Sustaining Shadows : A Theory of Special Operations Logistics For Unconventional Warfare

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Självständigt arbete (30 hp)

Författare Program/Kurs

Daniel Vendel HOP 19-21

Handledare Antal ord: 19975

Dr. Niklas Nilsson Beteckning Kurskod

Självständigt arbete mastersuppsats, krigsvetenskap 2HO013

SUSTAINING SHADOWS: A THEORY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS LOGISTICS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Abstract:

Smaller states face conventional force strength asymmetry against larger states like Russia and, it is in their interest to find ways to mount an effective and multifaceted resistance. Being able to sustain operations on occupied territory against an occupying force could be one of these ways. These operations can be categorized as part of a state’s special operations capacity and furthermore sub-categorized as unconventional warfare. Military logistical theories are based primarily on logistical supply chains where the force largely has its own geographical control or dominance. However special operations in occupied or enemy controlled territory faces the challenge that the geographical area is controlled or dominated by the enemy, effectively blocking sustainment, the question then becomes: How can sustainment for a military force, operating in enemy controlled territory, be achieved?

The aim of this study is therefore to make a contribution to theoretical military logistic literature by conducting a theory developing study. This by deductively developing a tentative theoretical framework from existing theories of conventional military logistics combined with special operations theory. The framework is then tested in a qualitative multiple historical case study by using the cases as a testing ground for the theory.

The study concludes that the logistical options (methods) needed to sustain the unconventional force are determined by taking into account operational environmental factors such as geography, climate and enemy actions in order to achieve physical access and concealment for supplies. Together access, concealment and planned combat events influence the choice of logistical option or combination of options and as result a build-up time of supply levels is needed before sufficient sustainment is reached. Furthermore, this build-up time is always present no matter if the unconventional operation is planned or not. But, an advantage in force availability and execution exists when planning and preparing campaigns.

Keywords:

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

When I started my career in the Swedish Armed Forces I participated in many exercises where the units were supposedly cut off and stuck behind the enemy lines. Our standing orders in these situations were always the same: Continue armed resistance, engage targets of opportunity and find your way back to friendly forces if possible. These exercises usually had the goal of training each individual in pushing their physical and mental limits more than preparing us for an actual situation in fighting behind enemy lines. However, when participating in these exercises I was always struck with the question: Should we not have more logistic support than just grass, hard digested plants and whatever else was available?

1.2 Problem formulation

States like Sweden and other small countries face conventional force strength asymmetry when compared against larger states like Russia and, it is in their interest to find ways to mount an effective and multifaceted resistance. For example an ability to wage sustained operations on occupied territory against an occupying force might be one of these ways. This option in fighting against occupation is reinforced by Salum in his writing from Tartu Resistance Seminar (Salum 2018:48). Because, for a state facing threats from a stronger state it can, at face value, be concluded that parts of the smaller state’s territory will be occupied in the event of armed attack (Fiala 2019:18-19,32). Therefore, it is of importance for small states to know how to sustain operations in enemy occupied territory in order to be able to mount an effective resistance campaign. However, in order to be able to accomplish sustainment, we must understand why it is so difficult and what factors influence this difficulty.

Military logistics is a research field that attracts more and more interest and almost all scholars interested in the war sciences domain agree that military logistics is a crucial and necessary branch of warfare. Despite this, there is a surprising lack of research in logistics in regarding logistic theory (Kress 2016:vii). In addition most of the theoretical works are focused on the military logistics for conventional forces either on a national/military strategic level, Thorpe (2000), Eccles (1959), Sarin (2000) and Tuttle (2005) or more on conventional operations, Kress (2016) and Foxton (1994). These theoretical works are based primarily on the context

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where the logistical supply chain is largely geographically under own force’s control or dominance. Special operations in occupied or enemy controlled territory therefore face the challenge that the geographical area is controlled or dominated by the enemy and therefore the enemy effectively blocks sustainment. This blocking of sustainment results in an ever increasing Clausewiztian friction (Clausewitz 1991:80-81, Kress 2016:23), which has to be overcome to be able to conduct effective operations. Logistics is by its very nature complex (Kress 2016:2) and it becomes even more complex when there is an enemy effectively blocking the way.

Special operations are essential in every nation’s capacity to face threats and to accomplish specific and important goals on the battlefield. And special operations are, according to Tom Searle, all operations which are outside the parameters of conventional operations for which a nations conventional forces are designed (Searle 2017:17-18). Therefore, operations against an enemy state on occupied territory, also known as unconventional warfare1 (Fiala 2019:20), fall under the definition of a special operation, this as conventional forces in general are not designed for these kind of operations. Also, special operations are unique, they tend to be directed at military problems which have no standard solution and therefore have special demands attached to them that need to be met in order to succeed (McRaven 1995:2-3, Spulak 2007:23). This of course, also applies to the field of logistics that support these kind of operations.

Finally, there is a lack of scholarly studies studying the particular field of special operations logistics. Although contribution in this field has been made by Turbiville (2005) and Haddick (2016). But, these two authors do not present a theoretical foundation for which sustainment in occupied territory can be based; nor do they explain the connection between conventional logistics and special operations. Additionally Moshe Kress outlines some theoretical foundations for logistics in insurgency and counter insurgency warfare (Kress 2016:127,134). But, there is a gap in Kress’ theory since it does not contain organized unconventional or resistance operations directed by a state. There is thus a theoretical gap within special operations logistics from a state perspective in conducting unconventional operations that requires more academic inquiry.

1_{There is no commonly accepted academic definition of unconventional or irregular warfare, but the study’s}

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1.2.1 Research question

There are several questions that can be deduced from the above problem formulation. But, the main research question for the study is:

How can sustainment for a military force, operating in enemy controlled territory, be achieved?

1.2.2 Aim of the study

The aim of this study is therefore to make a contribution to theoretical military logistic literature by conducting a theory developing study. The study will therefore develop a new tentative theoretical framework from existing theories on conventional military logistics, with a strong foundation in Kress’ work, combined special operations theory. Also for the study to achieve credibility in an otherwise purely deductive theoretical reasoning exercise, the theory will be tested in a qualitative multiple historical case study to see if the theoretical concept actually holds its projected explanatory value.

1.3 Scope and Limitations

Even if it would be interesting for this study to examine all the intricate and important aspects of logistics and sustainment in unconventional warfare, such an undertaking would soon prove itself to be too extensive. An additional reason for not undertaking a full comprehensive study of sustainment in unconventional warfare is that the study is interested in one particular aspect namely: The perspective of the state sustaining and using unconventional warfare, on occupied territory, expected occupied territory or territory under belligerent domination, as a method in achieving its goals. Therefore, this study will not investigate insurgencies, expeditionary small wars or revolutionary wars. Furthermore, the study will not examine to what extent the sustainment of unconventional warfare contributed to strategic victory or not, it will only examine if sustainment was achieved and how. The reason for this limitation is both available space and time.

1.3.1 Sources and Literature

The study is based solely on literature studies and the theoretical framework proposed by the study is based on previous research published by other scholars. The data for the case study

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analysis is also literature based since the case study is conducted on historical cases. A deeper presentation and discussion of the merits of the literature can be found in the Research methodology section.

1.4 Main definitions

As in all studies a common language is used in order to understand what is actually being discussed. Therefore, this section will outline some definitions, in accordance with the literature, of the main concepts used throughout this study. The definitions covered in this sections are the main definitions that are needed for the reader to understand what is meant when the concepts are used in the following chapters.

1.4.1 Special Operations (SO)

Special Operations have two different definitions in the literature from different perspectives. The first perspective is to define special operations based on the units that usually conduct these special operations, and the other perspective is to define special operations in relation to ‘normal’ operations. Spulak argues for a definition from the first perspective (Spulak 2007). According to Spulak, special operations are defined by the unique attributes Special Operations Forces have in their small numbers. With these attributes special operations forces can overcome the amount of friction posed by an opponent in reaching their objectives (Spulak 2007:11-12). In other words the character of the special operation requires these special attributes for a successful conclusion. Spulak’s definition although very specific, risks leaving out operations that neither Special Operations Forces conduct nor those operations that conventional forces cannot conduct. Those kind of operations are not addressed in Spulak’s theory.

Searle (2017), on the other hand, states that in order for the theory to cover every military operation and to not leave anything outside the theory, the definition must be in relation to what is conventional. Thus, according to Searle, special operations are operations that fall within the military authority’s responsibility but, outside those operations that are considered to be the focus for conventional forces (Searle 2017:18). This definition leaves no gaps in either responsibility for special operations or its classification. It is therefore Searle’s definition that will be used in this study.

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1.4.2 Unconventional warfare (UW)

This is one of the hardest concepts to define and clarify. This, since throughout literature resistance, irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, guerilla warfare and insurgency are sometimes used interchangeably and refer to the same phenomenon and sometimes, they do not. Since this study focuses on nations faced with the risk of partial or full occupation of territory in the event of armed attack, it is important to have the nation’s perspective in focus in establishing a definition of unconventional warfare.

Firstly, irregular and unconventional by construction refers to being an opposite of something else namely, what is considered regular and conventional. Using Searle’s definition outlined above and referring to irregular and unconventional warfare to be the activities that falls inside the military authority’s responsibility but, outside the focus of conventional forces. Having said this, it should be remembered that irregular warfare and regular warfare are two different kinds of warfare that, exist in different realms since most wars contain elements of both (Käihko 2016, Smith 2003). If one insists in dividing warfare into these two categories then most wars become hybrid wars, since the belligerents frequently use conventional and unconventional methods of warfare simultaneously (Murray&Mansoor 2012:1-2). Furthermore, guerilla warfare is more like a tactic than a form of warfare with the purpose being to wear down the enemy by primarily attacking his will (Arreguín-Toft 2005:32-33).

Secondly, to be able to define what we mean by unconventional warfare through the perspective of a nation state, how the concept relates to resistance and insurgency needs to be investigated. Otto Fiala (2019) states in Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) that resistance is:

“A nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.” (Fiala 2019:xv)

Resistance is to be understood as all efforts violent or non-violent for a state to regain sovereignty of its territory which means all manners both regular and irregular. And this directly relates to hybrid wars. Fiala does not define irregular or unconventional warfare but refers instead to the U.S. definitions (Fiala 2019:4).

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The current U.S. definition of Irregular Warfare is: Operations and combat activities that in a non-regular manner either, support an insurgency against an occupier or a government or support a nation against an insurgency, resistance or terrorists (USJCS 2020:II-3). In working in support of a resistance or insurgency unconventional warfare is used as an operational method and is described as:

“UW is activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” (USJCS 2020:II-7).

As a result, the concepts now becomes a matter of perspective. According to Fiala, as mentioned above, resistance is the concept for a nation that has had its territory occupied partially or wholly. Therefore, in the eyes of the nation it conducts resistance against an occupier and in the eyes of the occupier the nation conducts insurgency since it resists the occupier’s dominance over the territory. When conducting resistance to regain sovereignty a nation can choose to do this through regular or irregular warfare with conventional forces, Special Forces or other forces under state control or influence. Furthermore state directed military operations fall into two categories, as previously stated: special operations or conventional operations. Unconventional warfare therefore falls into the category of special operations.

Since the above stated US definition of unconventional warfare is only seen as an expeditionary affair conducted in other countries, for the purpose of the study it is necessary to switch perspective to a nation’s perspective. This study therefore proposes the following definition of unconventional warfare2:

Unconventional warfare are activities and operations conducted to enable resistance in order to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating with military forces or with an underground, auxiliary or guerilla force in a denied or occupied area.

2_{The author is well aware that unconventional warfare, like the discussion about guerilla warfare, can be more}

considered as a method of warfare rather than a separate category. But we will keep the name unconventional warfare in the study.

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1.4.3 Logistics

Some writers refer to the origins of the word to either the greek word "logistikus" meaning skilled in calculating (Sarin 2000:30, Kress 2016:3). Another definition is based on Jomini’s description in chapter 6 in The Art of War (Jomini 1836/2007) where he describes the meaning of logistics after the duties of a position in the French army’s major general de logis which is the equivalent to a quartermaster position (Jomini 1836/2007:188). This origin for a definition is referred to by Sarin (2000:30) and Kress (2016:4).

In our contemporary times logistics has become far more complicated and complex than in Jomini’s time, and a single definition has been difficult to find. For example, Eccles defines logistics as: "The provision of the means for conduct of military operations" (Eccles 1959:46). Eccles connects logistics as the means to conduct combat operations and therefore positions logistics as a bridge between strategy and tactics. Sarin on the other hand, uses a combination of both the Greek scientific base and the functional used by Jomini: “Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces". Sarin’s definition leaves out the connection to tactics and strategy that Eccles felt was important in order to describe logistics’ role in the conduct of war. Kress (2016:7), on the other hand, manages to compile a definition based on previous works and takes inspiration from the civilian industrial based research when he defines logistics as: "A discipline that encompasses the resources needed to keep the means of a military process (operation) going in order to achieve its desired output (objectives). It includes planning, managing, treating, operating and controlling these resources." Kress manages to capture logistics relation to tactics and strategy by defining logistics as part of the military process of achieving objectives (same as Eccles) and that it contains the means to make this process possible. Kress also defines what processes are included in the logistic discipline, keeping it on an abstract level, avoiding making it invalid as technology and knowledge expands. It is therefore Kress’ definition that will be used in this study.

1.4.4 Sustainment

Eccles uses sustainment as a description of actions used to deliver manpower, materials, facilities and services to achieve maximum combat effectiveness with military forces (Eccles 1959:46-47). The term sustainment is closely connected to logistics and as Tuttle explains; sustainment is one of the objectives of the logistic system (Tuttle 2005:8). Furthermore,

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sustainment according to Kress who echoes some of Eccles thoughts, relates sustainment to the supply of troops and the actions taken in order to enable the military force to have supplies, materiel, maintenance and manpower available over time in order to achieve the assigned military objectives (Kress 2016:2-3). This study will use Kress’ definition of sustainment.

1.5 Disposition

In section, two a literature review concerning previous research in the fields of Special Operations and Unconventional warfare, Logistics and Special Operations and Logistics are presented to show the state of current research concerning the topics of this study. In section three, the theoretical building blocks for the study’s proposed theoretical framework, along with the establishment of the study’s hypothesis and the study’s research methodology are presented. In section four the multiple case study analysis are conducted where the proposed theoretical framework is tested on two historical cases to see if the framework holds the explanatory value proposed in section three. Finally, the study’s conclusions and reflections regarding the results will be discussed along with recommendations for further research.

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2. Literature review

The literature review serves the purpose of summarizing existing knowledge and the findings of previous research and to show where the current study can complement already existing research (Knopf 2006:127). Therefore, the literature review will focus on the three main focus areas investigated in this study: Firstly, literature concerning special operations theory and unconventional warfare is reviewed. Secondly, the study examines literature concerning operational logistics and the theory concerning the execution of logistics to meet operational needs. Lastly, literature that covers both special operations and logistics are reviewed.

2.1 Special operations theory and unconventional warfare literature

Spulak (2007) connects special operations forces and their unique attributes to the execution of special operations. Spulak basically defines the special operation through the special operations forces’ ability to overcome the friction that conventional forces cannot overcome. Spulak’s perspective is criticized by Searle (2017) who defines special operations in relation to what the military consider conventional operations. Furthermore, since Spulak’s definition ties Special Operations to the unique attributes of the force, it follows that, it is only Special Operations Forces that can conduct Special Operations. This perspective is criticized by both Searle and McRaven which states that the force conducting the Special Operations has no bearing on its categorization (Searle 2017:32, McRaven 1995:3). Both Spulak and Searle aim to define Special Operations and conclude by stating which kind of operations that belong to the Special Operation’s category. These authors’ work do not contain deeper theories on the conduct of different types of Special Operations, in particular not unconventional operations which this study is interested in. Spulak makes one observation of interest: Spulak outlines that a special operation requires certain access to the operational area and that it needs relative superiority3 to succeed (Spulak 2007:23).

This need for a special operation to achieve certain access is further studied by Harris (2013) in his work where he examines the character of irregular warfare. Harris finds three categories containing nine tenets of special operations that have had an impact on how to prepare and employ military forces in irregular warfare operations (Harris 2013:3). Thus, Harris concludes that a special operation in irregular warfare needs physical access, cognitive access and moral

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Page 13 of 61 access to the operational environment in order to be able to succeed (Harris 2013:2). Furthermore, need of physical access is also addressed in Che Guevara’s work Guerilla Warfare, where Che Guevara outlines the problems of access to the operational area that need to be overcome in order to achieve sustainment of forces (Che Guevara 2009:95-97). In conclusion, Harris’ study shows that without the requirement of physical access being fulfilled sustainment of forces in an enemy dominated environment is not possible, since being a non-logistician he lacks explanation on how sustainment is achieved.

Salum has conducted a study of unconventional warfare as a part of the state’s defense against occupation (Salum 2018). And Salum concludes in his writing that unconventional warfare needs comprehensive preparations in peace time and that unconventional warfare is a viable means to defend the state against occupation (Salum 2018:48,63). Salum’s work concerns itself with doctrinal aspects of unconventional warfare as part of defense planning and does not go into detail regarding sustainment; this therefore, leaves the question open to how the state achieves sustainment. Also MMI elaborates, as Salum, on the usefulness of using irregular warfare as a defensive strategy for a small state (MMI 2017) and highlights several factors in order for irregular warfare strategy to work with a focus on strategical, tactical and psychological factors but completely leaves out logistical considerations and does not cover any of the specific characteristics of irregular/unconventional sustainment.

2.2 Logistics literature

Thorpe (1917/2000) was the first writer in the United States that defined logistics in a theoretical sense and also made a contribution by connecting logistics with strategy and tactics as the third entity in war (Thorpe 1917/2000:5). The perspective of logistics being a part of strategy and tactics and not a separate supporting function is continued by Eccles. Thus, Eccles (1959) takes Thorpe’s strategy-tactics-logistics trinity by strengthening the role of logistics with strategy and tactics. And Eccles states, that in the higher levels of command commanders can sometimes not differentiate between strategy and logistics since they are so closely linked to each other (Eccles 1959: 19-20,22). In other words, according to Eccles, logistical possibilities are strategic possibilities. Together they have a further impact on possible tactics. Another contribution of Eccles’ is the theory on of how logistics are coordinated between the levels of strategy and tactics in order to achieve maximum responsiveness; the ability for command to logistically meet the needs of combat forces to reach the assigned objectives and the evolving

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needs of combat (Eccles 1959:57,93). According to Eccles it is through a constant analysis of available information together with control over resources that this responsiveness can be achieved (Eccles 1959:102-103). There is a gap in Eccles work in that Eccles does not cover the operational level of command. Consequently, Eccles’ theme on information and control reappears in more modern studies of civilian businesses (Nilsson 2006:47-48) which supports his theory.

The gap left by Eccles, on how to achieve maximum responsiveness, has left other writers to examining in depth and formulating and evaluating of the guiding logistical principles. These guiding logistical principles, such as the general principles of war, serves the purpose of guiding the formulation of logistical plans and subsequently can be used to evaluate plans after they have been executed. For example, Moore et.al. (2000) uses the five logistical principles formulated by NATO4 as a theoretical lens for analyzing historical case studies to show the value of the logistical principles for contemporary logistical work (Moore et.al. 2000:19). Also, Foxton (1994) uses the same five logistical principles in his work (Foxton 1994:3) as a base for his explanatory study of logistics. As a further argument to the value of logistical principles but also towards integration between strategy-tactics and logistics is Sarin’s (2000) work. According to Sarin, the principles5_{should serve as a common platform, in achieving better} understanding between logisticians and commanders and thus resulting in better military plans (Sarin 2000:58). The value of Sarin’s work is that he ties the principles more effectively to the planning and execution of military plans leaves a theoretical gap in regards to the exact mechanism on how logistics meet the combat forces needs when faced with a dynamic combat situation.

Contrary to all the other authors Tuttle (2005) does not follow the mainstream of logistical writing. According to Tuttle logistics is a separate entity that exists outside strategy with the only purpose of supporting strategy (Tuttle 2005:3-5). Other authors show the importance of moving logistics closer to strategy and tactics, something that was already recognized by Jomini (Jomini 1836/2007:188). Moreover, Tuttle’s view moves logistics to a responding function that is formulated after strategy or tactics. As a result of this, logistics risks ending up not being able

4_{NATO:s five logistical principles used by Moore et.al. are: Foresight, Economy, Flexibility, Simplicity and}

Cooperation, adopted by NATO in the year 2000 (More et.al. 2000:v,19)

5_{Sarin combines the NATO five principles with American nine and gets fourteen principles: Equivalence,}

Mobility, Momentum, Flexibility, Dispersion, Feasibility, Timeliness, Sustainability, Continuity, Accountability, Maintainability, Standardization, Integrability and interdependence and Information (Sarin 2000:58).

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to meet the requirements of strategy and tactics. This view is confirmed in Nilsson’s study which claims that the separation between logistics and operations creates unnecessary frictions and problems in meeting the needs of the customers6 (Nilsson 2006:44).

Kress (2016) appropriately mentions both Eccles and Sarin in his work but takes their ideas further in building a military logistical theory that shows how logistic efficiency (Kress 2016:21) and successful sustainment is tied to the use and combination of logistic options7. Especially, how logistical options are combined in order to match the changing needs stemming from the operational environment (Kress 2016:9-10,13). Furthermore Kress uses the logistical clock in defining how logistic processes, which are time-driven, must correspond with combat processes, which are event-driven in order to achieve sustainability (Kress 2016:41). Kress also further expands on how the principles of logistics, or properties as Kress names them, are related to operational plans (Kress 2016:51,54). In conclusion, Kress presents a comprehensive theory, built upon previous authors’ work, on how to achieve the maximum responsiveness previously outlined by Eccles. Although, the theory can be considered to be comprehensive it does have a strict expeditionary conventional force perspective to it. For example, the theory does not take into account the ability of stockpiling in order to help solve the time vs. event dilemma, an option readily available for states planning for combat on their own territory. Neither does it take into account special operations logistics.

2.3 Special operations and logistics literature

Turbiville (2005) in his inductive study of Soviet irregular warfare during the Second World War describes how the combination of logistical options is used in order to sustain the forces operating in occupied territory (Turbiville 2005:15-16). Turbiville also points out several logistical functions such as: local and external support dimensions, concealment and deception, local fabrication of supplies and supply networks that need further study in regards to how to sustain operations in occupied/denied areas (Turbiville 2005:6). Tuberville’s study is an entrance study into the area of special operations logistics however it is by no means complete. For example, Turbiville’s study is a single case inductive study that can only show what is found one particular case.

6_{i.e. operational needs}

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Haddick (2016) focuses his study on ways to improve the sustainment of forces in access denied operational environments. This, by outlining the capabilities of current methods of sending support to the forces (Haddick 2016:21) and then shows how future technologies and methods might improve the ability of sustainment. For example, Haddick finds the historical overreliance of sustainment by air a severe problem in the light of ever more increasing presence of advanced anti-air weapons systems (Haddick 2016:2,16). Haddick, due to an expeditionary focus, lacks depth in his study since it only focuses on one logistical option on how to achieve sustainment. Therefore, Haddick does not cover all the possibilities that, for example a nation state defending its home territory has for sustainment. Although, Haddick makes a contribution in his study by outlining ways to circumvent the access problem, the expeditionary focus makes it one sided.

Finally, Sheehan (2015) in Nonstandard Logistics Success in Unconventional Warfare describes the current planning, coordination and organization of U.S. Special Forces logistic support. Sheehan’s article, although mainly descriptive in nature, contains the interesting findings that concealment and security of the logistical system is the most important factor for successful sustainment and that the need for concealment has to take as much resources, including time, as it needs (Sheehan 2015:26-27). The main aim with Sheehan’s article is to describe the current development and training of Special Forces sustainment and does not refer to previous research or theories. Nevertheless, Sheehan’s identification of concealment as the most important factor is of great interest for this study; although Sheehan leaves out how the factor impacts the sustainment system as a whole.

2.4 Contribution

In the above review of existing literature and knowledge the study has found both merits that can be of use and a deficit in knowledge then be improved upon. There is no lack of knowledge on how unconventional/irregular warfare can be of use, especially strategically, for the states waging war and even as a defensive policy. However, there is a lack of knowledge concerning how to sustain this method of warfare when defending what is by the state considered its own territory.

There have been attempts to show how sustainment is conducted in unconventional warfare (Turbiville) and improved (Haddick, Sheehan) but these studies and articles are either too

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specific, like Haddick’s study, or too shallow theoretically as in Sheehan’s article and Haddick’s study. Theoretical logistical literature has primarily concerned itself with conventional logistics and many of those are of an expeditionary nature. In addition, no theoretical logistical literature examines how the logistic system is affected by the unique characteristics that are inherent in unconventional operations.

This study therefore aims to make a theoretical contribution by combining the theory Harris/Spulak regarding the need for physical access to the operational environment with theories from Kress and findings from Turbiville. The contribution would then be a theoretical addition to the field of special operations logistics by delivering a theory that explains how sustainment for a military force, operating in enemy controlled territory can be achieved. The perspective of this theory would be a nation state faced with the possibility of having parts of or the entire territory occupied by an aggressor. Since as Salum states that extensive preparations must be made in peacetime if unconventional operations should be used defensively. And, as most other authors have an expeditionary focus, it is of interest to know what this defensive perspective means for sustainment. The contribution would therefore be of both theoretical and practical interest.

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3. Research design

In this section we will introduce the theoretical perspective for this study and the study’s methodology will be introduced As explained in section two the study aims at building a theoretical framework that can explain how a state resisting occupation and having the will to reclaim territory from another state, can achieve sustainment for a military force operating in a territory dominated by the enemy. Therefore, this section begins with our foundational theoretical perspective and then continues with the building of the theory and the section ends by outlining the study’s research methodology.

3.1 Theoretical framework

3.1.1 Foundational theoretical perspective on logistics

As has been mentioned in the literature review two foundational perspectives on logistics exist. The first perspective used by Eccles is one that views logistics as three branches of warfare that the military command needs to consider as being evolved together and not as separated entities, as described in figure 1. (Eccles 1959:21-22).

Figure 1. Eccles perspective on strategy-tactics-logistics (Eccles 1959:20)

Logistics is therefore an integral part of all decision making in military command. If one pursues the perspective used by Tuttle (2005:3-5), that logistics is only a supporting function that comes into effect after strategy and tactics have been decided, then the risk of having to little or incorrect means to support combat forces might arise. This study chooses Eccles foundational perspective since if the study were to choose Tuttle’s perspective, supporting only, then this would not give an accurate explanation of reality. This, because logistical means both direct what is possible in strategy and tactics but logistic abilities can also be created to support the desired strategy and tactics.

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3.1.2 The theoretical building blocks

As discussed in the problem statement there is a need for a theoretical framework that explains in what way the character of the unconventional warfare operation, especially the problem with access to the operational environment, affects the commands ability to sustain a military force over time in an enemy controlled territory. Therefore, the theory needs to explain the relationship between the character of the unconventional warfare operation and the logistical theory. A deductive logic approach will be used by looking at theories from each part of the problem and join them together to form a cohesive theoretical framework.

Logistical options

According to Kress three basic logistical options have been used throughout military history to sustain forces on the battlefield (Kress 2016:9):

 Obtain the logistical resources in the battlefield area.  Carry the resources with the force.

 Ship the resources from a supply source to the troops.

Since Kress has an expeditionary view on logistics he does not seem to consider that a defending force has a fourth option available as well; something that Turbiville (2005:15) and Moore et.al. (2000:5,16) have expressed:

 Pre-positioned stockpiles in the expected battlefield area

This logistical option is of its nature mostly available to a state which is defending its territory and that the state therefore can, in its operational plans, pre-plan stockpiles in order to meet the logistical needs of anticipated combat.

Obtain resources on the battlefield can be divided into three broad categories (Kress 2016:10, Turbiville 2005:15-16):

 Utilizing the local population, including local manufacturing, as a means of support.  Obtain the resources from the enemy.

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According to Mao Tse-Tung (2007:82) and Che Guevara (2009:96-97) the obtain option is the primary options for sustainment in guerilla warfare. Also Kress (2016:130), mentions this as an important option in regard to insurgencies. And, according to Haddick (2016:19), this method gives the benefit of making the unconventional combat force less dependent of outside support and it also has downsides such as: lacking the advantage of tailored support in achieving operational objectives. As a conclusion: Even though this logistical option might be suitable for covet situations and availability, being too reliant on this option might dictate what military objectives that can be achieved and in the end, result in that combat actions might not support the overall strategy for the state.

Carry with the force is an option mostly used when specialized equipment is needed that cannot be obtained from anywhere else. It also serves the purpose of guaranteeing needed sustainment for a time period until supply lines can be established (Kress 2016:10).

Ship to the force is, according to Kress (2016:11), the most common method for conventional units and has become the principal method of sustaining a modern military force. The option gives the ability to respond to needs of the troops that cannot be foreseen in planning and also to sustain the force over time as resources are consumed. Furthermore, Kress (2016:13) stresses that this option frees combat forces from using their time in acquiring supplies however, it is also the least robust option since, and it relies on secure communications and reliable transportation.

Pre-postioned stockpiles has to be reachable by the force in the operational area and not be dependent on other units or functions. Pre-positioned stockpiles give command the ability to increase the level of sustainment above what the option carry can and without having to rely on ship to force. This option requires that the military command determines the scope of combat activities, for which sustainment is determined, before they occur which can be hard to accurately estimate.

The different logistical options all have their pros and cons and it thus becomes clear that a military force must rely on a combination of all logistical options in order to be able to meet the sustainment demands of the force. It can also be concluded that the available technology and equipment influences which logistical option will be used. For example, if there are no

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means of air, road or ship transportation to send critical supplies, then a different option needs to be chosen. Also, the character of the operation and the environment influences the choice of options: terrain, climate, infrastructure and the enemy activities all have an influence on what options might be suitable.

Kress’ operational logistics theory of time vs. event

Time is a principal dimension in Operational Logistics and includes the lead-time (Kress 2016:40) which expresses the time that elapses from when a logistical need arises in a combat unit until when resources are delivered. Time is also a variable that contains: Consumption rate (Kress 2016:40), how fast the combat unit consumes its resources in completing combat tasks and attrition rate, and how fast assets needs to be replaced in the combat environment (Kress 2016:40). The time factor contains uncertainties in the form of determining when resupply is to be scheduled in the supply chain to meet unit demands, demands that are influenced by combat actions on the battlefield (Kress 2016:40-41). Adequate estimates in the time factor are essential for operational command in determining the effectiveness of the logistic response to combat units’ needs (Kress 2016:41).

As logistics is highly time-driven as prescribed above, combat is event-driven. Normal logistical supply chains operate in time cycles according to the command's estimates of the time factor. This, comes in contrast to combat which is an event-driven process that includes both own forces actions and enemy’s actions. This often creates a discrepancy between two different processes since they evolve differently (Kress 2016:41).

It can therefore be deduced that the logistic process is a linear process dominated by time that needs to match a non-linear process of combat that, contains combat actions (events) of which the results of are hard to accurately predict. In a perfect setting military command would be able to match these two different processes and reach desired sustainment levels in order to reach determined military objectives. However since this linear vs. non-linear characters are difficult to match; the result is that one usually would have to prioritize one over the other.

Special operations theory of “access”

According to Harris the reason for an unconventional warfare operation being difficult stems from the challenge of projecting power over distance and, that there is no institutional control

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for the own force in the area since it is dominated by the enemy (Harris 2013:32). Therefore, the ability to support the force becomes harder since the distance to one’s own lines of support becomes long and interrupted. In order to obtain support to a military force operating in enemy controlled territory physical access to the operational environment needs to be achieved (Harris 2013:40, Spulak 2007:23,38, Che Guevara 2009:95). In contrast to unconventional warfare operations, conventional operations achieve access through the brute power of the conventional forces’ operational reach (Harris 2013:38). However, with unconventional operations the physical access needs to be established for each individual time insertion of forces, evacuation of casualties occurs.

Furthermore, every access attempt must be concealed to avoid creating a ‘snail trail’ that can be detected by the opposition and risk the survivability of the force (Harris 2013:42-44). The need for concealment of the access to the operational area is an unconventional warfare operation are characteristic reinforced by Turbiville and also by the writings of Che Guevara (Turbiville 2005:30, Che Guevara 2009:98-99). Furthermore Sheehan (2015:26) claims, from his observations of current development of nonstandard logistics for U.S. Special Forces, that concealment and secrecy of sustainment for the force, is the foremost important factor that needs to be upheld when working with nonstandard logistics in support of unconventional operations.

3.1.3 Hypothesis generation

In this section hypothesis will be generated based on the above theories and conclusions of these theories.

Hypothesis 1: The character of unconventional warfare implication on logistics

Previously it was concluded that the character of the operation influences what logistical options are possible to use. The ability to achieve access to the operational environment together with the need to maintain concealment should therefore determine the combination of logistical options available for sustainment in unconventional warfare operations.

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Hypothesis 1 would therefore be:

The need for access to the operational area and the need for concealment in order to ensure survivability of the force influences what logistical options can be used to achieve the desired sustainment.

Hypothesis 2: The ability to meet combat events

The various logistical options have different lead-times and the various options also have varying possibilities to meet specific needs as a result of combat events. For example, ship to the troops has most flexibility in meeting combat needs but has the longest lead time and in this specific context, unconventional warfare, has the highest chance of exposing the fighting force. The other logistical options can result in a shorter lead-time but might not match the consumption rates resulting from events. Also, as mentioned, available technology and equipment for the ship option has an impact on time. Therefore, the ability of command and its logistical system to balance time vs. event is therefore crucial to effective sustainment. To conclude, the military command’s availability of logistical options have a direct impact on the time factor and the ability to meet unfolding events.

The combination of logistical options affect the time needed to reach sufficient sustainment and therefore affect what possible combat events that the force could meet in the unconventional operation.

Hypothesis 3: Planned combat events effect on time and logistical options

The relationship with the logistical options can also be reversed. Because, if a certain event is planned it follows that it influences which logistical option must be chosen in order to fulfill the requirement of having sustainment on time; while simultaneously fulfill the requirement of access and concealment of the operational environment.

If a certain combat event is planned it influences the choice of which logistical options that can deliver sustainment on time.

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3.1.4 Proposed theoretical framework for the sustainment of unconventional

warfare

There is no comprehensive theoretical framework that explains how sustainment is achieved and how the different aspects of logistics and the character of the unconventional warfare operation influence each other. In figure 2 there is a model of when the three hypotheses derived from the theories outlined in section 3.1 are combined into a theoretical framework.

Figure 2 Proposed theoretical framework for sustainment in unconventional warfare operations.

3.1.5 Theoretical relevance

The relevance of this theory should of course be discussed. Firstly, the use of Eccles perspective on strategy-tactics-logistics shows that the theoretical framework gives a two-way relationship between the different logistical parts of the theory. If the choice would have fallen on Tuttle’s view on logistics it would be a one way relationship, from that perspective logistics only function is to work on sustainment for objectives set by the command, regardless of the pushback from the operational environment or combat events and disregards the actual availability of logistical means.

Secondly, regarding the choice of using the theory of logistical options and time vs. event instead of analyzing logistics from the logistical principle perspective, which is a widely used

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method of analyzing military logistics, is that the logistical principles cannot give the answer to how sustainment is achieved. The combination and use of logistical options together with time vs. event has this possibility.

Thirdly, the above stated theory is both historically time independent and technologically independent. Thus, it does not matter, for the theory, what technological level the state party analyzed with the theory has. Likewise, it is historically time independent since the logistical options have been found throughout military history in one way or another.

Lastly, the choice of Harris’ theory of access is chosen because it is this part of the character of the unconventional warfare environment that affects execution of logistics the most, and ties into existing logistical theory.

3.1.6 Summary of the theoretical framework

The proposed theoretical framework has shown through a deductive analysis approach that it has the potential to answer the research question posed by the study. It does not, however, have the potential to explain details within the different logistical options, nor has it the possibility to explain what tactics or strategy are possible, in relation to logistical support, for the unconventional warfare campaign as a whole.

3.2 Research methodology

This study aims to develop a new tentative theoretical framework, using theoretical deduction, by combining already existing frameworks to form a new theory that can answer the question posed by this study. Firstly, the theoretical model outlined in section 3.1 will be used on the cases and then observable implications from the model, which are described below in section 3.3, will be derived and then test these implications against empirical findings from two historical cases that fit the parameters of the study (George&Bennett 2005:6). Also, the method of using a case study to develop new theories is suitable when cases or observations no longer fit existing theories (George&Bennett 2005:7). The struggle for conventional logistics to explain how sustainment of unconventional warfare operations is achieved, is such an observation. Therefore, this theory developing case study methodology, suggested by George and Bennett, is specifically suited for this study since the cases can serve as a testing ground in

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order to see if the proposed theoretical framework can answer the research question. This method is also supported by Denscombe (2017:59).

Furthermore, the method proposed by George & Bennett, using a comparative case study, in this case of historical cases, is suitable since the phenomenon of a nation state using unconventional warfare in a conflict with another state does not have a natural reoccurring frequency. Because, nation states do not very frequently engage in war with one another and therefore other than historical case study methods the required data is not available to investigate the theory. As a counter argument, one could have proposed to interview current professional practitioners. However, there are very few military practitioners, if any, that have conducted this kind of state vs. state unconventional warfare and therefore would not yield any qualitative data.

As outlined above it is theory development that is the focus of the study and although the logical reasoning regarding the proposed theoretical framework, can be considered solid, it needs to be tested in the case study in order to be confirmed. Even though a single case study can show that the theoretical framework is working it is not enough for this study since a more thorough generalization is needed. In addition, a single case would not cover all the aspects that this theory wants to include. Therefore this study will follow Yin’s (2018:54) recommendation of a multiple case study in order to reach a broader result for the type of cases examined. The resulting theory would then be a conditioned generalization valid for cases belonging to state directed unconventional warfare operations within special operations, also known as a middle-range theory (George&Bennett 2005:110–122). Even if the theory would only be valid for these kind of cases it can however, have implications of validity for similar cases, not included, based on the general character of the theoretical factors included herein. Also, the selection of a case study methodology means that the study can only show that the proposed theoretical framework contains the relationship between the factors outlined, not how much they affect each other, this is what George and Bennett (2005:25) describe as existence of causal connection.

Furthermore, since the cases all have sustainment in common it is prudent to use the method of agreement (George&Bennett 2005:155). However, in order to minimize rival explanations for the causal relationship other factors that might influence, the outcome needs to be different. The study’s application of these factors will be discussed in section 3.2.2.

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3.2.1 Selection of cases

The study aims to develop a theory by testing it on cases that have the ability to show the validity of the theory. This case study then becomes what Denscombe (2018:61) calls a test-site for theory. It is then vital that the cases contain vital elements which have the ability to test the theory. And therefore the cases should not to be the most difficult cases that can be chosen to test the proposed theory. In order to avoid case selection bias (George&Bennett 2005:23) cases are selected based on these crucial elements which are described further below. Also, the study will show that other cases have been considered but disregarded for not having the same explanatory power potential as the cases chosen for examination.

In order for logistics to become a challenge for decision makers the operations or war itself also has to be of an unknown duration, either in the planning stage or actual execution. The two different cases selected for the study, besides containing the above criteria also need to have individual characteristics that are of interest for the theory:

 Planned defense using unconventional warfare is of interest since most previous theories are of an expeditionary nature.

 Absence or presence of access to air resupply is of interest since Haddick states that there has been an overreliance of this method for the logistical option ship to the force.  Since previous authors have discussed the use of unconventional warfare as a viable

method for both defense and offense, it is of interest to have cases whose campaigns differ.

 Special operations can be conducted by both specially or not-specially trained personnel so it is beneficial if the cases differ.

The choice of cases is primarily based on the above criteria and there are not very many cases in history that contain the above described conditions. The selection of cases is therefore:

 The British planning and preparations for unconventional warfare to meet the expected German invasion of the British Isles during the Second World War in 1940-41. This case has the interesting feature of being one of the few cases where extensive planning for unconventional warfare can be shown to have occurred during an actual war. There is of course a slight methodological issue that this planning never came into reality since the German invasion never took place and therefore it can be argued that

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there was no sustainment for the campaign. The author would then argue that the case is still valid since planning and preparations took place during a war with solid expectations that an invasion would occur. Therefore, the planning and preparations have to be based on actual facts from previous invasions that occurred between 1939 and 1940. Therefore, the author would argue, that it the British planning and preparations are as close to an actual execution one can be without actually needing to execute it. An additional reason for including the British case is that it is a case that solely relied on a specifically trained and selected force to conduct the campaign.

 The Soviet unconventional warfare campaign on the Eastern front during the Second World War 1941-1945. The Soviet campaign contains both defensive and offensive elements since the tide of war shifted during the War. The campaign also has the ability to use air resupply as part of the ship to the force option. The unconventional warfare campaign also relied on specific units and on ad-hoc volunteer recruitment in the occupied areas during the campaign.

This study only contains two cases mainly because of space and time considerations. A third case would undoubtedly give more credibility to the study and perhaps strengthen its findings. The selection of the above two cases is a result of careful deliberation as described above. The two cases manage to capture the characteristics and indicators that have been discovered in previous sections and chapters and therefore are best suited to be able to answer if the tentative theory holds value or not. Another case that could have been considered is North Vietnam’s unconventional warfare campaign in South Vietnam during the years of 1959-75. This case has merits of being of a very offensive nature, reclaiming perceived occupied territory and lack of airpower, although these factors are already included in the British and Soviet cases. The British Burma campaign with the Chindits, 1943-44, is another example of an unconventional warfare campaign during war; however, it is limited in that it relied heavily on the logistical options of ship to the troops with the use of air power. Therefore the Burma case does not contain the intricate mix of logistical options that the study is interested in. The British SOE campaign in France during 1940-44 is also an interesting case however the factors of this campaign are present in the Soviet case. Finally, there is the Russian unconventional warfare campaign in Crimea in 2014. The problem with Crimea is that this campaign was never a war, not even

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recognized as an armed attack by international law standards and therefore is outside the class of cases.

3.2.2 Causal relationships and case differences

In order to ascertain that there is a causal relationship between the different factors in the theoretical framework and sustainment, certain criteria has to be fulfilled. The study uses Kellstedt and Whitten (2018:60-62) model to achieve this:

 Credible causal mechanism – The credible explanation that change in logistical options, time or events causes change in sustainment is discussed in section 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, a hypothesis generation and a proposed theoretical framework respectively.

 Direction of the relationship – To rule out that sustainment should cause change in the logistical options, the time and event factors is ruled out by logic since no sustainment can be achieved until supplies are delivered.

 Covariation –Is investigated in the case analysis.

 Isolation – To examine rival explanations to the effect on sustainment, other than the relationship proposed by the theoretical framework, is achieved through the method of agreement design.

The control factors used to distinguish between the cases and to minimize rival explanations are outlined in table 1. These control factors are based on previous research described in section two and on the description above in the selection of cases. These can be described as factors that can have a possible influence over sustainment in unconventional warfare.

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Factor British Soviet union Comment

Campaign type Planned defensive Defensive and

offensive

Ability to

air-resupply Limited Yes

Since the air battle over Britain would have been lost if a German invasion occurred the value for the British is set to be limited.

Type of terrain

Island with dense urban and rural settlements

European continental This control factor relates to the ability to maintain concealment.

Type of force Specifically trained and selected force

Mixture of forces: conventional, specially trained and guerilla

This relates to Spulak’s

definition that special operations are conducted based on Special Operations Forces unique attributes

Technology difference

Equal to the opponent

Lower than or equal to the opponent

Available technology affects as the ability to send supplies to the force.

Air dominance No Contested

The British would have lost air dominance if the German invasion had occurred.

Table 1: Control factors

3.2.3 Data analysis

The data in this study will be analyzed by using a structured and focused comparison (George&Bennett 2005:67). The structure of the analysis will be attained by the study asking the same questions with the data presented by the two cases. This, enables the study to achieve systematic data collection and comparison. Also, the focus will be attained by only asking questions relevant to the research question and hypothesis of the study. This structure and focus is important if other cases will later be included and analyzed under the study’s theoretical framework and it is also important for the reliability of the study.

The questions will be determined in section 3.3 Operationalization. Furthermore, the data gathered from the source material will be analyzed through a qualitative text analysis in accordance with the questions in section 3.3.

3.2.4 Source material

One of the sources used for this study’s theoretical framework is William Harris’ Special Operations, Irregular Warfare, And Operational Art: A Theory of Special Operations, a study

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on a master’s level and its use in this study can of course be criticized. However, Harris’ work has been regarded highly and was adopted into the Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design, the United States Army Special Operations Command publication from 2014 (USASOC 2014:V-14-15). And, aspects of his findings about certain characteristics of irregular/unconventional warfare are supported by other scholars. Therefore, its inclusion is merited.

The source material for this study’s case analysis mainly consists of secondary sources in both cases first-hand accounts from people involved in the different campaigns have been used for example, Fleming for the British case and Sudoplatov and Drum for the Soviet case. The contribution from these first-hand accounts have varied and have been triangulated with other more record based sources. The sourced critical challenges between the cases are quite different. In the British case the difficulty was that the records were not de-classified until 1994 and thus older works relied on testimonies and scarce declassified information regarding the Auxiliary Units. Therefore the British case was augmented with more contemporary works, which had obtained access to the historical records.

The Soviet case presented the characteristic challenges in the way that Soviet numbers and description of events were often exaggerated and therefore, works based on German records have been used to triangulate and balance the accounts made from the Soviets. Armstrong’s anthology incorporated both types of records while Howell only used German accounts. Maksimchik’s on the other hand uses only Soviet records and testimonies. Since this study is not aiming to achieve an actual account on how much the factors studied influence each other the author has focused on if the factor influenced each other. Therefore, the study has used the numbers to illustrate the relationships; and the numbers used in the study have been triangulated as described above.

In conclusion the use of different secondary sources based on both archived and personal accounts taken from different time periods; ranging from works created close to the actual cases to more contemporary works, are assessed as satisfactory in being able to triangulate and validate the data.

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3.3 Operationalization

In this section the theoretical concepts of the study are transformed into observable indicators that can be investigated in the data presented by the cases. The operationalization of the hypothesis is done through posing questions to the cases and the answers either strengthen or falsify the hypothesis. In order to build a thorough analysis the study will use Bloohm’s taxonomy (Rienecker 2016:15) as a guide. This means in practice that the questions derived from the study’s hypothesis will ask questions of the what and why character. Furthermore, the final discussion and cross-comparison of the cases and the analytical conclusion will answer the question how sustainment is achieved in order to reach a valuable answer to the research question.

Sustainment will vary between the cases, this is because the context and the intent of combat operations are different. However, all cases have one thing in coming that being sustainment has to fulfill the necessary and sufficient (George&Bennett 2005:25-27) conditions, which are represented by the three hypotheses, in order for intended combat operations to be sustained. This means that for sustainment (see definitions section) to be sufficient it cannot be the contributor to failure. Sustainment could have been reached even if the combat operation (event) is a failure since this, can be a result of other factors.

3.3.1 Operationalization hypothesis 1