Why Women Take to the Streets of Minsk: An Interview Study of Female Protesters' Motivations

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Why Women Take to the Streets of Minsk

An Interview Study of Female Protesters’ Motivations

Mathilda Gustafsson

Bachelor’s thesis, 15 credits December 2020

Political Science C

Department of Government Supervisor: Katrin Uba Word count: 13840 Pages: 38

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Abstract

While there are numerous examples of research investigating who would protest and why, the research fields of social movements and political participation have not done enough to understand the motivations of women in protest. Nor are there enough studies of the mobilisation of women in anti-regime protest in a post-communist context. This thesis investigates what motivates women in non-democratic settings to participate in protest, despite the elevated costs and risks given the context. It examines Belarus, a protest movement where women have taken on a prevalent role in the protest movement of 2020.

The research design is a within-case study using the method of in-depth interviews. I conduct interviews with ten Belarusian female protesters who are found primarily via a snowball sampling technique. The transcribed interviews are analysed using a framework of collective and selective incentives. The study finds that discontent with the government and belief in the movement’s success are significant motivations, while there is not belief that their own participation will enhance the likelihood of success. Results also show that respondents were motivated by the violence used against protesters, a newfound sense of community between Belarusians, solidarity with protesters, the peaceful repertoires in the movement and group belongingness with other women. Taken together, these results deepen our understanding of protests as motivations in themselves and of motivation as a resource, but foremost of why women protest. The results might incentivise more research to be made on women’s role in protest and motivations to join social movements.

Keywords: authoritarian regime, Belarus, collective incentives, motivations, political participation, protest, selective incentives, social movement, women.

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Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible had it not been for the participation of the ten female Belarusian protesters, who took the time to explain their thoughts and views in the interviews conducted. Neither would it have been possible without the kind people helping me find respondents to talk to; which is why I want to thank Alesia Rudnik, Belarusian political analyst at Karlstad University; as well as the anonymous people whom I approached through social media and who, while not wanting to talk themselves, found people around them who would. Finally, I want to thank my supervisor, Katrin Uba, for guiding me in the writing of this thesis.

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“A woman not only made it to the election, but she won it, and it empowered all the women in this country. And we became

drivers of this protest, and we became the drivers of change in our country.”

29-year-old woman from Minsk, Belarus

1 Introduction

In the aftermath of the 2006 Belarus elections came a wave of protests, following the pattern of the Colour Revolutions in neighbouring post-communist countries. Thousands of people took to the streets of the capital Minsk, in the country often referred to as ‘the last dictatorship of Europe’. Five days after the protest was initiated, it was countered by police. Finally, the protesters had to recognise themselves as defeated. In the wake of these events the Belarusian government, led by Alexander Lukashenko, took stronger measures against political opposition while also fighting the influence of independent media (Markus, 2010). Nevertheless, following yet another loss for the opposition in the 2020 presidential election, allegedly because of election fraud, the Belarusian people rose again. White and red flags were once more waved in protest marches. Women were in the forefront, dressed in white, they occupied the Lenin square in Minsk holding flowers while pleading to the riot police to end their brutal violence against protesters. This time, it would seem, the Belarusians were not going to be defeated so easily. Their endurance as well as their strategies have changed. But what lies behind this change: why is this time different from the last and why are women now in the forefront of the regime-opposing movement?

While we do have general knowledge on who would protest; the research field has not done enough to understand the mobilisation of women in anti-regime protest in

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authoritarian states. Furthermore, I would argue that it is crucial to understand not only the group-level of protest participation, but also the individual level. As studies on the individual level have primarily been conducted through investigating voting behaviour, these cannot be generalised to concern motivations of people protesting in non- democratic settings. To fully understand why women in Belarus have found the motivation to stand up against the oppression of the regime, we must research their protest behaviour on the micro-level by asking for their incentives.

Social movement and political participation research have often asked questions about why some participate while others do not (see e.g. Verba, Nie & Kim, 1972; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Norris, 2002). This research on political participation has focused primarily on why people participate in elections within a democratic setting.

Theories that should not be expected to be applicable to an authoritarian context, having been developed in a setting so different. Neither should theories, generated from the understanding of political participation in elections, be expected to explain protest participation in relation to non-democratic elections. Other questions frequently asked regard which groups are expected to protest and why (see e.g. Gurr, 1970; Gamson, 1975;

Tarrow, 1989). Without taking into account that separate individuals make up a group, methods used to understand social movements have commonly been qualitative (e.g.

Murdie & Peksen, 2014). While these scholars have attempted to understand groups, their theories cannot be applied to individuals. These methods cannot capture the emotional and subjective motivations that explain a single individual’s choice to join a protest. The question of why some individuals choose to participate is attempted to be explained by Pippa Norris (2002) through two factors: individual resources; and individual motivation.

However, to fully understand the choice of a person who goes out to protest, I believe we must study motivations meticulously. Although resources are important in facilitating action, they do not ignite it.

1.1 Purpose & Aim

The aim of this study is to deepen the understanding of what motivates women in non- democratic settings to participate in protest: why do they choose to participate, given that they have the resources to do so? And if they do not hold resources: might motivation compensate for the lack of resources? The purpose is furthermore to understand these

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collective or selective ideas: are women’s protest behaviours primarily motivated by the goal achieved for the collective, or rather by the intrinsic value perceived by that individual? Moreover, it is relevant to study an authoritarian setting where the risks and costs associated with participation are elevated, in comparison to a liberal democracy where protest is merely an addition to institutionalised forms of political participation.

Despite all constraints, why would women in an authoritarian country choose to protest?

This query leads me to examine the case of Belarus, where women have taken on a prevalent role in the protest; and to the research question:

What motivates women in Belarus to participate in the protest movement of 2020?

This research question guides the thesis, using a research design of a within-case study set in Belarus. The method used is in-depth interviews conducted in a sample of ten female protesters from Minsk. After having transcribed the interviews, the material is analysed using an analytical framework of collective and selective incentives. The results find that both types of incentives serve as motivation for the respondents. While they do not believe in the importance of their personal participation; there are high levels of discontent with the government and strong belief in the cause, however slightly less belief in the success of the protests. Violence used by the regime against the protesters is an important incentive for almost all respondents. Importantly, the selective incentives are highlighted as significant motivations to protest: to show and feel solidarity with other Belarusians and other women, to feel that they have at least tried to make a change, to be amongst hundreds of thousands of people. Perhaps most importantly: feeling that they are all standing together, being a community.

The subsequent section will give a brief background of the political state of Belarus and elaborate on the context preceding the protests as well as outline some important milestones in the protest movement in Belarus 2020. In the following third section previous theories and research on political participation, social movements and protest mobilisation will be presented. In the last part of this section the theory used in this thesis will be specified. The fourth section provides an understanding of the research design and method as well as the analytical framework. The fifth and sixth section presents the results of the study and discusses them in relation to previous research. Lastly a summary of the findings of this thesis, together with suggestions for future research, are outlined.

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2 Background & Context

The Belarus of today can be traced back to 1994, when the country held its first presidential election. Its birth corresponded with the landslide victory for Alexander Lukashenko, president to this day. Up until today, the president has continued to increase his powers through amendments to the constitution. Furthermore, he has restricted independent media and work of NGOs while also removing political opposition and critics (Markus, 2010). Belarus is often referred to as ‘the last dictatorship in Europe’ (see e.g. Marples, 2005; Bennett, 2011; Wilson, 2011), a criticism evoked primarily by the president’s authoritarian style leadership (Markus, 2010). The constitution in Belarus was changed in 2004, allowing the current president to be re-elected indefinitely. Although presidential elections are regularly held, there is seemingly no reason to believe that there will be a change in leadership. Especially since elections are frequently criticised by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for fraudulent vote counting, also condemning the elections as neither free nor fair (Ibid, 2010:121). Belarus has also been deemed as ‘not free’ by Freedom House (2020) with a score of 19, where 100 is the most democratic.

The year 2020 in Belarus has, as well as the rest of the world, been coloured by the covid-19 pandemic. But it has perhaps mainly been coloured by the presidential election in August. In the run up towards the election, two of the main opposition candidates were barred from registration, Viktor Babariko and Valery Tsepkalo. The injustice in registration gave rise to the first protests in July, according to Makhovsky (2020).

Babariko had already been detained after an alleged coup d’état in June, charges that were later changed to regard economic crime. In the time before the presidential election almost all of Lukashenko’s main rivals were either put in detention or under investigation. This continued to spark anti-government protests (Ibid, 2020). Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya stepped into the shoes of her husband as his candidacy was evoked and he was placed in jail. She then remained as one of the few candidates still allowed to register for the election, known as the ‘reluctant opposition leader’ (Specia, 2020). She quickly became the face of the opposition, gaining the people’s support, despite having no previous experience in politics. Soon she was joined by two other female politicians, Maria Kalesnikova and Veronika Tsepkalo. They formed a trio representing a new era of women

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victory for the sitting president; with 80.08 % of votes for Lukashenko and only 10.9 % of votes for Tsikhanouskaya. The opposition had counted on a majority win and immediately claimed election fraud. Simultaneously, the Belarusian people took to the streets to protest against the results in the biggest protest since Lukashenko came to power (Roth & Auseyushkin, 2020).

In the first nationwide protests, following the allegedly rigged presidential elections, authorities used violent methods against protesters. Government forces even threatened to use sharp ammunition on protesters (Walker, 2020). These actions led up to the first women’s only protest in Belarus, a movement now known as ‘Women in White’.

Female demonstrators organised a peaceful protest to demand an end to the violence that erupted after the night of the election, emphasizing purity and peace by dressing in white while holding flowers. Many women joined actions after their sons and husbands had been jailed and beaten by police forces. Several women participated in a protest for the first time in their lives (Goldsmith, 2020). Protests continued into the fall. In October, the opposition called for a national strike: the ‘people’s ultimatum’. Crowds turned out holding the white-red-white flags, now a symbol of the Belarusian anti-government movement, several bands of drummers joined the marches. The national strike was mainly an attempt to shut down workplaces and stop the use of national products in order to sabotage the Belarusian economy (Walker, 2020). It did not, however, make a lasting impact. To this day, in December 2020, an end to the protracted anti-regime protests seems far away. Still, protesters gather in the streets for weekly protests, while police try to force the movement to an end (Devitt, 2020). It is the stubbornness of the female protesters that I will attempt to understand in the following sections of this thesis.

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3 Theory & Previous Research

Firstly, this section will briefly outline the most established theories for explaining protest movement behaviour and political participation. Secondly, it will present some of the research on protest behaviour and the motivations for it in an authoritarian context.

Thirdly, it provides examples of research on women’s participation in protests, moving closer to the case of Belarus. Finally, it will highlight which theories will constitute the theoretical framework in this thesis.

3.1 Social Movement & Political Participation Theories

In order to explain social movement mobilisation on a general level three theories are commonly used: (1) relative deprivation theory, (2) resource mobilisation theory, and (3) political opportunity structures theory (Murdie & Peksen, 2015). Relative deprivation theory argues that relatively disadvantaged groups of people are expected to protest (Gurr, 1970). Resource mobilisation theory, on the other hand, claims that groups with resources, such as education, information and stability, are expected to protest (Gamson, 1975). Meanwhile, political opportunity structures predict that settings of political opportunity will make people more prone to protest, where aspects like the political system and the size of civil society are important (Tarrow, 1989). These theories do not admit an intrinsic value in the individual participation alone. Rather, these theories primarily explain which groups participate; if it is those with grievances or those holding resources; as well as under what circumstances people will protest. They do not help us understand, however, the motivation of individuals and their mobilisation. Despite that motivations are crucial to our understanding of protests.

Additionally, three common reasons to account for individual participation in protest are the following: biographical availability, political engagement and structural availability. Biographical availability is the absence of constraints, such as full-time employment or responsibility of childcare, that is argued to facilitate protest participation.

Political engagement means that factors such as political interest, information and perceived political efficacy should increase an individual’s likelihood of protesting.

While structural availability suggests that the presence of interpersonal networks facilitates recruitment to activism, like being part of an organisation and having civic

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Murdie & Dursun Peksen listed above, these theories explain which groups would be expected to protest. No explanations of why a specific individual would want to participate are however suggested. Some insight on why individuals would or would not protest is provided by Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman & Henry Brady (1995), where they suggest that individuals do not participate in protest because: (1) they do not want to; (2) they cannot; (3) they were not asked to. There are however little explanations of why an individual would want to participate.

Whereas the above-mentioned theories are the most established in social movement research, yet another is worth mentioning in regard to individual participation: theory of emotions (Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta, 2000; Jasper, 2016). The study of emotions in social movement derives from a critique against the assumption in social movement theories that individuals are rational. In sociology, emotions have been researched extensively in relation to social life. Nonetheless, when examining social movements, the framework of emotions has not been used as frequently as the theories above (Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta, 2000:73f). Meanwhile, it has been contended that rational thinking requires emotion and that therefore one cannot be possible without the other (Bray et al., 2019). While arguing that in collective frame theories the perceptive and rhetorical processes used by movements to recruit members are associated with emotions, Goodwin et al. (2000:72) contends that it is rarely discussed what motivates people actually doing something. This demand is in part met by so-called ‘injustice frames' developed by William Gamson, Bruce Fireman & Steven Rytina (1982), who argue that negative emotions produced by threats and blame are important to study to understand motivations to protest. Additionally, studies on collective identity are maintained to, in part, reflect a desire to capture emotional motivations for protest, although these are rarely discussed.

However, the concept of identity is often used to depict a sense of solidarity among members of a social movement (Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta, 2000:73). While this sense of solidarity has been understood through studying how a collective movement prevails, what is still missing is more research on whether it might be a motivation for the individual protester in a collective movement.

Moreover, according to rational choice theory, a rational individual should not participate in protest if the costs of participation outweigh the utility of a probable outcome. As the outcome is a common good that the individual will still be able to enjoy the benefits of, regardless of participation. Yet they do choose to participate which is known as the ‘paradox of participation’ (Bäck, Teorell & Westholm, 2011). This paradox

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is especially salient in an authoritarian context where the costs are high, and the probability of success might be low. Still, people do participate, even in the least likely cases of success. There are two explanations to this phenomenon: collective incentives, the presumption that individuals consider the opportunities to influence the outcome possible and; selective incentives, the benefits that apply only to the individuals that participate and that can be enjoyed regardless of the outcome. Selective incentives can be further disaggregated as follows: (1) to comply with a social norm, where the alternative is to be exposed to social sanctions; (2) expressive incentives, commonly illustrated with a sports supporter rooting for their favourite team in front of a television; (3) the strength of party identification, where participation is a way to express loyalty; (4) radicalism, the opportunity to express intense political opinions in company with like-minded individuals; (5) entertainment value, the activity in itself is exciting to the individual, who might as well enjoy the company of other participants (Bäck, Teorell & Westholm, 2011).

Meanwhile, collective incentives are explained by the ‘collective interest model’ which contends that individuals will participate in protest activities given that: (1) they have high levels of discontent with the current provision of public goods by the government or regime; (2) they believe that collective efforts can be successful in providing desired public goods; and (3) they believe that their own participation will enhance the likelihood of the collective efforts’ success (Finkel & Muller, 1998:39). While most social movement theories have attempted to understand collective mobilisation with primarily the collective incentives suggested by Finkel & Muller, I would argue that the selective incentives have not been as diligently investigated.

Several scholars have also stressed the importance of integrating gender into the social movement research field (Waylen, 1992; Einwohner, Hollander & Olson, 2000;

Zemlinskaya, 2010; Jasper, 2016). In their effort to do so, Einwohner, Hollander & Olson (2000) suggest that the following factors are gendered: (1) composition; (2) goals; (3) tactics; (d) identities; (4) attributions. Again, these theories are provided in order to understand the collective, but not the individual, in social movements. While these factors can be used to understand the extent of which a specific movement is in fact gendered, they do not discuss the individual motivations to protest, which might also be gendered.

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3.2 Previous Research on Protest in an Authoritarian Setting

Whilst studying the Plzeň uprising in former Czechoslovakia, Laura Bray, Thomas Shriver & Alison Adams (2019) uses a framework of emotions when finding that high- risk activism in an authoritarian setting can be mobilised by structural and incidental grievances. The study finds that those with pre-existing grievances, such as class position, in the Plzeň uprising were more likely to cite political motives for their participation, while those without pre-existing grievances motivated their participation with a recent reform; both of the groups had emotional bases for participation, albeit anger because of the reform or a sense of political commitment from class identification. Conclusively, although anger was triggering participation, hope allowed protesters to endure while also believing that they could attain actual change (Bray et al., 2019). While it is important to highlight that motivations came from hope and belief in collective efforts, and while the authors do use a framework of emotions to understand the protesters, they do not consider whether motivations might also have come from an intrinsic value in the participation itself. Furthermore, do the authors neither consider gender as an aspect in their study.

Joshua Tucker (2007) uses a collective action framework to rationalise around why the Coloured Revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia broke out. Findings show that the common factor resulting in the outbreak was major electoral fraud. Tucker (2007) argues that citizens with higher beliefs of the probability of success in combination with lower expectations of costs following participation are more likely to participate in protests after electoral fraud. Especially major electoral fraud, as the probability then of success is higher in the eyes of the protesters; while also citizens with more grievances against the regime should be expected to participate in the same type of protests (Tucker, 2007:544). These findings, that citizens with greater belief in the probability of success are more likely to participate, are again favouring collective incentives in protest movements. Considering that the protests in Belarus followed a presidential election, and an alleged electoral fraud, these findings are interesting to have in mind. However, the study did not focus attentively on attitudes or motivations, but rather on political structures and grievances, perhaps not discerning the selective motives.

Additionally, in a study of another non-democratic context, Lynette Ong & Donglin Han (2019) make a comparison between China’s rural and urban areas in regard to protest behaviour through a quantitative study. Their primary focuses are on factors of resources, as well as rewards compared to risks, which they believe to be unique to protesters in

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authoritarian states. Interestingly, there are contradictory hypotheses of whether or not individuals with higher income and levels of education will be more inclined to protest:

they both have more to lose, which speaks for the risk being greater than the rewards;

while they have more resources, speaking for resource mobilization theory. Their discoveries show that the opportunity cost of higher education outweighs the resource- enabler effect, as well as support for the theory that individuals participate in protest for reasons of interest firstly (Ong & Han, 2019:232f). These findings from research in an authoritarian context primarily show collective incentives of a possible change among the protesters, and individuals being more inclined to participate if they have more to win from the change, as well as a lower cost of participation. No selective incentives are mentioned, again in line with earlier findings that prioritise collective incentives in explanations of protest participation (Bäck, Teorell & Westholm, 2011). While these studies have helped us understand protest in authoritarian countries, more must be done to understand individual motivations to participate in protest in these settings.

3.3 Previous Research on Women in Protest Movements

In later years, researchers have published more in relation to women’s role in social movements (see e.g. Waylen, 1992; Taylor, 1999). To better understand women’s movements, Murdie & Peksen (2015) perform a cross-national study with data of women’s and non-women’s protest, while applying the most established social movement theories: relative deprivation theory, resource mobilisation theory and political opportunity structures theory. They reach the conclusion that women’s social movements follow the same general patterns as do social movements overall. While they do study women’s movements, they do not study women in other movements. Additionally, as they study movements on the group level, they cannot tell if women’s motivations to protest stand out from the general patterns. Finally, Murdie & Peksen (2015) conclude that while the data is global, it does not examine the variance within each world region and country. Therefore, further studies could expand by specifying region- and/or country-specific factors that might instigate women’s protest (Murdie & Peksen, 2015).

Relating to these recommendations, the study performed in this thesis both explores a region- and country-specific context: that of Eastern Europe and more specifically Belarus. It also examines a protest context in which women’s presence have been

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prevalent without engaging in a ‘woman’s’ issue. Studying women on an individual level, findings might also be able to tell us more.

Georgine Waylen (1994) finds in her study of women’s role in democratization processes that conditions differ when comparing democratization movements in Latin- America to those of Central- and Eastern Europe. The most significant difference is that while women, and women’s movements, have had a prominent role in the democratization processes of Brazil, Argentina and Chile, this was not the case in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Perhaps is this also why more studies on women’s role on Latin American democratization movements have been made (Waylen, 1994). In the Chilean transition to democracy women’s movements were prevalent both against and in favour of the regime (Noonan, 1995). In her study, Rita Noonan (1995) examines how and why women mobilised in Chile, while modifying and extending the concepts of political opportunity structure and collective action frames. It is suggested that the manner in which ideology and cultural themes are framed could provide opportunities for protest in an authoritarian context. Women in the contemporary Chilean women’s movement used stereotypical ideas of women as housewives in the campaign and the slogan: “We want democracy in the nation and in the home”. The author describes the irony of women using Pinochet's conservative ideology of traditional womanhood in their struggle to deteriorate the state (Noonan, 1995). What is also emphasized is the way in which, all through the different women’s movements in Chilean democratisation, motherhood has been used as a framing technique in their protests. And moreover, that women might have been successful in ways that men were not because their power resided in informal, private arenas; this leading up to a critique against political opportunity models that both tend to neglect cultural opportunities, while also being gender blind. This despite women being key to understanding activism under conditions of state repression because they are

“typically considered non-political (and therefore nonthreatening), they are responsible for family and community care. [...] it seems that they are key actors in the mobilization against repressive states because of the way in which their activities are framed” (Noonan, 1995:107). While framing of a social movement has been researched extensively, the framing of the movement by its members has not been investigated enough. Although the movement collectively might have been framed to the public as one of motherhood and family care, this is not necessarily why women chose to participate in the movement. This is why we must engage more in research on the individual level with an insider

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perspective. We must also conduct more research in Central- and Eastern European states to understand why their patterns have been different.

Contributions to research on women in protest have been made through studies of the Euromaidan protest in Ukraine. A movement in which women played a pivotal role and made up around half of the participants (Onuch & Martsenyuk, 2014; Nikolayenko

& DeCasper, 2018). Olga Onuch & Tamara Martsenyuk (2014) investigate the changing repertoires in the Euromaidan protests and compare the role of women with their male counterparts. Arguably, gendered language of violence, militarism and patriotism have been a much-debated phenomenon in feminist international relations literature (Onuch &

Martsenyuk, 2014:117). The authors explain how the Euromaidan went from a peaceful mass protest with equal participation between women and men to violent repertoires and general militarization. While men were on the frontlines, women engaged in the background. Although women played a crucial role in the protests, these protests were from the beginning unequal and gender norms were reproduced among participants (Ibid, 2014). Interviewed female activists bore witness of a gendered division of labour: women would help during the day, cook, compiled lists of missing persons and provide food and supplies while men provided security, threw Molotov cocktails and engaged in battles (Onuch & Martsenyuk, 2014; Nikolayenko & DeCasper, 2018). Especially when protests spiralled into violence, women were turned away from the barricades by men ‘for their own safety’. Patriarchal views on the role of women as ‘mothers’, ‘weak’ and ‘beautiful objects’ were reproduced on the Maidan (Onuch & Martsenyuk, 2014). Building on findings from Onuch & Martsenyuk (2014): that concerns about the quality of life and human rights abuses were the main reasons for protesting in the Euromaidan, while women were more motivated than men by police violence, Olena Nikolayenko & Maria DeCasper (2018) choose to study women’s motivations to protest on the Euromaidan.

Based on in-depth interviews they uncover a range of motivations, the primary ones being dissatisfaction with the government, solidarity with the protesters, civic duty and motherhood. Solidarity with protesters was a significant motivation, especially towards spouses and friends. Women who were mothers provided a rationale for protesting from motherhood, consistent with Nancy Naples’ (1992) concept ‘activist mothering’, broadening the traditional definition of mothering, encompassing nurturing work for the community as a whole (Nikolayenko & DeCasper, 2018:746). Research on women’s participation has only recently begun to understand women’s motivations to protest,

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explain it. Although Nikolayenko & DeCasper make an essential contribution to the field, this thesis can add on their findings while using an established theoretical framework to better distinguish between different types of incentives to participate in protest.

In sum, previous research has not sufficiently investigated the motivations for which women choose to protest in a setting where costs and risks are elevated. This despite the fact that theories of rationality continue to argue that they should not in fact protest. While there are examples of scholars scratching the surface, I believe that we can come closer to understanding motivations of protest participation in authoritarian regimes through the use of in-depth interviews during an ongoing movement, rather than questionnaires or aggregated data. In order to understand the motivations better, a theoretical framework of selective and collective incentives will be used to separate between, as well as to analyse, the answers from the interviews. This framework is chosen in order to understand if earlier results have ignored one part of motivation, the part that is not only about the perceived success of a movement. Before the results are presented, the research method will first be described in detail.

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4 Research Design & Method

This section will outline the research design and method, which have been chosen with regards to the aim of the thesis: a within-case study of Belarus using the method in depth- interviews. The ethical principles that are used will be presented and discussed. As will the sample that I have used for this method, consisting of Belarusian women having protested in Minsk after the election in August 2020. And finally, the operationalisation of the theoretical framework is outlined.

4.1 Research Design

In order to examine the motivations behind women’s participation in protests, the best way to do so ought to be by asking them directly. To provide unbiased results where the respondents are unaware of the protest outcome, I have chosen to investigate the motivations of individuals who are currently in the act of protesting. These reasons, and the ambition to explore an authoritarian context, forms a basis for case selection. A case has been identified where a protest movement is currently ongoing and where the role of women has been reported as important: Belarus. This serves as an ideal setting for this within-case study. To my knowledge, this is the only country in Eastern Europe where large scale protracted protests are occurring.

According to Esaiasson et al. (2014:262ff) in-depth interviews are used: (1) when going into an unknown field; (2) when wanting to understand how people perceive their own reality; (3) when the objective is to develop theories and/or concepts; (4) when testing a theory, although it is not the primary method for the cause; (5) as a complement to other research. Apart from the first point, the following four will be relevant to the aim of this thesis. Moreover, there are two types of interviews: informant interviews, where the person is consulted as an expert witness of a specific event, and respondent interviews, where the individual’s thoughts, feelings and experiences are the focus. In this study, the interview will be conducted with respondents, as motivations are captured not by testimony but through thoughts and emotions (Esaiasson et al. 2014).

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4.2 Ethical Principles

The four main ethical research principles in social sciences yielded by the Swedish Scientific Council, Vetenskapsrådet, are: (1) The Principle of Information: participants shall be informed about their part in the project and be aware that their participation is voluntary; (2) The Principle of Consent: the scientist shall gather information from the participants with their consent, participants choose themself to what extent and in which ways they participate; (3) The Principle of Confidentiality: all details about identifiable persons shall be stored and presented in such a way that outsiders are not able to identify them, especially regarding ethically sensitive information; (4) The Principle of Utilisation: information about individuals collected for the purpose of science may not be used for commercial or other non-scientific purposes (2002). These ethical principles are followed diligently during the work process of this thesis, as they are of particular importance when conducting an in-depth interview study. It is also important to consider whether or not to guarantee the respondents anonymity. As the case of Belarus is especially precarious and the respondents are currently taking part in illegal demonstrations against the authoritarian regime, they are guaranteed complete anonymity and the respondents’ safety is prioritised.

4.3 Sample Selection

Following the first established contact with protesters, a snowball sampling technique is used to find additional protest participants to interview. The first respondents are found through social media (Instagram and Facebook), chat groups (Telegram), and through contacts provided by Belarusian political analyst Alesia Rudnik. Because of ongoing demonstrations, a global pandemic, as well as the scope of the essay, it has not been an option to find respondents by being in Belarus physically. Seeing as the protesters are performing an illegal act when participating in non-approved unorganised events in Belarus, finding respondents who are willing to trust someone coming from the outside, is a difficulty. Therefore, using a snowball sampling technique helped as the first respondents could guarantee the safety of the next one. However, when interviewing respondents, one usually wants diversity in the sample, which is difficult to obtain in a snowball sample: there is a risk that the respondents come from the same social circles

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and that they are therefore similar in regard to background. This limits the generalisability but not enough to render the method inappropriate.

In addition, it is important to consider whether or not men should be included in analysis, to compare the female respondents’ replies against the male respondents’ views.

As this study is interested in understanding women’s motivations by themselves and not in relation to men’s, I have chosen to only include women.

Another important aspect is that of language. The author of this thesis does not master Belarusian nor Russian. There are thus two options for conducting interviews with the protest participants: either to conduct them in English, with persons who master the English language; or to conduct the interviews in the respondents’ mother tongue with an interpreter present. Only conducting interviews in English might lead to a somewhat biased result. Not all Belarusians speak English and we might expect that those who do are more privileged and have a better education than those who do not. It is also more common in the younger generation to speak English. I have however chosen to conduct the interviews in English. Despite the limitations in the sample selection, the perceived weaknesses give the sample strength considering resource mobilisation theory and biographical availability theory (Murdie & Peksen, 2015; Schussman & Soule, 2005).

Seeing as that the respondents hold both an at-large biographical availability: not having children and being young; as well as holding several important resources: higher education, full-time work, available information; and for the simple reason that they have in fact participated in protest; I make the assumption that these individuals had all available resources and reasons to participate, while I want to know why they made the choice to do so. This sample does therefore serve as a most-likely selection.

The ten women who are respondents in this study are between 22 to 35 in age. They all live, or have lived, in Minsk, and they have all primarily participated in protest movements in the city of Minsk. None have been politically active other than in elections before, something that is not surprising as political engagement has been suppressed in Belarus. Some have been engaged in civil society organisations. Two of them state that they have parents who have been active in the opposition. All of the respondents have a higher education, several on a bachelor’s level and some on a master’s level; they are all employed and have a stable income and a home. For the respondents’ safety, they have been anonymised.

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4.4 Method & Material

The in-depth interviews took between 35 to 65 minutes and mainly consisted of open questions drawn from a semi-structured interview guide, presented in the appendix (section 9) The open questions allowed for the respondents to associate freely, especially regarding their motivations and emotions, but also in their narratives of street protesting.

Follow-up questions were used to precise and clarify information and translation, while also encouraging the respondents to elaborate on their sometimes-brief replies. Examples of questions asked during the interview is both of a simpler character such as: “How old are you?”; “What is your level of education?”;“Did you vote in the election in 2020?”; as well as open ended-questions such as: “In what way have you participated in the protests?”; “Could you explain what you want the mass demonstrations to lead to?”.

Interviews were conducted in November and December of 2020 using the video call service Zoom and were all recorded with the respondents’ consent. The material that will be used for the analysis and that will yield the results for this thesis is the content of the ten interviews.

4.5 Analytical Framework

What needs to be encompassed in this last part of the method section is the analytical framework. The research question that is sought to be answered using my research method is why women choose to protest, despite the costs and risks that they might be exposed to. The first step to do so is asking the right questions during in-depth interviews, whereas the second step is to ask the right questions to the transcriptions from the interview replies. As I will use a frame of collective and selective incentives to do so, I shall first outline what indicators will be used to determine how the content of the transcribed interviews should be interpreted in terms of selective and collective incentives. The results will be presented in the next section. In the discussion I will use previous research to compare the results with.

Collective incentives will be operationalised in three parts, that I have adjusted from Finkel & Muller’s (1998:39) original indicators (see section 3) to better suit this particular case: the protester expresses (1) high levels of discontent with the government; (2) belief that collective efforts can be successful in providing the desired outcome; (3) belief that

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their own personal participation will enhance the likelihood of the collective efforts’

success.

Selective incomes will be operationalised in five parts, while these parts are borrowed from Bäck, Teorell & Westholm (2011:77-78), I have again made small adjustments to better suit my case. The indicators are the following: the protester expresses (1) a will to comply with social norms and/or a fear of social sanctions; (2) a will to express an opinion to the public, without necessarily believing that this will change anything for the collective good; (3) strength of group identification/a will to express loyalty and/or solidarity with a political group; (4) a will to express radical/intense political opinions with like-minded individuals; (5) an excitement for the activity in itself and/or the company of other participants. I have chosen to interpret the third (3) subcategory slightly more broadly to only ‘group’ than the original ‘political group’ in this operationalisation. This is because there have not been any particular political groups in Belarus other than the ruling side and the opposition, because of the long, extended presidential rule of president Lukashenko (see section 2).

Additionally, I have added two open categories called ‘other’ for both collective and selective incentives in the event that the indicator does not correspond fully with the indicators of the different categories but still correspond with the general incentive. See Table 1 for an overview.

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Table 1. Framework for analysis using theory of collective and selective incentives.

Incentives Indicator

Collective:

(1) Discontent with government Individual expresses high levels of discontent with the government/the government’s actions.

(2) Belief in collective efforts Individual expresses belief in and/or hope for success of collective actions to achieve the wanted outcome.

(3) Belief in personal participation Individual expresses belief that their own

participation will enhance the likelihood of success.

(4) Other collective incentives Individual expresses the collective good as primary motivation in other way than mentioned above.

Selective:

(1) Social norms Individual expresses will

to do as their social network and/or fear of social sanctions.

(2) Expressive incentives Individual expresses will to proclaim own views and ideas to the public, seen as a goal in itself.

(3) Group identification Individual expresses will to show solidarity with/be part of a political group.

(4) Radicalism Individual expresses will

to show intense/radical political opinions with like-minded individuals.

(5) Entertainment value Individual expresses

excitement for the protest as an activity in itself and/or the company of other participants.

(6) Other selective incentives Individual expresses participation in protest as an intrinsic value, without corresponding to the indications above.

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5 Results & Analysis

The transcribed interviews will in this section be analysed by first categorising the replies according to the analysis scheme given in the previous section. Using the framework of collective and selective incentives, I will attempt to find the motivations to protest.

Following this section, a discussion will be presented, to provide a deeper understanding of what the results indicate in relation to previous research.

5.1 Collective Incentives

This part of the section follows the analytical framework presented in the previous section, with regard to collective incentives. They will be presented by the means of quotes from the transcribed interviews in an order following the subcategories: (1) discontent with government; (2) belief in collective efforts and; (3) belief in personal participation. No quotes needing the fourth category, (4) other collective incentives, were found.

Based on the interviews, I consider the level of discontent with the government high with all the respondents. Firstly, there are some concerns regarding the general ruling of the country and the situation of Belarus in regard to the economy and people’s living standards, e.g.: “[I]n our country, it is very difficult to find a job” (R1, 2020). Moreover, several protesters claim to be dissatisfied with the perceived oppression of the regime.

One respondent makes an example of freedom of speech, that she hopes to see in the future if the government is overthrown:

I want the younger generation of Belarus not to worry, or like that they don’t have to think

‘Can I protest?’, ‘Can I say what I actually think?’ and for them not to worry about getting into prison for it, you know? (R2, 2020).

Additionally, some concerns regard the election results. Despite them not seeming to have been a surprise considering former elections. As said by one respondent: “[E]veryone in Belarus, they know that the votes will be falsified” (R5, 2020). And yet, several claim that an important reason for why they went out to protest was because of the election results:

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The first time [I joined the protest] it was about the candidates who were imprisoned. And later it was just about the truth. We were, uh, all lied to about the election, so uh, we didn’t know the real results in the election (R3, 2020).

Nonetheless, the discontent is mostly connected to the oppression by the regime and the violence used by government forces in relation to protests: “They are criminals with blood on their hands, the blood of their own people” (R10, 2020). One respondent says that while the first days of protests were about the election results, they quickly turned into being about the violence from the government side:

So, we went into the streets because of [the fraudulent election results] and in that time, police had murdered the first person. And now there are at least 15 dead because of the protest […]

they were very cruel: they beat people up, they killed people. In the first two or three days, and then the following ones, they were about fighting the situation where they are so cruel to people (R3, 2020).

Several of the respondents talk about the violence used by the government forces as their main, or one of their main motivations, to join the protests; both the violence and torture in detention centres as well as against political prisoners being held (R2, R3, R4, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, 2020). The respondents see this violence as an explanation for why the presence of women is so substantial, seeing as “a lot of mothers and wives came out to the streets because they could not live with the thought that their children and husbands are being beaten and tortured” (R4, 2020). Having exposed them to both what they consider poor governance as well as to violence and cruelty, several express a wish to remove the government and president from power: “I want our illegitimate president to leave his post” (R2, 2020), and “I would want to see a new government, a new president”

(R10, 2020). They also express a strong desire for justice:

So, I want to stop the violence. And basically, it is my wish, that I want to send to jail all the people who have done that harm: I want charges for all the soldiers, for all the policemen who have ever raised a hand on people from their nation (R2, 2020).

When expressing the goals that they have with the protests, several emphasize the common objectives framed by the collective movement: for the president to step down, to have free and fair elections, for all release political prisoners to be released, for fair trials against those responsible to be held, and to change the constitution to its original

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form (R2; R4; R8, 2020), one also adding “ to stop the cruelty” (R6, 2020). Meanwhile some focus solely on the first goal: to remove the sitting president (R1; R5; R9; R10, 2020). Not until they are explicitly asked do some express a wish to see their country become a democracy. But the hopes that are highlighted give some indications of a more just political system. One of the respondents expresses hope to see a decentralisation of power: “I think it is the best way, when people from one district decide if they want to build a new park or a new kindergarten […] I want to live where I can decide what will happen near my home” (R1, 2020). Whereas others draw examples from the United States of America: “[E]ven if you are [only] choosing between the Republicans or the Democrats in the USA, this is still democracy” (R5, 2020) Several mention that they have not trusted society to help them before, neither civilians nor the government. While also expressing hope for a future where they will be able to feel safe and even receive help from the state and support from the community (R2; R3; R7; R9, 2020).

Furthermore, there is predominant belief in the collective success of the movement among the respondents: “I feel like this war, this revolution, is the beginning of the greatest future that we could ever have imagined” (R3, 2020). In fact, all but one of the interviewees express some kind of recognition of the collective efforts’ success in bringing about the desired outcome (R1; R2; R3; R4; R6; R7; R8; R9; R10, 2020). The belief comes strongly from the collective and their solidarity with other Belarusians: “I have seen people who were ready to help […] We have great people here. And that is why I believe and that is why I am motivated” (R6, 2020). Or as yet another respondent phrases it: “[W]e feel that we have the strength, and that we have the brains; that we have everything that can help us beat the government” (R3, 2020). Another one expresses similar views:

And I felt like we were together and that people around you, they had the same ideas and views as you and we were definitely a nation and we were together and struggling with this issue and we can actually change something (R2, 2020).

Meanwhile, they express that they have realistic ideas of the outcome. Perhaps their goals will not be reached fully in the near future, but they will nonetheless be reached: “I am pretty sure that in the future, each and every one of us will continue our struggle and will continue fighting” (R9, 2020). There is, although the interviews were all conducted late November to early December, when the protests had been active for almost four months,

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[T]here is always hope that it is the last day that we go to protest and that the next day we will wake up to the news that everything we wished for has happened […] all of us have a bottle of champagne in the fridge (laughs). All of us. And we are one hundred percent sure that [we will succeed]. We are not hesitating at all. It is only a question of time (R4, 2020, my emphasis).

However, very few expresses belief that their personal participation will enhance the likelihood of success. As mentioned, the solidarity in the movement is strong, which is often referred back to. When replying to questions of their own participation respondents still use the word ‘we’, seemingly to underline that they are not doing this as an individual but as a collective. When describing her own participation in the protest, one of the interviewees concludes her account with: “It’s nothing special” (R1, 2020), accentuating that she does not perceive her own participation as an important contribution. Another respondent underlines her own participation as a need to make sure that she did everything to free her country, which can be interpreted as seeing her contribution as somewhat important, but more so for herself than for the outcome (R2, 2020). Of all the interviewees, the one that seem to put the most value into her own contribution said the following:

[…] but just the feeling that I stand for something that I believe in truly, and like hoping at least, if not knowing, that it is not in vain. That this is contributing to something, this fact that I go into the street, or that I send money, or write something. That this is all helping achieve some kind of common goal. And that goal would be for my country, and for the people I know, to live some sort of better, different, life (R8, 2020).

In sum, there is strong discontent with the current government, where the president is often the one who is primarily mentioned and seen as the symbol of the general ruling of the country. There is a weak belief in the individual participation that they themselves contribute with, whereas the recognition of the collective effort is strong. All respondent’s do in some way express belief that success in bringing the desired outcome can be obtained from the protest actions. Additionally, several express strong sentiments of solidarity with the collective.

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5.2 Selective incentives

After having underscored the collective incentives found in the group, this next part of the section follows the analytical framework presented in the previous section, now with regard to selective incentives. Quotes from the transcriptions will again be used to support my analysis following the order of the subcategories as they are presented in table 1: (1) social norms; (2) expressive incentives; (3) group identification; (4) radicalism; (5) entertainment value; (6) other selective incentives. As the reader will note, no indications of the subcategory (4) radicalism have been found in the respondents’ replies.

With regards to social norms, the findings are ambiguous. Firstly, it emerged during interviews that many respondents had first joined the protest alone without having been asked; they spontaneously went to a protest without having attended one before (R1; R6;

R7; R10, 2020). One respondent also explained that she had been a driving force in gathering people to the first protest event to which she attended (R3, 2020). Meanwhile, there are replies that indicated that interviewees are to some extent incentivised by friends to attend protest:

[W]e are just a group of friends that, like every week we check our plans and ask like: ‘Are you going?’; ‘Are you going?’; ‘Yes we are’, and we go to the station that I previously talked about and from there we go to the demonstration (R2, 2020).

However, this also suggests that they are also inspiring their friends to go. Not only do they then adhere to norms, they are responsible for upholding these norms themselves.

Another one expresses that when you do not feel the energy to go out, you will receive it from friends that ask you to go, saying that:

[S]ometimes you do not feel any energy to go out or organise, and then someone will write to you and ask like ‘Okay we need to go, everything will be okay but we need to show that there are a lot of us and so we need to go’ (R4, 2020).

The same protester goes on to express that it has become their “main civic duty to go out every Sunday for demonstrations” (R4, 2020), indicating a social norm that is located on a societal level. Another also indicates this sense of a collective pressure or ‘civic duty’

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to go out, again also obtaining motivation from the violence that others are being exposed to:

I could not stay in. When people were going out, protesting, I was like, I couldn’t see myself just staying home, watching a movie or something like that. Because I knew that there were people fighting back, and they were getting injured while they were doing something (R7, 2020).

Finally, there is a sense of responsibility toward those who are not participating because they cannot. Both to participate on behalf of them, but also to be able to report back to them. It creates social pressure from those who live outside the country: “a lot of my friends [are not in the country]; they want to know what is happening” (R1, 2020). While the social norms indicated are somewhat ambiguous, none of the interviewees express any fear of social sanctions, showing that predominantly positive aspects from social norms rather than negative are prevalent in this group.

Meanwhile, there are indications of expressive incentives in most of the interview replies: “[W]hen we saw the results of the election, I just knew what I needed to do. I wanted to show them that I don’t agree with them, in any possible way I can” (R2, 2020).

It is important to note that while this respondent has a feeling of wanting to express her views, she is not mentioning change in connection to her answer. Meaning that while there is a need to express her views, her motive is not the belief that this expression will affect the outcome. Similar incentives are expressed by most of the interviewees, saying that their motivation is simply to show to the public that they disagree with the government, expressed also by some as a way to ‘stand up for yourself’ (R4; R6; R7; R8, 2020). Another less obvious way to attest expressive incentives is the way in which they protest:

[The police] are becoming more aggressive, they feel that we are winning. That we are not giving up, that we continue fighting for our future and that we are still smiling, and that we are still peaceful and that we are still, that it continues to be peaceful. And they see it, they can feel it, and they are aggressive about it. […] I will never use violence to protect myself from violence (R3, 2020).

In her reply, this protester proclaims the importance in their strategies. Her motive is in the modes of participating, which is peaceful, while expressing the contrast to the violence used by police. Again, the respondent does not indicate that these strategies will lead to

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success, instead she sees an intrinsic value in the way in which she and others express their views. Furthermore, the need to see strength in numbers is proclaimed: “Somewhere we just wanted to show that we are the majority” (R4, 2020). A related incentive is indicated by yet another protester: “I felt like we needed to go out as well, just to see ourselves, how many of us would actually be there” (R10, 2020). Here the expressive incentives are in connection to the collective, as respondents wish to express their views together with other people. These incentives are also spoken of in connection to violence:

[T]he day after the election it was like a war here. I saw grenades and I saw people that were injured, many people were injured and one of them was killed the day after the election. And I understood that I must do something to stop it. But I also understood that I am just a little part of society, and I am not one to stop it all alone. But it was still important for me to go there and to say ‘Stop’ (R7, 2020).

In conclusion, these motives are related to unfairness and to stand up for what they believe to be right (R8, 2020). Seeing a dissonance between what one knows to be right and what is actually happening, and to finally say no:

From my childhood, my parents always taught me that it is not okay to lie, and that it is not okay to betray people. And those principles, this year, they clashed with the events and the election results. Because that was so unfair, when we all found out that we had been lied to, and that we made a choice and this choice was just ignored. And after this unimaginable violence that we saw, it all just made us finally stand up for ourselves (R9, 2020).

There are indications in the interviewees answers that they perceive themselves as being part of the general group that is opposing the government. An example of what has been considered belonging to the category strength of group identification is the following:

I want the Belarusian people to feel that they are all united, that they are all together and that is probably the main reason for us joining the protests because, before [these protest events]

we have never felt so united. We have never felt so strong before (R3, 2020).

As the reader might notice, the respondent speaks of the whole Belarusian nation as the group that they feel identified with. This is something new to the protesters that I spoke to. Some of them mention the United States of America as an example. They explain that

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will put up their flag in the garden” (R4, 2020). And that they have thought: “So this is what it feels like to be a Belarusian?” (R8, 2020). The sense of belonging to their own nation seems to be a strong motivation, and there is a clear before and after:

Let’s say I just feel closer to the rest of Belarusians now. It was always like, everyone else was just doing their own thing and trying to survive, each and every one of us. […] And now people are willing to do something for other people, and fight back for everyone, not just themselves (R7, 2020).

A second group that some respondents claim to feel a strength of identification with is women: “We went on the streets for the first time as only women […] and we went through the whole city and not a single policeman stopped us […] it was so inspiring”

(R3, 2020). It seems to be a will amongst some of the protesters to feel connected to the women who were peacefully protesting:

I saw it and I joined the demonstration [where a hundred women were standing with flowers], and it was amazing. These women, they were so nice, with their flowers and I could smell their perfumes and it was harmless (R6, 2020).

While another expresses similar feelings towards women, when she says that “there was a whole bunch of women coming past us, like the whole crowd and I felt joy in finding this sort of solidarity [with them]” (R8, 2020).

I did not find any indications of radicalism being an incentive for any of the ten women that I interviewed. However, with regards to the entertainment value there are all the more indications to fetch. Eight of the respondents showed clear signs of receiving satisfaction from the protest act in itself (R2; R3; R4; R5; R6; R7; R8; R9, 2020). While several express that they especially enjoyed certain demonstrations that were more like

‘national celebrations’, ‘city holidays’ or ‘music festivals (R2; R4; R6; R9, 2020). For example, one respondent saying:

[I]n the beginning it was like a national, not celebration but uhm, yes actually a national celebration, you know. There were a lot of people and we were in beautiful dresses with flowers and we had balloons and uh, I liked them because in those moments in that crowd you felt powerful and you felt like you were not alone (R2, 2020).

Yet another value was also seen in the sheer mass of people. Perhaps both sensing the strength, but also amazement, in the number of people who were participating together.

Why Women Take to the Streets of Minsk: An Interview Study of Female Protesters' Motivations