Union responses

union accused the Tobacco Monopoly of selling imported goods at greater discounts than domestically produced ones.⁷⁴

In the summer of 1921, the union increased its efforts to influence decision makers and persuade them take actions to “[…] mitigate the unemployment and its consequences”.⁷⁵ Sigfrid Hansson, a Member of Parliament and editor of the LO journal Fackföreningsrörelsen, was invited to a conference where the precarious situation in the cigar branch was discussed by union leaders and representatives from some local branches.⁷⁶ The conference also sent a delegation to meet the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Hjalmar Branting and his colleague Per-Albin Hansson. The two dignitaries are reported to have been receptive to the arguments of the union representatives. It is said that Branting and Hansson found the union’s demands “[…] very moderate and thought it was highly remarkable that the company board did not take them into consideration”.⁷⁷ It is also said that Branting had taken the names of all the members of the company board and promised to take up the matter with the party board and inform the government.⁷⁸ If the company board did not listen, he saw the possibility to bring the matter to Parliament and then it “[…] could become rather unpleasant for the monopoly”, as paraphrased in the minutes.⁷⁹ A couple of days later Wallenberg gave an assurance that the gradual workforce reductions associated with mechanization would be “carefully studied and considered” and that no significant layoffs would be implemented during the coming months.⁸⁰ The union board then called off further actions for the time being.

74 One member of the union board registered a reservation against this statement. He argued that this was propaganda that only served the interests of the tobacco dealers. The reason why the Tobacco Monopoly sold imported cigars more cheaply than domestic ones was apparently the parallel import.

If the company had used a higher price, the tobacco dealers could have turned to private importers.

ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 4, 22 April 1921.

75 Swedish: “[…] mildra arbetslösheten och dess konsekvenser.” ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 4, 7 July 1921.

76 ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 4, 30 July 1921.

77 Swedish: “[…] mycket moderata och fann det högst märkvärdigt om icke monopolstyrelsen skulle taga någon hänsyn till desamma”. ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 4, 28 July 1921.

78 Sweden was at the time administered by a caretaker government, lead by the Liberal Louis de Geer.

79 Swedish: “[…] kunde bliva rätt så obehagligt för monopolet.” ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 4, 28 July 1921.

80 ARAB, STF, Inkomna skrivelser, E01: 10, 30 July 1921.

An important channel of information and influence for the Tobacco Workers’ Union was the Social Democratic representative on the company board. Nilsson often attended meetings of the union board or the executive committee where he provided information about considerations made on the company board. Nilsson also listened to the union views and encouraged the union’s protectionist tendencies. At a meeting in the fall of 1921, he reported that the sales of imported tobacco goods had increased from 19 to 44 percent during that year and that he had made government representatives aware of this development.⁸¹ By that time, the Social Democrats had formed a minority government and Branting is said to have been prepared to raise taxes on products from countries with low-valued currency. Nilsson also urged the Tobacco Workers’ Union to contact the Prime Minister in the same matter. Such a petition was made but without success.⁸² The Minister of Finance, Fredrik Vilhelm Thorsson, regarded import taxation a useless tool since the difference in labour costs was so great between countries. Thorsson also saw a political danger in accepting the union’s proposal as both consumers and representatives of other industries would become dissatisfied. The consumers would complain over high prices and the other industries would demand the same protection as the tobacco industry.

5.5.2 Direct state management

Another issue that was connected to downsizing and import competition was whether the Tobacco Monopoly should be run directly by the state. Although positive to the idea of nationalizing the industry in principle, the Tobacco Workers’ Union opposed the inclusion of private interests in the company. This opposition against what was described as “[…] a capitalist company with certain state interests” remained,⁸³ and the union demanded direct state management in its contacts with politicians on several occasions. One of the main reasons for this was to obtain the same employment protection as civil servants.⁸⁴ This was clearly expressed by a delegate at the congress in 1928 who had “[…] never

81 ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 4, 1 November 1921.

82 ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 4, 22-23 November 1921; ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 4, 10 December 1921.

83 Swedish: “[…] ett kapitalistiskt bolag med vissa statsintressen”. ARAB, STF, Kongressprotokoll, A01, 1918, p 7.

84 ARAB, STF, Kongressprotokoll, A01, 1918, p 7-8; ARAB, STF, Kongressprotokoll, A01, 1923, p 25; ARAB, STF, Kongressprotokoll, A01, 1928, pp 23-24.

heard about a state company dismissing senior workers.”⁸⁵ It was also thought that a monopoly directly run by the state would be more efficient in restricting import competition.

A significant minority of the workers gradually came to accept the monopoly as it was. Interestingly, one of the representatives for this minority was the chairman himself, who had been objecting to direct state management since 1915 or before.⁸⁶ At the congress of 1923, when the issue was discussed intensely because of the coming renewal of the charter, Kindstrand argued that direct state management could imply decreased union influence over wages and other employment conditions and an increased dependence on political conjectures. This time he had to make way for the majority. When the issue came up at the following congress, in 1928, the union board thought it fruitless to actively strive for direct state management since it could not get support from LO and the Social Democratic Party.⁸⁷ The congress decided to stick with the opinion that the tobacco industry should be directly run by the state, but not to make any real efforts to convince the political decision makers. Instead, the congress decided to demand direct representation on the monopoly board. One explicit motivation for this standpoint was that a representative on the board could safeguard the workers’ interests in personnel reductions.

The union demand for direct board representation was not accepted by the government, but when the Tobacco Monopoly’s stock of shares was increased in 1931 the Minister of Finance turned to LO with an inquiry about suitable shareholders. The chairman of the Tobacco Workers’ Union became the holder of shares in the Tobacco Monopoly and the union gained access to the annual meeting of shareholders.⁸⁸ It is doubtful whether this had any direct influence on the remaining personnel reductions in the 1930s.⁸⁹

85 Swedish: ”[…] aldrig hört att statliga företag avskeda äldre arbetare.” ARAB, STF, Kongressprotokoll, A01, 1928, p 24.

86 ARAB, STF, Kongressprotokoll, A01, 1923, p 24.

87 A representative from LO was present at the congress in 1923 and discouraged the tobacco workers from continuing to demand direct state management. He argued that the conflicts between employer and workers should remain in an enterprise directly run by the state and emphasized that the tobacco workers had relatively high wages. ARAB, STF, Kongressprotokoll, A01, 1923, p 24. See also ARAB, STF, Kongressprotokoll, A01, 1928, p 24.

88 Lindbom & Kuhm 1940, pp 281-282.

89 The minutes from the annual meetings of shareholders were not available when preparing this study.

5.5.3 The union and the machines

When studying the Tobacco Workers’ Union in the inter-war era, it is striking how accepting the organization was of technological change. The union demanded compensation for costs associated with the introduction of machines, but did not try to stop the development. The union’s acceptance was certainly not of the embracing kind. In his introductory speech at the congress of 1923, Kindstrand established that the machines had devalued traditional skills. When opening the congress five years later, he declared that “mechanization has been a phenomenon of good and evil. Great unemployment has followed its paths.”⁹⁰ However, the solution was not to combat the development but to alleviate the negative consequences thereof.

There are several examples of the union leaders clearly taking a stand against those hostile to technological change. When a group of male cigar makers were about to be laid off due to mechanization in 1927, a member of the executive committee suggested that all possible measures, including a strike, should be considered to protect the jobs.⁹¹ On this occasion, Eliasson immediately responded that a strike was out of the question since technological change could not be stopped. Another initiative to save the redundant male workers was to put forward a bill to Parliament, via the Social Democratic Party, with demands to strengthen the employment security of the tobacco workers.

What this demand meant in practice was not made clear. The executive committee thought it was about forcing the Tobacco Monopoly to stick to old methods of production, an idea that the union leaders considered highly unrealistic.⁹² For the union leaders, technological change was something unavoidable; a movement that ultimately depended on the efforts of technicians and engineers, not on the management of the Tobacco Monopoly.⁹³ Therefore, the priority was to make sure that redundant workers were generously compensated. After the actual downsizing process had ended, discussions about how to compensate remaining workers for the increased work intensity became more central.⁹⁴ Towards the latter part of the 1930s, paid vacation became a

90 Swedish: ”Mekaniseringen har varit en företeelse på gott och ont. Stor arbetslöshet har följt densamma i spåren.” ARAB, STF, Kongressprotokoll, A01, 1928, p 3.

91 ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 5, 29 January 1927.

92 ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 5, 13-15 July 1927.

93 ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 6, 7-8 April 1931.

94 ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 6, 12 April 1932.

prominent union demand motivated by the higher pace brought about by the machines.

One could suspect that the acceptance of technological change was greater among the union leaders than among the rank-and-file. There is some evidence pointing in this direction. In August 1921, the local branch in Malmö made a statement in which it condemned the management’s plans to mechanize production, considering the depressed state of the labour market.⁹⁵ However, the section wanted to postpone changes, rather than to stop them permanently.⁹⁶ Ten years later, the Malmö branch motioned to the annual meeting of the union board to pressure the Tobacco Monopoly for information on how far the rationalization measures would be taken.⁹⁷ The idea was rejected by the union board, with reference to the company’s contract with the state. The union leaders were well aware that the Tobacco Monopoly was bound to use the most efficient technology. Anyhow, the leadership did not think that the management was able to give the kind of information asked for by the Malmö branch.

It is likely that more evidence of a less accepting view on technological progress could be found if archives of the local union branches were systematically investigated. Still, it should be noted that tendencies to block mechanization did not appear at the union congresses. There was much less debate on the replacement of men by machines as such than on how to help the affected. The attitude of the Swedish tobacco workers seems to have differed from that of tobacco workers in some other countries. With regard to the United States, for example, it is told how hand cigar makers frequently refused to take service as machine operators.⁹⁸ The union of the Cuban cigar makers did not accept the introduction of machines in the industry until 1950.⁹⁹ After that, protests of independent cigar makers persuaded the Cuban president to prohibit the sale of machine made cigars in local markets.

95 ARAB, STF, Inkomna skrivelser, E01: 10, 10 August 1921.

96 The same idea was launched from the Stockholm branch in 1933. ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 6, 11 April 1933.

97 ARAB, STF, Styrelsens protokoll, A02: 6, 7-8 April 1931.

98 Manning & Byrne 1932, pp 3, 31.

99 Time: The Weekly News Magazine, 16 July 1951, “Men v. Machines”.