The Gulf Cooperation Council : Its Nature and Achievements

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The Gulf Cooperation Council

Its Nature and Achievements

Alasfoor, Reyadh

2007

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Citation for published version (APA):

Alasfoor, R. (2007). The Gulf Cooperation Council: Its Nature and Achievements. Department of Political Science, Lund University.

Total number of authors: 1

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The Gulf Cooperation Council: Its Nature and Achievements. A Political Analysis of Regional Integration of the GCC States 1979-2004

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The Gulf Cooperation Council:

Its Nature and Achievements

A Political Analysis of Regional Integration

of the GCC States 1979-2004

Reyadh Alasfoor

Lund Political Studies 149 Department of Political Science

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© 2007 Reyadh Alasfoor ISBN 91–88306–67–4 ISBN-13 978-91–88306–67–8

ISSN 0460–0037 Lund Political Studies 149 Cover by Mikael Sundström

Printed by KFS AB Lund 2007 Distribution: Department of Political Science

Lund University Box 52 SE–22100 Lund

Sweden

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS... 9

LISTOF ACRONYMS... 11

FIGURESAND TABLES ... 13

CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION... 15

1. 1 Aims ... 15

1. 2 The Historical Background ... 16

1. 3 Methodology and evaluation ... 21

CHAPTER TWO – THE ORIGINAND NATUREOFTHE GCC 1979-1981 ... 27

2. 1 Foundation and Emergence of the GCC ... 29

2. 2 The Pre-integration Perspective ... 31

2.3 Main Characteristics of the GCC Formation ... 33

2. 4 GCC Organizational Structures and Objectives ... 35

2. 5 Conclusion ... 44

CHAPTER THREE – INTEGRATIONASA CONCEPTUAL FIELD... 45

3.1 Current Definitions and Applications ... 45

3. 2 The Approach Utilized in this Study ... 51

3. 3 A definition of Integration ... 52

CHAPTER FOUR – ECONOMIC INTEGRATION... 55

4. 1 Creating a GCC Economic Citizenship ... 59

4. 2 Common Objectives and Policies; Oil Policy ... 67

4. 3 Building Institutions and Harmonizing Regulations. ... 72

4. 4 Creating Regional Infrastructures ... 73

4. 5 Developing Joint Venture projects ... 75

4. 6. Coordinating External Policies. ... 76

4. 7 Challenges ... 78

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CHAPTER FIVE – POLITICAL INTEGRATION... 87

5.1 Security ... 91

5. 2 Foreign Policy ... 123

5. 3 Challenges ... 174

5. 4 Concluding Remarks ... 178

CHAPTER SIX – DISINTEGRATIVEAND INTEGRATIVE FACTORSINTHE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT... 185

6. 1 Disintegrative Factors... 187

6. 2 Integrative Factors ... 203

CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION... 219

EPILOGUE... 225

NOTES... 227

APPENDICES... 277

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When Britain decided in 1968 to terminate its official colonial presence in the Gulf as of 1971, prompting the Arab Gulf states to start the search for a form of partnership that would bring them together to cope with the insecurity and danger surrounding them and their regimes.

The Arab states of the Gulf share a similar economic, social and political system. They have acquired significant importance in the world politics since World War II as a result of the discovery of oil and their potential oil and gas reserves.

This research has been a very long time in the making. Its origins date back many years, to my postgraduate days at the University of Lund in 1977 when I first became interested in the unity of the Arab Gulf States. Since then this interest has simmered steadily until it finally came to the boil in the end of the 1990s when I began to look more closely at both the development of the integration of these states and the writings about this integration.

Following two years of difficult negotiation (as I mentioned above. In fact, I followed the development of the GCC since the negotiation of its foundation in 1979), the six states; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed, on May 25, 1981, a charter creating a regional entity called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The preamble to the charter indicates that underpinning the Council are the shared religion, social, and political systems, and history and aspirations of the six states. As a regional organization, the GCC is a somewhat unique experiment in the Arab world.

This study is an attempt to trace the background, emergence, and development of the GCC in a primarily tribal culture. It is a description and analysis of specific aspects of the GCC; its structure and charter, its economic and political achievements, the challenges facing this organization, and the factors which either enhance or hinder its integration.

There has been a spate of scholarly works on the Gulf States in both Arabic and English concerning all aspects of life. This study uses some of these works for a systematic study of this integration, and to develop certain concepts and themes, in order to analyze and understand the complexities and conflicts of this region. I have relied heavily on these works and sources as well as on various documents. In addition, use is made of surveys and extensive interviews with officials of the

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Secretariat -General in some of the member states as well as with members of the intelligentsia and the private sector during my visits to the Arab states of the Gulf. This study would not have been at all possible without the help and understand-ing of many people, to whom I would like to express my gratitude. Thanks must go first of all to my supervisor Professor Lars-Göran Stenelo whose supervision, suggestions and constructive comments gave me valuable insights. My deepest gratitude should also go to Professor Hans Petersson (In fact, the concept of this study grew out of the discussion with the Professor in 1980) for his support and suggestions, to write (on Arab integrative efforts in the Middle East) on the GCC. I owe a debt of gratitude to Staffan Lindberg and Malena Rosén for reading the manuscript. Their assistance in the reorganization of the study is incalculable, and their constructive and perceptive comments transformed the whole study.

For making my several visits in the GCC states more fruitful and pleasant I thank my sisters, brothers, and many relatives living in many member states in general, and acknowledgements and huge gratitude go to my brother Salman Alasfoor in particular, for his hard work in obtaining some of the research materials, and for giving me the support I needed. I thank them again for their generosity during my several visits to the area.

Specific mention must be made of my wife Linda, and our sons Jacob and David for giving me the moral encouragement to be able to continue despite difficult times. My gratitude to Jaya Reddy, for his patience in checking the language, and, to Mikael Sundström who assisted with the layout, and the design of the cover, without which this book would still have been no more than a bunch of papers. Needless to say none of the people mentioned above are responsible for the views expressed in this final product. The blame should be on the author alone.

Lund 2007 Reyadh Alasfoor

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ACC Arab Cooperation Council

AMU Arab Maghrib Union

AOI Arab Organization for Industrialisation ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft

BPD Barrel Per Day

CAP Common Agricultural Policy

CECLA Latin American Coordination Commission CENTCOM Unified Command-Central Command CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CG Contadore Group

COPDP Common Objectives and Policies for Development Plans

DD Damascus Declaration

DLF Dhufar Liberation Front

EAC East African Community

ECOWAS Economic Community of West Africa States ECJ European Court of Justice

EEC European Economic Community

EMU Economic Monetary Union

EU European Union

EW Electric Warfare

FM Foreign Minister

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GIC Gulf Investment Corporation

GICO Gulf Industrial Consultancy Organization GIB Gulf International Bank

GNP Gross National Product

GSP Generalised System of Preference INC Iraqi National Congress

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICJ International Court of Justice IMF International Monetary Fund

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IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

IT Information Technology

LA Arab League,

ME Middle East

NAM Non-Aligned Movement

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty OAS Organizations of American States OAU Organizations of African Unity OIC Organization of Islamic Conference

OAPEC Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen

PFLOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization

PM Prime Minister

PNA Palestinian National Authority

POW Prisoners of War

RDF Redeployment force

TCM Thousand cubic meters

UAE United Arab Emirates

UEA Unified Economic Agreement

UIDS Unified Industrial Development Strategy

UN United Nation

UNSCOM United Nation Special Commission UNDA United Nation Disarmament Agency

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTC World Trade Centre

WTO World Trade Organization

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Table 1.1 Capitals and Population of the GCC States. Table 2.1 Integration Organizations.

Figure 2.1 The Organizational Structure of the GCC Council. Table 2. 2 Most Active regional bloc in 2004-2006

Table 4.1 Oil and Gas as percentage of total Revenues.

Table 4.2 Key Macroeconomic Indicators of the GCC in 2000. Figure 4.1 Instability and the Price of Oil.

Table 4.3 Population, GDP Per Capita and Oil Production in 2003. Table 4.4 Gulf Investment Corporation since 1983.

Table 4.5 GCC Joint Ventures in 1997.

Figure 5.1 Threats Perceived by Member States 1820-2004.

Table 5.1 The Political Issues Discussed in the GCC Summits 1981-2004. Table 5.2 Percentage of Shia Population in the GCC States.

Table 5.3 Internal Subversive Activities in the GCC States. Figure 5.2 Extremist Groups in the GCC States.

Table 5.4 Territorial demarcation between GCC States and their Neighbors. Table 5.5 Gulf Military Manpower, Selected years 000s.

Table 5.6 The Military Balance in the Gulf 1999. Table 5.7 Arms Sales to the Gulf Countries 1992-1995. Table 5.8 The Balance of Power, 1981, 1995-2004. Table 5.9 Spending on Armament in Ten Years 1987-1995. Table 5.10 Total Armed Forces of the GCC, including Active

Paramilitary Forces.

Figure 5.4 Security Triangle Formula in the Middle East 1981-2004. Figure 5.5 USA Military Presence in the GCC Member States in 2003. Table 5.11 GCC Trade-Balance Deficit with EU.

Table 5.12 GCC States in Favor of Establishment of Relations or for Rapprochement With Five Countries, 1981-2004.

Figure 6.1 The Ruling Families in the GCC States and their Tribal Affiliation. Table 6.1 Consultative or Legislative Assembles in the GCC States. Table 6.2 GCC Financial Aid in $ Millions 1980-2002.

Table 6.3 Saudi Arabia’s, as Percentage of the Total.

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1.1 Aims

One of the more salient features of the political economy of developing countries during the last three decades or so has been the proliferation of regional cooperation arrangements designed to strengthen horizontal links among devel-oping countries. Many of these arrangements have attempted to promote outright economic integration in the belief that increased integration can help accelerate the rate of development in a region or sub region, while simultaneously facilitating the spread of the benefits of development more widely and equitably, and contribute toward a peaceful world order. Collective action at regional level to secure national goals has become an increasingly characteristic and important feature of developing countries’ international relations. Recent decades have witnessed the emergence of a rash of regional organizations, many of which are in a state of crisis, either at a standstill and in conflict, or have deviated from their objectives and can no longer be considered integrative.

“While regional integration efforts have been in some way successful in more advanced countries, no scheme in the developing countries has yet achieved

concrete success”.1

It was only after the Second World War that the subject of integration developed as a systematic body of cumulative knowledge, and historical and intellectual trends over the past three decades have combined to make the study of regional cooperation and integration a particularly fruitful area of research for social scientists. Moreover, cooperation among nations has become the focus of a wide range of studies, a subject of interest to economist, diplomats and political scientists in the last few decades.2

The purpose of this study is to deal with one integrative scheme of developing countries, namely, the integration of the member states of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. The official name is the Arabian Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC) or Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),3_{consisting of Bahrain,}

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Table 1-1 Capitals and Populations of the GCC States

Country Capital Pop. 1981(1) Pop. 2001(2) Pop. 2004 (3)

Bahrain Manama 400,000 620,000 672,124

Kuwait Kuwait City 1400,000 1,980,000 2,363,325

Oman Muscat 948,000 2,250,000 2,537,742

Qatar Doha 240,000 520,000 685,409

Saudi Arabia Riyadh 8100,000 20,000,000 22,007,753

UAE Abu Dhabi 1040,000 2,620,000 3,754,000

Total 12,128,000 27,990,000 32,020353

Sources: (1) The Military Balance 1980/81. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London. (2) www.gcc-sg.org/; (3) www.gcc-sg.org/

Its main objectives are a customs union and political cooperation, harmonization of policies, a common external tariff and integration in a specified cultural, geographical, economic, and political setting. This study is an attempt to trace and study the nature, background, emergence, and development of the GCC as an integrative venture. It is also an attempt to identify and discuss the security problem of these states (which was the first and the main reason for the founding of this organization), the economic development, and the political dynamics that have shape the vital region in which the GCC has emerged, the role play by major actors in this emergence, and the significance of this part of the Middle East in the perception of the policy makers of the superpowers because of its geographical location, markets, and huge oil reserves. One of the main aims of this study is to describe the GCC integrative venture and explain why it has taken its present form, and to elucidate what lessons the venture can learn from the experience of developed and developing countries. There has been a spate of scholarly works on the Gulf region, concerning all aspects of life. Another concern of this study is to use these works, for a systematic study of this integration, and try to develop certain concepts and themes in order to analyse and understand the complexities and conflicts of this region.

1.2 The Historical Background

1.2.1 British Involvement in the Region

The establishment of British influence in the Gulf began at the end of the eighteenth century.5 _{For two hundred years before that period British interests}

were dominated by commerce, and even before that the Gulf had been the target for ambitious maritime European powers whose main concern was the

promo-17

tion of mercantile and strategic interests.6 _{The first European influence to appear}

in the region along these lines was that of the Portuguese in the early 1500s. The Portuguese venture was to monopolize the trade in spices and other Eastern luxuries to which the Portuguese had become accustomed during the Muslim occupation.7 _{However, a century later, the sea power’s already evanescent era}

came to an end in 1622 when a combined flotilla of British and Persian forces captured the Portuguese stronghold at Hormuz on the Persian side of the Gulf. For one and half centuries afterwards, British, French, and Dutch mercantile interests competed, and on occasion cooperated, in the Gulf area through the construction of trading centres at Basrah in Iraq, Bushire, and Bander Abbas in Iran.

The consolidation of the British East India Company’s control of the Indian subcontinent in the latter half of the eighteenth century, led to the whittling away of both Dutch and French influences in the Gulf region by 1770. However, British interests multiplied and intensified to the point that British supremacy in the Gulf was clearly recognizable by the 1920s. This evolutionary process included many factors or events.8 _{During the 1920s and 1930s, it became}

apparent that several British strategic interests were to be found along the shores of the Gulf. The first of those arose out of the development of imperial air routes with the Gulf, providing one of the earliest links in the London-India route. The second factor reviving the strategic importance of the Gulf to Britain, and, in the end becoming, the more permanent and important factor, was the growing dependence on Gulf oil. The first oil finds in the region occurred in Persia in 1904. Oil was discovered in Iraq shortly after World War l and soon after in Kuwait. Subsequently, more fields were brought into the production down the Gulf, including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. The presence of this oil was seen early as a strategic resource for the British Empire, since the Royal Navy depended heavily on Gulf oil for fuel, and British commercial interests held the great majority of concessions in the region. A third reason for the Gulf’s emerging importance to London at this time was actually a continuing manifes-tation of the Gulf’s geopolitical significance. For centuries, Britain had sought to prevent rivals from penetrating its control around the Gulf, and the continuance of this enduring policy was further confirmed by the emergence of the Gulf as an air route and the discovery of oil. Consequently, by approximately the mid-1930s, the Gulf’s peripheral place in the imperial scheme of things had been transformed to an area of increasing strategic importance, and Britain was able to protect its emerging interests in a number of ways.9

The British presence in the Gulf was initiated by private mercantile interests as early as the opening decades of the seventeenth century. The consolidation of British hegemony over India late in the eighteenth century naturally led to a concomitant rise in the strategic value of sea approaches to the newly established empire in the East. Not the least among such routes was the Gulf.10 _{While the}

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British influence in the Gulf can be said to have existed for one and half centuries, complete and effective British control over external access to the Gulf and some of the internal politics in most of the littoral states was more ephemeral, lasting only a few short decades.

The highest point of British concern over Gulf security and its ability to guarantee that security was reached during the decade of the 1930s. The next quarter-century witnessed a steady British retreat from its predominant position. In many ways, World War II marked a significant turning point and the beginning of the end of British imperial standing. While the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula were not the centre of attention during the war, they did play a role in the conflict. Bombing raids were conducted from Aden during the Italian East African campaign early in the war, and Aden and other airfields along the southern perimeter of the Peninsula were useful for convoy escorts and antisub-marine patrols. The Gulf and Iranian corridor was used as a key Allied supply route to the Soviet Union, and air routes through the Gulf and along the southern Arabian rim served as important links in the ferrying of men and material to the Pacific in the latter stages of the war.11 _{One lasting effect of the relatively minor}

impact of the war on the peninsula was the stripping away of the isolation that the British had imposed

However, for the entire duration of British involvement in the Gulf, which ended officially in 1971. The various treaties, agreements, and engagements that provided the legal basis for this foreign dominant power and its clients on the Peninsula and Gulf littoral were of a truly special nature. For the most past, Britain viewed its interests as essentially in the sea and hence adopted, more or less, a hands-off policy toward tribal sheikhdoms on land. “ Indeed the states were allowed

to fight each other as well, provided there was no breach of the Maritime Truce.”12

1.2.2 Anglo-Saudi Relations

For centuries, central Arabia was so isolated that it had virtually no relations with any outside power; (except occasionally with Turkey and Egypt) and was divided among different tribes fighting each other. The first sign of contact with Western powers came when Shakespeare, the British consul, was sent to meet King Abdul Aziz in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, in August 1914.13 _{By 1915, the first}

major contact with a Western major power had occurred. On December 26, 1915, Britain and king Abul Aziz signed a treaty that secured the latter’s benevolent neutrality and, in return Britain recognized Abdul Aziz’s undisputed sovereignty over Najd and Al-Hasa.14

As the Saud family reclaimed its dominance over Najd in 1902, and extended its control to most of the Arabian Peninsula for the next 32 years, the British thought it expedient to establish a frontier separating their own clients along the coast from the Saudi Bedouin armies. In 1922, Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner in Baghdad, drew up a border between rapidly expanding Saudi

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territory and British possessions in Kuwait and Iraq. But not until 1927, when the British mobilised an effective military force in Iraq and Transjordan, was the border an effective deterrent to Bedouin crossing the border at will.15

Moreover, in 1927, Saudi Arabia and Britain entered into full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, recognizing the sovereignty of Abdul Aziz as the king of Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies. Saudi Arabia acknowledged Britain’s rights in Bahrain and other political entities in the area. Relation with Britain remained traditionally good up to the late 1940’s, during which period Britain gained no new political or military privileges in Saudi Arabia.16 _{By 1949, relations had begun to deteriorate over the Buraimi Oasis}

issue.17 _{The Saudi government, in November 1956, severed its diplomatic}

relations with Britain because of the latter’s invasion of Egypt. It was not until January 1963 that diplomatic relations were restored. In short, Saudi -British relations from 1915 through 1950 were mainly concerned with fulfilment of boundary agreements concluded between them,18 _{and from 1964 to 1971, were}

concerned with the British policy in the Gulf, and the withdrawal from it.19

1.2.3 The Withdrawal from the Gulf

On 16 January 1968, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, announced in the House of Common the intention of the British Government to withdraw troops from the Far East and the Gulf by the end of 1971.20 _{The British decision}

aroused the concern of all the Gulf States, but those of the Lower Gulf were most directly affected by it in view of their special treaty relationships with Britain.The withdrawal from the Gulf was only the local manifestation of the broader process involving the dismemberment of the British Empire and the cumulative aban-donment of long-held East Suez responsibilities. The Peninsula and the Gulf constituted the tail end of retreat punctuated by exits from India (1947), Egypt (1954), Iraq (1958), South Yemen (1967), and finally the Gulf (1971).21

Withdrawal from South Yemen (also signifying abandonment of Britain’s last major military installation in the Middle East) turned out to be a long, involved process. It was acrimonious in the domestic British context, since it partly revolved around the debate over imperial Britain vs. “little England” and also bloody in the Aden context, as British presence there had faced increasingly violent resistance since the early 1960s.22 _{In contrast, withdrawal from the Gulf}

seemed far less painful. The military implications were negligible, since only a small naval facility in Bahrain and Royal the Air Force in Sharjah were involved. From London, the political impact was minimal. The prospect of eventual termination of all East-of-Suez commitments had had time to settle in the intervening years since Aden. Even though the Conservatives had decried Labour’s announcement of withdrawal in 1968, they were content to allow the decision to stand when they came to power shortly thereafter.23

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The impact of withdrawal from the Gulf was more substantial in political terms since it necessitated the formulation of an independent political framework for the small emirates along the Arab littoral, but the real impact was essentially psychological. As Britain had served as judge, arbiter, administrator, and, of course, protector of this littoral for well over a century, departure in 1971 was tantamount to removal of the safety net.24

Moreover, the British decision to withdraw from the area can be seen in perspective. The decision generated various reactions and repercussions and triggered a debate in Britain as to the political and economic merits. It drew the attention of the ruling authorities in the lower Gulf States (Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman) to the necessity of dealing with various political, security and economic issues that emerged in these states, as they were entering the era of independence. It had the dual effect of provoking rivalry and disputes among the states of the area. It also aroused the anxiety of the interested outside powers, mainly the superpowers, with regard to their interests there and their positions of influence in the surrounding region.

Some words about the past and recent environment of the GCC have to be mentioned: The Arab world has acquired an undeserved reputation for political instability. This is mainly due to two reasons, first, the permanent sense of crisis, punctuated by outbreaks of warfare, which has characterised the Arab-Israeli dispute since 1948, and second, the dramatic nature and consequences of the internal upheavals, which have taken place since 1945 in a few Arab states, in particular Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Most Arab countries are still ruled by the same regimes as in 1945. In this context, the Arabian Peninsula has exhibited a continuity which should make it the envy of the non-aligned world. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are still ruled by the same families and by the same traditions and patriarchal methods that were in place at the beginning of this century.

In recent times the governments of the small Gulf states and Saudi Arabia have survived a series of storms and vicissitudes, the tidal wave of pan-Arab socialism (Nasserism) in the Fifties and Sixties, the termination of British protection in the Sixties and Seventies, the access to vast wealth with the oil boom of the mid-Seventies, the collapse of the Iranian monarchy in 1979, a major war at the head of the Gulf between the two regional powers, Iran and Iraq from 1980-89, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in the beginning of the Nineties, , the war in Afghanistan, for the second time, and the war against terrorism since 2001, and last but not least the American occupation or “liberation” of Iraq in 2003.

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1.3 Methodology and Evaluation

1.3.1 Method

There are a few reasons why I have chosen to study the integration of the GCC: • in one of these Arab states of the Gulf, Bahrain, where I was born and lived the first twenty-three years of my life, in Arab culture and society I became familiar with the culture, thinking, and traditions of the Arabs of the Gulf, and the way they think about the integration of their countries in particular, and Arab unity in general.

• I have more often felt and identified myself as a person who belongs to the Gulf (Khalejee),25 _{and as a native I see things from a different perspective to}

those few foreign authors who wrote (with bias) about this integration. • it is the political and economic situations in the Arab states of the Gulf in

particular, and the Arab world in general, that have attracted my interest, especially as far as integration and unity are concerned. However, in the case of the Arab states of the Gulf, the question is how is it possible that tribal, authoritative, and autocratic regimes can come together under the same umbrella? Moreover, I believe that the cooperation and integration of the Arab countries of the Gulf 1981-2004 (with exception to Iraq) is particularly due to:

• the independence of some of these states from British protection, and the abrogation of its treaties (signed about more than 150 years ago) with them, which had an implication for these small, weak states’ security, and the stability of the region.

• the political development that took place around the world during the 1960s, and 19 70s, namely, the trend that might have gained ground, inter alia, as a consequence of the atomization of the political world into smaller entities that often crosscut cultural and ethnic communities. This trend is integra-tion. My interest here is to study the integration of these states, integration in specified cultural, geographical, political, and economic settings, and to argue that the GCC integration is unique and it has its own attributes and characteristics.

Before I discuss the applicability of the case study to our integrative case, I should, in short, give some meaning to this concept: A case study is a particular method of qualititive research. Rather than using large samples and following a rigid protocol to examine a limited number of variables, case study methods involve an in-depth, longitudinal examination of a single instance or event.They provide a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data, analyzing information, and reporting the results. As a result the researcher may gain a sharpened understanding

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of why the instance happened as it did, and what might become important to look at more extensively in future research. Case studies lend themselves to both generating and testing hypotheses26

One researcher suggests, that case study should be defined as a research strategy, an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context. Case study research means single and multiple case studies, can include quanti-tative evidence, relies on multiple sources of evidence and benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions. He notes that case studies should not be confused with qualitative research and points out that they can be based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence.27 _{This is also supported and}

well-formulated by another known researcher “The case study is a research approach, situated between concrete data-taking technique and methodologic paradigma”.28

It would not be difficult to see this study as a single- case study, with an explorative, explanatory and descriptive drive. This approach may, therefore, be described as expository. I have chosen to make these visible in every chapter, using mostly qualitative and partly quantitative techniques. Moreover, the empirical advantage of integrating a descriptive and explanatory direction into an exposi-tory method is that it is possible to predict the developments and the outcomes of a GCC integrative process. In this context, the expository approach helps to explain, inform, describe or define GCC integration vis-à-vis other integrative ventures.

Some researchers have seen certain advantages in using a case study method; these include the value and usefulness of qualitative case studies: (1) for understanding complex processes, where contextual factors are important to prevent oversimplified generalization. (2) When the purpose is exploration to ‘discover what otherwise would probably not have been discovered’ or ‘stimulate our imagination to think about alternative relationships, generate new ideas and to force the researcher to think differently. (3) Using case studies, ‘the researcher may look for previously unobserved factors in conjunction with new cases being added to previously known cases.29 _{I would argue that these three advantages are}

applicable to the GCC integrative venture; the case I study is complex, and we should exercise caution when we talk of this integration, as we are in essence referring to a significantly different cultural context.

Because, the GCC as an integrative case with unique feature, the qualitative method is not only preferred here but also heavily relied on. In the other hand, in this study, quantitative method is less relied on, but this does not suggest that quantitative methods are not useful, especially if one wants to track shifts or changes of the volumes of trade, numbers of meetings, and so forth

I draw on some concepts from existing integration theories to develop a conceptual framework for the nature and development of the GCC as a unique integrative effort (see chapter 3-2, the approach utilized in this study) with adequate consideration of cultural variables endogenous to the region.

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1.3.2 Questions

To help our understanding of this integrative venture, several important ques-tions revolving around the concept of integration, are raised. The main task of this study is to attempt to pursue such questions in their relevant contexts in order to draw conclusions about this integration. For instance, what are the circumstances under which the GCC emerged? To what extent is integration elite-inspired and forged, and to what extent, if at-all, is it mass inspired? What is the role of the GCC institutional structure in the integrative process, and to what extent does this process seem to be succeeding in all major institutions? What are the challenges facing the member states to achieve their objectives? What is the significance of the existence of a core within this integration? What are the integrative and disintegrative factors on the local scene, and how do they operate to hinder or enhance the integration? What are the major political dynamics of the region in which the GCC is an actor? What types of variables might shape the behavior of the two superpowers vis-à-vis the region in view of its strategic and economic significance? What general observation can this study render in term of the integration’s present situation and future viability in light of locally, regionally, and globally generated supports and stresses?.

The GCC is a new experiment in cooperation and integration. The circum-stances of its emergence and development over the two and half decades of its existence, as well as its interaction with the Gulf’s two powers -Iraq and Iran-suggest several propositions of a highly tentative nature.

1.3.3 Propositions

1) The GCC came into existence mainly because of the perception of pertinent political elites of an external military threat posed by regional and global environments following the British 1968 decision to withdraw from the Gulf by 1971, and the Iranian revolution in 1979.

2) The smaller the number of the member units of a prospective integration, the better the chances for its realization, and, then growth.

3) The more capabilities a core unit in an integration has, the greater the acceleration of integration of its units.

4) The more varied and developed the means of communication among member units in integration, the greater are the chances for integration to develop among the same units.

5) The GCC as an integrative venture of mostly small states, will hold, and hence be categorized as successful, as long as the major Western powers, in general, and United States, in particular, perceive such an integrative venture to be in their own national interests, or at least, not incompatible with those interests.

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1.3.4 Material

1) This thesis is primarily based on secondary materials and sources, which provide the background information and basic data for this study. Over the last fifteen years that is since the liberation of Kuwait (1991), there has been a large quantity of scholarly works including books and articles in both Arabic and English. Most of these books, articles, and newspaper are descriptive and do not deal with serious problems and questions of GCC integration, but, they have been helpful to this study.

2) I have relied heavily on hundreds of documents (mostly in Arabic) which they are valuable and important sources, and have relevance to the GCC structures and development, I have obtained them from the Headquarters of the GCC in Riyadh, in Saudi Arabia

3) I reviewed some surveys, and interviewed some officials, members of the intelligentsia, and important personalities, (many of them, for political reasons, did not like to be interviewed or named) in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE during my many visits to the area.

4) This study draws to some extent on sources such as: The satellite programs of GCC member states for information in Arabic. Internet: which provides some important information and basic data needed for this study; it provides the Websites of the opposition groups and their opinions of the regimes of the member states. Moreover, the internet provides good access to the best known world newspapers and libraries. Material in the body of this study may tend to support or refute the initial propositions mentioned above; a discussion of such propositions and the likelihood of their verification have to wait until the concluding chapter.

Moreover, I must mention here, that the GCC states’ regimes are dominated and ruled by strong rulers and their extended families, with highly authoritarian and paternalistic political systems. However, they want to be integrated and united in one organization with its supranational institutions, but, at the same time, they forbid and prevent their officials from being interviewed, whether in public, or in private, and, under such circumstances, it is very difficult to get access to information, unless one is lucky, or knows one, an insider, who has privileged information.

1.3.5 Structure of the Study

The approach utilized in this study is contextually oriented. Chapter 2 deals with the origin and nature of the GCC, and the GCC organizational structures and objectives based on the Council’s charter. Chapter 3 deals with the theoretical part of this integration. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the GCC development and achievements in economic and political fields in the period 1981-2004. (Actually,

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the whole study is concerned with the period 1979-2004, that is to say, beginning two years before its existence. Chapter 6 deals with the local disintegrative and integrative aspects of this integration venture. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.

When the GCC was formed, it was announced as a regional organization for promoting economic, political, social and cultural cooperation. Specifically, the charter requires that the participants recognize the inevitability of economic integration among their countries and a social merger among their peoples. In view of this, the GCC was set up with an organization and institutions that would make this integration a living reality. What kind of institutions and organizational structures? That will be the subject of the next chapter.

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C

T

T

O

N

GCC 1979-1981

Regional integration organizations have increased in the past few years and the importance of regional organizations in economics and politics is growing dramaticcally.The first integration organization appeared in nineteenth century. In 1828 Prussia established a customs union with Hesse-Darmstadt. Half a century later, the idea of European integration organization was re-invented. The first step was taken with the creation of European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. However, integration organizations are not exclusively European phenom-enon, but they have taken place in Latin America, North America, Asia, and Africa. In the Arab world three organizations were formed: Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), Arab Maghrib Union (AMU) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The first one does not exist any more and the second one is almost dead, only the GCC alive and strong. In the last 170 years many organizations around the world have been created. Table 2-1 provides some of the most important organizations in the past and present. Here some of these organizations with the year of their foundation and their objectives:

Table 2-1 Integration Organizations

Name of the organization Year Objective Bavaria-Wurttemberg Customs Union 1828-1833 Common tariff Middle German Commercial Union 1828-1833 Close Commercial ties

German Zollverein 1834 German Customs Union

Tax Union 1834-1854 German customs Union

with Common Tariff

German Monetary Union 1838 Fixed rate

Moldovian-Wallachian Customs Union 1847 Led to the foundation of Romania in 1878

Swiss Confederation 1848 Economic and Political Unification of Switzerland

German Monetary Convention 1857 Fixed rate

Latin Monetary Union 1865 The basis of this union was the French franc

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Name of the organization Year Objective

Scandinavian Monetary Union 1875 Based on Crown of 100 ore

Benelux 1944 Customs Convention

European Community(EC) 1958 Economic and Political Integration European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) 1960 Elimination of all tariffs on

manufactures by mid-1967 European Monetary System (EMS) 1979 Coordinate and Stabilize Exchange

rates

Gran Colombia 1948 Plan to establish a Great Colombia

Economic and Customs Union Central American Common Market 1960 Customs Union and Joint Industrial

(CACM) Planning

Latin American Free Trade Association 1960 Free Trade Association with

(LAFTA) Industrial Planning

Andean Pact (AP) 1969 Customs Union and Industrial

Planning

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 1973 Customs Union and Join Industrial Planning

Mercado Comin del Sur (MERCOSUR) 1991 Creation of a single in market in goods, capital, and people Canada-US Free Trade Agreement 1989 Removal of all tariffs and most

Quantitative restriction North American Free Trade Agreement 1994 Elimination of tariffs (NAFTA)

South African Customs Union (SACU) 1969 Customs Union

Communaute Economique 1972 Free Trade Area

de I Afrique de IOuest (CEAO)

Union Douniere et Economique 1973 Customs Union de I Afrique Centrale(UDEAC)

Economic Community of West 1975 Full economic integration African States (ECOWAS)

Southern African Development 1980 Cooperation on projects Coordination Conference (SADCC)

Preferential Trade Area for Eastern 1984 Elimination of tariffs on all goods and Southern Africa

Association of South Asian 1967 Free-trade area and common

Nations (ASEAN) industrial projects

Australia-New Zealand Closer 1983 Elimination of all tariffs and Economic Relations Trade Agreement Quantitative restrictions (ANZCERTA)

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 1981 Cooperation and integration in all fields

Asia Pacific Economic Coperation 1989 Free trade forum (APEC)

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2.1 Foundation and Emergence of the GCC

2.1.1 Antecedent Efforts at Cooperation

One cannot but be struck by the fact that among all these organizations involving the Gulf states there was no regional international organization dealing exclu-sively with the Gulf itself, as a political, economic, cultural, or ecological unit. Effort to create some kind of a cooperative framework for the Gulf dated from the late 1960s. But these earlier efforts were thwarts largely because of regional rivalries, especially those between Iran and Iraq. Other Gulf countries had also found it difficult to establish formal cooperative arrangements among themselves in the face of Iranian and Iraqi opposition. Similarly, the relatively low level of regional tensions restrained the impetus for cooperation among these countries. After the announcement of the planned British withdrawal in the early 1968, there was a flurry of activity concerning the possible creation of an international organization in the area. The UAE is itself a successful effort to avoid the maximum fragmentation. However, both Qatar and Bahrain opted for indepen-dence rather than carrying out the broader Federation Agreement they had entered into with the other seven Trucial States in February 1968.30

The idea of a Gulf collectively had been haphazardly advanced by Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia ever the since the period of British withdrawal. But was no enthusiasm among the smaller states for any framework whose main effect would be to advance Iranian or Iraqi hegemony in the Gulf. In 1975, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar set up the Arab Industries Organization, a joint effort to establish Arab-run armaments factories in Egypt, but this project was cancelled in reaction to Camp David. Saudi Arabia continued to promote a political framework in which it would play the dominant role. Gulf tours by Saudi king Khalid in March 1976 and Interior Minister in October 1976 led to very low profile agreement to share intelligence and internal security information.

In economic domain, the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consultancy was formed, with Iraq as a member, in November 1976, and the idea of a Gulf common market was proposed a year later. By 1980, however, the Gulf scene had changed dramatically, Iran, while in the throes of revolution and turmoil, was bent on exporting its ideology to other regional states, thus sharply increasing the other Gulf countries’ sense of vulnerability and insecurity. Later the same year. Iran and Iraq became engaged in a bloody war. As for the prospects for cooperation in the Gulf, however, the war did remove the obstacles presented by Iran and Iraq.31

2.1.2 Origin and the Establishment of the GCC

Any alliance or close combination of countries is founded, in the first instances on the perceived identity of interests among the parties involved and on an

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assessment that there is more to be gained in association that there is to be bad from isolation. The identities of interest may be of almost any kind, political, economic, military or cultural, but a common denominator is essential if a coalition of states is to have real substance and explicit purpose. The many existing international groupings, such as the Arab League, the Warsaw Pact (the cold war period), the European Economic Community, the Islamic Conference Organi-zation, may be disparate in constitution and differ widely in their objectives. Yet they all possess the thread of communality that binds together their members into an organizational fabric.

Long before the GCC came into being the six countries had talked about the formation of some kind of regional grouping. As early as 1976 the Foreign Ministers of the present members of the GCC plus Iran and Iraq, had met in Muscat at the invitation of Oman to consider a joint regional security and defence policy. The ministers could not agree in a common position and the idea languished.32 _{Later in the same year, Shiekh Jaber al Ahmad (the present 2004,}

ruler of Kuwait) the Crown Prince and Prime Minister then, suggested the establishment of a Gulf Union:

“to preserve the region security and stability in the face of political, economic and security challenges threatening this strategic area”.33

In 1978, (the present, 2004, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait at that time) Sheikh Saad Alabdulla AlSabah paid official visit to Bahrain, the UAE and Oman. Before his departure, the Prince announced, that:

“Kuwait has a complete framework for cooperation among all Arab Gulf states under present political situation”.34

Serious negotiation started in 1979, in Amman (Jordan) Arab Summit, the ruler

of Kuwait Shaikh Jaber al Ahmad has contacted the other Gulf Arab States leaders and suggested some thoughts concerning the establishment of a union among themselves, and in 1980 the Arab states political establishments discussed the matter officially.35 _{A meeting of Gulf foreign ministers on February 4-5 1981}

codified the Kuwaiti proposals, to establish a Cooperation Council of Arab Gulf States, which would provide a framework for cooperation, coordination and integration in cultural, social, economic, political and financial affairs.36

Following a further meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Muscat, on March, 9-10, the heads of member states of the Cooperation Council held then first summit meeting in Abu Dhabi on May 25-26, 1981. On the first day of their summit the rulers approved the statues of the new Council.37

The GCC states share common grounds and enjoy common links. Such ties can be summarized as follows:

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• The GCC states are located in a single geographical region and share common frontiers that facilitate travel and promote trade.

• The religious, linguistic and historical ties create a homogeneous unit, promoting mutual understanding on the official and public levels.

• The GCC states enjoy a long history of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral cooperation in various vital areas.

• The strategic location and possession of most of the world oil reserves lead the GCC states to realize the common dangers confronting them and to take the measures necessary to maintain the statue quo.

• The fact that they share similar political systems and interests, and face similar development problems, prompts them to pursue a policy of close cooperation and coordination.

• The desire to avoid duplication of industrial projects and to create a common market that would absorb their industrial production has inspired close economic cooperation, and eventually integration and unity.

Moreover, in examining what the GCC has achieved it is important to keep in mind that it is not only an institution but also an atmosphere involving commitment to cooperation. Therefore some things that have been accom-plished by one or more member states, rather than the Supreme Council or the Secretariat, nevertheless have drawn some inspiration and backing from the fact that the Council exits.

2.2 The Pre-integration Perspective

2.2.1 Socio-political Milieu

Until about four decades ago, the Arab states of the Gulf were in varying degrees poverty stricken. Agriculture was primitive and limited by desert conditions. The main economic activities were fishing, costal commerce, and pearling. The governments were basically tribal in natural and orientation. The family and the tribes were the principal bases of social organization. In general, the societies were dominated by tribal loyalties and religious norms.

The introduction of oil wealth began to change the situation radically. However, as a result, these states became modern, urbanized, and bureaucratically organized centres of regional and international finance and commerce.38 _With

some of them boasting the world’s highest average incomes per capita. Individu-ally and collectively, they came to play a role in area and global affairs far in excess of that indicated by their modest geographical and population dimension.

Moreover, the social structures of the Gulf States have characteristics different from those found elsewhere, that is, for instance, the absence of substantial indigenous working class, the flourishing commercial sector, the large state

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administration sector, the impact of peasants and nomads on political dynamics of the state.39

However, the affluence brought about by the discovery of oil has almost put an end to the tribal structure, and brought social mobility, increased literacy, improved the means of communication, increased the contact with the outside world, and so forth. These societies are now undergoing a rapid socioeconomic change with all the strains and stresses that this phenomenon might entail. This process, along with the nonplurality of the social structure and the low level of political participation and consciousness, helps to create the region’s unique situation.

2.2.2 Historical Experience

British domination of the waters and shores of the Gulf lasted over one hundred and fifty years, from the early decades of the nineteenth century until Britain’s withdrawal at the end 1971. Britain exercised political control over four Arab sheikhdoms - Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE-dictating defence and foreign affairs, but with little interference in the tribal structure and pattern of rule, because it neither wanted nor needed to. The form of colonialism that prevailed in the area was one of the prevention and exclusion. It differed in many respects from that exercised in Africa or the Caribbean. This resulted in a great measure of autonomy for the states, but it also contributed to the delay in political and economic development. While Britain did not control the remaining two states, Saudi Arabia and Oman, it did exercise considerable political influence over them.

2.2.3 Economic Structure and Underdevelopment

The oil wealth has its greatest impact in the Gulf states, which down to the 1960’s were very poor indeed and retarded. At that time most of the inhabitants made a living either by fishing and trading or by pearl diving. These countries have experiencing common trends of growth and development. The shared features include a large expanding government sector, ambitious industrial development programmes, and an ever increasing standard of welfare and income.

The creation of industrial sectors has necessitated as well a rapid expansion in infrastructure provision. However, these countries still have at present time, predominantly non industrialized single-resource economies whose strengths depend heavily on markets beyond their immediate surrounding. This is particu-larly true of Saudi Arabia, though the richest and largest among the six states can hardly claim to consume domestically over 300,000 BPD of its crude oil out 9, 6 million BPD it produced in 1981.40 _{In 2004, production reached 11 million}

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entrepreneurial spirit. None of the six states being able to feed itself from its own agricultural produce, and most food have to be imported.

The nature and structure of their economies seem to suggest that the extent to which economic integration takes place depends more on deliberate and planned action by the Council authority, rather than the gradual, smooth and functional pattern characteristic of the highly industrialized economies.

2.2.4 Variation in Size and Capabilities

The states of the GCC vary widely in both territorial expanse and means of power in a way perhaps unparalleled in the case of any contemporary regional group-ing.41 _{In term of size the states range from Saudi Arabia’s 2, 200, 000 sq. Km to}

Bahrain’s 676 sq. Km. 42 _{As to human resources, again, Saudi Arabia with its 11,}

450,000 inhabitants over (22m in 2004) and Qatar with its 310, 000 inhabitants in 1985(over a half million in 2004). 43 _{But it is really in GNP percapita, that the}

variation is sharp too. Oman with its population almost as that of the UAE, but Oman with percapita $ 6240, and the UAE with $ 21340 in1983. 44 _{That is, in}

national income, that the variation is the sharpest, again, Saudi Arabia, with total revenue of $127, 8 billions in 1981, commanded more than the other five combined with $57, 7 billions.45

2.3 Main Characteristics of the GCC Formation

2.3.1 External Factors

The process of integration among developing countries is much more affected by regional and non regional governments, than those, process of integration among the industrialized countries. The fact, that the GCC is composed of states, though, they are rich in their financial resources, they generally small, by definition economically underdeveloped, and militarily weak, the “outside world “ will have relatively greater impact on them than they are likely to have on the outside world. There were many external factors influence the formation of the GCC, principally, this refers to regional actors, global powers, and non state actors, and their relationship to the formation of the GCC in terms of their roles and interests.46

That is, the formation of GCC was direct response to the situation created by series of events in the region and around the world in the end of the 1970’s, these included, the emergence of Marxist state in Ethiopia, the downfall of the Shah’s regime in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, outbreak of Iran-Iraq war, and oil market developments.

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2.3.2 The Core of the GCC

According to Deutsch and his co-authors, that, all the historical cases they have studied, together with their data, suggests that;

“Wider political communities have been built and integrated primarily around the cores of political and economic strength, and of social or cultural attraction, provided by large state.”47

Saudi Arabia is the largest and most strong, and important member of the GCC. The superiority in both territorial size and material resources has enabled Saudi Arabia to provide a core area for the development of the GCC, and is likely to play a crucial role in how it develops. It has the human resources that the other five council members lack. It also has the world’s largest proven oil reserves. It has acquired its international significance from its role as the world’s largest oil exporter. Additionally, Saudi Arabia occupies a key strategic position. It lies across the air routs between Europe and the Far East, and dominate two great sea routs - the Red sea and the Gulf- through which a majority of Western oil flows. It has also inherited a key political role because of the presence of the Moslem holy places.

Unlike the EEC – an alliance of relatively strong states – the GCC has one dominant member, Saudi Arabia’s role as follow:

“The Saudis are pushing the GCC for political reasons. They want one big happy family. And there can be no doubt that the Saudis were the driving force behind GCC creation, and the Council headquarter / secretariat, is located in Riyadh.” 48

Saudi Arabia has the means to subsidize the integration with all the socioeco-nomic and political implication that might be involved. A discussion of whether this core orientation will be accompanied in the long run by a gradual shift in loyalties from the peripheries to the core will be put off to a later chapter.

2.3.3 Security Orientation

Concern over the security and military defence of the Gulf, have steadily intensified over the course of the twentieth century. At the same time, the actors assuming responsibility for the security of the Arab Gulf states have changed. Furthermore, as perceived threats to the security of this area have changed, so have the means-and thus the strategies- to defend the area. Britain exercised primary responsibility for the security of this region because of its predominant position in the Gulf through world war 11 and continued to be directly concerned with the area until final withdrawal in 1971.

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world war 11, it was not until after 1971 that the United States became increasingly and directly concerned with the defence of the region. However, in 1981, the question of security of these states, particularly in the light of territorial problems in the region, came to assume first priority.49

In fact, the matter of survival might have charged the integration with sense of urgency seldom matched elsewhere. Moreover, the sense of security has been obtained now, that the GCC is a reality, is probably more psychological than material.

“The second half of the Cold War was marked by decline of the OAS, the OAU and the Arab League and the emergence of sub-regional frameworks for security”50

It must be emphasized here that it was the perception on the part of those concerned that unity was more likely to discourage external ambitions than disunity, at least from an internationally legalistic and moralistic perspective.

“The GCC has started as an alliance for the purpose of internal and external security.”51

The internal security of the Gulf states is also came to assume a high priority, the Gulf states came to realize that coordination, and integration of their security capabilities, they will not be able to solve the economic, social, and political problems individually. And they can certainly assure their future security by collective actions.

2.3.4 Political Nature of the GCC

The integration of the six Gulf States is primarily a political act brought by deliberate action of political elites. Its politicization has thus been abrupt, not gradual, and this integration indicates both a shared conception of common interest and a perception of a profound security threat.

The Western European conception of spillover is alien to this integrative experiment. In fact, if there is any spillover at all, it runs in an opposite direction, that is, a spillover from politics to economics exist in the form of planning for economic development by relevant political elites. Moreover, the Gulf States see the integration of their states neither as an end in itself, nor as integration of nations, but integration of tribes within much larger sphere-Arab nationalism.52

2.4 GCC Organizational Structures and Objectives

For the time being, and in some ways, the GCC follow the confederalist approach, though in a somewhat modified form owing to member states to abandon some

36

of their sovereignty on some issues. However, confusingly, the GCC shares some of the features of a confederation and a federation, that is, institutionally; of course the GCC is far from a complete federal or confederal structure. Nevertheless, the first Secretary-General of the GCC Bishara described the GCC as follow:

“The GCC philosophy is that it is a confederate structure whose aim is total

unity, we move on the basis of this perception.”53

Figure 2-1 The Organizational Structure of the GCC Council

Moreover, he described the GCC organization as follow:

“The GCC is a forward looking organization and embodies the aspiration of the member states, but we embrace change only when it is peaceful, based on persuasion and consensus.”2

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Table 2 -2 Most Active regional bloc in 2004-2006)

Regional Area (km2_{) Population GDP (PPP) per capita Member}

bloc ($US,millions) states

EU 3,977,487 460,124,266 11,723,816 25,480 25 CARICOM 462,344 14,565,083 64,219 4,409 14 ECOWAS 5,112,903 251,646,263 342,519 1,361 15 CEMAC 3,020,142 34,970,529 85,136 2,435 6 EAC 1,763,777 97,865,428 104,239 1,065 3 CSN 17,339,153 370,158,470 2,868,430 7,749 10 GCC 2,285,844 35,869,438 536,223 14,949 6 SACU 2,693,418 51,055,878 541,433 10,605 5 COMESA 3,779,427 118,950,321 141,962 1,193 5 NAFTA 21,588,638 430,495,039 12,889,900 29,942 3 ASEAN 4,400,000 553,900,000 2,172,000 4,044 10 SAARC 5,136,740 1,467,255,669 4,074,031 2,777 8 Agadir 1,703,910 126,066,286 513,674 4,075 4 EurAsEC 20,789,100 208,067,618 1,689,137 8,118 6 CACM 422,614 37,816,598 159,536 4,219 5 PARTA 528,151 7,810,905 23,074 2,954 12

Source: wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooperation Council Oct. 2006

The Council may be looked at as a legal step presented by a Charter accepted by all member states, while integration is a process that can be lengthy and frustrating. Before we get to this process, however, a presentation of the institutional setting of this organization is in order.

The GCC is organizationally composed of three principal bodies; the Supreme Council, a Ministerial Council and a Secretariat-General. But, the GCC is unlike the EU, the GCC has no Budget (only operational Budget), no Parliament,54 _and

no Court of Justice.55

2.4.1 The Supreme Council

The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the GCC, and consists of the six heads of state, or their deputes in case any of the former should be unable to attend for any reason. The Council meeting annually in ordinary session, and emergency session if demanded by two or more members. The presidency of the Council is undertaking by each state in turn according to the Arabic alphabetical order of the names of member states. Meetings of the Supreme Council are considered valid if attended by two-thirds of the member states, at which each has one vote and it takes decisions on substantive, as opposed to procedural, matters by unanimous consent of those chiefs of state participating, while a majority is enough to approve those of

38

procedural nature. The Supreme Council draws up the overall policy of the organization; it discusses recommendations and laws presented to it by the Ministerial Council and Secretariat-General in preparation for endorsement; it appoints the Secretary-General and approves the budget of the Secretariat-General.

Article 10 of the Charter establishes a Commission for Settlement of Disputes, which is to make recommendations to the Supreme Council for resolving either disputes between member states or issues with respect to interpretation of the Charter. The Supreme Council is to select the members of the Commission for each dispute referred to it, with nominees to be drawn from member states (at least 3 persons) other than those who are party to the issue at hand.56_{Moreover, there}

is the Advisory Commission (Council), or some times called Consultative or Conciliation Committee for the Supreme Council, an outcome of the 1997 GCC Heads of state Summit in Kuwait and convened its first meeting in Kuwait on November 7 of the same year.57 _{It is a 30-member body, chosen according to their}

experience and qualification for a period of three years, with seats equally distributed among the six member countries composing the GCC, it provides advice and suggestions on subjects referred to it by the Supreme Council.58

Moreover, this Committee is attached to the Council to serve as a mediator in cases of disagreement between members. Decisions of this Committee are binding as to interpretation of the rules.59_{In 1998 summit, the Supreme Council}

expressed its happiness with the start of its functioning, and entrusted it with the task of studying the economic, social, cultural problems in the member states. Based on the proposal presented by the Sultanate of Oman, the Supreme Council approved that Commission should have a permanent headquarters in, Sultanate of Oman.60 _{The Commission held its fourth meeting in Oct 2004 in Muscat.}61

Cognizant of impediments to regional integration, GCC leaders made difficult compromises by adopting a Charter that would allay the fears of member-states and satisfy their different aspirations. The Charter reflects their desire to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the region, provides a process through which integration could be achieved, and exhorts member-states to make the sacrifices necessary for integration. It also spells out the means for achieving GCC objectives and stipulates the institutional structure that gives effect to the community.

Most regional groupings in the Third World are characterized by weak supranational organizations. In neither Latin America nor Africa have national leaders demonstrated much willingness to establish regional associations with sufficient resources and autonomy to expedite integration. The special Latin American Coordination Commission, (CECLA) created in 1964 for the purpose of collective economic bargaining with foreign countries and international organizations, soon became known as “Latin America’s floating crap game”. The name came from its extremely weak institutions; no permanent headquarters and no secretariat, and any member could call a meeting provided it hosted and financed the conference and prepared the documentations.62