Waves of Hunger
A qualitative study on state’s response to food threat and its impact on civil unrest in Namibia and Zambia
Vita Sabel-Douglas
Bachelor Thesis, January 2018 Department of Peace and Conflict Studies Supervisor: Stefan Döring
Uppsala University
Table of Contents
1. RESEARCH QUESTION ... 2
1.1INTRODUCTION ... 2
1.2PREVIOUS LITERATURE ... 3
1.3RESEARCH GAP ... 4
2. THEORY ... 5
3. RESEARCH DESIGN ... 9
3.1POPULATION ... 9
3.2CASE SELECTION ... 10
3.4TIME PERIOD ... 12
3.5METHOD ... 13
3.6INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ... 13
3.7DEPENDENT VARIABLE ... 14
3.8MATERIAL ... 14
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ... 15
4.1NAMIBIA ... 15
4.2ZAMBIA ... 21
4.3INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS ... 26
4.6LIMITATIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... 30
4.7ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS ... 31
5. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION ... 32
6. REFERENCES ... 34
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 1. SELECTED CASES WITH A VARIATION IN THE PROXY FOR THE INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE AND VALUES ON THE CONTROL VARIABLES 12
TABLE 2. COUNTRY PROFILE NAMIBIA 15
TABLE 3. COUNTRY PROFILE ZAMBIA 21
TABLE 4. SUMMARISED RESULTS FROM STRUCTURED FOCUS COMPARISON QUESTIONNAIRE 26 FIGURE 1. CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE. 9
1. Research question 1.1 Introduction
Climate change is a widely discussed and debated field, often mentioned by politicians and NGO’s, or in news reports or by celebrities. Some argue that the impact of future disasters is to be even more devastating. Disasters are expected to become more frequent in the future and have a greater effect due to climate change, a growing world population and more people living in hazard-prone areas. With each disaster, the gains of development may be lost as infrastructure is destroyed, poverty increases, and many economic opportunities and livelihoods are interrupted or lost (USAID, 2017a).
However, there are inconclusiveness and contradictory in research from scholars in the field (Salehyan, 2008). The idea that climate change will lead to global degradation, poverty, refugees and conflict is a recurring view of the future. Although, recent literature tests this assumption and finds contradicting evidence. In some scenarios, natural disasters or a changed environment seems to foster cooperation and dialogue between groups or affected parties. Some examples of this is group cooperation around the Nile and the decrease of tensions after the Tsunami in Indonesia (Nicol, 2003; OEF, 2017) .There are two branches in the current literature debate, one suggesting that climate variability leads to scarcity or other extreme conditions, which may lead to IDP, environmental refugees, or spur on tensions, leading to political violence, riots or armed conflict. The other branch holds the idea that a sudden change of available resources or land will make groups, parties and individuals increasingly dependent on one another and therefore communication and cooperation will increase. Along these lines is also the explanation that in a situation of scarcity or other extreme degradation of land and environment, capabilities of violence decrease and groups tend to be more peaceful due to lack of resources. There is however dubious evidence for both theories and there seems to be several other factors which may determine the violent outcome of climate variability (USAID, 2017a).
Some natural phenomena are enhanced by climate change and rising temperatures. In order to prepare for future disasters, more knowledge is needed to build resilience. One phenomena affected by climate change is the El Niño Southern Oscillation, leading to severe droughts or flooding in certain regions of the world, devastating crops and livelihoods (NOAA, 2017). This paper will study the impact of state’s response to food threat on civil unrest. The analysis will be done on two case studies, both exposed to food threat imposed by the El Niño phenomenon in 2015- 2016.
1.2 Previous Literature
Climate change often leads to scarcity in resources, which is argued to be a cause of conflict.
However, in the current literature debate, scholars have failed to agree on its role and importance. Quantitative studies examining the effects of resource scarcity have generated a wide range of empirical findings, although they fail to reach a clear conclusion. Hauge &
Ellingsen (1998) find that land degradation, freshwater scarcity and deforestation all have positive and a significant effect on the onset of armed conflict (Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998).
Theisen (2008), shows more significantly that only very high levels of land degradation increase civil conflict risk, while scarcity has no effect (Theisen, 2008). On the other hand, Hendrix & Glaser (2007) find that land degradation has no impact at all and that more water per capita actually increases the risk of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (Hendrix & Glaser, 2007). Urdal (2005, 2008) finds that the combination of land scarcity and high rates of population growth increases risk of civil conflict, and that scarcity of agriculturally productive land is positively correlated with civil conflict when agricultural wages decline (Urdal, 2005, 2008). Furthermore, Østby et al. (2011) do not find evidence for the effect of land pressure on violence in Indonesian provinces (Østby et al., 2011). Relatedly, Theisen (2012) does not find that land pressure affects civil conflict in Kenya (Theisen, 2012). Meier et al. (2007) report that increased vegetation rather than scarcity has a positive effect on organised raids (Meier, Bond,
& Bond, 2007).
Along with inconclusive results in the literature, Gleditsch (1998) and Theisen (2008) point to several weaknesses of the existing research, namely that it neglects the potential mediating roles of economic and political factors (Gleditsch, 1998; Theisen, 2008). It fails to address issues of endogeneity, selecting on the dependent variable and it is unclear about the appropriate level of analysis. Similar critique of previous research is presented by Bretthauer (2017), who argues that the main reason that quantitative studies and in-depth case studies reach different conclusions is that social, political and economic factors are not included in the quantitative research design and in single-case studies they are not comparable between cases, therefore its significance remains undefined and debated (Bretthauer, 2017).
Several studies use drought as an indicator of climate variability, causing a lack of sufficient resources to sustain livelihood and growth. With a disaggregated research design with focus on
onset. This significant finding shows no effect regardless of whether droughts take place in socio-political contexts that are more prone to violence or not (Theisen, 2011). Nina von Uxekull (2014) also disaggregates at the grid level. She finds that both episodic and sustained droughts increase the probability of battle events with at least one fatality, and that ongoing conflict and drought vulnerability may mutually reinforce each other. (Von Uxekull, 2014).
The absence of robust statistical evidence supporting the scarcity argument led Theisen to conclude that ‘scarcity of natural resources has limited explanatory power in terms of civil violence’ (Theisen, 2008, p. 810). The lack of consensus within quantitative studies and between quantitative studies and case studies indicates a variation of the conduction of research.
This disparity in research has led to inconclusive results. Some case-studies take this into account in order to isolate the effects of climate change and scarcity by controlling for and investigating other factors. Several of the in-depth case studies therefor give quite significantly different results (Bretthauer, 2017).
1.3 Research gap
Scarcity and climate change appear to function as a catalyst for conflict and tensions to erupt into violence rather than being the main cause of conflict or the central incompatibility. If recourse scarcity spurs on exciting cleavages and tensions, eventually leading to conflict or civil unrest, this is likely to take off in the form of political protests and riots before spiralling in to heavier contentious tactics (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, p. 154). Despite the logic of this argument, this is not the case in many scenarios. Some societies have coped with scarcity and climate variability while others have turned violent (USAID, 2017a). Why this might be the case is plausibly explained by other circumstances, determining whether scarcity will catalyst tensions or not. While tensions may already be in place when resource scarcity occurs or intensifies, several mechanisms may hinder them to transform into violence. Which these mechanisms and circumstances may be is yet to be investigated and identified. Through studying which circumstances causes a society to be vulnerable to climate variability and its aftermaths, steps can be taken to antagonise the challenges facing food and water scarcity caused by climate change and other events. In order to study what characteristics makes societies vulnerable and violent as a result of scarcity, this research will compare cases threatened by food scarcity.
Drawing from the lack of knowledge on specific natural phenomena and its impact on human life and unrest, this study will explore the relationship between the El Niño phenomenon and
civil unrest in southern Africa. This will be done through examining the differences in governments’ response to an impending crisis and its effect on the affected populations perception of the threat and probability to riot. El Niño is a phenomenon caused by an increase in the average temperature in the Pacific Ocean, leading to extreme weather affecting many regions. Amongst other things, El Niño impacts the ordinary regularity of precipitation, which in southern Africa causes drought. The phenomena occur every two to seventh year, and every twentieth year it is usually more extreme. The occurrence of El Niño in 2015-2016 was of an unusual severity, causing the worst drought in 35 years for most of southern Africa (Reliefweb, 2017). The impending crisis of El Niño led to several south African countries to be in a threatened position of food and water. Worst affected were the countries mostly dependent on domestic agricultural production. When drought hits agricultural dependent societies, the livestock and livelihood quality of affected populations will decrease sharply. Failed crops due to lack of precipitation will force up food prices and further increase pressure on arable land.
Deficit due to failed crops will therefore affect the country’s own domestic production and increase reliance on food imports. It will also affect its neighbours and other potential exporting countries due to the lack of productivity. Furthermore, as neighbouring countries are likely to be sharing the same struggles simultaneously, import prices rises and the food crisis may spiral on, leading to lethal consequences (UNOCHA, 2017). To contribute to the research field on the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict, this paper will study the impact of food scarcity on civil unrest in countries threatened by El Niño induced drought. By narrowing the study down to the role of food insecurity on protests and riots, an unobserved piece of the puzzle is addressed.
2. Theory
This paper sets out to examine the consequences of government’s response to food threat and its effect on outbreak of civil unrest. In the previous literature on climate variability and its impact on social unrest and conflict, several theories and schools of thoughts have been used.
Some of the most prominent theories in the literature on climate change induced resource- scarcity and conflict are built on relative-deprivation theory and neo-Malthusian thought.
The neo-Malthusian logic builds on the argument that depletion of freshwater resources (and other scarcities) and exploitation of fisheries etc., does not only affect human health and well- being and endanger the habitability of some regions. They are also increasingly understood to play an important role in generating or exacerbating conflict (Bretthauer, 2017). Khal (2008)
and others argue that scarce resources exacerbate existing cleavages in societies (Kahl, 2008).
If resource conflicts are framed in terms of ethnic, social, religious or political groups, this can result in a hardening of group identities and inter-group conflict. In situations where the state is absent, this can lead to a process similar to a security dilemma, in line with the state failure hypothesis (ibid). If one group tries to increase their access to a resource, which is a perceived as a threat by another group, they will in turn try to increase their security. Even though both groups are aiming at security not conflict, this situation can spiral into violent conflict (ibid).
Another linkage between scarcity and conflict is presented by Homer-Dixon and derives from the process of migration and ecological marginalization. Scarcity functions as an incentive for people to migrate to other areas, where this might result in tensions between those already living in the area and newcomers. Furthermore, the pressure of resources will increase with more people in the same area (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 74). Kahl (1998) builds a theory on both relative-deprivation theory and Malthusian thought; “DES (demographic and environmental stress) increases incentives for violence by contributing to deprivation and intergroup competition over scarce resources. This ratchets up the level of societal grievances and resource competition, thus increasing incentives for anti-state and intergroup conflict. DES increases the opportunities for violence by undermining economic productivity, reducing state revenue, and increasing societal demands. This can weaken the capacity, cohesion, and legitimacy of states and thereby increases the “political space” for collective action” (Kahl, 1998, p. 84).
One prominent theory in the literature on grievance is relative deprivation theory, where feelings of deprivation arise in comparison with a standard, as one’s past or a cognitive standard such as equity or justice. If the result of the comparison is that one is not receiving what one deserves, one may experience relative deprivation. In the context of protests studies, group comparisons are especially important. Although, in a situation where the group experience also becomes relevant for one’s own experience, the personal becomes political, and the motivation to protest increases (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013, p. 887). Along with relative deprivation, social psychologists have applied social justice theory to theorise on grievance and protests (Tyler & Smith, 1998). In the literature on social justice, two distinguished categories are discussed; distributive and procedural justice. Distributive being the fairness of the outcome and procedural the fairness of the decision-making process and inclusiveness. Tyler and Smith argue that procedural justice might be a more powerful indicator for protests and social
movements than the actual outcome. This is because people care more about being treated with respect and dignity than the final outcome (ibid).
The classical theories propose that people participate in protests in order to express their grievances, which may originate from relative deprivation, frustration or perceived injustice (Gurr, 1970). However, some scholars of social movements questioned this simplified idea by proposing that the question to be answered is not whether people who engage in protests are aggrieved, but whether aggrieved people engage in protest. They suggested that other factors, such as efficacy, resources and opportunities would predict participation in protests (McAdam, 1982; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Additionally, other scholars have explored the role of collective identity in protest behaviour. In recent studies, the role of emotions has also been studied (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013).
Lastly, some scholars base their research on the theory of sate capacity. In this case, with the assumption that the effect of food insecurity on the likelihood of violent unrest depends on the extent to which state structures and institutions are vulnerable. In line with the International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) criteria, a state’s vulnerability to food insecurity is determined by two factors: first, the state’s capacity to manage and mitigate sudden increases in the threat of food insecurity and secondly, the state’s susceptibility to food insecurity (IPCC, 2014) . This theory will be used in this study, arguing that the state capacity conceptualises the state’s ability to respond to sudden increases in food insecurity and/or to offset the societal consequences of food insecurity. This is in line with the arguing by Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Collier &
Hoeffler (2004), that states are less vulnerable, more capable to handle sudden increases in food insecurity, if the central government has the capacity to manage shocks and dissent.
Institutionally coherent regimes reduce vulnerability to food insecurity, because institutional coherence allows these states to fully tap into their resources, addressing food insecurity more rapidly and more effectively than institutionally incoherent regimes (Jones, Mattiacci, &
Braumoeller, 2017, p. 340).
Coherent democracies and coherent autocracies will use different resources to face threats of food insecurity. Democratic regimes can embrace economic intervention packages or redistribution, as they have more open and stable political structures, with politicians responding to the concerns of their citizens. On the other hand, autocratic regimes will be more
deter it before it materialises. In both scenarios, the coherence of the political institutions is essential for the ability of these strategies (Jones et al., 2017, p. 341).
A state’s susceptibility to increases in food insecurity may impact the likelihood of violent unrest. Jones et al. argue that a state’s susceptibility to food insecurity depends on the structure of its agricultural system and its access to global trade. High reliance on agricultural production is likely to increase vulnerability for two reasons. On the one hand because if the economy is agriculturally centred, a shock to domestic agricultural production will displace a substantial number of workers and subsistence farmers. This is because the agricultural sector is an important source of employment. On the other hand, agrarian states which are more reliant on subsidence farming, extreme weather events will severely reduce the ability of farmers to produce enough food. Furthermore, high agricultural production will reduce vulnerability, as high levels of productivity suggests more production is achievable with fewer inputs (Jones et al., 2017).
A state’s level of imports may also affect its vulnerability to food insecurity, through three mechanisms. First, high levels of imports may increase the risk of food insecurity as a result of rises in international food prices. Secondly, higher levels of imports may also indicate an inability to rely on domestic production to balance international price increases. Lastly, reliance on food imports may increase vulnerability to food insecurity, however, the effect of imports is more complex as it might in fact reduce vulnerability through two additional mechanisms.
Namely that high levels of import can balance shortfalls in the domestic production: if the weather threatens domestic food production, higher levels of imports might indicate that such states are better able to compensate for those domestic sources of food insecurity by buying food abroad than states that import less. Finally, higher levels of imports afford states greater diversity of international foods. If international food prices increase, states with more import will have access to a larger choice of foods than states that import less, and may therefore adjust and substitute one commodity in response to rising prices. Greater reliance on imports can therefore also decreases states’ vulnerability to food insecurity. In contradiction to the first mechanism, this suggests that imports should increase a state’s vulnerability (Clapp, 2015;
Jones et al., 2017, p. 341).
Increases vulnerability
Based on this discussion, the proposed causal story is that threats of food insecurity will increase the risk of violent unrest. However, greater vulnerability to food insecurity – less institutional coherence, less bureaucratic capacity, and lower revenues – will increase its effects, whereas less vulnerability will mitigate the effect of food insecurity. This means that a state’s vulnerability interacts with global and local determinants of food insecurity to increase the risk of violent unrest (Jones et al., 2017). From this causal chain we can draw the hypothesis that; Insufficient response to food threat increases vulnerability and civil unrest.
Figure 1. Causal relationship between independent and dependent variable.
3. Research Design 3.1 Population
This paper studies the relationship between government’s response to food treat and the onset of civil unrest. The population of cases in this study are countries facing food threat induced in
Insufficient response by government to
food threat
Increase of existing tensions
and dissent towards government
Onset of civil unrest: street protests and riots
More food insecure people, increase of inequalities and desperation à Eruption of (new and existing) cleavages and tensions àLack of trust towards the government.
part by the 2015-2016 El Niño phenomena in southern Africa. The concept of food security is multifaceted and complex. Many factors cause food instability and insecurity, some of the most prominent ones being natural disasters such as floods and droughts, conflict, shifts in the global market and increasing commodity prices, as well as problems of accessibility, for example in situations with refugees or internally displaced people (FAO et al., 2017). The complexities of food security make it hard to measure, and no indicator can fully encompass all dimensions of food insecurity. The indicators used to measure food insecurity focus on either the perception of food security, the individuals perceived access to food, or the percentage of malnutrition within a country, imports, household expenditure etc. Nonetheless, no single indicator can fully grasp all facets of food insecurity. With this in mind, the concept is commonly divided into three categories; availability, access and utilisation (FSIN, 2017, p. 17). In this study, all cases were in the chosen study period under threat of experiencing either kind of food insecurity, due to unreliable precipitation due to El Niño.
By focusing on countries affected by the El Niño phenomenon, along with other causes of food insecurity, allows the analysis to study how states manage to cope with the incidence of a wide- spread phenomena as well as other external and domestic challenges, such as market prices and food production. Through studying a state’s resilience capacity in the plagues of El Niño, a recurrent phenomenon, policy implications can be thought of to increase resilience for the occurrence of the same phenomena in the future, as well as developing knowledge on how to best cope with other challenges simultaneously.
3.2 Case selection
To choose cases suitable for this study, several steps were taken. Primarily, an area was chosen where countries had experienced a similar level of food threat. In order to find cases with similar implications of food threat and to isolate from other factors which may impact a country’s security and coping capacity, cases were considered which were all under threat by the El Niño phenomenon in 2015-2016. By selecting geographically clustered cases, the effect of the El Niño will be somewhat similar. In the south of Africa, usually the most severe effect of El Niño is sustained drought, leading to water scarcity and food insecurity (UNOCHA, 2017). The countries threatened of an El Niño induce drought in Africa were located in the east and southern parts. All countries with ongoing conflicts were excluded, as Ethiopia and Somalia, as measuring civil unrest resulting from food threats and government behaviour is unfeasible
in a conflict context. Based on these scope conditions, the most-similar case strategy was used to rule out other intervening factors (Powner, 2015). A couple of theoretically important control variables were chosen; political globalisation, democracy index and level of human development.
The measure of political globalisation is included as an indication of the state’s relation to other stakeholders and governments, to build diplomatic relations and reach out for assistance in a domestic crisis. Political globalisation defined as the degree of embassies and high commissions in a country, the number of international organisations to which the country is a member, the number of UN peace missions a country participated in, and the number of treaties signed between two or more states (Global Economy, 2017a).
Democracy index is included as a control variable to ensure there is a level of democracy high enough for civil mobilisation and political protests to be feasible for the general population.
The democracy index ranges on a scale of 1-10 based on ratings of free and fair elections, political participation, political culture and functioning of government (EIU, 2016). The index of human development measures three basic dimensions of human development: long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Four indicators are used to calculate the index; life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, and gross national income per capita (Global Economy, 2017b).
The values are all taken from the beginning of the studied period (2014 or 2015), to assess the cases position prior to the outbreak of the El Niño induced food threat. The values of the control variables are relatively similar, making the cases comparable. Nevertheless, there are differentiations between the cases which cannot be controlled for by case control or isolated in the study, these will however be commented on and taken into account in the analysis. Country size, population size and arable land are not included as control variables because they are not of specific theoretically significance.
Further, for finding cases with a variation in the independent variable, a quantitative measure of government effectiveness was used as a proxy for the government’s capability to response effectively to threats and reduction of risks. By using government effectiveness as an indicator for the independent variable when selecting cases, it offers an idea of what differences may
impact the cases responses and its outcome, yet leaves the complexity of the independent variable of state response to be further studied and analysed. The government effectiveness index is one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators by The World Bank, measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to its stated policies (MCC, 2017; WGI, 2017).
Lastly, when all cases threatened by an El Niño induced drought in southern and eastern Africa, excluding cases with ongoing conflict and authoritarian regimes, the remaining countries were Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Madagascar, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. These countries were all eligible within the selected scope conditions and the analysis aims to address the struggles of drought as experienced in this region. Based on the results from 2014 (prior to the 2015 El-Niño outbreak but after 2013’s drought) Government Effectiveness Index, two cases were selected, one with a representative high score of 58, Namibia, and one case with amongst the lower scores, Zambia with a score of 33 (WGI, 2017). To avoid selection bias in the process of case selection, the chosen cases were picked unknown of their dependent variable (Bennet & George, 2005, p. 23). By selecting cases with a controlled variation in the independent variable and resulting variation in the dependent variable, the design strives to be as equivalent to a controlled experiment as possible (Bennet & George, 2005, p. 24)
Country Government effectiveness 2014 (proxy for IV)
Political Globalisation Index 2014
Democracy index 2014
Human development index 2015
Namibia 59 65 6,24 0,64
Zambia 33 75 6,39 0,58
Table 1. Selected cases with a variation in the proxy for the independent variable and values on the control variables.
Sources: (EIU, 2016; Global Economy, 2017b; UNDP, 2017; WGI, 2017)
3.4 Time period
This study is focused around the preparations, the response to and the aftermaths of the El Niño phenomenon in 2015-2016. The El Niño occurred in 2015-2016, with consequences stretching
into 2017. A state of emergency was announced at different times in different places.
Consequently, an exact start and ending date is not possible to say. Each case studied will be analysed in the timeframe stretching from 2015 until 2016. However, as the El Niño is a recurring phenomenon, scientists are able to foresee its occurrence and government’s may take important measures in advance of signs or outbreak. Therefore, some of the material on government preparedness may be collected from an earlier period. Although, the main focus of the study is the response by the government, in the presence of threat, which is centred in the period early 2015, reaching throughout 2016.
3.5 Method
The selected cases will be analysed through case control, to see if there is variation in the independent and dependent variable. Further, the method of Structured Focused Comparison will be applied to examine the cases in further detail, and scrutinise if the results support the causal story or otherwise. The comparison will provide insight of how the specific mechanisms of state response influence a state’s vulnerability to food insecurity and compare these results across cases (Powner, 2015). By examining the proposed causal relationship, the hypotheses will be supported or objected. If evidence is found in support of the proposed hypothesis, or if a specific factor of the government’s response is found to be of significant importance, inference as well as suggested policy implications could be made from these findings. If the evidence is not supportive of hypothesis, there is reason to believe several other factors matter for a state’s repressive capabilities and further studies would be in need to examine what conditions make some states vulnerable to food insecurity, whilst other states manage to cope.
3.6 Independent variable
The independent variable of the government’s response to food threat, and its impact on civil unrest will be studied though a set of questions using Structured Focus Comparison. To operationalise the response, several dimensions of the governments behaviour will be included in the questionnaire (see Appendix). By posing specific questions to each case, the questionnaire has the potential of including many actors and stakeholders into the analysis, validating the measurement. However, as many different sources will be used, all has to be individually assessed and analysed in order to avoid biases and construct a reliable measure (Bennet & George, 2005; Powner, 2015).
3.7 Dependent variable
The dependent variable of civil unrest will be operationalised as street protests and riots, which will be studied using the SCAD dataset, ACLED dataset and by news items and reports on scarcity induced protests against the government. By using datasets recording all incidents of protests and riots within the chosen time period, the analysis will look at the outbreaks of civil unrest directly or indirectly linked to either the state and the implications of threatened food availability, or aimed at the government’s response and behaviour during food threat. By studying the datasets along with news items and reports, the intensity and regularity of the unrest will be assessed. Through combining different sources, both reliability and validity can be achieved. The quantitative measures offering reliability, measuring events in different countries based on the same definition, and the in-depth study of reports and news items offers insight to actual causes of protests and its potential relationship to food threat and state response (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013; Powner, 2015).
3.8 Material
Each selected case will be analysed and evaluated based on the results from each question. The material studied for each case is collected from new items, Government’s reports and policy papers and reports from different organisations. By using different kinds of sources, several dimensions can be analysed and information can be triangulated, as there may be many reasons for involved actors to mispresent information. NGOs might be in need of funding and therefore represent their work as especially sufficient whilst being transparent with their spending. The government on the other hand, may want to receive foreign aid and interests, or on the contrary, want to offset the idea of an impending crises to not offset foreign investors.
4. Results and analysis
Government’s response to food threat and the eruption of riots and protests are studied in this paper. The relationship is assessed based on structured focused questions posed to each cases’
material. Foremost, each case is evaluated separately and thereafter compared and analysed.
4.1 Namibia
- How much of the population is dependent on agricultural production and/or on import?
Namibia is classified as an upper middle-income country, with about 2 million people relying on subsidence agriculture (FAO, 2017). Between 2000 and 2015, Namibia saw substantial economic growth. Although, poverty, malnutrition and deep inequalities are amongst many challenges in the country. Namibia produces about 40 percent of the food it consumes and is highly reliant on imports. A heavy
dependence on imports implies that while food is available, price fluctuations can make it difficult to access for 26% of Namibian families (ibid). This particularly affects the 80% of the population who depend on markets. On a national level the country has been food secure, however with subsidence agriculture being low in productivity and highly vulnerable to water scarcity and variation in precipitation. Namibia has rich natural resources, a well-developed physical infrastructure and political stability, a democracy polity index of 6,31 in 2016 and a human development index of 0.64 in 2015 (EIU, 2017; FAO, 2017; UNDP, 2017). Namibia imports agricultural products for an annual value of $413 (2015), mainly from neighbouring South Africa (Chatham House, 2017).
- What measures did the government take to secure vulnerable populations prior to the outbreak of El Niño?
The occurrence of drought is nothing new in Namibia and the government launched a well- rehearsed programme of food deliveries to the hardest-hit areas. The response by the Namibian government is admired by its neighbours in southern Africa, as it shows how possibilities of coping in dangerous conditions, setting an example both for now and the future. Prior to the
Country size 825 418 km2 Population size 2,4 million GDP/capita
2015 4,770 $ US
Control of corruption in 2015
66,35%
(UI, 2018; W Table 2. Country profile Namibia
(UI, 2018; WGI, 2017; World Bank, 2017b, 2017a)
outbreak of El Niño, an early warning system raised the alarm, informing people that less rain was expected and pre-planned emergency food was sent out (Shukman, 2015).
The government implemented a Community Based Management Strategy to improve access to safe drinking water within a reasonable distance in all 14 regions of the country. The implemented subsidy measure consisted of 15 litres of water per person and day as a lifeline requirement (Dlamini, 2016). The Agricultural Bank of Namibia developed four drought relief facilities for farmers, allowing drought affected farmers to recover from hardship without drowning in increasing debts. The facilities also included improvement of water and infrastructure facilities, drilling boreholes, solar systems for water and fencing, initiating a long- term resilience building (Namibian, 2015a).
The Namibian government also put in place a contingency plan to guide El Niño preparedness and response activities. Several measures were put in place, such as; a mid-year budget for the allocation of N$531 million (about 38.2 million USD) for the national drought response up to March 2016; in-kind food distribution (8,000 tonnes of maize meal and 368 tonnes of millet meals distributed to 92, 700 rural households); in-kind distribution of agricultural inputs (84 tonnes of maize seeds, 20 tonnes of cowpea and 123 tonnes of millet seed to communal farmers on all crop growing regions), and subsidised fertiliser to commercial and resettled farmers under the drought assistance programme (WFP, 2016).
The Namibian government has established a number of social and food-based safety net programmes to mitigate the impact of poverty and food insecurity on vulnerable populations.
One of the programmes is the school feeding programme, reaching out to 330,000 children in 1,428 schools. The World Food Programme provides technical support the government on school feeding to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. The WFP also provides technical assistance to the government to strengthen national capacity to manage food assistance programmes in Namibia. The support relates to four broad areas: food security analysis, system development and strengthening, capacity building and programme support and logistics and supply chain management. This technical support has developed a Food Security Monitoring System which informs decisions relating to recurrent natural disasters which affect the livelihoods of vulnerable people, such as El Niño, as well as regular food security updates (WFP, 2016).
- How much did the government spend on securing vulnerable populations?
The Namibian President Hage Geingob claimed more than N$300 million had been set aside for drought mitigation purposes and will cover measures such as procurement of food for affected communities and households, provision of water for human and animal consumption by drilling new boreholes and rehabilitation of old ones, as well as assistance to crop producers and livestock farmers. Of the total of N$300 million, N$90 million was to go towards animal fodder, licks and health packages. In essence, the Cabinet authorised the implementation of an interim drought relief programme, including the distribution of maize and meal to close to 418 000 people from May to July (Namibian, 2017a). The permanent secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister, Nangula Mbako said the situation is so dire that the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry started advertising farmers to sell some of their livestock while they are still in good condition, and that the ministry of agriculture will be in consultation with farmers and other stakeholders to work out a strategy to assist farmers to restock after the current drought situation. Additionally, Mbako announced that free seeds will be distributed to communal farmers from August 2015 (Namibian, 2017a).
In April 2015, the government announced that N$54 million will be spent on maize grains, N$23,5 million on the milling of maize grain, and N$15 million on logistics such as transport, drivers, labourers and warehouse operations (Namibian, 2015b). The Government implemented an interim food assistance to 595,839 beneficiaries from May to July in 2016 and a comprehensive drought programme in August to March 2016. The implemented interventions included livestock marketing incentives, subsidies for ploughing services, free seeds distribution, drilling and rehabilitation of boreholes, laying of water (Reliefweb, 2016).
- Did the government make public statements? (Calling for external support, declaring state of emergency etc.).
Several statements were made by the Namibian government in relation to the impending threat of sustained drought and food insecurity to large amounts of the population. The minister of Agriculture and Forestry made a statement in 2016, blaming the chaos caused by the severe water shortages to be a result from climate change and not due to lack of planning and preparing for drought. The president of Namibia declared the country to be in a state of emergency in late June 2016 (Reliefweb, 2016). Later in October 2016, The Prime Minister Saara Kuugongelwa-
Amadhila said the government will need assistance from the intentional community to address the ongoing drought in the country (NBC, 2016). The official emergency appeal was launched on 29th of September 2015 (Namibian, 2015c).
- Did the government allow NGO’s assistance and external donors?
The Namibian government allowed external donors and foreign assistance. However, due to many donors’ focus on the European migration crises, and Namibia’s earlier susceptibility to natural disasters, they received less funding than some of the affected neighbouring countries (IRIN, 2015). Still suffering from the 2013 severe drought, this meant the population were heavily reliant on the government’s response.
- How much did included external parties and NGOs spend and prioritize food insecurity?
Compared to some of its neighbouring countries, Namibia has a relatively high scores in democracy and development compared to its neighbours (EIU, 2017; UNDP, 2017; UNOCHA, 2017). Nevertheless, USAID argue that Namibia is susceptible to many of the same natural disasters affecting south Africa, such as drought, epidemics, floods and food insecurity. The OFDA’s (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance) response strategy in Namibia has been focused on addressing humanitarian needs while investing in Disaster Risk Reduction programmes that strengthen the ability of communities to mitigate the effects of disasters (USAID, 2017b). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) donated N$49 million for drought assistance in Namibia (Namibian, 2017b). However, despite being more susceptible to disaster than neighbouring countries, the lack of support caused complications in securing the Namibian population. The Namibian Red Cross Society were not able to deliver the planned drought relief in some regions of the country due to a lack of funding from international donors. The lack of funding may have many reasons, but the migrant situation in Europe in 2015 and 2016 put a strain on many donors. However, the support from within Namibia itself was also lacking (IFRC, 2016a).
Namibia received funding from Nigeria in 2015, before Namibia made any official appeal for drought assistance to the international community. Nigeria donated tonnes of rice, maize and fish to drought-stricken families in Namibia. The Nigeria High Commissioner to Namibia Dr Biodun Olorufeni, stated that Namibia was hit by a devastating drought in 2013, causing
extensive damage to the ecology and death of livestock due to the lack of grazing and water.
Although this disaster did not spare Namibians in rural areas as many were classified as food insecure and a number of deaths were recorded, Olorumfeni commended the swift and timely response to the disaster in 2013 (New Era, 2015).
In October 2015, The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies said they were in need of N$13,4m aimed to support 11 500 people facing drought. The food security response strategy launched by the IFRC included soup kitchen for 720 households, amounting to 2600 people, providing one meal per day, six days a week. The NCRS focused on a long-term food security and livelihood support through establishing of community gardens and providing gardening inputs. IFRC educated lead farmers, encouraging them to pass on the knowledge to other farmers (Namibian, 2015c). However, by May 2016, only 15 percent of the Appeal had been funded, meaning only 1,200 people were supported with drought relief by the Red Cross (IFRC, 2016b). The Namibian Red Cross has also launched a three-month campaign,
“Namibians helping Namibians”. The campaign aims to raise funds from citizens as well as from the private sector to support the drought-related activities (IFRC, 2016b).
The government of Namibia reported that an estimated 370 316 people (16%) of the total population were in need of food aid in October 2015. Similarly, the IFRC stated in October that there had been an acute gap in meeting the needs of approximately 300 000 people in urgent need of food support and access to water, since September 2015 (Namibian, 2015c).
UNICEF spent a total of 2722,00 US$ on funding to Namibia. The required funds were in line with the Regional Inter-Agency-Standing Committee (RIACO) action plan, intended to meet the humanitarian needs of children in the most-affected countries in southern Africa. The action plan includes multi-sectoral responses, containing HIV and AIDS, nutrition, child protection, education and social protection. The UNICEF appeal emphasises concerted efforts to minimise the impact of the El Niño crises through multi-sectoral interventions, providing urgent assistance to communities and implement effective recovery strategies contributing to building resilience among the most vulnerable (UNICEF, 2017).
Namibia was one of the included priority countries in The World Food Programme’s regional IR-PREP response operation for three months (November 2015 to February 2016) in preparing
the region for the expected shortfall of rain induced by El Niño. The operation included both monitoring of commodity prices and cross-border monitoring of cereal and maize, mapping hazards and regional support in all affected countries with a specific and foremost focus on the priority countries (WFP, 2015). The World Food Programme is also active in Namibia with the long-term operation Achieving Zero Hunger project, partnering with The Government of Namibia and USAID/OFDA (WFP, 2017a).
Namibia was not included as one of the countries of great concern on the Alert, Early Warning and Readiness Report on the period November 2015 to April 2016 by IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee), scheming risks of conflict, droughts and floods (IASC, 2015).
- Did people with dissent towards the government’s response to the food threat protest?
The 2015 El Niño induced drought and earlier incidents of hardship and dry-spells increased commodity prices. As a result of lacking income and higher prices, companies as well as farmers struggled. Several incidents of protests followed the consequences of the sustained drought. In December 2015, 250 general workers in the meat industry went on a strike to protest against a 50% pay cut which the company induced due to operational cost problems. The Union representative claims the problems of operational costs have arisen because of the drought in the country (Cloete, 2015).
A year later, in December 2016, Dam grape farmers protested over low wages and poor living conditions. Due to the price increases, they claimed unable to afford basic commodities and were drinking dirty water directly fetched from the dam (Cloete, 2016).
Studying quantitative indicators of protest and riots in Namibia following the drought, The SCAD dataset on protest has no recorded incidents of protesting in Namibia from 2015 and only a few recorded incidents in 2014 (SCAD). The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Projects (ACLED) dataset on Riots and Protests in Africa has recorded 122 incidents of protests between 2015 and 2016 in Namibia. Between 2013-2014 there were 140 recorded incidents (ACLED, 2018). However, by studying news items from example the national news agency The Namibian, several incidents of small-scale protesting have been reported. These protests
have to an extent been caused but the aftermaths of the drought, putting strains on companies and fuelling tensions between employers and workers.
- Were street protests and riots carried out by vulnerable/ threatened population to rise the government’s awareness of the impending and/or ongoing crises?
Yes, by people affected by rising prices. Protests aimed to achieve better conditions and be heard by employers and state. However, rather than taking to the streets as a consequence of dissent towards the state, people’s conditions and livelihoods were worsened due to rising prices (Cloete, 2015, 2016).
4.2 Zambia
- How much of the population is dependent on agricultural production and/or on import?
Zambia is classified by the World Bank as a middle-income country.
Despite economic growth and political stability in the past decade, human development has remained static, and the country faces numerous challenges of food insecurity, undernutrition, poverty and natural disasters. Landlocked in southern Africa, unpredictable weather patterns greatly affect the farmers relying on seasonal rains and subsistence farming.
Widespread poverty is a major barrier to food access in Zambia, with about 40% of the population living in extreme poverty (FEWS, 2013; Lusakatimes, 2016). Maize production is by far the largest industry in Zambia and a common livelihood for many smallholder farmers.
The top 2 percent of smallholders produce half of the maize, meaning that there is a significant stratification in the income from the maize production. The poor rural households rely on income from other sectors in order to meet their food requirements and are therefore vulnerable to price shocks. Contrary, the urban poor tend to be completely market dependent and are thereby vulnerable to price shocks. In response, the government typically purchases large quantities of maize from its domestic market at an above-market price as a way to stabilise prices and ensure the farming income. Although, some argue these policies rather increase the price level and result harming the poorest households (FEWS, 2013).
Country size 752 614 km2 Population size 16 million GDP/capita
2015 1,313 $ US
Control of corruption in 2015
46,15%
(The World Bank, 2017; UI, 2018; WGI, 2017; World Bank, 2017)
Table 3. Country profile Zambia
Zambia is a big exporter of maize and has an annual surplus of 6,5 million dollars, but has still seen a relatively slow economic development (Chatham House, 2017; World Bank, 2017a).
This goes in line with the Zambian governments low scores of government effectiveness and high rates of corruption (WGI, 2017).
- What measures did the government take to secure vulnerable populations prior to the outbreak of El Niño?
The Government of Zambia with support from The World Food Programme and other agencies developed the Government’s Integrated Emergency Response, including interventions such as social cash transfers, maize distribution, emergency school feeding, nutrition surveillance and emergency supplementary and therapeutic feeding for infants and children under five (WFP, 2017b).
The Zambian government’s 2015-2016 Contingency Plan was revised based on the El Niño forecast and the country’s reliance on maize as the main staple (WFP, 2016). As part of the preparedness measures by the government was to increase seasonal monitoring and activating plans to preposition food supplies. An emergency preparedness plan for the energy sector was developed in anticipation of low water levels. Response mechanisms were put in place by the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit. Additionally, disaster mitigations activities in drought affected regions were carried out by the government, such as relief food distribution, agricultural input support to affected households and rehabilitation and construction of water boreholes (ibid.).
In April 2016, the Zambian government imposed a ban on the export of maize and maize products to similarly drought-hit neighbours, such as Malawi and Zimbabwe (Kaunda, 2016).
The government considers Social Protection as a key strategy to support economic growth, reduce poverty and promote equity (WFP, 2016). With support from partners, the government is scaling up the Social Transfer Scheme to cover 50 districts, supporting approximately 580,000 beneficiaries. Additionally, the government implemented other policies as a part of the Zambian safety net. About thirty programmes are included which directly provide transfer either in-kind or cash to households. One of these programmes is the Farmers Input Support Programme which supports about 795,000 households (ibid.).
- How much did the government spend on securing vulnerable populations?
The Government of Zambia committed to assist 975,000 people affected by food insecurity due to El Niño with 43,133 mt of maize distributed between August 2016 and April 2017 (WFP, 2016). To support the government’s goals, The World Food Programme in liaison with the government’s Disaster and Management Unit (DMMU), developed and submitted a proposal for international donors. The proposal was for 19.3million$US included transport, logistics management and capacity development, local procurement and distribution and emergency school feeding. The proposal, based on WFP’s expertise, was aimed to strengthen the government’s response coordination capacity at national, provincial, districts and sub district levels, through the development of an Information Management beneficiary registration tool to strengthen the logistics capacity to better manage relief distribution (ibid.).
- Did the government make public statements? (Calling for external support, declaring state of emergency etc.).
Unlike many of the neighbouring countries, the Zambian government did not declare a state of emergency induced by drought in the 2015-2016 period. This may be explained by the country’s previous experience of dealing with severe drought and food scarcity and has thereby established cooperation’s and partnerships with the World Food Programme and other organisations as well as the European Union and the United Nations, promoting drought- resilient crops, conservation agriculture and contingency planning in liaison with the government (Simbeye, 2016; UNICEF, 2010).
- Did the government allow NGO’s assistance and external donors?
External donors were involved in the drought relief assistance as well as NGO’s both in partnership with the government and through international programmes (UNICEF, 2010;
World Renew, 2016).
- How much did included external parties and NGOs spend and prioritize food insecurity?
The World Renew, in partnership with the United Church of Zambia, provided food to 4,500 households in south-western Zambia until April 2017. In the past year, The World Renew has also drilled six boreholes to provide water for drinking and irrigation all year around, and provided food to nine schools, keeping children enrolled. The World Renew has also helped
schools build vegetables gardens to continue the school lunch programme after the food assistance project ends (World Renew, 2016).
FAO in Zambia were in need of 3.3 million to assist 173 000 households in the El Niño Response Plan 2016/2017. The priority activities of the FAO in Zambia are to safeguard agriculture-based livelihoods, to protect and enhance livestock production, to increase water access through improved infrastructure and distribute information, coordination and analysis for future vulnerability mapping (FAO, 2016).
Zambia is one of the countries involved in the World Food Programme’s R4 Rural Resilience Initiative (R4), launched in 2013 to enable vulnerable rural families to increase their food and income security by managing climate-related risks. The initiative combines four risk management strategies: improved resource management through asset creation (risk reduction);
insurance (risk transfer); livelihood diversification and microcredit (prudent risk taking); and savings (risk reserves). R4 enables the poorest farmers to access crop insurance by participating in risk reduction activities. Assets built through such activities and programmes promote the resilience of farmers and their families by steadily decreasing vulnerability to disaster risks over time (WFP, 2017b).
The Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK reported that a financial empowerment programme prevented 14,500 families in Zambia, Malawi and Kenya from falling into extreme poverty after the climate shocks following El Niño (Chitwa, 2017). The report revealed that an innovative market-based approach was central in building resilience.
About $3.3 million was disbursed in loans to Zambia, Malawi and Kenya to assist rebuilding of existing businesses affected by disaster and to establish new businesses by taking advantage of emerging opportunities. According to the report, 72 percent of the borrowers were women in rural areas dealing with severe effects of droughts and floods caused by El Niño. Through loans the clients can diversify into short-season productive activities such as hot-culture, small livestock, retail and service businesses (ibid.).
- Were street protests and riots carried out by vulnerable/ threatened population to raise the government’s awareness of the impending and/or ongoing crises?
Political violence and protests increased in 2016 in Zambia, mostly due to electoral turmoil and clashes between supporters of the ruling party and the main opposition party (AfricaNews, 2016).
Zambia has held peaceful multiparty elections since 1992 and several peaceful transitions of power since democracy was initiated. However, immediately after the results of the 2016 election was announced, the opposition rejected the results and claimed them fraudulent.
Consequently, protests and riots followed in the country’s south. Dwan Brancati for Political Violence At a Glance argues that the instability in Zambia follows a predictable pattern, although unusual for Zambia. Protests and other forms of collective action often arise around elections in weak democracies which have experienced an economic crisis. A crisis tends to increase support for the opposition and reduce the amount of patronage governments have at their disposal. Brancati applies this reasoning to the political unrest in Zambia as the economy has declined sharply in recent years. The price of copper has fallen and triggered inflation and unemployment, reduction in economic growth, and a devaluation of the country’s currency.
Further, agricultural production has also dropped, and electricity shortages have arisen as a result of drought (Brancati, 2016). Thus, protests were not executed specifically to raise awareness of the crisis or as a response to the government’s response to food threat, but there is reason to believe that the drought, insufficient response and the consequent hardship motivated individuals of the opposition to protest against the government.
In the ACLED Dataset there is 151 recorded incidents of protests or riots in Zambia during the period 2015-2016, an increase from 2013-2014 with 133 recorded incidents (ACLED, 2018).
The SCAD dataset on protests have 13 recorded incidents of protests during 2015 and 2016, and 5 in 2013-2014 (Cullen S & Salehyan, 2017). The different datasets have used different coding for protests and riots in their data collection and have therefore different values.
However, both ACLED data and SCAD show an increase of recorded protests in the 2015-2016 period.
- Did people with dissent towards the government’s response to the food threat protest?
Despite high numbers of recorded protests and riots in Zambia in during the 2015 to end of 2016 period, when analysing the incidents few appear to be directly related to the government’s
response to food threat. Due to political shifts in the same period, much of the recorded protests have a broader political agenda and may contain discontent over several issues, however when reported in media simplified to concern leaders and election results. Nevertheless, vulnerability to food threat and climate variabilities may be a spurring factor to political engagement. To what extent the population is satisfied with the drought relief by the government is hard to acknowledge through studying the onset of protests.
Table 4. Summarised results from Structured Focus Comparison questionnaire
4.3 Interpretation and analysis of results
This study finds some support of the proposed hypothesis that a state’s response to food threat has an impact on the onset of civil unrest, through making populations more vulnerable. However, several limitations in the conducted study and some opposing results suggests the relationship is
Namibia Zambia
Government response
-Early warning system of drought to raise awareness.
-Community based water security to all regions.
-Drought relief for farmers for long-term resilience building; improved infrastructure.
-Contingency plan, food distribution.
-Social programmes to counteract food insecurity:
school feeding programme.
-Social cash transfers, maize distribution, and emergency school feeding.
-Contingency plan: preposition food supplies.
-Relief food distribution, agricultural supply to rehabilitate households.
-Construction of water boreholes.
-Social protection programmes: transfer schemes, farmer support.
-Ban on maize export to neighbours.
Foreign assistance
-Drought relief assistance from USAID, IFRC -Funding from Nigeria
-UNICEF: urgent assistance and building resilience
-WFP IR-PREP, monitoring prices, hazards and response.
-Food relief by The World Renew and Church of Zambia
-Response assistance by FAO: safeguard agriculture-based livelihoods
-WFP R4 Rural Resilience Initiative: secure rural families from climate-risks by loans and building resilience
Dissent towards government response to food threat
-Anger towards rising prices and hardship. -Protests against the government were carried out by the opposition.
-Economic crisis and hardship induced by drought are likely motives for opposition representatives to protest against the government
Protests
and riots -Protests by workers due to lack of income and rising prices.
-Low levels of protests in quantitative measures.
-Protests and unrest increased in 2016, mostly due to election turmoil between the ruling party and the main opposition.
-Increasing levels of protests in quantitative measures.
more complex and that several other factors influence the hypothesised relationship. At first glance, Namibia with a higher control of corruption and higher scores of government effectiveness on quantitative measures, experience less onset of civil unrest than Zambia, with lower scores on government effectiveness and control of corruption. However, these results cannot speak for themselves or prove a causality between the independent variable of government response to food threat, and the dependent variable of protests and riots. Studied in more detail, despite many similarities there are considerable differences, which to some degree also neglects the proposed hypothesis.
The consequences of a severe and recurring drought are many, such as lowered income prices leading to food shortages, spreading of diseases, degradations in infrastructure and political turmoil.
In the case of Namibia, where the El Niño induced drought in 2015 hit the country as it was still recovering from the 2013 drought, the effects were arguably even more severe. In line with the proposed hypothesis, there seems to be a correlation between governments’ coping with food insecurity and tensions and dissent among the population. However, as the aftermaths of a drought are many and widespread in many sectors in society and all levels of analysis, a straight link to civil unrest is not supported in the analysed material. Protests erupt as a result of peoples’ anger and opposition to employers and other stakeholders, building on tensions and injustices which may have been present for a longer period of time. It may however be plausible that the occurrence of a severe drought and its aftermaths on the economy puts a strain on companies and employers, as well as farmers, causing ongoing frictions and worries to erupt into public debate or protests. In other words, the conditions and consequences induced by food threat serves as a catalyst for looming conflicts to spiral into the onset of political protests, demonstrations or riots.
In Namibia, some of the presented results point towards a different causality between the two measured variables than suggested in the hypothesis. Some support is found for that the government’s response has an impact on the resilience capacity of vulnerable populations, and that this may indeed be enhanced by external donors and NGO’s to fully respond to a severe threat.
However, results from studying the onset of civil unrest suggests that there may be other explanations for people to join street protests. I.e. that regardless of the state’s response to food threat, if prices are rising and livelihoods are endangered, people are more prone to take action and join protest. Therefore, external shocks to domestic production as well as fluctuations on the global market putting a strain on the vulnerable, will bring about similar consequences. The degree to
