Conflict background and armed actors

The central parts of Raqqa governorate are under the control of the Kurdish-dominated SDF. The GoS and its allies control the southern parts of the governorate.¹⁷⁸⁸ As the result of the Turkish military incursion in October 2019¹⁷⁸⁹, the GoS forces and/or their Russian allies have been present along the

1776 Dukhan, H. et al., The Kin Who Count: Mapping Raqqa’s Tribal Topology, Midde East Institute, 24 March 2021, url

1777 Dukhan, H. et al., The Kin Who Count: Mapping Raqqa’s Tribal Topology, MEI, 24 March 2021, url

1778 See, for example, Cockburn, P., After IS, LRB Vol. 43 No. 3, 4 February 2021, url; Mogelson, L., America’s Abandonment of Syria, The New Yorker, 20 April 2020, url; Sly, L. & Martins, A., The former ‘caliphate capital’ is haunted by fears of an ISIS comeback, The Washington Post, 22 May 2020, url

1779 COAR, Syria in 2021: Forecast for a Protracted Crisis, 28 January 2021, url, p. 13

1780 Kalo, R. & Kajjo, S., Rebuilding Efforts Continue in Syria’s Former IS Stronghold, VOA, 3 March 2021, url

1781 Al-Omar, H., Al-Raqqa: over a decade of the Syrian revolution, Enab Baladi, 29 March 2021, url

1782 Sly, L. & Martins, A., The former ‘caliphate capital’ is haunted by fears of an ISIS comeback, The Washington Post, 22 May 2020, url

1783 Mogelson, L., America’s Abandonment of Syria, The New Yorker, 20 April 2020, url

1784 WFP, Syrian Arab Republic – mWAM Bulletin Issue no. 51: December 2020, 31 December 2020, url

1785 Information provided by Syria Report and cited in: Christou, W. & Advani, R., Damascus struggles to secure wheat supply amidst coronavirus crisis, Syria Direct, 18 May 2020, url; HRW, Syria: Bread Crisis Exposes Government Failure, 21 March 2021, url; Tsurkov, E. & Jukhada, Q., Kneel and Starve: Under the Watchful Eye of the Secret Police, Syrians Go Hungry, Newlines Institute, 9 February 2021, url

1786 FAO/WFP, Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, 18 July 2017, url, p. 25

1787 EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 146-148

1788 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021], url; Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]

1789 For further information on the October 2019 Turkish incursion, see EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url

main roads¹⁷⁹⁰ in the SDF-controlled areas and in the frontlines¹⁷⁹¹ separating the SDF-controlled parts of Raqqa from the Turkish-controlled area in northern Raqqa governorate. Since October 2019, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian armed groups operating under the umbrella of the so-called ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA) have been in control of most of the territory north of M4 highway in northern Raqqa governorate, including the border town of Tall Abyad and its surroundings and the district of Suluk.¹⁷⁹² Along with an adjoining territory of roughly equal size in northern Hasaka governorate (see Section 2.7.2), this area constitutes the so-called Operation Peace Spring area.

During the reference period for this report, the security situation in Raqqa governorate has been affected by ISIL’s growing insurgency. In 2020, ISIL’s activities increased especially in the GoS-controlled southern parts of Raqqa governorate. However, in early 2021, ISIL’s attacks increased also in the SDF-controlled parts of the governorate (see Section ISIL’s resurgence in Raqqa governorate below). In addition, there have been reports of recurrent shelling and armed clashes between the Turkish forces/ Turkish-backed armed groups and the SDF along the frontlines between the Operation Peace Spring area and the SDF-controlled areas in Hasaka and Raqqa governorates (for Raqqa, see Section The conflict between the SDF and the Turkish forces (Ayn Issa frontline), for Hasaka, Section The conflict between the SDF and the Turkish forces).

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

As already stated above, the central parts of Raqqa governorate are under the control of the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The structure of the SDF is discussed in Section 1.4.3 Syrian Democratic Forces.

The US-led Coalition

The information concerning the US-led Coalitions military presence in Raqqa governorate is ambiguous. On the one hand, conflict maps by USDOD¹⁷⁹³ and several other sources¹⁷⁹⁴ show that the US has no military sites in the governorate and it is the US-led Coalition’s position that Coalition forces operating in north-east Syria have ‘limited their ground movements’ to Hasaka and Deir ez-Zor governorates.¹⁷⁹⁵ On the other, Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021 contains information on 2 US military sites in Raqqa governorate: one immediately to the west and one immediately to the east/north-east of Raqqa city.¹⁷⁹⁶ The continued presence of US military bases in (SDF-controlled parts of) Raqqa governorate is also noted by media sources.¹⁷⁹⁷

1790 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url;

Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url

1791 Based on reading of maps in Balanche, F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10 February 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]

1792 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021], url; Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 3; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]

1793 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–

December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56

1794 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url;

Kemal, L., Suriye'de YPG bölgesindeki Rus ve ABD üsleri sayıları [Map] [Twitter], 1 March 2021, url

1795 USDoD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–

March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, pp. 61-62

1796 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url

1797 AA, US continues to reinforce military bases in Syria, 26 September 2020, url; Baladi, US building new military bases in Syria’s Raqqa amid Russian expansion, 26 May 2020, url;

Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

As already stated above, the GoS and its allies control the southern parts of Raqqa governorate and are also present in the SDF-controlled parts of the governorate (the main roads and the frontlines between the SDF-controlled and the Turkish-controlled areas).

According to the USDOD report of August 2020, the number of SAA and affiliated armed groups personnel deployed in SDF-controlled governorates of Hasaka and Raqqa after October 2019 ranges between 4 000 and 10 000. It is also stated that the GoS has increased its recruitment efforts among the locals to strengthen its ranks.¹⁷⁹⁸ Since late 2020, the GoS forces have increased their presence at the Ayn Issa frontline. The map on ‘The Complex Operating Environment of North-eastern Syria’ in the USDoD report of February 2021 notes the presence of GoS forces in the town of Ayn Issa and in Al-Tabqa.¹⁷⁹⁹ The GoS has reportedly controlled the Tabqa military air base since October 2019, although the city itself is in SDF control.¹⁸⁰⁰

See the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020) for more specific information on SAA formations deployed in Raqqa governorate as of March 2020.¹⁸⁰¹

Russia

The Russian forces are present in the GoS-controlled Raqqa governorate and, to a limited extent, in the SDF-controlled parts of the governorate.

According to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021, Russia has 7 military sites in Raqqa governorate: six north of the city of Raqqa (with three in the border area between Turkish-controlled and SDF-controlled areas and one immediately north of the city) and one in Al-Tabqa (in the district of Al-Thawrah).¹⁸⁰² According to a map by researcher Levent Kemal, Russia has 10 military sites in Raqqa governorate: Eight north of the city of Raqqa (with five along the border with Turkish-controlled areas), one north-east of Raqqa city and one in Al-Thawra.¹⁸⁰³ The information concerning the existence of a Russian military site north-east of Raqqa city represents the main difference between the two estimates.

Since late 2020, the Russian forces have increased their presence in the Ayn Issa frontline (see Section The conflict between the SDF and the Turkish forces (Ayn Issa frontline)). The map on ‘The Complex Operating Environment of North-eastern Syria’ in the USDoD report of February 2021 notes the presence of Russian forces south of Ayn Issa.¹⁸⁰⁴

Iran

According to a map published by the Atlantic Council and charting the influence of Iran and its militias in Syria in 2020, Iranian-backed armed groups control the town of Resafa in southern Raqqa governorate and have influence in the Euphrates river valley in the eastern part of the governorate, near the administrative border between Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor. The Iranian-backed groups are marked to have influence also along the main roads in GoS-controlled parts of the governorate. These include parts of the central road connecting Raqqa to Aleppo governorate to the west and Deir Ez-Zor governorate to the east and road connecting Tabqa (Madinat Ath-Thawrah) to Homs governorate. In

1798 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June 30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 51

1799 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–

December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56

1800 Kalo, R. & Kajjo, S., Rebuilding Efforts Continue in Syria’s Former IS Stronghold, VOA, 3 March 2021, url

1801 EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 135–136

1802 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url

1803 Kemal, L., Suriye'de YPG bölgesindeki Rus ve ABD üsleri sayıları [Map] [Twitter], 1 March 2021, url

1804 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–

December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56

addition, Iranian-backed armed groups are depicted to have a pocket of influence in Ayn Issa area, bordering the Operation Peace Spring area controlled by Turkey and its affiliates.¹⁸⁰⁵ According to an analysis by Haian Dukhan and Ammar Alhamad, Iran has provided support to tribal militias in Raqqa governorate in order to gain influence in the governorate.¹⁸⁰⁶

Turkey and affiliated armed groups

According to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021, Turkey has 9 military sites in the western half of Operation Peace Spring area, three in and around the town of Tall Abyad, two in Suluk subdistrict and four north of Ayn Issa, near the M4 highway and the frontline with the SDF.¹⁸⁰⁷ According to researcher Khayrallah al-Hilu, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) are positioned in the town of Tall Abyad (three positions) and in the military bases in Karmazah and Bir Asheq. In addition, TAF has barracks in the area and operates several observation posts located along the M4 highway. Although Turkish intelligence services are present in Tall Abyad area, their direct involvement in detecting and suppressing the opposition to Turkish rule is considered rare since Turkey utilises the SNA in this role.¹⁸⁰⁸

According to al-Hilu, the town of Tall Abyad, the main population centre of the western half of Operation Peace Spring area, is controlled by the Third Corps of the ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA).¹⁸⁰⁹ According to Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, the formations of SNA’s Third Corps are mainly affiliated to Jabhat al-Shamiya (‘the Shami Front’/’the Levant Front’).¹⁸¹⁰ The STJ report of March 2021 names Jabhat al-Shamiya, Faylaq al-Majd and Ahrar al-Sharqiya as the Turkish-backed groups in control of Tall Abyad. Other SNA groups are also present in the area in limited numbers.¹⁸¹¹

ISIL

ISIL has a presence in GoS-controlled southern Raqqa governorate.¹⁸¹² According to March 2021 analysis by ISW, ISIL controls small patch of territory ‘east of Resafa, overlooking Tabqa air Base (in Thawra district).¹⁸¹³

According to Gregory Waters’ analysis published in August 2020, the estimates concerning the number of ISIS fighters operating in the Badia desert region (in western Deir Ez-Zor, northern Homs and southern Raqqa governorates) vary between 1 000 and 1 800 fighters. Based on the information provided by an NDF officer and confirmed by SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Kobane Abdi, Waters states that ‘these fighters are organized into 15 to 20 active groups’ and notes that ‘approximately 70 % of all fighters [are] located in the urban belt along the western side of the Euphrates.’¹⁸¹⁴ In an analysis published in February 2021 analysis, Waters’ notes that, in 2020, ISIL utilised its presence in Raqqa to conduct attacks also in other Syrian governorates (e.g. Hama).¹⁸¹⁵

1805 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url

1806 Dukhan, H. & Alhamad, A., Iran’s Growing Network of Influence among Eastern Syrian Tribes, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy/ Fikra Forum, 6 April 2021, url

1807 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url

1808 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 4 [cf. map on p. 5]

1809 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 8

1810 Al-Tamimi, A. J., The Structure of the Syrian National Army, 21 November 2019, url

1811 Syrians for Truth and Justice, Syria: Crops Looted, Lands Seized in “Peace Spring” Territories, 11 March 2021, url, p. 4

1812 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021], url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]; Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 19 August 2020, url

1813 Kahan, E., ISIS Poised for a Ramadan Surge in Syria, ISW, 9 March 2021, url

1814 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 19 August 2020, url

1815 Waters G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url

Besides the GoS-controlled areas, ISIL has also conducted attacks in SDF-controlled parts of Raqqa governorate during the reference period of this report (see Section ISIL’s resurgence in Raqqa governorate). According to Patrick Cockburn, ISIL ‘rules’ by night in ‘parts of the countryside around’

Raqqa¹⁸¹⁶, nominally under the control of the SDF. This presence of ISIL in SDF-controlled areas and the targeting¹⁸¹⁷ of SDF’s members and associates as well as secular and non-practicing locals is discussed further below, in the context of Deir Ez-Zor governorate (see Section ISIL’s insurgency in Deir Ez-Zor).