Conflict background and armed actors

The city of Latakia has been a stronghold for the Alawites and the Assad family.¹¹³⁷ Since the spring of 2012, Jabal Al-Akrad in the north-east, bordering Idlib governorate and Turkey, had been a rebel stronghold, according to Fabrice Balanche.¹¹³⁸

1127 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic Governorates Profile (June 2014), June 2014, url, p. 19

1128 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic – Lattakia [map], 2017, url

1129 Izady, M., Syria: Ethnic Shift, 2010-mid 2018 (approximation), 2018-19, Atlas of the Islamic World and Vicinity [map], url

1130 Balanche, F., Latakia is Assad’s Achilles Heel, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 23 September 2015, url

1131 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, url

1132 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source: WFP], December 2020, url, pp. 5, 38

1133 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 23

1134 Times (The), Tehran eyes vital Syrian port of Latakia as gateway to Mediterranean, 18 March 2019, url

1135 World Port Source, Port of Lattakia, 2021 (n.d.), url

1136 FAO/WFP, Special Report, FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, 5 September 2019, url, pp. 21, 37

1137 L’Orient le Jour, Iran gains a foothold in Latakia, 26 March 2019, url

1138 Balanche, F., Latakia is Assad’s Achilles Heel, 23 September 2015, url

In an article for the International Review, analyst Gregory Waters stated that rebel forces had kept a foothold in Latakia for nearly the entire length of the civil war in Syria, creating a frontline in the mountains. In August 2016 the small mountain town of Kabani was seized by rebels. Strategically Kabani was of significance to the rebels’ defence of their gains in Idlib governorate further to the east, according to Waters. The SAA started a counterattack shortly after the rebels had taken over Kabani, meanwhile the rebel forces made other gains along the 30 km frontline. A new government offensive was launched in April 2019, also this one without decisive results. Attacks and counter attacks followed during the rest of 2019.¹¹³⁹

As of March 2021, Latakia governorate was under control was under GoS control except a strip along the Turkish border and the border to Idlib governorate which was under anti-GoS armed groups.¹¹⁴⁰ (see also Map 4).

According to ACLED’s control map for Syria for the third and fourth quarters of 2020, the governorate was under government control. Except for the two northern subdistricts Rabeea and Qastal Maaf which were marked as ‘active’, the remaining subdistricts were marked as ‘inactive’.¹¹⁴¹

Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

State military forces of Syria and other countries, paramilitary forces supporting the GoS, and rebel forces, have been present in the governorate. Since 2013, when the GoS managed to isolate rebel strongholds to the mountain areas, there had been no need for it to permanently deploy troops on any massive scale in the governorate, the ISW stated. The population of loyalist paramilitary fighters already existed there. The ISW also pointed to the largely Alawite and Christian populations, the GoS’

reliable security apparatus, and the presence of paramilitary forces supporting the GoS forces there, as reasons for the relative stability of the governorate.¹¹⁴²

Units of the SAA were reported to be present in Latakia governorate in early March 2020. For deployments of the SAA in Latakia governorate as of 3 April 2020 see the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020).

The SAA’s Republican Guard together with the 4^th Division reportedly led an attack on positions in Kabani and Sirimaniyah held by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), in July 2020. The two army units also fired at opposition group positions in the Al-Ghaab Plain and Jabal Al-Zawiya region.¹¹⁴³

In an October 2020 interview with DIS, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, stated that Shabiha, government-affiliated armed groups, were present across the governorate, and was assisting the government in maintaining security.¹¹⁴⁴

Foreign state forces and affiliated groups

The Russian air force has acquired its own airbase in Latakia¹¹⁴⁵ in Hmeimim.¹¹⁴⁶ The Russian air force conducts expeditionary operations to support the GoS.¹¹⁴⁷ Deutsche Welle reported in May 2020 that Russia had called for talks with the Syrian government, aiming to expand its airbase as well as its naval

1139 Waters, G., Battle of Kabani: A Rare Defeat for the Syrian Army in 2019, International Review, 6 January 2020, url

1140 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap, Syria, 26 March 2021, url

1141 ACLED, The State of Syria: Q3 2020 – Q4 2020, 22 February 2021, url

1142 ISW, Regime regains ground on the coast, 22 August 2013, url

1143 Geopolitics News, Syrian Army launches heavy attack on jihadist strongholds in Latakia, 3 July 2020, url

1144 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:

Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p. 8

1145 EPRS, Russia in the Middle East, From side lines to centre stage, November 2018, url, p. 5

1146 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, October 2020, url, p. 11; Al Jazeera, The battle for Syria's Idlib explained in 400 words, 12 February 2020, url

1147 Borshchevskaya, A., Shifting Landscape, Russia’s military role in the Middle East, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2019, url, p. 7

base in Tartous.¹¹⁴⁸ Security analyst Joseph Trevithick posted satellite images purportedly showing works undertaken to extend a runway at the airbase, in a February 2021 article on The Drive/The WarZone, a website providing information about security and military issues.¹¹⁴⁹

Asharq Al-Awsat reported in January 2021 that Turkish forces had set up a new military post in Jabal Al-Akrad.¹¹⁵⁰

Syria analyst Gregory Waters indicated in a January 2020 article about the battle for Kabani, that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), was present in the governorate.¹¹⁵¹ Analyst Navvar Saban at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies stated that Iran had organised militias manned by Syrian Shias recruited from various areas of the country. One of these militias, the Al-Mukhtar Al-Thaqafi Brigade, was operating in Latakia.¹¹⁵²According to Jusoor, an NGO, Russia had three bases and military posts in Latakia, Iran six posts and bases, and Turkey two posts in the form of roadblocks.¹¹⁵³

Anti-GoS armed groups

Reuters news agency reported in 2019 about rebel positions in the Kubayna Mountains.¹¹⁵⁴ The Beirut-based news outlet Al-Masdar News mentioned in October 2019 that jihadists were holding on to positions in the Kabani area, while being attacked by the Syrian air force.¹¹⁵⁵ Al-Masdar News reported in another posting in September 2019 that jihadists had taken over Atterah town in the Turkmen mountains.¹¹⁵⁶ A map of control areas provided by the map service PoliticalGeographyNow indicated HTS presence in Kabani in July 2020.¹¹⁵⁷

Bellingcat, an independent collective of researchers who use open sources and social media to track armed conflicts, reported that Turkmen militias, who received limited Turkish support, were operating in Latakia governorate. These groups had an agenda of Islam, Turkism and nationalism. They have been fighting to hold areas traditionally considered to be Turkmen, as well as against the Syrian government. They were small groups, the most notable being the Second Coastal Division, a Turkmen group which also includes Arabs. Most Turkmen groups in Latakia are part of the Second Coastal Division. They could number up to 1 000 fighters, and were gaining growing support from Turkey.

Another Turkmen group operating in Latakia, the Sultan Abdulhamid Han brigade, counts around 50 fighters, Bellingcat reported in February 2019.¹¹⁵⁸ The International Business Times reported in July 2020 about positions held by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) inside Kabani town.¹¹⁵⁹

Ethnic Turkoman and Uyghur militant groups in particular were present in the Kabani mountains, the DIS reported in October 2020.¹¹⁶⁰ The Carter Center reported in March 2021 on the Fatah Al-Mubin Operations Room, a coalition of armed groups including Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, the Turkish-backed opposition National Liberation Front, and Jaysh Al-Izza, having attacked GoS soldiers near Kabani.¹¹⁶¹

1148 DW, Russia aims to boost military facilities in Syria, 30 May 2020, url

1149 Trevithick, J., Russia Is Extending One Of The Runways At Its Syrian Airbase, 5 February 2021, the Drive/The WarZone, url

1150Asharq Al-Awsat, ايروس برغ لامش» ةيذلاوف اعرد« رشني كرتلا شيجلا [Turkish army creates 'steel shield' in northwestern Syria], 28 January 2021, url

1151 Waters, G., Battle for Kabani: A Rare Defeat for the Syrian Army in 2019, International Review, 6 January 2020, url

1152 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url

1153 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url

1154 Reuters, Oppositions say Syrian army fails to retake Latakia mountain, 19 May 2019, url

1155 Al Masdar News, Eight Syrian choppers swarm jihadist stronghold in northeast Latakia, 12 October 2019, url

1156 Al Masdar News, Jihadists capture first town in northern Latakia, Syrian Air Force enters battle, 9 July 2019, url

1157 Political Geography Now, Syria Control Map & Report: Frontlines Stable - July 2020, url

1158 Bellingcat, Syrian Turkmen Groups in Latakia: An Overview, 7 February 2019, url

1159 International Business Times, Syria's New Russian MiG 29 Unleash Hellfire on Turkey-backed Chinese Uyghur Muslim Militants, 4 June 2020, url

1160 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:

Omran Studies], December 2020, url, p. 8

1161 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary, 15-21 March 2021, 24 March 2021, url