Background of the conflict and armed actors

Hama governorate was impacted by the ‘early civil unrest in Syria’ and received a big number of IDPs due to its proximity to areas of high tension.⁷¹⁷ On 3 August 2011, ABC News reported that more than 200 civilians were killed since the government forces started to crack down on protesters on 1 August⁷¹⁸, where tanks were reportedly used.⁷¹⁹ However, Fabrice Balanche suggested that the situation in Hama city was peculiar due to several elements. The city was ‘unappealing to non-Sunnis’

and Alawite neighbourhoods did not exist in the city. Moreover, the existence of numerous military bases around the city and the relative passivity that the residents of Hama showed during the war constituted an obstacle in HTS’s attempt to capture the city.⁷²⁰ Finally, the majority of the government positions were held by local Sunni Arabs who endeavoured to put an end to the early demonstrations.⁷²¹

Despite the ‘serious armed confrontations between opposition armed groups and GoS forces’⁷²², the urban centre of Hama city witnessed limited fighting and has remained under the control of GoS forces.⁷²³ The totality of the city came under the control of the government forces in 2014, and the northern and eastern countryside was captured by the opposition. Some areas were particularly contested, such as those around Muhardah, Madiq Castle, Kafr Zeita, Talaf, and Aqrab.⁷²⁴ The relative stability of the city of Hama resulted in ‘a significant trend of inward migration and settlement in Hama’.⁷²⁵

Between 2014 and 2017, Hama governorate witnessed several offensives and clashes between government forces and opposition groups. In May 2017, Russia, Iran and Turkey signed an agreement in Kazakhstan, referred to as Astana Agreement, which called for the ‘cessation of hostilities between rebel groups and forces fighting on behalf of Bashar Al-Assad’s government’ in four areas. Those areas were called de-escalation zones, and northern Hama fell under Zone 1 together with Idlib province, north-eastern Latakia, and western Aleppo province.⁷²⁶

711 CIA World Factbook, Syria, last updated: 20 February 2020, url

712 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 6

713 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 43

714 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 15

715 USDOS, Syria 2018 International Religious Freedom Report, 21 June 2019, url, p. 4

716 Al Masdar News, Syrian Christians hold mass in Mhardeh town as life in north Hama gradually normalizes, 8 May 2017, url

717 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Governorates Profile, June 2014, url, p. 16

718 ABC News, Syrian Crackdown Kills Hundreds in Hama, 3 August 2011, url

719 Washington Post (The), Syrian tanks storm protest epicentre of Hama, 31 July 2011, url

720 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 43

721 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 43

722 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Governorates Profile, June 2014, url, p. 16

723 World Bank (The), Syria Damage Assessment: of selected cities Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, March 2017, url, p. 12

724 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Governorates Profile, June 2014, url, p. 16

725 World Bank (The), Syria Damage Assessment: of selected cities Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, March 2017, url, p. 12

726 Al Jazeera, Syria’s ‘de-escalation zones’ explained, 4 July 2017, url

2.3.2.1 The Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

According to Gregory Waters, the following SAA units divisions were deployed in Hama governorate with the name of the unit and the last known date of deployment, as of 17 March 2020:

Republican Guard:

 Unknown unit – Masasna – 3 March 2019;

 1421^st Battalion – Hama province – 9 August 2019;

4^th Division:

 555^th Regiment/48^th Battalion – Kafr Nabouda – 10 May 2019;

 555^th Regiment/Unknown Battalion – Kernaz – 13 January 2019;

1^st Corps:

 15^th Special Forces Division: 15^th Division/Unknown unit – Hobait – 14 August 2019;

 5^th Division: 15^th Brigade/852^nd Battalion – Hama province – 22 July 2019;

 7^th Division: 76^th Battalion – Qusabiyah – 11 June 2019; 79^th Battalion – Tel Malah – 24 June 2019; 84^th Battalion – Hama province – 26 June 2019; 78^th Brigade/85^th Battalion – Hama province – 13 June 2019; 121^st Brigade/225^th Battalion – Qusabiyah – 21 July 2019;

 9^th Division: 33^rd Brigade – Tel Malah – 2 August 2019; 43^rd Brigade – Hama province – 13 May 2019; 43^rd Brigade/103^rd Battalion – Hama province – 4 February 2019; 89th Brigade/109th Artillery Battalion – Hama Province – 5 September 2019;

2^nd Corps:

 1^st Division: 141^st Artillery Regiment – Hama province – 26 January 2019; 167^th Regiment – Hama province – 23 November 2019; 61^st Brigade/326^th Artillery Battalion – Hama province – 14 March 2019;

 10 Division: 85^th Brigade – Hama province – 25 April 2019;

3^rd Corps

 8^th Division: 45^th Brigade – Jurin – 14 October 2019;

 11^th Division: 60^th Brigade/unknown unit – Hama province – 19 June 2019; 87^th Brigade – Masasna – 3 March 2019;

4^th Corps

 6^th Division: 88^th Brigade – Sahl Al-Ghab – 1 March 2020;

5^th Corps

 1^st Brigade/unknown unit – Hama province – 13 August 2019;

 2^nd Brigade – Zaliqiyat – 1 August 2019.⁷²⁷

Al-Modon, in an article published on 15 May 2019, also referred to the deployment of the 5^th Corps, the 1^st Division, the 11^th Division, the 9^th Division, and 79^th Battalion in Hama governorate.⁷²⁸

According to Gregory Waters, north Hama constituted the core territory of the Tiger Forces. Some of the sub-groups present in Hama governorate were the Taha Regiment (which was from Sahl Al-Ghab), Sheikh Mubarak Regiment (on the Abu Dali axis), the Tarmeh Regiment (outside its hometown of Qomhana), Sahabat Regiment (near the town of Kawkab), and the Hawareth Regiment (in Sahl

727 Waters, G., Current Syrian Army Deployments, International Review, 13 December 2019, url

728 Al-Modon, اهطيحم و بلدا تاهبج يف يركسعلا راشتنلاا ةطيرخ [Map of military deployments on Idlib Fronts and the Adjacent Parts], 15 May 2019, url

Ghab).⁷²⁹ Al-Modon stated that the Tiger Forces came second in terms of density and deployment in Hama governorate. The source mentioned the following regiments that maintained a presence in the governorate: Tarmeh, Hawashem, Elite, and Hawareth.⁷³⁰

In addition to the Tiger Forces, sources referred to the presence of Al-Ghawar militia (which is allegedly affiliated with the 4^th Division)⁷³¹, the NDF, and Al-Quds Brigade in rural Hama.⁷³²

In an interview with EASO on 14 November 2019, Christopher Kozak, senior analyst at ISW, assessed that the Syrian Coast, western Homs and Hama governorates have one of the densest concentrations of pro-GoS paramilitary groups in Syria, often to the detriment of the SAA.⁷³³

2.3.2.2 Anti-government armed groups

In an article dated 15 May 2019, Al-Modon stated that the National Liberation Front (NFL) was widely present in northern Hama, with Ahrar Al-Sham being the dominant group. Other Jihadist groups participated in the fighting in northern Hama albeit they did not maintain bases in the area. Such groups included Ansar Al-Din, and the Turkistan Islamic Party. Moreover, HTS was involved in the battles in northern Hama as well.⁷³⁴ On 22 May 2019, BBC reported that HTS seized key areas in norther Hama from NLF in the wake of renewed infighting between the two groups.⁷³⁵ Furthermore, Katibat Al-Tawhid wal Jihad (Battalion of Monotheism and Jihad, KTJ) which is constituted of foreign fighters from central Asia joined HTS in 2015.⁷³⁶ According to the UN Security Council report of 15 July 2019, KTJ operated in Hama governorate and the number of its fighters grew to 500, between 30 and 40 of which were Uzbeks.⁷³⁷

Another localised anti-GoS armed group - Jaysh al-Izza - was based in northern Hama province and cooperated with HTS. Their home territory was captured by the GoS forces during the April – August 2019 offensive, and the group lost up to 70 % of its combat power and was pushed up into southern Idlib.⁷³⁸

2.3.2.3 ISIL

The Carter Center stated that ‘ISIS or affiliated fighters continue to affect the security environment in areas formerly controlled by the group’, which include Hama Desert. The review added that ‘steady, low-level activity continued to be recorded after Syrian forces became dominant in the area’.⁷³⁹ Moreover, Al-Masdar News reported in November 2019 that clashes broke between Syrian Internal Security and ISIL militants in the eastern countryside of Hama.⁷⁴⁰

729 Waters, G., Understanding Syria’s Military Deployments in Idlib, International Review, 10 March 2019, url

730 Al-Modon, اهطيحم و بلدا تاهبج يف يركسعلا راشتنلاا ةطيرخ [Map of military deployments on Idlib Fronts and the Adjacent Parts], 15 May 2019, url

731 Jorf News, ماظنلا ظفح ةبيتك مهعم و نيرخآ اطابض و ةط رشلا يف اديمع سرأت "راوغلا تاوق" ايشيليم ..ةامح ةيداب يف [In Hama Desert.. “Al-Ghwar Forces” Militia Abducts a Police Brigadier General, Other Officers, and a Crowd Control Battalion], 17 November 2019, url

732 Al-Modon, اهطيحم و بلدا تاهبج يف يركسعلا راشتنلاا ةطيرخ [Map of military deployments on Idlib Fronts and the Adjacent Parts], 15 May 2019, url

733 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019

734 Al-Modon, اهطيحم و بلدا تاهبج يف يركسعلا راشتنلاا ةطيرخ [Map of military deployments on Idlib Fronts and the Adjacent Parts], 15 May 2019, url

735 BBC News, Syria group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and al-Qaeda legacy, 22 May 2019, url

736 Shaam, لماك لكشب ةصرنلا ةهبجل اهمامضنا نلعت داهجلا و ديحوتلا ةبيتك [KTJ announces its complete joining of HTS], 30 September 2015, url

737 UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 July 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, 15 July 2019, url, p. 14

738 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019

739 Carter Center (The), A Review of ISIS in Syria: 2016 – 2019, March 2019, url, p. 7

740 Al-Masdar News, ISIS reemerges in east Hama after 2017 defeat by Syrian Army, 17 November 2019, url

2.3.2.4 Russia

While official information about the Russian military presence in Syria was publicly available, e.g. on the Kremlin website⁷⁴¹, sources tended to rely on social media posts to prove that Russian soldiers are actually deployed on the ground. The news website Noon Post shared photos, from various sources, of Russian soldiers reportedly in Hama governorate.⁷⁴² Moreover, based on analysis of social media posts, Gregory Waters stated that ‘Russians have been pictured alongside SAA units in the region at least four times this year [2019]’.⁷⁴³

2.3.2.5 Iran

In a report dated December 2018, SOHR stated that more than 15 vehicles carrying equipment and Iranian fighters arrived in northern Hama. Reportedly, the convoy reached its final destinations in Rahbat Khattab, the area south of Zaliqiyat, and the vicinity of Marzaf.⁷⁴⁴ On 4 June 2019, the Syrian platform SY24, shared a list of the prominent locations in Hama governorate in which Iranian militias are allegedly deployed. The list included locations in Misyaf, az-Zawiya, Ma’rin Mount, Shalyout village, Qomhana, and Salamiya. The source also referred to the existence of recruitment offices recruiting young men into militias affiliated with the IRGC.⁷⁴⁵

2.3.2.6 Israel

SANA, and other sources reported on several Israeli airstrikes during 2019 that targeted positions in Hama governorate, such as Misyaf and Hama airfield.⁷⁴⁶