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SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO

Case No. 84SA393

Appeal from the District Court, Water Division No. 2

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY

IN THE ARKANSAS RIVER OR ITS TRIBUTARIES IN OTERO, BENT, KIOWA, AND PROWERS COUNTIES AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY,

Appellant,

vs.

THE FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY,

Appellee. Carl M. Shinn, 1302 Thomas L. Shinn, 9958 Wendy S. Shinn, 11527 SHINN LAWYERS P. 0. Box 390 Lamar, Colorado 81052 303/336-4313

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents . . . Table of Authorities Statement of the Issues Statement of the Case . Statement of the Facts Summary of the Argument Argument: Issue I Issue II Issue III PAGE i i i 1 2 2 6 Conclus ion 18 24 26

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Hunger V. Uncampahgre Valley, 192 Colo. 159,

557 P.2d 289 (1976) 11

Roderick v. Colorado Springs, 193 Colo 104,

563 P.2d 3 (1977) 11

Jones V. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (1981) 11-12

Ginter, Jr. v. Palmer & Company, 196 Colo. 203,

585 P.2d 583 (1978) 12

Moore v. 1600 Downing Street, Ltd., 668 P.wd 16 (1983) 25 Discovery Land v. Colorado-Aspen Development Company,

40 Colo. App. 292, 577 P.2d 1101 (1977) 25

STATUTES

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I.

STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUES

THE WATER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY AND FOR FORT LYON CANAL

COMPANY BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL

FACTS AND THE MOVANT, FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY, WAS NOT

ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF

WHETHER AMITY OWED FORT LYON MAINTENANCE COSTS.

II

THE WATER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY AND FOR FORT LYON CANAL

COMPANY BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL

FACTS AND THE MOVANT, FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY, WAS NOT

ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF

WHETHER DEPRECIATION OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF

MAINTENANCE COSTS.

III. THE WATER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY AND FOR FORT LYON CANAL

COMPANY BECAUSE THE MOVANT, THE FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY MOVED

FOR A DETERMINATION OF A QUESTION OF LAW PRIOR TO THE TIME IN

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal stems from an Application for Change of Water

Right submitted by the Amity Mutual Irrigation Company with the

Water Court, Division No. 2. In this case the Fort Lyon Canal

Company, an objector, filed five different counterclaims against

the Amity Mutual Irrigation Company. The Water Court granted

Partial Summary Judgment granting, in part, a judgment against

Amity and for Fort Lyon on Fort Lyon's Fourth Claim of Relief and

Fifth Claim of Relief (Volume 1, Pages 47 and 49).

Amity has appealed the Order and Partial Summary Judgment of

the Water Court (Volume 2, Pages 182-183).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Amity Mutual Irrigation Company (hereinafter called and

referred to as "Amity") filed on March 31st, 1980, an Application

for Change of Water Right with the Water Court, Divison No. 2. On

May 22, 1980, the Fort Lyon Canal Company (hereinafter called and

referred to as "Fort Lyon") filed a Statement of Opposition to

Amity's Application with said Water Court.

Amity, on November 30, 1981, filed with said Water Court a

Seperate Count or Claim against Objector - the Fort Lyon Canal

Company in the same proceeding (Volume 1, Pages 24-28). In this

seperate count. Amity seeks a declaratory judgment by the Water

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respons-ibilities between Amity and Fort Lyon arising out of a written contract entered into by both parties. Said written contract was executed in 1944 and was later made part of a judgment by the Bent County District Court, State of Colorado in Civil Action No. 2158, entitled The Fort Lyon Canal Company, Plaintiff, vs. The Amity Mutual Irrigation Company, Defendant (Volume 1, Pages 64-78). In

the seperate count by Amity, it also seeks a judgment requiring

Fort Lyon to perform all of its obligations and duties under this written contract.

Under the written contract between Amity and Fort Lyon, Fort

Lyon is required to transport Amity water for Amity down the

so-called Western Division of the Fort Lyon canal system. At a cer

tain point on the canal system. Amity water is then split off from

Fort Lyon water, and Amity water is then delivered to various res

ervoirs in the Great Plains Reservoir system. In exchange for the transportation of Amity water by Fort Lyon, Amity is required to

pay 20% of the costs of the maintenance of this Western Division per year to Fort Lyon.

In Amity's Seperate Count or Claim against Objector - The

Fort Lyon Canal Company, Amity alleged that by virtue of this Bent County District Court judgment. Fort Lyon is obligated to trans port for Amity a portion of Amity's decree through the so called

Western Division of the Fort Lyon Canal Company. Amity further

alleges that Fort Lyon failed to perform its obligations under said judgment by refusing to furnish, to Amity records or other in

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the Western Division of the Fort Lyon Canal Company.

Amity also alleges that Fort Lyon during the irrigating

season from April 1, 1981 to October 30, 1981, wrongfully used

Amity water which was diverted under said Western Division upon

Fort Lyon land. Amity also contends that Fort Lyon is obligated

under said contract to maintain the upkeep of said Western Divi

sion but that Fort Lyon has allowed said system to decline and

silt up, thereby reducing its capacity and also reducing the

amount of Amity water actually delivered. Lastly, Amity maintains

that Fort Lyon has been incorrect in its interpretations of said

judgment of the Bent County District Court and that said Water

Court should make the proper interpretations and construction of

the terms of said judgment between the parties.

Thereafter,, Fort Lyon filed a series of pleadings, which

included a Counterclaim against Amity alleging that Amity owed

Fort Lyon money for upkeep and maintenance of the Western Divi

sion, pursuant to the Bent County District Court judgment (Volume

1, Pages 36-39, 44-48). Fort Lyon alleged under its Answer and

Second Amended Counterclaim, under their Fourth Claim for Relief

that Amity owed Fort Lyon the sum of $29,912.00 for maintenance

and operating expense, together with $1,410.00 for equipment

depreciation expense, for a total of $31,322.00 for the year

ending October 31, 1982 (Volume 1, Page 47).

Fort Lyon further alleged in its Amendment to Answer and Second Amended Counterclaim, in their Fifth Claim for Relief that

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operating expense, together with $3,107.00 for equipment depre

ciation expense, for a total of $41,228.00 for the year ending

October 31, 1983 (Volume 1, Page 48). Fort Lyon alleged that part

of the terms and conditions of the Bent County District Court

judgment was that Amity would pay Fort Lyon a yearly maintenance

and operating expense for the upkeep on the Western Division.

Fort Lyon alleged that the upkeep by Amity would amount to twenty

percent (20%) of the maintenance and operating expenses incurred

by Fort Lyon for said Western Division.

Fort Lyon then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asking the

court to enter summary against Amity and for Fort Lyon on Fort

Lyon s Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief as well as other claims

for relief alleged by Fort Lyon (Volume 1, Pages 49-50). Said

Motion for Summary Judgment was filed with the Water Court on

December 16, 1983 and oral argument was held on May 25, 1984 on

said motion.

The Water Court on July 27, 1984, granted partial summary

judgment for Fort Lyon (Volume 2, Pages 182-183), and granted

summary judgment in the amount of $29,912.00 for maintenance and

operating expenses for the year ending October 31, 1982, together

with moritory interest on said amount calculated from October 14,

1983. Further, said Court granted summary judgment in the amount

of $38,121.00 for maintenance and operating expenses for the year

ending October 31, 1983, together with moritory interest on said

amount calculated from November 21, 1983. Lastly, said Court

ordered that Fort Lyon is entitled to claim depreciation on

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® ^

^ i pm Gnt whsn it C3lcul3tGS its msintsnancG and opsrating

expenses for the years ending October 31, 1981, 1982, and 1983.

Although the Court granted depreciation, it did not calculate the

method for computing depreciation but held that the method of

computation of depreciation was in dispute.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. THE WATER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AGAINST AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY AND FOR FORT LYON CANAL

COMPANY BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS AND

THE MOVANT, FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDG

MENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER AMITY OWED FORT

LYON MAINTENANCE COSTS.

Amity submits that summary judgment was improperly granted in

this case by the Water Court in that there were genuine issues as

to material facts over whether Amity owed Fort Lyon for mainten

ance and operating costs. The subject of this appeal deals with

the interpretation of a 1944 contract entered into by Amity and

Fort Lyon; said contract was later made a part of a judgment in

the District Court of Bent County, Colorado, Case Number 2158

(Volume 1, Pages 64-78).

Under the written contract between Amity and Fort Lyon, Fort

Lyon is required to transport Amity water for Amity down the

so-called Western Division of the Fort Lyon canal system. At a

certain point on the canal system. Amity water is then split off

from Fort Lyon water, and Amity water is then delivered to various

reservoirs in the Great Plains Reservoir system. in exchange for

the transportation of Amity water by Fort Lyon, Amity is required

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to pay 20% of the costs of the maintenance of this Western

Division per year to Fort Lyon.

Amity submits that it does not owe Fort Lyon 20% of the main

tenance and operating expenses for the upkeep of the Western Divi

sion of the Fort Lyon canal system inasmuch as Fort Lyon has

breached its part of the contract by repeatedly

refusing to give to Amity records and accounts of the water

diverted down this system, failing to maintain the Western

Division thereby reducing the capacity of said canal, failing to

deliver to Amity water diverted for Amity, and failing to divert

Amity water entirely. A related issue. Issue II, discussed in

this brief is whether or not depreciation of Fort Lyon equipment

and machinery should be considered as part of the maintenance and

operating costs assessed to Amity.

Amity submits that contained in the pleadings, depositions,

discovery, and oral argument are evidence which shows the

above-mentioned issues are disputed between the parties. Accordingly,

Amity submits that these issues ought to be heard at trial and

that the Water Court erred in granting summary judgment against

Amity and in favor of Fort Lyon in this matter.

II* THE WATER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AGAINST AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY AND FOR THE FORT LYON

CANAL COMPANY BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL

FACTS AND THE MOVANT, FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO

A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEPRECIATION

OF EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF MAINTENANCE COSTS.

Amity submits that summary judgment was improperly granted in

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to material facts over whether Fort Lyon was entitled to charge

Amity the costs of depreciation. Again the subject of this appeal

deals with the interpretation of the 1944 contract entered into by

Amity and Fort Lyon; said contract was later made a part of a

judgment in the District Court of Bent County, Colorado.

For the years 1981, 1982 and 1983, Fort Lyon added a charge

of depreciation of equipment and machinery to the bill submitted

to Amity for its 20% share of upkeep and maintenance of the

Vvestern Division. The Water Court granted summary judgment

against Amity on this issue and held that Amity owed depreciation

to Fort Lyon (Volume 2, Pages 182 — 183) . However, the Water Court

stated further that the method of computation of depreciation was

in dispute, and therefore did not rule on how much depreciation

Fort Lyon was entitled.

Fort Lyon admitted during oral argument that this issue of

whether or not Fort Lyon was entitled to depreciation was in

dispute; therefore, the Water Court erred in granting summary

judgment on an issue that both parties admit is in dispute.

Further, the pleadings and oral argument show that the computations made my Fort Lyon on depreciation were in error.

Lastly, there is a question of whether or not the equipment which

Fort Lyon desires to depreciate, is depreciable property.

Accordingly, Amity submits that this issue dealing with

depreciation ought to be heard at trial and that the Water Court

erred in granting summary judgment against Amity and in favor of

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III. THE WATER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AGAINST AMITY.MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY AND FOR FORT LYON CANAL

COMPANY BECAUSE THE MOVANT, THE FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY, MOVED FOR

A DETERMINATION OF A QUESTION OF LAW PRIOR TO THE TIME IN WHICH

THE LAST REQUIRED PLEADING WAS DUE.

Amity submits that the summary judgment was improperly

granted in this case by the Water Court in that the movant. Fort

Lyon, moved for determination of a question of law before the last

required pleading was filed. Rule 56(c) of the Colorado Rules of

Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment may be granted if

the pleadings, depositions, and answers to interrogatories, admis

sions on file, and affidavits show no genuine issue as to any

material fact. Amity submits that before they were allowed to

respond to the Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief of Fort Lyon,

Fort Lyon moved for summary judgment. In otherwords. Water Court

considered and granted summary judgment on a matter in which Amity

had not been afforded the opportunity to respond and answer Fort

Lyon's Fourth and Fifth Counterclaims.

Accordingly, Amity submits that the Water Court erred in

granting summary judgment against Amity prior to all of the plead

ings being filed.

ARGUMENT

I. THE WATER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY AND FOR FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY

BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS AND THE

MOVANT, FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS

A MATTER OF LAW ON THE ISSUES OF WHETHER AMITY OWED FORT LYON

MAINTENANCE COSTS.

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1944 contract entered Into by A.ity and Fort Lyon. Said contract

was later made a part of a judgment in the District Court of Bent

County, Colorado in the case entiled "The Fort Lyon Canal Company,

Plaintiff vs. The Amity Mutual Irrigation, Defendant.", Case No.

2158

in the contract. Fort Lyon was reguired to transport Amitys

"Great Plains" water for Amity down the Western Division of the

Fort Lyon Canal system. At a certain point on the canal system,

this "Great Plains" water is then split off from Port Lyon water

and Amitys Great Plains water is then delivered to various

reservoirs of the Great Plains Reservoir system. I„ exchange for

the transportation of Amity water by Fort Lyon, Amity is required

to pay 20» of the costs of the maintenance of this Western

Division per year to Fort Lyon.

The Water Court erred in granting summary judgment quoting

that Amity owed Fort Lvon 7na

Lyon 20% of the maintenance and operating

^

expenses inasmuch as there were genuine issues as to material

facts and Fort Lyon was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law on this issue.

Rule 56(c) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provides

in part that:

with"i'/

tendered

forth-genuine issue as to any material fact anH f-h t- i-io

moving party is GntiHtaa

j

that the

of law..:

entitled to a judgment as a matter

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judgment may be granted there must not be a genuine issue as to

material facts. In the Colorado Supreme Court case of Bunger v.

Uncampahqre Valley, 192 Colo. 159, 557 P. 2d 389 (1976) the Colo

rado Supreme Court, in discussing summary judgments, stated that:

This Court has specifically stated concerning

C.R.C.P. 56: 'The obvious purpose to be served by

the above rule is to further prompt administration

of justice and expedite litigation by avoiding

needless trials and enable one speedily to obtain a

judgment by preventing the interposition of

unmeri-torious defenses for purpose of delay.' Blain v.

Yockey, 117 Colo. 29, 184 P.2d 1015 ( 1947)"! Where

the facts are clear and undisputed, 'or (are) so

certain as not to be subject to dispute, the court

is in position to determine the issue strictly as a

matter of law.' Morlan v. Durland Trust Co., 127

Colo. 5, 252 P.2d 98 (1952).

Similarly, in the case of Roderick v. Colorado Springs, 193

Colo. 104

, 563 P.2d 3 (1977), the Colorado Supreme Court stated:

C.R.C.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment may

be rendered only if 'there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and .

. . the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'

Summary judgment is appropriate 'only in the

clearest of cases, where no doubt exists concerning

the facts,' Moses v. Moses, 180 Colo. 397, 505 P.2d

1302. In considering a motion for summary judg

ment, all doubts must be resolved against the movant. Abrahamsen v. Mountain States T & T, 177 Colo. 422, 4^4 P.2d 1287.

Not only have the Colorado Courts strictly applied that portion of

Rule 56(c) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure which require

there be no genuine issue as to any material fact, but, also, the

courts have announced that summary judgment is a drastic remedy.

In the Colorado case of Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (1981)

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Sumniary judgment is only granted if the pleadings, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogator ies, and affidavits establish that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and judgment should be entered as a matter of law. C.R.C.P. 56(c). It

is, however, a drastic remedy, and should only be

granted upon a clear showing that there is no genu ine issue as to any material fact...

Also, in the case of Ginter, Jr. v. Palmer & Company, 196 Colo.

203 , 585 P.2d 583 (1978), the Colorado Supreme Court announced

tha t:

Summary judgment, however, is a drastic remedy which denies litigants their right to trial and is never warranted except on a clear showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

. . . The action must proceed to trial if a genuine

issue of material fact exists. The burden of

establishing the lack of a triable issue, there fore, is upon the moving party, and all doubts must

be resolved against him. . .

Accordingly, Amity submits that the burden of showing to the Water

Court that there were no genuine issues as to any material facts fell upon Fort Lyon. Amity submits that there are genuine issues as to material facts and that the moving party is not entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.

One genuine issue between both parties concerns whether Amity

owes Fort Lyon for 20% of the costs of upkeep and maintenance of

the Western Division. Amity submits that although Amity is resp

onsible to pay 20% of the upkeep and maintenance on the Western

Division of the Fort Lyon canal system. Fort Lyon similarly is re

sponsible to transport and deliver Amity water through the Western Division. In the paragraph "Tenth" of the 1944 contract (Volume

1, Page 70, Paragraph Ten) Fort Lyon agreed to recognize and honor

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Amity's perpetual right-of-way through the Western Division. Said right-of-way had been established in an 1897 contract, an attachment to the 1944 contract (Volume 1, Pages 76-78), entered into by Fort Lyon and Amity's predecessor in interest, the Great

Plains Water Storage Company. Under this 1897 contract. Amity was entitled to transport their water decree of 1,150 c.f.s. through

the Western Division (Volume 1, Page 76, Paragraph One). Paragraph "Tenth" of the 1944 contract, however, gave Fort Lyon the prior and exclusive right to divert their water decree of 933 c.f.s. through the Western Division prior to honoring Amity's water decree of 1,150 c.f.s. (Volume 1, Page 70, Paragraph Ten).

Amity submits that Fort Lyon has failed to perform its part of the contract by not transporting and delivering Amity's water

decree of 1,150 c.f.s.

One reason Amity submits that Fort Lyon has not del. iverod all of Amity's decreed 1,150 c.f.s. is because Fort Lyon has allowed the Western Division to fall in a state of disrepair so that the canal no longer has the capacity to carry both the combined decree of Fort Lyon' s 933 c.f.s together with Amity's 1,150 c.f.s.,

making a total 2,083 c.f.s.

During oral argument on Fort Lyon's motion for summary judg

ment, Amity stated to the Court that one reason why Amity felt justified in not paying Fort Lyon for maintenance and operation, was because Fort Lyon was not performing its end of the contract by transporting and delivering Am.ity water through the Western

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it was represented to the Court by Amity that at most. Fort Lyon

is willing to only put into the Western Division 1,560 c.f.s.,

instead of the required 2,083 c.f.s. (Volume III, Page 33, Line

17-21) .

The fact that Fort Lyon has allowed the Western Division to

fall into a state of disrepair was shown in the affidavit by Lewis

Davis, Superintendent of the Amity Mutual Irrigation Canal. In

paragraph 19 of his affidavit, Mr. Davis states:

That, in addition. Affiant has inspected the West ern Division of the Fort Lyon Canal, and that he

last inspected it in February, 1984 and that the

canal was in a bad state of maintenance for the

reason that Fort Lyon has permitted its canal to

become sanded up with very much sand for approxi

mately the first 30 miles, and Affiant knows that Fort Lyon cannot carry and handle the Great Plains

water from the river to the Kicking Bird headgate, as required under the Stipulation of the parties,

and Affiant has heard the representatives of Amity

insist to the representatives of the Fort Lyon that

Fort Lyon should be maintaining its canal in a much

better shape, and that representatives of Amity

think that Amity are not to pay for the maintenance of the Fort Lyon Canal when Fort Lyon Canal is not

able to run the Great Plains Decrees belonging to

Amity. That for the past several years, since

Affiant has been the Superintendent, Fort Lyon has

been able to run only about 1,400 c.f.s in its

canal, which would leave a capacity of only about

450 c.f.s. for Great Plains, leaving the Arkansas

River at La Junta, when, in fact. Amity is entitled to a diversion of 1,150 c.f.s. at that point, as a result of which. Amity is usually always shorted of

water in periods of high river, because Fort Lyon

takes care of its decrees first, and takes care of

the Great Plains decree as a secondary requirement.

(Volume 1, Pages 124-125, Paragraph 19).

Similarly, in the affidavit by Mr. Leo Pollart, President of

the Board of Directors of Amity, he remarks in paragraphs 7, 8,

and 9 of his Affidavit of the increasing inability of the Western

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Division to deliver Amity's decreed water (Volume 1, Page 159,

Paragraphs 7, 8, and 9). Further, Mr. Pollart states that part of

the reason why Amity does not pay Fort Lyon its 20% of the upkeep

on the Western Division is because of Fort Lyon's failure to

provide Amity with Amity's decreed water. In particular, Mr.

Pollart states in the eighth paragraph that;

That Affiant has called this sand deposit and the

reduced capacity of the canal to the attention of

Fort Lyon on many occasions during this period, and

has requested Fort Lyon to correct the situation by

the removal of the sand and has indicated to Fort

Lyon that Amity does not like to pay Fort Lyon its

twenty percent (20%) share of the upkeep unless

Fort Lyon commences action to remove the sand.

(Volume 1, Page 159, Paragraph 8).

Lastly, Mr. Clifford Verhoeff, member of the Board of Direc

tors of Amity for approximately 20 years, also states in an affi

davit that he had noted the state of disrepair of the Western

Division. In paragraph 6 of Mr. Verhoeff's affidavit, he states

that:

That Affiant had not visited the head end of the

Fort Lyon diversion system until February of 1984,

at which time Affiant was shocked and surprised to

see the sorry state the Fort Lyon Canal was in from

a standpoint of maintenance, and Affiant observed

that it was plugged with a tremendous quantity of

sand for the first 30 to 35 miles which seriously

reduces the capacity of the canal. (Volume I, Page

163, Paragraph 6).

The point to be emphasized is that there is a genuine issue

as to whether Amity owes Fort Lyon this 20% upkeep and maintenance

cost. Amity submits that since Fort Lyon has failed to perform

its part of the contract in delivering Amity's decreed water,

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whether Fort Lyon has materially breached its part of the contract thereby excusing Amity from paying, is a genuine issue which

should be allowed to be presented at trial.

In addition, Fort Lyon has refused to deliver to Amity water records appertaining to the water diverted by Fort Lyon into the Western Division. Amity desired to review these records to ascer

tain how much of Amity's decreed water was not being delivered

through the Western Division by Fort Lyon. Although Fort Lyon continually agreed to furnish the records to Amity, it was not until March 28, 1984 that the records were finally furnished to Amity. In the affidavit by Mr. Pollart, he states that:

. . . Amity has taken the position that it will not

pay the statements of Fort Lyon until Fort Lyon

delivers to Amity the records pertaining to the

diversion by Fort Lyon of the Great Plains water

that Affiant has requested Fort Lyon to deliver records of these diversions to Amity on many occa sions including the following specific instances . . . after the trial of a lawsuit on September 11, 1981 . . . a meeting held at the office of Carl M. Shinn, Lamar, Colorado on September 27, 1981 . . .

(Volume I, Page 160, Paragraph 12).

Similarly, Mr. Verhoeff, in Paragraph 11 of his affidavit states:

Also, the Amity board has refused to pay the bills

for further reason that, with respect to its Great

Plains Decree, which is delivered by Fort Lyon,

Amity has never been able to get the diversion records from Fort Lyon, and, although Fort Lyon has promised on numerous occasions to make the records

available. Amity has not received them until just

recently. Affiant remembers on two occasions when he was present, to-wit: September 29, 1981 and

October 13, 1981 in the offices of Fort Lyon at Las Animas, Colorado at which, time the subject of the delivery of the water records was raised, and on

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records that it wanted from Fort Lyon would be

mailed to them within a day or two, but the records never did come. (Volume 1, Page 164, Paragraph

11).

Further, in a letter dated October 12, 1982 from Amity's

attorney to Fort Lyon's attorney, there is a request made for the

Fort Lyon records (Exhibit "K" to Amity's response to Fort Lyon's

Motion for Summary Judgment, Page 157). Lastly, in oral argument,

it is stated by Amity's attorney that:

• . . if there were a trial to the Court, which of

course it is not at this time, but evidence would

show that Amity has made countless requests and demands on all of the people in Fort Lyon to fur

nish the water records. The evidence will further show that despite all of those demands and their frequent statement that they would furnish them immediately, the records were not obtained until March 28, 1984 when these depositions were in ses

sion. (Volume III, Page 25, Lines 7-14).

There is a genuine issue as to whether or not Amity owes Fort

Lyon the costs for upkeep and maintenance. Inasmuch as Amity can

visually see the state of disrepair of the Western Division and

inasmuch as Amity is not receiving its decreed water right of

1,150 c.f.s.. Amity submits that it has a right to withhold

payment to Fort Lyon until Fort Lyon furnished records to Amity

showing the amount of water actually deliverd to Amity.

The point to be emphasized is that this issue of withholding

payment until the records were furnished is a genuine issue which

ought to be allowed to be tried to the Water Court.

Lastly, Amity submits that there is a genuine issue as to whether Amity owes Fort Lyon maintenance costs inasmuch as Fort

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of depreciation. Inasmuch as Amity discusses this issue under a separate section of this brief. Amity will not discuss this matter

in this section other than to point out that this is an additional

reason why Amity feels justified in withholding payment. Amity

again submits that this matter ought to be tried before the Water Court inasmuch as there is a genuine issue over whether or not de preciation ought to be charged by Fort Lyon to Amity.

II. THE WATER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AGAINST AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY AND FOR FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS AND THE MOVANT, FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEPRECIATION

OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF MAINTENANCE COSTS.

Amity submits that the Water Court erred in holding that the

Fort Lyon had a right to charge Amity depreciation, and that summary judgment on this issue was improper for four reasons.

First, Amity submits that the issue of whether depreciation

ought to be considered as part of maintenance costs is a genuine

issue which ought to be litigated at trial. Although Fort Lyon's

attorney stated in oral argument that he felt Fort Lyon ought to

be able to charge Amity depreciation costs, he admitted to the

Court that this issue was disputed between both parties when he

stated that:

It simply sets forth the claim based upon ordinary

maintenance and then adds a figure for deprecia

tion, and the reason that it is broken down is because of the problem that we have had over

whether or not depreciation should be an allowable item. (Volume 3, Page 6, Lines 14-18).

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. But, at any rate, we have broken down these

claims so to set forth in separate amounts so that if the Court in its discretion then allows a Partial summary judgment for which we would ask it

to do so, without reference to depreciation

our position is that it is clear cut, that the

claim which we made for ordinary maintenance are

shown and that partial summary judgment should be

allowed as to those separate claims as broken down. (Volume 3, Page 11, Lines 11-20).

Again during oral argument the Fort Lyon attorney stated:

We submit that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact as to the Fort Lyon claims for rou

tine maintenance operating expenses.

in all

candor, there may be an issue as to the allowance as to depreciation, since that was a hassle between

the parties on different occasions. (Volume 3,

Page 19, Lines 5-9)

Lastly, at the end of oral argument, the Fort Lyon attorney

stated that:

As I stated in my opening argument, in all candor,

there is probably an argument with regard to the

depreciation and that is why in our Motion for Sum

mary Judgment that we have set forth the separate

items. The Court, I submit, may enter summary

judgment for any of these items which are not truly

in dispute, and so that with respect to deprecia

tion, if the Court feels there is a dispute that

particular item can be deleted and become the sub

ject of a later action. . . (Volume 3, Page 36,

Lines 13-20).

a

Amity submits that this issue concerning depreciation is

genuine issue which ought to be litigated at trial; it is clear

that the opposing party also recognizes depreciation to be a

genuine issue and not subject matter for a summary judgment.

Second, Amity submits that the reason why Fort Lyon admits

that there is a genuine issue as to depreciation stems from the

wording of the 1944 contract. Paragraph "Nineteenth" of the 1944

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contract (Volume 1, Page 73, Paragraph 19) states that:

There has been established over a period of years a

definite custom as to the proportion of the Super intendents' salaries, telephone expenses, and other similar expenses which are included in the annual operation and maintenance charges of the respective parties, which custom shall be continued.

Amity submits that they have been receiving from Fort Lyon yearly statements for its share of the operation expenses of the

Western Division since 1944. Heretofore the custom has been established that Amity had never paid nor been required to pay the

charge of depreciation in any of the yearly statements. As the 1944 contract stated, there was established a definite custom as

to what costs were billed to each party. Further, in paragraph

"Twenty-first" of this 1944 contract (Volume 3, Pages 73-74), it

states that:

Prior to the first day of November, 1947, or in any

given year thereafter, in the event the relation

ship between the parties hereto, as controlled by

this stipulation, shall be in existence, they shall

consult and consider a new basis of annual expense

of maintenance and operation, . . . and shall take

into consideration all matters which may effect an equitable division of such cost and expense; it being expressly understood, however, that until a different agreement is reached, and during the

pendency of any negotiations therefore, the basis

provided in this stipulation, findings and decrees shall control to the date of the commencement of an action to obtain a court determination of said division basis.

Inasmuch as no agreement was ever reached between the parties

concerning depreciation costs. Amity submits that the basis or custom heretofore agreed upon between parties shall control. In other words, inasmuch as depreciation had never been an allowable

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expense in maintenance costs. Fort Lyon should not be allowed to

unilaterally commence charging Amity for depreciation.

It is undisputed that Amity has never paid for the costs of

depreciation before. In the affidavit of Mr. Davis he states that;

That Fort Lyon now insists that the statement for

each fiscal year must contain items of deprecia

tion, and Amity refuses to pay the same for the

reason that to the knowledge of Affiant for the

year 1977-1978, and 1979-1980, the statements

contained no items for depreciation, and Affiant is advised by the directors of Amity, and Affiant has

learned from the correspondence in the files of

Amity, that Amity has always refused to pay

depreciation and Fort Lyon has accepted payment

without depreciation . . . at no time has Amity

ever agreed to accept and pay a bill containing

depreciation. (Volume 1, Page 123, Paragraphs 13

and 14) .

The Water Court in the Partial Summary Judgment stated that

Amity's attorney during oral argument admitted that Fort Lyon was

entitled to depreciation. Although Amity never intended to convey

or express to the Court that Amity was in favor of being charged

depreciation. Amity did make the following statement during oral

argument that;

. . . Mr. Lefferdink says, well, everybody has to figure depreciation because Fort Lyon takes it, the

cost of doing business, lawyers have, everybody has

it. Amity has voted to agree to that, and they are

willing to agree, but we submit, your Honor, that

if it applies to them it also applies to Amity, and

Amity has the question as to the way in which its bill should be figured for what Fort Lyon owes it,

under its agreement so if the Fort Lyon is to adopt

a new method, or either party is to adopt a new method, the two boards are supposed to sit down and adopt it . . . (Volume 3, Page 28, Lines 11-20).

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Court that the terms of the 1944 contract ought to be followed in

which custom is to prevail until such time Ss the two boards meet

and agree on the new way to figure maintenance costs. Never did

Amity's attorney expressly agree that maintenance costs were to be

assessed against Amity; at most, Amity's attorney stated that both

parties should follow custom.

The point to be emphasized is that error is a genuine issue

as to whether or not depreciation ought to be an allowable cost.

Inasmuch as the custom heretofore established between both parties

did not allow for depreciation, this matter ought to be allowed to

litigated at trial; therefore, summary judgment was improperly

granted on this issue.

A third reason why Amity submits that summary judgment was

improper on the depreciation issue is because there are obvious

errors in the calculation of said depreciation.

During oral argument, Amity's attorney in referring to the

special report by Fort Lyon's auditor, Mr. Trainor, for the years

ending October 31, 1981, 1982, and 1983, stated:

Now, if the Court will notice there at the bottom

of each of those first sheets, Mr. Trainor says

that he takes into account the following schedule

of depreciation.

On the first year, that is October, '81, he

says, heavy equipment is depreciated over a period

of 7 to 20 years, and in the years '82 and '83 he

says he considers that 5 and a half years. . .

(Volume 3, Page 29, Lines 24-25, and Page 29 a.

Lines 1-6).

The Amity's attorney further pointed out other errors made by

Mr. Trainor in his special report, when he stated that:

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. . . The last item 'other equipment', method,

straight line, life 5 years, and he says equipment

cost is $32,786.00, and so '81 depreciation he

figures $2,045.00 and then the year of '82, he

assigns a different life to it, he assigns a 5 to

15 year life, but he's still got the same equipment

apparently, $32,786.00, and so the '82 depreciation

for some reason is $1,296.00. I submit that if it is straight line depreciation it should be the same

figure on the same equipment year after year until

it is depreciated out and should be over the same

life period. . . . In the year '83 he changes the

cost from $32,786.00 to $35,233.00 which is an in

crease of some $325.00, but yet he has a thousand dollars worth of depreciation to it, but it is this type of figuring, your Honor, that the Fort Lyon

submits to Amity and just says "Pay it." and there

is bound to be, as I view it, something wrong with

Mr. Trainer's depreciation figures. (Volume 3,

Page 30, Lines 2-11, Lines 15-21).

Because of these accounting errors in the computation of the depreciation, summary judgment should not be granted on the issue

dealing with depreciation. Rather, the issue as to depreciation

ought to be allowed to be litigated at trial.

Lastly, the fourth reason why Amity submits that the Water

Court erred in granting summary judgment on the depreciation

issue, is because there is a genuine issue as to whether Fort Lyon

has depreciable property.

It was unrefuted that Fort Lyon had old machinery. In para

graph 21 of the affidavit of Lewis Davis, he states that: . . . with respect to depreciation mentioned above,

Affiant is unable to know how Fort Lyon computes it

for the reason that, according to testimony of Mr.

Paul Converse (Superintendent of Fort Lyon) in a deposition taken between the parties, all of the machinery belonging to Fort Lyon, other than

possibly a few motor vehicles, is a vintage of 15

to 20 years old, and should have been depreciated out a long time ago. (Volume 1, Page 125,

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t

similarly. Amity's attorney stated during oral argument that:

. Mr. Converse testified that every piece of

major equipment of the Fort Lyon canal was almost

as old as the hills, your Honor - - I have forgot ten - - a big old dragline or something like, I think 30 or 40 years old; the more recent additions to their dragline, I have forgotten the number of

years, but, anyway, they're way beyond the period that you ordinarily figure on depreciatin . . . and

then when you account it, his figures there,

coupled with Mr. Converse's deposition, in which he indicates that except for a motor vehicle or two,

pickup or two or three, that Fort Lyon absolutely

has no equipment at all, except a Case manufactured machine and as Amity understands the deal, that is

on some kind of a lease-purchase deal, so that

depreciation shouldn't figure in at all. But the

point is, that if the machinery is as old as Mr.

Converse testified it is, it would have been depre

ciated out under some 20 year period, 10 years, 5 years, whatever, long ago depreciated out before Mr. Trainor ever got into the picture. But it is

this type of accounting to which Amity has always

objected to Fort Lyon . . . (Volume 3, Page 29,

Lines 3-9, Page 30, Lines 21-25, Page 31, Lines

1-7). .

Amity submits that the equipment which Fort Lyon wishes to

depreciate, is nondepreciable property. In any event, this issue of whether or not depreciation ought to be charged to Amity should

be litigated at trial and that it was improper for the Water Court to grant summary judgment on this issue.

III. THE WATER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST AMITY MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY AND FOR FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY BECAUSE THE MOVANT, THE FORT LYON CANAL COMPANY, MOVED FOR A DETERMINATION OF A QUESTION OF LAW PRIOR TO THE TIME IN WHICH THE LAST REQUIRED PLEADING WAS DUE.

On January 17, 1984 Fort Lyon filed with the Water Court an Amendment to Answer and Second Amended Counterclaim of the Fort Lyon Canal Company as to the Fifth Claim for Relief.

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B t

Three days later on January 30 , 1984 , Fort Lyon filed with the Water Court its Motion for Summary Judgment which is the sub

ject of this appeal. The Court subsequently granted partial sum

mary judgment on Fort Lyon's Fifth Claim for Relief.

Amity submits that it was improper for the Water Court to

grant summary judgment in this matter before Amity had the oppor

tunity to file an answer to Fort Lyon's Fifth Claim for Relief.

In otherwords, the Water Court erred in granting summary judgment

before all parties had an opportunity to respond to the pleadings.

Rule 56(c) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure states in

part that;

. • . The judgment sought shall be rendered forth with if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.

In the Colorado Court of Appeals case of Moore v. 1600

Downing Street, Ltd., 668 P.2d 16 (1983) the Court states: Moore's final argument is that he fairly and ade quately represents the partnership members

similarly situated. We hold that the record has

not been adequately developed on this issue; thus, summary judgment was not proper. . .

In addition, the Colorado Court of Appeals case of Discovery Land v. Colorado-Aspen Development Company, 40 Colo. App. 292, 577

P.2d 1101 (1977) the Court stated:

"...However, until the disputed issues of fact are resolved as to the relationship between the

four-defendants, no legal determination can be made as

to whether the parent corporations are liable for

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p

k

subsidiaries. Thus, entry of summary judgment on

this claim was improper.

In the same vein. Amity submits that until they had an opportunity to answer Fort Lyon's counterclaims, and until they

had an opportunity to adequately develop the record in this matter, it was improper for the VJater Court to grant summary judgment against Amity. The attorney for Fort Lyon stated during oral argument that further pleadings would be forthcoming when he stated that;

Well, this is just the supplement, I believe, your Honor, and I guess there isn't much point in getting into it now, but we will have to file

another amendment because the Amity has amended its

petition again to which we haven't had an opportun ity to respond. (Volume 3, Page 11, Line 7-11)

Accordingly, Amity submits that it was improper for the Water

Court to grant summary judgment before Amity had an opportunity to answer and develop the issues.

CONCLUSION

The Water Court improperly granted summary judgment against

Amity for three reasons. First, there were genuine issues as to

material facts on the issue of whether Amity owed Fort Lyon maintenance costs. Second, there were genuine issues as to material facts on the issue of whether depreciation ought to be considered as part of maintenance costs. Third, the motion for

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summary judgment was filed before Amity had an opportunity to

respond to Fort Lyon's counterclaim. Accordingly, for these reasons the summary judgment of the Water Court should be rever sed.

Respectfully submitted,

CARL M. SHINN, Reg. No. 1302 THOMAS L. SHINN, Reg. No. 9958 WENDY S. SHINN, Reg. No. 11527

P. 0. Box 390

Lamar, Colorado 81052 303/336-4313

Attorneys for Appellants-Amity

References

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