Spilling The Tea On Electoral Violence Prevention: Can technical election assistance prevent electoral violence?

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Spilling the TEA on Electoral Violence Prevention

Can technical election assistance prevent electoral violence?

AGNES CRONHOLM Master's Thesis

Spring 2021

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Supervisor: Kristine Höglund

Word count: 19,842

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1 Abstract

The international community has long sent democracy aid, and technical election assistance (TEA) has become increasingly popular in the last three decades. Despite these investments, little is known about the effects of TEA. This master thesis focuses on how TEA affects violence during elections and asks if and how does technical election assistance prevent electoral violence in some contexts and not in others? I argue the TEA that is provided to both state and non-state actors in combination can reduce electoral violence. I argue that this can make elections credible and that credible elections are less probable to turn violent. By conducting case studies on Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe using Structured Focused Comparison, this thesis finds that the hypothesis when a state receives comprehensive technical election assis- tance, it will experience a reduction in electoral violence gets limited support. The findings show that TEA can help reduce violence since violence was reduced in all three cases, but only two of them received comprehensive TEA.

Keywords:

Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, technical assistance, election violence prevention, electoral governance,

international democracy assistance, electoral dispute resolution

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Introduction

Violence during elections is a recurring phenomenon in the modern world: one out of five elections experience incidents of violence (Claes & von Borzyskowski 2018; Birch et al. 2020;). Examples are the recent invasion of the US Congress; the Kenyan 2007 election; and Côte d’Ivoire in 2010. The electoral violence in all these examples was lethal, with the number of deaths in the two latter cases exceeding 1,000 (BBC 2008; Birch et al. 2020). I adopt the common view electoral violence as a sub- category of political violence (Adolfo et al. 2012; Burchard 2015), that differs from other types of political violence in its timing, target, and motivation: the election period and people and objects connected to the election, are targeted as an attempt by the perpetrator to affect the electoral outcome (Höglund 2009). Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the MENA region are areas particularly afflicted with violent elections (Birch & Muchlinski 2018c).

The United Nations has worked towards peace and security worldwide since its establishment and since the 90s the international community has provided technical election assistance (TEA) to increase the level of democracy around the world (Daxecker 2012). The receivers of this assistance are often institutions involved in the electoral conduct, as well as non-state actors. One body of research finds that civil society programs, such as voter education and anti-violence campaigns, are successful in preventing the violence that elections can trigger (Collier & Vicente 2014; Smidt 2020). Other studies see state-aimed assistance, e.g., capacity building of electoral institutions and training police in election security, to be more effective in electoral violence prevention (Birch and Muchlinski 2018c; Claes &

von Borzyskowski 2019). To examine what assistance influences electoral violence, I ask the research question if and how does technical election assistance prevent electoral violence in some contexts and not in others?

The consequences of electoral violence are not only that people and objects are physically harmed but can also undermine the democratic progress of the afflicted state, as well as triggering armed conflict (Birch & Muchlinski 2017). Its indirect effects can be decreased voter turnout, discouraged candidates, and decreased faith in the electoral process (ibid; Burchard, 2015). In post-conflict states, this can trigger renewed conflict onset with all its consequences. Electoral violence is thus a meaning- ful phenomenon to study, since this can provide the international community with policy recommen- dations that could avoid the effects of this type of violence on elections and democratic progress.

Despite its significant effect on violence prevention, TEA research is scarce since the academic focus has been on election observation and left TEA “grossly understudied” (von Borzyskowski 2019, 2).

This points to a need to examine the effects of electoral violence strategies provided through technical

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assistance. Furthermore, the studies that have been conducted have chosen to examine either pre- or post-electoral violence. Hence, there is a lack of studies that include violence from all stages of elec- tions. This master thesis aims to fill this gap by conducting a qualitative study that will examine vio- lence from the whole election cycle.

I argue that TEA aimed at both state and non-state actors in combination, considered comprehensive TEA, is more likely to affect electoral violence. This is because it will increase the capacity of state institutions involved in the electoral process and the knowledge level of civil society. State-aimed TEA to state actors can make the institutions able to conduct credible elections and prevent and manage conflictual situations that risk turning violent. TEA can increase non-state actors’ knowledge about their electoral rights and responsibilities, and an informed civil society is able to assess election cred- ibility. If electoral stakeholders view the election as credible, they are more likely to turn away from the use of violence and instead use institutions to solve electoral disputes. I hypothesize that when a state receives comprehensive technical election assistance, it will experience a reduction in electoral violence.

This master thesis is a comparative, theory-driven, qualitative study that uses Structured Focused Comparison in its attempt to fill the gaps presented above by connecting the two phenomena TEA and electoral violence. A qualitative research design enables me to examine the steps in the causal story, which will help establish the temporal order. Moreover, this allows for nuances of the phenomena under study. I aim to and by examining violence during the whole election cycle to investigate whether comprehensive TEA reduces the risk of electoral violence. The main contribution of this thesis is to add a piece to the puzzle that is electoral violence prevention by conducting a small-N study of three elections: in Kenya 2013; Zimbabwe 2013; and Nigeria 2015. This study finds mixed support for the hypothesis since the TEA was comprehensive in only two of the cases, and all three saw a reduction in electoral violence.

To answer the research question, I will first present the previous research on electoral violence and the strategies used to mitigate this type of violence. Next, the key concepts will be defined and dis- cussed, to then be linked together in the theoretical argument, the causal story, and the hypothesis. I will then describe the research design, operationalize the variables, and argue for the selection of cases.

Next, the case studies will be presented case by case. I will then discuss if, and how the hypothesis

finds support in the results in the analysis. Finally, the conclusions and suggestions for future research

will be given.

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Previous Research

This section presents and discusses several fields and strands of previous research important to un- derstand the theory and its relevance. What will be discussed first concerns electoral violence, which countries that are at high risk of this violence, who use it, and what motivates them to use violence during elections. I will then go on to present research on international election aid and electoral vio- lence prevention. Both these themes are relevant to this thesis since they set the stage and show the gaps that this study aims to fill.

Electoral Violence

Elections are per definition competitive situations that divide societies into supporters of different political opinions and parties. Lindberg (2006, 43) argues that “[i]n ‘normal’ free and fair elections, we expect democratic-minded elites to accept defeat graciously – even if grudgingly – and to assume the position of a constructive opposition”. In unconsolidated democracies, on the other hand, elections are often flawed in this regard (Adolfo et al. 2012; von Borzyskowski 2019).

What separates electoral violence from other types of political violence is that it aims to affect the electoral outcome: it targets individuals, groups, or objects related to the election with psychological or physical violence (Höglund 2009). Noteworthy is that these different forms of violence are found to target genders differently: women are more often targets of threats and harassment, and men tend to be victims of physical violence (Bjarnegård 2018).

Straus and Taylor (2012) find in their seminal study on violence during African elections between 1990 and 2008, that no more than 42 percent of these elections were spared from violence. The Countries at Risk of Election Violence (CREV) dataset concludes that “only 3.47% of elections in the 1995–2013 period experienced no violent conflict of any kind” (Birch & Muchlinski 2017). Elec- toral violence is thus a common phenomenon in countries at risk of electoral violence.

Which countries are then at risk of electoral violence and what characterizes this violence? Scholars

find that in unconsolidated democracies, “where non-violent norms of mature democracies are not

fully developed”, elections risk turning violent, especially if the state has a history of political and

societal inequality (Adolfo et al. 2012, 2; Birch & Muchlinski 2018c). In these unconsolidated democ-

racies, the state often lacks the capacity to hold free and fair elections, as well as the ability to prevent

electoral violence (Adolfo et al. 2012; von Borzyskowski 2019). Norris (2013) finds that the relation-

ship between the risk of electoral violence and the level of democracy forms an inverted u-shaped

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curve, with unconsolidated democracies placed in the middle, thus risking experiencing more violence than both full-scale democracies and authoritarian regimes.

Several factors are theorized to enhance the likelihood of electoral violence. First, some scholars find that when an incumbent president is up for reelection increases the likelihood of violence increase (Taylor et al. 2017), and that electoral violence can enhance the chances for incumbent victory (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2018). Conversely, Arriola and Johnson (2012, 3) argue that ”in unconsolidated democracies where corruption, the everyday manifestation of patronage politics, can satisfy the interests of elites who otherwise have the capacity to organize violence in pursuit of those interests” electoral violence is less likely to occur.

Second, an institutional factor that has been found to affect the risk of electoral violence is the type of electoral system (Burchard, 2015; Claes, 2016; Fjelde & Höglund 2016). In contrast to proportional representation systems, majoritarian electoral systems tend to increase the stakes since the winner of the election will have control over state institutions (Fjelde & Höglund 2016). The political sphere in these states is “often exclusive, intolerant of opposition and sometimes militarised, not least in post- war states” (Adolfo et al. 2012, 1). This can increase the willingness to use violence to secure a place in political decision-making.

Ethnic polarization is relevant here since where “political exclusion follows ethnic lines, the exclusion is particularly likely to reinforce the development of grievances and encourage political mobilization”

(Fjelde & Höglund 2016, 304). Thus, if major societal groups fear or experience manipulation of the electoral laws, institutions, or the election result; or exclusion from political decision-making, electoral violence is more likely to occur (Adolfo et al. 2012; Birch & Muchlinski 2018c, 387).

Lastly, one study finds that states that experienced violence in previous elections have a higher risk of seeing electoral violence again (Taylor et al. 2017). This is entwined with the start of this section, as this is more likely in unconsolidated democracies.

Burchard (2015) divides the motives of electoral violence into two categories of intent: violence as a

strategy and incidental violence. The latter refers to violence that occurs spontaneously during elec-

toral protests or when supporters of rivaling political parties meet coincidentally. However, electoral

violence as a strategy is found to be used to influence the electoral outcome (Höglund 2009). Burchard

(2015) finds that this strategy is used to both mobilize voters and to decrease voter turnout of rivaling

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party constituents. This study focuses on the strategic violence that intends to affect the election outcome.

Election violence can occur during the whole election cycle, but scholars find that the different parts of the election bring different incentives for electoral violence (Höglund 2009; Lindberg 2006; Straus and Taylor 2012; von Borzyskowski 2019). Pre-election violence and violence on election day is found to be the most common electoral violence and is used as a mean to influence how and if voters cast their votes, which in turn will influence the result (Straus and Taylor 2012; von Borzyskowski 2019).

After elections, what is found to cause violence to be reactions to the announced result: either “the loser violently challenges the election outcome or the winner violently represses a peaceful loser chal- lenge” (von Borzyskowski 2019, 36; Lindberg 2006). Despite being less common, the scholarly focus has been on post-election violence (von Borzyskowski 2019).

There are three broad categories of actors that use electoral violence. The main orchestrators of elec- toral violence tend to be either the government and its allies, or opposition parties, but they can also be armed actors that are against the elections and reject them altogether. The ones these elites use as perpetrators of this violence are often affiliated armed groups, such as armed youth wings or guerilla groups (Burchard 2015; Höglund 2009). One body of research finds that state actors are the most common perpetrators of electoral violence, as they possess the monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Fjelde & Höglund 2016; Straus & Taylor 2012). Other scholars identify oppositions as the main perpetrators since they lack power over institutions and other means that enable them to alter election outcomes through fraud or vote-buying (Collier and Vicente 2014). Birch and Muchlinski through their CREV dataset find both these arguments to be supported: state actors commit most electoral violence, while opposition parties tend to use more serious forms when they do use violence (Birch

& Muchlinski 2017).

Preventing Electoral Violence

As a solution to the electoral violence problem, the international community has stepped in to support

the electoral process. Electoral assistance has become an important component of peacebuilding and

is provided by international and regional organizations such as the UN, OSCE, the European Com-

mission, AU, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and International IDEA to nu-

merous states all over the world. For instance, the UNDP supports elections in around 50 countries

every year (UNDPPA 2021). International electoral support can be divided into two categories: elec-

tion observation; and technical election assistance (TEA) (Carothers 2015). What is included in the

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latter is often tailored to the context, but it is essentially aimed at improving the capacity of state institutions to hold free and fair elections and educating civil society in electoral rights and responsi- bilities (von Borzyskowski 2019, 55; 62; UNDPPA 2021). Although TEA “in fact, [is] a rare Cinderella story of international election support”, and hence is considered a successful type of democracy aid, the research on this type of support is scarce: academia has mainly focused on election observation (von Borzyskowski 2019: 3).

Observers are the watchdogs of the election cycle, “with the potential of public ‘naming and shaming’

in cases when violence is used in relation to electoral processes” (Höglund & Jarstad 2011, 34). Studies have shown that international election monitoring can decrease the likelihood of election day violence

“simply by visiting polling stations on that day” (Hyde 2011, 206; Daxecker 2014). They can encour- age civilians to vote, can vouch for an election’s credibility and its results, and both reveal and avert fraud (von Borzyskowski 2019). There is however a “dark side” of election monitoring (ibid, 100).

The presence of a monitoring team might only shift the use of violence to the pre-election period, before the observers’ arrival (Daxecker 2014), or to polling stations with no observers present (Asunka et al. 2019). Furthermore, in cases where election observers deem an election to be fraudu- lent, it has been found that the credibility of the election is damaged, and that “opposition groups may find that violence is the most effective communicative tool to catch observers’ attention”, thus there is an increased likelihood of the loser violently challenging the result (Smidt 2016, 230; Daxecker 2012; von Borzyskowski 2019). Studies have found that the fear of triggering such violence affects observers’ decisions to condemn elections (Kelley 2012). Additionally, when an election is only partly free and fair, observer missions can be influenced by their desire to meet their goals, leading them to praise a flawed election (Kelley 2012).

The objective of technical election assistance (TEA) is, as stated above, to provide support to state institutions including, but not exclusively, the electoral management bodies (EMBs), to enable them to hold fair and free elections, with results recognized by all stakeholders (Birch & Muchlinski 2018c).

Since many elections in unconsolidated democracies experience violence during the election cycle, it

has been recognized as an electoral risk, making the designing of electoral violence prevention (EVP)

programs a vital task of EMBs and international organizations supporting these institutions (Birch et

al. 2020; Birch & Muchlinski 2017; 2018c).

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Scholars have debated how to compose EMBs to enhance their ability to conduct free and fair elec- tions. Some argue that EMBs should be designed as juridically independent and non-partisan institu- tions since electoral disputes can be avoided if the ruling party does not have exclusive power over the EMB (Lehoucq 2003; Mozaffar 2002). In contrast, Opitz et al. (2013, 714) state that “[i]nclusive and collaborative relationships, allow[…] political parties jointly to negotiate electoral issues” and hence argue that EMBs that include members that represent the different stakeholders in the election create incentives for non-violent conflict resolution.

The effects of different EVP strategies are debated. One body of research has found that strategies aimed towards non-state actors, such as voter education initiatives, are needed to alter the incentives to use violence. Collier and Vicente (2014) find that anti-violence campaigns aimed towards civil so- ciety in the forms of theatre, town meetings, and distribution of election information material reduce politicians' use of violence as a strategy to influence elections. Moreover, the authors find that civil society becomes empowered, that voter participation rise, and that the population feels safer as an effect of these types of campaigns. Smidt (2020, 212) finds that TEA-sponsored election education helped to bring about a peaceful election in Côte d’Ivoire and “reduced propensity to use political violence”.

Conversely, von Borzyskowski & Kuhn (2020, 16) find that “when violence is used as a campaign strategy, informed voters are more at risk than uninformed voters.” When politicians do not expect to be held accountable for their actions, they target voters that have received independent information about the election through media because they are “harder to sway through alternative campaign techniques” (ibid, 15). However, the authors continue to argue that this can be mitigated by having stronger institutions that can hold perpetrators of electoral violence accountable.

Claes and von Borzyskowski (2019, 28) find that increased capacity of EMBs “is associated with

perceptions of higher-quality elections, increased institutional trust, and less election violence” and that security sector engagement in Kenya and Liberia in 2017 was “was significantly associated with reduced election violence”. Although these scholars did not dismiss civil society-aimed assistance as worthless, they argue that the evidence supporting the effectiveness is weak.

However, Birch & Muchlinski (2018c, 387) state that “[b]uilding the capacity of electoral institutions

and transforming popular attitudes about the electoral context are […] both potentially viable means

of addressing electoral violence”. Hence, TEA that supports all stakeholders of an election, in the

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form of both civil society programs and support to electoral institutions can be effective EVP strate- gies (ibid; Bush & Prather 2018; Claes & von Borzyskowski 2019; Smidt 2020).

Identifying the Research Gap

How can international election support affect electoral violence? The effect of international support has received little scholarly attention. The studies that have focused on this tend to study election observation, leaving technical election assistance to be the “neglected stepchild of international elec- tion aid”, despite being “a – perhaps the – missing link in understanding the transition to truly dem- ocratic regimes” (von Borzyskowski 2019, 2; 157). To study this frequently deployed assistance is vital when trying to understand how international actors can best help unconsolidated democracies prevent electoral violence. The case studies done on TEA are often on a single case, which decreases the findings' generalizability to other cases (Collier & Vicente 2014; Smidt 2020). In her book The Credi- bility Challenge (2019) Inken von Borzyskowski conducts a quantitative study of countries in Latin America and Africa and examines whether democratic aid in the form of election observation and technical assistance prevents electoral violence. Some illustrative cases are presented in the book;

however, these case studies have some limitations. First, they are quite short. Second, they only con- sider either pre- or post-election violence. This is a limitation of not only von Borzyskowski’s book:

post-election violence is the most studied election violence, although violence can occur during the whole cycle.

This thesis aims to contribute to the research field by conducting a comparative qualitative study on

if technical election assistance to both civil society and state actors can be effective in preventing

electoral violence during the whole election cycle.

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Theory

In this section I will first present the key concepts in this thesis: electoral violence is defined, and technical election assistance is put into context. I will then explain the argument, present the causal story and the causal mechanisms. Lastly, I will present the hypothesis.

The Dependent Variable: Electoral Violence

I adopt the common view of defining electoral violence as a sub-category of political violence (Adolfo et al. 2012; Burchard 2015) but is, as Höglund (2009, 417) puts it: “separated from other forms of political violence by a combination of timing and motive. The time aspect relates to violence carried out during the election period. The objective of electoral violence is to influence the electoral process and in extension its outcome”. Moreover, what distinguishes electoral violence from other types of violence, is that it targets individuals linked to elections, such as constituents, election candidates, and election workers (von Borzyskowski 2019). Methods can be political assassination, assault, threats, and harassment (Höglund 2009; UNDPA 2016; von Borzyskowski 2019). Additionally, it can be vio- lence towards objects, such as burning ballot boxes. In sum, the incentive for using violence during the electoral cycle is to impact the election result (Adolfo et al. 2012).

Technical Election Assistance

The state institutions that are involved in the electoral process differ, but often include electoral man- agement bodies and the security sector. Although the conduct and design may vary, electoral man- agement bodies (EMBs) are commonly the institutions that are responsible for administrating and conducting free and fair elections (Catt et al. 2014). These bodies can also have titles such as the Electoral Council, Department of Elections, or National Electoral Commission. The core activities for these bodies can differ somewhat, but usually include being responsible for candidate nomina- tions; polling; ballot counting; announcing the result and managing potential appeals (ibid). Addition- ally, EMBs can monitor media, provide election information, facilitate voter education, and act as a forum for electoral dispute resolution (ibid). The security sector is involved in elections by guarding ballot boxes, providing security to campaign rallies, and disperse illegal and violent protests. Moreo- ver, cooperation between state actors and non-state actors can, as von Borzyskowski states, “help detect local tensions earlier, discuss incidents, address rumors, and resolve problems in a joint forum”

(von Borzyskowski 2019, 56).

As discussed in the previous section, many new democracies, previously under authoritarian or one-

party rule, are still under the transformation into consolidated democracies. Although there might be

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institutions in place, “the underlying structures of power in society and the norms governing the political system have often not yet been transformed” (Adolfo et al. 2012, 1). Hence, in unconsoli- dated democracies, state institutions often stand without the capacity to hold free and fair elections.

Furthermore, the civil society may lack information about their electoral rights and responsibilities, which could lead to a lack of trust in electoral institutions (von Borzyskowski 2019).

This lack of institutional capacity and trust can, as discussed in the previous research section, increase the risk of electoral violence (Birch & Muchlinski 2018c; Claes and von Borzyskowski 2019). Offe (1999) suggests two strategies to deal with this: one bottom-up, working with civil society to engender popular trust and respect in the electoral conduct; and the other top-down, concentrating on improv- ing institutional capacity to hold credible elections.

Election assistance has been critical for election credibility in unconsolidated democracies and has been deployed to over 100 countries since the 1990s (Birch & Muchlinski 2018c; ACE Project 2021;

UNDPPA 2021). For instance, the UN has provided support to 39 percent of all African elections since 1990 (von Borzyskowski 2019). The main providers of this support are the UN, through the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs and the UNDP; the United States, through the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES); and the European Com- mission. These organizations also tend to join forces to avoid overlapping interventions (ACE Project 2021).

The most frequently deployed type of election support is technical electoral assistance by international organizations (TEA), which is the independent variable in this thesis (von Borzyskowski 2015, 2).

TEA interventions are defined in this thesis as “organized programmes, undertaken or managed by bodies not based in the state in question”, often implemented long before the election day to “build the capacity of emerging democracies and semi-democratic states to hold credible elections” (Birch

& Muchlinski 2018c, 386; 387). TEA strives to bridge the gaps that state institutions are incapable of filling without this support. TEA activities can be divided along with Offe’s (1999) two categories:

state-aimed and non-state-aimed, as mentioned above

¹

. The activities in which the state is the target includes finding and renting offices for the EMB headquarter; developing the voter registration sys- tem; recruiting and training election workers, training the security sector; and reforming electoral law.

1 Birch and Muchlinski (2018) differentiates technical assistance (some of them referred to in this thesis as TEA with the state as the target) and “attitude-transforming strategies” (some of them referred to in this thesis as civil society programs).

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Non-state-aimed support can be civil society programs, such as voter education, youth programs, and peace messaging. In sum, TEA strives to avoid technical glitches that threaten the credibility of the election (von Borzyskowski 2019). As an empirical example, in Liberia, TEA by the UN both in- creased the capacity of the EMB and facilitated the 1997 and 2005 elections, and thus filled a “signif- icant gap in domestic capacity” which if unfilled would have made technical glitches inevitable (ibid, 96).

TEA is considered an election violence prevention (EVP) strategy, since “[i]ncreasing the technical skills and capacity of electoral actors to run credible elections and to cope with potentially conflictual situations ought therefore to reduce both election-related tensions and the likelihood that such ten- sions will result in violent outbreaks” (Birch and Muchlinski (2018c, 388). In this thesis, comprehensive TEA is defined as interventions that support both state and non-state actors in combination.

For the TEA providers to send support, the government of the state in question needs to make an official request; or the UN General Assembly or Security Council has mandated the intervention (UNDPPA 2021). It can be assumed that the incentive of the government to request TEA in some cases might be to prevent violence perpetrated by the opposition and not by state actors. However, since TEA can include training of the security sector “designed to enable state agents to diffuse tense situations without resorting to violence”, the TEA is assumed to be able to decrease violence com- mitted by both state and non-state actors (Birch and Muchlinski 2018c, 390).

The Causal Story

The Credible Election Theory (CET) developed by von Borzyskowski (2019) forms a base for the arguments in this thesis, with influences from other studies

²

. This theory has two claims: that TEA can affect the credibility of elections, and those credible elections are likely to be peaceful. This is because, as von Borzyskowski puts it, “if challenges occur, losers should be more likely to challenge peacefully (through institutions)” (ibid, 125). I build on these claims and argue that elections that receive international technical assistance that includes support aimed towards both civil society and state actors, TEA I define as comprehensive, is more likely to be able to prevent electoral violence than if only one of these types of actors receive assistance. I will now go on to explain why I argue that comprehensive TEA leads to reduced electoral violence.

2 Birch & Muchlinski 2018; Opitz et al. 2013.

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Figure 1: The Causal Figure

The units of analysis in this thesis are elections. The mechanism through which TEA is argued to be able to prevent violence during elections concerns election credibility. This credibility is defined as when elections “are (perceived as) free of technical glitches and political interference”, gaps that TEA aims to fill (von Borzyskowski 2019, 13). To be credible, two criteria concerning the two types of TEA must be met.

The state-aimed TEA aims to increase institutional capacity. The UNDP defines capacity as when institutions are able to “perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sus- tainable manner” (UNDP 2009, 53). When state institutions are of high capacity, these institutions are able to administer a credible election. As argued in an IFES handbook (Darnolf & Cyllah 2014, 19), “the most valuable asset any EMB can possess is credibility, which can significantly increase election security”. High-capacity institutions can prevent and manage conflictual situations that risk turning violent in at least three strategies. First, capable institutions can provide a venue for dispute resolution between political parties, during the whole election cycle since they can mediate or act as a forum

³

for solving electoral grievances and disputes on a national or local level. This connects to election credibility because political elites that have faith in and respect for the electoral institutions and the elections, they administer are more likely to trust the result the EMB announces, and hence find the election credible (von Borzyskowski 2019, 151). If they, and other election stakeholders, find the election and its institutions credible, they are more likely to use institutional conflict resolution avenues, and thus avoid violence. Second, high-capacity state institutions can prevent electoral vio- lence by removing conflict triggers. When planning an election, small but important changes in tech- nicalities can prevent conflictual situations. For instance, during the election in Sierra Leone in 2007, IFES and the UN provided TEA as consults in designing new nomination registration procedures.

3 Depending on if it includes representatives from different political parties and other stakeholders; or if it is autonomous.

DV:

Reduced Electoral Violence

Causal Mechanism:

Credible Elections IV:

Comprehensive TEA

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Time slots for the different political parties were created, which lead to potentially confrontational situations being avoided (ibid, 91). Lastly, a capable security sector can address rumors, dissolve crowds, and detect local tensions. Training security personnel and deploying them to hotspots that risk triggering violence, such as polling stations and campaign rallies can prevent clashes between opposition and government supporters.

TEA support to non-state actors aims to enhance voters’ knowledge of their rights and responsibili- ties related to the election, and of the electoral conduct, thus making them informed (Birch & Much- linski 2018c). I argue that if civil society is informed, voters will be more able to critically assess propaganda and rumors on electoral manipulation, and able to determine whether the election is credible. When the voters perceive the election as credible, it reduces the ability of elites to mobilize for electoral violence.

I argue, like von Borzyskowski (2019, 49), that when this mobilization for violence becomes harder,

“political elites who still wish to contest the election and engage in political violence will find it more costly to do so”, which should make them refrain from violence.

So, civil society needs to be well informed to be able to find the election credible, and when the civil society perceives the election as credible it is more likely that electoral violence will be reduced

In sum, I argue that comprehensive TEA can reduce violence during an election, compared to a previous violent election. This because TEA can increase the capacity of state institutions involved in the electoral process and the knowledge level of civil society. TEA can make the institutions able to conduct credible elections and manage conflictual situations that risk turning violent; and make elec- tion stakeholders, including an informed civil society, able to view elections as credible and thus use institutions to solve electoral disputes, and not violence. Considering this, when examining the re- search question if and how does technical election assistance prevent electoral violence in some contexts and not in others, the theory generates the following hypothesis:

When a state receives comprehensive technical election assistance, it will experience a reduction in electoral violence.

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Research Design

This master thesis is a theory-driven, comparative qualitative study. Cases will be selected and exam- ined to assess if the TEA that was deployed was comprehensive, i.e., support to state and non-state actors in combination. In line with the theoretical framework, I will then assess if TEA did contribute to the prevention of electoral violence by comparing the cases. To study the cases, the method Struc- tured Focused Comparison (SFC) will be used. This qualitative method helps the researcher focus the narrative of the study by asking specific questions concerning the phenomena under study in all cases, which enhances their comparability, the internal validity, as well as the replicability of the study (George & Bennett 2005). The reliability of qualitative studies is generally lower than in statistical studies. The reliability of this thesis is increased since the answers to the SFC questions will be shown in the case studies even though they might not support the hypothesis. Furthermore, SFC questions will be posted on the causal mechanisms. This will enable this thesis to follow the steps in the causal story, which can help establish the temporal order of the phenomena under study. These are some of the main benefits of a qualitative research design.

When looking at election violence, scholars tend to define the timeframe as six months before, the month of the election, and three months after the election (Birch & Muchlinski 2017; von Borzyskow- ski 2019). This temporal scope will make it possible to study pre- and post-election violence, as well as violence occurring on election day. Hence the timeframe under study considering the electoral violence in each case will be a period of 10-months.

When it comes to the independent variable, the projects or missions deployed to support the elections under study will determine the period examined. This cannot be limited to the 10-month period cho- sen for the dependent variable, since it is unlikely that these missions will match this period. The reports concerning these missions will be explicit about the exact dates of their activities.

Operationalization of the Dependent variable: Lethal Electoral Violence

The definition of electoral violence in this thesis opens for various ways of operationalization of the dependent variable. As stated above, electoral violence is violence carried out during the electoral cycle towards people or objects connected to the election. It can be both physical harm, such as assault, murder, and arson; and in a psychological form such as harassment and intimidation. In this thesis, electoral violence will be operationalized as lethal violence. This decision has been made since psychological violence, although sometimes is reported in the media, often happens under the radar.

Additionally, time and space for conducting this thesis limit what can be included in the study.

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The qualitative case design allows for some nuance of the dependent variable to be included in the case studies and the analysis. The lethal violence can be non-existing, of a moderate or a high level.

This level will be determined by the number of deaths in each case compared to the other cases. In this study, a decision was made to examine whether the violence decreased from the previous election.

As will be described in the subsection about the case selection, all cases under study will have experi- enced electoral violence during the past election, which makes a decrease possible to assess. To clarify, what the theory expects to see in the DV is a reduction in violence. It would be desirable for normative reasons to see an abolishment of lethal violence in all cases. However, a reduction compared to the previous election will suffice for the theory of this thesis. Reports from NGOs and IOs, news, and academic articles are studied to examine the dependent variable.

SFC-questions concerning electoral violence:



Did any electoral violence occur during the election cycle?



If so, was the violence reduced compared to the previous election?

Operationalization of the Independent variable: Comprehensive TEA

The independent variable, TEA, will be examined by looking at whether assistance was provided to both the state and non-state actors, or only to one of these types of actors. What will determine if state actors received technical election assistance is if the electoral institutions were provided with election management and administration support, and support to the security sector. If the election was provided with TEA such as civic and voter education and civil society consultations this indicates that non-state actors received TEA. Since the media is sometimes government-controlled, support to this type of actor could have been added to both state and non-state TEA. For this reason, and to limit the indicators, support to the media will not be included.

SFC-questions concerning TEA:



Did the TEA include support to state actors? If so, to both the EMB & the security sector?



Did the TEA include support to non-state actors? If so, in what form?

Operationalization of the Causal Mechanism: Credible Elections

The causal mechanism, credible elections, connects to the two categories that encompass comprehensive

TEA. What will indicate this credibility is, first, to what extent different actors, such as international

observers; civil society organizations; the population; the political parties; and other stakeholders re-

garded the elections as credible. Statements, news media, and reports will be studied in the search for

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comments on credibility from for instance the opposition, the UN Secretary-General, the ruling party, and election observers. All comments are bound to a person or organization and are not taken as a fact but as opinions.

Second, the TEA provided to the state and non-state actors will be examined to find out whether the TEA had its intended effects: to have an informed civil society and capable institutions. The TEA mission reports will be studied, and the TEA providers’ assessments of the effects will be presented both as summaries and as quotes to be as transparent as possible. Despite the clear flaws, such as the one source bias, of this operationalization, these mission evaluations are the only sources of infor- mation on the TEA provided and its effects. To get another perspective, reports of observation mis- sions will be examined to find out whether another actor found the state and non-state TEA to have had its intended effects.

A final indicator of the election credibility is whether electoral disputes were solved through institu- tions and not through violent means. TEA reports as well as observation mission reports and news will be examined to investigate whether conflictual situations that risked turning violent were pre- vented or managed by institutions.

SFC-questions on election credibility:



Was the election perceived as credible?



Did the TEA have its intended effects?



Were there any indications of conflictual situations being avoided or managed through institutions?

Validity and Reliability

The choice to use Structured Focused Comparison (SFC) as the method provides this thesis with a

decent level of reliability since it is easy for others to reproduce the results of the study by asking the

same SFC questions of the cases. However, the answers to these questions can be affected by, for

instance, the previous possession or lack of knowledge about the cases and thus it is hard to accom-

plish reliability in a qualitative study. The operationalizations of the variables aim to be as clear and

replicable as possible, without losing the benefits of the ability to present nuances that come with a

qualitative study. These nuances contribute to the validity of the operationalizations since the numer-

ous indicators can comprehend the complexity of variables. Hence, the validity of this thesis is

deemed as moderately high.

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To increase the comparability, Africa was chosen as the geographic area. The reason for this is that 86 percent of all African countries have experienced electoral violence in some form or another (Bur- chard 2015).

To investigate the hypothesis, when a state receives comprehensive technical election assistance, it will experience a reduction in electoral violence, three conditions need to be met in the cases under study. First, the cases in this study need to be countries that have received technical electoral assistance. The provider of TEA will be held constant over the cases, as an attempt to exclude factors such as the relationship of the state and the provider and other factors that might affect the TEA’s effect on the outcome. The UNDP is the main provider of TEA at the UN and the organization with most TEA implemented worldwide. The UNDP provides publicly accessible reports on its missions and “is not systematically linked to the foreign policy priorities of any given state or group of states” (Birch & Muchlinski 2018c, 392; UNDPPA 2021). Hence, UNDP is considered a fairly neutral organization that, through its mul- tinational TEA provision, generates a myriad of cases. To select cases, the Electoral Violence Preven- tion Intervention Database was consulted (Birch & Muchlinski 2018b). This database includes cases that received electoral assistance, and electoral assistance provided by the UNDP is presented as a dichotomous variable.

The second criterion generated by the theory is that the cases need to be unconsolidated democracies, i.e., states that are under transformation, but not fully developed democracies. Here, the Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence (Birch &Muchlinski 2017) was consulted. This dataset in- cludes only states that are not consolidated democracies, which leads to a decrease in cases in which the theory is applicable.

Third, the cases that did receive UNDP electoral assistance were scrutinized in the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset, to identify cases that experienced electoral vi- olence during the previous election (Hyde & Marinov 2012; 2019). Here, the indicator of previous electoral violence was “nelda33”: “Was there significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election?” which is a dichotomous variable with the values yes and no (Hyde & Marinov 2012; 2019).

This case selection method, in which all cases have the same value on all variables except the depend-

ent variable, is referred to as Mill’s Method of Difference (Mill 2011). This method generated cases

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with different values in the dependent variable, electoral violence, in the NELDA dataset (Hyde &

Marinov 2012; 2019). Again, the indicator nelda33 was used to find cases. This case selection gener- ated the cases of elections under study: Kenya 2013; Nigeria 2015; and Zimbabwe 2013. The cases were selected on their variation on the dependent variable, to be able to investigate the level of com- prehensiveness of the independent variable, TEA. All three countries have been under British control, which may enhance the comparability considering some shared cultural and structural contextual fac- tors.

Table 1: Case Selection

Case Kenya 2013 Nigeria 2015 Zimbabwe 2013

Type of election Executive & Legislative Executive & Legislative Executive & Legislative

DV: EV (NELDA) Yes Yes No

Previous Electoral Violence (NELDA)

Yes,

during the 2007 Executive

& Legislative Election

Yes,

during the 2011 Executive &

Legislative Election

Yes,

during the 2008 Executive &

Legislative Election

UNDP TEA Yes Yes Yes

Level of Democracy

(CREV) Unconsolidated Unconsolidated Unconsolidated

Data and Source Criticism

Several datasets are used to find information on the variables important for this study. The most used are The National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy dataset (NELDA); the Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence (CREV) dataset; and the Electoral Violence Prevention Intervention Da- tabase (Birch & Muchlinski 2018a; 2018b; Hyde, & Marinov 2012; 2019. NELDA collects its data from sources such as regional electoral handbooks, country profiles from electoral monitoring agen- cies, and media sources like Factiva (Hyde, & Marinov 2012; 2019). CREV uses violent events re- ported in media to deem if the cases of unconsolidated democracies are at risk of electoral violence (Birch & Muchlinski 2018a). The prevention intervention database uses reports on UNDP interven- tions (Birch & Muchlinski 2018b). All these datasets are available for the interested public and are thus contributing to the transparency needed to make the criteria and study replicable.

News articles from BBC, Reuters, and The Guardian together with facts from the Swedish website

Landguiden and reports Human Rights Watch (HRW) will form the context descriptions and be used

to triangulate information on the electoral violence and the credibility of the election. All these data

sources are deemed to be unbiased in themselves, but the information will be triangulated to verify

the facts.

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As already mentioned, the UNDP TEA mission final reports will provide the findings on the TEA.

This brings an obvious singular source bias; however, these mission evaluations are the only sources of information on the TEA provided and its effects. To get another perspective, reports of EU, AU, and Southern African Development Community (SADC) observation missions, along with Amnesty International reports, will be examined to find out whether another actor found the state and non- state TEA to have had its intended effects. This way the study aims to triangulate the information found in UNDP’s reports. Moreover, the UNDP is deemed to be a transparent and unbiased organ- ization, and hence the information and assessments found in the UNDP reports are regarded as hon- est. The advantage of the UNDP reports is that because they are from the same source, the compa- rability is high.

Structure of the case studies

The case studies will be structured as follows: first, the cases will be presented in turn, starting with a short background section that concentrates on the previous election and run-up to the election cycle under study. This background will show how much electoral violence occurred during the previous election. Second, the values of the variables will be discussed and the SFC questions will be answered, starting with the outcome of the election and the potential electoral violence. Each case study will end with a summary of the empirical findings.

The next section in this thesis, the comparative analysis, will start with a table that summarizes the

answers to the questions for each case. Then the different variables will be analyzed in a between-

case comparison. I will then analyze the results and compare the cases to be able to assess whether

the hypothesis found support or not. After that, additional findings and some alternative explanations

will be discussed.

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The 2013 Kenyan Election

Case background

The general election in Kenya in December 2007 was the fourth multiparty election in the country’s democratic history and is notorious for the high level of violence that occurred (HRW 2008a). The electoral contest stood between the two parties Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and its leader Raila Odinga; and the incumbent Mwai Kibaki and his Party of National Unity (PNU). Political parties in Kenya had ethnic connections: ODM was based on Luo and PNU was affiliated with Kikuyu (UI 2016b). Pre-election violence along ethnic lines resulted in 200 dead and gave a premonition of what was to come (ibid; HRW 2008a).

The parliamentary election was won by ODM with almost two times as many votes as PNU, and Odinga was expected to win the presidential election. Surprisingly, Kibaki was declared the winner by the EMB and was quickly sworn in. The opposition and international election observers rejected the election result and claimed fraud. In the days that followed, and well into January 2008, opposition supporters took to the streets all over Kenya. But ethnic groups clashed, resulting in ethnic-based killings, and peaceful protests were met with extreme police brutality. 1,300 people were killed in the post-election violence and half a million were left internally displaced, which means that in total ap- proximately 1,500 people lost their lives due to electoral violence during the election cycle (BBC 2008;

HRW 2008a; Reuters 2020; UCDP 2021; UI 2016b).

A mediation team, headed by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, acted under the Re- sponsibility to Protect, and brokered a power-sharing agreement. Through this agreement, Kenya’s first coalition government was created, with Kibaki as president and Odinga as prime minister (Reu- ters 2020; UI 2021a). Kenya adopted a new constitution in 2010 with reforms to ensure future peace- ful elections, including replacing the old EMB with the new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) (UNDP 2014).

The Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, commonly known as the Waki Commission,

was mandated to investigate the election violence. The Waki Report presented evidence of ethnic

violence used by both sides and highlighted serious flaws in the security and juridical institutions

among the causes of the violence. It did not disclose any perpetrators, but a list of six suspects was

handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC): three allies of Odinga, and three from Kibaki’s

camp. In 2012, the ICC decided to prosecute four suspects, including Uhuru Kenyatta and William

Ruto from opposite sides, who were both about to run for president in 2013 (ACE Project 2012; UI

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2016a; UI 2016b). The ICC had dropped the case against Kenyatta, but the trials of Ruto would start in September 2013, thus beyond the temporal scope of this paper (UI 2016a).

Electoral violence, but deaths reduced

In the run-up to the Kenyan 2013 elections, the former rivals Kenyatta and Ruto formed the Jubilee Alliance and ran together against Odinga (UI 2021a). Through the electoral reforms, it had been decided that six different elections were to take place during the same day: presidential; nation assem- bly; sensate; county assemblies; governors; and women’s representatives (EU EOM 2013). On elec- tion day March 4, Kenyatta won the presidential election with just over 50 percent and thus avoided a run-off (BBC 2013)

Did any electoral violence occur during the election cycle? If so, was the violence reduced compared to the previous election?

NELDA shows that there were “violent protests on election day” and that this violence resulted in civilian deaths, however, the data do not show the number of deaths (Hyde & Marinov 2012; 2019).

According to HRW, post-election protests in Bungoma and Busia counties lead to 10 dead (HRW 2014). Attacks on polling stations in Mombasa on election day killed 19 people, among them police officers and election officials (Smith 2013a). The perpetrators of this violence were reportedly sepa- ratists (Smith 2013a). Nevertheless, with a total of around 30 dead, the 2013 Kenyan Election did not see the electoral violence that killed around 1,500 people during the previous election, hence a reduc- tion of electoral violence is observed.

Comprehensive Technical Election Assistance

Did the TEA include support to state actors? If so, to both the EMB & the security sector?

To avoid the extreme violence of the 2007/2008 election period, TEA was provided to state institu-

tions to a large extent in the preparations for the 2013 elections. The newly created IECB stood

without the experience of holding elections, and the Government of Kenya (GoK) recognized its

need for TEA from UNDP in its endeavor to hold credible and peaceful elections in 2013, and in the

implementation of the new constitution (UNDP 2014). To fill the gaps in the EMB capacity, the

project Strengthening Electoral Reforms and Processes (SERP) was established (UNDP 2013b). UNDP

through the project supported IEBC by increasing its capacity through enhancing the framework for

electoral law and organizing election management training for IEBC personnel. In addition, new elec-

toral conduct was implemented to enhance the efficiency of polling (ibid). Moreover, the project

planned to invest in a Biometric Voter Registration, a system that identifies voters by their fingerprints

or facial features, and through this system register 15 million voters.

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Furthermore, the SERP project implemented a new conflict prevention strategy, the Electoral Secu- rity Arrangements Plan (ESAP), which included the strengthening of police capacity to manage con- flictual situations; training of IEBC staff in electoral dispute resolution; and the establishment of a partnership between all electoral stakeholders on “election security coordination and management in the period leading up to and through the 2013 general elections” (UNDP 2013a, 32; UNDP 2013b).

Hence, both the security sector and the EMB received TEA that both concentrated on capacity- building and conflict prevention.

Did the TEA include support to non-state actors? If so, in what form?

UNDP invested in extensive TEA to civil society actors through several democratic governance pro- grammes during the period under study. The UNDP Amkeni Wakenya Civil Society Democratic Governance Facility (Amkeni Wakenya) was launched in 2008 to “work[…] through civil society or- ganizations (CSOs) to strengthen participatory democracy, […] facilitate citizens’ active engagement in governance reforms and development processes”, and to create “a more informed and participative citizenry” (Ruteere et al. 2015, 5; 76). Another UNDP project was the Uraia Trust that aimed to support CSOs that worked with voter and civic education “from a rights and responsibility aspect”

(UNDP Kenya 2021).

Furthermore, UNDP facilitated the state-civil society collaboration Uwiano Peace Project created a system that would collect “real-time information on tensions, hate speech and incitement nationwide”

(UNDP 2013b, 15). This information could then be obtained by local peace committees composed of representatives from civil society, religious groups, and security institutions to resolve disputes locally (UNDP 2013b).

In sum, the empirical findings indicate that the TEA was comprehensive.

A credible election

Was the election perceived as credible?

According to UNDP, the 2013 elections were “largely regarded as peaceful”, and the UN Secretary- General commended Kenyans for holding “peaceful, credible elections that should strengthen Kenya’s democracy and its unity” (UNDP 2014, 6; UN News 2013a).

The opposition leader Odinga called the election fraudulent and challenged the result in the Supreme

Court. Although the Court, as well as the EU Election Observer Mission (EOM), found irregularities

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in form of tallying errors, it deemed them as clerical mistakes and the Chief Justice called the elections

“free, fair, transparent and credible”, thus upholding the results (EU EOM 2013; Patinkin 2013).

The UNDP supported National Voter Survey, found that 67 percent of Kenyans perceived the elec- tions as “largely free and fair although with some challenges”. Opposition constituents tended to find the elections less free and fair. Furthermore, it showed that the level of confidence in the IEBC was

“significantly higher amongst supporters of the ruling coalition compared to those of the opposition”

(UNDP 2013b, 19). These findings correspond with those of an Afrobarometer survey of the quality of democracy and governance in Kenya, although the proportion of participants that considered the elections credible was larger. When getting the question “On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in 2013?”, 78 percent of the participants an- swered that they assessed the election as “free and fair”

⁴

(Afrobarometer 2014a, 13).

In sum, although the election results were questioned, the election was generally perceived as credible.

Did the TEA have its intended effects?

The UNDP TEA to non-state actors aimed to achieve “a more informed and participative citizenry”, as described above (Ruteere et al. 2015, 76). According to the evaluation of UNDP, TEA results contributed to an increased voter turnout and an informed civil society. The National Voter Survey showed that 78 percent of the participants said that they “received information on voting”, and 75 percent claimed that they were “sufficiently informed to be able to vote without difficulty” (UNDP 2013b, 20; 30).

The EU EOM found that, although there are over 60 languages in Kenya, voter information was only available in English and Swahili. However, despite being presented late, the voter information in the media concentrated on enhancing citizens’ understanding of the election procedures and was of good quality (EU EOM 2013).

The state-aimed TEA helped the IEBC “fill gaps, resolve problems and ensure that certain electoral activities were accomplished”, which otherwise could have jeopardized the peacefulness and credibil- ity of the election, according to the final report on the SERP project (UNDP 2013a, 14). However, it

4 The 78 % consisted of 35 % “Completely free and fair”; 27 % “Free and fair, but with minor problems”; and 16 %

“Free and fair, with major problems”. 18 % saw the elections as “Not free and fair” (Afrobarometer 2014a, 13).

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was also found that “technical assistance was effective when used, but demand was limited which meant the IEBC did not benefit as substantially as it could have from the expertise that the project could provide” (UNDP 2013a, 56). According to UNDP, this was due, first, to the fact that most IEBC staff members did not see SERP as a development project, but as a source of funding. Second, that they did not realize “the complexity of the electoral tasks and the technical and political implica- tions of some of the decisions that they would have to make” and did not ask for assistance until closer to election day than the UNDP planned (UNDP 2013a, 14).

The purchase of the Biometric Voter Registration system dragged on because of donor interests and political pressure, according to the UNDP, hence “putting the registration of voters into jeopardy”

(SERP 1, 23). The EU Election Observation Mission had together with UNDP recommended the IEBC to not attempt to introduce the new Biometric Voter Registration so close to the election, but IEBC had done so anyway. The institution did not have time to train election officials on how to use the system, and it failed to implement the system in time for all voters to be registered. Around 3 million voters were not allowed to vote because of this failure (EU EOM 2013; UNDP 2013b). The UNDP project registered 96 percent of the aim of 15 million voters before the election. This is must however be seen as a success since the actual voter turnout was at an unprecedented 86 percent (UNDP 2013a). The evaluation of the UNDP project found that the voter registry was completed and widely perceived as credible.

The EU Election Observation Mission found that glitches and mistakes in the IEBC administration of the elections. However, the mission recognized the difficulty to hold six elections simultaneously and found that overall, the IEBC “succeeded in overcoming the technical and operational difficulties”

and ultimately held a free and fair election (EU EOM 2013, 1). The conclusion drawn by the UNDP evaluation team was that:

There was insufficient institutional development and capacity building done and although the IEBC delivered the 2013 elections, there were significant institutional challenges that still need to be addressed. These are all issues that a future development project should directly target (UNDP 2013a, 56).

The support to the security sector is discussed in the next subsection, on conflict management, but

in sum, the IEBC was a sufficient capacity to hold elections, even though the institution and the

process needed further capacity building. The civil society was informed. Thus, the TEA is considered

to have had its intended effects.

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Were there any indications of conflictual situations being avoided or managed through institutions?

The SERP project implemented the renewed conflict prevention strategy ESAP, as a collaboration between UNDP, IEBC, UN Women, and the Uwiano Peace Project. By identifying clear mandates and synergies, the strategy helped state the EMB and the security sector “stipulated their roles and responsibilities in contributing to a free, fair and peaceful election” (UNDP 2013b, 26). IEBC staff received training on conflict analysis, early warning, negotiation, and mediation, to give them the skills to manage conflicts when they occur. Furthermore, ESAP included electoral security training, con- taining electoral gender-based violence, which was provided for 100,000 police officers (UNDP 2013a). The UNDP evaluation concluded that ESAP “directly contributed to the project’s goal of supporting a peaceful, credible election” (ibid, 33).

The IEBC Prosecution and Investigation Department, with support by UNDP, resolved 206 electoral disputes during the pre-election party nominations, and 188 challenges of the election result (UNDP 2013b). According to election observers, the police were more active in providing security to the election compared to the previous election. For instance, female candidates “who felt that their lives were in danger” were provided protection so that they could participate in the election campaigns (UNDP 2013b, 27). The EU EOM saw that the electoral reforms had led to the implementation of electoral dispute resolution avenues and increased the capacity of the juridical institutions to manage these disputes (EU EOM 2013). The mission found that the political parties had “fulfilled their prom- ise to use the courts to settle their disputes, and accepted their verdicts” (ibid, 2). EOM argued that the political parties might have had more incentives to peacefully accept the election results because the undertaking of the six different elections on the same day led to a variety of opportunities to win seats in political decision-making.

In short, institutions were used to manage a large number of electoral disputes, and the conflict pre- vention strategy ESAP helped avoid conflictual situations.

Case Findings: Kenya

The 2013 Kenyan elections were considered credible by most stakeholders. Both state and non-state actors received TEA that, despite a few glitches and minor failures, was considered to have its in- tended effects. The flaws in the capacity building of the IEBC were due to the institution underesti- mating the complexity of the electoral conduct. Nevertheless, the state-aimed TEA “helped the IEBC to deliver peaceful elections”; facilitated cooperation between the institutions involved in the election;

and increased the capacity of the security sector to avoid and manage conflictual situations (UNDP

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2013a, 4). The electoral violence prevention plan ESAP was an instrumental contribution to the ca- pacity to hold a credible and peaceful election, according to the TEA evaluation. The TEA for non- state actors contributed to an informed civil society, able to assess the credibility of the election.

Furthermore, TEA conflict management training for both state and non-state actors is considered to have achieved their intended effect to provide them with the skills to handle conflictual situations.

Spilling The Tea On Electoral Violence Prevention: Can technical election assistance prevent electoral violence?

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