Lessons from Listening:
The Aid Effectiveness Agenda
A Critical Systems Heuristics analysis of the Grand Bargain and Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness from the perspective of implementers and local practitioners
Author: Ruth Devadoss
Supervisor: Dr. Christopher High Academic term: HT18
Subject: Peace and Development Level: Master (second)
Course code: 4FU419
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Abstract
Wide debates over the last 15 years have questioned the impact of global initiatives like the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 and more recently the Grand Bargain 2017 on any real improvements to the development effectiveness agenda. Many also ask to what extent do the initiatives consider the concerns and views of practitioners as stakeholders who implement the objectives and who have valuable experience, contextual insights, specific skill-sets and innovative ideas on how to address complex problems (Sjöstedt 2013). The breadth of literature surrounding the initiatives seems to reflect this, collectively calling for improvements in four common theme areas; greater collaboration, partnership and coordination between actors; instilled mutual accountability and shared responsibility; simplified administrative requirements for implementers;
and greater participation and inclusion of stakeholder voices throughout processes. Questions that ask ‘who are the actors and decision-makers?’, and ‘who ought they be?’ can highlight gaps between an ideal situation and the reality, and is characteristic of a Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) approach to analysing sources of influence in a typical system, or in this case, global initiative. Therefore, this paper analyses the voices of aid and development practitioners who are actively working in the sector, and compares their responses to the four themes from the literature.
The research was conducted over three (3) months from May to July 2018 and interviewed nineteen (19) participants from a wide variety of development and humanitarian backgrounds and levels.
The main findings of the research are summed as follows:
● Definitions of ‘effectiveness’ vary and depend on underlying political influences
● Global initiatives like the Paris Declaration and Grand Bargain have had minimal visible impact on changing systems at the implementation level
● The role of global initiatives is however still important as forums for promoting discussion, defining boundaries and unifying debates
● Power imbalances and hierarchies within the development sector are structurally embedded and addressing this is crucial to improving effectiveness
● Real improvements to the effectiveness agenda require both innovative, participative and evidence-based learning, and systems to accept and address the concerns of implementers
Keywords: Aid effectiveness, Critical Systems Heuristics, Grand Bargain, Paris Declaration
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Acknowledgements
Firstly, I extend my gratitude towards my Supervisor Dr. Christopher High, who was patient with my evolving proposals, flexible to my inconsistent timetable (and geographical location!) and provided a great deal of knowledge on the subjects of Systems Thinking and Participatory Approaches.
I wish to express a sincere thanks to the nineteen respondents who volunteered their time, knowledge and expertise for this research and without whom this paper would not be possible. I also thank the multitude of contacts who were regretfully unable to contribute to the research, but responded in words of encouragement and interest towards the importance of the subject and final outcome of the paper.
Finally I would like to acknowledge my volunteer third-party assistant and dedicated emotional-
support Benjamin Devadoss, for cross-checking and triangulating the data of multiple hour-long
interviews, and my mentor in the profession David Allan, who instilled my passion on the topic and
provided an endless supply of relevant resources.
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Table of Contents
Abstract... 1
Acknowledgements... 2
Table of Contents... 3
List of Figures, Graphs and Tables... 5
List of Abbreviations...5
1 Introduction... 6
1.1 Problem Identification...6
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions... 7
1.3 Literature Overview... 8
1.4 Overview of Methodological Frameworks...9
1.5 Limitations and Delimitations...10
2 Contextualisation... 12
2.1 Background and Relevance...12
2.2 The Paris Declaration...13
2.3 The Grand Bargain...14
2.4 Critiques of the Initiatives...15
The Paris Declaration...15
The Grand Bargain...17
3 Literature Review... 18
3.1 Conceptual Framework... 18
Partnership and Coordination...18
Shared Responsibility and Mutual Accountability... 19
Harmonisation and Simplification... 20
Participation and Empowerment...21
3.2 Imbalances of Power...22
3.3 Stakeholder Participation... 23
3.4 Donor Perspectives...24
3.5 Justification for Study... 25
4 Analytical Framework...28
4.1 Critical Systems Heuristics... 28
4.2 Sources of Influence...28
4.3 CSH as Methodology versus Method... 30
4.4 Justification for the Methodology... 30
5 Methodology... 31
5.1 Research Design...31
5.2 Sources, Sampling & Data Collection... 31
5.3 Data Analysis... 32
A Critical Systems Heuristics Analysis... 33
5.4 Scientific Quality... 34
Ethical Considerations... 35
Caveats of the Methodology... 35
6 Empirical Findings...36
6.1 Dataset...36
6.2 Summary of Results... 38
Definitions: Effectiveness versus efficiency...38
Distinctions between humanitarian aid and long-term development...40
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Attributed drivers of change...41
The perceived role of global initiatives...43
Impact of global initiatives...44
6.3 Themes in the Data...46
A vast recognition of power inequalities... 47
Participation in decision making...48
Collaboration and partnership between actors... 50
The debate on Mutual Accountability...52
Challenges reporting effectiveness... 54
Additional themes for consideration... 56
7 Discussion... 58
7.1 Alignment of Experience and Rhetoric?...58
7.2 Expectations versus Reality: The CSH Framework...59
8 Conclusion...64
References...66
Appendices...71
Appendix I: CSH Assisted Questions for Analysis...71
Appendix II: A Matrix for Designing the Methodology...73
Appendix III: In-Depth Interview Prompt Questions... 75
Appendix IV: Doing Development Differently, A Manifesto... 77
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List of Figures, Graphs and Tables
Figure 1.4.1 Diagram of Research Phases and Processes
Figure 2.1.1 Time-line of global forums, reports and initiatives for “Effectiveness” in development delivery
Figure 2.3.1 Commitment work-stream categories of the Grand Bargain 2017
Figure 4.2.1 The boundary categories and questions of Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) Figure 4.3.1 Distinction of Modes on the Spectrum of Method/Methodology in CSH Figure 5.3.1 Example Critique from the Source of Motivation
Figure 6.1.1 Reference Table of Interviewees
Figure 6.1.2 List of Interviewees’ Affiliate Organisations Figure 7.2.1 Summary of Findings in a CSH Framework Model
List of Abbreviations
AAA The Accra Agenda for Action
ADB Asian Development Bank
CSO Civil society organisation
DDD Doing Development Differently Manifesto
GB The Grand Bargain
GPI Genuine Progress Indicators
GPPI Global Public Policy Institute
HLP High-Level Panel (on Humanitarian Financing) IASC The Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICVA The International Council of Voluntary Agencies
LDC Less Developed Country
LPMA Less Paper More Aid
NGO Non-government organisation
NNGO Northern-based non-government organisation
NWoW New Way of Working
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations ODI Overseas Development Institute
OECD-DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development- Development Assistance Committee
PD Paris Declaration (on Aid Effectiveness) PLA Participatory Learning and Action
PPA Programme Partnership Arrangement
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SNGO Southern-based non-government organisation
UN United Nations
WPoAE Working Party on Aid Effectiveness
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1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Identification
There has been a growing consensus over the last three decades that international development assistance is not effectively achieving the goals anticipated for the billions of dollars in aid inputs.
The late 1990s-2000s saw the rise of initiatives for improved aid effectiveness and efficiency, after the MDGs called for greater global partnership for development (Millennium Development Goal 8, OECD-DAC 2011). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 was a milestone commitment for improving aid quality, outlining five key principles of aid effectiveness: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, management for results, and mutual accountability, alongside methods for accelerating achievements and monitoring progress (Sjöstedt 2013). According to OECD stakeholder surveys, initiatives such as these made great headway in some areas, however significant weaknesses still hinder optimal governance and functioning today. Of particular note are continuing issues of limited local weigh-in for the achievement of goals, poor coordination between actors, and gaps in responsibility, transparency and accountability for development impacts on the ground (OECD-DAC 2011).
Critics also discuss a multitude of additional structural issues within the development industry that hinder the efficiency and wider effectiveness of practitioners working to implement aid and development agendas in the field; from NGOs developing projects to suit donor priorities and political agendas over stakeholder needs; to local voices and innovative solutions that are undervalued and unsupported; from inflexibility of donor requirements to changing contexts or exceptional circumstances; to excessive red-tape that wraps partners in bureaucracy and impossible administration (Chandy 2011; De Renzio, Foresti & O’Neil 2006; Droop, Isenman & Mlalazi 2008, Sjöstedt 2013). Even if one excludes the ethical and equitable principles that are so promoted within the development industry, these issues at the very least demonstrate significant gaps in costs to labour, time and resources of decision-makers, donors and implementers, and the impact these losses have on the effectiveness of desired outcomes.
Today, more recent initiatives like the Grand Bargain of 2017 seek to further commitments through additional operational targets involving broader partnerships between multilateral and bilateral agencies, governments, NGOs and civil society (ICVA 2017a; ICVA 2017b; UNOCHA 2018a;
UNOCHA 2018b). However so too must modern initiatives be subject to review. Through a
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combination of literature critiquing the Paris Declaration and Grand Bargain to date, and scholarship promoting the benefits of equitable participation of actors for end outcomes, the researcher will argue that the thoughts and experiences of practitioners in the field are not only valid but essential to highlighting problem areas and proposing potential solutions to improve the overall effectiveness of the aid and development industry.
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions
The aim of this research therefore is to understand more closely the views and concerns of development practitioners who ultimately form the link between international decision-makers and donors that allocate development funding, and the outcomes that are intended for recipients. The paper seeks to highlight some of the gaps that exist between principles of the Paris Declaration and Grand Bargain and how they are translated into action, particularly with emphasis on what the ideal situation ‘ought’ to be in relation to how the situation really ‘is’ (perceived). A secondary objective is to explore what leverage exists for shifting the development system to better recognise, communicate with and support partners’ voices. To address these objectives, the following research questions are proposed:
1) To what extent do current international initiatives like the Paris Declaration and the Grand Bargain align with the latest debates on development best-practice and voices of practitioners with experience in the field?
And;
2) What does a Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) analysis reveal about the disparities between practitioner’s visions of what the effectiveness agenda ‘is’ and what ‘ought’ to be done?
Several key activities of the research will assist in the answering of these questions. The researcher proposes to:
i. Identify common themes from academic literature and independent reviews critiquing the Paris
Declaration, Grand Bargain and other best-practice publishings
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ii. Conduct qualitative interviews with a wide range of development practitioners with experience working in the aid and development fields
iii. Code the findings according to commonalities and against the themes drawn from the literature iv. Use themed narratives and a CSH framework to present the findings and conclusions
See chapter 1.4: Methodological Framework for overview of these activities.
1.3 Literature Overview
A growing community of scholars have debated the pitfalls of the development system extensively (Barr, Fafchamps & Owens 2005; Burger & Owens 2010; Gregory & Howard 2009). The workings of those outlined briefly below have influenced the entire scope, direction and design of the research, and account for the researcher’s selection of themes from the literature to focus attention.
Scholars like Chandy (2011) for one, believes the majority of inefficiencies in the current system are a direct result of structurally embedded bureaucratic failings, and that many issues within the development industry stem from deep and politically-motivated roots. He believes global
‘democratic' solutions such as the Paris Declaration do not address underlying political incentives that determine the allocations of aid funding, and instead vies for political solutions like promoting high quality leadership and better cooperation to match. On the other hand, academics like De Renzio (2006) and colleagues note the almost non-existent accountability chain between donors and recipients in the Paris Declaration, as many donor agencies rely upon intermediary local practitioners to provide services and implement programmes, thus delegating responsibility elsewhere. His team suggests power imbalances between parties and their vastly differing abilities to provide aid and monitor development should automatically require higher accountability standards on the part of donors (De Renzio, Foresti & O’Neil 2006). Droop (2008) and his colleagues similarly point to weaknesses in the mutual accountability objective, and ask if are there other feasible and “politically-acceptable” interventions that stakeholders can utilise. They too bring attention to power imbalances, where donors too often drive project objectives and designs, impose conditions or halt assistance whilst partner countries do not have the ability to respond in kind.
Ultimately they conclude donor-recipient relationships should be characterised by ongoing negotiations to maintain a balance of power for aid effectiveness (Droop, Isenman & Mlalazi 2008).
Lastly, Sjöstedt (2013) conducted empirical research on the “severe and competing demands” that
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the current development system puts on aid practitioners themselves, with “aid fatigue” creating lasting repercussions that impact whole institutions and processes. He critiques results-based management as creating incompatible tensions between objectives of promoting ownership and capacity building whilst at the very same time prioritising donor agendas, and the constant need to measure and report results at the expense of lasting change (Sjöstedt 2013).
Overall, the literature points to clear gaps in the research around international aid effectiveness initiatives, particularly in relation to accountability and the imbalance of power between donors, implementing partners and recipients. These scholars maintain that few initiatives monitor donor performance from local perspectives, or provide meaningful platforms for those in the field to
“express their voice” (Droop, Isenman a& Mlalazi 2008). Therefore, the researcher draws upon the works of those above to support greater consultation of local partners and practitioners.
1.4 Overview of Methodological Frameworks
This study ran from May 2018 to August 2018 and was conducted in three phases:
Phase One: A contextualisation and literature review of the discourse on the global aid effectiveness agenda, focusing on four key themes within the debate and critiques on the Paris Declaration and Grand Bargain;
Phase Two: Collection of qualitative data through a series of interviews, with discussion questions influenced by a Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) framework; and
Phase Three: The coding and analysis of data for themes, particularly against those extracted from
the literature. The results were written up descriptively and collated into a CSH formatted table for
further analysis.
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Figure 1.4.1 Diagram of Research Phases and Processes
Two frameworks were used in the research; a Conceptual Framework that is developed in the literature review (see Chapter 3) and an Analytical Framework that assisted in the development of the methodology and critical analysis of the results (see Chapter 4 and 7).
1.5 Limitations and Delimitations
The task of understanding the issues that impact development effectiveness is far greater than may
be covered in a short study of two high-level signatory initiatives, however as determined, there is
need for a start of discussion.
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Aware of a multitude of alternate examples, this study confined itself to the scope of two sample initiatives on aid effectiveness. The Paris Declaration (2005) was selected as one of the earlier and more comprehensive catalysts for kick-starting the global effectiveness agenda, that had a well- established base of literature around it to draw from. The Grand Bargain (2017) was selected as the most recent initiative coming out of the World Humanitarian Summit, with new reports and reviews currently being published annually evaluating it, and was thus more likely to be familiar to interview participants from relevant organisations employing it. The Accra Agenda for Action (2008), the Doing Development Differently (2014) manifesto, the Less Paper More Aid (2016) initiative and the New Way of Working (2017) initiative were all considered as alternative examples for the study.
The four themes pulled from the literature critiquing the initiatives and promoting best-practice for effectiveness were also selected by the researcher as areas for focus to bring some boundary to the topics discussed. These were influenced by a short scholarly review on the development effectiveness agenda. See chapter 1.3: Literature Review.
The use of the Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) analytical framework was not to provide a thoroughly comprehensive outlook of the effectiveness agenda system, nor to provide “yet another ready-to-hand matrix to offer clients through a consultancy”, but was used as a relatively simple tool to frame viewpoints on issues and highlight possible improvements to future interventions (Reynolds & Holwell 2010:17). The CSH approach was also selected for its repeatability.
Few financial resources and a short time period of 10 weeks limited interviews with practitioners in the field to be conducted through technology-mediated forms of communication like Skype or email.
Selective, purpose sampling limited the call for participants to be those with a first or second degree connection to the researcher. As data was collected via informal, qualitative interviews, the study was likely limited by degree to which participants disclosed their feelings or sentiments on a topic, as well as known examples of instances within their own experience. A number of these factors likely shaped the data and influenced the researcher to interpret and draw the conclusions she did.
Likewise, the study focused solely on the perspectives of the individuals and was in no way
representative of a participant’s organisation, agency, NGO, donor or larger international
institutions. A more thorough study may capture the representative voices of donors and agencies as
own actors and thus may be a subject for further investigation elsewhere.
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2 Contextualisation
2.1 Background and Relevance
As discussed in chapter 1.3: Literature Review, shortfalls of the humanitarian and development effectiveness agenda have been linked by scholars to poor coordination between actors, stringent administrative requirements for development funds, and too many projects and programmes with vastly differing procedures trying to tackle the same issues, leading to less effective programmes, low levels of ownership by the developing countries themselves, and a civil society overburdened by ‘tied aid’ and donor interests (Wood 2010). Becoming more and more aware of these constraints, development actors over the last three decades have seen a “convergence of political pressure to work together, more holistically, for more effective outcomes” (ICVA 2017b:3). The Millennium Development Goals (particularly MDG 8) were some of the earlier catalysts in the call for change, along with the first High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the Paris Declaration and then the Accra Agenda for Action. More recent initiatives like today’s Sustainable Development Goals for Agenda 2030, the World Humanitarian Summit and the Grand Bargain similarly reflect the overall sentiment that more must be done through collaboration to achieve meaningful and lasting impact.
Figure 2.1.1 Time-line of global forums, reports and initiatives for “Effectiveness” in development
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(OECD 2018; UNOHCHR 2013)
According to the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the latest political climate on global initiatives is a mixed bag of actors and institutions coping with both the impacts and limitations of past initiatives, and the shifting context of the world responding to events like the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe post 2015. The ICVA claimed while “the World Bank is repositioning itself in the development sector, particularly vis-à-vis other development banks, by scaling up in situations of fragility and conflict”, the Secretary General of the UN is “fighting to preserve the multilateral system” and respond to calls for greater coherence among the various UN agencies in order to maintain influence (ICVA 2017b:3). Meanwhile, though many governments and stakeholders across the field firmly support the SDGs and the Agenda 2030’s commitment to
‘leave no one behind’, questions are being raised as to the tangible-felt impacts of globally governed initiatives, and what needs to happen to improve this.
The following chapter provides an overview of the two global initiatives selected as examples for the research. (See chapter 1.5: Limitations and Delimitations for justification of selection)
2.2 The Paris Declaration
After great success of the first High-Level Forum for Aid effectiveness in Rome 2002, the
following forum in Paris led to the development of a non-binding declaration and set of twelve
indicators for measuring the impacts of development on a global scale (Bissio 2013:238). The Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, adopted in 2005 (and reaffirmed by the Accra Agenda for Action
in 2008) was agreed upon and signed by representatives of 90 countries, with the main aim of
taking “far reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and manage aid” (Paris
Declaration, paragraph 1). The Paris Declaration focused on five key areas for improvement; 1)
ownership of strategies and plans by aid-receiving countries; 2) alignment of donors to country
plans using their native systems and procedures; 3) harmonization of donor actions to cut burdens
and costs; 4) managing for results to focus on better outcomes and improved decision-making; and
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5) mutual accountability for shared mechanisms of responsibility (Wood 2010). By 2011, 135 countries and institutions like the European Commission had signed the commitment, leading the OECD to praise the Paris Declaration as “a ‘landmark reform’ in development cooperation endorsed by leading development practitioners” (Bissio 2013:233). The concept of having time- bound, global targets and an agreed set of performance indicators for development actors was a strong step towards improving the knowledge and learning of the humanitarian aid-delivery sector.
Chandy (2011) notes that the self-monitoring aspect has “injected an element of rigour to aid effectiveness discussions… [and] it has also made possible performance tracking, benchmarking and standard setting among donors and countries” (Chandy 2011:1). For these reasons, the principles of the Paris Declaration are today still considered “a touchstone for effective recipient- donor relations in any setting. They provide a common agenda for both global and country level dialogue on aid effectiveness and have inspired attempts to localize global commitments through country-based action plans” (ibid).
2.3 The Grand Bargain
A decade on, the ‘Grand Bargain’ initiative arose as a result of the 2016 High-Level Panel on
Humanitarian Financing (HLP) report ‘Too important to fail – addressing the humanitarian
financing gap.’ The HLP report had three main focus areas, of which the third was to “improve
delivery: A Grand Bargain on efficiency”. Such a movement was thought to help yield USD 1
billion in savings from improvements in aid efficiency that could be used to further development
objectives. The underlying logic was that “if donors and agencies each make changes (e.g. if donors
reduce earmarking and agencies are more transparent with how funds are spent), aid delivery would
become more efficient, freeing up human and financial resources for the direct benefit of affected
populations” (ICVA 2017a:1; UNOCHA 2018a). The outcomes of the HLP outlined a roadmap for
the formulation of ten key commitments which formed the Grand Bargain of 2017, as seen below.
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Figure 2.3.1 Commitment work-stream categories of the Grand Bargain 2017
(adapted from IASC 2017;UNOCHA 2016; ICVA 2017)
The Grand Bargain was mostly targeted towards higher-level actors in the humanitarian aid sector, with signatories by 2018 including 24 member states, 13 United Nations organisations, 19 NGOs (mostly large internationals), 2 members of the Red Cross Red Crescent movement, and the OECD.
Reports from its first year of implementation stated “the Grand Bargain has successfully mobilised key stakeholders, representing 86-88% of international humanitarian donor funding and 72% of aid organisations’ budget” (Derzsi-Horwath, Streets & Ruppert 2017). More recently, the ODI’s latest independent analysis for 2018 found some clear progress in areas of increased cash-based programming, better coordination of multi-year planning and funding, and more proactive and coordinated engagement of the aid community (Bennett 2018). However, the Grand Bargain as with the Paris Declaration is not without its ongoing international critiques. Some of these are presented below.
2.4 Critiques of the Initiatives
The Paris Declaration
One of the main shortfalls of the declaration, as discussed in various papers by Bissio (2007; 2013)
is the failure to address (and even promotion of) power inequalities and asymmetries between
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donors and development partners in the industry. Scholars like Foresti et al. (2006), Droop et al.
(2008), Wood (2010) and Chandy (2011) also highlight that the declaration does not fairly distribute rights and responsibilities to actors, even penalising recipient countries if conditions are not met (under threat of having aid funds reduced) while these recipients in turn have little means of policing their donors on ethical issues. As Bissio notes, although mutual accountability is one of the five principles of the declaration, “one would expect a mutual accountability exercise to be undertaken at the international level, with opportunities for developing countries to be advised by international NGOs and other experts and to share experiences among themselves about the performance of donors individually or collectively”, however current means from the declaration showcase “an enormous imbalance of power and resources” (Bissio 235, 239-240, 245; Droop, Isenman & Mlalazi 2008). Voices of developing countries who can participate in forums have little impact, as it is organisations like the OECD’s DAC and World Bank that actually decide upon the policies and indicators for assessing implementation of the Paris Declaration, with “no participation whatsoever of developing countries in the definition of the criteria… or in the designation of the experts in charge” (ibid).
Ownership is another area of attestation for scholars like Bissio, who claim greater national ownership “is defined, tautologically, as countries having plans that conform to what the donor wishes, as articulated in conditionalities attached to loans and grants” (Bissio 2012:238, Foresti, Booth & O’Neil 2006). Bissio writes “the view of many critics is that assessment institutions rate the extent to which a government has: “a) adopted Neo-liberal economic policies (i.e., liberalization and privatization)... and b) developed institutions, particularly those that protect property rights and promote a business-friendly environment” (ibid). Similarly, managing for results in many cases is
“not measured in terms of poverty reduction or Millennium Development Goal achievement, but only refer to governance and macroeconomic policies…. deemed successful if those policies are in place, even if poverty actually increases” (Bissio 2013:244). Ultimately, Bissio strongly believes that “untying aid is probably the single most important factor that could contribute to aid efficiency, and one that depends only on donors. Failure to include untying of aid among the binding targets in the Paris Declaration does not help to build credibility in the process among ‘partner’ countries”
(2013:242).
Overall, despite the Paris Declaration calling for major changes in the way development is managed
by governance actors, many critics believe few donors made adequate shifts in their practices
towards the modalities involved. Others still believe that some of the actions from the initiative may
even undermine efforts for developing countries to realise the right to development (Bissio
2013:245). Regardless, Chandy makes a good point about this early attempt at better coordination
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for aid delivery: “where the targets and indicators have been criticized for measuring the wrong thing or failing to account for particular circumstances, this has only added to the quality of the debate”, and paved the way to a succession of global initiatives towards better aid delivery (Chandy 2011:1).
The Grand Bargain
The Grand Bargain is still relatively young in its establishment, with only the second round of independent reviews now being published as it heads into its third year. One of the main early concerns increasingly noticed by policy-makers worldwide was that many major stakeholders have been left out of the initiative, including many other international NGOs, Southern-based NGOs (SNGOs), non-OECD donor countries, private corporations and organisations, and arguably most importantly, host governments of LDCs themselves. The Global Public Policy Institute delicately notes that “little buy-in from non-OECD countries and NGOs limits its [the Grand Bargain]
potential” (Derzsi-Horwath, Streets & Ruppert 2017). The latest 2018 review by the ODI also points to significant challenges that are undermining the initiatives from achieving any durable and meaningful change. The ODI writes “the agreement itself is collapsing under the weight of its own bureaucracy: its 51 commitments, ten work-streams and multi-layered governance structure are proving too unwieldy to manage. Its architecture is over-structured, and its implementation under- governed, lacking the high-level political commitment and investment from signatories needed to encourage momentum, focus and prioritisation” (Bennett 2018). Some of the “politically contentious and practically difficult” areas remain a lack of consistent and practical indicators of progress, poor engagement on a state or political level, and lack of clarity and agreement on specific terms, actions and even goals (Metcalfe-Hough et al. 2018:2-3). In particular is the significant stand-still on work-stream 10: enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors.
According to the ODI, addressing the humanitarian-development nexus is “critical to ensuring that the signatories can make speedier and more consistent progress across the full set of commitments”
(Metcalfe-Hough et al. 2018:2). More discussion on the importance of this nexus is found in chapter
3.5: Justification for Study.
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3 Literature Review
3.1 Conceptual Framework
As demonstrated, there is a wealth of literature surrounding the Paris Declaration and Grand Bargain with both positive and negative critiques, and indeed critiquing the concept of a
‘development effectiveness agenda’ on the whole. In order to make a critical analysis, the researcher has selected several commonly occurring themes and debated areas from which to establish a framework for research analysis. The four themes chosen are partnership and coordination between development actors; mutual accountability and the sharing of responsibility; a harmonisation and simplification of administrative requirements; and a ‘revolution’ in participation and empowerment of stakeholders. These common themes are explored below and were used to guide the design of the research.
Partnership and Coordination
One of the first major themes that appears is the perceived need for greater partnership, coordination and alignment among and between actors for development. Often stressed is the need to work together interactively, not in parallel or with competing or contrasting objectives, which is seen as crucial for reducing repetition of programmes and preventing gaps where stakeholders’
needs are left unaddressed. The OECD includes these as separate concepts for consideration to its
DAC quality-standards for development evaluation, stating “in order to increase ownership of
development and build mutual accountability for results, a partnership approach to development
evaluation is systematically considered early in the process. The concept of partnership connotes an
inclusive process, involving different stakeholders such as government, parliament, civil society,
intended beneficiaries and international partners” (OECD-DAC 2010:7). Similarly, the Busan
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation created at the Fourth HLF on Aid Effectiveness
in Korea, 2011, focused its entire attention on the subject, believing “success depends on the results
and impact of our joint efforts and investments” (HLF4 2011:17). During the forum, stakeholders
from across the development sphere renewed efforts towards cooperative action, agreeing that a key
principle of partnership is that “lessons should be shared by all… we welcome the opportunities
presented by diverse approaches to development cooperation” (ibid:18). Perhaps a critical highlight
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of the forum was the recognition of newly arising actors and relationships for development, and an increasingly complex architecture of networks for cooperation, such as not only state and non-state actors, but also partnerships between countries at different development stages (including middle- income nations), BRICS and South-South cooperations, and public-private partnerships that
‘complement’ more historical North-South forms of cooperation (HLF4 2011:17). This paper will focus more critically on traditionally lower-level actors, of whom signatories promised to welcome
“the contribution of civil society organisations and private actors; we will work together to build on and learn from their achievements and innovations, recognising their unique characteristics and respective merits” (ibid:18).
Shared Responsibility and Mutual Accountability
Accountability is an extremely common and popular term used throughout the literature on best practice for organisations involved in aid delivery. The OECD among many argues that for increased development efficiency and effectiveness, theoretically “a system of collective responsibility and mutual accountability could work best” (Scott 2014:1). This theme is applied throughout the texts as largely called for by civil society and partner governments. Actors involved in implementation of development projects and agendas, like NGOs or recipient governments, are often subject to stringent transparency requirements for revealing the spending of funds or their general conduct, however it is well recognised that donors and policy-makers themselves are very seldom subject to similar standards. This has raised the question among partners ‘who watches the watchers?’. As Sengupta (2017) proposes, some such obligations simply require more thoroughly formulated, imposed or enforceable remedies for meaningful accountability (Sengupta 2013:73).
But defining the boundaries and assessments of accountability can be challenging. Bovens (2007) debates the meaning of the term and defines it as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct; the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens 2007:447). He holds different contexts require different types of accountability according to the actors involved and the situation concerned, i.e. in the context of organisations for development, his approach would be a
‘learning perspective’, where the intention of accountability structures is mainly to provide actors with feedback to increase effectiveness towards achieving optimal social outcomes (ibid:466;
Bratteteig et al. 2013:132). Even so, this concept- not inclusive of power inequalities- remains
hierarchical. The concept of mutual accountability on the other hand, under a collaborative
framework, stresses the importance of a two-sided system of checks and balances. Mutual
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accountability asserts that both actors are equally obligated to justify actions and question one another, with all parties being held responsible regardless of bureaucratic structure or power asymmetries. In this case, Bovens alludes to mutual accountability as a more “moral” aspect that is horizontal in nature, where the ‘learning’ perspective for improved social outcomes is a given (2007:460; Bratteteig et al. 2013:132).
In their paper critiquing the Paris Declaration, De Renzio (2006) and his colleagues comment specifically on the existing inequalities of current structures of accountability. They show how many aid-dependent countries have very strong accountability mechanisms for funding spent placed upon them by donors, while in return “the accountability of donor agencies to recipient governments... is much weaker. But possibly, the weakest accountability chain is that between donor agencies and recipient countries’ citizens, whose well-being represents (or should represent) the ultimate objective of aid provided by donor agencies” (De Renzio, Foresti & O’Neil 2006:53- 54). De Renzio’s team also speculate that, “although in theory it is developing country governments who should ensure the accountability of donors to their citizens through their management of the aid relationship… and through domestic processes that allow citizens to hold their government to account for their use of donor resources, in practice, this does not reflect either the power relationship between donors and recipients, the range of incentives for providing and accepting aid or the weak accountability that usually exists in developing countries between the executive and electorate” (De Renzio, Foresti & O’Neil 2006:58).
Harmonisation and Simplification
This third theme refers closely to the research and work done in the Less Paper More Aid (LPMA)
initiative in 2015 (which influenced the Grand Bargain), dedicated to the unification and
simplification of conditions, requirements and paperwork often placed on facilitators of
development; from concept and grant writing, to reports and evaluations. A decade on from the
Paris Declaration, the LPMA campaign set about to specifically conduct research on and identify
some of the key bureaucratic and technical ‘red-tape’ restrictions to aid delivery from the
perspective of NGOs. Carried out and supported by international NGOs like Oxfam, CARE, World
Vision, Plan and ICMC, the initiative’s aim was “to reduce the burden of donor conditions on aid
agencies and thereby improve the efficiency of humanitarian action” (ICVA 2016:6). The global
study largely examined NGO perceptions on grant applications, reporting, auditing and evaluation
assessments, and found that giving a voice to NGO staff involved in the delivery of programmes
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could shed light on a variety of issues preventing effectiveness, such as tied aid, unnecessary paperwork and the exhaustion of already limited human resources (ibid).
The main result of the report was a clear message from development practitioners in the field experiencing similar issues when it came to reporting to donors; namely excessive reporting requirements, duplication of paperwork, and processes which were time and resource consuming (ICVA 2016). These findings recommended donors question the conditions placed on their partners in order to receive or maintain funding, and overall asked whether it is really the best use of resources when “funding hinges more on the ability of organizations to comply with multiple donor conditions, rather than clearly expressed and well-informed needs analysis? Such questions highlight the ways in which humanitarian principles and action may be undermined in current practice, and systems of accountability may inadvertently be focused more on the needs of donors than affected populations” (ICVA 2016:6). The LPMA initiative made a strong case for harmonisation and simplification of all development paperwork from the field, and contributed significantly to the topic being addressed in the Grand Bargain.
Participation and Empowerment
Typically, the debated theme ‘participation’ is often referred to in terms of the recipient communities and target beneficiaries of development programmes, however here the researcher discusses the theme from the perspective of civil society as stakeholders. NGOs, field workers and local development practitioners on the ground should be considered a form of beneficiary due to their being direct recipients of funding, training, and information systems, and an important voice as the sometimes primary-liaisons between donors and local populations.
Writers likeTufte and Mefalopulos (2009) for the World Bank state that “as promises of past paradigms [for development]
fail to materialise, the demand for a shift from expert-driven models to endogenous ones grows steadily” (Tufte & Mefalopulos 2009:3). While evidence for this is clear, their belief that the international development community “has been attentive to the issues raised” is less clear, for although participatory approaches are present in the project cycles of many organisations, they are largely at the grass-roots levels of programme implementation, and less so at higher levels of policy making, programme design or in accountability mechanisms (ibid). Therefore, with the growth in momentum for global initiatives like the Grand Bargain, any analysis must explore who are the actors making these decisions, who is not able to participate, and what are the various power distributions and inequalities that shape how these decisions with global impacts are made? (Tufte
& Mefalopulos 2009:3). More on this theme is discussed in chapter 3.3: Stakeholder Participation..
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3.2 Imbalances of Power
It is no secret that hierarchies of power govern the structures of aid organisations as in wider politics of managing an agenda for change. Varying levels of influence at the local, organisational, institutional and societal levels are all instrumental in targeting particular areas of society, and the functioning of the wider system as a whole. Scholars like Bratteteig (2013) and co-authors believe projects “that manage to connect across arenas will have a larger and longer lasting impact”
(Bratteteig et al. 2013:131). Sadly, problems arise when imbalances of power impact the value and democratic nature of processes, hindering participation and the ability of actors to have a say in decisions that affect them. On a global scale, Fukunda-Parr (2013) writes that inadequate participation of developing countries in international decision-making, such as inclusion in global initiatives like the Grand Bargain, is a major issue. He says “this is related to the democratic deficit in global governance and the lack of transparency and broad participation in institutional structures and decision-making processes… not only is their [partner actors] voice constrained due to lack of financial and technical resources and capacity, but asymmetries are institutionalised in decision- making structures and processes” (Fukuda-Parr 2013:207).
On a more localised scale, Ebrahim (2003) focuses on the power differences and relationships between donors and their partner NGOs, each playing a different role in influencing the effectiveness of aid and development. He emphasises the system of ‘exchange of resources’ that forms the development sector, where donors provide funding, information, political support, capacity building and preferred solutions to pre-defined problems, while NGOs provide their labour, local knowledge, networks and connections, success stories and evidence of effectiveness. However, Ebrahim makes the important recognition that “the terms of exchange are by no means equal;
donors can and do impose definitions of ‘success’, notions of relevant information, systems of measurement and reporting” (Hammack 2004:305). The very aspect that donors have access to a much greater pool of valuable information, political influence and monetary resources to draw from that is not available to local development workers means they have a much higher degree of bargaining power over their recipients (ibid). As a result, tensions arise due to competition for these resources amongst implementers, with those successful bidding closest to the desired agenda of donors rather than proposing solutions that might be the most appropriate to the problem context.
The lack of structure for reporting grievances and resisting inappropriate demands, policies or
practices reinforces these tensions (Ebrahim 2003:156). Though global initiatives like the Paris
Declaration and Grand Bargain do try to address some of these inequalities by promoting better
partnership, collaboration and mutual accountability, Ebrahim believes civil society itself is best
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able to highlight the disparities and call for change: “the responsibility for changing the myopic nature of reporting and learning lies not only with donors but also with NGOs, which have a
‘weighty responsibility’ to ‘educate their donors’ about the complexities of social change” (Ebrahim 2003:156,159; Hammack 2004:306). Though not a representative of an NGO, the researcher through this paper seeks to do exactly that.
3.3 Stakeholder Participation
Arguably at the very root of democratic practice, the most common attribution of participation is giving ordinary people a voice and say in the issues that concern them, and the ability to act towards achieving a beneficial outcome (Tufte & Mefalopulos 2009). However, in a socio-political climate of making big decisions via global initiatives that will impact how money is spent and development is done, questions are continually being asked about the agreed definitions of ‘meaningful and effective’ participation. Scholars like Tufte and Mefalopulos (2009) believe in assessing quality of participatory methods by answering questions not only like ‘who is able to participate and who is not’, but also ‘what are the varying degrees of involvement?’, ‘what are typical constraints to participation?’, ‘what problems can participation help address?’ and ‘how can one evaluate participatory outcomes?’ (Tufte & Mefalopulos 2009:4, 10-11). At the higher level, actors are beginning to argue that stakeholder participation for development has lost momentum and meaningfulness, as “publicly one is supposed to support participation in a democratic society” and
“it is more or less de rigueur for policy-makers to at minimum pay lip service to the importance of participation” (Fischer 2009:48, 53). Some even describe it as “a new bureaucratic instrument for political-administrative manipulation” (ibid).
Opposition to participatory methods and actions also exist, largely in the Realist school of thought.
Arguments typically ask “why… should we consult people who... have little knowledge of the
issues?” and is it not better “to rely on the more informed members of society? Is not… expert
decision-making more likely to support the values of social justice (the liberal position) or
efficiency (the conservative position)?” (Fischer 2009:53). Such arguments typically favour the elite
in roles of governance, an essentially utilitarian approach that relying on a select educated-few in
positions of power and their knowledge, skills and competence is in the best interest of effective
guidance for the greater good. Socio-political theorists like Zolo (1992) speak of the sheer
complexity of the systems and contexts in which participation is preferred. Zolo asserts “there is
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already too much participation [in Western political systems] and that much of it is little more than a reflection of the public’s limited, self-serving understanding of the complicated problems confronting [a] country” (ibid). Fischer (2009), playing devil’s advocate, said “with each area of modern life under the control of disciplinary expertise [welfare, health, environment, education etc.]
there is little that the citizen (in our case recipient actor or local practitioner) would seem to be able to offer...in a world dominated [and guided] in large part by the views of administrative and policy experts, professional advisory committees, think tank specialists, governmental policy staffs, academic consultants and the like… in face of this situation, deliberation… moves from being considered a waste of time to being detrimental to the making of effective policy decisions”
(Fischer 2009:54-55). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), among others, even go so far as to suggest participation in development policy-making is in fact a “leftist project” imposed on actors who would prefer to leave deliberations over complex problems to their representatives (ibid).
Despite the different arguments, Fischer ultimately reminds decision-makers that we “need to recognise that most experts are themselves only members of the public when it comes to many areas of expertise other than their own. Given the complexity of many of these fields, an expert in one field rarely has expertise in others” (2009:57). This point in particular is something that should be considered further when deciding the actors who are to be involved in designing global initiatives for better development and humanitarian aid delivery.
3.4 Donor Perspectives
The OECD’s paper “Imagining More Effective Humanitarian Aid: A Donor Perspective” by Scott (2014) was a research project designed to contribute to the debate on development effectiveness from the perspective of donors and funding bodies. The research interviewed eleven “major player”
donors who collectively provided over USD 8 billion of funding in 2012 and were therefore significant contributors to financing humanitarian work in the field that year (Scott 2014). Results of the study revealed the donors were relatively aligned with one another on the factors they thought to be most important for humanitarian effectiveness, and on the needs for increasing efforts (Scott 2014:1). The report concluded with four characteristics that donors and funding groups believed are
“critical” for achieving better effectiveness, including 1) sharing responsibility, but with differing
roles for different actors; 2) designing programmes with maximum reach that are contextually
relevant, results-based and good value for money; 3) having the right tools and partnerships for
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flexibility, predictability and coordination; and 4) being measurable with systems of accountability and learning in practice. Overall, the published findings stated “operational actors, affected populations and states, donors and policy-makers can’t be put into neat boxes, but they can, and should, be held accountable for their contribution to humanitarian effectiveness” (ibid). Scott asked if it is even possible to imagine a common framework for humanitarian effectiveness, and suggests if so, such as framework should be inclusive of all development actors based on “what they can control, what they can influence, and where they advocate- no matter who was assessing them”
(ibid). Unsurprisingly, the four characteristics that resulted from the study of donors’ perspectives align very strongly with the four themes selected from the literature throughout this paper’s research.
Also similarly, the conclusions of Scott for the OECD were not intended to propose “a definite solution or framework” for solving these structural issues, but merely “provoke debate and stimulate further thinking” on the subject as a whole (Scott 2014:1).
3.5 Justification for Study
As ascertained throughout the literature, the global development effectiveness agenda is struggling to deliver results in a multitude of areas. Building upon this, the researcher makes the case that approaching and incorporating the voices of professional experts from the field can be helpful in revealing both gaps and potential solutions to better understand and address these issues on a global scale. But why base the study on the voices of practitioners, researchers and civil society representatives over the traditional policy-making ‘elite’? Several reasons are detailed below to justify the focus of this study.
Practitioners often work within the nexus of development and humanitarian aid
The Grand Bargain’s work-stream 10 commitment to ‘develop the humanitarian-development
nexus’ came under fire in the most recent 2018 independent ODI review for significant lack of
growth, labelled as ‘detrimental’ to the entire process of the modern development effectiveness
agenda. The very first recommendation published was to “determine where and exactly how
enhanced engagement between humanitarian and development actors should be integrated in the
actions and strategies adopted under other work-streams. Given the critical nature of this work-
stream to the overall Grand Bargain framework, this exercise should be undertaken with some
urgency” (Metcalfe-Hough et al. 2018:4, 59-63). Similarly, few actors or organisations classify
themselves as strictly part of one ‘sector’ over the other. Therefore this study looks directly at the
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cross-cutting issues within the global effectiveness agenda between humanitarian aid and longer- term development sectors, and assesses the potential of interviewed actors as representatives of that nexus.
Participatory interplay between designers and users improves outputs
Fischer (2009) believes the best outcomes for development stand the greatest chance of being achieved when combining and balancing actors from three realms of knowing: the technical, political and local/experiential. Wenger, McDermott and Snyder (2002) support this by suggesting
“bringing about more inclusive practices of governance involves inventing contexts in which the representatives of these forms of knowing can share their perspectives in the common pursuit of problem-solving… translating ideas in ways that facilitate mutual understanding among the participants and seeking to promote a synthesis of perspectives that helps to stimulate different ways of knowing relevant to the problems at hand” (Fischer 2009:72). Here participation is
‘genuine’, i.e. making the fundamental transition from an actor’s role as merely an informant or respondent, to being an engaged and valued participant throughout the process (Simonsen &
Robertson 2013:5). The viewpoint of this research asserts practitioners’ work and experiences have value, and rides on the interplay and interdependence of different-but-valuable roles. Bretteteig (2013) and colleagues discuss how inclusion of ‘users’ (here the practitioners) promotes “the intertwining of technology [e.g. programme or initiative] and human activity, where knowing about technology and design does not give (enough) understanding of the effects of technical choices, and knowing the practices does not give (enough) imagination for possible other ways of doing things”.
Thus the mantra for success should be where “designers learn about the use context from users, but also that the users learn about the technical possibilities from the designers” (Bratteteig et al.
2013:132).
Practitioners are locally-informed representatives of beneficiaries
Civil society groups that work closely with beneficiaries in local contexts argue they are in a better position to act as their closest representatives. Scholars like Hajer (2003) discuss the concept of an
‘institutional void’, where NGOs have unique relationships between actors, “situating their
activities in the institutional cracks of the traditional state… NGOs constitute new forms of social
and political engagement typically associated with governance” (Fischer 2009:70). The
participatory approach therefore suggests that civil society, or at the very least experienced
professionals and practitioners who represent them, should also be involved as signatories in the
process of decision-making for global commitments.
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Participation of local actors promotes accountability
This approach argues for the voices of local practitioners to be heard as a means of keeping decision-makers and influential parties in check. Of the traditional policy-making ‘elite’, Fischer (2009) asks questions like ‘who were the actors involved?’ and ‘which stakeholders were not involved, and why?’. Rowe and Frewer (2004) discuss that “participatory projects can easily be co- opted by powerful institutions for their own ends… [for example] the World Bank has been accused of instrumentalising participation to service its own purposes… but this has come as no surprise to many practitioners in the field” (Fischer 2009:73-74). Thus, the researcher turns to localised, experienced implementers of aid from a wide range of backgrounds to answer some of these questions. More, scholars argue such inclusions can help monitor overarching systemic processes.
Fischer (2009) holds that thorough participatory approaches can address “the material conditions that create dependency” and thus should be designed to “counter the top-down bureaucratic tendencies that define contemporary political and organisational decision processes” (Fischer 2009:69). In other words, participation and empowerment efforts “must reach deeper into the organisational structures and processes... [where the] effort to empower people must thus be designed to counter existing power relations that result in domination of some groups over others”
(ibid). This relates very strongly to the discussions of systemic power inequalities in chapter 3.2.
Having one’s concerns heard is empowering
Lastly, the researcher also works from Robertson and Wagner’s (2013) assumption that “people who do a particular activity (including work) know most about how it gets done. So involving them in the design of the technologies [initiatives] they will use means that the outcomes are more likely to be successful” (Robertson & Wagner 2013:65). Bratteteig and colleagues believe this involves stakeholders “getting to know and respect each other across differences in position, perspective, knowledge and skills. A basic element of this is seeing the other participants as skilled practitioners in their professional context” (Bratteteig et al. 2013:132). Surely this is a first step to addressing power inequalities within the development sector itself.
For these reasons provided, the researcher justifies the inclusion of active or experienced
development practitioners as the main subjects of the study, and emphasises that any guiding
principles or initiatives for development should voice consciousness of structured power relations
within the industry, and be accepting of the concerns of those ‘in-the-know’ (Tufte & Mefalopulos
2009:10-11). The following chapter outlines and explores the CSH framework that influenced the
design of the research methodology and resulting analysis of findings to form the conclusions.
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4 Analytical Framework
4.1 Critical Systems Heuristics
Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH), a modern form of Checkland’s (1999) soft systems thinking, is a practical analytical tool for reflecting over the complexities of systems (in this case initiatives and interventions), understanding the boundaries of what is known and accepted, and assisting in the discovery of new ways to improve them (Ulrich & Reynolds 2010). CSH has been described by Jackson (2003) as an approach that seeks to “counter possible unfairness in society, by ensuring that all those affected by decisions have a role in making them” (Segone 2011:115,120). This chapter therefore justifies why and how CSH can be used as an analytical tool to expose tensions between global initiatives like the Grand Bargain and Paris Declaration, and the views of development practitioners.
4.2 Sources of Influence
Borum and Enderund (1981) in an early practice of systems thinking, designed a concept model for determining decision-making power through examining a system’s design process, asking about agenda control; what is discussed and who decides; participants and who is invited to the discussion;
scope, what solutions are possible and which problems are defined/ judged relevant/ addressed; and what resources (time and people) are available (Bratteteig et al. 2013:130). Ulrich and Reynolds (2010) delved deeper with Critical Systems Heuristics. They believed CSH can work as a roadmap for “working constructively with tensions between opposing perspectives as they arise in many situations of professional intervention…. such as ‘situation versus system’, ‘is’ versus ‘ought’
judgements, concerns of ‘those involved’ versus ‘those affected but not involved’” and where
“boundary critique is presented as a participatory process of unfolding and questioning boundary judgements rather than as an expert-driven process of boundary setting” (Ulrich & Reynolds 2010:243).
Ulrich and Reynolds’ CSH asks a series of twelve highly evaluative questions that fall under four general categories of unpacking a system, by asking what are the sources of Motivation (values and motivations for actors’ views); Control (power structures, decision-makers, influences);
Knowledge (relevant information, experience and skills); and Legitimacy (concerning morality and
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the consideration of consequences and impacts) (ibid:245; Segone 2011:120-121). In a sample evaluation of a UNICEF initiative, Reynolds explained these four sources were important for any critique because “Motivations and values are built into our view of situations and efforts to
‘improve’ them; Control and power structures influence what is considered a ‘problem’ and what may be done about it; Knowledge defines what counts as relevant information and skills; and Legitimacy forms the moral basis on which we expect third parties (such as beneficiaries) to bear with the consequences of what we do, or fail to do, about the situation in question” (Segone 2011:124). The following table outlines Ulrich’s original twelve questions alongside these sources of influence in the CSH framework.
Figure 4.2.1 The boundary categories and questions of Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH)
