Considerations of Commitment and Capacity: A Study of the SADC Infrastructure Regulation Environment

(1)

STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY

Department of Economic History and International Relations

Master’s Thesis in International Relations with specialization in Global Political Economy Spring Term 2021

Student: Robert Bergkvist Supervisor: Elisabeth Rosvold

Considerations of Commitment and

Capacity: A Study of the SADC

Infrastructure Regulation Environment

(2)

Abstract

This study aims to uncover the political environment of infrastructure regulation in the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) member states, within the energy/electricity, water and transportation sectors (road, rail and maritime). Specifically, the degree to which states would be both willing and able to introduce and maintain regulation authorities in these sectors is studied. To this end, the posited research question is “Is the classification of regulatory commitment and state capacity useful to understand the regulation climate in the SADC member states?”. The study makes use of a theoretical framework grounded in “post-Washington Consensus” thinking, and the process is largely informed by a World Bank issued handbook on analysing infrastructure

regulation. This document provides a four-category matrix in which to place the countries,

depending on whether political commitment towards independent regulation is evident and whether or not the state capacity exists to enforce it. Political commitment is determined after qualitatively assessing official and private documents and texts, while state capacity depends on the countries’ positions on a number of numerical indicators. After examining each variable for the countries in question, they are consequently placed in one of the four categories, depending on the results. The study’s major findings are as follows:

1: many SADC member states showcase high political commitments towards independent

regulation, notably in the case even of smaller countries like Eswatini and Lesotho,

2: there is a split in the frequency of independent regulation between the sectors, where

energy/electricity and water are often independently regulated, while the transport sectors appear regularly to be more centrally controlled, and

3: the categorisation is helpful for understanding the SADC regulatory climate, as it neatly divides

member states into manageable categories, though the constituent parts of the research leading up to it can also be quite informative in and of themselves.

Future research is suggested on the topics of the aforementioned sector split and the differences between general and non-resource adjusted political extraction values. Moreover, deeper and more thorough research of a single or a few of the member states is encouraged.

(3)

1. Introduction

In 2002, leader of Angolan rebel group The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) Jonas Savimbi was killed in battle with Angolan army troops.1_{Ever since the close of the}

war of independence against Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, the political party turned guerilla movement had been locking horns with the Sub-Saharan state government and its long-time

president José Eduardo dos Santos, in a bloody and drawn out civil war. The most pressing question of the early 2000s, then, was when and how one could now finally rebuild the battered economy, and seal the dangerous political chasms that had evolved and festered for the better part of half a century.2_{At a time when the poor and ailing country desperately required infrastructural}

reconstruction, the shoring up of social improvements, and the use of its massive natural resource endowments for public gain and economic breathing space, not one of these goals were fulfilled without controversy. In many respects, Angola became a microcosm of how deep and structural issues can stand in the way of meaningful development in Southern Africa.

One 5-part The Africa Report deep dive into the world of alleged nepotist corruption,

embezzlement charges, financial irresponsibility and lacklustre infrastructural commitments, paints a vivid picture of the country’s tribulations in the beginning of the 21st_{century. Chinese-Angolan}

infrastructure loans, backed by the mortgaging off of the country’s crude oil reserves, were hailed as original and helpful methods of reconstruction.3_{In a country with broad systemic issues and a}

current life expectancy of 61 years, more than half of these 2000-2017 $42 billion infrastructure-for-resources loans were unaccounted for, many of them lost along the revenue streams of the state oil company Sonangol.4567_{Some remaining segments of these loans were spent on grand but}

ultimately fruitless industrial endeavours that are now being successively auctioned off by Angolan authorities.

1 Brittain, V. & Siona, C., “Unita leader Savimbi killed by Angolan army”, The Guardian, 2002-02-23, Available:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/23/victoriabrittain, (Gathered 2021-05-01)

2 Eisenstein, Z. & Smith, P., “Angola: Where did all the money go? Part 1, a family feast”, The Africa Report, 2019-10-25, Available: https://www.theafricareport.com/18754/angola-where-did-all-the-money-go-part-1-a-family-feast/, (Gathered 2021-04-29)

3 Eisenstein, Z. & Smith, P., “Angola: Where did all the money go? Part 3, the China connection”, The Africa Report, 2019-10-25, Available: https://www.theafricareport.com/18759/angola-where-did-all-the-money-go-part-3-the-china-connection/, (Gathered 2021-04-29)

4 Ibid.

5 Eisenstein, Z. & Smith, P., “Angola: Where did all the money go? Part 2, the parallel economy”, The Africa Report, 2019-10-25, Available: https://www.theafricareport.com/18756/angola-where-did-all-the-money-go-part-2-the-parallel-economy/, (Gathered 2021-04-29)

6 The World Bank, Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – Angola, 2019, Available:

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?contextual=default&locations=AO, (Gathered 2021-04-29) 7 Eisenstein, Z. & Smith, P., “Angola: Where did all the money go? Part 3, the China connection”

(5)

Against this backdrop, sitting President João Lourenço has reportedly taken a stance against corruption, with a view towards strengthening the Angolan justice system, rectifying some of the ills of the Chinese-Angolan loan structure and finding some of the displaced billions, for

reintroduction into the Angolan economy.8_{The potential of such an endeavour is not viewed with}

universal optimism. The sitting administration is saddled with what looks to be an uncertain election year in 2022 and, as one observer is quoted in The Africa Report as having said: “Even if there is genuine reform, say on agriculture, electrification, industrial policy and banking regulations […] the question is when [Lourenço] pulls the levers can he really make a difference?”910

Albeit an extraordinary case in some respects, Angola mirrors many of the difficulties encountered by other Southern African states, along their journeys towards economic development. Touted as one of the main pathways to growth and economic success, infrastructure development is a high priority for many of these governments, as well as a crucially important academic issue. It is of no great surprise, then, that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) makes much of the region’s future infrastructural potential.11_{Angola being the first alphabetically, the}

development-focused SADC also counts among its member states Botswana, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.12

The SADC and indeed much of the continent in general face uncertainties in the future. One 2019 paper notes the immense challenges ahead for African states, as for instance power deficits continue to loom large in the Sub-Saharan region and electricity access remains elusive for upwards of half a billion Africans.13_{The picture is not wholly negative however, as recent technological advances}

have facilitated renewable energy development, and as it has been shown that for the first time ever, electricity access rates in Sub-Saharan Africa have overtaken population growth. Along with renewable energy financing channels, constructive governance solutions and the like, the strengthening of regulation frameworks are touted as one important way to improve system

8 Eisenstein, Z. & Smith, P., “Angola: Where did all the money go? Part 5, the fight back”, The Africa Report, 2019-10-25, Available: https://www.theafricareport.com/18767/angola-where-did-all-the-money-go-part-5-the-fight-back/, (Gathered 2021-04-29)

9 Lusa, “Analyst says MPLA goes to elections in 2022 more fragile than ever”, Ver Angola, 2021-01-29, Available:

https://www.verangola.net/va/en/012021/Politics/23790/Analyst-says-MPLA-goes-to-elections-in-2022-more-fragile-than-ever.htm, (Gathered 2021-04-29)

10 Eisenstein, Z. & Smith, P., “Angola: Where did all the money go? Part 5, the fight back”

11 SADC, Infrastructure, 2012, Available: https://www.sadc.int/themes/infrastructure/, (Gathered 2021-04-29) 12 SADC, Member States, 2012, Available: https://www.sadc.int/member-states/, (Gathered 2021-04-29) 13 Simbanegawi, W., “Africa’s Energy Renewal: The Twin Challenges of Energy Deficit and Climate Change”,

Journal of African Economies, Vol. 28 No. 6, 2019-08, Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejz022, (Gathered 2021-01-03), p. 5

(6)

functionality.14_{Targeted policies, eventual regulation agencies and well-designed services contracts,}

the authors note, will also have to be properly monitored and fully transparent. Financial consistency and incentives are important tools for access-deficit states, and proper governance efforts will be needed to secure both private contracts and general construction development. Positive though these guidelines are at their core, it is also conceded that many states facing political and even military turmoil will continue to face grave difficulties in actually achieving the changes that are needed. The SADC members, in other words, have meaningful work still ahead of them, both in terms of energy infrastructure and that of other sectors.

Within this collection of varied governments, there is a common aspect of infrastructure policy that is arguably centrally important, namely that of its regulation. How, when and by what means one can and should regulate an economic sector is an intriguing question in every state, but takes on an almost unrivalled importance in countries where its answer can make or break the economic and social futures of millions of people. For a long time, the general answer of the international community has been the universal pursuit of Western-style independent agency construction, a paradigm now being successively supplanted by more locally and regionally minded development policy. The dominance of “Washington Consensus” thinking and its universalist approach to regulation and development, in other words, is now being replaced with viewpoints taking more into account the particular state dynamics that either facilitate or complicate regulation change. In the case of this study, member states’ apparent political willingness to institute such changes, as well as their observed capability to go through with them, will be researched. Whether or not this categorisation will be helpful in understanding the regulatory environment in the SADC will be the main driving question of this paper, and its constituent parts will be described in detail below.

1.1. Purpose of study and research question

This paper will have a distinct focus on differentiating between countries on the basis of their regulatory character in the realm of infrastructure development. With this having been established, one can hopefully use the lens to glean a number of deeper insights about proper state policy, international approaches and the like. In this way, deeper political considerations for international efforts within and outside of the SADC can hopefully be had when building on this categorisation. Additionally, it is the hope of this paper that some valuable analysis can be made for how the World Bank’s current and future efforts can be moulded in the area, considering the fact that much of the study’s literature basis builds on sources from that organisation.

(7)

To this end, the research question posed must address both the main categorisation of member states and the analytical possibilities it entails. The following question was formulated to satisfy these conditions:

Is the classification of regulatory commitment and state capacity useful to understand the regulation climate in the SADC member states?

This question will hopefully embody the essence of the paper, namely the construction of a

categorical list of these states, followed by more deep diving analysis surrounding the domestic and international consequences of the results. To answer the above, one must start with ample

knowledge of the general field, a suitable theoretical framework, considerations of methodology, etc. With that information in hand, work can begin on a framework and lens that will subsequently be applied on the empirical material, the interplay between which will hopefully provide insightful results. Subsection 1.3. will outline these steps.

1.2. Delimitations

As this paper will handle quite a broad topic, some boundaries will need to be clarified for issues that lay outside the scope of it. There are geographical limitations to consider, for instance.

Although the SADC member states encompass much of Sub-Saharan Africa, that is not the region to be targeted in this essay. While “Southern Africa” is a more apt description, it is the SADC members that will be analysed, constituting a manageable and logical list of countries to research. Moreover, while many factors might contribute to infrastructural development in these countries – and indeed while some of them may well be brought up in the process of this paper’s research – the main focus will be to uncover the regulatory character of the states. This entails a prioritised focus on aspects of governance that specifically relate to regulation commitment and capacity. As will be described below however, this approach will certainly incorporate many varied measures in its own right. Finally, this paper will invariably make use of some historical facts and figures, but will ultimately aim to research 21st_{century SADC policies and situations. Indeed, the numerical portion}

of the work will be limited to indicators from the year 2020.

The generalisability of the study is high in some respects. Targeting other parts of the world, for instance South American or South-East Asian countries, one might reasonably be able to use a similar if not identical framework as shall be employed in this paper. A valid issue to consider, however, is whether the studied states would be economically and politically developed to the same degree or not. If such is not the case, due attention should be given the fact, with any major

(8)

differences pointed out. The SADC member group is by no means monolithic in development terms, but contains states from the same general area and with similar political structures. Particularly, the ranking and categorisation of countries from different regions and in varying development stages might prove difficult. Thus, while region-specific approaches should be served well by this type of study, there is no guarantee that multi-region – or indeed worldwide –

approaches would be.

1.3. Disposition

This subsection will provide a general overview for the structure of the remainder of this paper. First, section 2 will deal with background information and earlier research in the chosen field. Following this, the third section will focus on theoretical considerations. In its first subsection, some popular development theory paradigms from the end of the second world war and onwards will be outlined, eventually leading to the eventual adoption of “post-Washington Consensus” ideas, the study’s main theoretical framework. The following subsection, 3.2., delves into this perspective and its modern connotations for development and international politics, while subsection 3.3. will specify the matter further and focus on regulatory considerations. The main variables of political regulation commitment and state capacity will be introduced in this subsection.

The fourth section will handle methodology and material. Under its first subheading, the general methodological choices that have been made will be summarised, as well as the general

philosophies and considerations they bring to the paper. In the second, third and fourth subsections, the specific variables to be used in the study will be detailed first, followed by a subsection

outlining the general categorisation method and presenting an example table for the analysis. Subsection 4.3. finishes the section by presenting potential methodological and material critique. Section 5 constitutes the Analysis section, and the main body of the text. Subsection 5.1. is immediately divided into specific country subheadings, dealing with each SADC member state in turn, in alphabetical order. The research of these follows a general pattern, where facts and figures surrounding the political commitment towards independent regulation of the chosen sectors start each country segment. This is followed by the presentation of the numerical indicators tied to state capacity. Next, the country’s level of political commitment is determined considering the previous results, followed by that of state capacity. Finally, the resulting country category is determined. Subsection 5.2. summarises the countries analysed, and showcases the gathered results in an encompassing table. Here, observed trends and deeper analysis of the results will take place.

(9)

Section 6 will conclude the paper, outlining important result trends and the aforementioned analysis. This is followed by the final section, Bibliography, which presents an alphabetically ordered list of all sources used.

2. Background and earlier research

The topic of infrastructure construction and regulation in Africa is quite broad, but defining areas of expertise and general patterns can be done on the basis of existing academic and other literature. The background literature consists of many different perspectives, all of which focus on different parts of infrastructure development.

One of these perspectives focuses on the international – and specifically, Chinese – aspect of

African infrastructure development. The often cited and discussed phenomenon of Chinese road and harbour building collaboration with various African governments, or as a constituent part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has become a mainstay academic topic in relation to African

developmental affairs. Indeed, much of this topic is wrought with controversy and moral debate, making it an intriguing introduction to the international politics and considerations at play. One work which showcases the breadth of the topic is “China- Africa and an Economic Transformation”, written by a wide collection of experts and edited by former mayor of Addis Ababa, Arkebe Oqubay.15_{The major themes of the book revolve around China as a catalyst for}

African economic growth in many areas, with a particular focus being paid to manufacturing-based Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).16_{The possibility of real African sovereignty in connection with}

Chinese economic investment is also brought up, and the authors appear to paint quite an optimistic view of the relationship.

The book highlights the way in which traditional Western thinking on the subject has allegedly been overturned and how it is now subject to revision, chiefly because of the Chinese precedent. The stated reasons why are many. For instance, it is argued, classic small-scale, cost-benefit analysed infrastructure projects are less steady and predictable than the wide Chinese structural

transformation goals tend to be.17_{The Chinese system is lauded as relatively efficient and quick,}

thanks in large part to its direct connection between policy bank and contractors, without public system interference. It is also pointed out that Chinese infrastructure work is often not tied to

15 Oqubay, A. & Lin, J.Y., (eds.), China-Africa and an Economic Transformation, 2019, Oxford University Press: Oxford, Available: https://fdslive oupcom.ezp.sub.su.se/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/

9780198830504.pdf, (Gathered 2021-01-05) 16 Ibid., pp. 4-7

(10)

international standards regulation, in the way that of the remaining international community might be.

At first glance, this appears to support the view of China as a world leader for infrastructure development in Africa. However, more critical voices can also be heard on the subject. One such article reports dimly on the very real possibility of the Chinese presence perpetuating the African natural resource extraction focus indefinitely.18_{African exports, the authors point out, are}

diversifying much too slowly, and it is claimed that Chinese “resources-for-infrastructure” deals are mostly to blame. Moreover, the aforementioned Chinese ability to be unbeholden to certain

international work standards is not always popular. Neither is the seeming inability of Chinese contractors to follow even local norms and regulations.

Indeed, authors Wang Bing and Nancy Githaiga raise similar concerns in their own article, outlining the impacts of the various BRI construction initiatives in Kenya.19_{For one thing, it appears as if the}

Chinese worker influx is often negative for the local workforce, which could have filled the positions required for the project, were it not for the guest workers.20_{For another thing, there are}

glaring systemic issues on many fronts that cannot be ignored. Environmental impacts of infrastructure projects, for instance, have detrimental effects on local wildlife, and the Chinese presence appears to lead to an increase in poaching and smuggling.21_{Meanwhile, economic issues}

are looming large in the background of what might otherwise appear to be perfectly economically sound projects. The Kenyan debt levels are said to have been rising dramatically as a result of the projects, the Chinese high-interest loan financing lacks some of the elegance and thrift that public bond issue solutions would have had, and the authors point out the troubling Chinese habit of being granted ownership of crucial harbours and trade nodes in developing states, as repayment for defaulted loans.22_{Granting these issues, the authors still acknowledge the facts for instance, both}

Chinese-oriented and general Kenyan trade has grown alongside the infrastructure projects, that for all their potential issues, the projects have been positive for the Kenyan workforce overall, and that Kenyan development can be genuinely boosted by the endeavour if it is managed correctly.23

18 Asante, R., “China and Africa: Model of South-South Cooperation?”, China Quarterly of International Strategic

Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2018, pp. 259-279, Available:

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/epdf/10.1142/S2377740018500124, (Gathered 2021-01-05), pp. 20-21 19 Bing, W., & Githaiga, N.M., “Belt and Road Initiative in Africa: The Impact of Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya”,

China Report, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2019), pp. 219-240, Available:

https://journalssagepub-com.ezp.sub.su.se/doi/pdf/10.1177/0009445519853697, (Gathered 2021-01-05) 20 Ibid., p. 10

21 Ibid., p. 11 22 Ibid., pp. 12-16 23 Ibid., pp. 8-9, 18

(11)

Controversies are abound also on the topic of African infrastructure development in general, and where any international influence is concerned. Often times, quite a lot of this criticism is levied against the prevailing perspectives of the programmes’ financiers.

As one article puts it, there is indeed a large infrastructure challenge in Africa as a continent, but the answer cannot always be large-scale highway toll road projects.24_{In fact, many times these}

endeavours allegedly hamper, rather than help, the local populations they are ostensibly there to assist. Its author continues by critiquing not only the high-finance "investment opportunity" focus that often is said to lay behind development efforts, but also the issue of how disconnected these projects often are from the very real and quite modest needs of ordinary people. Water availability and sanitation, working low-tier transportation routes and proper irrigation channels, it is argued, must be the primary focuses if one truly wishes to undercut many of the poverty issues in poor, rural communities. If these projects cannot be made commercially viable and more attractive for Western or other investors, they nonetheless need to be financed somehow. The tunnel vision with which current infrastructure projects are often undertaken will be an obstacle to their development, and stoke local resentments in their place. Another article concerning African infrastructure priorities argues much the same point, and adds that human capacity and knowledge creation are the real measures of development potential, not road maintenance and power lines.25_{Author David Ndii}

adds "[t]here is no evidence in economics that infrastructure investment contributes to economic growth".26

The actual case for an investment-growth correlation does appear somewhat spotted, if perhaps not as final as Ndii's 2018 article would imply. There has been some research done on this topic as it relates to countries in different development stages, most notably in the developing BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) community. One such work for instance makes the case that although energy infrastructure investments can be seen to have an overall positive influence on economic growth, telecommunications, transport and other categories can range from seemingly irrelevant to significantly negative.27_{Another paper links both public and privately financed}

24 Goodfellow, T., “Massive African infrastructure projects often hurt, rather than help, local people”, The

Conversation, Available: https://theconversation.com/massive-african-infrastructure-projects-often-hurt-rather-than-help-local-people-132699, (Gathered 2021-01-03)

25 Ndii, D., “Knowledge and Growth: What Paul Romer’s Economics Nobel Prize Says About Africa’s Infrastructure Obsession”, The Elephant, 2018, Available: https://www.theelephant.info/op-eds/2018/10/13/knowledge-and-growth-what-paul-romers-economics-nobel-prize-says-about-africas-infrastructure-obsession/, (Gathered 2021-01-03)

26 Ibid.

27 Apurv, R. & Uzma, S.H., "The impact of infrastructure investment and development on economic growth on BRICS", Indian Growth and Development Review, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 122-147, 2021, Available:

(12)

infrastructure efforts in India to increased economic growth, and adds that the private option reigns supreme in terms of crowding in growth potential.28

While one 2021 paper argues that infrastructure investments have led to positive growth in China, another study conversely points to tremendous issues with the country’s infrastructure development policy, that are poised to threaten the very economic future of the country if left unchecked.2930_Far

from being universally helpful, the authors argue that major Chinese infrastructure endeavours are routinely unprofitable, leading to unsustainable busts after initial and short-lived profit booms. Finally, a regionally focused Turkish study finds that physical as well as social and financial infrastructure all contribute to a decrease in regional income disparities in the country, and recommends government mandates for more physical infrastructure links with this in mind.31

Of course, none of the BRICS states except South Africa accurately portray the difficulties faced by the various SADC members, who have reportedly attempted a collective infrastructure development scheme for almost a decade.32_{Indeed it is in the organisation’s 2012 Regional Infrastructure}

Development Master Plan that it is hoped many of the member countries’ infrastructure demands will be properly outlined and planned.33_{The infrastructure and services gap focus, much critiqued in}

some of the previously mentioned articles, appears again to an extent in this document, as well as in the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 2020-2030.3435_{These gaps are}

categorised as “hard” and “soft”, owing to both the clear physical needs of e.g. power stations, functioning ports, storage solutions, etc., and to the more indirect political considerations of policy, financing and – notably – regulatory frameworks.36_{In its plan for regional development, the SADC}

points to several areas that are of momentous importance if member states are to fulfil the forecast demands of 2027, the end point of the current development scheme.

28 Unnikrishnan, N. & Kattokaran, T.P., “Impact of Public and Private Infrastructure Investment on Economic Growth: Evidence from India”, Journal of Infrastructure Development, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 119-138, 2020-12-01, Available: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0974930620961477, (Gathered 2021-01-03)

29 Raza, A. et. al., “Infrastructure investment and economic growth quality: empirical analysis of China’s regional development”, Applied Economics, Vol. 53 No. 32, pp. 1-16, 2021-02, Available:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2020.1863325, (Gathered 2021-01-03)

30 Ansar, A. et. al., “Does infrastructure investment lead to economic growth or economic fragility? Evidence from China”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 32 No. 3, pp. 360-390, 2016-09, Available:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grw022, (Gathered 2021-01-03)

31 Saygili, H. & Özdemir, K.A., “Regional economic growth in Turkey: the effects of physical, social and financial infrastructure investment”, Empirical Economics, Vol. 60 No. 2, 2021-04, Available:

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00181-020-01828-0, (Gathered 2021-01-03) 32 SADC, Infrastructure, 2012

33 SADC, Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan – Energy Sector Plan, 2012, Available:

https://www.sadc.int/files/5413/5293/3528/Regional_Infrastructure_Development_Master_Plan_Energy_Sector_Pl an.pdf, (Gathered 2021-01-02), pp. 6-13

34 Ibid., pp. 6-13, 44-47

35 SADC, SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), 2020-08, Available:

https://www.sadc.int/files/4716/1434/6113/RISDP_2020-2030_F.pdf, (Gathered 2021-01-02), pp. 19-20 36 SADC, 2012, p. 6

(13)

With the caveat attached that at the time of writing, this report is almost 10 years old, it never the less demonstrates SADC priorities fairly well. Sorely lacking electricity generation, power grid connectivity problems and other issues are reported region-wide, with supply deficits reported in the hundreds of megawatts in most member states.37_{Additionally, South Africa was reported as the only}

country with nuclear power capacities in the region, though both nuclear development and

renewable energy programs had been started in others. A lack of refineries in the region reportedly results in large oil imports every year despite the area’s natural endowments.38_{Moreover, coal}

production is soaring in countries like South Africa and Mozambique, but landlocked states like Zimbabwe and Botswana are facing transportation difficulties, owing to the poor quality or lack of road networks, stations and storage facilities.39

3. Theory

3.1. Reaching a “post-Washington Consensus” - Theoretical

background and history

The neo-liberal account of how best to manage economic systems in general, and development efforts in particular, has some obvious tie-ins to the general liberal traditions that Western powers have been familiar with since the end of the second world war, but with some crucial differences.40

For one thing, the neo-liberal effort and market centred approaches have recently been shaped into more internationalist and wide-spread agendas, that now also incorporate more elements of

sustainable and effective development policy than just economic liberalization. To see how this has come to be, one can glance at the general history of the theoretical trends.

When taking into account the political state of the world after the second world war, the American and overall Western development approaches took on distinctly Keynesian characteristics.41_With

state power support abound and a general view towards the goal of rebuilding the damaged markets of advanced economies, many states in Europe, Asia (prominent examples being South Korea and Japan) and elsewhere mantled the heavy task of reaffirming their former strength, but with new political and democratic strategies in mind. New international power dynamics were also introduced. The creation of behemoth organisations like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group shortly after the war showcased the Western perspective

37 SADC, 2012,, pp. 19-21 38 Ibid., pp. 21-22

39 Ibid., p. 24

40 Hurrell, A., “Rising powers and the emerging global order” in Baylis, J. et. al. (eds.), The Globalization of World

Politics (6th_{ed.), 2014, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 82-83}

(14)

on what it was believed, specifically, the new international order ought to be.42_{The latter two, when}

combined with the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), also

demonstrated the free trade focus of Western thinkers at the time. What this all amounted to was a strategy of classic liberal free market ideas, combined with the support of state power and guidance: an “embedded liberal” approach. Though this tactic varied in its success tremendously, the

historical period marked an overall positive economic growth, as well as a reshaping of the old political and economic world orders. The dominant economic theories of the mid 20th_{century would}

wax and wane in their popularity across the globe however, and suffer both some heavy setbacks and harsh criticisms.

Some of these critiques originated in the countries where this approach had evidently worked out the worst. Scores of developing economies, reliant on primary goods exports, suffered greatly during the general recession periods of the mid- to late 1970s, along with the first and second oil shocks of that time.43_{Of course not every developing state followed the free market or even the}

“embedded liberal” ideas of development to begin with, and challenges to the orthodox logic of economic growth came from many directions. In terms of trade, many developing economies – in particular in South America – adopted an import substitution-industrialisation (ISI) policy to stay competitive on the world scene, and the community-based rather than market-based critical theorizing was widely popular in many development circles already.4445

The real turning point towards a neo-liberal dominance in the realm of development thinking arrived by the early 1980s. The tumultuousness of the 70s’ oil price shocks reverberated throughout the developing world, with more and more of these states increasing their national lending limits and experiencing a virtually unmatched period of indebtedness.4647_{By 1982, the pressure had}

become practically insurmountable, with developing states defaulting on their loans and Mexico threatening bankruptcy. As the lenders of last resort, the IMF and the World Bank imposed stringent limits on the countries that received economic support, for which help was made conditional. This period introduced the world to the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that intended to create sound political and economic environments for rehabilitation and future development, and whose actual effectiveness is being fervently discussed to this day. It also finally introduces the

well-42 Evans, T. & Thomas, C., “Poverty, development, and hunger” in Baylis, J. et. al., 2014, pp. 434-436 43 O’Brien, R. & Williams, M., 2016, pp. 227-229

44 Capling, A. & Trommer, S., “The Evolution of the Global Trade Regime” and Ravenhill, J., “Regional Trade Agreements” in Ravenhill, J. (ed.), Global Political Economy (5th_{ed.), 2017, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.}

124, 153

45 Evans, T. & Thomas, C., 2014, p. 434

46 O’Brien, R. & Williams, M., 2016, pp. 229-230 47 Evans, T. & Thomas, C., 2014, pp. 435-436

(15)

known moniker of neo-liberal economics and politics: the “Washington Consensus” (henceforth “WC”).

Economist John Williamson, who coined the term, did so to describe the prevailing attitudes

towards development in South America around prominent Washington circles, during the late 80s to early 90s.4849_{Both by virtue of its succinct categorisation of American policy makers’ overriding}

development goals and thanks to the straight-forwardness of the term, its use soared, both in academic and other communities. Williamson had noted 10 points of apparent consensus for much of the Washington development establishment of the time, such as economic liberalisation,

industrial privatisation, the freeing of exchange rates, etc. Subsequently, both ardent critics and staunch supporters of IMF and World Bank normal procedure attached to the term, for different reasons. Seeing himself as sorely misunderstood by both groups as a supporter of the ideas – as opposed to simply an observer of a political trend – Williamson is outspoken about his views on the matter, and the neutral manner in which he believes the term should be understood.

Despite this, the end of the Cold War and its neutering of the previous main rival alternative of development approaches rather ushered in the dominance of neo-liberal, “WC-approved”

development ideas. “Embedded liberalism” became a virtually forgotten paradigm and Keynes’s state-market dualism was supplanted by privatisation, market liberalisation and a strong focus on the limiting rather than strengthening of state power.

Despite its initial popularity, the tradition was continually opposed by more critical development thinkers, who argued firmly against what many saw as a free market over-emphasis. And indeed over the course of the next two decades, many of their various critiques would become more or less vindicated. Its relative dominion over development thinking in the late 80s to mid 90s

notwithstanding, the WC account suffered some major setbacks until its eventual reshaping in the beginning of the 21st_century.50

To start with, it was pointed out that for developing and developed countries with the ability to choose, not all of the core Consensus prescriptions had to be adopted. States could and did in practice pick and choose freely between policy recommendations that were all touted as

fundamental in theory. The fact that not every state could choose to begin with, because the aid they received was tied to the wholesale acceptance of the prescriptions, did little to ameliorate the issue.

48 Williamson, J., “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” in Williamson, J. (ed.), Latin American Adjustment:

How Much Has Happened?, 1990, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2002, Available:

https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/what-washington-means-policy-reform, (Gathered 2021-01-05) 49 O’Brien, R. & Williams, M., 2016, pp. 269-270

(16)

Furthermore, some of the stated success stories of market liberalization and privatization (notably in the case of newly industrialized Asian states) proved to be cases where, in actuality, quite a lot of state power and guidance accompanied the global market focus. In many African states that had adopted the SAP policy plans stagnation continued to be a constant issue, and in 1997 the East Asian financial crisis was blamed on the premature liberalisation of markets and capital. Any hopes of retaining popular support for the ideas of unabashed liberalisation and state power limitation would have been ultimately extinguished with the 2008-09 financial crisis, where the results of extensive capital management freedoms became clear. The WC approach to development and indeed its entire economic foundations came under scrutiny as a result.51

Even before these tumultuous years it had become clear to many observers that a “post-Washington Consensus” model would have to be established, and the late 90s and early 2000s saw some small but meaningful changes being implemented, one by one. Possibly chief among them was the renewed interest in good governance, democratisation and acknowledgements that simple economic output measures would not be enough.52_{The goal could no longer be just to free up national}

markets and liberalise the economy – it had to also be done in both a time frame and manner that suited local bureaucracies. In fact, one key feature of good development policy, dominant players in the IMF and the World Bank now began to agree, was the simultaneous evolution of both the political and the economic spheres, alongside one another. No longer was the state necessary just to guide the economy in the right direction, but its very formation proved vital for any semblance of a free and stable economy to emerge in the first place. Other changes were also influential. The World Bank – after having received many years’ worth of criticism for ignoring social development realities – added a gender equality clause to its development agenda in 1994, and in general started becoming more and more observant about minority issues.53

3.2. The PWC account and its modern contributions

This background brings one to what can be called a “post-Washington Consensus” (henceforth “PWC”) world view, as adopted by many development thinkers and international institutions. It struggles from the outset with some theoretical contradictions. There is now a renewed state focus running alongside economic recommendations, of the very kind that many pre-crisis neo-liberal adherents would themselves have staunchly opposed.54_{The original program was a specific attempt}

to limit, not increase, the abilities and powers of the state. For another issue, many critics look to the

51 O’Brien, R. & Williams, M., 2016, pp. 231, 274-275 52 Ibid., pp. 231, 271

53 Evans, T. & Thomas, C., 2014, pp. 440-442 54 O’Brien, R. & Williams, M., 2016, p. 271

(17)

extensive and widespread political changes that are now expected of developing states. Large-scale political projects like democratisation and institutional restructuring, they affirm, are exactly the types of expensive and arduous ordeals that many of these countries struggle with in the first place. Not all previous perspectives have been wholly changed, one should note. Newfound governance focuses to one side, the World Bank’s approach to development economics for instance remains largely private sector based, with the underlying argument that striving for firm competition is beneficial for the functioning of the particular market, for the needs of its consumers and for the state economy at large.55

On the flip side of its apparent inconsistencies, it is within the newfound acceptance and flexibility of the PWC approach that many find reassurance, not hypocrisy. Although both the IMF and World Bank’s approaches to development have been rocky in the new PWC landscape and by no means uniform, it is often accepted that to some extent, a new vision of North-South cooperation and development has emerged.56_{The stubborn clinging to exclusively neo-liberal market liberalisation}

and structural adjustment has been to some degree replaced, by a reinvigorating shift towards effective governance efforts, and the optimisation of statesmanship. It is this general theoretical framework, very much focused on economic factors but not ignoring political realities, that will provide the foundation for this paper. The following subsection will handle how the PWC perspective can be employed in practice, in relation to infrastructure regulation policy.

3.3. PWC perspectives on infrastructure regulation

It is within the new political focus of the World Bank and other institutions, that one finally finds the specific view towards regulation policy, to be used for this essay. Where infrastructure regulation sources are concerned, there are two major works of note – both issued by the World Bank – that will contribute the most for this paper. The first and by far most widely encompassing is “Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems”, in which authors Ashley C. Brown and others comprehensively summarise the methods, reasoning and general principles behind the analysis and effectiveness ranking of infrastructure regulation systems, all around the world.57

55 Faye, I. & Tran, L., Promoting Impact by Creating Markets: Management and Measurement, International Finance Corporation, 2021-03, Available:

https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/fae6981c-5a4c-4681-8020-425432688db7/EMCompass_Note+100_Promoting+Impact+by+Creating+Markets_FIN-March+2021.pdf? MOD=AJPERES&CVID=nz7Xi5q, (Gathered 2021-02-10), pp. 1-2

56 Guven, A.B., “Whither the post-Washington Consensus? International financial institutions and development policy before and after the crisis”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 23 No. 5, 2018-05, Available:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2018.1459781, (Gathered 2021-02-11), pp. 21-22

57 Brown, A.C. et. al., Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems, World Bank, 2006, Available:

(18)

The recommendations in this handbook, varied though they are, are generally centred around the paradigm of independent regulation, a crucially important aspect of modern regulatory discussion. Put simply, independent regulation implies a situation wherein a state has mandated that regulation of a certain sector – for instance and in the case of this paper, infrastructure sector development and management – should be conducted by a single and autonomous entity.58_{In this model, the regulator}

would optimally have full organisational, financial and management independence from other government bodies, as well as wiggling room for making quick and final decisions. Decisions made can range from large-scale tariff setting and designs of contract monitoring systems, to minor investment policy tinkering. The overarching goal of this approach however, is to create an environment in which important regulatory decisions are wholly depoliticized, and removed from the malleable and changing political climate in the state. According to this logic, no one party or other political actor would be allowed to change contracts and price levels on a whim, for the good of both domestic stability and future international investment.

The idea of establishing such independent regulatory agencies in developing countries were long of major interest for the World Bank and other institutions, but has lost some of its universal appeal since the early 2000s.59_{Much in line with the previously mentioned developments at the World}

Bank, it has now been conceded that tailoring regulatory systems to countries’ various capacities and local realities is a far better approach. To put it bluntly, not all states can actually manage a direct jump to independent regulation.60_{The fact that political development is difficult and quite}

back-breaking work has been established, and alternative views are being brought to the fore. It is far better instead, it is now believed, to commit developing states to “hybrid” and “transitional” models of regulation, where good practice and depoliticization can be, to different degrees, combined with the acknowledgement of cultural and local realities.

This brings us to the work of one Anton Eberhard. In his study, “Infrastructure Regulation in Developing Countries: An Exploration of Hybrid and Transitional Models”, Eberhard draws heavily on the previously mentioned writings of Brown and her colleagues, and further evolves their ideas about two important state variables to consider: political commitment and state capacity.61

58 Brown, A.C. et. al., 2006, pp. 50-51

59 Eberhard, A., “Matching Regulatory Design to Country Circumstances”, Gridlines, No. 23, World Bank, 2007, Available: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/10688?locale-attribute=en, (Gathered 2021-01-10) 60 Brown, A.C. et. al., 2006, pp. 7-9

61 Eberhard, A., Infrastructure regulation in developing countries: an exploration of hybrid and transitional models, 2006-04, Available:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228355427_Infrastructure_regulation_in_developing_countries_an_explo ration_of_hybrid_and_transitional_models, (Gathered 2021-02-02)

(19)

Starting with the material Eberhard was inspired by in the first place, Brown’s handbook delves into transitional systems and their features, challenges and impacts in its fourth chapter. It is there, too, that an attempt at categorising the different country situations is made, with a four-squared matrix dealing with political commitment and state capacity.62_{The fundamental point is simple: a state can}

either have the political willingness to create an independent regulatory agency or not. Similarly, it can either have the capacity to build and maintain such a system or not. This leaves one with four possible conditions in which a developing state can be found (see Figure 1).

Category 1 Countries Category 2 Countries

Strong commitment, Strong capacity: Able and willing

Weak commitment, Strong capacity: Able but unwilling

Category 3 Countries Category 4 Countries

Strong commitment, Weak capacity: Unable but willing

Weak commitment, Weak capacity: Unable and unwilling Figure 1: Four-category commitment/capacity matrix

Countries belonging to the first category exhibit both the commitment and the ability to create an independent regulatory system, and will in this paper be called the Able and willing. Category 2 states have the capacity for the project should they choose to start it, but lack any real willingness to see it through (Able but unwilling). Category 3 countries conversely have a strong commitment to independent regulation, but because of weak state institutions, suffer the inability to enact it

(Unable but willing). Finally, Category 4 countries lack both willingness and capacity, and are in no position to revolutionize their infrastructure regulation (Unable and unwilling). Using PWC

considerations as a general framework, it is this specific four-category model that the paper will be based on.

4. Methodology and material

In this section, the general methodological and material choices and considerations of the paper will be presented and explained.

4.1. Method of choice

This paper will take on the form of a theory testing and typological study. The characteristics of the method’s relation to theory, its explanatory value and the general character of the method will be described in turn, in this subsection.

(20)

First, the relation between theory and method will be testing, rather than consumptive or constructive. Theory testing studies are characterised by the focus of the researcher on the

explanatory value of a theory’s measures, while a more constructive approach centres the effort on further theoretical development.63_{The latter motivation is not in line with those of this paper. While}

both its purpose and research questions state an aim towards greater understanding of the regulatory characteristics in the SADC, no new theoretical contributions are expected to result from it. Neither does the study consume the theoretical framework as such, but rather tests its explanatory value and models.

The most important question, then, becomes which specific method the study will actually make use of. Here, the lines between the alternatives blur to an extent. There is a clear categorical/typological focus inherent to this study, but not only are there alternatives within that methodological sub-strait, there are also competing alternatives that describe the character of this paper to an extent.

Focusing first on typological research, there are two broad approaches that one can use in the first place: the “class based” and the ideal type alternatives.64_{Starting with the latter, ideal type analysis}

is based on Max Weber’s ruminations on social science analysis, and builds on the notion that although no empirical case can ever perfectly represent the complete ideal of a particular category – say, “democracy” or “meritocracy”, for instance – the researcher can still estimate roughly how close a certain case comes to representing it.6566_{This thinking runs in line somewhat with the}

theoretical framework chosen for this essay. For example, it is worth noting that concepts like “commitment” and “capacity” can ever only be subjectively determined approximations related to some universal measure, as will be elaborated further below. During the course of this work, many estimations as to how close a particular country is to a particular category will have to be done. However, the country in question will ultimately be assigned to one of these categories, not be measured for its gradient relation to it. It is more accurate to say, therefore, that the study will be centred on the assignment of countries into one of four “classes” of state. These classes will also be intrinsically unconnected and nominal, rather than ordinal, meaning no ranked relationship exists between the categories themselves.67_{Although it is clear what category type the World Bank and}

other analysts would prefer developing states to be in, the study itself makes no attempt at any

63 Esaiasson, P. et. al. (eds.), Metodpraktikan, 2017, pp. 40-43 64 Ibid., pp. 137-144

65 Ibid., pp. 139-144

66 Swedberg, R., “How to use Max Weber’s ideal type in sociological analysis”, Journal of Classic Sociology, Vol. 12 No. 2, 2017-12, Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468795X17743643, (Gathered 2021-04-02), pp. 3-4

67 Powner, L.C., Empirical Research and Writing, 2014, SAGE Publications: London, Available:

(21)

hierarchical ranking between them. Some of the measures used to determine categorisation will be highly ordinal, however, as is described further below.

Lastly, though the categorical character of the study has been made clear, it is important to also acknowledge other methodological ideas that fit in with the paper’s overall structure. For one thing, as Leanne Powner describes in one 2015 practical guide to empirical research, some “between-case” designs make use of a methodological structure that aptly describes this paper’s general aims.68_{The “structured focused comparison” (SFC) method for instance revolves around the}

interrogation of empirical material with a predetermined set of questions and measures. Continuing this process across several cases, the research aims towards eventually increasing understanding of the social phenomenon in question, in its entirety. This SFC approach description fits very well with the general approach of this paper.

There are also so-called “intermediate-n” designs, named for the relative academical grey zone that their observation numbers are said to force them to inhabit.69_{In many cases, it is explained, these}

research designs are considered quite unique, by virtue of the fact that the sizes of their observation numbers are on the one hand too large for traditional qualitative and in-depth research, but on the other hand too small for generalisable quantitative work. The result ends up as a middle ground between large and small scale research, as well as a middle ground between qualitative and quantitative methodology.

Indeed, two of the most prominent examples of intermediate-n design are “Qualitative Comparative Analysis” (QCA) and “Fuzzy Set Analysis” (FSA), both of which often mix qualitative and

quantitative variable measurements in order to seek out the answers to testable hypotheses. Although this paper can justifiably be categorised as “intermediate-n” in terms of its number of cases (the number of SADC member states to be analysed), and although the mixing of qualitative and quantitative data is familiar, the overall resemblance to QCA and FSA appear to end quickly. For one thing, this paper will not make use of any Boolean algebraic formulas (AND, OR and NOT logical functions, often used in computing) to determine category placement and the like, as FSA customarily does. Instead, the categorisation structure is already set in place, by purely theoretical constraints. Moreover, there exists no explicit hypothesis to be tested, but rather there is an attempt to test the suitability of a given framework.

68 Powner, L.C., 2014, pp. 105-108 69 Ibid., pp. 106-108

(22)

4.2. Chosen variables and research structure

How, then, can one transform the four categories of Brown and Eberhard into useful variables? How can one mould them into factors that are more workable in a study of this type and size? The most striking possibility is with a table, where one tries to list the different factors for each SADC member state, and where one can use the compiled results to later place the states in one of the four categories. Considering the framework that was described in the theoretical section, there are certain measures that could fit this mould.

4.2.1. Political commitment

To properly unpack the methodology of the paper, the two constituent parts of the framework should be broken apart, i.e. political regulatory commitment and state capacity. Starting with the former, the variable of political commitment can be made into a sort of binary value, where

commitment towards independent infrastructure regulation either exists or it does not. The ultimate answer as to whether it does or not rests on the author’s discretion. In some countries, there might be small amounts of highly positive attitudes towards regulatory renewal, countered by large amounts of tepid responses, for instance. In other states the opposite situation might arise, with almost no discernible statements on the matter at all. Since these and many other configurations surely exist, an interesting and varied approach can be taken for each individual country in question. Choosing the proper sources for such information is also important. The clear choice is to make use of official statements from the governments in question first and foremost. As such, the measure deals with primarily current, but also historical government statements, policy documents and the like. When relevant and needed, additional information from sources like news outlets can also be used, to help give a thorough glance of the country’s situation.

Thus, the method for researching regulatory commitment becomes rather broad and encompassing. The analysis should contain government mandated sources where available, and rely primarily on the positive or negative character of statements therein, as they relate to infrastructure regulation. This can also be done indirectly, as the existence of an independent regulatory agency is obviously a sign of political commitment towards independent regulation. If possible, this information should also cover all relevant infrastructure sectors, namely transport (road, rail and port-based), energy and electricity, as well as water and sewage. The level of “Observed Regulatory Commitment” will be stated first, the general result of which will lead into a more specific and final commitment score. In the results table, this will be symbolised by a column headed “PC?”, to which the answer can be either “Yes” or “No”, depending on the observed political commitment.

(23)

4.2.2. State capacity

Then there is the issue of the second factor for consideration, state capacity. “State capacity”, although simplifying the matter somewhat, hopefully accounts for what needs to be actually measured: a country’s capacity in all areas to go through with a project of real regulation change. This process includes both the introduction of independent regulation agencies and their

maintenance. This still leaves one with the matter of how to actually measure this variable, however. There are endless amounts of both qualitative and quantitative indicators of note that could be used for such a task, but this paper will be centred around a choice selection. This will consist of two categories: rule of law (henceforth ROL) scores and Relative Political Capacity, or RPC, indicators.

The ROL indicator’s inclusion will be quite uncomplicated, relying ultimately on a single value, or score, for the state in question, gathered from the World Justice Project’s “Rule of Law Index 2020”.70_{The RPC indicators stem from the “Relative Political Capacity Dataset”, and will consist}

of three of its measures.71_{These are “Absolute Political Extraction” (general APE), APE with}

adjusted non-resource tax revenues (adjusted APE) and finally “Relative Political Extraction” (RPE) modelled for developing societies.72_{These four numerical indicators – ROL, general and}

adjusted APE, and RPE – combine to describe general conditions for a government’s capacity to institute real regulatory change.

The “Rule of Law Index 2020” is calculated using two main datasets sourced by the World Justice Project: a General Population Poll (GPP) with a representative sample of 1,000 people in each country and jurisdiction, as well as Qualified Respondents’ Questionnaires (QRQs), given to domestic experts.73_{The index accounts for a number of social sectors, but most notably measures}

change in four general areas, related to accountability for public and private actors, just and clear laws, an accessible and open government, and proper dispute resolution channels.74_{These are}

reported as the main factors for a proper maintaining of the rule of law, and are followed by more sector-specific indicators. The generalised ROL indicator results run from 0 to 1 (1 being the best score), with the highest registered result being Denmark at 0.90, and the lowest being Venezuela, at 0.27.75

70 World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2020, 2020, Available:

https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf, (Gathered 2021-04-15) 71 Fisunoglu, A. et. al., Relative Political Capacity Dataset (Version 2.4), 2020-08, Harvard Dataverse, Available:

https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/NRR7MB&version=7.0, (Gathered 2021-04-16)

72 Codebook for Fisunoglu, A. et. al., 2020-08, p. 4 73 World Justice Project, 2020, pp. 8, 162

74 Ibid., pp. 10-11 75 Ibid., p. 6

(24)

The RPC indicators all differ slightly in their calculations. APE is reportedly designed to measure “the extractive capacity of nations”.76_{National tax revenues, mining revenues, export values and}

social contributions are all divided by the General Domestic Product (GDP) of the state, added together with a GDP per capita valuation. Labour force participation rates and gross secondary school enrolment ratios are integrated into the model, and the entire model is subsequently multiplied with country life expectancy. The indicator for adjusted APE builds on the exact same formula, with the exception of one step. When dividing general government tax revenues by GDP, the formula excludes any taxes collected from mineral revenues. This is the step that signifies the adjustment of “non-resource” tax revenues. Both the APE indicators are absolute, and range from 0 to 1, with 1 denoting absolute extractive government control.

According to the attached codebook, the RPE indicator “approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals”.77_{Three formulas exist for RPE,}

where two are focused on the measurement of developed states and where only the third accounts for developing countries. As such, that particular indicator is the only one that this paper will make use of. State tax revenues (non-adjusted in this instance) are divided by GDP, as are mining, export and – importantly – agriculture revenues. The indicator measures the political extraction of a government, relative to other governments’ results in the country category of choice (developing, in this case), and though it also starts at 0, can continue beyond 1. The higher this value is, the better the political mobilisation efforts should be in the state in question.

The RPC values, as well as the ROL scores, will all now be placed on a tailored scale, ranging from “Low”, to “Medium”, to “High”, for easier categorisation of the numerical results. The World Justice Project makes use of its own sliding scale for the general adherence to the rule of law around the world, where the values 0.75-1.0 connote strong adherence, while values below this threshold run from middling to weak.78_{In the case of this paper, such valuations are not justified, as}

observations will be made of states that all score under this limit, to different extents. In the Sub-Saharan region, so the 2020 Index reports, scores range from just 0.63 to 0.34, with an average of 0.45. Therefore, a more fitting categorisation of results is required for the region, of which SADC member states constitute rather a large part. Although the entire region will not be analysed in this study, it is proper to include Sub-Saharan states outside SADC membership, in order to account for comparable countries. Considering the regional results, an arbitrary division must be made as to the score requirements of the three tiers of the scale. Scores of 0.50 and upwards will be considered

76 Codebook for Fisunoglu, A. et. al., 2020-08, p. 3 77 Ibid., p. 4

(25)

“High”, scores below 0.40 will be considered “Low”, and scores between these two points will be considered “Medium”. For intuitiveness and ease of reading, these categories will each be assigned a colour code in the final summarised table of the Analysis section, where “High” corresponds with green, “Medium” with yellow, and “Low” with red.

The RPC indicators are more complicated to place on a scale, given their character, but the general approach remains the same. First, the Sub-Saharan results for the general APE indicator range from 0.261 to 0.627, with a region average of 0.436. Once again arbitrarily choosing dividing lines, “High” results will range from 0.50 and upwards, “Medium” results will range between 0.40 and 0.50, while “Low” results will register anywhere below 0.40. Since many interesting features of the country APE statistics are possible due to the interplay between indicators for general and adjusted APE, the same numbers will be used in the scaling system for the adjusted indicator. In this way, the registered change in results from non-resource adjusted to adjusted indicators might become easier to illustrate, especially if resulting in a change from one tier to another. Finally, region RPE

indicators range from a low end of 0.258, to a recorded high of 2.235, with a region average of 1.036. In this instance, dividing lines are especially difficult to draw, considering the relative, rather than absolute, character of the indicator. Considering any indicator value below 0.80 to be “Low”, any result from 0.80 to 1.20 to be “Medium” and any result value over 1.20 to be “High”, appears to be a solid way forward however. All RPC indicator results will be ultimately colour coded in the same way as the ROL indicator. This all results in a three-tiered scale for ROL and RPC indicators, as illustrated in Table 1 below.

Indicator Low Scores Medium Scores High Scores

ROL score < 0.40 0.40 – 0.50 > 0.50

General APE value < 0.40 0.40 – 0.50 > 0.50

Adjusted APE value < 0.40 0.40 – 0.50 > 0.50

RPE value < 0.80 0.80 – 1.20 > 1.20

Table 1: Scaled rating tiers for ROL and RPC indicator values

4.2.3. Final categorisation method

Ultimately, when these factors are all accounted for, the country in question will be judged to either have the state capacity for independent regulatory change or not, much like the commitment

measure. With both variables examined and with their results in hand, one can then finally proceed to place a given state in the proper category, depending on the combination of variables observed. The right-most row of the table will show this final categorisation, with either of the four

(26)

conditions, written out as Able and willing, Unable but willing, and so on (see Table 2). Worth noting on this topic is the fact that even though the categorisation will be final, there may be situations wherein a state’s status is looking ambiguous. For instance, policy focus might dictate that one particular type of infrastructure sees massive state commitment, where another lacks it. The onus is on the author in these cases to justify a final categorisation, with potential caveats attached.

State

Name Observed regulatory commitment

RC? ROL

Score General APE Adjusted APE RPE SC? Final Category

Example State

Mixed, mostly low

No Low Medium Low Low No Unable

and unwilling

Table 2: Example of country analysis

This all amounts to a result that hopefully reflects both the specific framework of choice and the broader PWC attitudes to development. Eberhard and Brown’s writings on the subject are clearly influenced by the PWC paradigm, as it blends free market and investment priorities with the purely social and political elements of commitment and human resources. The table also reflects the political-economic divide by virtue of it bringing both concrete economic issues as well as local and social realities to bear. Though the approach of generalising such complex political entities down to four simple categories must necessarily be quite summary and imprecise, it is the hope of this paper that the act of blending different measures and sources will provide a picture that is, at least,

understandable and logical. The study will make use of this table to the best possible degree, and hopefully end up with a summarised view of the SADC regulatory environment.

4.3. Methodological and material strengths and weaknesses

There are some points of possible contention to acknowledge in the descriptions of methodology and material above. For instance, the number of states to be analysed does indeed situate this paper within a somewhat unique research environment. It should be noted that, as was described in the first subsection, this study will not be case-specific enough to contribute as deep an understanding of the various countries as a one or two-case qualitative design would permit. Neither are any large-scale quantitative trend lines within reach, nor indeed is any robust quantitative analysis performed to begin with, only the presentation and sorting of available statistics. The active hope of the study is rather that careful examination of both the qualitative and numerical material in tandem will contribute to a general insight into the entirety of SADC infrastructure development regulation, and how it might be analytically ordered. In other words, a descriptive and wide, but by no means exhaustive, categorical lens is the intended end stage of the research.