2015, 49).
What is considered a common ground for perhaps all post-Soviet states is that their common Soviet past is somehow influencing their present (Pop, 2009). Georgia’s post-Soviet experience has been somewhat of a turbulent. Until 2003, the country suffered from a civil war that left Tbilisi in ruins, severe corruption and mismanagement paved for political and financial exhaustion and instability. Due to the former Justice Minister, Mikheil Saakashvili, and his leadership in the Rose revolution Georgia made necessary adjustments that from 2004 became a starting point for the country. At the same time as the newly elected President,
Saakashvili, pushed the country towards the West, seeking for membership in the NATO as well as the EU, the country’s relations with Russia took a nosedive (Burke, 2014). The Georgian-Russian (or vise versa) relations have been tense since Georgia’s increased efforts of becoming an independent state – free from Russian interference and in companionship with the West. This has resulted in a number of fractions between Russia and Georgia. For instance Russia shook the Georgian economy by banning imports, wine and mineral water, from Georgia. And perhaps the biggest fraction is the one concerning the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Which in return turned into such a bilateral tension between the two that led to a five-day war, and Russian occupation of parts of Georgia, in August 2008 (Burke, 2014; German, 2012).
Georgia withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1999, and finalized its withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independnet States (CIS) as whole in August 2009, with the explanation that CIS had failed as an international organization. It had not shown to have the capacity of preventing the 2008-tragedy, and President Saakashvili stated that except for the failure of the security organization it was time for Georgia to give its goodbyes to the Soviet Union (O’Rourke, 2009; Pop, 2009). Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova created the organization, GUAM, during the Council of Europe’s Summit in Strasbourg in 1997. The organization was transformed into the Organization of Democracy and Economic Development in 2006, and is sometimes argued by Moscow to be a strategic organization, backed by the United States, to create some kind of equilibrium against Russia in the region (Minassian, 2008).
As one of the poorest countries in the Caucasus – Armenia’s post-Soviet history can be defined through diplomatic tensions between the country and its neighbors. Along with efforts of getting Turkey to agree the massacre of hundred of thousands of Armenians that occurred during the late Ottoman era, the country has also tried to come to settlements with Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. There is also a number of domestic turbulence in the country’s political history, such as the assassination of the country’s Prime Minister and several top officials in the parliamentary chamber in 1999, and the presidential election in 2008 that ended in clashes, which resulted in a handful of people loosing their lives. There have also been cases of presidential re-election, mass protests, and severe economic problems, which have left Armenia to be severely dependent on Russia (Burke, 2014). Economic exchanges between the two countries increases constantly and scholars argue of the two countries having common political interests, where they both fear the rise of
new “color revolutions” and the alliance of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) (Minassian, 2008, 9–10).
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The previous research concerning TNW is limited and it is connected to studies of nuclear weapons in general. There is a shortage in academia about the role of TNW and their relation to regional influence. Perhaps history has a role to play in a sense that most of the previous research about nuclear weapons is based on the Cold War, and the role of strategic nuclear weapons as the primary component of threat between the United States and the Soviet Union.
A lot of the existing research that pays attention to nuclear weapons tends to focus on the role of these weapons as in a general term, where they are used by states in possession of them, as means of deterrence. One question that seems to be central in previous research is why nuclear states rely on their arsenal as a particular object of security. In the case of Russia, Sokov argues of a two-folded answer. He argues that on one side there is a matter of the perception of an external threat – by which he refers to Russia actually believing that there is an external threat against the country. The extent of the perception of threat is so great so that the deadliest weapons must be involved to create a wall of defense. The second argument Sokov makes concerns the perception of availability of alternative security mechanism.
Because at the same time as states seek protection among allies, international organizations, and through treaties they also seek for alternative security tools to handle their concerns.
Which once again leads to the point where nuclear weapons play the role they do (Sokov, 2002).
Previous research touching on Russia’s regional influence is tackled differently than focusing on TNW as an explanatory factor. Aboshov argues that Russia’s pursuit of regional influence occurs differently compared states such as the United States. His claim is related to Russia’s struggle with creating an image of its own where it can step out of the shadow of the Soviet Union. Economic power has played a major role in globalization, and economic prosperity is considered as an attractive preference that has contributed to a great regional influence for states such as the United States and China. Russia’s pursuit of great power status and regional influence is different because it is more based on the manifestation of security policy and military power. Regardless of how economic prosperity and its role for influence is perceived by other states, Russia considers economic power to be a soft power. And Moscow’s policy instrument in its region is that hard power is more of a valuable strategy of gaining regional influence (Abushov, 2009).
In a study by Tracey German, Russia’s invasion of Georgia can be used as an evidence of Russia’s ‘hard-power’ strategy in the region. It is a necessary step that Russia considers as a way of securing its ‘sphere of influence’. She argues that Russia uses coercive methods against former Soviet states that have fallen for the West’s democracy manifestation. A manifestation that Russia considers occurring to close to its strategically important backyard.
This has led to Kremlin’s adaptation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, a way of counterbalancing the West’s influence in the former Soviet states, which are of interest to Russia. An example of this coercive diplomacy could be seen in Russia’s attempts of manipulating separatist conflicts in Georgia, when the country started to increase its relationship with the West. Her overall point is that in the pursuit of maintaining its sphere of interest – Russia uses the methods of stick – coercive diplomacy through military invasions as well as cutting off vital gas supply to the countries that resist. But above all Russia will presumably continue to manipulate local conflicts across these former Soviet countries as a coercive measure to undermine the security in these countries, and achieve its own national objectives (German, 2009).
Korkmaz, on the other hand, considers the invasion of Georgia (as well as Crimea) to be evidence of a physical aggression, which is a part of Russia’s foreign policy. Russia’s conservation of its sphere of interest is related to the fact that NATO is too close and too involved in the region. This has led to an increased Russian military presence as well as threat against the states in the region. It is a conscious action from Moscow in the pursuit of expanding its influence in the former-Soviet countries (Korkmaz et al., 2014). In order to understand that fully one must understand the Russian leaderships’ geopolitical view of the world, a view that is seen as matter of zero-sum game. It is a matter of identity, which is connected to Tsarist and Soviet Past (Persson and Vendil Pallin, 2014).
Research Gap and Contribution
As previous research states there is a shortage in academia about the role of TNW and their relation to regional influence. Nuclear weapons, in general, have been used as an element of power-balance among nuclear states, and not as means to achieve political ends in non- nuclear country. Thus, coercive measures through the method of deterrence have had a
contributing role in understanding nuclear powers and their aim. Nuclear arsenals have in that sense never been about wining a war physically, a political goal, or an interest and until recently nuclear weapons have been about something relative and not absolute. Their effectiveness have been measured by the amount of power they hold if to be used (Brodie, 1959, 176-177).
Although many scholars and policy makers still argue that Russia’s TNW-behavior is strategy of deterrence, with the aim to deter NATO from Russia’s backyard, this study argues that there is a gap in research about alternative explanations concerning Russia’s increased reliance on its TNW. On paper, Russia’s overall nuclear arsenal fulfill the purpose of deterrence (Lavrov, 2013), however, TNWs seem to speak a different language in reality. The existing academic research deals with Russia’s irritation of NATO-expansion, and Russia’s conventional measures through the use of the Armed Forces but it does not deal with the possibility of a strategic change of Russia’s behavior in maneuvering its neighbors. This paper aims to shed light on the gap of the role of TNWs as strategic means to increase regional influence, through coercive measures of compellence.
The main contribution this study makes is its theoretical frame. The theoretical work of Thomas Schelling, in Arms and Influence, sheds light on the strategy of compellence. It is about one state compelling another state in order to change his behavior, or affect his decision-making. This theory is not a typical theoretical frame that scholars use when studying and analyzing nuclear weapons and their relationship to the self-interest of states (Schelling, 1977). By using coercive diplomacy’s strategy of compellence this paper will provide insights that are different compared to studies that argue that by using deterrence nuclear states reach certain political ends.
The second contribution this study makes is related to the issue of nuclear weapons, namely Tactical Nuclear Weapons, and their role in the Russia’s nuclear/military doctrines. The current academic studies that this research has come across have not looked at changes in the doctrine in relation to TNW. These weapons are fairly new as a way of threat; historically nuclear weapons have been studied in the context of the Cold War and the strategic nuclear weapons. Finally, perhaps the most important contribution this thesis makes is to shed light on the subject per se, which is of relevance when studying peace and conflict. Nuclear weapons are a direct threat to stability and peace, how states: the West and NATO, choose to
react to Russia’s threats is a sensitive issue due to the risks of arms race, as the one during the Cold War.
Limitation
It is important to discus matters concerning the limitation in this study. This paper rests on the idea of offensive realism; it has a security policy perspective based on the use of the military as means to achieve political goals. This school’s core principle considers military means as the primary tool for super powers and their political goals. The military reliance rests on the idea of self-help in a political environment that is based on anarchy and forces great powers to be suspicious of one another (Mearsheimer, 2001)1. With this as a background this paper only studies the role of military power in relation to regional influence. Although this could be argued of being a small part of how regional influence is achieved, the limitation is of importance due to the feasibility of the paper. The time constrains, finding material and good enough sources have limited this study, in particular when defining and measuring the dependent variable: regional influence.
Finally, there is also a limitation of how many and which military exercises to study. This paper is a product of the Peace and Conflict studies, military operations (even in exercises) are complex and technically difficult to describe. Therefore it is important to make a clear transition of the information, which is why only three major exercises (with possible parallel exercise) will be focused on. All of the exercises occur on Russia’s western geographical part - mainly involving the Western and Southern Military Districts.
1 It must also be mentioned that this paper considers Russia a great power due to a number of reasons. The first one is a matter of historical contexts where until 1991 the Soviet Union was not only a great power but also presented one of the two power blocs in the world. Russia has a great military capacity with an eminent military industry (Majumdar, 2015) as well as resources such as manpower through conventional forces (Elfving, 2014).
Russia is a nuclear weapons state. It is also one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UN Security Council, 2016).
Theoretical Framework
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study. It starts with giving a short explanation of Coercive Diplomacy, which is the basis of the strategy of Compellence. The theoretical section will then continue with introducing the strategy of compellence. Based on the theoretical frame of compellence, I explain how states seek to increase their regional influence. It is also important to clarify the terms, the coercer and the adversary. These terms are used throughout the thesis in order to avoid confusion; the coercer is the state with the aim of making another state to do something, or to act in a way that is favorable to the coercer.
The “other” state is the adversary, which some studies refer to as opponent, enemy and so on.
The task of the theoretical framework is to help analyze and find explanations for the following research question:
What changes in the nuclear doctrines, with regards to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s increased regional influence?
Conceptualizing Coercive Diplomacy
The purpose of this section is to shed light on Coercive diplomacy that uses the strategy of Compellence or Deterrence to achieve a certain outcome. The theoretical work frame of this paper is mainly built on Thomas Schelling but it also uses components from Freedman and George in able to develop the theory. To begin with coercive diplomacy argues that as a strategy, deterrence aims to either prevent or persuade something before it happens – which makes it passive in nature (See figure one) (Freedman, 1998, 40; Schelling, 1977, 78–82).
Compellent seeks to make the adversary halt or to agree to a particular action that is favorable to the coercer (Bratton, 2010, 595; Schelling, 1977, 78). This study focuses on threats that are compellent in nature, because compellence offers an alternative perspective to a nuclear state’s behavior towards it neighboring countries that are not nuclear states.
Coercive diplomacy conceptualizes diplomacy as bargaining. It is about searching for an outcome that is favorable for the involved parties. Bargaining can be shaped as polite or rude.
The polite bargaining involves offers, trust, privileges, cooperation and so on, the rude one involves threats, it is based on mistrust and hence aggressive (Schelling, 1977, 1). Thus, diplomacy is risky because it involves bargaining. Bargaining is risky because all the parties involved could make a gain from the bargaining. This situation could be avoided through
means such as threats, which could affect the coercer’s bargaining range in his own favor. But to achieve the ideal outcome possessing a superior military force is inevitable. In coercive diplomacy this is “the art of influencing the behavior of others by threats” - it is a forceful persuasion that maximizes the coercer’s gains (Schelling, 1977, 1-5). However, one can always argue of how much military superiority is enough? I argue that although a superior military has the capability of causing massive injuries, the involvement of TNWs are a game changer when used as a threat that could, or might come to force. My argument is based on the fact that by involving TNWs the price of disobedience increases. And despite who the adversary is in alliance with, states do not seek to end up in nuclear conflicts. Therefore, the use of TNWs has the capacity of influencing the behavior of the adversary. My argument is based on the impact of the threat of force, where not behaving as it is asked of one could result in coercer’s use of TNWs in order to break down the adversary.
Compellence – A Forceful Persuasion
The following section will focus on the strategy of compellence, used as a coercive threat by the coercer to gain influence over the adversary. Before explaining this strategy it is important to acknowledge the lack of a systematic and comprehensive body of literature on compellence as a separate entity within coercive diplomacy. The term has been rather hidden within security policy, and not been used as one of the primary threats in international relations (Freedman, 1998, 39). The work of Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence is perhaps the most comprehensive work among theorists. To conceptualize the term one can simply say that compellence is a strategy that is used in order to persuade another actor, it seeks to change his behavior, which leads to the alter of status quo (Schelling, 1977, 71). It involves the idea that the coercer initiates something, makes a decision, seeks a certain political outcome and so on, which involves making the adversary to either do something, or to keep him from doing something. Compellence actively seeks to make the adversary to yield. To yield could be that the adversary either makes a decision or acts in a way that satisfies the coercer, or the opposite, the adversary stops doing something he was about to do because it has been compelled to. However, Schelling argues that for compellence to work it must be consistent over time, it must have a specific time period so that the adversary understands the depth of the threat (Schelling, 1977, Chap 2). That is why compellence requires assurance, the threat is set with a specific timetable, once the time is reached, the line is crossed, and the adversary
has yet not yield, he must face the consequences (Schelling, 1977, 74). The Cuban crisis is typical case of the importance of assurance’s threshold. The United States could not have been sincere with its threat if it had threatened to bomb Cuba next Thursday, and given the Russians the deadline of being out by the end of the month (Schelling, 1977, 75-76).
Figure 1 shows the sub-branches of compellence and their aim. They are motivations behind compellence and are argued of Freedman and George to be important factors to why the coercer seeks to alter status quo. Opportunity-driven motivation, which makes policymakers engage in compellence because they see an opportunity of how certain changes, decisions, or actions could lead to the change of status quo, and decide to act upon it (Freedman, 1998, 49–
50). Need-driven motivations are however, based on policymakers’ rational perception of security - they initiate a change through compellence because they believe that compelling is less costly for them in the long-run, compared to the costs of not initiating a challenge and being challenged (Freedman, 1998, 50).
Figure 1. Theoretical explanation of the sub-branches of Compellence, one of the strategies under the umbrella of Coercive Diplomacy.
Although both motivations provide a good explanation of state-behavior, I argue of need- driven motivations having a stronger connection to the basic principle of great powers’
pursuit of regional influence. I base my argument on the fact that states value their security and they are in need of it, in order to preserve their sovereignty, which is why maintaining a
‘buffer zone’ is of importance. This zone works as a protection zone and it makes a state to create a sphere of control without having other great powers too close to its borders.
Compellence (Alters status
quo)
Deterrence (Preserves status quo)
Coercive Diplomacy
Opportunity- driven Motivations
Need-based Motivations
Prevent undesired behavior before it
occurs
Persuasion – with the aim of avoiding costly
behavior
However, I also believe that nuclear states, in particular, do not compel their neighbors unless they actually feel threatened by an actor that is as strong, or perhaps even stronger than they are.
Compellence – just like any other component within the realm of international relations involve risks and miscalculations. Therefore, compellence must be based on costs, which is why creating a scenario where the consequences of not yielding becomes an important part of strategy (Schelling, 1977, pp. 84–85). The adversary must be brought into a position where he asks himself what would happen if I refuse to agree to the demands? What would happen if I would not do what the coercer wants me to do? And that is why strategies and how to go about are important components of compellence. For instance, when scholars argue of the American compellence against Vietnam and its failure – it is essential to shed light on elements such as results and actions. The United States demanded results from the North Vietnamese, without asking for specific actions. Hence, compellence failed. There was a lack of enough insight or knowledge about the details of how much influence the North Vietnamese regime had over the Vietcong. The Americans demanded results, where details about specific actions were left to the North Vietnamese – making the American compellent strategy rather weak (Schelling, 1977, Ibid).
So far I have argued that once a state involves TNWs in its security policy, compellence will have a higher chance of success. My argument is based on the presence of TNWs and their role on the threat of force – namely, when ‘threats’ move over to the actual use of force. Thus, a nuclear state that threatens to use these weapons in case of occurred threats creates an overwhelming threat, which does not need to be directed against a specific actor to be perceived as dangerous. As long as threat is offensive in nature, where it is more proactive than reactive it will succeed. The combination of a more offensive role of the coercer’s nuclear capabilities – highlighting the role of TNWs - together with the creation of an overwhelming threat scenario, where the adversary is given the idea that it could be a target of force, will play in favor of the coercer.
In line with the theoretical frame the following hypothesis will be tested:
“Offensive changes in the doctrines, with regard to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s likelihood of increasing its regional influence”.
Argument and Causal Mechanism
As previous research states, soft power through an attractive ideology and economic prosperity have been a central strategy for increasing regional power. At the same time, hard- power strategies occur and the role of the conventional forces is still a central part of some states that seek regional influence. The theoretical framework argues of coercive diplomacy and the strategy of compellence as means for a state to achieve its political goals. Hard power is given a central role since by having the necessary military capacity the coercer could use the threat of force and show the willingness of causing hurt, which could in return decrease the level of bargaining in its favor.
To enable the causal link of this paper I argue that the mechanism, threat of force, plays a significant role in in increasing regional influence, when TNW are involved. I relate this to the cost that is at stake, namely the adversary’s lack of information on whether the threat of force is real or if it is a bluff. Thus, the adversary will yield in order to avoid facing the consequences.
Independent Variable Dependent Variable
Threat of force (Mechanism) Figure 2. Causal explanation of the mechanism.
Changes in the
Doctrine (of TNW) Regional Influence
RESEARCH DESIGN
The previous chapter presented the theoretical framework of this thesis and it was argued that as a strategic tool within coercive diplomacy, compellence could be used by one state to influence the behavior of another. The main theoretical claim of this paper is that I argue that TNW could contribute to increased regional influence when used as a threat of force. This per se creates an overwhelming threat, which makes the adversary to agree to the demands that the coercer has posed or face the consequences. Since the costs are too high for the adversary, it will change its behavior in favor of the coercer.
The aim of this paper is to examine the role of TNW for Russia’s regional influence. During the recent years Russia has increased its reliance on TNW, these short-range nuclear weapons have come to be given a significant role in Russia’s defense policy and political language. To be able to examine the aim this paper seeks to examine the following research question: What changes in the nuclear doctrines, with regards to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s increased regional influence?
Structured Focused Comparison Method
This chapter outlines the used research design in this qualitative study, and the use of the research design in implementing the analytical framework on the empirical material. In order to do so, this study takes help of the simple and straightforward method known as the structured focused comparison method.
The structured part of the method refers to the study being guided by a clear research objective where a set of questions that reflect the object of research are asked of each case during the data collection. This enables a systematic comparison and collecting of the findings of the selected case. The method is focused because it simply deals with certain features of the historical cases examined because one single study cannot alone address all of the interesting aspects of a historical happening (George and Bennet, 2005, Chap 3).
The selected countries are compared with the aim of examining what changes in the doctrine of TNW (independent variable) could contribute to Russia’s increased regional influence (dependent variable) by using threat of force (causal mechanism). This paper contains elements of both theory- testing and building. It builds on the theory of Thomas Schelling’s
coercive diplomacy by using the strategy of compellence, with the aim of examining the relationship between TNW and regional influence. The thesis is also of a theory testing nature, it seeks to test whether compellence can offer explanations for the use of TNW in pursuit of favorable ends.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the selection of cases will be introduced. Second, the time frame and the used sources in the paper will be discussed. Third, a well-described operationalization of the independent and the dependent variable is provided. After each operationalization the necessary analytical tools that are to help with the analysis will be presented. The analytical tool consists of a set of general questions to the designed variables – these questions will be asked of each case.
Case selection
The first step in any case study is to illustrate what the cases are cases of. Case selection is an essential part of any research, especially in qualitative studies. As Seawright and Gerring argue case selection is a crucial part in qualitative studies. The focus of the case selection in this study is on a limited number of cases, leaving no allowance for random sampling due to the risk of facing problems of precision (Gerring, 2007, 295). For case studies of a particular phenomenon to make a theoretical contribution and develop a theory they must be well- defined, each selected case must have a common focus (George and Bennet, 2005, 70). As noted in the theoretical section compellence could be used by one state to influence another state in order to achieve certain political goals. This study argues that offensive changes in the doctrine of TNW contribute to a nuclear state’s increased regional influence because of the kind of threat the approach to these weapons cause. This causal argument will be tested on the case of Russia and its changes in the doctrine of its TNW and impact in its region. In order to test the hypothesis this theory will study and compare three neighboring countries to Russia, namely, Georgia and Armenia.
Doing a case study based on a limited number of cases could cause selection bias. In order to avoid that, certain criteria have been used with the purpose of setting the ground for the selection of cases. It is also important to mention that the selected cases share a historical background with Russia in a sense that they are former-Soviet states that chose to be
independent states after the collapse of the Soviet. Despite being independent units, many of the former Soviet countries are still considered by Russia as being a part of the Russian identity sphere (Kroenig, 2015). The first criterion for case selection was to select the cases based on the observed variation on the dependent variable: regional influence. Therefore, counties with both high and low level of Russian influence, with regard to the military factor, were selected. The second criterion was that the cases’ involvement in the Commonwealth of Independent States Organization (CIS), where they either have been or are members of the organization. This would give the cases a common historical ground since they became independent units. Third, all selected countries are only partners to NATO and not members.
This enables the study to focus on the same set of basic variables and questions asked of each case.
Time Frame and Sources
The time frame of this study is the period of 2008 to 2014. This particular time frame is of interest because of two reasons; the first is that Russia started the most extensive military reform in the history of the Armed Forces since the great reform of the 1700s (Elfving, 2014, 8). The second reason is related to Russia’s release of a new Military Doctrine in late 2014. I have chosen to leave out the latest Russian Military Doctrine, which was released in late 2014 due to lack of a substantial version of the doctrine. So far the public version of the doctrine is released as short summarizes concerning what the doctrine has in common with the former version. There is also a shortage in scholars studying the latest doctrine. Thus, it has shown that when studying Russia it is more suitable to go back in time in order to find translated information, that are of value. Lastly, the time frame of this paper also maintains some of the biggest military exercises in Russia since the Soviet-era, which could per se shed light on the aim of this paper.
One finale note, the 2000 doctrine is working as a starting point making it possible to look at the 2010 doctrine, and make a comparison or some kind of estimation considering the occurred changes.
This thesis will make use of primary and secondary sources in order to test the suggested hypothesis. The primary sources consist of governmental documents such as Military Doctrines and information that is directly released from a source that is being used in the
thesis, such as NATO. The secondary sources include research, reports, and documents from governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations, think tanks institutions as well as other forms of previous research. By using different categories and sources is important both in the term that it decreases the likelihood of data to be too biased with regard to the specific topic of this thesis. It also prevails a wider picture of the details surround the topic of the thesis.
This paper is open to possible critique towards sources on Russia’s military exercises, and that data on the topic is driven from one source, namely the Swedish Defense Research Agency, FOI. Thus, it must be mentioned that accessing reliable information about Russia’s military exercises is difficult, the majority of information is based on news articles. Due to previous knowledge about the work and work ethic of FOI, this paper argues that the presented information holds a substantial quality. Lastly, whenever (news) websites and articles were used, data was triangulated, meaning that different sources were used in order to confirm the validity of the information.
Operationalization And Analytical Tools
The following section presents the operationalization of the independent variable: changes in the doctrine (of TNW), and the dependent variable: regional influence.
Testing the hypothesis requires clarification of the theoretical definitions of both of the variables. By translating changes in the doctrine and regional influence into operational definitions the empirical capture of these concepts becomes possible (Teorell and Svensson, 2013, 39). The operationalization starts with a throughout definition of each variable, it will present the designed indictors and provide the necessary analytical tools which is a set research question that will guide the analysis.
Independent Variable: Changes in the doctrine (of TNW)
Clarifying the independent variable is a necessary part that facilitates the operationalization process and relevant data gathering in order to answer the research question. States in possession of nuclear weapons have concepts and principles of how and when to use their nuclear arsenal (nuclear warheads in general). Therefore, having guidelines for how the
nuclear arsenal is to be composed and developed is an essential factor for nuclear weapons’
usefulness. The overall appellation for this is nuclear doctrine and constitutes an essential part of a nuclear state’s national security. A nuclear doctrines is expressed in several documents, most of them confidential, these documents are adapted and developed on a basis on a state’s perceived threat (Westerlund, 2012, 9). Accessing Russia’s nuclear doctrines is difficult and perhaps even impossible. Nuclear doctrines in general maintain classified information, and nuclear states are not keen on prevailing detailed information about their nuclear arsenal (Westerlund, Ibid). Russia does however prevail details concerning the number of warheads they have in possession in cooperation they have within treaties such as NPT and INF (Arms Control Association, 2014; UNODA-NPT, 2016). The role of TNW (nuclear weapons in general) is also marked in statements concerning Russia’s defense policy and capability, where for instance information is prevailed concerning how planning and readiness is divided into different military groups (naval; ground; air units) (Carlson et al., 2013; Nichol, 2011).
Russian nuclear doctrine can be described and analyzed in different ways. Since accessing the actual nuclear doctrines have shown to be rather impossible this study examines Russia’s implementation approach in relation to its nuclear doctrines. To enable research of changes in the doctrine, the concept will be measured through ways the implantation of TNWs takes place, in reality. For a doctrine to give an effect it must be oriented in such a way so that it can be implemented. This can be observed and analyzed by examining Russia’s official defense- and security policy documents, the Armed Forces exercises and the pattern the exercises, as well as Russia’s behavior in international community concerning cooperation in treaties such as the NPT. But also the political language concerning the reliance and the use of TNW could be a component of analysis. Changes in the doctrine (of TNW) is studied over time, where comparing the implementations will take palace in relation to every time a doctrine has been released.
Changes in the doctrine (of TNW), is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, however the qualitative nature of this study and the complexity of the subject allows a discussion regarding the implementation approach and also about the nature of change in comparison to the selected cases.
The independent variable of the paper is operationalized as a dichotomous variable:
X = 0: The purpose of the MD has changed – the change is of offensive nature - TNW aim to be used against an actor. The implementation approach concerns elements such as military exercises, TNW scenario-based exercises. Deployment of TNW occurs or there are discussions of deployment.
X = 1: There is no offensive change in the MD. After a new MD has been released Russia’s implementation approach has not changed – no increase.
A number of basic indicators have been designed; they are guided by the concept, changes in the doctrine, and reflect on the implementation approach (table 1).
Independent variable: Changes in the doctrine (of TNW) Clarification of the
concept
Implementation Approach
Indicators - Changes concerning the use of TNW against countries - Region-specific military exercises and their aim - Increased parallel exercises
- Indication of, or the use of TNW during the exercises - Deployment of TNW (in areas of relevance for the cases) - Russia’s description of external threats to the Homeland Table 1. Indicators for Changes in the Doctrine
In accordance to the indicators, the following questions are designed to facilitate the analytical work and these questions will be addressed to each selected case. The questions have been designed in accordance to the indicators and seek to find out whether compellence has occurred.
1. Is there a change in Russia’s nuclear doctrines concerning the use of TNW against external actors?
§ In what way could that affect the selected case?
2. Is there a change in the military exercises, have they increased/decreased with the release of each doctrine?
§ What could the change say about the pattern (the execution) of the exercises?
§ What is the role of TNW in the exercises?
§ Is there any political engagement in exercises involving TNW?
3. Are there any indications or plans for deployment of TNW?
§ What is the relevance of the deployment for the cases (or the region)?
Dependent Variable: Regional influence
Before addressing the operationalization of the dependent variable it is essential to tackle the geographical term of a region, since states could (seek to) increase their regional influence in different regions in the world. According to the Oxford dictionary a “region” is “an area…a part of the country or the world having definable characteristics but not always fixed boundaries” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). The regional area this paper refers to is what this study is a case of, namely Russia. Due to the research question that this paper seeks to answer, regional influence in a geographic sense is related to Russia’s influence in its own region. The (former-Soviet) countries that present the cases in this study are geographically placed in South Caucasus.
To enable a more precise definition for the dependent variable and, this study takes help from offensive realism’s explanation of how regional influence is achieved. This school considers relative power to have a significant role in increased regional influence. Relative power is achieved through the component of the military factor, which is through defense and military means. This component is important because international politics is played out in a realm of anarchy. States mistrust each other, and can never be sure of each other’s intentions, which is why they relay on self-help. A combination of anarchy and self-help paves for states’ pursuit of guaranteeing their survival (Mearsheimer, 2001, Chap. 2).
This study seeks to examine whether offensive changes in the doctrine (of TNW) increases the likelihood of a nuclear state’s increased regional influence. In order to measure the level of influence this study will operationalize the variable as dichotomous, but allows following discussions due to the qualitative nature of the paper.
The dependent variable is operationalized as a dichotomous variable:
Y = 0: Influence is high, based on the increase of the military factor:
1) Russia has military bases in the selected case
2) Russia has the same amount of military forces on the ground (during the focused time frame of this study) or has increased its military forces in the selected cases
3) Russia has installed important military components in the bases it maintains in the selected cases
4) The level of joined NATO activities and cooperation has decreased in the selected case.
Y = 1: Influence is low, based on the decrease of the military factor:
1) Russia has no military bases in the selected case
2) There is no joined military cooperation between Russia and the case
3) The selected case is involved in NATO activities and has increased its cooperation
A set of basic indicators is designed with the aim to contribute to a more practical and precise way of finding data of relevance. The following figure demonstrates the indicators that will be used in the operationalization process (table 2).
Dependent variable: Regional influence
Clarification The Military Factor
Indicator - Russia has established military bases in each case
- The size of the Russian Armed Forces in each case and plans of expanding the number of forces (personnel)
- Specific type of arms (equipment) in relation to TNW in each case
- Training exercises or cooperation between Russia and the Armed Forces of each case
- (Increase of) selected cases’ relationship to NATO - (Increase of) selected cases’ relationship to CSTO Table 2. Indicators for Regional Influence
The finale step of the operationalization of the dependent variable presents the questions that will be asked of each case. The questions have been designed in accordance to the indicators of the main concept, and seek to find out whether the changes in the nuclear doctrine (of TNWs) have had any impact to the level of influence in each case. By asking these questions to every case this study seeks to make estimations about the ‘changes’ role for the overall regional influence.
