2013:22
Sweden’s Cooperation with Eastern
Europe in Radiation Safety 2012
Lars van Dassen et al. Author:
Foreword
On behalf of SSM I introduce this annual report for 2012 from the Swed-ish Radiation Safety Authority, SSM, as concerns our work to increase safety at nuclear power plants, security at facilities that have radioactive and nuclear materials, efforts to strengthen emergency preparedness, improve radiation protection, handle nuclear and radioactive waste is-sues and bolster nuclear regulatory offices. Measures in these fields were implemented in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.
A number of overarching events took place in 2012 and these guided and influenced our work in 2012 as they will in the years to come. First of all, the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in March 2012 underlined the impor-tance that the international community attaches to nuclear security. This includes international cooperation in the area and the use of international institutions such as the G-8 Global Partnership. The Swedish statement before the Nuclear Security Summit included references to the importance Sweden attaches to international cooperation in nuclear security.
At the Nuclear Security Summit, SSM was asked by US representatives whether Sweden would be willing to co-host one of the Working Group meetings under the US Presidency of the G-8 in 2012. The plan was approved by the Swedish Ministries of the Environment and for Foreign Affairs and in late August the Working Group meeting took place in Stockholm. It turned out to be the largest of the five GP meetings held in 2012 and it was a meeting that was able to address most important issues on the future directions for the G-8 Global Partnership.
The Global Partnership meeting in Stock-holm also became the place and occasion when SSM together with counterparts from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal State Nuclear Energy Corporation, ‘Rosatom’ and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority laid the foundation for the “Moscow Conference”, a conference that was imple-mented in November 2012. The conference had the title The G-8 Global Partnership: Assessment and Options for Future Programming in the Fields of Nuclear and Radiological Security and it looked back at what had been achieved between 2002 and 2012 as well as creating a com-mon agenda for the work to be done under the G-8 Global Partnership Declaration for the period from 2012 till 2022. More than 100 persons from Member States of the Global Partnership and international organi-sations participated.
I want to draw special attention to two projects where we have been per-sistent and therefore successful. In cooperation with Russian and Ukrain-ian authorities, universities and technical institutes we have for almost
a decade implemented various nuclear non-proliferation education and training programmes. These activities have grown in scope and ambition and cover today a large range of activities in Tomsk, St Petersburg, the Ural Region and in Odessa. To our satisfaction, more and more activities are cosponsored by local actors as well as international partners.
Swedish and Russian authorities have also for almost a decade worked to implement systems with which the illegal trade nuclear and radioac-tive materials can be detected and deterred. Regional combating sys-tems are in place in the Murmansk and Kalingrad and in 2013 a further system will be established in the Sverdlovsk Region. We are happy to be one of Russia’s partners in this area and hope to continue our efforts with them.
The cooperation with Moldova reached a good and high level in 2012 when we delivered essential equipment and a vehicle for inspection purposes to the Moldovan regulatory authority, NARNRA. It is my hope that we can continue and deepen our cooperation with Moldova in the years to come.
The cooperation on nuclear safety has been performed during 2012 together with the nuclear industry and regulators both in Russia and in the Ukraine. A number of projects comprising both knowledge transfer and delivery of modern equipment have been completed and started within the areas of safety analyses and assessment, ageing, fire safety, non-destructive testing, emergency power supply, nuclear waste and education and licensing of nuclear power plant staff. The projects in Russia are implemented at the Leningrad and Kola nuclear power plants and projects comprising hardware supplies have to a large extent been co-financed by the recipient itself and also by our sister organisations in Finland and Norway.
Our projects are subject of great focus and interest also outside the nuclear power plants directly involved in our cooperation. There are many examples that our safety upgrading projects serves as pilot projects for similar im-provements at other nuclear power plants and at their own financing. In 2012, SSM completed its Periodic Safety Review project in cooperation with the Ukrainian owner of the nuclear power sector, Energoatom. This project has been tremendously successful in transferring a method for safe-ty analyses to Ukraine and it has led to the formulation of a couple of new projects in the area of reactor safety and in cooperation with Energoatom. In 2012, SSM also reached a critical stage of project implementation for its projects in Ukraine financed by the Swedish International Develop-ment Cooperation Agency, SIDA. The projects are unique in three re-spects. First of all, they belong to a small and exclusive group of projects that aim at tackling radiation hazards that are not related to security is-sues. In a time when most international donors focus on projects related to nuclear security as well as nuclear safety, SSM is proud to also have
projects that are directed towards the releases of radiation of radon, the contamination issues that arise from former uranium and mining sites as well as the issues related to uses of radiotherapy and diagnostics in the medical sector. Secondly, the projects are unusual as they have a four-year horizon and budgets and this allows for thorough planning and a broad incorporation of interested actors, stake-holders and experts. Finally, the projects are important because they rely on a developed methodology (Logical Framework Approach and Result-Based Manage-ment) that are well-established working principles in the development community. SSM works to apply these methods to all projects and their planning and implementation stages.
At the end of these opening lines I wish to express my gratitude to the persons at SSM who work with the international projects. This concerns the staff at the Secretariat for International Cooperation and Devel-opment and also the many experts from other parts of SSM who have worked with us on project implementation, giving advice - and by being there. Last but not least, I want to thank all the many dedicated, inter-ested and wise partners who we have as counterparts in each project. Without their contribution we could not achieve what we do. I wish our readers much pleasure in reading this report and myself and my col-leagues will look forward to receiving feed-back from our international partners and all other readers. With your input we become better.
Fredrik Hassel
Deputy Director General
2013:22
Author: Lars van Dassen, Sarmite Andersson, Gabriela Bejarano, Zlatan Delalic, Olof Karlberg, Håkan Klasén, Kjell Olsson, Viviana Sandberg, Cecilia Somell, Tor Stenberg and Barbro Wickman
Sweden’s Cooperation with Eastern
Europe in Radiation Safety 2012
Content
Economy ... 3
Comments to the Financial Outcome the Fiscal Year 2012 ... 3
Russia ... 5
Projects Russia: Nuclear safety and emergency preparedness ... 5
The outcome and impact of work in nuclear safety and emergency preparedness in Russia ... 11
Projects Russia: Nuclear non-proliferation ... 12
The outcome and impact of work in nuclear non-proliferation in Russia ... 17
Projects Russia: Legacy and other nuclear and radioactive waste issues ... 18
The outcome and impact of work in nuclear legacy and other nuclear and radioactive waste issues in Russia ... 21
Moldova ... 22
Projects Moldova: Radiation safety ... 22
The outcome and impact of work in radiation safety in Moldova ... 23
Georgia ... 25
Projects Georgia: Radiation safety ... 25
The outcome and impact of work in radiation safety in Georgia ... 27
Ukraine ... 28
Projects Ukraine: Nuclear safety and emergency preparedness ... 28
The outcome and impact of work in nuclear safety and emergency preparedness in Ukraine ... 30
Projects Ukraine: Non-proliferation and legacy waste ... 31
The outcome and impact of work in non-proliferation and legacy waste in Ukraine ... 34
Economy
Comments to the Financial Outcome the Fiscal Year
2012
International Environmental Cooperation with Russia
The Secretariat for International Cooperation and Development at the dish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) was granted 38,2 Msek by the Swe-dish Government in 2012 for Environmental Cooperation with Russia. The main areas of cooperation were within safety cooperation with nuclear pow-er plants, radiation protection & empow-ergency preparedness, and security pro-tection and non-proliferation cooperation regards the fuel cycle. Also the Swedish annual fee to the international coordinating group, Contact Expert Group (CEG) was financed by the appropriation.
In all, a total of 35,0 Msek was spent on different cooperation activities as reported on the following pages. Some of the projects were financed not only by SSM but also by the Russian beneficiaries themselves. The Finnish Radi-ation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has also been a financial con-tributor in some of the projects in the field of nuclear safety.
Development Cooperation with Eastern Europe
The corresponding appropriation for Development and Reform Cooperation in Eastern Europe was 16 Msek plus an additional 480 Tsek savings amount transferred from 2011.
The main areas of cooperation in Eastern Europe were within safety coop-eration with nuclear power plants, security protection and radiation safety,
radiation protection and emergency preparedness in Ukraine and a total of 14,6 Msek was spent.
The funds were also spent on radiation safety regards the fuel cycle in Geor-gia and Moldavia. Of the appropriation, 3,0 Msek were assigned for work with Georgia and Moldavia and the outcome was just under that limit (2,8 Msek) .
Salary- and overhead costs are included in the total costs for both govern-ment financed cooperation areas. It can be added that the expenditure for both areas, is more in phase with the funds allocated 2012, compared to 2011.
Cooperation between SIDA and SSM on the Development Program for Ukraine
The program consists of four projects with civil radiation protection as their focus and they will be implemented between 2010 and 2013. The projects are subject to a separate reporting scheme with SIDA and are invoiced ac-cordingly every third month.
The total budget for SIDA was 33,5 Msek over the period of 4 years (2010-2013). The estimated budget for the year 2012 was estimated to 13,1 Msek and the total amount spent, was 7,7 Msek.
The project, Radiation Protection for Workers at Operational Uranium Min-ing Facilities, was suspended in 2012. Therefore no further activities will be implemented, other than administrative such as final reporting.
Russia
Projects Russia: Nuclear safety and emergency
preparedness
Upgrades of the safety systems for the diesel generators at Kola NPP, completed, d.nr. SSM2009/1984
Nuclear power plants need diesel-powered back-up generators to ensure the continued cooling of reactors in the event of an interruption of its ordinary power supply. In order to strengthen this part of the operational safety at the Kola NPP, SSM together with its counterpart from Finland, STUK, delivered a total of eight equipment sets for the upgrade of the electrical outfits and warning systems used for the diesel generators. In 2012, the last two sets of equipment were installed and inspected during the outage at the Kola NPP. The Kola NPP also financed the installation of an additional eight sets of similar equipment.
Installation of gas chromatograph equipment at the Leningrad NPP, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2009/2668
Gas chromatography is used to measure the composition of hydrogen and other gases from the reactor cavity and is therefore used to trace early indicators of malfunctions or deviations from normal production and operation. Such equipment was purchased in the USA and a site acceptance test was carried out in 2011. In spring of 2012, the equipment was delivered to the Leningrad NPP and installation work will be performed in 2013. In late 2012, a minor software upgrade that aimed at the control of the system was also provided. The project continues, with the final site acceptance test scheduled for late 2013.
Overarching meetings with Rosenergoatom and the Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian counterparts, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2011/1005
Although activities under this heading do not constitute a project as such, it has nevertheless been important for the Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian partners to meet with Rosenergoatom and two of its subsidiaries, the Leningrad and Kola NPPs. In 2012, there were two meetings, one in Moscow in May and one in Oslo in November. At the meetings,
Rosenergoatom presented an overview of its safety work and safety plans for individual power plants and reactors as well as highlighting the needs for and how/where external assistance and technology upgrades from Western companies would be useful in the future. In the same manner, the Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian counterparts presented their instructions and preferences for the implementation of projects. At those meetings,
Rosenergoatom stated that in general it wants to expand on the experiences learned from the three-year cooperation project on nuclear and radioactive waste issues (see SSM2010/1159 above) and direct project activities with
Nordic partners towards issues that relate to decommissioning of reactors and other buildings at the NPPs.
Measures to strengthen the management of nuclear and radioactive waste at the Leningrad NPP, completed, d. nr. SSM2010/1159
Leningrad NPP experts studying H-3 and C-14 monitoring at Ringhals NPP
In 2010, SSM and the Leningrad NPP established a three-year program to strengthen the management system for nuclear and radioactive waste in NPPs. The objective was to resolve a number of issues in this area where the Leningrad NPP and other Russian NPPs had accumulated waste products but did not have a comprehensive system for treating and storing/disposing them. In 2012, equipment was provided and installed at the Leningrad NPP to sort and categorize waste products based on their levels of radioactivity. Furthermore, technical staff from the power plant visited Ringhals in May to learn about the Swedish procedures and standards for measuring the release to the atmosphere of tritium and carbon-14 as a result of reactor operations. In November, SSM also arranged an exchange at the Ignalina NPP between technical and management staff from the Leningrad, Ignalina and Chernobyl NPPs. All three power plants have RMBK-type reactors and have, or plan to have, similar western facilities for waste treatment, as well as sharing similar problems concerning decommissioning issues.
Oil-cleaning equipment for the main coolant pumps at Kola NPP, completed, d. nr. SSM2009/2664
The cleaning of the lubrication oil for the main coolant pumps in a reactor is considered to be a vital safety feature. In this project the existing oil-cleaning filters for Units 3 and 4 at Kola NPP were replaced with modern and more efficient filters. The filters were provided by Alfa-Laval, installed at the Kola NPP in October and the site acceptance test carried out in December 2012.
Upgrading of ‘Eddy Current’ inspection system at Kola NPP, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/447
The ‘Eddy Current’ inspection system is used to determine the condition of the steam generator tubes. The steam generator tubes are a crucial barrier to prevent contamination from the reactor system into the secondary system. The upgrading comprises a new inspection manipulator and software which were contracted in 2012 and will be commissioned and delivered in 2013. The project is co-financed by Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Kola NPP.
Residual heat coolant pumps for the reactors at Leningrad NPP, completed, d. nr. SSM2012/451
This project aimed at renewing the coolant pumps at the Leningrad NPP given that continued cooling is indispensable for both the energy production and the safety of the reactor. In March 2012, SSM agreed with Leningrad NPP the technical specifications for the pumps and thereupon a tender process was initiated. However, no bids were received in spite of initial expressions of interest from two companies and consequently LNPP and SSM had to terminate the project.
Delivery of an Interactive Education and Training Program to the Kola NPP, completed, d. nr. SSM2012/4148
Kola NPP uses interactive training programmes for the training and examination of its operating and maintenance staff so that they are able to maintain their level of knowledge and keep their licenses and perform their tasks within the Kola NPP organisation. The examination results are then transferred to the head office of the mother company, Rosenergoatom in Moscow, who issues the personal certificates. The Kola NPP requested support from SSM in the provision of such training programmes in 2011. In November 2012, SSM purchased these interactive programs, developed by the Russian company “Simulation Systems” in Obninsk, which were delivered to the Kola NPP December. The programs were tailored to fit the technical requirements of the Kola NPP and covered the areas of nuclear safety, radiation protection and fire safety.
Exchange of operators’ experience between the Forsmark and Leningrad NPPs, completed, d. nr. SSM2011/2785
In 2007 and 2008, SSM organised and sponsored exchanges between the operators of the Forsmark NPP in Sweden and Leningrad NPPs. This proved most successful and it was at long last possible to have an additional
exchange in 2012 when reactor operators discussed various procedures on the production process and the management of safety systems. In February 2012, five reactor operators from Forsmark NPP visited Leningrad NPP for one week to follow the Russian operators’ routines and study the safety culture. A corresponding visit from LNPP operators was arranged in Forsmark in September 2012. When the Director of the Leningrad NPP visited SSM and Forsmark in December 2012, there was much mentioning of the exchange visit and of a request from Leningrad NPP to use this type of model for sharing experiences in other areas of work. The project is
completed for the moment, but a new project, based on this work, may be developed in the future.
Equipment for thickness measurement of for feed-water pipes systems at Leningrad NPP, ongoing, d. nr. SSM 2011/3142
The structural integrity of the water pipes at a nuclear power plant is an essential safety feature. In this project, SSM aims at providing the Leningrad NPP with equipment that makes it possible by scanning to measure the thickness of pipes so that potential leakages and breaks can be detected at an early stage. In 2012, SSM carried out a tender process and received one bid from a consortium of companies. The offer required further price negotations before the contract was signed. The project is co-financed by Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA), SSM and Leningrad NPP; the installation and site inspections are planned for 2013.
Gamma-tracer for leakages to the groundwater at Kola NPP, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/3429
At the Kola NPP, small amounts of radioactivity in the groundwater have been identified, yet it has not been possible to locate the sources. SSM decided to provide equipment to the Kola NPP capable of measuring the extent of the radioactivity in drilled holes and thus determine to which extent the groundwater is contaminated and potentially also identify the source of the leakage. In 2012, there was a tender process for the selection of the proper equipment and a contract for the purchase of the most appropriate equipment was signed. It is planned that in the first half of 2013 the equipment will be delivered and put into operation.
Batteries for the emergency power supply at the Kola NPP, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/450
The existing batteries for Units 1 and 2 at the Kola NPP are old and in need of being replaced by new accumulator batteries. The purpose of the batteries is to secure the power supply to Units 1 and 2 in the event of loss of external power supply to the reactors and the diesel generators. There are in total five
battery sets for the two reactors. This project comprices the delivery of one battery set to Kola NPP. The remaining four battery sets will be purchased by Kola NPP at a later stage if the new battery is proven to be efficient and safe. The battery sets financed by SSM will be deliverd and installed in 2013.
Development of ”Risk Monitoring” at Leningrad NPP, completed, d. nr. SSM2011/1064
The control room for Full Scope Simulator at Leningrad NPP where Risk Monitor is used in training
The “Risk Monitoring” system is designed to give real-time information on the various parts and technical sub-systems present in nuclear power plants as well as indicate how various situations of stress and failure may affect other components. Rosenergoatom expressed an interest in testing this system for its safety infrastructure at the Leningrad NPP. In the course of 2012, SSM and Leningrad NPP held three meetings to discuss the prospects of installing a Risk Monitor at the power plant. At the last meeting in December 2012, it was still not clear whether the Leningrad NPP was interested in installing this equipment. SSM had made sure the Russian nuclear regulator was present at the meetings where the system was
discussed in full, since many of the Risk Monitor’s functions may contribute to the regulatory control and oversight of nuclear facilities. The Finnish regulator, STUK, also participated in the meetings and is in the process of developing a similar project related to the Risk Monitor for 2013. For SSM, however, this project is completed.
Upgrading of the Trunk-Line Radio Communication System at the Leningrad NPP- phase 2, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/4150
The Trunk-Line Radio Communication System (TRCS) is essential for the normal operation of the Leningrad NPP, and in emergency situations, when it is used to direct actions for mitigating the consequences of events and accidents. A so-called “Tetra – based” TRCS was installed at LNPP in 2005.
Rosenergoatom’s requirements for internal communication systems have increased significantly since then. Because of this, and other technical reasons, there was a need for upgrading that system. The purpose of this project was to create a unified network, increase the number of line subscribers and connect the automatic radiation monitoring system to the local warning system. SSM’s share of the system related to the purchase of the hard- and software of the radio system; the installation was paid by the Leningrad NPP. The system will be finaly delivered and taken into operation in the first half of 2013.
Swedish cooperation with the Institute for Radiation Hygiene (IRH), St-Petersburg, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2011/2047
The project supports the cooperation between IRH and Malmö University in research that will strengthen the ability of IRH to serve in the Russian emergency preparedness system by providing scientific information and measurement data to other authorities. The cooperation takes the form of exchange of scientists, joint measurement campaigns and the purchase of equipment for IRH. There are two main areas of research targeted by the cooperation. The first is the medical application of radiation, with a focus on quality assurance in computer tomography and standard X-ray, as well as in patients dosimetry. The second area is environmental dosimetry, focusing on post-Chernobyl exposure in the Bryansk region in Russia, i.e. a region hard hit from the Chernobyl fallout. A measurement campaign was carried out in Bryansk by experts from IRH and Malmö University in September 2012.
Swedish cooperation with Khlopin Institute, St-Petersburg, suspended, d. nr. SSM2013/2543
The Khlopin Institute has a long-standing reputation and function for providing data on the releases of radiation and the levels of radiation in the Baltic Sea. The Khlopin Institute provides this information to the Russian emergency preparedness system. The project aimed at providing equipment for sampling and analysis in support of the Khlopin Institute’s role of monitoring the radiation levels in Baltic Sea. However, the Khlopin Institute was unable to sign a cooperation agreement with SSM in 2012; therefore the project is pending further discussions.
The outcome and impact of work in nuclear safety and
emergency preparedness in Russia
The cooperation with Russia in the area of reactor safety and emergency preparedness is of great importance to both Russia and its neighbouring countries. Improvements in Russia add a layer of safety and prediction to other countries in the region as well, which is another important aspect. Un-der this heading 16 projects are summarised. The outcomes they have pro-duced include improved tools for identifying errors and malfunctions to ena-ble early detection of potential safety issues. Four projects have focused on various measures that ensure the continued cooling of a reactor being se-cured under all imposed conditions, which is a crucial safety feature. Other projects have in general terms strengthened the training capabilities and the safety culture’s infrastructure. An overarching focus in waste issues for nu-clear operators in Russia, especially for waste from RBMK reactors, has been to identify different ways of handling the major challenges in this field. Finally, there has been an improvement of the capabilities for Russian organ-isations to identify releases of radioactivity, which then improved their abil-ity to input into the Russian emergency preparedness infrastructure. It is probably fair to say that, together with similar efforts and cooperation schemes financed by Norway, Finland and Russia (Rosenergoatom), there has been a genuine impact on the nuclear safety at the Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants. Yet, with reference to Rosenergoatom’s meticulous pride in spreading positive experiences from its cooperation with Sweden and the other Nordic countries to all nuclear power plants in Russia, it is fair to conclude that the impact in Russia have reached far beyond the invest-ments made by Russia’s international partners.
In 2013, the Swedish Government will review whether cooperation on nu-clear safety shall continue. SSM will follow the Government’s instruction in this regard but will also explore possibilities to increase its focus on decom-missioning and emergency preparedness issues in its cooperation with the Kola and Leningrad NPPs.
Projects Russia: Nuclear non-proliferation
Major activities related to the G-8 Global Partnership, completed, d. nr. SSM2012/1296
G-8 Global Partnership meeting in Moscow
In 2012, SSM participated in most activities governing international cooperation in the nuclear and radiological field. In March 2012, during the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, the Swedish delegation was asked by the US chair of the G-8 Global Partnership whether Sweden would be willing to host one of the five meetings that were organised during the US presidency of the G-8 during that year. Sweden was asked because of its close relations with the USA in the international assistance field. In August, the conference took place in Saltsjöqvarn, Stockholm, under a cost-sharing arrangement between the US State Department and SSM. The meeting was opened by the Swedish State Secretary from the Ministry of the Environment. Over 100 participants attended, which was by far the largest G-8 Global Partnership meetings held in 2012.
In early 2012, SSM, the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority discussed whether an
international donors’ conference should be arranged for the work remaining to be done in Russia and the former Soviet Union. The issue was raised at the Global Partnership meetings in March and June and a decision agreed at the August meeting in Saltsjöqvarn. The “Moscow Conference” as it is today referred to by Rosatom (the full name was: The G-8 Global Partnership:
Assessment and Options for Future Programming in the Fields of Nuclear and Radiological Security) took place in November aimed at taking stock of
the implemented efforts in Russia primarily, with a reference to the formulation of the G-8 Global Partnership Declarations in 2011 and 2012, and at creating an agenda for the remaining tasks. The conference counted more than 100 participants from 11 states that adhere to the Global Partnership.
Nuclear material accountancy system for the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2008/241, SSM2008/242
The Chepetsk Mechanical Plant (CMP) has the world’s largest capacity for natural uranium production. However, the measurement of the incoming unprocessed and outgoing processed materials has been insufficient for dec-ades, which resulted in discrepancies between the inventories and the record-ings of nuclear material. As natural uranium is at the early stage of the ura-nium production cycle, an accurate control at CMP may have far-reaching positive consequences for the control of later stages of the fuel cycle being processed at other facilities. Measurement capabilities at the CMP facility were improved by the delivery of gamma spectrometry equipment in 2011 with financial and technical support from SSM. This equipment allows for a qualitative measurement of the incoming materials to the plant and the out-going materials being directed to other facilities. In 2012, a contract was signed with the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk for the development of measurement methodologies for different types of nucle-ar materials as well as for the provision of calibration samples. This pnucle-art of the cooperation between SSM and CMP will be finalised in June 2013. In 2012, two meetings took place in Moscow and Stockholm between SSM, CMP, Rosatom and the Rosatom fuel company TVEL for negotiating the development of software for the nuclear materials accounting system at the facility. An action plan was set up for the coming tendering and contracting procedures. However, SSM was notified of a possible reorganisation at Rosatom, which may lead to the movement of the production of natural ura-nium from CMP to another facility by 2016. Further clarifications in 2013 will be necessary before SSM can define the exact scope of its assistance with regards to additional software development aimed at the nuclear mate-rials accounting system.
Physical protection upgrades for the “Serebryanka” vessel at Atomflot, Murmansk, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/4693
Atomflot is the Russian civilian icebreaker fleet with a land-based
maintenance and technical repair facility and port in Murmansk. This facility plays a key role in the management and storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in northwest Russia from spent fuel shipments originating from decommissioned and dismantled nuclear submarines. To reduce the threat of sabotage and theft of nuclear and radioactive materials, the
improvement of the physical protection system on the vessels designated for the transport of spent nuclear fuel is a high priority. SSM has chosen to support the service vessel “Serebryanka” with the modernisation of its physical protection system. The vessel has been refurbished for the transport of fresh and spent nuclear fuel containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) originating from various dumping and storage sites on the coast of the Kola Peninsula. The physical protection system on “Serebryanka” will have to fit into the overall integrated physical protection system for Atomflot that includes both land-based and mobile facilities being constructed with the assistance from USA, UK and Norway. In the earlier stages of the cooperation, technical specifications for the “Serebryanka's” physical protection system were developed and finalised by Atomflot. A tender process was then implemented for the detailed design of the physical
protection system. In June 2012, a meeting in Stockholm was arranged to discuss the procurement of the physical protection system. SSM hired an international expert on physical protection systems on vessels to assess the Russian proposal and its price. This prolonged the time span before a contract could be signed, yet it also led to a more favourable price. The contract documentation was developed in late 2012 but the signing of the contract for a complete physical protection system to be installed on the vessel was scheduled for early 2013. The duration of the work is scheduled to take one year.
Education and training in the field of nuclear non-proliferation at Russian universities and technical institutes, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/519, SSM2012/1637, SSM2012/3145
Meeting in Sweden with the main partners from Russia and Ukraine concerning the SSM project on nuclear non-proliferation education
The aim of the project is to support Russian universities in their efforts to establish and improve nuclear non-proliferation education and research capabilities. Sweden has chosen to cooperate with three regions: Tomsk, Urals and St-Petersburg, which are subject to rapid nuclear sector
modernisation and restructuring. There are new ways of looking at nuclear threats, peaceful uses of nuclear technology and international cooperation in the nuclear field – not least in the Siberian and Urals regions where the nuclear weapons complex is undergoing changes and where more and more nuclear activities are moving to the civilian sector. The main activities implemented during 2012 were: the completion of a training course on non-proliferation for faculty members/teachers from St-Petersburg and the Central region universities; continued support to PhD programs at universities in Tomsk; enhancement of non-proliferation knowledge and thinking among students in the Siberian and Ural regions.
Moreover, support was provided for the participation of russian students at international conferences and training courses. SSM also initiated
cooperation with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) thus providing Russian partners the opportunity to get an insight into CTBTO’s work and tasks within the international nuclear non-proliferation arena. Two coordination meetings were held in Sweden with SSM’s education project partners from Russia and Ukraine. Results were summarised and evaluated, and strategies outlined for future actions. The project spured the development of networks and contacts not only within Russia but also with partners from Ukraine and international organisations.
Combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in the Kaliningrad Region, completed, d. nr. SSM2011/726
Visit at the Agency for Civil Defence and Fire-fighting Services of the Kaliningrad Region
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad has become separated geographically from the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation. Due to the Cold War’s military legacy in the Kaliningrad region, there are significant problems relating to the disposal of nuclear and radioactive waste. Based on the experience previously gained in the Murmansk region, Rosatom and SSM decided in late 2011 to establish a combating system in the Kaliningrad Region. SSM carried out a fact-finding visit to Kaliningrad together with Rosatom’s Coordination Centre Atombezopasnost in
November 2011. This lead to a signed contract for the development of a proper detection and information infrastructure for combating illicit
trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. The system was approved by the Government of the Kaliningrad Region in October 2012. In parallel an Information and Analytical Centre on the basis of the Agency for Civil Defence and Fire-fighting Services of the Kaliningrad Region was established. This Centre enables seizures of radioactive and nuclear
materials entering the alert and preparedness system of the Region. In December 2012, the system for combatting illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials, including the entire mobile detection laboratory, was put into operation.
Upgrades for the physical protection system at the Nerpa Shipyard, Murmansk, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2011/4036
Replacement of the perimeter fence at the Nerpa Shipyard
The Nerpa shipyard situated west of Murmansk has been involved since 1996 in various dismantlement works for various nuclear-powered vessels, such as submarines and other military vessels. This has required increased levels of nuclear security. Sweden is assisting, together with other
international donor countries, Russia in the implementation of the General Plan for Reconstruction of the Physical Protection System at the Nerpa shipyard (2008-2015). In 2011, SSM financed the reconstruction of
fortifications of the administrative building (installation of new bullet-proof windows, window bars, security doors and supply of spare parts for earlier secured facilities). In 2012, SSM and Norway agreed to finance the replacement of the perimeter fence, which is a significant part of the entire physical protection system and which must be in line with national and international security requirements. SSM financed the technical
reconstruction and material supply and Norway the construction works. The supply of a special purpose monitoring equipment, including an independent energy supply and communication system, is to be financed from the
Russian State budget in the last stage of the project. The parts of the project under SSM’s responsibillity will be finalised in October 2013.
Completing efforts regarding illicit trafficking in the Murmansk Region, completed, d. nr. SSM2011/1996
In 2011, SSM and Atombezopastnost, who were partners in the
establishment of a regional system for combating the illegal transportation in the Murmansk Region (SSM2011/726), agreed that follow-up activities to put the system into operation and make it part of the regional emergency preparedness system would be important. Therefore, SSM decided to contribute to the Monitoring and Forecasting Centre of the Murmansk Region EMERCOM when it in May 2012 organised its first international conference on “Monitoring of natural and man-made processes – the basis for emergency situation prevention in the Murmansk Region”. During the conference a simulation-based demonstration of the interaction between different radiation monitoring and emergency response systems in an emergency situation at a nuclear facility was carried out - using the equipment delivered by SSM in 2011 for combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. The main purpose of the conference was to underline the importance of the international cooperation in nuclear security and radiation safety management.
The outcome and impact of work in nuclear
non-proliferation in Russia
Cooperation with Russia in nuclear non-proliferation has its origins in the ‘sins and omissions’ of the Soviet Union, which led to the formulation of the G-8 Global Partnership in 2002. Today, international cooperation with Rus-sia continues to secure proper control over nuclear materials. The outcome of the projects mentioned under this heading is that nuclear materials will be better protected at several nuclear facilities and during their transportation. Moreover, the Russian capability to detect and deter clandestine trade and transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials has increased in the Murmansk and Kaliningrad regions as a result of SSM’s cooperation efforts. SSM’s training and education for teachers and students were delivered at training facilities and universities in the Urals region and Siberia. Other in-ternational partners cooperate with Russia at some nuclear facilities on the protection of materials, for instance the USA has an encompassing program directed towards nuclear facilities and training institutes in the Urals and Siberia. For the countries that continue to cooperate with Russia, there have been various meetings at the G-8 Global Partnership level, where Sweden devoted large efforts in 2012 to strengthen this institutional underpinning. When considering all the outcomes delivered, it is reasonable to state that Sweden’s efforts implemented at Russian facilities had a positive impact on their level of protection. Together with efforts implemented by other states – and Russia – at many other facilities, it is clear that international cooperation has delivered positive impacts and outcomes.
In 2013, many of the mentioned efforts will continue as SSM projects, just as Sweden will strengthen its coordination with predominantly the USA and Norway.
Projects Russia: Legacy and other nuclear and
radio-active waste issues
Replacement of radioactive thermal generators, RTGs from lighthouses on the coast of the Bay of Finland, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2009/4744
For many years in Russia, the lighthouses with radioactive sources as power supply have been considered to be an imminent threat against the
environment and to pose a risk as a tool for potential malevolent uses. Norway, the USA, Germany and Canada have implemented many projects in various parts of the former USSR to remove these radioactive sources and replace them with solar panels. Since September 2010, SSM cooperated with Finland, Norway and Russia on the removal of more than 70 radio-thermal generators (RTGs) from lighthouses on the Russian coast of the Bay of Finland. In 2012, the project was completed as regards to all practical matters related to the removal of the RTGs and the replacement of them by solar panels. However, the formal closing of the project was originally scheduled for September 2012, but was then postponed till late November and now to August 2013. It is various security clearance issues for the visits in Russia that have caused these delays. All SSM activities have been implemented and all invoices paid. However, the formal closing of the project will not occur until the final meeting has taken place with the four project partner countries.
Feasibility studies of the needs and requirements for the electricity infrastructure at Andreeva Bay, Murmansk, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/4525
In 2012, SSM started negotiations with Rosatom, SevRAO, Italy, Norway and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) on the establishment of an improved and strengthened power supply system at Andreeva Bay. The electricity supply will need to be capable of satisfying the needs of the site when the whole infrastructure has been built and all the equipment for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste has been installed. SevRAO carried out a feasibility study, which was reviewed by the EBRD and Norway, and aims to propose an optimised solution to satisfy the energy needs as well as the legal requirements for the regular, reserve and emergency power supply for this type of facilities. A separate Andreeva Bay Power Supply Working Group was established inside the Andreeva Bay Technical Steering Group to deal specifically with the issue of the power supply. The commissioning of the equipment for the management of spent nuclear fuel is expected to start operations in 2015, and it will for its operation rely on a large reliable power supply. Discussions so far have indicated a division of labour, with Sweden potentially financing the design, Italy delivering the equipment and Rosatom installing the additional diesel generators. New transformers needed for more electricity supply from the local grid would be financed by the EBRD. Signing of the contracts is expected in 2013.
Participation in and contribution to the Contact Expert Group meetings regarding radioactive and nuclear waste issues in Russia, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2008/2026
The Contact Expert Group (CEG) under the auspices of the IAEA was established at the initiative of Sweden in the 1990s and was intended to promote international cooperation to assist the Russian Federation in addressing nuclear legacy issues such as the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. As other Member States, Sweden contributes annually 10,000 euros as CEG membership fee. In 2012, there were two activities organised by the CEG with Sweden giving a presentation at both: a workshop “Implementation of International Nuclear Legacy Programs in Russia”, in Helsinki in April; and the Plenary Meeting in Paris in October. During 2012, many discussions centred on the future of the CEG and its relationship with the Global Partnership. It was decided that, besides the focus on Russia and its nuclear legacy problems, the CEG should consider expanding its membership to new countries and widen its focus areas, for example the safety and security of radioactive sources. This particular topic was proposed for the upcoming workshops in 2013. Ukraine joined the CEG as an observer in 2012. Canada and the UK suspended their participation for the time being due to the formulation of new priorities in their Global Partnership work. Norway will hold the CEG chairmanship during 2013-2014.
Establishment of a control dosimetry station at Andreeva Bay, Murmansk, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/1265
At the request of The Northern Federal Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SevRAO) a new project was launched in 2012 at the Andreeva Bay site on establishing a dosimetry control station at the access point to the controlled zone of the site for vehicles, equipment and personnel. The control station will increase the safety and security culture at the site, ensure that no radioactive material can pass in or out of Andreeva Bay without authorization and prevent radioactive contaminated vehicles, equipment or personnel leaving the site before being decontaminated. The dosimetry control station will also improve the preparedness and response in case of a radiological emergency at the site. In June 2012, the project financing agreement was signed between SSM and SevRAO. The project covers the entire infrastructure as well as all equipment to be delivered by
subcontractors. In 2012, all contract activities proceeded according to the work plan; the site acceptance test for the finalised dosimetry control station is expected to be approved at the end of 2013.
Provision of containers for the transportation of highly radioactive waste from Gremikha Bay, Kola Peninsula, ongoing, d. nr.
SSM2012/1266
Gremikha Bay is a former naval base situated on the eastern part of the Kola Peninsula. Most of the spent nuclear fuel has been removed from the site, yet large amounts of radioactive waste remain and await transportation to the Sayda Bay site, north of Murmansk, where a facility for the treatment and
storage of these materials has been built. To facilitate this transportation, SSM signed a contract in August 2012 with the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, “Radioactive Waste Management Enterprise RosRAO”, for the provision of six containers for the radioactive waste. The containers will be delivered initially to Atomflot, in Murmansk, before being used for the transportation of radioactive waste between Gremikha Bay and Sayda Bay. The project will be completed in August 2013.
Final support measures for the Russian efforts to establish a final repository for nuclear and radioactive waste, completed, d. nr. SSM2010/4291
In 2012, SSM completed its support activities with the central Russian operating agencies such as Rosatom, RosRAO, The Nuclear Safety Institute (IBRAE) and Federal Center of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (FCNRS) in the field of the management of nuclear and radioactive waste. Many years of international cooperation has finally resulted in the Russian authorities establishing in 2012 a national legislation for the management of nuclear and radioactive waste from nuclear power plants. Political choices were made to support the legislation in terms of how to categorise the various waste products and where and when to develop the plans for a final repository. In short, Russia has chosen a strategy where spent nuclear fuel will be
reprocessed for re-use in new nuclear fuel and where only radioactive waste will be placed in a repository. From 2009 until 2012, SSM and the Swedish Nuclear Waste Management Agency (SKB) conducted a project with Russian counterparts in the nuclear and radioactive waste management area to define new possible ways of optimising waste management strategies in the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and in direct disposal, as per the Swedish strategy. Since Russia decided to opt for a different approach than Sweden’s, the last part of the project became redundant. Other auxiliary efforts, including the publication of various materials on nuclear and radioactive waste issues in Russia and the transfer of methods for making safety cases and environmental impact assessments, also became less relevant as the methods and preferences that Sweden could have contributed with did not match the strategies chosen by the Russian authorities.
Cooperation with the Russian regulatory authority, Rostekhnadzor, on nuclear waste issues, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2010/3668
During 2012, SSM re-established its contacts with Rostekhnadzor’s section dealing with waste issues. Because the Waste Management Law in the Russian Federation is now in force, Rostekhnadzor benefits from a stronger status and role as supervisor of the industry. A meeting between experts from SSM and Rostekhnadzor took place in May to discuss matters for continued cooperation, and a study visit to the final repository for operational waste in Forsmark NPP took place. Following these efforts a delegate from the Rostekhnadzor’s support organisation Scientific and Engineering Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SEC NRS) was invited to participate in the OECD/NEA’s peer review of the application for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel in Sweden. SSM also finalised the preparations for a workshop for January 2013 on the exchange of
experiences for the supervision of facilities for radioactive waste storage and processing. This workshop will include a study visit to the Oskarshamn NPP and Studsvik Nuclear.
The outcome and impact of work in nuclear legacy and
other nuclear and radioactive waste issues in Russia
In 2004, Sweden started cooperating with Russia in the field of nuclear and radioactive waste management. This cooperation concerned the waste gener-ated in the nuclear power sectors and the strategic planning for taking care of these materials. In 2012, cooperation with Russia in this field came to a close as Russia made a number of crucial decisions on the treatment and storage of their waste, which resulted in the instigation of a national legislation. Coop-eration with Sweden has over the years exposed Russian organisations and their decision-makers to the Swedish know-how, and together with inspira-tion from other countries such as Finland, France and others, Russia has gained valuable experience in this field. Swedish efforts in the area of legacy waste (waste that dates back to the Soviet era) remain an important issue, with the focus directed on northwest Russia, and projects implemented in cooperation or coordination with Norway or Norway and Finland, respec-tively. The outcome of these projects include a solution for identifying cer-tain hazards related to radioactive materials as well as the creation of a framework that protects people and the environment from exposures to radi-ation and other infrastructure that will make it possible, in the long term, to move all radioactive materials to safe storage sites. The impact of these ef-forts are slow in coming due to the enormous investments that need to be made, the complicated procedures that have to be developed and followed as well as the new technologies that have to be developed to make remediation work safe and secure.
In 2013 and the years to come, Sweden intends to keep working in the field of legacy waste management in Russia in close cooperation with Norway and Finland.
Moldova
Projects Moldova: Radiation safety
Delivery of inspection tools and ‘transportation capability’ for the Moldovan regulatory authority, completed, d. nr. SSM2012/3434, SSM2012/3435
Delivery of mobile detection laboratory in Chisinau, Moldova
SSM’s cooperation with the Moldova`s National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activity (NARNRA) is based on a priority plan by the Government of Moldova on improving radiation detection capabilities. To strengthen the radiological measurement capacity building, SSM has provided Agency with personal protective clothing and handheld equipment for conducting inspections.
To further improve NARNRAs inspection capabilities, in the course of 2012, SSM financed a mobile-vehicle based measurement laboratory for
inspections, calibration, finding and recovery of lost radioactive sources and radiation detection. In order to support infrastructure development for emergency preparedness in Moldova, SSM has had discussions with the State Hydrometeorology Service (SHS) and NARNRA on delivery of a gamma spectrometer and supporting training program for 2013.
In order to initiate exhaustive, step- by-step approach to all aspects of nuclear security, and particularly, on nuclear security culture, SSM together with NARNRA arranged a two-day Workshop in Chisinau on November 7-8, 2012. The main focus was put on the methodology and practical steps to be taken on how to improve nuclear security in the Black Sea countries.
Regional conference on nuclear security issues, completed, d. nr. SSM2012/743
In 2012, SSM and NARNRA respectively sponsored and hosted a
conference for states that are members of the GUAM (Georgian, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) regional cooperation. The conference raised issues related to nuclear security and attempted to make the participating states address their challenges and progress in the field and measure them against the requirements set in the Nuclear Security Summit documents. The conference was successful, and for the first time attracted 45international experts to Moldova and framed their nuclear security challenges in a regional manner. One of the main outcomes of the conference was the Secretariat of the GUAM’s willingness to address nuclear security issues. For 2013, SSM and NARNRA plan to organise a regional conference for Moldova and other states bordering the Black Sea to address issues related to the illegal transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials.
Study of the Moldovan needs related to capacities for emergency preparedness and environmental surveillance, completed, d. nr. SSM2012/3427
Moldova lies in a geographical neighbourhood where several states (Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania) possess large nuclear power sectors. Moreover, the region experiences numerous cases of illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials. The Transnistria region of Moldova, which is not under proper control of the Moldovan government, gives special rise to such concerns. However, Moldova does not have any
capability of monitoring the situation in relation to the level of radiation. The seriousness of this situation stood out during the Fukushima accident when Moldova was unable, based on its own analytical capabilities, to advise its citizens of possible hazards. In 2012, SSM evalutated the situation as to the needs and the organisational issues related to the efforts required to upgrade equipment and analytical tools. A new project is being scoped that foresees the delivery of essential equipment and the implementation of training activities in the course of 2013 and 2014 to be started in 2013.
The outcome and impact of work in radiation safety in
Moldova
In 2012, the cooperation between Moldova and Sweden experienced a break-through in the nuclear field from addressing the most essential needs in Moldova to covering wider and more progressive issues in their national control mechanisms. Moldova has a clearly defined plan for the development of its national regulatory authority and it has been easy for SSM to find gaps and then contribute to fill them within this plan. The outcome in 2012 has been that the regulatory office has increased its inspection capabilities by means of the delivery of a vehicle and equipment that allow staff to be pre-sent in more places, more often and carry out more inspections. Moreover, Moldova has taken additional steps in reducing nuclear security challenges
and increasing its presence in the nuclear security field by organising a re-gional conference on nuclear security, which led to a strengthening of its contacts and exchanges with neighbouring countries. Initial steps in the building of a national emergency preparedness infrastructure have been tak-en and will be implemtak-ented in the years to come. The mtak-entioned issues gtak-en- gen-erated a certain impact and it is important to note that the development of the Moldovan regulatory authority is progressing, albeit at a slow, yet planned, determined pace. Other engaged actors such as the European Union and the USA focus on border control issues while SSM has its focus on the devel-opment of regulatory competences.
In 2013, SSM will continue to implement the work on the development of a basic emergency preparedness infrastructure as well as further strengthening Moldova’s regional cooperation activities by sponsoring a conference on combating of illicit trafficking in the Black Sea region, hosted by Moldova.
Georgia
Projects Georgia: Radiation safety
Historical survey of Georgia in the “Nuclear Age”, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/1025
The project team for the Historical Survey on Georgia’s Nuclear Past
When the IAEA’s Additional Protocol was about to enter into force, Sweden submitted a report to the IAEA to present its past record of nuclear activities. This was done to avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions regarding activities undergone in the 1950s and 1960s when Sweden had a nuclear weapons program. Later Sweden sponsored thewriting of similar reports for the Baltic States. As these states were part of the USSR and there were military nuclear activities on those territories misunderstandings could have arisen as to what were past Soviet activities and later post-Soviet civilian activities. The reports for Sweden and the Baltic States were handed over to the IAEA and considered now as “best practice”. The IAEA encourages other states to follow these initiatives when they join the Additional Protocol. Georgia was also part of the Soviet Union and there were nuclear research of a civilian and military nature as well as a deployment of nuclear weapons in the country. Moreover, there was a large use of radioactive sources for military purposes for batteries and guidance systems for aircraft. In February 2012, SSM initiated a project similar to the ones specified above for Sweden and the Baltic States. The aim was to disclose the Soviet nuclear activities in Georgia to make a full report to the IAEA. Moreover, Georgia’s problems with orphan radioactive sources would be helped by discovering and collecting information in archives on the use and placement of
expertise from the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies in Monterey to make sure that the survey on Georgia’s nuclear history fulfils the scientific criteria, that results can be published and the report submitted to the IAEA. In 2013, the findings will be presented at the annual conference of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, one of the most prestigious associations in the nuclear management area. In the fall of 2013, the project will be completed and results published.
Support to the regional office in Poti of the Georgian nuclear regulatory authority, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2010/2363
Outside Western Regional office in Poti, Georgia
For a couple of years, SSM and the US State Department’s Nuclear Security Outreach Initiative (NSOI) have collaborated on the strengthening of the Georgian nuclear regulatory office. Due to Georgia’s large number of seizures of radioactive and nuclear materials it was decided early on that the Georgian authorities needed an inspection and control capability at its main port in Poti. SSM and the US NSOI agreed since 2009 on a shared
mechanism whereby the US would provide the infrastructure and SSM would pay for the salaries of two inspectors located in Poti. The aim of establishing a regional regulatory capacity has worked but the project has been hindered by hold-ups and obstacles. Some of these have been caused by uncertainty over the ownership of the buildings in Poti. Moreover, the regulatory office’s responsibility has moved between various ministries, with each attaching various degree of importance to the issue. In 2012, it seemed as if the overall site’s objective has been accepted and shared by the current governments with plans to establish further regional offices for other authorities in the same building complex in Poti. SSM and the US NSOI Office share the views that the project has developed less straightforward than expected yet the efforts and persistence have, for a relatively small
investment, been able to create a breakthrough in the regional control functions of the regulatory office. For SSM the current contract will expire in December 2013. Continuation in cooperation will depend on the dialogue with the Georgians and US partners.
The establishment of a non-proliferation and nuclear safety training centre at the Andronikashvili Institute of Physics in Tbilisi, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2010/2451
In June 2011, a cooperation agreement between the Georgian science centre Andronikashvili Institute of Physics, Tbilisi, and SSM was established. The purpose of this cooperation concerns the implementation of nuclear security and nuclear non-proliferation. The plan was to create a modern and fully equipped training and education centre, ready for opening by the second quarter of 2013. During the fall of 2012, the comprehensive reconstruction of the Institute was initiated. SSM followed the progress through updates every second week from the construction company and the Institute of Physics. The project will be finalised in spring of 2013. SSM has interacted with the US State Department, as the USA plans to use the facilities for various training purposes in the framework of the US assistance to Georgia in the nuclear non-proliferation field.
The outcome and impact of work in radiation safety in
Georgia
The on-going political constraints in Georgia, including the transition of rights and responsibilities of the Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safe-ty of Georgia from the Ministry of Environment Protection and Natural Re-sources to the Ministry of Energy, have influenced the outcome of bilateral cooperation on radiation safety and security issues between Sweden and Georgia.
In the absence of a national strategy for nuclear and radiological safety and security for Georgia and a weak strategy for radioactive waste management, the regulatory control in the country in these fields is not functioning proper-ly. This has caused difficulties in the implementation of large scale interna-tional projects. Sweden has focused its efforts on capacity building of the regulatory authority; development of the infrastructure for nuclear non-proliferation education and training; research studies of Georgia`s nuclear past, current political environment; and Georgia`s role in the international non-proliferation regime.
In 2013, SSM will continue to strengthen its cooperation with the Georgian regulatory authority and relevant ministries and discuss conditions for the elaboration of a national strategy for nuclear and radiological safety in Geor-gia.
Ukraine
Projects Ukraine: Nuclear safety and emergency
pre-paredness
Cooperation with Energoatom and the Yushno-Ukrainsk NPP Unit 1, on the application of the Periodic Safety Review (PSR) methodology, completed, d. nr. SSM2008/1694
Participants of the PSR final seminar at SSM June 2012
The Periodic Safety Review methodology is a method by which sub-systems and parts of a nuclear reactor undergo a comprehensive safety analysis. At an early stage, in 2007, Energoatom expressed an interest in working with SSM on the application of this method to specific aspects of the reactors in use in Ukraine. When the PSR project thereupon started in 2009, it was supposed to be finalised in 2011, but the project was extended until the end of 2012, as the Ukrainian regulatory authority, SRNIU, requested that the PSR also included experiences drawn from the Fukushima accident. In 2012, the scrutining and application of the 14 Safety Factors used in the PSR were completed and benchmarked against the requirements of the IAEA. Towards the end of the project a seminar was held in June to extend the use of the PSR methodology to the remaining nuclear power plants in Ukraine. The project was completed, yet it has led to the formulation of various smaller projects related tot the Safety Factors of the PSR; for instance the project described below on the aging management (SSM2012/619).
Swedish experts help with the South Ukraine NPP Full Scope Simulator, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/687
The safe operation of nuclear power reactors and the proper use of safety-related features require that staff receive continuous training in simulators. In this project, SSM and Energoatom want to draw on the experiences in
Ukraine and Sweden regarding the role of instructors and simulator
developers from South Ukraine NPP (SUNPP) and those from the Swedish simulator operating company, Nuclear Safety and Training, Ltd. In March 2012, a Swedish delegation of instructors and simulator developers visited the SUNPP and a second exchange took place in November when five persons from SUNPP visited KSU Studsvik. The exchanges led to
discussions on the development of various software tools. These discussions led to a new project to be launched in May 2013 titled “Providing technical assistance for Acceptance Test Programme procedures for the SUNPP plant simulator”.
System for qualification of staff and equipment of the SNRIU, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2009/4200
This project was initially part of the PSR project mentioned above (SSM2008/1694) but from 2011 it became a separate project to help the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) develop a new system for the qualification of staff and equipment. The project has three phases. In Phase 1, September 2011, there was an exchange of information to facilitate an understanding of the Swedish qualification infrastructure, including the organisations involved and the systems for making standards and guidance documentation, quality assurance, qualification process methodology and documentation requirements. Phase 2 concerned the development of technical documentation for the Qualification Mechanised In Service Inspection System (QMISIS). In 2012, five technical documents were developed by the Ukrainian regulator, SNRIU, commented by Swedish experts and submitted to the SNRIU in December. In Phase 3, a qualification pilot study at a Ukrainian NPP will be completed in 2014.
Systems and procedures for the management of ageing reactors, ongoing, d. nr. SSM2012/619
In Ukraine, as in Sweden, it is a challenge to keep increasingly old reactors in operation in a safe and reliable manner. SSM and the SNRIU agreed to cooperate on the SNRIU’s requirements and instructions to ageing management and long-term operation of NPPs. The project will serve as a basis for the preparation of corresponding regulatory documents by the SNRIU. The project activities started in 2012 with an exchange of
information on approaches to ageing management to facilitate a reciprocal understanding of the challenges and methods faced by Sweden and Ukraine. Thereafter, the development of the draft requirements on aging management and long-term operation was initiated in October 2012. As the next stage, in 2013, there will be a review of the draft requirements on aging management and long-term operation by Swedish experts and technical support
organisations from nuclear power plants in Ukraine. In 2014, the developed methods and requirements will be put into use at the Rivne NPP as a pilot case before the requirements are finally published as a manifest by the SNRIU for use at all reactors in Ukraine that are operating towards the end of their intended lifetime.
