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The Defender vs. the Censor: CDA Analysis of 2017 Russian Web-Source Ban in Ukraine

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Department of Informatics and Media

Master’s Programme in Social Sciences, Digital Media and Society specialization

Two-year Master’s Thesis

The Defender vs. the Censor: CDA Analysis of 2017 Russian Web-Source Ban in Ukraine

Student: Anna Sliesarieva Supervisor: Solange Hamrin

May 2020

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Abstract

With the new challenges of the digital world associated with disinformation, data breaches, and cybercrimes (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018; Connolly et al., 2016; Shipley &

Bowker, 2013) many countries nowadays discuss approaches to Internet regulation. In Ukraine, which faced propaganda tactics employed by Russia as a part of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict (Yurkova, 2018), the need for information security in recent years became a major challenge. In 2017, authorities of Ukraine addressed the challenge by introducing sanctions to the most-used Russian web-platforms, including social networks Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki, search engine Yandex, and many other services.

This study analyzed the discourse that was formed around the decision. The work incorporates the model of critical discourse analysis by Fairclough (1995a) and framing analysis by Pan & Kosicki (1993). This qualitative study analyzed materials from Ukrainian online media, TV stories, user comments, and political speeches from 16th-17th May 2017 – the dates when the decision on blocking of Russian web-sources was announced to the Ukrainian public.

The research answers the questions about the dominant discourses in society regarding the approach of the authorities to Internet regulation, the main arguments and counter-arguments, and media framing. The results show that the discussion was locked in a trap of two dominant discourses of freedom of speech and national security, whereas alternative measures to restrictions were not represented on the public agenda.

Keywords: censorship, Internet regulation, freedom of expression, digital media, information warfare

Word count: 25412

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Table of contents

Abstract ... 2

1. Introduction ... 4

1.2. Aim and contribution of the research ... 6

1.3. Research questions ... 7

1.4. Disposition ... 7

2. Background ... 8

3. Literature and concepts ... 11

3.1. Censorship ... 11

3.2. Freedom of speech and media freedom ... 13

3.3. Censorship in times of war and conflict ... 13

3.4. Censorship support ... 15

3.5. Media coverage of freedom of speech limitations ... 15

4. Theoretical framework ... 16

4.1. Critical discourse analysis ... 16

4.2. The special role of the media in discourse theory ... 24

4.3. Critical Discourse Analysis by Fairclough ... 25

4.4. Framing theory ... 28

4.5. Framing for analyzing news discourse ... 30

5. Methodology and data ... 33

5.1. Data ... 33

5.2. The model for the current research ... 37

5.3. Applicability and validity of the methodological approach ... 39

5.4. Coding system ... 39

5.5. Limitations ... 43

5.6. Ethical considerations ... 46

6. Results and analysis ... 47

6.1. Text ... 47

6.2. Media texts: framing through omitted points and sensationalism ... 53

6.3. Discursive practice ... 57

6.3.1. Your right to free speech ends with my right to security: arguments for the decision ... 58

6.3.2. Users will suffer the most: arguments against the decision ... 59

6.4. Social practice ... 62

6.4.1. Connected and omitted topics ... 63

6.4.2. Power dimensions and dominant discourses in society ... 64

7. Discussion and implications ... 66

8. Conclusion and future research ... 70

References ... 72

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1. Introduction

The ideal of media freedom originated almost simultaneously with the first printed newspapers (D. A. Graber, 2017; Oloyede, 2005). It suggested that media should be free from governmental interference and collect information freely in the interest of the public (Oloyede, 2005). Freedom of press – which stems from the right to free expression – is globally protected right under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, irrespective of political regime, press freedom is enshrined in constitutions of almost all countries in the world (Oloyede, 2005).

In the 20th century, with the development of the Internet, expectations about media freedom reached a very optimistic point, when it seemed that any kind of information would be open to the public (Lindgren, 2017, p. 59; Young, 2001, pp. 11–12). The early Internet was built on ideas of freedom and openness, it “interpreted censorship as damage and routed around it”

(Doten, 2011). Back in the 2000s, Bill Clinton, then president of the United States, ridiculed the attempts of China to regulate the Internet as if they tried “to nail Jello to the wall” (Griffiths, 2018).

Nowadays, however, it is clear that the statement was far from truth. The discourse of the Internet freedom was replaced by the discourse of Internet regulation (Young, 2001). It is clear that the Internet can be both a liberation and a repression technology (Rød & Weidmann, 2015).

Arab Spring uprisings showed the potential of the Internet and social media in protest action, which was taken cautiously by autocratic regimes around the globe (Roth, 2012). The last decade was accompanied by fundamentally new challenges of digital technologies, such as data breaches (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018), and fake news (Soll, 2016). With all those issues on the plate, the real question nowadays is not whether it is possible to regulate the Internet, but how to do it (Pollicino & Bassini, 2014, p. 348). The real question nowadays is not whether the Internet will be limited, but to what extent. Thus, it is crucial to determine how countries discuss Internet regulations, how citizens perceive limitations, which restrictions are considered to be necessary by governments and societies.

The media coverage of freedom of speech limitations – or censorship measures – constitutes the major interest of the thesis work. This study proposed to analyze the discourse of Internet regulation in post-Euromaidan Ukraine (2014 and further) and the blocking of major Russian web platforms due to security concerns.

The reasons for this choice is twofold:

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1) The recent history of the country was associated with harsh censorship under the communist regime. At the current stage, media are closely connected to political elites, with major media groups controlled by oligarchs (Orlova, 2016);

2) The case of internet blocking in Ukraine is closely connected to security issues, which oftentimes used by governments as a “perfect excuse” to introduce censorship measures (Fourie, 2001, p. 571).

Thus, the case of blocking Russian online sources in Ukraine represents a relevant example of the complexity of censorship phenomenon, combining cultural, historical, political, and security aspects.

1.1. Why is the speech censored?

Censorship is a complex phenomenon that goes beyond the political act to suppress certain types of speech. Internationally, there is certain agreement on what categories of information should be censored – such as child pornography or threats to national security. However, countries introduce specific restrictions, taking into account cultural, religious, and historical peculiarities. By way of illustration, in Germany, Austria, and other EU states Holocaust denial entails criminal liability, whereas countries with a different historical background (e.g. the US) may decide not to punish such an expression (Akdeniz, 2010, p. 3). In the US, the authorities allow many categories of harmful content under premises of protecting one of the most fundamental rights in the US legal tradition – the First Amendment (Delgado, 2017). Therefore, moral norms, culture, and tradition constitute a framework for speech regulation. Censorship is not merely a legal or political act – it has a strong social aspect.

Depending on topics, the public may support or even call the government to control the speech. For instance, Ho et al. (2012) determined strong support in Singaporean society to censor homosexuality in movies. Hoffner et al. (1999) analyzed the support for censoring violence on TV. Hong (2015) found stronger support for regulating violent video games in Korea comparing to the US, and among those who were culturally oriented for collectivism.

Among other crucial factors for censorship support, Hong named age, gender, and religiosity.

Yet another important takeaway from the study is that the level of support for censorship varies from country to country.

The balance between freedom of speech and the need for security – whether national security, protection of cultural values, religious feelings, creating a safe online environment for children –

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are constantly negotiated in societies. Therefore, it is crucial to track how debates over freedom of speech limitations are evolving around the globe (Imre et al., 2016).

1.2. Aim and contribution of the research

The Internet has provided many opportunities for the development of freedom of speech and promoting democratic values. Previous research has shown, that the Internet provided for the two-way flow of information and challenged the gatekeeping role of traditional media (Ford, 2014; Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013; Shaw, 2006). Data from several studies suggest that such open communication in the digital world is essential for democratic progress. Pirannejad (2017) came to the conclusion that Internet extension leads to the promotion of democracy. According to Papacharissi (2004, p. 267) the Internet enabled “a more enlightened exchange of ideas”. The novel jargon i.e. “digital democracy”, “cyber democracy”, “politics on the net” (Zang et al., 2019).

But the Internet has also posed many challenges to modern societies. This is exemplified by extensive data breaches, such as Cambridge Analytica Scandal (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018); impacts of fake news on democratic elections – which became a hot-button issue following the US presidential run of 2016 (Connolly et al., 2016). The other challenges are concerned with the dissemination of terrorism ideas online and cyber crimes (Shipley & Bowker, 2013). Steaming from those concerns, many countries worldwide – both democratic and authoritarian ones – impose some level of control over the Internet sphere. Those include policies to combat disinformation online, which was introduced in recent years in France and Germany among other European countries (Ungku, 2019). Very controversial approaches towards fake news were taken by authorities of the Singapore and Malaysia (Ungku, 2019).

Taking from privacy and security-related concerns, a growing number of states follow data- nationalism views and prefer to store data on citizens within national borders (Castro, 2013).

Such steps show that being unregulated at first, the Internet is turning into an increasingly controlled domain; being borderless, it starts to replicate the borders of the offline world (Castro, 2013; Giacomello, 2004; Griffiths, 2019). According to the latest report by Freedom House, almost 60 present of internet users in the world live in countries where content on political, social, and religious subjects was blocked online (Freedom House, 2019); only 20 percent live in countries with “free” Internet status.

In view of this, it is worthy to examine how discourse is formed around restrictions on the Internet (Imre et al., 2016). Societies are constantly negotiating the borders of the allowed and acceptable speech, determine what content is safe or dangerous. But in the “race” for security, in

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the moral panic and hype around fake news (Carlson, 2020) and other issues on digital media, the discourse on freedom of speech should not become secondary.

The role of media is a subject of particular interest. Media are the first to feel limitations of speech, but the media are those who shape the understanding of whether restrictions are necessary and acceptable. The subject becomes increasingly sensitive when limitations are connected to the national-security issues (Handley & Rutigliano, 2012), and media oftentimes follow the national narrative and support the position of the state government. What may be perceived as censorship for some countries, in other countries will be perceived as necessary protective measures. The authorities can turn both the defender and the censor.

This work attempts to add on the subject of how Internet regulation discourse is established in society. The discussion regarding online censorship should be placed under scrutiny since what starts as blocking of inimical sources can transform in general censorship of anti-governmental speech.

1.3. Research questions

The current research is limited to the following questions:

- What were the dominant discourses in society regarding government approach to Internet regulation?

- How the decisions on censorship were communicated to the Ukrainian public?

Which discourses were connected to the topic?

- What were the main arguments and counter-arguments by government and civil society organizations covered in the media?

- How the media framed the decisions?

1.4. Disposition

This chapter was aimed to introduce the complexity of online censorship and Internet regulatory discourses in society, aims of the research, and research questions. The following section will provide more details on the background of the blockings of Russian media sources in Ukraine. Chapter three will cover relevant concepts and literature for the research – namely, concepts of censorship and freedom of expression; literature on censorship in times of conflict, censorship support, and media coverage of freedom of speech limitations. Subsequently, chapter four will cover the theoretical framework used in the research, which combines critical discourse analysis and framing theory. Chapter five will describe a methodological process, data

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collection, and limitations of the study. An analysis will be followed in chapter six, and chapter seven will summarize findings in accordance with research questions.

2. Background

After the conflict sparkled in Eastern Ukraine, the government faced with the need to ensure information protection and limited the use of major Russian web-platforms.

The most notable package of Internet restrictions was introduced in 2017. The Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 133/2017 sanctioned 468 legal entities and 1228 individuals based in Russia for three years (Soldatov, 2018). The blacklist included the most popular social media platforms VK and Odnoklassniki, e-mail service Mail.ru and Russian search engine Yandex. As of 2017, those web-services were in the top ten list for Ukraine according to Alexa rankings (Soldatov, 2018). Other sources describe the substantial use of Russian social media in Ukraine as well. As of summer 2016, the audience of Vkontakte stood at 12.9 million Ukrainian users per day, Odnoklassniki – 6.6 million users (Gemius Marketing, 2016). Millions of Ukrainian Internet audience used services Mail.ru and Yandex.ru, as well as Kaspersky and 1C software. The service Mail.Ru stated, that the total audience of banned Russian social media estimates in about 25 million users (Ukrainska Pravda, 2017b).

There are several preconditions for the blocking. Many studies note that propaganda and information warfare are strategies repeatedly employed by Russia in Ukraine (Jaitner & Geers, 2015; Mejias & Vokuev, 2017; Szostek, 2014; Yurkova, 2018). Thus, in Ukraine the discussions about the need of reacting to the issue started at the very beginning of the conflict. Back in March 2014, the Stop Censorship! Movement (local journalist movement concerned with freedom of speech issues) and media NGOs urged journalists not to use information from pro- government Russian media about events in Ukraine, foreign newsrooms were asked to send their own correspondents to Ukraine, and Russian journalists were asked not to misinform the world and their people (UNIAN, 2014).

Concerns were raised also about the Russian media and Internet legislation. On August 1, 2014, the set of anti-terrorist amendments to the legislation came into force in the Russian Federation (Golitsyna & Nikolsky, 2014). It provides for access of the Russian secret services to the data of users of the Russian Internet resources without a court decision. In connection with the adoption of this law, on July 30, 2014, the Security Service of Ukraine advised not to use Russian Internet resources:

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“It is their [Russian] decision. They reduce democratic principles, and we have said for a long time that, please, use Ukrainian resources, international resources that are protected by international law. Of course, we just recommend, but we can not prohibit.” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2014)

On October 16, 2014, the Security Service of Ukraine urged Ukrainians not to use Russian social networks, as they were noticed, in particular, in inciting protests against the Ukrainian authorities (BBC Ukraine, 2014).

Due to such concerns, in 2017 it was ultimately decided to block access to Russian web- platforms. The government repeated national security argumentation when explaining the ban. In the official response to an online petition calling for the annulment of the decree, then President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko named major reasons for blockings (Otmenit’ Blokirovku Internet- Resursa Vkontakte [Online Petition: To Cancel Blocking of the Internet Resource Vkontakte], 2017). He stressed, that banned web sources may be used by Russian intelligence services to collect information about Ukrainian citizens; the large piece is aimed to manipulate public opinion, spread pro-Russian disinformation and propaganda, and destabilize Ukrainian society.

Similar argumentation was provided by the Ukrainian government on the COE “Platform to promote the protection of journalism and the safety of journalists”, where “level 2 media freedom alert” was published in response to the blockings (Ukraine Blocks Russian Social Networks and Expands Economic Sanctions Against Russian Companies, 2017).

There was also an economic aspect in the introduction of sanctions. Valentyn Petrov, head of the information security department of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, said that Ukraine could not afford the financing of the aggressor country for the state budget.

According to him, the state budget spent up to UAH 1 billion annually (EUR 34 million) on the purchase of Russian software (Korotky, 2017).

However, the public perception of the decision was divided: a part of society welcomed the ban as a necessary restriction to counter Russian propaganda, while others suggested that internet blockings would have negative consequences for the freedom of speech. According to the 2017 survey by Rating Group, almost 60% of Ukrainians did not support the ban on Russian sites in Ukraine, in particular Odnoklassniki, Vkontakte, Yandex (Rating Group, 2017). At the same time, when the Democratic Initiatives Foundation conducted a poll among experts – political scientists, journalists, sociologists, media experts – the majority supported the decision

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(Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2017). Only 9 out of 40 experts were against the ban on Russian social networks and services.1

Volodymyr Ariev, the Member of Ukrainian Parliament and chairman of the Ukrainian delegation in Parliament Assembly of Council of Europe, stressed that Russian internet legislation was a major reason for blocking of Russian social media in Ukraine (Ostapenko, 2017). According to him, the direct access of Russian intelligence services to the databases of Russian social networks allows them to easily obtain and systematically analyze the widest range of information that ordinary citizens and servicemen upload to social networks. Moreover, he stressed that discussions about censorship in conditions of unrestricted access to international platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter are “ludicrous.”

Despite the named reasons, civil society organizations expressed concern due to disproportionality of the measure, as a large piece of legitimate publications were affected (Muižnieks, 2017). For instance, Reporters Without Borders condemned the ban by Ukrainian authorities on Russian social networks, calling it a disproportionate measure that seriously undermines the right of the Ukrainian people to information and freedom of expression (RSF, 2014).

Evaluating long-term effects experts question the effectiveness of the measures and recommend to authorities and civil society in Ukraine to find other solutions to ensure information security (Rzheutska, 2019). Recently – analyzing three years since measures were introduced – Freedom House recently stated that blocking sites in Ukraine has markedly limited the digital rights of Ukrainians and has significantly damaged freedom of speech (Kyryliuk, 2019). At the same time, the organization notes that sanctions did not completely prevent Ukrainians from accessing blocked websites and did not cause serious financial damage to Russian companies, which casts doubt on their effectiveness.

At the same time, it is worth noting that sanctions had a significant effect of the audience of Russian social media in Ukraine. The study by gemiusAudience showed that the amount of users on blocked social networks decreased already in the first week after blocking: Vkontakte lost 3.7 million users who came to the site via personal computers or laptops, and Odnoklassniki - 2.6 million users. According to the Internet Association of Ukraine, from September 2016 to

1 Since the ontological point of departure of this research is social constructionism, it worth noting that data from surveys and other quantitate materials in this section is used to provide reader a mere comparison that subject on blocking is until nowadays is contested topic in Ukrainian society. At the same time, the reader should perceive such data as being constructed in discursive process, not as something static an unequivocal.

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September 2019, the share of Ukrainian Internet users who visit Vkontakte every day fell from 54% to 10% (Nekrasov, 2019). During the same period, the daily share of Ukrainian visitors of Odnoklassniki decreased from 35% to 10%. Thus, the audience of social networks Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki in Ukraine fell three to five times.

Overall, 461 pro-Russian sources are blocked in Ukraine as of 2019: some of the restrictions were introduced by presidential decrees, but also by court decisions (Rzheutska, 2019). On May 14, 2020, President Zelensky prolonged sanctions for Russian web-platforms for another three years (Liga.net, 2020). The public perception about the decision did not change significantly over time and is still divided. The latest research by Kyiv National Institute of sociology showed, that half of Ukrainians do not support the decision on blocking, while 36% support the measures (DT.ua, 2020).

3. Literature and concepts

3.1. Censorship

Censorship exists for thousands of years, whether in the form of active restrictions, or less evident factors that affect one’s speech (Kemp, 2015). This subject attracts the attention of scholars from many areas, including historical, legal, sociological, psychological, and media research (Bar-Tal, 2017; Clegg, 2004; Gunther & Hwa, 1996; Liang & Lu, 2010; Sheriff, 2000;

Skjerdal, 2008).

In a most simplistic definition, censorship implies a limitation of speech by some authority, along with self-censorship – when a person limits own speech (Müller, 2004, p. 4). Here censorship is understood as a series of concrete actions by someone in a position of power. For many years, scholars followed this vision on censorship, analyzing censoring policies of certain historical periods, and contrasting them with the ideal version of society – free from censorship (Müller, 2004, p. 5).

However, in recent decades scholars called for a more complex understanding of censorship (Müller, 2004, p. 4). In this approach, the phenomenon is seen as inevitable and ubiquitous, regardless of socio-political conditions. In other words, there is no society with absolute free speech, and the phenomenon of censorship also has structural and social premises. Therefore, scholars distinguish between “regulatory” censorship – the traditional meaning where state censors limit the speech), and “constitutive” (or structural) censorship – which is seen as

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productive, as the one that has an impact on the construction of knowledge and social power (Müller, 2004, pp. 5–8; Rosenfeld, 2014, p. 129). The censorship is considered to be just as complex as the notion of power itself. It is more than a limitation imposed forcibly, but a part of everyday communication.

According to such understanding of the term, censorship can take various forms. Surely it can take place in a traditional sense when governments limit expression, but “it also materializes in the actions and decisions taken by those who administrate charitable foundations and local government, or corporate sponsors and sources of public subsidy” (Freshwater, 2004, p. 241).

Along those lines, it is worth mentioning that historically many forms of censorship were developed, such as religious, moral, political, corporate, military censorship (Esomba, 2013, p.

37).

This work operates on a broader understanding of censorship. Taking into account the

“structural” vision, she suggests that any limitations of speech are originating in social practices.

Limitations are broader than policies; they include cultural, political, national aspects. Therefore, it is so important to analyze how limitations to free speech are discussed by the public.

It should also be noted that in this thesis the term “censorship” is not perceived as an attribute of authoritarian regimes or the one that has a negative connotation. As noted by Ingram (2019) censorship does not necessarily mean total control over public opinions, but rather limitations to free expression. Even in the most liberal societies the right to free speech is not absolute and have boundaries (Bresner, 2015).

The present study, however, wants to shed light on how censorship measures – particularly on the Internet – are discussed in societies. The subject of this thesis, however, is not censorship per se, but how this issue is discussed in society. Among other dimensions, this work sees censorship and Internet restrictions as a discourse – competing with discourses of free speech and media freedom.

In media research, there are four bodies of literature relevant to the topic: freedom of speech and media freedom; censorship and security issues; censorship support; media coverage of freedom of speech limitations.

The first two topics will help to address the complexities of freedom of speech limitations, and common discussions over censorship. As mentioned in the background chapter, freedom of expression and security were among issues that were raised in the discussion about Internet

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restrictions in Ukraine. The third topic is important to note because limitations to speech are not necessarily taken negatively by the public – in fact, there is a broad list of issues, which societies prefer to be censored. The final topic, media coverage of freedom of speech limitations, is the most connected to the topic. This section will help to draw theoretical and methodological foundations for the thesis.

3.2. Freedom of speech and media freedom

Freedom of expression and censorship represent two sides of the same coin, and it is impossible to understand one concept without another. In turn, freedom of expression is a foundational concept of the media (D. A. Graber, 2017). In a common vision, the ideal media should be free from any interference.

According to Graber (2017), the idea that media should free from governmental control stems from the ideas of Enlightenment, namely, it is perceived as a basic human right. As of today, the freedom of the press is guaranteed even in the most restrictive and authoritarian environments and is a part of the majority of constitutions. However, in practice, there are many conflicting rights, and freedom of the press may be neglected if authorities assume that stability and security are threatened. It is a practice of constant balancing between rights (D. A. Graber, 2017).

The idea of contradictory rights – such as the right to freedom of expression and national security – is a crucial idea for this research. The argument here is that boundaries are constantly negotiated in society. Public and media discuss what limits should be settled, what categories of speech are inappropriate. When it comes to introducing media regulations, society experiences battle between the discourse of free speech and discourse of protection. The latter can include many aspects – protection of moral and religious values, protection of children, national security.

For instance, Oswell (1998) covers discussions of public policies concerning Internet and child protection issues. Young (2001) notes, how the discourse on “absolutely free Internet” was shifted by the discourse on Internet regulation. But one of the most visible domains where limitation of speech is justified is national security. The following section is devoted to the topic.

3.3. Censorship in times of war and conflict

The media play a crucial role in war and conflict, and in such times media are commonly subjected to special rules and regulations. As mentioned by Abbasi & Al-Sharqi (2015, p. 6), media is “the first victim of war”. Restrictions under the reason of national security are not new and took place, inter alia, in World War 1 and World War 2 (Abbasi & Al-Sharqi, 2015, p. 6).

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Therefore, many scholars focused their attention on communication during conflicts and war.

The very early article by Price (1942) covered the principles of censorship in times of war, taking the example of the United States. He stressed, that even though censorship is always unfavorable measure, there are some guidelines that can help with public understanding of the issue: 1) censorship should be understood as a war measure, and is only excusable if benefits the outcome of the war; 2) censorship measures are imposed on each person; 3) censorship measures are transparent to the public and rules are published; 4) restrictions should rely on facts rather then opinions – and the major factor for censoring information is whether it can help enemies.

Graber (2003) investigated censorship in the US when the Bush administration declared war on terrorism. He stressed that free press is essential during conflict or terrorist-related issues, but is likely to be sacrificed to protect civilians, army, and to protect military secrets. Thus, Graber scrutinized what arguments are used on both sides of censorship decisions. He found, that both proponents and opponents of censorship measures used three types of verbal strategies: excuses, justifications, and transformations. The main excuses from the government were national security concerns and public demands for protection. On the contrary, the anti-censorship side noted that government officials leaked secret information for press themselves and there were many alternatives to censorship measures that could ensure security. This research relied on the model by McGraw (1991), who suggested that politicians use accounts and explanations to shape an understanding of unpopular decisions. The conceptual framework defined two strategies:

excuses and justifications.

Hills (2006) analyzed intervention to interpersonal communication (phones, telegraphs, letters) in the events of the war. He analyzed what changed from the 1990s to the “war on terror”. The major difference, according to Hills, is a volume of surveillance and increased opportunities for state control.

Kumar (2006) analyzed the role of the US media as propaganda tools to justify intervention in Iraq. He stressed, that the Bush administration manipulated information regarding the case, and with a lack of proper investigation media helped to keep the pro-war agenda in society. Kumar covers particular strategies of information management that were employed by the state in the Iraq War. The article also contains a valuable overview of the history of war information management, which originates in times of Cold War. In a nutshell, what is different about media in times of war is that they are employed to serve the propaganda machine. A state cannot afford the privilege to leave the media uncontrolled in times of war. The successful outcome of the war

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– as proven by historical examples – is to a large degree dictated by censorship systems (Kumar, 2006, p. 50).

During the conflicts, censorship serves as an element of propaganda. Due to this connection, propaganda is another important concept for the present thesis.

3.4. Censorship support

Whereas it may seem that public perception over censorship would always be negative, this is not always the case. The public may have a positive attitude towards censoring many types of content – pornography, violent video games, or content sensitive to religious believers.

In communication research, many scholars examined censorship support within the framework of third-party effect – people believe that others are more vulnerable to media messages than they are, and thus they support censorship as a form of protection. This group of studies is represented by Hoffner et al. (1999) who studied the support of censorship for television violence in the US. Rojas, Shah, and Faber (1996) found evidence between third-party effects and censorship attitudes. Detenber and Rosenthal (2018) found relatively high support of censorship of sex and nudity in films among Singapore citizens.

Guo and Feng (2012) analyzed the support of censorship in China by using the theory of reasoned action and applying in on two concepts - the third-party effect and authoritarian personality.

Furthermore, several studies found a correlation between authoritarianism and censorship support. Studying attitudes of college students, Hense and Wright (1992) established the relations between censorship perception with traditional family values, religiosity, authoritarianism, and conservatism. There were no significant differences in terms of gender, although women were less supportive of pornographic materials. Other studies also noted the authoritarianism role in pro-censorship attitudes (Byrne et al., 1973; Ritts & Engbretson, 1991).

3.5. Media coverage of freedom of speech limitations

Sections above help to address the complexities of freedom of speech limitations, and common discussions over censorship. Most likely, they will be evident when analyzing the discourse on Internet restrictions in Ukraine. The final topic, media coverage of freedom of speech limitations, is the most connected to the topic. One way to think of censorship is to think of it as of limitation of a human right to free expression.

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Whereas it is problematic to find the literature dealing particularly with freedom of expression, there are many qualitative studies, which investigate media discourses on associated human rights – for instance, regarding the issues of privacy and surveillance.

One of them is research by Tiainen (2017), who analyzed Finish media discourse on surveillance. Barnard-Wills (2011) conducted similar research by the example of the British press. The studies determined that media coverage on censorship is divided into two opposing discourses: appropriate and inappropriate surveillance. The former heavily draws from discourses on national security and crime prevention, whereas the latter emphasized the value of the right to privacy and inappropriateness to spy citizens by governments and corporations. Both of the studies have discourse theories central to the research, which provided a rationale to use CDA as a method in the present thesis.

Furthermore, there are studies, which deal with media coverage of freedom of speech limitations. A valuable example of this thesis is research by Du (2016) on how censorship measures of Arab Spring were covered in Chinese, Hong Kong, and Taiwan media. The results determined a notable difference in reporting among three media environments, which steamed from ideological distinctions and different environments in terms of media freedom. As a result, each media provided a different story about the same event. The study relied on news framing as a major theoretical framework.

4. Theoretical framework

4.1. Critical discourse analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) constitutes a major framework for exploring the relationship between language and society (Fairclough et al., 2011). As a part of discourse research, CDA mostly deals with the issues of power structures, dominance, and the way such inequalities are reproduced by texts, public messages (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 352).

Comparing to other branches of linguistics, CDA should not be perceived as a separate academic field with a rigid set of methods (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 357). It should rather be treated as an “interdisciplinary research movement”, comprising a number of theoretical models and methods (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 357). However, they are all focused on the same categories, such as power, abuse, and injustice (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 357).

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The foundations of CDA was developed in works by Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen, Ruth Wodak (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Within the CDA, discourse perceived as a form of social practice. Fairclough et al. (2011, p. 357) note that discourse as a practice “implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and all the diverse elements of the situation(s), institutions(s), and social structure(s) which frame it.” This is a constitutive feature of discourse: discourses are shaped by elements of social reality, but also shape them.

As mentioned above, critical discourse analysis is a broad scientific field, which may be different in theoretical premises, methodological foundations, and techniques. At the same time, CDA has distinctive features and should not be confused with other types of discourse research.

According to Wodak & Meyer (2009, p. 2), CDA differs by its “constitutive problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach”. Thus, CDA is not concerned with analyzing linguistic units as such but mostly deals with complex social phenomena.

The definition of discourse

One of the basic notions in CDA – discourse – is a concept that has a variety of meanings and applications (Carpentier, 2017, p. 15; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 2). As noted by Wodak & Meyer (2009, p. 3), “discourse means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se”. Such a broad application of the concept causes much criticism and confusion (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 3). By way of illustration, this work uses such notions as media discourse, news discourse, public discourse, which will be explained in the following paragraphs. However, before explaining these specific notions, several basic approaches to understanding the term “discourse”

should be covered.

As one of the definitions, Jørgensen & Phillips (2002, p. 1) suggest understanding the discourse as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of world)”. Tannen et al. (2015, p. 1) note, that for some scholars discourse means “anything beyond the sentence”, for others – it is a language-in-use, and there are also definitions, which emphasize that discourse refers to a broader range of linguistic and non-linguistic social practices.

Carpentier & De Cleen (2007, p. 276) distinguish between micro-textual and macro-textual approaches to discourse. In micro-textual approaches, the concept of discourse has a strong

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connection to language – both in the spoken and written modes (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 3). Macro- textual approaches, in turn, understand texts from a broader perspective, as “materializations of meaning and/or ideology” (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007, p. 277). In other words, macro-textual approaches are focused on representations, meanings, ideologies embedded in texts rather than the language.

Fairclough (1992, p. 3) notes that depending on the scholarly field, the discourse may refer to

“spoken or written language”, “the processes of producing and interpreting speech and writing”,

“language used in different sorts of social situation” (e.g. “newspaper discourse”, “advertising discourse”). In other work, Fairclough uses three different applications for the concept of discourse (Fairclough, 1993, p. 138; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 66): the discourse as an abstract noun – the language use as social practice; discourse as a count noun – experiences from a particular perspective, e.g. environmentalist or feminist discourse; language within a specific field, e.g. political or scientific discourse. Overall, in his understanding of the discourse Fairclough (1993, p. 134) refers primarily as “a spoken or written language use … as a form of social practice”.

To understand specific formulations such as “media discourse”, “news discourse” or “public discourse” within Fairclough’s model, it is important to clarify that apart from the term

“discourse” Fairclough also distinguishes “discourse types” and “genres”. Genres and discourses represent two categories of discourse types (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 56). “Genres” refer to the use of language associated with certain social activities, for instance, an advertising or a news genre (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 56). Discourses, in turn, imply the use of language to present social practice from a particular point of view: medical discourse in conventional health care vs.

homeopathy, politics in liberal and Marxists political discourses (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 56).

Discourse types constituents the order of discourse – the configuration of all discursive practices of an institution or a social field and relations between them (Fairclough, 1993, p. 138; Jørgensen

& Phillips, 2002, p. 67). Discursive practices mean the production and consumption of text and talk (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 67).

Taken from the key concepts of Fairclough’s model, this thesis uses the term “media discourse” as a specific type of discourse that takes place on a common used informational sources/broadcast platforms, such as online news sources, social media, TV, etc. News discourse is referred to from the point of view of the specific media genre. The use of the term “public discourse” is associated with the concept of the order of discourse – all types of discourses, which interrelate in a public domain.

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With approaches to the concept of discourse being explained, the following section provides an overview of the CDA as a research field and major approaches established within the

“movement”.

CDA as a research field

As noted it the beginning of the current chapter, CDA is not a clearly defined discipline, but rather an “interdisciplinary research movement”, which provides a theoretical and methodological base to study relations between discourse and cultural and social developments (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007, p. 288; Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 357; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 60). By way of illustration, Fairclough (1995a, 1995b) address CDA both to name his own approach, and in a sense of a broader CDA movement, which his approach is a part of (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 60).

According to Fairclough et al. (2011), the CDA field includes the following approaches:

critical linguistics and social semiotics, Fairclough’s approach, socio-cognitive studies, discourse-historical approach, argumentation and rhetoric, corpus-based approaches.

Starting in the 1970s, critical linguistics approach in CDA was established, inter alia, through the work by Fowler et al. (1979). This area was strongly focused on practical ways of analyzing texts, and the potential of grammatical forms (e.g. passive forms, nominalizations, rhetorical devices) to impact ideology (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 362). While CL proved to be a valuable entry point to analyze social inequality, it lacked addressing grammatical structures from a broader social context.

Later on, some of the key scholars from critical linguistics created “social semiotics” (Kress

& Van Leeuwen, 1996; Van Leeuwen, 2005). This approach draws attention to the multi- semiotic, ideological component of many texts in modern society (Fairclough et al., 2011, p.

362). Apart from language, social semiotics takes into account such elements as images, design, color, and the intersection of all the elements.

Fairclough’s approach to CDA (Fairclough, 1992, 1995b), in turn, examines the effects of discourse on social transformation. This is a transdisciplinary approach, where CDA field interacts with other areas of social research (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 362). The subsequent sections will return to details of Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, as it represents one of the major frameworks of the current research.

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Socio-cognitive approach in CDA owes mainly to the contribution of Teun Van Dijk (Van Dijk, 1993, 1998) (1993, 1998), who focused on cognitive aspects of how discourse functions in questions of ideology, knowledge, racism (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 363). For instance, his research (Van Dijk, 2008) examined the connection between knowledge and discourse and developed the knowledge definition “as a shared consensus of beliefs among social groups”

(Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 363).

Discourse-historical approach, associated with Ruth Wodak (Reisigl & Wodak, 2005; Wodak, 2001), aims for practical application and deals with questions of racism, anti-Semitism, and racism (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 364). Particularly, it proved to be fruitful in investigating post- war anti-Semitism in Austria (Wodak, 2009).

Argumentation and rhetoric approach to CDA is aligned with the language of persuasion, justification, and legitimation strategies (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 365). This approach is exemplified in works of (Chilton, 2003; Van Leeuwen, 1995).

Corpus-based approach brings a corpus linguistic toolkit to the CDA research (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 365). Particularly, it implies the use of computer-based methods of analysis.

Examples of such studies include works by Mautner (2009), Mulderrig (2008, 2011).

Similar to Fairclough et al., (2011), Wodak & Meyer (2009) provided their own categorization of the CDA approaches. It includes discourse-historical approach (Reisigl &

Wodak, 2005), corpus-linguistics approach (Mautner, 2009), social actors approach (Van Leeuwen, 1995), dispositive analysis (Jäger & Maier, 2009), sociocognitive approach (Van Dijk, 1993, 1998), and dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 1992, 1995b).

Despite the CDA field is represented by many approaches, they share some common features.

The main principles of critical analysis, according to Fairclough et al. (2011), are the following:

1. Critical discourse analysis addresses social issues.

2. Power relations are discursive in nature.

3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.

4. Discourse takes part in the creation and functioning of ideology.

5. The discourse is historical in nature.

6. The relationship between text and society is mediated.

7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory.

8. Discourse is a form of social action.

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Similar principles are mentioned in work by Titscher et al. (2000, cited in Richardson, 2006, pp. 26–27). Those include the problem orientation – or focus on social issues instead of language units; interest in power-relations; two-way interaction between the discourse and society;

ideological use of language; the importance of historical context in studying discourse; as well as interpretive and explanatory nature of DA.

In line with these principles, CDA deals with four common themes: power and social relations, hegemony, ideology, the constituted character of discourse (Richardson, 2006, p. 27).

a) The character of discourse – here Richardson (2006, pp. 27-29) mentions the tension between Idealistic and Materialistic perspectives on discourse. In CDA tradition,

“discourse is a form of social practice which both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 61). CDA acknowledges the dialectical relationship between discourse and social reality. In other words, discourse has an impact on the formation of social practices, as well as reflects them (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 61). It is important to note, however, that in its approach to the role of discourse in the formation of the social world, CDA distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive approaches to the social (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 19). The latter means that the social world includes dimensions that do not necessarily have discursive character. This perception differentiates CDA from other traditions, some of which perceive discourses as mere reflections of other social practices, while other perceive discourses as fully constitutive of the social (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 19).

For instance, in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (Carpentier, 2017, p. 18;

Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007), all objects and social phenomena gain meaning through discourse. Therefore, there is no differentiation between discursive dimension and other parts of the social; discourse is not a separate dimension but a part of the whole. However, discourse theory does not claim that nothing exists outside discourse; but the latter is necessary to make sense of the material (Carpentier, 2017, p. 19).

b) Power and social relations – power is a complex and contested matter. Thus, taking from Lukes (1974), Richardson (2006) mentions three approaches to power research.

The first one – one-dimensional view – is the most simplistic. It views power as an ability of certain individuals to change the actions of other individuals; to make them do something that they would not otherwise do. In the most complex level – three- dimensional view – power is not about getting people to do something, but about

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determining “attitudes, believes, and very wants” (Richardson, 2006, p. 31). The latter is achieved through discourses.

c) Ideology – here Richardson (2006, pp. 32-35) brings attention to the historical development of the concept, from years after the French Revolution, to Marxist and neo-Marxist views on the subject. Whereas initially, ideology referred to the studies of how ideas are formed, at the current stage it is more specific than exercising the systems of ideas and beliefs. Instead, ideology is viewed as a specific frame of mind where short-term historical forms of exploitation are presented as inevitable and natural. Furthermore, the theory of hegemony was built within a Marxist theory of ideology.

In Fairclough’s CDA approach – which constitutes the major framework for the current research – ideology denotes “meaning in the position of power” (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 14). To clarify the role of ideology in Fairclough’s model, it is important to mention several other concepts in his work: namely, interdiscursivity – a combination of discourses and genres in a communicative event; intertextuality – a form of interdiscursivity which implies that all communicative events rely on previous events;

and orders of discourse – the configuration of all discursive practices of an institution or a social field and relations between them (Fairclough, 1993, p. 138; Jørgensen &

Phillips, 2002, pp. 73–74). Those concepts signify two important standpoints of Fairclough’s model: 1) that texts rely on earlier texts, which creates constraints for a change due to continuity of dominant discourses, but also can provide for a change when new discourses are developed; 2) that discourses does not have the same value and impact, have different positions of power, and are sites of hegemonic struggle (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 73–74).

Therefore, in Fairclough’s model, the notions of ideology and hegemony are closely linked to the orders of discourse and changing power relations in society. For Fairclough, ideology refers to those discursive practices which facilitate establishment and reproduction of relations of domination (Fairclough, 1992, p. 87). According to Fairclough, discourses are ideological when they affect continuity or shift of power relations (Fairclough, 1992, p. 91).

The concept of ideology in Faircloug’s approach is largely drawn on works by Althusser and Gramsci (Fairclough, 1992, 1995a). Both mentioned scholars refer to the production of meaning in everyday life as a significant aspect of the maintenance of social order (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 75). However, Fairclough does not share Althusser’s understanding of people as a passive force with low possibilities of

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action, and perception of ideology as a totalizing entity. Instead, Fairclough suggests that “relations of power may in principle be affected by discursive practices of any type, even scientific and theoretical” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 91).

Within this framework, ideology means “a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in the manifestations of individual collective life” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 328).

d) Hegemony – within Fairclough’s CDA approach – represent another important concept in terms of power. In Fairclough’s work the concept of hegemony – as well as ideology – is drawn from the Gramscian theory of power (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 93).

For Gramsci, the ability of the ruling class to maintain power is associated not only with force and state power but with “moral and intellectual leadership” or “hegemony”

(Fairclough, 1995a, p. 93). The state, therefore, is constituted by “political society” or the public domain (aligned with state authorities), and “civil society” or a private domain – work, family, education, etc (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 93). Hegemonic control of dominant class over civil society is established to a large extent through the discursive conventions of institutions and organizations. It is a process of negotiation of meaning, and, as a result, finding a consensus on meaning (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 76). Also, exercising power through hegemony entails that various practices in the realm of civil society has the potential to “naturalize” certain practices or ideologies. According to Fairclough, (1995a, p. 94), “naturalized discourse conventions are a most effective mechanism for sustaining and reproducing cultural and ideological dimensions of hegemony.”

According to Fairclough, the concept of hegemony has important implications for the analysis of discursive practices and their relation to the social practice: discursive practice can be regarded as a facet of hegemonic struggle that impacts the reproduction and transformation of the order of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 91–

96; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 76).

With mentioned characteristics, CDA became a helpful tool to analyze a long list of issues. It is commonly used in gender studies, studies of political structures, issues of nationalism, racism, and antisemitism (Van Dijk, 2001). From the standpoint of this research, the most important part of CDA research is related to aspects of media discourse. Studies of media discourses constitute a significant part of CDA research due to the specific nature and power of media (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 359). Another area of research deals particularly with news discourses (Richardson, 2006, p. 76). The power of media is evident on many levels – in the ability to choose the angles

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to cover the story, to decide what speakers deserve voices, to bring or exclude news from public agenda, etc. (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 359). Thus, media are important actors in constructing discourses (Kelsey, 2019).

4.2. The special role of the media in discourse theory

Critical discourse analysis takes the roots in critical linguistics and critical social theory. In addition, taking from a constructivist perspective, the model is discussed as a part of debates about “structure” and “agency” (Beck, 1994, cited in Jensen, 2002, p. 107). A special role here is attributed to the media, particularly due to the dialectical role to the social formation – as media and society have a mutual effect on each other. Naturally, the media function within a series of political and economic agendas, presenting the dominant social order (Jensen, 2002, pp. 107–

108). Yet, diversity and internal representational issues of the latter – as characterized by the media – place media at the crossroads between formalities and innovation, repetition, and transformation.

Media provides for a specific form of communication, which has distinct features comparing to other communication. Thus, Fairclough draws attention to the specific theory of media discourse (Fairclough, 1995b). Media content both reflected the society it was created and stimulates changes in the social order (Fairclough, 1995b).

According to Fairclough, one of the key differences of media discourse is the function of mediation between the official and private. In other words, it “translates” official sources to the public. The impact of media discourses on private discourses can be exemplified by the power of media to impose topics for conversations between people. By the same token – when it comes to important political decisions – the way media weave discourses in texts serves as a means of legitimizing official sources and setting public opinions (Fairclough, 1995b). The legitimization concept is of special relevance for this research, as it analyzes one of the complex political decisions.

To accommodate this complex relationship between the media and society, CDA utilizes the concept of “intertextuality” (Jensen, 2002, pp. 107–108). Texts are developed on a foundation of various other texts, but also serve as a source for new texts. As for media products, CDA scrutinizes various formats, e.g. commentaries or news, as “discourse types,” which, for their part, are based on political discourse types, such as press briefings or press releases (Jensen, 2002, pp. 107–108). Various types of discourse develop on the adjacent, but diverse discourse practices.

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Moreover, intertextuality is relevant from the perspective of the “orders of discourse” (Jensen, 2002, pp. 107–108). For instance, conventional political discourse can interlace with scientific or technological discourses. In the end, the ultimate meaning of discourses and practices is assessed on the macro-social layer. This may be seen, inter alia, in the process that Fairclough defines as

“conversationalization” of the media – or “leveling down” to everyday expressions and informal style (Jensen, 2002, p. 107). At one end, such an approach oversimplifies a broad social phenomenon; however, addressing issues clearly may also bring democratization to mass media culture. According to Fairclough, the ambivalence of broadcasting communicative style lies in a combination of “democratizing, legitimizing, and marketing pressures” (Fairclough, 1995b, p.

149). Likewise, Fairclough mentioned the growing number of commercial discourses in public speeches as “marketization”, whereas less attention in the author’s works was devoted to the phenomenon of the “politicization” of market discourses, as ethical and economical concerns become important in the area of business (Jensen, 2002, p. 107).

4.3. Critical Discourse Analysis by Fairclough

This study draws heavily upon Faiclough’s method of CDA. Fairclough defines CDA as “the analysis of relationships between concrete language use and wider social cultural structures”

(Titscher et al., 2000, p. 149).

Fairclough’s method belongs to the Dialectical-Relational Approach (DRA) of Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 27). It is characterized by the strong emphasis of social conflict, and its linguistic reflections in discourses (especially when it comes to power- relations issues). In DRA’s tradition, language and social practices are dialectically related, which form the main subject of CDA analysis (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 27). Within DRA, there are two competing traditions, focused either on structure or action. But, whatever the strategy is, the subject of DRA research is always related to underrepresented groups in society (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 27).

According to Wodak & Meyer (2009, pp. 30–31), preparatory steps for DRA analysis include:

1. Being a problem-oriented approach, DRA first step is to identify the social problem with a semiotic aspect;

2. The second step lies in establishing dominant styles, genres, and discourses in line with a semiotic aspect;

3. And to take into account the range of diversity in those styles;

4. The next step is to determine the resistance against prevailing discourses.

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After these preparatory steps, the researcher moves directly to the analysis. Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of discourse analysis consists of three layers of analysis: social practice, discursive practice, and text (Jensen, 2002, pp. 106–108). They are illustrated in the figure below.

In the current model, texts are first subjected to the discursive practices – particular social activities in which texts are produced, distributed and consumed; and then to the level of broader social process (Jensen, 2002, p. 106). Texts serve as the center of the model, and they are scrutinized largely through the categories of critical linguistics.

According to Fairclough, the level of textual analysis is devoted to how sentences are structured and sequenced (Richardson, 2006, p. 38). In particular, this level of analysis emphasizes the following elements of text: 1) representations, which carry out ideational function; 2) identities and social relations, which hold interpersonal function; 3) and cohesion and coherence, which is textual function per se (Richardson, 2006, p. 38).

However, even on this level, CDA sees texts from a broader perspective than a set of linguistic structures. From the point of view of CDA, it is more important to analyze what remains unsaid in the text. Taking a look at the vocabulary, CDA researcher is less concerned

SOCIAL PRACTICE

DISCURSIVE PRACTICE

(production, distribution, consumption) TEXT

Figure 1. Fairclough's three-dimensional model of CDA (Jensen, 2002, pp. 106-108)

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with grammatical and semantic structures, rather than a function that they hold (Richardson, 2006, p. 38).

Level 2 of discursive practices refers to the process of (media) text production, where organizations create text, and the audience consumes or “decode” these messages (Jensen, 2002, p. 106). Within the model, discourse practices are perceived as mediators between text-level and social-practice level.

This level of analysis is the least developed and attracts the most of critique (Richardson, 2006, pp. 40–41). For instance, Verschueren (1985, vii) stressed that discourse lacks attention to structural and functional aspects of news gathering and the process of reporting. Cotter (2003, p. 428) noted that scholars did not address texts as the “outcome of discourse process”.

The level of discourse practices is also under-researched because of the complexities of the encoding-decoding process between media producers and audiences. Texts are not just consumed by readers – they are compounded by the reader’s background and social knowledge.

The reader may have own attitude towards the media platform and alter the trust to the content accordingly. Moreover, media produce texts following their own ideas of what the audience may like (Richardson, 2006, p. 41).

The third level takes into account broader social context, where first to layers are perceived from the standpoint of prevailing “order of discourse” at a given historical period (Jensen, 2002, p. 106). At this level, the researcher takes into account the immediate situational context of the analyzed event, the wider context of institutional practices, or even wider frame of the society and the culture (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 57). In doing so, the researcher analyzes what text can say about society it was created for, how it can affect social relations (Richardson, 2006, p. 42).

Methodologically, CDA research describes texts, interprets the process in which they are produced, and explain the relationship between discursive practices and social practices (Omrow, 2018). To achieve descriptive, interpretational and explanatory goals scholars imply various levels of analysis –linguistic, intertextual – to address the complexity of discursive events.

The data is analyzed within the process of coding. Within this process, data is sorted into categories, which then allows researchers to determine patterns.

References

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