Between discourse and practice

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Between discourse and practice

A critical analysis of the EU migration regime

Lara Solty

International Relations

Dept. of Global Political Studies Bachelor programme – IR103L 15 credits thesis

Spring semester 2021

Supervisor: Dimosthenis Chatzoglakis

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Abstract

Word count: 12 595

This thesis investigates how migration is framed in the public discourse of the European Union (EU) and in how far the discourse corresponds with the EU’s actions in the Mediterranean. A content analysis and critical discourse analysis of speeches and policy documents produced by the EU, identify that the discourse on migration is heavily focused on externalization and depoliticization. Migration is presented as a state of exception which allows for extraordinary measures. Biopolitics and Thanatopolitics are used as theoretical frameworks to argue that irregular migrants are places in a zone of indistinction and thus become bare life.

While the EU emphasizes high human rights standards in its discourse, it fails to live up to these standards as illustrated by the EU’s alleged involvement in human rights violations in the Mediterranean.

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List of Abbreviations

EU European Union

IOM International Organization for Migration IR International Relations

MOAS Migrant Offshore Aid Station MSF Médecins Sans Frontières NGO Non-governmental organization SAR Search and rescue

UN United Nations

UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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1. Introduction

The EU and its preceding institutions were founded after WWII to strengthen cooperation and avoid further conflict. A cornerstone in the development of the EU has been its commitment to shared values and norms. Today, the EU is known and praised for its humanitarian commitment and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. Yet, reports on human rights violations at its external borders, especially in the Mediterranean, are accumulating in recent years. How do these contrary issues fit together? This thesis investigates this disparity by attempting to answer the following research question: how does the EU discursively frame migration and how does the discourse correspond with the EU’s actions in the Mediterranean?

During the peak of the so-called migration crisis in 2015, over one million people crossed the Mediterranean and over 3500 people died trying (UNHCR, 2021). In 2016, over 5000 people died despite the total number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean dropped to just over 370 000 (ibid). In the following years, the number has constantly decreased but roughly 1400 still died in 2020 with the estimated number being significantly higher (ibid). Different European naval missions have been conducted in the Mediterranean, some launched by member states (e.g. Mare Nostrum by Italy), some by the EU (e.g. operation Sophia), and some by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, commonly known as Frontex, (e.g. Operation Triton). While earlier missions had a clear mandate to conduct search and rescue (SAR) operations, this has changed in recent years. The current EU military operation Irini does not have a clear SAR mandate and is located further away from migration routes departing from Libya despite many migrants dying while attempting to cross the Mediterranean. Due to the scope of this thesis, I will refer to all people trying to reach Europe as migrants rather than distinguishing between migrants and refugees. This allows for a more inclusive analysis and circumvents the difficulties of defining who counts as a refugee without processes of identification.

In recent years, accusations of human rights violations against the EU have been increasing, particularly with regard to pushbacks. Pushbacks refer to actions by state authorities to prevent migrants from entering a territory or forcefully returning them to another state’s territory with no regard for individual circumstances and without granting the right to apply for asylum. This practice violates a series of international laws, including the principle of non- refoulement which forbids returning persons to countries where they would face human rights violations (OHCHR). This is especially applicable to pushbacks to Libya where migrants

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2 evidently are subject to unlawful incarceration, torture, and ill-treatment (Amnesty International, 2020). Accusations of EU involvement in pushbacks are therefore to be treated and assessed seriously. However, despite clear indications, the EU denies conducting or facilitating pushbacks.

At the same time, the EU enjoys a very positive image as a protector and advancer of human rights worldwide. In fact, human rights are one of its founding values and the EU is the self-proclaimed “champion of human rights” (Schinas, 2020). This thesis seeks to investigate how the EU can be a human rights champion while at the same time, evidence is pointing to the EU’s repeated involvement in human rights violations.

1.1. IR relevance and structure

Both, migration, and the EU, have a high relevance in the field of International Relations (IR).

Migrants are not merely objects but have the agency to decide their movement. Therefore, they have a certain degree of power which addresses the core debate of IR: which actors have power and how can we understand it (Johnson, 2021)? Further, migration typically involves the crossing of borders and thus involves at least two states which “places the state at the heart of the analysis” and addresses issues of sovereignty (ibid). In the case of the EU, migration affects EU institutions and 27 member states which is a prime example of regional governance.

Therefore, migration to the EU is an IR-relevant topic, both theoretically and empirically.

Research on migration and the EU is often either focused on specific policies (Riddervold, 2018), the general discourse, or humanitarian concerns (Cuttitta, 2018; Gloninger, 2019). This thesis aims to contribute to the debate by combining these issues and directly contrast discourse and actions. Further, the present research produces original insights into the discursive narrative on migration by the EU and thereby adds value to the academic debate

This thesis is organized in five chapters, including the introduction. The literature review will present common approaches to the study of the EU with regards to migration and introduce this thesis’ theoretical framework. The Foucauldian theory of biopolitics is complemented by Agamben’s Thanatopolitics including relevant concepts used to make sense of the EU discourse on migration. Further, the concepts of externalization and (de)politicization will be introduced and later applied on the analysis. Next, I will present a combination of content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the theoretical framework and lay out the data selection process. In the analysis section, the results of the content analysis will be used to guide the CDA

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3 which will analyse the discursive framing of migration by the EU using externalization and (de)politicization as relevant concepts. To contrast the discursive framing of migration with the EU’s actions in the Mediterranean, secondary data will be presented to assess the EU’s involvement in human rights violations before discussing the findings and concluding the thesis.

2. Literature Review

Migration in the EU is a widely discussed issue in the field of IR and has been assessed from many different angles. Especially the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 sparked new interest in the field and many scholars analysed the aftermath and changing framing of migration across the EU. To answer the research question how does the EU discursively frame migration and how does the discourse correspond with the EU’s actions in the Mediterranean?, three core themes in the academic debate have been identified and will be presented in the literature review. Firstly, I will present research of naval missions in the Mediterranean since it is the region chosen to illustrate this thesis’ argument. Secondly, due to their increasingly important role both onshore and offshore, I will outline research on the role and perception of NGOs with regards to migration in the Mediterranean. Thirdly, biopolitics will be introduced as the theoretical foundation of this thesis before illustrating how biopolitics has been used in prior research.

2.1. Analyses of naval missions

This section of the literature review will provide an overview of naval missions in the Mediterranean and how the European discourse on migration has changed over time. A major research focus within the studies of EU migration policies has been on the several naval missions in the Mediterranean launched by the EU, member states or Frontex. In particular, scholars have critically investigated the intentions behind these missions and questioned their commitment to upholding human rights in the Mediterranean (see Riddervold, 2018; Cuttitta, 2018; Gloninger, 2019).

After witnessing many tragedies involving the death of hundreds of migrants, Italy launched the operation Mare Nostrum in October 2013. Mare Nostrum had a “twofold purpose

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4 of safeguarding human life at sea and bringing to justice human traffickers and migrant smugglers” (Ministero della Difesa). It was the first mission with a clear humanitarian SAR mandate for which it was praised by state and non-state actors like Amnesty International and UNHCR (Cuttitta, 2018: 789). During the mission, over 150 000 migrants were rescued and safely brought to European soil (IOM, 2014). However, the success of Mare Nostrum was also accused of being a pull-factor for illegal migration and to facilitate an “invasion” of the EU by African migrants (ibid). Within academic research, however, there is a consensus that Mare Nostrum was a success and should not have been abolished only one year after its launch in October 2014. Italy claimed that the mission was stopped due to financial constraints and because it was only intended as an emergency response to the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Central Mediterranean (Taylor, 2015; Cuttitta, 2018: 789).

Even though Mare Nostrum received international praise for its humanitarian commitment, it was also criticized for using humanitarian rhetoric instrumentally while enforcing restrictive and delocalized border policies (Cuttitta, 2018: 791). This criticism is mainly based on Italian cooperation with Libya which aimed at preventing migrants from embarking boats towards Europe. Further, the mission was criticized for publicly staging its humanitarianism: public opinion shifted significantly after soldiers began to publicize photos and videos of their missions which led to the construction of a new narrative and public compassion for the lives of migrants (Gloninger, 2019: 470). By analysing EU documents, Italian laws, and statements of politicians, Cuttitta (2018) found that humanitarianism, as in the case of Mare Nostrum, is often merely used as a rhetorical means to advance exclusionary and delocalized border policies. In fact, while humanitarianism has inclusionary and exclusionary dimensions, it is often used as a legitimization for outsourcing responsibilities and thereby emphasizing delocalized border management (Cuttitta, 2018: 792f). Following Cuttitta, this thesis argues that the EU employs externalization measures to delocalize migration management to third countries and thereby increases the risk of human rights violations against migrants.

In the case of Mare Nostrum and migration management in the Mediterranean, this means that the responsibility for the deaths of migrants is put on countries of origin or transit. By preventing migrants from leaving countries like Libya, they face human rights violations for which no European state can be held accountable (Cuttitta, 2018: 793). This disparity is supported by the fact that there is no universal definition of humanitarianism. In his analysis, Cuttitta (2018) showed that the humanitarianization of migration management might emphasize the right to life while ignoring other basic human rights. Hence, humanitarianization “[…] does

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5 not result in an enhancement of human rights as such but rather in isolated paternalistic gestures, in which inclusion is an act of generosity within a context of emergency” (Cuttitta, 2018: 794).

In April 2015, about six months after the discontinuation of Mare Nostrum, the EU launched the military naval mission Eunavfor Med (later renamed Operation Sophia). Its main target was to “[…] undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling” (Operation Sophia). Even though conducting SAR missions was not part of its main or supporting tasks, almost 23 000 migrants were rescued in 2016 (Guardia Costiera, 2016: 3). This shows that saving lives is not a major concern for the EU but a minor piece of the puzzle (Gloninger, 2019:

475).

In order to assess the operation’s commitment to human rights, as set by the EU, Riddervold (2018) studied rhetorical action used in documents by different actors across time.

The research was conducted by triangulating documents from member states in favour and opposed to the launch of Sophia with documents produced by the UNCHR, the Council of Europe, a variety of human rights organisations, the UK House of Lords, as well as from legal and other scholars and five interviews with EU civilian and military staff (Riddervold, 2018a:

165). Similarly to Cuttitta (2018), Riddervold used the notion of humanitarianism, in this case the humanitarian foreign policy model, to analyse the EU’s behaviour in the Mediterranean. In opposition to the traditional rational choice based foreign policy model, a humanitarian one focuses “[…] on protecting and strengthening global norms, i.e. human rights law, in the international system, and [...] is willing to bind itself to such norms in conducting its foreign policy” (Riddervold, 2018: 159). Similarly to the case of Mare Nostrum, a catastrophe costing the lives of many hundreds of migrants near the Italian shore in 2015 influenced a change in public opinion leading to countries firstly opposed to a European mission (e.g. Germany and the UK), claiming it would act as a pull-factor, eventually conceded (Riddervold, 2018: 166).

Further, operation Sophia was criticized for its cooperation with the Libyan authorities and coast guard and thereby surpassing the principle of non-refoulement which increased the number of pullbacks. Therefore, Riddervold (2018: 171) argues that whereas the launch of operation Sophia was motivated by humanitarian concerns, its later conduct clearly was not.

These findings are supported by interviews with EU officials who openly admitted that the EU consciously ignored the EU’s human rights standards (Riddervold, 2018: 170).

This part of the literature review has shown that naval missions are a crucial part of the EU migration regime. However, they often face criticism for being too focused on the external

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6 dimension of migration, i.e. cooperation with countries of origin or transit, than with the upholding of human rights and rescuing migrants in distress at sea. Further, member states tend to be concerned with an alleged pull-factor of SAR missions which might explain the smuggler focused mandate of naval missions. The presented literature supports my analysis as it provides crucial background knowledge on the concerns regarding migration policies, such as the absence of a European SAR mission and the emphasis on externalization.

2.2. The role and perception of NGOs

In recent years, several European NGOs (MOAS, MSF, Sea Watch, SOS Mediterranee etc.) entered the Mediterranean stage and conducted independent SAR missions after the discontinuation of Mare Nostrum and the securitized mandate of operation Sophia and other EU operations. Their role as independent actors and their relationship with the EU will be outlined in this section of the literature review. Firstly, the academic debate on the differences between how the EU and how civil society actors, frame EU migration policies will be outlined.

Further, it will be assessed how and why NGOs are involved in the Mediterranean and which challenges they face.

As briefly mentioned in the previous section, a major part of EU migration management is concerned with its external dimension and cooperation with countries of origin and transit.

One of the main countries of transit in north Africa after Libya, is Tunisia. Through extensive fieldwork, desk research and interviews, Pastore and Roman (2020) have analysed how Tunisian civil society actors evaluate EU migration policies and how their framing differs from the EU’s. An analysis of EU documents over 20 years showed that the emphasis on the external dimension firstly occurred in 1999 and again in 2011 during the Arab Springs and in 2015 during the so-called refugee crisis (Pastore & Roman, 2020: 1f). Mixed migration flows, which make it more difficult to distinguish between refugees seeking protection and economically motivated migrants, might have contributed to these developments as the external dimension of migration management is aimed at reducing the flow of people seeking access to the EU in general (Pastore & Roman, 2020: 5). As previously mentioned, migration is a highly securitized topic and the role of third countries is often limited to benefit European interests and minimize mobility across the Mediterranean. In fact, securitization and focus on border controls, surveillance, returns, and economic interests is highly criticized by Tunisian actors (Pastore &

Roman, 2020: 6, 9). Including civil society actors in the process of implementing migration

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7 policies could therefore increase public support, human rights and policy coherence (Pastore &

Roman, 2020: 16, 18).

The notion of migration as something to be managed, which will later be discussed further, is but one part of the process of depoliticizing the migration process by the EU. By presenting policymaking as “a neutral, necessary and indisputable process” with limited opportunities for discussion and disagreement, issues are being depoliticized (Cuttitta, 2017:

634). In the context of migration, this enhances the possibility for stricter border measures and decreased respect for the human rights of migrants as they are framed as a problem needing to be managed rather than as people seeking protection and a better life. In contrast, repoliticizing a subject means “[…] promoting the existence of antagonism, conflict, difference and choice as opposed to the passive acceptance of the whole framework” (Cuttitta, 2017: 635). If NGOs can contribute to the process of repoliticizing migration, however, is dependent on the respective NGO. An analysis of the political positions of three NGOs (MOAS, MSF, Sea Watch) has shown, their political stances differ (see Cuttitta, 2017). While MOAS remains neutral and operates under the motto “Save lives first. Sort out the politics later”, Sea Watch understands its role in political terms and acts as a watchdog in the Mediterranean, pressuring politicians and authorities to embrace their responsibilities towards migrants (Cuttitta, 2017:

640f). Hence, NGOs can play an important role in a context where human rights are regularly in jeopardy of being violated (DeBono, 2018: 294). However, research shows that the role and potential of NGOs in the areas of SAR operations and first reception is not acknowledged by the EU. In fact, NGOs are often hindered to operate, for example by the introduction of a code of conduct for NGOs by Italy in 2017 and several legal troubles which make it difficult for NGOs to fulfil their missions (Gloninger, 2019: 477, 480). Further, there have been several incidents with Libyan authorities, including shooting in the air next to NGO vessels and destroying migrants’ boats causing them to drown (Cuttitta, 2017: 647f).

Albeit being restrained by European authorities, NGOs have great potential to improve EU migration policies by contributing with a civil society perspective and supporting authorities in SAR operations. The discussion has also shed light on the challenges NGOs face and the securitized and Eurocentric framing of migration by the EU.

2.3. Theory

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8 The following theory section presents the philosophical foundation of biopolitics as developed by French philosopher Michel Foucault and argues that it is an intrinsic aspect of migration policies in the EU. After outlining the basic conception of biopolitics, I will introduce Agamben’s theory of Thanatopolitics and present how they are used as analytical lenses and applied to a real-world case. The section concludes by explaining how the theoretical foundation of this thesis informs the analysis and supports this thesis’ argument.

2.3.1. Foundation of biopolitics

Following Foucault, biopolitics is closely connected to the sovereign, power, the population, and racism. In the 19th century, the conception of the sovereign moved away from understanding it as having the right to take life or let live towards the right to make live and let die (Foucault, 2004: 241). The old power of death was thereby replaced by “[…] the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” (Foucault, 1978: 140). This development coincides with a new perception of the population which was now understood as a political problem and “[…] a global mass that is affected by overall characteristics to life”

(Foucault, 2007: 377f). Managing this global mass of people and all of its characteristics is the main concern of biopolitics. A state taking control over reproduction, fertility rates, mortality, public hygiene, and thereby life and death, is exercising biopower to ensure a healthy workforce which is closely connected to the development of capitalism (Foucault, 1978: 140). In other words, biopower refers to the techniques used to control all biopolitical features of a population.

The concept of power is intrinsic to Foucault’s thinking and defined as “actions on others’

action” meaning that it is never fixed but an “open strategic game” in a society (Gordon, 1991:

5). The sovereign institution uses its power to improve the conditions for the population which, in turn, also includes averting harm from the outside. In fact, this goes so far as to justify killing anyone or any group that threatens the population’s wealth and well-being. The justification of killing is closely connected to racism as Foucault argues that the state that kills the most is also the most racist (Foucault, 2004: 258). Killing, however, does not only refer to direct murder but includes “[…] exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death, or, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on” (Foucault, 2004: 256). This inclusive conception of killing connected to racism is highly applicable to the analysis of EU migration policies. This thesis advances the argument that by systematically breaching human rights law and exposing migrants to hazardous living situations, the EU exercises biopower over migrants because they

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9 allegedly threaten the population. Before discussing how biopolitics has been used as an analytical lens, I will briefly outline Thanatopolitics as an development of biopolitics.

2.3.2. Thanatopolitics and bare life

In contrast to biopolitics which is concerned with the management of life, Thanatopolitics, as firstly introduced by Agamben, is its “rhetorical counterpart” and concerned with death and who must die (Murray, 2018: 718). In other words, one can speak of Thanatopolitics when “the decision on life becomes a decision on death” (Agamben, 1998: 122). It is therefore a highly relevant theory and a logical addition to biopolitics as a large part of the discussion on migration in the Mediterranean deals with decisions over life and death.

While Foucault understands power as a twofold concept consisting of sovereignty and biopolitics, these are two sides of the same coin for Agamben. Following Agamben, the sovereign has the authority to create a zone of indistinction. The zone of indistinction refers to the margins of society where people do not have access to social and political life but merely exist. Lives in this zone are “lives half lived” (Downey, 2019: 109). Further, the sovereign can declare a state of exception giving the sovereign more rights to address a threat and depriving the individual of his or her rights, including human rights (Downey, 2009: 112). Otherwise unjust measures are hence justifiable by declaring a state of exception. The sovereign's authority goes so far as to decide whose life is worth living and who has to be killed, which is not deemed an unlawful act due to the impunity in the state of exception (Agamben, 1998: 142). This can be applied to migration in the Mediterranean where the EU locates migrants in the zone of indistinction, unable to tell refugees and migrants apart and thus stripping them of their rights.

Therefore, refugees become bare life by the absence of their recognition.

People living under a state of exception in the zone of indistinction are thus reduced to bare life, i.e. merely being alive with no rights and agency and subject to complete political power. The concept of bare life is often applied to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay or refugees.

Migrants or refugees become bare life when “deprived of nation-statehood or sociopolitical identity” (Downey, 2009: 123). When grouped together under the label of a migrant, they therefore represent a mass phenomenon and are no longer perceived as individuals. According to Agamben, states and organizations dealing with migration are “absolutely incapable of resolving the problem and even confronting it adequately” (Agamben, 1998: 133). By framing migration as an exceptional situation, the EU exercises its sovereignty to create a zone of

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10 indistinction in the Mediterranean which justifies border measures like the increased securitization and militarization of border spaces. Subsequently, the EU’s approach to migration requires a combination of biopolitics and Thanatopolitics to adequately account for its complex border security scheme.

Thanatopolitics and its concepts are used in this thesis to analyse how migration is framed by the EU and argue that the EU creates a zone of indistinction where migrants are stripped of their rights to protect its sovereignty and the well-being of the population.

2.3.3. The usage of biopolitics and Thanatopolitics to assess EU migration policies

Biopolitics has become a prominent theory to assess migration policies in academic debates in both migration studies and IR. This section of the literature review will outline how biopolitics is used as an analytical tool. While this section will demonstrate examples of how to apply biopolitics to real-world examples, it will not go into detail of the theoretical discussion. The presented literature will help to develop the methodological approach of this thesis whereas the theoretical background will thoroughly be discussed in the theory section.

Biopolitics is frequently used to assess and explain migration policies. One of the main principles of biopolitics is the distinction between one group (the population) and the “other”

which poses a threat to the population. Othering is a widely used concept in social sciences and is often used to justify or explain exclusionary behaviour and hostility towards a certain group.

In the context of migration policies, the other typically refers to migrants entering the territory of the object of analysis, in this case the EU. Othering irregular migrants as a threat can go so far as to dehumanize and racialize them which can extend to eliminating them as a group (Gebhardt, 2020: 122). Dehumanization can therefore serve as a justification to eliminate or kill a group. In other words, depriving migrants of any humanity and basic human rights, therefore, allows inhumane treatment.

As previously laid out, killing the “other” does not only refer to direct murder but to increasing the risk of death and injury through unsafe living conditions, denying the fulfilment of basic human needs. Further, it also includes social and political death, for example by denying access to local communities, integration measures like language courses etc. Applied to the life of migrants, killing can mean forcing migrants to take high risks due to securitized borders, facilitating inhumane living conditions in camps and denying access to education,

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11 integration, and the labour market. Securitizing highly frequented passages of migration has not led to a decrease of migration but rather has forced migrants to choose more dangerous routes and methods (see Topak, 2014). As the example of the Greece-Turkey border shows, migrants adapt quickly to securitization measures by shifting routes from the Aegean Sea to the Evros region and back to the Aegean Sea when military presence was increased in Evros (Topak, 2014: 824). Similarly, smugglers in the central Mediterranean abandon migrant boats before they reach international waters to avoid being detected by military forces and thereby increasing the risk for migrants (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2018: 192). If state or EU authorities have the main mandate of disrupting smuggling networks and destroying equipment used by smugglers, it increases the risk of death for migrants as smugglers prioritize unsafe rubber dinghies (ibid).

These examples show how biopolitical practices by state and EU forces endanger migrants’

lives. Protecting the integrity of borders and the safety of the (legal) population is worth the deaths of irregularly migrating persons.

2.3.4. Externalization and Delocalization

In this thesis I will use the concepts of externalization and delocalization interchangeably to analyse their predominance in the framing of EU migration policies. While there is no universally fixed definition of externalization, I will briefly operationalize it and explain its usage in this section.

While the internal dimension of migration focuses on issues such as integration or relocation of migrants, the external dimension is concerned with the protection of external borders, readmission schemes, or the migration-development nexus. Additionally, a major focus advocated by the EU and member states is to tackle the root causes of migration in countries of origin. Externalization therefore includes “[…] extraterritorial state actions to prevent migrants, including asylum seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories of destination countries [...] or making them legally inadmissible without individually considering the merits of their protection claims” (Frelick et al., 2016: 193). As the analysis will show, these state actions are often framed in humanitarian terms: by preventing migration movement across the Mediterranean, the EU protects migrants from drowning. Cooperation with countries of origin or transit can be encouraged by offering financial or political incentives.

However, despite its humanitarian framing, externalization measures may increase human

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12 rights violations (Frelick et al., 2016: 197). In the analysis, I will assess how the EU frames its migration policies with regard to externalization and the implications for human rights.

2.3.5. (De)Politicization

There seems to be a disagreement within the literature on whether migration in the EU is a politicized or depoliticized issue. While some argue that it is “[…] the most highly politicized EU policy domain” (Lauwers et al., 2021: 72), others argue that the notion of “management”

has led to the depoliticization of migration (Cuttitta, 2017: 635). Politicizing an issue is closely connected to its conflictual character and whether it is open for criticism and debate.

Securitizing migrants is a recent example of adding to the politicization of the issue as it sparked controversial public debate in Europe.

Taking the conflictual character out of an issue and not questioning it, in turn, depoliticizes it. If migration is framed in technical terms as an issue to be managed, “[…]

policies would not result from political choices, but from ‘technical’ considerations and informal decision-making processes on the most appropriate and successful way of addressing migration” (Geiger & Pecoud, 2010: 11). An example of a depoliticizing measure is the migration-development nexus which has arguably contributed to turning the discussion into a more technical one. By combining both policy areas, migration has become less controversial and therefore politicized (Lauwers et al., 2021: 87).

In how far the EU depoliticizes, or wants to depoliticize, migration is one of the subjects of analysis in this thesis. Further, I will analyse the role of non-state actors and in how far they contribute to (de)politicization measures. Based on preliminary research on migration and the EU, the working hypothesis of this thesis is that the EU turns the debate into a more technical discussion by referring to numbers and quotas rather than the fates and deaths of people. In contrast, non-state actors try to counter this by emphasising the human side of migration.

3. Methods

As shown in the previous sections, scholars have assessed EU migration policies from different angles, including with a focus on the humanitarian dimension or the role biopolitics plays in the construction of EU discourse. The aim of this thesis is to explore the framing of migration in

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13 the EU with regards to how the EU portrays itself and its actions at external borders. To answer this thesis’ research question how does the EU discursively frame migration and how does the discourse correspond with the EU’s actions in the Mediterranean?, a combination of methods of textual analysis has been chosen and is presented in this methods section. By combining coding as part of a content analysis and CDA, I expect to get insights into how the EU is steering the discourse of migration in more general terms and how the type of language the EU consciously employs to present itself in relation to migration/migrants.

As a first step in the analysis, I have coded speeches and documents produced by the EU as part of a content analysis. The selection of data and coding categories are outlined in the next section. Drawing on the findings from the content analysis I have further conducted a CDA to make sense of the language employed by the EU in the discourse about migration. Thereby, the EU serves as the object of analysis. By choosing an interpretivist approach, I expect to gain insights into how the EU frames migration and its own policies and which themes dominate the discourse. The analysis will also refer to the relationship between the EU and migrants with regard to the structure and agency debate. Additionally, Foucault was a famous discourse analyst himself which provides a relevant link between the ontological and methodological approach of this thesis. The first part of this methods section, outlines the approach to content analysis and CDA before addressing issues of data selection and limitations of this research.

3.1. Content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA)

As previously mentioned, the first step of the analysis after carefully selecting relevant data sources was to view all data and code their content according to mentioned themes using the software NVivo. While starting with a list of codes expected to be found, the list has been modified during the coding process and thereby used a combination of deductive and inductive coding, for example by introducing sub-codes to increase the accuracy of the coding.

Combining both approaches to coding further increases the validity and decreases the researcher’s bias. Being transparent in the research process and coding also increases the research’s reproducibility and subsequently its reliability (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 356). The final list of codes consists of 16 codes and three sub-codes:

1. Border protection and security a. Pushbacks

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14 2. Crisis

3. Deportation/returns

4. European norms and values 5. External dimension

a. Development assistance b. Root causes

6. Frontex

7. Human rights/international law 8. Internal dimension

9. Legal vs illegal migration 10. Mediterranean

11. Migration as a normal social/historical aspect of life 12. Migration “management”

13. Safety and protection of migrants 14. Security (threat)

15. Skilled migration

16. Solidarity and shared responsibility among member states

The results of the coding process will be presented in the analysis section of this thesis and is used to guide the research. In other words, coding was used to get a general overview over prominent topics within the discourse and thereafter select foci for the afterwards conducted CDA.

In contrast to a content analysis, CDA explores “[…] the relationship of a text to its context (its source, message, channel, intended audience, connection to other texts and events), as well as the broader relations of power and authority which shape that context” (Halperin &

Heath, 2017: 335). Ontologically, CDA and most theories using CDA as a method, assume that meaning, as well as rules, values, and norms, is not given but socially constructed through discourse which is closely connected to issues of power (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 343).

Powerful persons or institutions are able to shape the discourse and thereby produce truths that become universally accepted. Conducting a CDA can therefore tell us about existing power relations and power abuse, but also about resistance against such abuse. Power as understood by Foucault is not interchangeable with force, meaning that no one has constant power (MacDonald, 2003: 33). According to Foucault, these truths are always under (re)construction.

(Re)constructed truths equal knowledge and are therefore not an object but a process (ibid).

Moreover, a discourse analysis can analyse how an actor, in this case the EU, constructs an argument but cannot determine the true intents and thoughts behind it (Schneider, 2013).

(Critical) discourse analysis is a prominent method in studies on migration policies. By analysing the wording of laws and EU documents with regard to externalization and

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15 humanitarianism, Cuttitta (2018) shows how the EU constructs a discourse that legitimizes practices of externalization. Human rights were mainly used as a rhetorical means and instrumentalized by the EU to stop migrants from crossing the Mediterranean (Cuttitta, 2018:

792f). In fact, these findings are supported by Pastore and Roman (2020) arguing that the main focus of EU migration policies is externalization without accounting for the needs and agency of migrants and countries of origin or transit. While their research focuses on Tunisia and the role of Tunisian civil society actors, this thesis will analyse the EU’s discursive framing on migration in the Mediterranean.

The analysis of this thesis will explore how the EU constructs the discourse around migration without drawing conclusions regarding the EU’s rationale or motives behind it. In the next section, I will discuss the data selection and limitations of this research.

3.2. Data selection and limitations

The EU is a complex institution made up of many different agencies which makes it difficult to identify a coherent narrative that applies to the EU as a whole. In order to circumvent this difficulty, this thesis draws on different data sources produced by the EU to get a more holistic insight into the EU’s position. All data used in this thesis are publicly available and were selected as follows. Using the advanced search option at the online press corner of the European Commission, I selected speeches, statements, and press releases starting in January 2019 until March 2021. This time frame was selected to limit the quantity of data to a reasonable amount that can be reasonably managed and analysed as part of a bachelor’s thesis. Further, choosing recently published documents increases the research’s relevance. The chosen documents were selected by searching for relevant keywords and policy areas which include inter alia

“migration”, “refugees”, “Frontex”, “borders”, and “Mediterranean”. This process resulted in a total of nine statements and press releases and ten speeches by high-ranking EU officials, for example by the Commission’s president von der Leyen, European Commissioner for Home Affairs Johansson, and the Commission’s vice president Schinas. By selecting speeches by publicly well-known EU representatives in high-ranking positions, the intended target audience can be expected to be the general European public and in particular European politicians.

Further, it can be expected that the selected persons represent the EU’s position rather than their personal opinion as they serve as authoritative sources. By combining different data sources, I

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16 anticipate an increased internal validity as they reflect a comprehensive approach that allows me to gain a holistic understanding of the EU’s discourse in regard with migration.

However, one must bear in mind that the EU might not be entirely transparent in its speech act which is demonstrated in the differences between the EU’s discourse and practice that will be highlighted in the analysis. While qualitative analyses tend to have a lower external validity and reproducibility, transparency of the coding and analysis process shall compensate that.

Furthermore, the total number of 19 EU data sources increases the internal validity of this research as it allows the identification of the broader discourse (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 149).

4. Analysis

In order to answer this thesis’ research question how does the EU discursively frame migration and how does the discourse correspond with the EU’s actions in the Mediterranean?, the analysis of the selected data will now be conducted following the structure laid out in the previous methods section. The analysis is structured as follows. Firstly, I will present the findings of the content analysis which will provide an overview over dominant themes in the EU discourse. Afterwards, the CDA will shed light on the general framing of migration by the EU with a special focus on the use of externalization and depoliticization measures and how the discourse is informed by biopolitics. In a later step, I will analyse the role of human rights in speeches by EU officials and explore whether there are discrepancies between the discourse and the actual conduct at the EU’s external borders.

The analysis is guided by two hypotheses: firstly, I expect the discourse to argue for strong external border management to guarantee free movement within the Schengen area and I expect the discourse to include humanitarian notions and references to human rights and international law as the EU is often perceived as a normative actor. After conducting the analysis, I will refer back to these assumptions and compare them to the actual findings of the research.

4.1. Content analysis

As previously stated in the methods section, the first step in the analysis after carefully selecting the material is to code it using the software NVivo. This is done to identify major trends within the discourse that will provide the focus of analysis for the CDA. The coding categories were

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17 chosen deductively, following general expectations following the public debate and conducting the literature review, and inductively to include issues that arose during the analysis. The results of the coding process can be seen in Figure 1 which illustrates the number of references made for each category.

Coding the data sources has produced four major themes with over 30 references each:

deportation or returns, solidarity and shared responsibility among member states, external dimension, and border protection and security (see Figure 1). The internal dimension was only mentioned 15 times showing that the main focus of the EU is to prevent migrants from arriving at its borders by externalization, border protection and effectively facilitating returns rather than on integration measures. Little attention is given to how the EU wishes to deal with migrants that have already entered EU territory and have a right to stay. Another main issue area that is constantly emphasized in the discourse is the solidarity among member states. Countries like Spain, Italy, and Greece receive the highest number of arriving migrants due to their geographic location and often feel disadvantaged and disregarded by the EU. While EU officials in 16 out of 19 speeches mention this issue, it has not been addressed properly yet. However, the new pact on migration and asylum introduces shared responsibility based on return sponsorship.

While this would certainly lead to financial relief in countries of first arrival, it does not encompass mandatory relocation and integration measures for migrants. The issue of solidarity among member states will be discussed further as part of the CDA.

On the other hand, the coding categories with least references are Frontex, pushbacks, crisis, root causes, Mediterranean and security threat with less than five references each. This is surprising because the main route of migration is through the Mediterranean. In the first four months of 2021 alone over 18 000 migrants arrived by sea compared to less than 2000 land arrivals (UNHCR, 2021). Most of them took the central Mediterranean route towards Italy and Malta or the Western route towards Spain. Further, 599 deaths were recorded in the Mediterranean in 2021 (as of 03/05/2021) while the estimated number of unrecorded cases is much higher (IOM, 2021). While there has been a decline in the number of deaths in the time frame January 1st until May 3rd since 2015, the number rose from 278 in 2020 to 599 in 2021 (ibid). It is therefore surprising that this is not one of the main issues of concern for the EU.

Additionally, Frontex receives great attention in the European media but very little in speeches by EU officials. This result bears the question whether the EU, or certain politicians, distance themselves from the negative news coverage of Frontex. While it is impossible to uncover the true reasoning behind this, it is worth mentioning it.

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18 The little use of phrases like “crisis” or “security threat” is not surprising and might be strategic as these words are typically employed by far-right European parties from which the EU wishes to distance itself. In the instances in which the word crisis is mentioned, it is used to refer to the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 or to EU policies providing a crisis response. The limited usage of language related to crises and threats by the EU can be expected and would more likely be found in an analysis of the framing of migration on the national and regional level in member states where far-right populist movements are more present.

4.2. How does the EU frame migration?

After outlining the results of the content analysis, a general assessment of the EU’s framing of migration based on the CDA laid out in the methods section will now be conducted. In this section, I will firstly address the differentiation between legal and illegal migration before analysing the framing of border security.

In 2020, the European Commission introduced the New Pact on Migration and Asylum which sought to renew the current migration regime. It is based on the six pillars of strong external borders, more effective procedures, solidarity, skilled migration, international partnerships, and flexibility and resilience (European Commission, 2020a). The document also includes so-called return sponsorships, meaning that countries cannot be forced to accept a

Figure 1

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19 quota of migrants, but can instead provide financial and bureaucratic support for the return of irregular migrants. Thereby, countries of first entry are supported while no one is forced to accept migrants based on a quota.

Generally, it can be said that the EU makes a stark differentiation between legal or skilled migration and irregular migration. This includes asylum seekers since they cannot claim asylum from outside the EU, but have to enter the territory first. Legal migration is very welcome and encouraged by the EU, claiming that it is necessary to fill gaps in the labour market and attract international talents (Johansson, 2020a). This, however, implies that migration is linked to productivity and that only people contributing to the economy are welcome “[…] to realise their potential in our societies” (Von der Leyen, 2020a). Even though the EU is encouraging legal migration, the discourse seems fairly cautious of overly optimistic formulations. As the Commission’s president von der Leyen (2020a) said, migration “[…] brings new talent to our countries, when well managed”. The notion of management in connection to migration can be explained as being a measure of depoliticization which will further be discussed later in the analysis section.

While legal migration is mostly welcomed by the EU, irregular migration is deemed unacceptable. This is evident by the predominance of returns in the EU discourse (see Figure 1), including encouraging voluntary returns. In a speech, Commissioner Johansson (2020a) argued that “[…] sometimes in a debate we try to make a link between migration and crisis. But most of the migrants that come to the European Union come here legally”, implying that it would be wrong to associate legal migration with a crisis. This leaves room for interpretation whether illegal migration in turn is linked to a crisis. Further, she argued that irregular arrivals are a problem. Framing the lives of people fleeing their homes as a “problem to be solved”

discursively dehumanizes migrants. Creating a contrast between people having the right to reside in the EU and people staying in the EU illegally, i.e. committing a crime, together with a dehumanizing discourse can be understood as part of a biopolitical discourse. Irregular migrants are framed as people with limited rights and hence are “othered”. As presented in the theory section of this thesis, othering is often used as an instrument to justify exclusionary behaviour and hostility towards a certain group, in this case irregular migrants. This can go so far as to deprive migrants of their rights because they are framed as irregular or illegal migrants.

They are thus reduced to bare life, i.e. merely existing without access to legal protection or participation in social and political life. However, this is rather implicit in the EU discourse.

How migrants are othered as part of a biopolitical discourse will be analysed in more depth later.

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20 Another dominant theme in the general EU discourse on migration is border security.

Throughout all analysed speeches and documents, having a secure and robust external border is mentioned as one of the main aspects of migration policies. Having strong external borders is often mentioned in connection with open borders within the European Schengen area and that the freedom of Schengen must be protected by securing external borders. In a speech at the Schengen Forum, Commissioner Johansson (2020b) discussed the importance of strong borders, followed by the demand to effectively fight crime and terrorism. In the next sentence, Johansson referred to the management of asylum and migration. Without explicitly correlating these issues, a link was created by mentioning borders, terrorism, and migration in the same breath. Thereby, Johansson discursively linked migration to crime without explicitly saying so and leaving it to the audience to draw the connection. However, a report published by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) clearly stated that “there are no signs of systematic use of irregular migration by terrorist organisations” (Europol, 2020:

33). Similarly, Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, said that migratory and security challenges must be met with a common response (European Commission, 2019). Again, there was no causal relation between security and migration but a discursive link. These findings indicate that migration and security concerns may be connected.

A discourse analysis, however, is not capable of identifying true intentions behind the discourse but rather “[…] seeks to expose connections between language, power and ideology” (Halperin

& Heath, 2017: 338). The EU and its officials whose speeches are the subject of analysis of this thesis are undoubtedly very powerful actors and are therefore able to control and stir the public discourse. Talking about migration and crime shortly after one another can thus be seen as a tool to influence the audience’s perception and control the discourse. Furthermore, connecting irregular migration with cross-border crime can also serve as a justification of stricter security measures. Arguing that large sums of money are invested to deter crime seems a more reasonable argument than saying that these measures are needed to stop people on the move with the intention of applying for asylum.

In order to be able to conduct a meaningful analysis, I have divided this section into the prior introduced concepts externalization and depoliticization. In the following, I will use these concepts to explore the EU’s discourse of migration before further investigating the role of human rights.

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4.2.1. Externalization

In this section of the analysis, I will analyse externalization strategies employed by the EU to manage migration and how they are framed discursively. Externalization was chosen as a concept due to its prominence both in secondary literature as well as in EU speeches and documents as the content analysis has shown. Firstly, I will re-introduce the concept and then analyse its presence and framing in the selected data.

As stated in the theory section, externalization is aimed at preventing migrants from entering the territory of the EU and can include a wide variety of measures such as “securitized naval operations, detention, readmission agreements and deportation and export of control infrastructures, but also humanitarian evacuations, asylum processing, humanitarian aid and refugee camps” (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2019: 253). Additionally, the external dimension of migration includes facilitating (voluntary) returns, border security, and development assistance aimed at addressing the root causes of migration. The reasons for employing externalization measures are diverse, but are often related to “[…] longer-standing diplomatic tensions about European responsibility for those rescued at sea, and states’ refusal to allow migrants to disembark on their territories” (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2019: 255). In other words, rather than arguing about internal dimensions and (legal) conflicts between member states, the EU wants to prevent migratory movements towards Europe in the first place. This also includes the migration of asylum seekers as it is not possible to distinguish between refugees and migrants when they are not subject to fair procedures.

Externalization strategies are very prominent in the EU’s discourse on migration. These bilateral partnerships with countries of origin and transit are based on financial and political support by the EU and can include “[…] development cooperation, investment and trade, employment, visa policy, education and research” (Schinas, 2020). An important observation in the discourse is the constant assurance that these partnerships are sustainable and beneficial for the partner countries. However, it bears the question whether the EU’s objective is to help and support third countries or if it is taking advantage of its privileged position to advance the EU’s own interests by using others. The framing of these externalization measures remains very positive throughout the discourse: “Since 2015, we have dedicated over 9 billion euros to supporting refugees and migrants outside the EU, providing life-saving assistance to millions of vulnerable people, supporting host communities, and fostering sustainable, development- oriented solutions” (Schinas, 2020). Commission president von der Leyen (2020a) argues that migration management begins in countries of origin and has to be mutually beneficial. This

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22 bears the question if the EU would continue to invest large sums of money in partner countries if it was not linked to measures to reduce migration towards Europe which provides the opportunity for further research (see Cuttitta, 2018: 787).

Externalization strategies are often justified by humanitarian reasons as providing better opportunities for people in their home countries or protecting migrants from dangerous and often deadly journeys. Within the EU discourse, there is a consensus that smugglers are directly responsible for migrants’ deaths which is why their business model must be disrupted by stopping migration before it can begin. Furthermore, research has shown that highly securitized and militarized borders by the EU do not stop migration but increase the risk of death and injury for migrants (Gebhardt, 2020: 126; Topak, 2014: 822). In fact, smugglers have adapted their behaviour to the presence of EU forces in the Mediterranean which increases the risk for migrants by choosing cheaper rubber dinghies and abandoning migrants’ boats before reaching international waters (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2018: 192). As the analysis of EU documents shows, the EU adopts a very strict and securitized attitude towards smugglers (“it is organised crime”) while at the same time stressing that “we must preserve the right to asylum and improve the situation of refugees” (von der Leyen, 2019). When migrants are framed as victims of smugglers with no agency, it further reproduces images of non-Western countries as not caring about human rights and the EU as the saviour which fosters neo-colonial power relations (Cuttitta, 2018: 788). In reality, it is not easy to distinguish between refugees and smugglers when both arrive in the same boat. Migrants are thus often subject to capture and biopolitical identification techniques to separate the migrant in need from the criminal smuggler. However, in EU documents, “[…] the migrant is featured at the same time as the victim to be rescued (from the waters or from smugglers and traffickers) and as the subject who could actually be a concealed terrorist” which leads to further stigmatization (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2018: 191). In fact, using humanitarian reasons to justify externalization measures serves as a “discursive legitimation [...] of exclusionary policies and practices and to a symbolically and legally subordinate inclusion of migrants in the European space” (Cuttitta, 2018: 783). In other words, externalization further enhances the legal subordination of migrants and thus reinforces the zone of indistinction where the EU locates migrants which is justified by discursively framing the migrant other as a threat to the well-being of the population.

Another aspect of externalization concerns SAR operations in the Mediterranean. After the discontinuation of operation Sophia, the new Eunavfor med operation Irini was launched in 2020 and is patrolling the Central Mediterranean with the main mandate to enforce the UN’s arms embargo against Libya. Operation Irini is just one of many consecutive military operations

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23 by the EU in the Mediterranean and has been criticized for not having a clear SAR mandate.

While operation Sophia did have SAR as a secondary task, operation Irini does not and was deployed in an area far away from the usual migration routes departing in Libya. There is thus no European naval mission operating near migration routes departing from Libya which increases the danger for migrants. Secondary mandates of operation Irini include preventing petroleum exports, “capacity building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea; contributes to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks” (EEAS, 2020). The Libyan coast guard has been heavily criticized for being involved in illegal pullbacks of migrants (Cuttitta, 2017: 648; Statewatch, 2020). Pullbacks refer to state forces returning migrants to their own territory from international waters or even the territorial waters of another state. By providing assistance to the controversial Libyan coast guard, the EU is responsible for returning migrants to a country where they are confronted with gross human rights violations. As a report by Amnesty International shows, human rights violations in Libya include “unlawful killings; enforced disappearances; torture and other ill-treatment; rape and other sexual violence; arbitrary detention; and forced labour and exploitation at the hands of state and non-state actors in a climate of near-total impunity”

(Amnesty International, 2020). It is therefore questionable in how far the EU can distance itself from the involvement in these human rights violations. The framing of human rights in the EU discourse on migration and its involvement in unlawful practices will be analysed in-depth later in this thesis.

4.2.2. (De)Politicization

This section analyses the EU discourse on migration with regards to its depoliticizing character.

As discussed in the theory section, depoliticizing an issue means to accept the framework as a status quo with no room for disagreement, conflict, and antagonism (Cuttitta, 2017: 635).

Further, it turns the discussion into something technical, i.e. a problem that has to be dealt with in the most effective way. In the case of migration policies, there seems to be a consensus among the EU to talk about migration in terms of management. As Commission president von der Leyen (2020a) argued, migration “brings new talent to our countries, when well managed”.

Together with a statement by the European Commission (2020b: 1) (“With a well-managed system, migration can contribute to growth, innovation and social dynamism”), this resembles a rational cost and benefit calculation on which measures the EU should implement to benefit

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24 the most from migration. In the same statement, it is argued that managing legal migration should “match people, skills and labour market needs”, supporting the argument of the discussion being a cost and benefit calculation. Continually “framing migration as something to be managed contributes to its depoliticized character” (Cuttitta, 2017: 635). Thereby, the human variable is completely left out of the equation and the discussion is depoliticized through its technical nature.

Moreover, migration is often framed as a challenge, i.e. something that has to be controlled and handled carefully. While challenges can be positive, framing arriving migrants as a challenge has negative connotations. Policies to address this challenge have to be structured and organized (European Commission, 2020c) which further reinforces the depoliticized character of the discussion. This is supported by the vague and technical claim that cooperation measures with third countries should be “[…] applied through a four-tier access model which includes: measures in third countries, measures with neighbouring third countries, border control measures and measures within the Schengen area” (European Commission, 2019). It remains unclear what exactly these measures entail, whether they are mutually beneficial, and in how far third countries are involved in the process. Furthermore, there seems to be no room for disagreement and debate.

These examples show the efforts by the EU to depoliticize migration which might be a politicized act in itself. The motives behind this, however, remain uncertain. Border security and migration management are based on rational analyses of risks, but it is unclear whether this is because EU institutions believe this to be the best and fairest way or if depoliticization is a disguised goal. Yet, what is clear, is that EU institutions and Frontex invest “highly in presenting its role in a scientific and politically impartial fashion” (Paul, 2018: 233).

4.2.3. The biopolitical/thanatopolitical discourse of migration

This section of the analysis will shed light on the extent to which biopolitical practices are part of the EU discourse on migration, implicitly and explicitly.

The basic assumption of biopolitics is to manage and protect the well-being of the (legal) population whereas Thanatopolitics emphasizes death and the sovereign’s power to decide who has to die. In the case of migration, the population can be protected from the threat migrants pose by implementing measures to control the influx of migrants. Following the logic of biopolitics, “[…] those who do not manage to migrate regularly are, thus, threatening Europe’s

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25 health and welfare not only physically but also socio-politically, economically, and morally”

(Gebhardt, 2020: 121). This constructed threat can be used to justify extreme measures taken to protect the population from the threat. In the most extreme cases, biopolitics is even used to justify genocides. As the prior analysis of the EU’s discourse on migration has shown, migrants are often dehumanized, migration is depoliticized, and Europe is presented as a space that should be protected from irregular migrants. Therefore, “[…] the exclusion and control of immigrants are adjudged as necessary measures to ensure the safety and survival of the social body. For example, deportation helps to eliminate illegal immigrants, and serves as a deterrent to other potential asylum seekers and undocumented migrants” (Apatinga, 2020: 41f).

Furthermore, Commissioner Johansson (2020b) links the right to claim asylum with having strong borders. A cooperation with the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights shall ensure that no pushbacks take place to protect international law. This, however, does not correspond with current realities. Greek authorities and Frontex are continually accused of conducting, or being involved in, pushbacks in the Aegean Sea (Lüdke, 2011). Additionally, through intensified cooperation with the Libyan coast guard, as laid out in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the EU is helping Libya to facilitate pullbacks of migrant boats in the central Mediterranean. These EU measures are implemented under the veil of protecting migrants from smugglers and therefore protecting their human rights. Yet, research has shown that border protection measures create biopolitical spaces and do not prevent migrant mobility but increase the risk for migrants as they search for ways to circumvent border security measures (Topak, 2014: 830). At the borders of the EU, mostly in the Mediterranean, “[…] borderzones are spaces where sovereign practices prevail over human rights and migrants are left to die” (ibid). By exercising its sovereignty, the Mediterranean becomes a zone of indistinction where migrants’

lives are reduced to bare life.

Another cornerstone of the recently introduced pact on migration are mandatory screening processes, including biometrical identification and health and security checks for all arrivals (European Commission, 2020b: 4). These identification processes are clear examples of biopolitical practices in action. After the screening process, persons arriving from a country with a low acceptance rate for asylum claims (less than 20%) enter border procedures that decide in twelve weeks whether asylum can be granted (Johansson, 2020a). These decisions, solely based on a person’s nationality, jeopardize the right for a fair and transparent decision.

It can also be questioned if the capacities of the authorities will be sufficient to guarantee decisions within twelve weeks.

Between discourse and practice