“We will become a people when…” A normative discussion of self-determination, secession and Palestine

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“We will become a people when…”

A normative discussion of self-determination, secession and

Palestine

Marie Lulu Skautrup

Human Rights

Bachelor-level, Thesis 15 ECTS

Spring 2019

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Abstract

Self-determination as a concept within political philosophy has developed exponentially in the last few decades. This thesis maps the most prominent conceptions and establishes three main arguments. Firstly, that self-determination is a universal right for all self-identified peoples. Secondly, that secession should not be universal, but instead is dependent on the level of cohesiveness of a given people, as well as historical or contemporary injustice. Third, that while Palestine does have a right to secession, there is a risk of neglecting the refugees and their right of return in the quest for statehood. Alternatives to secession, i.e. power-sharing solutions, are discussed as well, and applied to Palestine. Critiques of nationalism, intergenerational justice and group rights are evaluated as well.

Key words: self-determination, secession, injustice, Palestine, power-sharing Word count: 13,815

“(We will become a people when) the Palestinian only remembers his flag on the football pitch, at camel races, and on the day of the Nakba” (2009).

The title is an excerpt from the poem “If we want to” by Mahmoud Darwish, the Palestinian “national poet”.

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Abbreviations

ICCPR = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights OPT = Occupied Palestinian Territories

PA/PNA = Palestinian National Authority – PA is most common PLO = Palestinian Liberation Organisation

UN = United Nations

UNESCO = United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UDHR = Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Terms and definitions

Palestine

Nakba = Arabic for catastrophe, the term used by especially Palestinians and other Arab

peoples to describe the 1948 expulsion and massacres of the Arab population of Palestine, as well as the demolition of their villages. Commemorated on the 15 May.

PA vs. PLO vs. Fatah = there are several overlaps between these three entities. Simplified, the

PA is the current governing body of Palestine, essentially replacing the PLO after the Oslo Accords. The PLO is a multi-party organisation, including political parties such as Fatah and the PLFP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Mahmoud Abbas is the President of the PA, as well as the Chairman of both Fatah and the PLO, and thus they are easily confused, but they are different. The one most relevant to this thesis is the PA, as the representative body of Palestine, and the PLO is important historically and thus referred to in the Historical background section.

Statehood and secession

Existing state vs. new state vs. former state = existing state refers to the state that a people

secedes or gains autonomy from. The new state refers to the state created through secession. Former state refers to the state that the territory of the new state used to belong to.

National community vs. people = there is some discussion as to whether one should use either

of these terms. While the former is less ambiguous, it could put an unnecessary pressure on the “nation” element, and, as will be discussed, nationalism. People, however, has a more ambiguous meaning, but as it is the word used in UN conventions, it will be used in the analysis

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6 section. Some scholars prefer the term national communities and thus it is used to reflect their perceptions in the literature review section.

Referencing – conventions and UN Documents

All UN resolutions will be referenced with the format A/RES for the General Assembly and SC/RES for the Security Council.

Conventions and the UN Charter will be referenced to as their abbreviation (as mentioned above), followed by the article number.

Otherwise, the Harvard referencing system will be used throughout, with author, year and page number in brackets. Footnotes will be used for additional information, e.g. examples or clarifications that do not otherwise fit in the main text.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Great War and the consequent “redrawing of Europe”, self-determination has been at the centre of decolonisation movements, post-Cold War independence and the fight for autonomy for indigenous peoples. Grounded in ideas of anti-colonialism, personal liberty and the emancipation of oppressed peoples, it holds intrinsic values for minorities worldwide.

Self-determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter and the two international covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR), remains a relatively underdeveloped soft law-principle in international law, but has gotten significant attention in the last few decades within political philosophy. Mapping a general understanding of the concept in political philosophy is a challenge, but overall, human rights and justice, even in different understandings, remains consistent principles throughout.

As a group right, self-determination includes several contradictions, because the protection of the group sometimes risks allowing for the oppression of the individual. For that reason, self-determination must be seen as an extension of personal liberty – if human beings are free to pursue their own happiness, they must be free to determine the collective in which they will do so.

Self-determination relates to secession, as the latter is commonly understood to be an extension of the former. Whereas there are many self-determination claims that could justify a right to secession, in many cases, a right to limited autonomy is more stable and just.

Both self-determination and secession are controversial in the case of Palestine, because of the relationship with Israel, the increasingly ineffective PA and the neglect of the refugees in return for state-building.

Self-determination could for many reasons be central to solving and understanding several issues in Palestine, including but not limited to the initial expulsion in 1948, the border wall, Israeli settlements, the Israeli annexation of Palestinian territory, the lack of control of East Jerusalem, the occupation, even the split between Gaza and the West Bank. Respect for Palestinian self-determination and human rights are crucial to a solution to the conflict and remedying injustices.

One of the harder tasks with writing this type of academic paper is the avoidance of politics, i.e. succeeding in assessing a scientific problem, rather than a political one. Especially when discussing such a complex issue as Palestine, where political will and action (or lack thereof) are in fact the keys to much of the injustice at play, scientific objectivity is both

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8 extremely important and extremely difficult to keep. I hope that it shows that I have done my best to stay objective (even if perfect objectivity is unrealisable in social sciences).

In this thesis, I will investigate the various understandings of what rights to self-determination and secession should entail and who can claim them, using the example of Palestine throughout. As such, this will be a normative thesis and the structure will therefore be a little different. As will be explained further in the “Method, theory and material” section, both method and theory are implicit in the analysis. Following this introduction section, there will be a review of previous research, called the Literature review, followed by the Analysis section consisting of argumentation for a theory of self-determination and secession. My main arguments will relate to the universality of self-determination and the non-universality of secession, as well as a discussion of possible just solutions for Palestine.

The analysis will be followed by a Conclusion, including reflections on possible further research and the perceived contribution to the field of human rights, specifically to self-determination and secession scholarship.

1.2 Aim and main arguments

The aim of this thesis is to elucidate the moral understanding of self-determination of peoples, whether that be from the basis of nationalism, ethnicity or more fluid criteria such as self-identification. I aim to understand the justice-based conceptions of secession and display the intricateness of colonialism, self-determination and continued injustice. I aim to contribute to a broader understanding of these factors, specifically the role they play in Palestine.

As this thesis looks at a normative issue of what a right to self-determination and a right to secession should entail, I will approach it through arguments rather than a research question as such. There will be three main arguments:

1. Self-determination is a universal right for all self-identified peoples

2. The right to secession is not universal, nor accompanying the right to self-determination, but is reliant on other factors. Self-determination thus entails various levels of autonomy.

3. While Palestine has a right to self-determination and secession based on the conception of these presented here, the neglect of the refugees should not be accepted in return for a state. Other state-solutions should thus be considered.

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1.3 Relevance to the study of human rights

The connection between this thesis and the study of human rights rests on several factors. Firstly, and most obviously, self-determination is a right enshrined in two major human rights conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Additionally, as will be discussed in the next chapter, self-determination is core to the discussion of group rights as a part of human rights. Secession and autonomy will also be presented as rights with corresponding duty-bearers. A differentiation between these as claim and liberty rights will also be made.

Secondly, self-determination being a right of peoples brings into question an important issue in international human rights: the protection of people over governments. If people are the holders of self-determination, that gives way for a more human rights-focused understanding of sovereignty and statehood. It is based on a democratic understanding of autonomy of peoples, as well as personal liberty.

Third, the discussion on secession in the Analysis chapter is related to intergenerational and retributive justice, which can be related to principles in human rights, such as equality, liberty and, of course, self-determination. As such, retributive justice acts as a remedy for previous injustices, that are often closely related to human rights principles – e.g. forceful displacement is a violation of freedom of movement (ICCPR, art. 12) and genocide is a violation of the right to life. Justice, human rights, and humanitarian law are interrelated in the context of self-determination and secession.

Lastly, the case used, i.e. Palestine, is in many ways a human rights issue. Whereas there are multiple, complex issues of political character that cannot be discussed here, understanding the situation in Palestine and the lack of justice, from a human rights approach, is extremely relevant.

1.4 Delimitations

Self-determination and secession include many elements and only a limited number of these can be assessed here. While it is impossible to account for every possible perspective that is left out of this thesis, I will outline a few of the (to me) most obvious ones.

Firstly, I will, to the best of my ability, avoid delving into the political issues at play in Palestine, especially when it relates to Israel. I take a few things for granted: both Israel and Palestine (or rather, the Israelis and the Palestinians) have a right to self-determination; Israel

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10 disrespects the Palestinian self-determination claim through the occupation and the annexation of Palestinian land; and lastly, Palestine is not, at present, a fully functioning state.

I will, as such, not discuss the legal status of Palestine. A full thesis could be written on the implications of contested statehood, limited recognition and the Montevideo statehood criteria – this is not the focus here, but rather the implications of self-determination as a right. Still, some discussion of versions of autonomy and one-, two- or three-state solutions will take place as a reflection before the conclusion.

Secondly, whereas this will involve a specific discussion of sovereignty and statehood issues for Palestine, it will not include a general discussion of the meaning of these terms. Sovereignty should generally be understood as popular sovereignty, but I prefer terms such as non-domination and territorial integrity, as the nature of sovereignty is itself contested.

Lastly, whereas there will be some mention of territorial rights when it relates to secession, I will not include an elaborate discussion of what the right to a specific territory entails. Whereas territorial rights are relevant to self-determination and secession claims in general, the situation in Palestine is a lot more complex than what I find regular theories on territorial rights can embrace. Territory will therefore be mentioned in the context of territorial integrity (sometimes called external sovereignty (Bouris & Kyris, 2017, p. 758)) and as a point of critique of the theory of secession proposed in the analysis section.

1.5 Method, theory and material

As mentioned, this will be a normative thesis, including argumentation. As such, the method is implicit in the analysis section, more as an approach than a method in fact. General rules of argumentation are to be followed throughout, by ensuring balance, fairness and objectivity (see the following subsection) in the arguments. Fallacious reasoning should also be avoided, such as appeals to popularity, tradition and ignorance, as well as genetic fallacies (i.e. rejecting an argument on account of its source alone) (Vaughn, 2006, pp. 86-88).

Generally, the order of the argumentation is through presentation of arguments, followed by critique, followed by counterarguments. The structure will be informal, in that this structure will be implicit in the argumentation: e.g. first, an argument is presented for the universality of self-determination, then a critique, then a counterargument, etc. Major points of critique will be assessed in separate sections, e.g. for the first argument, a major critique is the critique against nationalism. The informal structure of argumentation is based on the structure suggested by Lewis Vaughn (2006, pp. 43, 55).

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11 The theory is similarly implicit, as the research area is self-determination and secession theories themselves. By presenting several perspectives of these two concepts in the literature review and arguing for a specific perspective in the analysis section, the theory will in itself be the area of inquiry throughout.

Additionally, theories of justice are used in the analysis section, including intergenerational and retributive justice. These are accounted for in the analysis section itself.

The main material is reviewed in the following chapter, fittingly called the Literature review. Philosophical texts, including edited volumes, monographs and academic articles, constitute the main material. Additionally, newspaper articles, human rights conventions and other UN documents constitute the remaining material. All sources were assessed for credibility before use.

1.6 Ethical considerations

For the sake of transparency, I find it important to acknowledge that complete objectivity is almost impossible in social sciences, and especially when discussing normative issues such as this one. That being said, I will attempt to present the arguments with as little subjectivity as possible. Though I have my personal political conviction on Palestine, I will strive to avoid any bias. I believe in the need for justice and human rights protections on all sides of the conflict.

I am also aware that critique of Israel is often intertwined with anti-Semitism. While this is in no way my intention – any critique presented of Israel is towards the political actions of the state, not the existence of the state itself or its people – I find it important to acknowledge this fallacy of many anti-Israel movements and I will do my best to avoid replicating it.

I would also like to note that though the intention of this discussion is to establish the normatively right perception of self-determination and secession, I am not alluding that this is an ideal theory. As a Western person, I will do my absolute most to avoid paternalism and other problematic attitudes, since this is, also, a post-colonial issue.

1.7 Chapter outline

This thesis will have six main chapters, with several subsections, followed by a conclusion chapter. The first chapter, Introduction, has included the outlining of the thesis, i.e. an introduction to the research area, the procedure to be used, delimitations and ethical considerations. The second chapter, Literature review, will include a section on the historical background, as well as a mapping of the previous research on self-determination and secession,

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12 as well as common points of critique. The third chapter outlines the three arguments again, before the argumentation begins. The analysis is then split into three chapters, chapters 4, 5 and 6, each assessing a main argument, as listed above. Lastly, there will be a conclusion and some ideas for further research.

2 Literature review

2.1 Historical background

I find it relevant to briefly present the historical contexts of two main concepts: self-determination in general, and Palestinian self-self-determination specifically. Understanding the roots of these concepts will make it easier to follow the argumentation in the following sections from both scholars and myself, as well as place the discussion in a historical framework.

For lack of space, only the most important events will be discussed here, selected on the basis that they relate the most to the research area. Palestinian contemporary history is complex, involving several wars, internal splits and of course its complicated colonial, settlement and occupational relations with Israel, Britain and its Arab neighbours. I do not intend to brush over these situations, or deem them irrelevant, as everything that has happened in Palestine in the last century or so, contributes to the image we have of Palestinian self-determination and in large part, how the Palestinians see themselves.

2.1.1 Self-determination

The concept of self-determination first came into play as a result of rising nationalism in the mid-19th_{century. As majority nationalities (such as French or British) became romanticised in}

culture and politics, minorities began to reflect on their own cultural and political autonomy. Whereas much of the world was under (especially European) imperial rule, self-determination was a principle in which colonised peoples and national minorities gave expression to their hope for independence (Castellino, 2000, p. 12).

The introduction of self-determination as a right is often credited to Woodrow Wilson (president of the United States from 1913-21) and his 1918 Fourteen Point speech, at the end of World War I, in which he endorsed self-determination for the peoples of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, as well as Poland (Castellino, 2000, pp. 13-14). Simultaneously, Vladimir Lenin, as leader of the Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union, is often credited with being the first to endorse universal self-determination, including the constitutional right to secession

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13 for the Soviet republics (ibid., 21-22). The 1945 UN Charter reinstates the principles of equal rights and self-determination as a necessary basis for peaceful and friendly relations among nations (UN Charter, 1945, art. 1 para 2 & art. 55). The right to self-determination of all peoples was endorsed fully in article 1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR (1966).

As a universal human right, self-determination has been implemented and recognised sparsely by the international community. Rather, it remains a tool of separatist and other movements, calling for their right to self-determination, often through secession. The recognition of these self-determination claims varies from case to case – whereas Palestine is in fact recognised by the majority of UN member states, Northern Cyprus (the TRNC) is only recognised by Turkey (Bouris & Kyris, 2017, pp. 759-60). Self-determination claims in legal and political arenas are thus strongly related to other political and/or legal circumstances, such as state sovereignty and diplomatic relations.

2.1.2 Modern history of Palestine: the British Mandate, the State of Israel, and the refugees

The territory now known as Israel and Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. When the Ottoman Empire dissolved in 1918, Britain became the League of Nations mandatory of Palestine. The mandate was made with the intent of establishing “a national home for the Jewish people” in the territory, stating simultaneously that “nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (United Nations, 2016).

The British had promised Arab independence (including Palestinian) in return for the Arab revolt against the Ottomans through the McMahon-Hussein correspondence in 1915-16, yet in 1917, they announced their support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration (United Nations, 2016). The Balfour Declaration and the British commitment to establishing a Jewish state in Palestine was a result of successful advocacy by the Zionist organisation in Europe, and Britain had political interests in the Levant that could thus be fulfilled (United Nations, 1978).

Britain decided to end the mandate in 1948 and the State of Israel was proclaimed. Mass expulsions of non-Jewish inhabitants followed, including the demolition of Palestinian villages and numerous massacres at the hands of the newly established Israeli military. Palestinian Arabs fled to nearby Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, where many of their descendants still live today. The events of 1948 are known as the Nakba (literally meaning catastrophe) to

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14 the Palestinians, and is commemorated annually on 15 May1_{, the day after the Israeli day of}

independence (Bastaki, 2015, p. 86).

Since the Six Day War in 1967, Israel has occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and is the de facto occupying power of Gaza, thus holding the record for longest ongoing occupation, at over 51 years (ibid., 82-83). The Six Day War resulted in an increase of refugees to the immediate neighbourhood, as well as internally displaced people in the Palestinian territories and Israel. The current estimate of the number of Palestinian refugees and internally displaced people is somewhere between 5 and 7 million (ibid., 85).

In 1993 and 1995, the respective Oslo I and Oslo II accords were signed between Israel and the PLO. Oslo I (officially the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Agreements) created limited Palestinian self-government through the PA and called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territory. Oslo II (officially the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) split the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, of which Israel would control Area C (around 60 percent of the West Bank). Neither agreement promised Palestinian statehood, yet the self-government agreement was seen as the beginning of recognition for Palestinian self-determination (United Nations, 2016).

2.1.3 The Palestinian right to self-determination and the right of return

The right of Palestinians to self-determination was first recognised by the UN in 1947, through the adoption of Resolution 181, i.e. the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, in which a proposal for both a Jewish and an Arab state was made (A/RES/181, Part II). Due to civil war, the plan was never implemented, and when the British mandate expired in May 1948, Israel declared statehood, with no mention of a possible Palestinian state (United Nations, 2016).

The UN reaffirmed this right to self-determination in General Assembly Resolution 3236 in 1974 (A/RES/3236), after having recognised the PLO as the representative of Palestinian interests. Since then, Palestinian self-determination has been reaffirmed several times, in UN resolutions, diplomatic correspondence, actions by the EU and many others (Quigley, 2011, p. 752).

The PLO declared an independent Palestinian state in 1988, which has since been recognised by around 130 states (Bouris & Kyris, 2017, p. 763). State-building has been the

1_{The Israeli day of independence follows the Hebrew calendar and the commemoration day shifts from} year to year. The Nakba day follows the Gregorian calendar however and is thus “set” from the European perspective.

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15 main goal for both the PLO, the UN and the EU, and the State of Palestine has observer status at the UN, as well as membership of UNESCO and the Arab League (Al-Shabaka, 2013). The State of Palestine has acceded to several international treaties, including the ICCPR and other human rights conventions (FIDH, 2014). In the eyes of the PA, statehood is crucial, because it would make Palestine a legal and diplomatic equal with Israel (Abbas, 2011). Palestinian statehood is also an issue of justice, something I will return to in later sections.

Innate in the statehood and self-determination question are two obstacles: the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian refugees. Through the occupation, Israel has remained in control of the majority of what is legally Palestinian territory and has, through illegal settlements in the West Bank and the construction of the border wall, effectively annexed a significant amount of Palestinian territory (A/71/554, p. 9). This threatens the viability of a Palestinian state, because territorial integrity is crucial.

The status of the refugees remains controversial. Whereas the right of return was a central point for the PLO from its establishment, the negotiations leading to the Oslo Accords put the refugees aside – the Declaration of Principles states that the refugees would be discussed in the “forthcoming” permanent status negotiations, along with other issues. A permanent status agreement has not been reached at the time of writing (May 2019) (United Nations, 2016).

2.2 Self-determination and secession – intertwined, yet separate

An important distinction should be made between the two main concepts in this thesis, namely self-determination and secession. Whereas they can be confused and are indeed intertwined, they are distinct in some ways. Whereas one can argue that the right to self-determination can exist without the right to secession, a right to secession is usually grounded in a right to self-determination. Self-determination is generally a normative right, that should be realised through other rights, as will be discussed in the analysis section. Secession, on the other hand, has more practical implications, even if the right to secession could still be discussed normatively.

As will be elaborated on in the analysis section, the right to self-determination does not in itself entail a duty for another entity, and can exist irrespective of the power relations in place. Secession and other types of autonomy, however, should create a duty on a previously identified duty-bearer. Thus, secession and other types of autonomy are reflections of the intrinsic right to self-determination of all peoples.

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2.3 Traditional approaches to self-determination

2.3.1 Classical vs. secessionist

Martti Koskenniemi identifies two main conceptions of self-determination in international law, classical/patriotic and secessionist (Koskenniemi, 1994, pp. 245-247).

The classical model of self-determination, also called the patriotic one, relates to a Hobbesian conception of the nation as a state, i.e. that to avoid bellum omnium (war of all against all, ed.) human communities must be channelled into formally organised states (ibid., p. 249). Self-determination acts as a justification for sovereignty and statehood as the centre of the international order (ibid., p. 245).

The secessionist model of self-determination states that self-determination is expressed through “the existence and free cultivation of an authentic communal feeling, a togetherness, a sense of being "us" among the relevant group”. The focus is less on how people are organised and more on why. It is called the secessionist model, because the value-laden conception of self-determination means that in some cases, secession is a necessity, and should be a right (ibid., p. 246-247).

2.3.2 Colonialism and self-determination

One of the strongest legal conceptions of self-determination relates to colonialism – as mentioned previously, growing nationalism in colonised countries meant the appeal to self-determination on the basis of shared culture and history, as well as arguments from justice (Castellino, 2000, p. 12). Thus, self-determination was claimable by colonial peoples specifically. This conception was supported amongst colonised peoples, and further by the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples (ibid., p. 22).

Arguably, this conception is not a separate one, rather it could be defined as a version of the secessionist model, as well as having basis in just-cause theory (on which I will elaborate later), but it is separate in the sense that it for a long time was the main (if not the only) conception of non-classical self-determination in international law (ibid., pp. 7, 24-27). Seeing as the vast majority of formerly colonised peoples now live in independent states2_{, one could}

perhaps see self-determination as a concept of the past (ibid., 7-9). Yet, there are still plenty of

2_{An important exception is of course the indigenous populations of e.g. Australia and Canada. These} peoples have been intentionally dispersed which weakens their self-determination claims. Palestine is also an example of a former colonised territory without independence at present.

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17 self-determination claims from national communities in all parts of the world, such as Catalonia, Kashmir, Kurdistan and, of course, Palestine (Moore, 1998, p. 1). Whereas some of these peoples have indeed been colonised in the past, their contemporary claims to self-determination are not towards their coloniser per say – this should, however, not delegitimise their claim. I will elaborate on this in the following sections.

2.4 Contemporary conceptions of self-determination

2.4.1 Universality

One of the key understandings of national self-determination is its universality, in that it should apply to all peoples. This view is promoted by Moore, throughout her work on national determination. She argues that national communities have an intrinsic right to self-determination independent of criteria to nationhood, but based on their general shared history and culture (Moore, 1997, p. 900).

The argument for universality relies on the universality of individual rights. As I will return to later, self-determination is of course a group right in its current form, in that groups claim it and not individuals. Holder supports the idea of the right of the group to self-determination on the account of individual liberty, in which the individual determines for themselves (Holder, 2006, p. 14). If individuals are free to determine their own fate, a group of individuals should be able to do so in unity, based on the principle of individual liberty ensured through e.g. article 9 of the ICCPR (1966).

2.4.2 Non-domination and non-interference

According to Bachvarova, the right to self-determination should, based on the previously stated concepts of liberty, involve a principle of non-interference from other national communities, and in the case of secession, from the former state (Bachvarova, 2018, p. 798). This view is also supported by Moore in her work on territorial rights – she argues that it is very likely that several national communities would have territorial rights to the same territory, at similar and different levels, but that power-sharing solutions could ensure a principle of non-interference in these cases (Moore, 2015, pp. 50-52).

In territories in which many national communities live amongst each other and are unable to live completely separated, non-interference might not be sufficient to ensure true self-determination, and instead a principle of non-domination might be more appropriate (Bachvarova, 2018, pp. 800-801). Domination takes place “where the relationship between two

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18 agents (individual or collective) is such that one of them is subject to arbitrary interference, or to the constant threat of (such, ed), by the other” (ibid.). Non-interference and non-domination are thus similar concepts, but the arbitrariness of domination is what makes a difference.

In cases where multiple national communities live together, a conception of self-determination as non-interference is not achievable, because the actions of one community will more or less always have some effect on the other community or communities in the territory. Non-domination however, allows for some interference as long as it is non-arbitrary and unintentional.

2.4.3 Treatment of internal minorities

One important perception of national self-determination, especially if it entails the right to secession, is the guarantee that internal minorities are not discriminated against. Because of the increasing integration and intermingling of peoples, it is rare that a secession (or a partial one in which limited self-rule is granted to a national community) can be done without the creation of minorities within the new state – e.g. from the former majority nation or from smaller minorities who had special protection in the former state. Thus, scholars such as McGarry present a concept of self-determination dependent on the protection of internal minorities, as well as other principles such as ensured democracy, etc. (McGarry, 1998, p. 217).

What could become an issue with a universal right to self-determination is the issue of secession from the seceding state – if a secession has to be just it has to allow for the opportunity for the internal minorities in the new state to secede at a later point, a critique that I will return to. Another way to deal with the “new” internal minorities is to allow them the option to easily resettle into the country from which they seceded from (McGarry, 1998, p. 225). This however, puts an added duty on the former state and could induce claims to territorial compensation, and it would perhaps be more sustainable and stabilising to ensure the full rights protection, including group rights claims, to the internal minorities in the new state.

2.5 Critique of the principle of self-determination

Several scholars are critical of the principle of universal self-determination, based on different arguments, such as its incompatibility with realism, the Optimal Protection Principle, etc. In her defence of universal self-determination, Moore summarises three core critical arguments against universal self-determination (Moore, 1997, pp. 905, 908, 910), which I will briefly

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19 represent here. Additionally, I will present Dahbour’s critique of national self-determination and his ideas of post-colonial self-determination.

2.5.1 The argument from indeterminacy

One of the most common criticisms of self-determination is that it is impossible to define what makes a group “a people” – appealing to democratic plebiscites is useless because the people cannot decide until someone decides who the people are. This is legitimate if one supports the perspective that objective criteria should define peoplehood, but Moore argues that such criteria should instead be somewhat subjective. The fact that a group defines itself as a people should be a major factor. Recognition by other groups should not be a requirement, as it is and has been used by states to reject self-determination claims of a minority: e.g. the Turkish government does not recognise Kurds as a specific ethnicity, just like the denial of the existence of specific Palestinian nationality has been an effective tool for Zionists to reject any Palestinian claim to self-determination (Moore, 2015, p. 55).

2.5.2 The argument from instability

Critics have argued that universal self-determination would risk the breakup of most of the world’s states, and by challenging the state-system would create global instability. Gellner argues that there is only space for a finite number of states in the world, and that too many actors would destabilise intergovernmental cooperation and institutions. On what basis, one could calculate this finite number of states, he does not say, and it is hard to understand what would be the destabilising factor if peoples gain self-determination democratically through a plebiscite (Moore, 1997, p. 909).

What is at the core of this critique is a conception of sovereignty as state-centred rather than people-centred. If one believes that existing states are finite actors, rather than a projection of the will of the people, then yes, breakups of existing states would arguably change that. If one favours a more democratic approach, however, it is clear that ensuring the will of the people is a stabilising act: Holder argues that the granting of self-determination is a lot less risky in the long run than ignoring or even oppressing the claims of minorities. Self-determination does not destabilise the sovereign, but rather questions the strict powers of traditional sovereignty and whether these should be shared amongst peoples (Holder, 2006, p. 12).

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2.5.3 The problem of overlapping nationalities

Another critique against national self-determination, and indeed one that makes scholars such as Ramet reject the principle all together, is the “inevitable” oppression of internal minorities if a national community secedes (Ramet, 2000, p. 98). This argument is based on a traditional, but not ill-founded idea of nationalism, in which the protection of culture in the seceding state would mean that minority cultures are oppressed – if the seceding community e.g. wants to protect their language, they might enforce it as the only spoken language in the new state (ibid., p. 100). Minorities that might have had minority rights in the former state risk losing them in favour of the nationalist goals of the new state, or they might have been the majority in the former state and are now a minority.

The problem of overlapping nationalities also relates to the issue of competing self-determination claims. Critics often use the dissolution of Yugoslavia as an example for this – whereas Slovenia was almost ethnically homogenous, and their secession thus fairly simple, the territory that became Croatia had no such ethnical majority and thus ethnical conflict ensued. In the same vein, whereas Serbia seceded, they have not allowed Kosovo the same privilege; one criticism is that in order for secessions to be just, they must allow for potential secession from the seceding state, something that secessionist movements rarely express their commitment to (McGarry, 1998, p. 217).

These points of critique are extremely valid and something that should be taken very seriously in formulating a theory of national self-determination. Some scholars, such as McGarry suggest that in order for secessions to be just, they must include threshold criteria for the seceding state, including minority rights and the possibility for later secession (ibid., pp. 225-227)

2.5.4 Dahbour’s critique of national self-determination

Dahbour’s critique of national self-determination is interesting in itself because it does not rely on common arguments for instability, indeterminacy or internal discrimination, but on a critique of nationalism in itself as a basis for self-determination. Dahbour contests the right to national self-determination because it is based on “pre-democratic” nationalism, a sense of unity based on arbitrary criteria such as ethnicity and language (Dahbour, 2003, p. 149).

The idea of the nation, and thus the accompanied nationalism, is contradictory even in the more liberal understanding, because the defining features of a nation are simultaneously normative and empirical. The normative features, often displayed in nationalism, such as a

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21 common culture, “values” and history are undemocratic and often suppressive of ethnic or other minorities. The empirical features of nations, such as ethnicity, are insufficiently distinct, and often without root in the real composition of the given nation (Dahbour, 2013, pp. 35-38).

As an alternative, Dahbour favours a conception of self-determination connected to places – in this view, peoples have distinct political identities based on their geographical location. His idea is rooted in the fact that most states are not nation states, even if they like to perceive themselves as such, but that their territorial affiliation distinguishes them. He follows this with appeals to the importance of territory to specific peoples, especially indigenous communities (Dahbour, 2013, p. 208).

In his most recent work on power-sharing in Israel/Palestine, he endorses a right to political self-determination for peoples who are “resident in an ecologically distinct region” as the most relevant type of self-determination for contemporary post-colonial claimants. He argues for a significant relation between humans and their environment. In the case of Palestine, this perception of self-determination also allows for several peoples to hold claims to territory, allowing for power-sharing and a potential solution to a deep political conflict (Dahbour, 2016, pp. 394-396).

Dahbour distinguishes between peoples and nations and accepts self-determination for the former. As such, he does not reject the principles of self-determination nor its relevance in post-colonial times, but disagrees with the identified right holder as national communities. The empirical and normative differences between nation and people, are indeed interesting, and will be discussed further in the analysis section of this thesis.

2.6 Secession

Territorial rights constitute an important element of national self-determination. Through territorial rights, national communities can control their own resources and their economic development. Territorial rights ensure a level of subsistence. Whereas there are other options for the protection of territorial rights, the most common way for national communities to claim them is through the request for secession, that is, the withdrawal from the state in order to create a new state (Moore, 2015, pp. 2-3). I will therefore present the three main theories of secession.

2.6.1 Choice

Choice theories typically require that a “territorially concentrated majority express a desire to secede (in a referendum or plebiscite) for the secession to be legitimate, and do not require that

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22 the seceding group demonstrate that they are victims of injustice or that they have a special claim to the territory they intend to take with them” (Moore, 1998, p. 5). Essentially, the fact that a group chooses to secede is enough for them to have a legitimate claim to do so.

Choice theories tend to be based on the right to political association, extending the individual right to the group. There is thus a close relation between democracy and secession, in which the right for the people to make decisions about the state they live in extends to the membership of the state itself (ibid.)

What choice theories fail to include is the ethnic or otherwise national characteristics of national movements, and it is similarly hard to connect a right to territory based on democratic claims. Territorial rights are defined in various ways, but, according to Ypi, must be dependent on justifications as to the right to include and exclude people from a specific territory (Ypi, 2012, p. 288). If choice theory is only dependent on a community’s will to secede, it is hard to make a connection to which territory they have a right to and thus where the new state would be situated (Moore, 1998, p. 5).

2.6.2 Just-cause

Generally, just-cause theorists, such as Buchanan and Norman, state that secession is only legitimate when it serves to remedy an injustice. Buchanan thus calls secession a remedial right. Different theories focus on different types of injustice: e.g. occupation and seizure of territory, serious human rights violations, such as genocide, while some argue that discriminatory injustices constitute an adequate secession claim (Moore, 1998, pp. 5-6).

Just-cause theories propose a strong connection between human rights and self-determination, strengthening the latter as it becomes part of an existing accepted system of respect for the former. This will be elaborated on in the analysis section.

At the same time, the corrective justice principle means that the burden of proof is on the secessionists and it places an additional moral requirement if the new state has to be more just (or at least less tyrannical or corrupt) than the existing state. Moore argues that this theory ignores the “political significance of cultural and especially national identity” because the emphasis is on fundamental human interests, rather than those of the specific group or national community (ibid.).

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2.6.3 National self-determination

The third and last theory of secession identified by Moore directly connects self-determination to secession. Secession is thus dependent on the community, embedded in the universal right to national self-determination defined in previous sections. Through political autonomy, the national community can ensure redistributive justice, the protection of culture and determine its own destiny. Arguments on the importance of national and social identity as an instrument for the individual self-identity and human flourishing, also play into this theory (Moore, 1998, pp. 7-8).

This theory relies on a belief in national self-determination itself and in turn, nationalism. I will return to additional critique of nationalism and discuss the risk of excluding internal minorities in the analysis chapter.

2.7 Group rights

For reasons of transparency, I find it important to make a note on the intrinsic issues of group rights, and their paradoxical nature. Group rights are generally perceived as the third generation of rights from the Western perspective (the first generation being civil and political rights, the second economic, social and cultural rights). Within the international human rights framework, i.e. the UN human rights conventions, the only explicit appeal to group rights is the right to self-determination, enshrined in article 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Furthermore, group rights have been interpreted as intrinsic in especially economic, social and cultural rights, but there are two main controversies with this interpretation and conception of human rights as a whole.

Firstly, there is the argument from cultural relativism that the modern human rights framework places an exaggerated, Western-centric, value on individualism. Cultural relativists argue that the individuality assumed from the conventions is ignorant of the collectivism of traditional non-Western cultures. “Asian values”-critics argue that collectivism is indeed more important than individual freedoms and that “second-generation” rights should indeed be prioritised first (Sen, 1998, p. 40).

This ties into the second controversy of group rights; if human rights are intrinsically accorded to individuals, how can we grant group rights while protecting the individual and their liberties? If group rights involve non-interference, what can we do when group members are oppressed? This argument is presented by Okin in her feminist critique of multi-culturalism: it is a fact that certain cultures give less liberties to women (not to mention oppression of sexual

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24 and religious minorities) and if we grant such a group specific rights to non-interference, we risk turning a blind eye to oppression (Okin, 1999, pp. 17, 22-23). In such a way group rights can in fact be antagonistic to certain group members’ rights.

Cultural relativism can be rejected on the basis of universalism, as supported by the human rights system in itself – if we did not believe in some account of universal values, we cannot justify that human rights are globally accepted based on the “inherent dignity of the human person” (ICCPR, Preamble). Even states that systemically violate human rights conventions, do not reject the system itself, but instead reject that their actions are actually violations (Tan, 2017, pp. 67-68).

What is harder to reject is the paradox of group rights as part of the human rights system, and this is an important consideration for the discussion on self-determination. What is important to remember is that in the case of the Palestinians (and many other peoples) their right to collective self-determination is rooted in their collective oppression; most oppression takes place towards a group of people or individuals on account of their specific group membership, thus it is just for these groups to seek justice collectively (Holder, 2006, p. 14). This does in no way solve the paradox, but it does present a justification for why group rights, and specifically, self-determination, are an issue of justice.

3 Outline of the analysis

In this section, the three arguments stated in the hypothesis section (1.2) will be looked at one by one – in each their chapter (4, 5 and 6) – and then summarised in the conclusion. The three arguments are:

1. Self-determination is a universal right for all self-identified peoples (chapter 4).

2. The right to secession is not universal, nor accompanying the right to self-determination, but is reliant on other factors. Self-determination thus entails various levels of autonomy (chapter 5).

3. While Palestine has a right to self-determination and secession based on the conception of these presented here, the neglect of the refugees should not be accepted in return for a state. Other state-solutions should thus be considered (chapter 6).

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4 A universal right to self-determination

One of the most common questions asked about universal self-determination is how we define peoples as such. Can any group claim self-determination and are there criteria they should meet for the right to be respected by others?

It is argued here that self-identification should be the only threshold or necessary criterion for the right to self-determination. Thus, if a group or collective identifies as a people, they have a right to self-determination.

Whereas there are many parameters onto which a group can be defined as a people – shared history, language, culture, ethnicity, etc. – it is in fact wholly relative to the case. Some peoples, such as indigenous peoples, have long histories of shared culture and language and have specific hierarchies and government systems – their self-determination is in many ways crucial to their survival. We can trace these peoples back to a time when they ruled themselves, before colonisation (Moore, 1998, pp. 141-142).

Other peoples have shorter shared history, though this does not mean that their claim to self-determination is necessarily weaker. Nationalism is not an age-old concept, in fact, the idea of nation states only really caught on in the mid-19th_{century (Wimmer & Feinstein, 2010).}

Stating that peoples only are legitimate as such, if they have history of autonomy or century-long shared history is tone deaf to the reality of both self-determination and nationalism, not to mention the long imperial history of most parts of the world.

This latter issue applies in large part to the denial of Palestinian self-determination. For a long time, a common Israeli narrative was that the Palestinians did not exist before 1948 and that their claim to self-determination was merely a reaction to the Israeli self-determination claim (Massad, 2018). Even in the case that this was true – Palestine and Palestinians did exist prior to 1948 and Arab nationalism predates the establishment of the State of Israel (ibid.) – it is not without merit that the creation of a people happens when the existence of this group is threatened.

Sometimes, groups become aware of their distinctive character due to oppression by majority groups – this is true both for the Jews and the Palestinians. Whereas it is true that Palestinian self-determination was not well-developed at the time of the Balfour Declaration, this takes nothing from the reality that Palestinian Arabs lived in Palestine legitimately and were illegitimately expelled by Zionists (ibid.). In a similar vein, the Jewish interest in a homeland became extraordinarily pronounced – seeming as the only safe haven after centuries of prosecution – during and after the Holocaust (ibid.).

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26 Establishing universal criteria for defining a people risks unfair comparisons between them. The merit and expression of commonality is wholly dependent on the specific people and their circumstances. Thus, the Jewish people’s wish for a homeland dates back centuries, as part of religious tradition3_{, and was, as mentioned, further intensified after the Holocaust. The}

Palestinian claim to self-determination however, is generally seen as having been ignited by the Nakba in 1948. This should in no way delegitimise this claim, rather one should perceive the injustices of 1948 as a legitimate ground for self-determination, similarly to how many saw the creation of the State of Israel as a remedy to the injustices of the Holocaust (even if it resulted in injustices towards Palestinians).

Instead, one could favour a conception of peoples as dependent on one necessary criteria for “peoplehood” – that they self-identify as such – and that other elements such as shared history, language, culture, ethnicity, geographical coherence, etc., are contributing factors. In practice, self-determination is rarely, if ever, claimed by non-peoples and it is misplaced to dismiss the legitimate claims of legitimate peoples in a search for a universal definition of which qualities such a people should possess.

A right to self-determination dependent on self-identification mirrors itself in the human rights system – human rights are intrinsic in human beings, simply because of our shared humanity, and thus self-determination must be a right of peoples, based simply on their identification as such. There is, in this sense, no stronger or weaker right to self-determination. This also means that self-determination is a liberty right – it does not in itself entail a duty upon another actor, but rather, gives a people the liberty to determine for themselves. This is practically quite vague and thus, the right to secession is a more interesting right to discuss, because it must necessarily be a claim right, entailing a duty on another entity.

4.1 Critique of nationalism

As mentioned in the previous chapter, critics such as Dahbour attack national self-determination on account of arguments against nationalism itself. Nationalism is ill-founded on account of it being excluding towards non-nationals, based on “pre-historic” criteria, which should not form a basis for how people enter into democratic cooperation (Dahbour, 2003, p. 149).

3_{Zionism should not be confused with Judaism. Some sections of Jews believe that a Jewish state is} contradictory to the teachings of their religious texts, whereas many Jews inside and outside Israel are critical towards the Zionist project and especially the Israeli treatment of Palestinians (Jewish Voice for Peace, 2019).

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27 Similarly, arguments from cosmopolitanism criticises nationalism on the account that it unnecessarily segregates peoples, who should treat each other as equals. Different conceptions of cosmopolitanism present different approaches to state sovereignty and statehood but the overarching sentiment is that nationalism places an unnecessary value on “co-patriots” rather than humanity as a whole (Kleingeld, 2014).

While there are legitimate concerns and arguments behind these critiques, one finds that when it is only used on self-determination claims, it is prejudiced and ignorant of the reasons for nationalism to be an important part of self-determination.

Firstly, existing states endorse their own nationalism, through the nation state, and if the critique of nationalism only applies to national communities without their own state, it is not actually a critique of nationalism itself. It is generally accepted that existing states have some sort of national sentiment, displayed in their language, culture and shared history. Whereas the extreme type of nationalism that caused mass destruction in especially Europe in the 1940’s4

should be avoided at all costs, if general nationalism is an accepted aspect of existing states, claiming self-determination on this basis should be accepted as well.

Secondly, it is a fact that human beings are not islands, i.e. isolated beings with no need for interaction, but rather they collectivise and identify in terms of group membership – be this through religion, language, ethnicity, political beliefs or nationality – thus while self-determination based on political freedom completely (such as choice-theorists and Dahbour suggest) could be a just alternative to nationalism, it is ignorant of the fact that human beings identify collectively. As Holder points out, this identification is not just internal, but happens externally as well – oppression, for the most part, targets people based on group membership (real or perceived), thus self-determination based on group membership is also, in a sense, a response (Holder, 2006, p. 8). Additionally, even if self-determining peoples were to be mobilised only through political goals, it is not unlikely that they at a later stage would form collective identities (Moore, 1998, pp. 5-7).

Lastly, nationalism is not necessarily central to self-determination because it is the core objective of non-independent peoples, or because nationalism is the only means of identification for these. Rather, one could argue that nationalism is core to self-determination because it is part of the existing discourse on statehood and how we understand collectives. The idea of nation states has been leading the discussion on sovereignty significantly since the end

4_{In this respect, it is indeed relevant to look at current nationalist developments in Europe, and its} commonalities with the developments in the interwar-period – yet this kind of nationalism is not directly comparable with national self-determination.

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28 of the Second World War – in this sense, a people identifying itself as a national community is also a strategic move, as well as a value-based one.

There are genuine concerns within the presented critique of nationalism – these should be taken into account when establishing new, just states. However, they should not delegitimise self-determination claims all together – national identity is, despite its pre-democratic roots and perceived arbitrariness, a legitimate concern of non-independent peoples and should be taken seriously. Cosmopolitan critique of self-determination is indeed interesting, but for lack of space, this will not be delved into further here.

5 The non-universal right to secession

Whereas the right to self-determination is universal, it does not automatically entail a right to secession. Rather, it entails some level of autonomy, dependent on the contributing factors in place and the nature and root of previous injustices. The latter creates a duty, which I will return to.

Whereas there is only one threshold (or necessary) criteria to claiming a right to self-determination, namely self-identification, the right to secession should be dependent on a certain level of cohesiveness of the group in question, attributed to the following factors: shared culture, history, language, ethnicity, religion, territorial commonality and, contentiously, oppression. The level of cohesiveness is thus a sum of these factors and the level of autonomy should be correlative. The right to secession is claimable in any case where serious injustice have taken or are taking place.

In the case of a self-identified people which only contributing factor is a shared language, the appropriate level of autonomy would be limited to linguistic rights e.g. using their language in official institutions (be they local, regional or state-level) and e.g. in schools, television and other cultural settings. The interest of such a people is their right to freely determine their language, and the importance of teaching future generations should be acknowledged through the language being taught in school, etc.5

On the other end of the spectrum, a people with most or all of the aforementioned contributing factors in place would have a legitimate claim to secession. This does not mean that they will choose full statehood or that they will be granted it necessarily, but they have the

5_{Lack of linguistic self-determination has historically been a part of the oppression of e.g. Irish (Gaelic)} culture, by forbidding the language in schools and public places. This resulted in a near-death of the language, which the Irish state is now spending a lot of effort on reviving (The Irish Times, 2007).

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29 appropriate level of cohesiveness to justify a secession. The duty upon another entity is dependent on previous injustice – as will be elaborated on in the next section.

There could of course be examples of mid-level cohesiveness, e.g. where cultural, linguistic and historical differences are too severe to only grant limited autonomy, but some interest in remaining with the existing state exists, variations of power-sharing could be relevant. I will return to these in section 5.2.

5.1 The duty to grant autonomy

As opposed to the right to self-determination as a liberty right, the right to autonomy must be understood as a claim right – this means that it is claimable towards another entity, and thus, creates a duty for either a state or the international community.

This is rooted in a modern concept of human rights, in which rights should create duties on others – in the case of individuals this is usually states6_{. In a similar vein, the right to}

autonomy could create a duty on the existing state and/or the international community.

The duty created is dependent firstly on the cohesiveness of a given people, as described above – defining the level of autonomy – and secondly, on the presence of historical or contemporary injustice – defining the duty-bearer.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, different theories of secession exist, and the conception argued for here will be related to a just-cause theory. That means that secession is, prima facie, a remedial right, held against the perpetrator of an injustice – whether it be a historic one or a continuous one. Injustices that could create a secession claim include colonialisation, annexation, prolonged occupation, forceful displacement of a population, genocide, grave human rights violations, among others (Moore, 1998, p. 6).

While secession is a remedial right, other levels of autonomy can be granted without the presence of injustice, and there can also be cases where the self-determining people and the existing state agree on a secession for other reasons. E.g. the secession of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia was based on a peaceful settlement, and the mutual interests of Czechs and Slovaks (Philpott, 1998, p. 96).

In cases of contemporary or historical injustice, identifying the duty-bearer is dependent on identifying the perpetrator of the injustice in question. Some cases involve a clearly identifiable duty-bearer. E.g. in the case of India, it was clear that the UK was the perpetrator

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30 of the injustice of colonisation, and thus the duty-bearer to India’s “secession” claim. In other cases, this relationship is less obvious or unambiguous.

It is then often necessary to ask whether the injustice can be traced to a specific state and specifically, the existing state. As an example, in many instances, decolonisation has left a vacuum, because while the continued injustice of colonisation has ended7_{, the borders drawn}

by colonists are still in use. This is important to secession claims, because the right claimed is not towards the existing state as such, but to the creators of it.

This is also relevant for Palestine, as the British Mandate is partly to be blamed for enabling the creation of Israel, at the cost of Palestinians. That is to say, while one can agree or disagree with the fairness of the creation of Israel (this is dangerous territory, because anti-Semitic sentiments still colour much of anti-Israel reasoning), one could argue that it should have taken place without subjecting the Palestinians to mass expulsions and massacres, and the British Mandate could have done more to prevent this. Yet again, one could argue that disposing of other people’s land and giving it away is in itself an injustice, which further strengthens the claim towards the United Kingdom.

In a similar fashion, the League of Nations and the UN, essentially the international community, bears a responsibility for the injustices caused to Palestinians, by not doing more to ensure Palestinian statehood before, during and after 1948 and for allowing impunity to prevail for the crimes committed towards Palestinians – i.e. the border wall and the continued annexation through Israeli settlements (Bastaki, 2015, p. 78).

Most prominently, of course, is the “secession” claim from Palestine towards Israel (in quotation marks because technically, Palestinian territory is not Israeli territory, though Palestinian sovereignty is disputed), as perpetrator of several of the above-mentioned injustices; i.e. annexation, prolonged occupation, forceful displacement of a population and (somewhat contested) ethnic cleansing through especially the massacres of 1948 (ibid., p. 79).

This goes to show that the identification of a duty-bearer is not always straight-forward, but rather that there can be multiple levels of duty placed on multiple duty-bearers. As such, the duty to grant secession is placed primarily on Israel, but the international community and the United Kingdom have a joint responsibility as well. For instance, the international community and the United Kingdom would have a duty to enable the right to secession, either through non-interference (displaying secession as a negative right) or through aiding the

7_{This, is, of course, a simplification – postcolonial theory contradicts this idea, but for the sake of} brevity, I will not delve into this further.

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31 Palestinian Authority and/or putting pressure on Israel to grant “secession” (displaying secession as a positive right).

What is relevant for all issues of political philosophy is that we discuss ideal solutions to unideal situations – while we can develop principles for what is the right course of action or solution, political problems will always be more complex than theory can account for. Indeed, even if the right to autonomy, in the extent presented here, was inherent in international law, each secession claim would still be subject to complications of other political interests, and generally, each claim would be assessed individually. This is not to say that the granting of secession rights to one people does not create a precedent for other peoples, but rather that it does not ensure the granting of the same rights in every case.

5.1.1 The critique against instability

As mentioned in the previous chapter, a common critique of universal self-determination is that it would create instability. It is argued that too many states would disrupt the current world order, as well as create fragile states, more likely to become failed states (Moore, 1997, pp. 908-909).

Firstly, it should be noted that this critique is levelled at self-determination from a conception that secession naturally follows the right to determination or that self-determination and secession are the same thing: as was argued above, this is not the case. Thus, the critique against instability, while presumably levelled at self-determination, is in fact a critique of secession.

The disruption argument is dependent on two premises: firstly, that one believes the current world order is stable, and secondly that a disruption would be inherently negative. While we can assess that the first premise is relatively legitimate – given that the world is generally peaceful, major powers have not been at war with one another for some decades and international cooperation is more developed than ever (The Fund for Peace, 2019, p. 9), it is harder to come up with a definite answer to whether the disruption would be negative, because it depends on the perceived fairness of the current system in place.

While one could agree and disagree with the fairness of the current system, it is hard to argue for why the status quo would have to be the only possible one. The number of member states has been increasing consistently since the creation of the UN in 1945, something that can be generally perceived as a positive development for global justice and democratic principles –

“We will become a people when…” A normative discussion of self-determination, secession and Palestine