Euroscepticism: A result of too much European Integration?: A process-analysis of Euroscepticism in times of crisis.

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Euroscepticism: A result of too much European

Integration?

A process-analysis of Euroscepticism in times of crisis.

Master’s Thesis

Author: Marcus Glimsholt Supervisor: Brigitte Pircher Examiner: Emil Uddhammar

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Abstract

During the last decade, the European Union has had to overcome several types of crises, for example, the economic crisis, the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, and Brexit. Currently, the EU is facing the Covid-19 pandemic. It is well known that there is a strong relationship between the multifaceted crises and the EU’s responses to them and increased Euroscepticism in the EU countries as a result. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the reasons why such crises result in increasing

Euroscepticism. More specifically, the study explores the mechanisms that can be identified as causes for Euroscepticism.

To test the hypothesis that the crises’ responses made by the EU created an

opportunity for Eurosceptic actors to thrive, a process-analysis of the responses was conducted. Three legislative acts as main responses to the economic crisis and the migration crisis were chosen, to analyze a mechanism between the crises and increased Euroscepticism in the EU member states. The responses were then combined with data on the EU citizens’ trust for the EU to identify if the EU’s responses to these crises have been a major cause for increased Eurosceptic tendencies. The results show that even though some of the EU’s responses to the crises resulted in increased Euroscepticism, EU citizens do not seem to lose their trust in the EU or their institutions in the long run.

Key words

Euroscepticism, European Integration, Migration Crisis, Economic Crisis, Process- Analysis, Historical Institutionalism.

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List of Tables and Figures

List of Tables:

Table 1: Mechanism explaining Euroscepticism in Europe 2020. ... 31 Table 2. Citizens response to “Tend to Trust” their national government and the EU in percentage in 2012. ... 37 Table 3. Mechanism explaining Euroscepticism in The Banking Union. ... 42 Table 4. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU in 2012 and 2015. ... 44 Table 5: EU citizens response to “The EU economy is good” in percentage across the EU in 2012 and 2015. ... 44 Table 6. Mechanism explaining Euroscepticism in the Resettlement Scheme. ... 51 Table 7. Citizens of Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Greece responds to

“Tend to Trust” the EU in percentage in 2015. ... 54 Table 8. Citizens of Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Greece responds to

“Tend to Trust” the EU in percentage in 2017. ... 54

List of Figures:

Figure 1: EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2010. ... 22 Figure 2. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2010. ... 32 Figure 3. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2015. ... 32 Figure 4. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2015. ... 47 Figure 5. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2015. ... 53 Figure 6. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2017. ... 54

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1 Introduction

Throughout the last decade, the European Union (EU) has had to withstand several crises. The Great Recession, the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit and most recently the Covid-19 pandemic. The different crises with their different focal points forced the EU to adapt and overcome them. For so long it has gone well, so well in fact that some claim that the crises have the potential to increase European integration. Davis Cross (2017:4) states that every time the EU has found itself in a crisis, it has been portrayed as the end of the EU, but the EU has persevered, and the forced change has strengthened the EU instead.

However, during the crises another issue grows larger, Euroscepticism.

Euroscepticism has continually been mentioned as a product of the crises, arguing that for every crisis the EU has to endure, political actors find ways to fortunate on the EU citizens misfortune, and by creating a narrative which deems the EU as the fault, increasing Eurosceptic tendencies (Pirro & van Kessel 2017, Caiani &

Graziano 2017).

The rise of populism has been a common answer from scholars to the question of what is responsible for the increase in Euroscepticism. However, what has also been shocking, is that many populistic actors who have been identified carrying

Eurosceptic tendencies, more often than not have been positive for European

integration (Pirro & van Kessel 2017:405). In fact, neither of the member states with populistic parties has advocated for their state to exit out of the EU (ibid.), except for The United Kingdom (UK). Moreover, populist political parties have never had as much political power as they do now. For example, the last European

Parliament’s election increased the populist seats from 118 in 2014 to 161 in 2019 (Ivaldi 2020:72). This against the background that the most recent Standard Eurobarometer shows that 49% of the European citizens tend to trust the European Union (Eurobarometer 2021:38), which is a relatively high number compared to previous polls during the last decade. Thus, this creates the interpretation that the discussion of increasing Euroscepticism does not entirely align with populism, as the rise of populism does not correlate with a decrease in trust for the EU. The

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question then is, what is it that drives the assumption that the crisis has led to an increase in Euroscepticism? This is the question which this study aims to take a closer look at.

With a seemingly ever continuation of crises in many various shapes, the issue is severe. If more crises will come, as the now active Covid-19 pandemic, one can also make the rational assumption that Euroscepticism will rise along, which leaves one to wonder what result that will have on the EU in the long run. Will more member states leave the EU as the UK did, or was it an isolated incident? Nevertheless, the aim of this study is to investigate closer to the presumed assumption that crises within the EU lead to an increase in Euroscepticism. Even though it is a common correlation made by many scholars (Hobolt & de Vries 2016, Bârgăoanu et.al 2015, Stockemer et.al 2020), this thesis aims to look closer at the relationships between these two. What is the mechanism that makes this assumption viable? To do so, the focus will lie on the responses made by the EU towards the economic crisis and the migration crisis. What are the underlying mechanisms within the responses made by the EU which can explain the assumption that the crises increase Euroscepticism?

1.1 Purpose

The aim of the study is to identify mechanisms in the EU’s response towards the economic crisis as well as the migration crisis and investigate if these mechanisms explain an increase in Euroscepticism.

1.2 Research Questions

To what extent has the EU’s response to the economic crisis and migration crisis changed citizens’ support for the EU in the member states?

Have the EU governance measures introduced as a response to the crises had enabling or constraining effects on the level of Euroscepticism in the different countries?

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2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is a central concept throughout this thesis, therefore, a general definition of how the concept will be used in this thesis will be presented. Since different interpretations and explanations regarding Euroscepticism varies in different contexts, Euroscepticism will be described in a general definition, as well as defined from the context of the economic crisis and the migration crisis. This is to give such a wide definition of the concept as possible, without leaving the

framework of the aim and research questions stated in this paper.

In its simplest description, Euroscepticism is a concept that describes party opposition towards the EU, as well as EU citizens who have a negative position to EU institutions (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:46). Euroscepticism has certainly on one level always existed since the start of the EU, even though the coined term Euroscepticism is a relatively new concept. However, since the last decade, Euroscepticism has increased throughout the EU member states. Figures showing that during the economic crisis, the trust in EU institutions had a dramatic decline, from 60 to 37 per cent between 2007 and 2013 (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:42).

The numbers tell an intriguing development as a result of the economic crisis.

Nevertheless, scholars have had some different theories and ideas as to why Euroscepticism rose in such drastic numbers. Meanwhile some look into the perspective on nationalism and identity, others investigate economic factors to find an answer to the increase of skepticism towards the EU. The nationalist and identity perspective mostly focus on the supranational governance within the EU. Where some citizens have found themselves with a dual identity, accepting both their identity as EU citizen and as a national citizen of their state. Meanwhile, some found themselves more connected in their national sovereign identity, thus having a negative attitude towards the EU, feeling that EU institutions are a direct threat towards their culture and national identity (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:47). The economic perspective focuses more directly on the economic crisis itself, showing that EU integration comes with an increase in income inequality across the member states. Hence, EU integration opens a window of opportunity for EU opposition to

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put blame on the EU and its institutions, along with the possibility for the opposition to blame the EU for limiting national economics (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:48).

Income equality and Euroscepticism is a relationship that has been accompanied for a long time, increased income equality has resulted in higher levels of

Euroscepticism in Western Europe (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:48).

Ever since the economic crisis, Euroscepticism has continued to grow throughout Europe, seeing many parties with Eurosceptic tendencies all over EU member states who have reached 20% of the votes in their national elections (Stockemer et.al 2018:329). However, the vast majority of the parties with Eurosceptic tendencies thrives from the migration crisis, where they blame the EU for “uncontrollable immigration” and use immigration as an explanation to Europe’s problems (Stockemer et.al 2018:329). Many parties have not only been given national political power but in return created situations that cannot be described only as catastrophic for the EU, where Brexit can be seen as the ultimate peak. The shocking and disturbing results of the EU referendum in the UK can be seen as the pinnacle of Euroscepticism in place. Since the citizens of the UK voted to leave the EU despite the majority of political experts and economists led the narrative that UK’s best interest was to stay in the EU (De Vries 2018:3).

2.1.1 Varieties of Euroscepticism

Within the discussion of Euroscepticism, it can be hard to differentiate the type of agenda or motive of an EU opposition. It often varies, some opposition is against the whole ideology of an integrated Europe, against the idea that member states should be working collectively with each other. Meanwhile, some are not against the idea of the EU but disagree with certain policies or direction in which the EU is heading.

To gain some perspective on the two sides of the opposition, Taggart & Szczerbiak (2004) presents a definition of “soft” Euroscepticism and “hard” Euroscepticism.

“Hard” Euroscepticism involves a total disagreement with the idea of European integration. It is often seen in political actors within member states which have a strong stance about their country’s membership within the EU, or their countries intention to join the EU (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:3). Hard Euroscepticism often comes from ideological differences or values, where the opposition thinks that the

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EU is too prone to capitalism, or too socialistic, or liberal (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:3). Hard Eurosceptic actors are often political parties with a clear anti-EU stance, who sees the EU as a vital political issue, therefore often being identified as a single-issue political party (ibid.). However, there is a grey area, where political parties might have anti-EU rhetoric and focus on specific issues for which they blame the EU, but at the same time recognizes that there is no other option than to stay in the EU. These parties are still considered to be hard Eurosceptic but do not have a stand-alone position as anti-EU (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:3-4).

“Soft” Euroscepticism is often taken form in “policy” Euroscepticism and “national interest” Euroscepticism. In the means of policies, it is Euroscepticism where the opposition disagrees with a certain policy which the EU presents and revoke their support for the EU in that policy (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4). It could for instance be a member state which is generally for the idea of the EU but does not want to give up its sovereign currency for the Euro (ibid.). Taggart & Szczerbiak (2004:4) gives the example of Sweden and Denmark, which are often more active in the process of enhancing European integration than many of the other member states but show Euroscepticism by being opposed to the Euro. “National interest” is Euroscepticism in the form of taking the stance for national priorities rather than taking a stance for European integration (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4). This is a common action taken by member states, often with good reasons, since a lot of practical actions are done by the member states themselves. They therefore often use their position as a factor when debating European integration (Taggart &

Szczerbiak 2004:4). However, more often than not “policy” and “national interest

“Euroscepticism goes in conjunction with one another (ibid.).

In general, soft Euroscepticism is highly circumstantial. It is seen in cases where specific questions affect some member states more than others, which often differs between the member states depending on which stage the integration has gotten to within the context of the policy. And is sometimes used as a tool by member states to negotiate better terms, thus they may not be Eurosceptic in a pure way but use soft Eurosceptic tendencies to get a more appealing deal for their domestic purposes (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4).

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To sum up Euroscepticism, there is a clear consensus of what Euroscepticism is, and there are a lot of data to show that Euroscepticism indeed has increased. A lot speaks for the rhetoric driven by EU opposition, which in turn has been fueled by different contexts, where two major ones are the economic crisis and the migration crisis. Nevertheless, a lot of the explanations made on why Euroscepticism is increasing is indeed explanatory. Leaving a lot of questions on why it actually happened. However, this thesis will try to take a step forward on trying to identify the mechanisms, therefore hoping to get closer to why it has happened, which mechanism led to an increase in Euroscepticism.

2.2 Previous Research

Euroscepticism is a well-researched subject. The concept is seen in many various works, ranging from Euroscepticism in itself and how it has evolved over the years, to more case centric topics and movements identifying the connection between Euroscepticism and the rise of populism. When looking through academic works concerning Euroscepticism, it has gotten a revival during the last years, with works focusing on the reasons why the UK exited the EU. As the UK is the first member state to ever exit out of the EU, it is the only case where Euroscepticism has reached its pinnacle result. However, when looking into the causes of the rise of

Euroscepticism, previous research is scanter. There are a lot of connections between Euroscepticism and crises done by scholars (Hobolt & de Vries 2016, Bârgăoanu et.al 2015, Stockemer et.al 2020), but less on why the two are connected.

Nevertheless, the book United by or Against Euroscepticism? An Assessment of Public Attitudes towards Europe in the Context of the Crisis, edited by Alina Bârgăoanu, Loredana Radu, and Diego Varela sets the aim to study the correlation between the economic crisis and Euroscepticism within the EU (Bârgăoanu et.al 2015). It is done so by looking into different member states and how the public in these countries perceive their trust in EU institutions. The book provides an in-depth look into how different member states and their citizens pose Euroscepticism, to later cross-reference with each other to get a look from where Euroscepticism comes from (Bârgăoanu et.al 2015). The results provide evidence that there are clear differences in Euroscepticism depending on which member state one focus on.

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Euroscepticism can be found in almost every member state, but there exist different levels of Euroscepticism, with the more extreme version in some places and less in others.

All in all, the result of the study is that Euroscepticism does not provide a general worry since there are few interconnected instances where there is a consensus on why the public perceives mistrust towards the EU (Bârgăoanu et.al 2015). Thus, Alina Bârgăoanu, Loredana Radu, and Diego Varela (2015) book show similarities in the purpose of this study. However, there are some clear differences. Meanwhile, the book provides similarities in studying Euroscepticism in the context of the economic crisis, the book does not provide a clear answer to why the crisis led to an increase in Euroscepticism, which is the overall goal of this study. Nevertheless, this previous research provides a good foundation to build upon and contributes a vital overall look at how Euroscepticism differs from various parts around the member states.

Another previous research of interest is Hobolt and de Vries article Public Support for European Integration. In this article, Hobolt & de Vries (2016) conducts research to investigate more into the differences and level of public support within the EU. Where one of the cornerstones of the study is to investigate the variations of Euroscepticism within the European member states. Hobolt & de Vries (2016) investigate different regions of the EU and separate the support for European integration by dividing the EU into the south, east and north. They also take a separate look into member states within the Eurozone, where they compare the level of trust for the EU from the member states which were heavily faced by the

Eurozone crisis and the ones that were not.

The result shows some clear variations of Euroscepticism within the EU. The Eurozone crisis is viewed as a factor for increasing opposition towards EU policies.

Hobolt & de Vries (2016) found that the public support for European integration varied between the northern and the southern member states. Different priorities in policy were seen as an explanation, whereas the northern member states who came out from the Eurozone crisis a lot easier than the southern member states was also reflected in the public opinion in these member states. Thus, the southern public

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support is seeking more economic policy changes, while the northern public focuses on policy areas such as open borders (Hobolt & de Vries 2016). What Hobolt & de Vries (2016) finally conclude after showing their result of public support for European Integration is that a lot of the public support varies, either pro-EU or opposed EU, has to do with a national perspective. Seeing that the support varies around the EU depending on geographical location strengthen this, showing that support for European integration cannot be viewed without various contexts, such as the contexts of crises and how member states were hit by them. Thus, Hobolt & de Vries (2016) article provides vital data on trust from different areas around the EU, as well as the notion of the importance of the national perspective. There are clear varieties in soft Euroscepticism, which means that the countries oppose certain EU policies or programs depending on which issues are raised and what priorities the given country has. Which is a vital result and will be taken into consideration in this study.

Previous research with more regard towards the migration crisis has also been done.

Stockemer, Niemann, Unger and Speyer (2020) published an article called the

“Refugee Crisis,” Immigration Attitudes, and Euroscepticism. In their article, they investigate the relationship of the migration crisis leading towards more

Euroscepticism. Their main cause of study comes from the idea that the migration crisis led towards more anti-immigration attitudes within the EU, thus resulting in more Euroscepticism. However, the most interesting fact with this study is that the result did not show any increase in anti-immigration during the migration crisis. In fact, European citizens were rather neutral in this aspect (Stockemer et.al 2020).

Thus, showing that the anti-immigration attitudes were already set before the migration crisis, and the crisis itself did not change how people within the EU viewed migration. However, the study leaves interesting notions to build upon. The authors mention that although it might sound rational that the migration crisis would lead towards more anti-immigration attitudes and that Euroscepticism would rise due to it, they were proven wrong. One explanation for the authors’ outcome is the national view of the migration crisis. They argue that the attitudes for the EU did not change because people did not deem the EU at fault, but other factors instead (Stockemer et.al 2020). However, this particular study is useful when looking into

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further research on this theme. Stockemer et.al (2020) argue that although their results do not show a direct correlation between Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant attitudes, the notion of political actors drawing people's attraction because of the migration crisis is still there. This leaves room for interesting research on the question of how populist parties gain so much attraction for people when

Euroscepticism cannot be linked to the migration crisis (Stockemer et.al 2020). This can however be looked at from the other way around too, that the migration crisis did attract people towards populist parties, who themselves often have Eurosceptic tendencies. Thus, the migration crisis could have increased Euroscepticism in an indirect way. However, the article provides interesting and useful thoughts about Euroscepticism and the migration crisis. This leaves the focus on more in-depth legislation presented by the EU due to the migration crisis insightful, to see if the results differ or go in the same direction.

However, as this study aims to explain the changes in Euroscepticism over time, it is vital to apply a theory that explains policy continuity and policy changes over time.

Therefore, Historical Institutionalism will be applied to identify these changes and possible critical junctures that led to these policy changes.

2.3 Historical Institutionalism

Historical Institutionalism is a theoretical tradition that has a relatively long presence in modern social science, having shown prominent uses in different contexts and perspectives. A vital mark of Historical Institutionalism is the attention towards the timing and chain of events that shape political processes. This, against the background that institutions shape human interaction, and depending on the constraints and opportunity for institutions, the ‘political game’ will change over time (Fioretos 2011:371). Historical Institutionalism can therefore be characterized by focusing on questions that involve structures and the development of institutions over time (Fioretos 2011:372). Fioretos (2011:372-373) states that what makes Historical Institutionalism a clear identity is its focus on second-order questions, which underlines the understanding of actors, human action, and behavior. Thus, having a large interest in the relationship between interest and institutions, as well as the mechanisms of institutional development.

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Moreover, Historical Institutionalism emphasizes not only the history itself but rather when and how a particular outcome came to exist. Therefore, identifying history as a point of interest in the sense of understanding a theoretical turn, history becomes more of a process that creates political outcomes rather than just an event in a timeline (Fioretos 2011:369).

What is most interesting in this theory though, are the vital building blocks within Historical Institutionalism. Two of these are critical junctures and path dependency, which often comes in conjunction. Path dependency is an important mechanism within historical institutionalism, which often comes from critical junctures

(Capoccia & Kelemen 2007:342). Both mechanisms are crucial in understanding the link between the crises and an increase in Euroscepticism.

2.3.1 Path Dependency

The utmost general definition of path dependency refers to the idea that events occurring at one point of time will later affect events at a later time (Djelic & Quack 2007:161). A more in-depth definition of path dependency in conjunction with critical junctures is provided by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007):

Path dependence refers to a process in which the structure that prevails after a specific moment in time (often a critical juncture) shapes the subsequent trajectory in ways that make

alternative institutional designs substantially less likely to triumph, including those that would be more efficient according to a standard expected utility model (Capoccia and

Kelemen 2007:376)

What path dependency ultimately suggests is that steps taken by institutions, organizations or practices do not follow the most rational steps towards efficiency (Djelic & Quack 2007:163). This means that because of the critical juncture, such as a crisis, institutions and organizations must react to what is happening. Therefore, creating a path dependency is necessary, but might not be in the framework of the initial plan. As a result, it opens up situations where actors can react to the results provided. Here is where Euroscepticism can be identified as a product of path dependency. The critical juncture (the economic crisis for example) created a path dependency that allowed for Eurosceptical actors to react with their disappointment towards the actions taken by institutions as a response towards the critical juncture.

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When seeing path dependencies from a political perspective, rather than an

economic perspective, for example, it becomes very complex. Mainly because path dependencies create political developments which are close to impossible to reverse when once in place (Pierson 2000:251). Path dependencies thus become vital in understanding political development as a process that evolves through time (Pierson 2000:264). Why political development is a complex process is plenty fold, however, a crucial point is that political processes are done collectively, this means that the actions made by one political actor effects other actors. And the consequences of one actor’s actions are dependent on actions done by others (Pierson 2000:258).

Political change thus creates a chain of events that inevitably all actors involved must adapt to. This results in a situation where political actors try to protect themselves, they become change resistant. Therefore, political arrangements that have been settled are hard to change further down the line (Pierson 2000:262). Thus, when a path dependency occurs and creates political change, it is a crucial point in time within the framework of political development. And the change created within the path dependency will create a new political path which in turn will be hard to change, thus the situation that the event of the path dependency creates a cycle where it will affect other events further down the line occurs (Pierson 2000:265).

2.3.2 Critical Junctures

In the simplest of terms, a critical juncture is an abnormal change in the sphere of institutions, relative to the normal historical development of interest (Capoccia &

Kelemen 2007:342). Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) define critical junctures as such:

[...] we define critical junctures as relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest

(Capoccia & Kelemen 2007:348).

From this definition, critical junctures are what sets out an abnormal period where actors have a higher probability of affecting interest, indicating that the probability will go down after the period is over. In accordance with Historical Institutionalism, when critical junctures occur, actors within an institutional setting get freer decision making (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007:349). The institutions and their actors can be plenty fold, from political parties, party systems, public policies to whole regimes

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themselves (ibid.). However, important to note is that during a time of critical juncture different institutions are affected differently, meaning that some institutions are more affected than others, a situation of a critical juncture for one institution does not mean that all its counterparts are automatically affected (Capoccia &

Kelemen 2007:349). Therefore, the definition and explanation of critical juncture are vital.

In this case, the economic crisis, also known as The Great Recession, is defined as the critical juncture as a point of interest along with the migration crisis. Although one might not be able to refer to these critical junctures as a universal effect on all institutions in existence, it had enough direct and indirect outcomes in institutional processes to be defined as a critical juncture.

2.3.3 Historical Institutionalism in practice

In short summary from the explanation of Historical Institutionalism provided above, Historical Institutionalism focuses on historical events which can be identified as a process of political change. Importantly, this is done by the foundation of path dependency and critical junctures. To use this thesis as an example, the economic crisis (the critical juncture) for example created a path dependency. The response (the path dependency) for the crisis (the critical juncture), from this thesis hypotheses, then created a window of opportunity for actors to advocate their interest and push certain politics through. Thus, this helps us also to examine whether the policy change related to the crises led to an increase in Euroscepticism. Although Historical Institutionalism is fitting as a mean to answer the set questions stated in this thesis, there are some critical notions that ought to be addressed. One crucial notion is seeing beyond critical junctures and path

dependencies as a window of opportunity for actors to bargain (Mabee 2011:36). It is easy to see the institutional change from a perspective of Historical

Institutionalism as an “easy” explanation. For example, situation X created an opportunity for actors to bargain, outcome Y would not be possible without situation X, therefore the institution evolved. Thus, describing the situation rather than explaining it (Mabee 2011:37). One of the steps Mabee (2011:36) gives to not fall into the trap of just describing, is the relationship between the critical juncture

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and path dependency. The critical juncture often creates actions that are non-

reversible when well in place and the actions that were taken are always dependable on the timing in which they were created (ibid.). This means that the evolution of an institution taken within a critical juncture will always be imprinted in the context of the critical juncture itself.

Moreover, Mabee (2011:37) talks about the importance of following the

mechanisms providing institutional change. This becomes even more vital when trying to follow actions taken in a particular setting and following them through time. Thus, giving the ability to follow reproduction. This thesis in particular, following how Euroscepticism is increasing in times of crisis. Nevertheless, without identifying mechanisms, the outcome will only be descriptive (Mabee 2011:37).

Moreover, Mabee (2011) states that Historical Institutionalism tends to focus more on radical change from the foundation of identifying critical junctures, rather than on change over time. This becomes problematic since the evolution of the institution and actions taken during the critical juncture is followed through forwards to the next critical juncture.

However, these critical enlightenments on Historical Institutionalism have been addressed in this thesis. First, process-tracing will be the analytic tool used, meaning that the mechanisms will be in focus in this thesis, therefore Historical

Institutionalism will not be used as a tool of getting descriptive answers to the research questions. Historical Institutionalism is used as it provides in detail information about policy continuity and policy change, thus making it the ideal theory to test policy changes. Second, the empirical foundation will come from two different critical junctures, the economic crisis and the migration crisis which can be seen as exogenous shocks for the EU initiating policy changes. Thus, the approach helps us to identify the specific policy changes and policy outcome over time. Using two different critical junctures in this manner will hopefully give more width to the understanding of how, or how not mechanisms in the actions taken during the critical junctures have been affected over time.

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2.4 Hypotheses

1. Responses made by the EU during times of crisis created a window of opportunity for Eurosceptic actors to thrive.

2. Providing that Eurosceptic actors rose in popularity during time of crisis, Eurosceptic actors can be identified as using the crisis as a critical juncture themselves, thus being dependable on perceived crises.

3 Method

To answer the research questions stated in this thesis, process-tracing will be applied. Process-tracing is a relatively new revised method within the social sciences. Being a prominent method within psychology and medicine for a longer time, process-tracing has shown to have a vital use within social sciences as well.

Showing that using process-tracing within single-case studies gives the analyst the possibility to gain an understanding of mechanisms that few if any other method can provide (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:1-2).

Process-tracings essence is to provide a greater understanding of the relationship between a cause and an outcome (ibid.). Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013:2) provides an example of democracy and peace, where there is a strong statistical correlation between the two concepts. However, even though the statistical correlation is strong, it does not tell us more than that. Process-tracing goes into the questions raised about the outgoing correlation, in this case, how does democracy result in peaceful relations (ibid.)? According to Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013:2), to answer that question one must study the relationships and mechanisms which links the two concepts together. Ultimately, tracing the mechanisms provides a better

understanding of how the cause produces the outcome (Beach 2016:463). Process tracing is a qualitative method, but as Beach and Brun Pedersen’s particular

example shows, it sometimes relies on quantitative information and/or is ‘helped’ by statistical data (Collier 2011:825). Moreover, a lot of the terminology used in Process tracing resembles the terms and concepts most commonly used in quantitative research, which adds to the importance to make clear that Process- tracing is a qualitative method.

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Furthermore, Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013) has divided Process-tracing into three different branches, Theory-Testing Process-Tracing, Theory-Building Process- Tracing and Explaining-Outcome Process Tracing. What branch one should opt for depends on the aim of the particular study to which Process-tracing is applied.

The Process-tracing branch which will be used in this particular study is the so- called ‘Explaining-Outcome Process-Tracing’. This branch is ‘case-centric’ instead of ‘theory-centric’ as the other branches, as well as the aim of this method is to provide a mechanism/s that accounts for the explanation of the outcome (Beach &

Brun Pedersen 2013:12). The aim of using the explaining-outcome process-tracing is to provide a minimally sufficient explanation of an outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:18).

3.1 Mechanisms

The mechanism in explaining-outcome process-tracing can most simply be described as events that lead to the outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:22).

Understanding the mechanisms and identifying the mechanisms in a particular case is the very point of using this branch of process tracing. Thus, understanding the mechanisms gives a deeper knowledge of the cause and outcome within the chosen case (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:22-26). This means that the cause and the outcome can be drawn from either a known correlation or an assumption, for example:

The Cause The Outcome

Economic Crisis Increase in Euroscepticism

Understanding the mechanism between the cause and outcome and breaking these mechanisms down provides a better understanding of how the cause and outcome are related, and why the cause led to the outcome. Enabling a chain of events, a timeline of what happened in that specific case between the cause and the outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013, Beach 2016, Collier 2011).

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For example:

The Cause Mechanism The Outcome

Economic Crisis ⇒ Event ⇒ Increase in Euroscepticism

Process-tracing allows following the link between the cause and outcome, by identifying and following the mechanism which eventually led to the outcome gives an in-depth picture of why it happened. Thus, mechanisms are what links causes and outcomes together, which in practice means to unpack these mechanisms and follow the activities produced by the mechanisms as a series of interlocking parts, one part to the next (Beach 2016:473). Until a minimum sufficient series of parts can be shown as an explanation of the outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:18).

The operationalization with this specific study will however be a bit different from the figures shown above. Mostly due to the case centric focus in this study. Since limitations must be made to make this study feasible, the mechanism already has a critical part, the event. A mechanism is an interlocking part of activities and entities, the entities are the factors that engage in the activities themselves (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:29). Thus, entities can be seen as actors, such as groups, countries, politicians and so on (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:178). Since the limitations in this study are the activities themselves, the responses made by the EU, the focus will lie on the entities. The actors and what they do within the response made by the EU.

So, the responses within this study framework and focus of analysis are already a crucial part of the mechanism.

3.2 Criticism of Case-Centric Process-Analyzing

Process-tracing is not a perfect method, it has pros and cons which are equally important to note. The most crucial con to highlight is in the sense of case centric process analysis. Since the focus of analysis is within the mechanism of a specific activity, the result given from the analysis is therefore specific for the case itself (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:12-13). Therefore, explanations of an effect and

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outcome cannot be completely detached from the case (ibid.). That means that the mechanism with the minimal sufficient explanation of why the economic crisis led to Euroscepticism cannot automatically be transferred or generalized in another situation, for example why the migration crisis led to Euroscepticism. The mechanism is explained in relation to the entities and activities in any given case.

However, even though it is important to note and take into consideration when making general remarks about the explanation between a cause and outcome, the explanations can be useful when going forward. Although the explanation has a relationship to the specific case, the mechanism in one case can be used as an indicator in another case. Thus, providing useful information of what to look for next time a mechanism leading to Euroscepticism is the focus of analysis.

3.3 Material

To get the contexts of the empirics in the analysis, a short description of the crises themselves is due. The crises will therefore be presented in a basic manner, enough to understand the situation of why they are considered a crisis and why the EU had to give responses to the crises.

3.3.1 The Economic Crisis

The economic crisis is perhaps more known as “the economic crisis in 2008” for most people but the formal name is The Great Recession, which started in 2007 and continued until 2009 (Sherman 2010:6). It is the largest economic disaster since the Great Depression in the 1930s. Not quite as severe in purely economic terms as the Great Depression, but arguably as bad. Even though the Great Recession did not quite reach the Depression term, which is based more on the levels of

unemployment, the characteristics of the Great Recession had equally, if not more, devastating results as it involved more than just unemployment (Sherman 2010:5-6).

The characteristics of The Great Recession and the devastating results of it, was a combination of market and housing crashes. The stock market crashed and with it 50% of the invested capital made by investors. Along with that, the market value on housing plummeted (Grusky et.al 2011:4). Which meant not only that many people lost their savings on the stock market, but also that many people lost their

investment they had made in their house. The stock market crash also resulted in

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increased unemployment as many firms went bankrupt or were in need of cutting people off. This meant that many people could not pay their mortgages on their houses. The banks who provided their mortgages were in great value loss since the housing crash meant that the houses used as leverage for the loan were suddenly worth less than the initial loan itself. Leading to many foreclosures, people then lost both their jobs and homes, meanwhile many banks filed for bankruptcy since they were left with houses that had lost great value in accord with no buying market (Grusky et.al 2011:4).

The brief conclusion of the Great Recession provided here is mainly from an American context. However, the stock market crash in the USA had a snowball effect which caused turmoil in the global economy itself, creating an economic crisis worldwide (Sherman 2010:3). Of course, the situation and the effects of the crisis affected countries differently, there is no clear detailed universal explanation of how the crisis affected all countries, some were affected more than others. In a European context, the financial crisis struck hard, even though the Great Recession itself ended in 2009, the aftermath of the recession continued years after. While the USA recovered and saw an end to the crisis, another crisis just started for Europe, the Eurozone crisis. The Eurozone crisis is a direct aftermath of the Great Recession (Ari 2014:5). Prior to the Great Recession, the national debt was at a low level across the Eurozone countries except for Italy and Greece. However, after the Great Recession, the national debt was at a very high level amongst most Eurozone countries (ibid.). The Eurozone countries became separated from each other, having large varieties of economic backlash where some countries needed more support than others. The European Union’s economic governance of the situation was ineffective since policy changes in response to the crisis were done separately by the member states (Ari 2014:5-6). The high national debts along with severe

unemployment with no sense of collaborative action within the Eurozone created a crisis of its own. Showing that the European Union needed to make vital steps in a structural way to make the Eurozone countries work together if the crisis were to be averted (Ari 2014:6).

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3.3.2 The Migration Crisis

The migration crisis refers to the increasing flow of refugees in Europe in 2015. The crisis was a result of the war in Syria, where the UN estimated that over 12 million people were in immediate danger in 2015, and millions had already fled the war (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:2). Many of those who fled were looking towards Europe across the Mediterranean. For comparison, in October 2015, it was estimated that 590,000 refugees had come into Europe, which is more than double compared to 2014 (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:2). The migration crisis led to many problems around Europe, for example, the high flow of refugees made it impossible for many states to handle the asylum process in a bureaucratic manner, especially the states in Europe which already had lower economic resources, resulting in the asylum systems to overflow (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:4).

A lot of the discussions surrounding the migration crisis were technical deviances, such as who was a migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker. Even though the European human right law applies to all migrants, whatever their status might be (Metcalfe- Hough 2015:4-5). The debate did cause more problems than imaginable. The policies involving asylum deviate from the member states, making the asylum- seeking process unfair in many ways, as member states have the decision to favor or not favor asylum seekers, thus making the asylum seeker choose countries with the best policies (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:4-5). The definition of who was a migrant and who was an asylum seeker was also a problem since the definition started to become an argument. For example, Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary claimed that most migrants are not refugees but people who seek a better life (Crawley & Skleparis 2018:49). This was a common argument by some member states to not let people seek asylum. Along with the argument that the slow recovery from the economic crisis made it financially unbearable to keep up with. This made some countries claim that they could not afford the flow of refugees, as the refugees needed support from the state (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:4).

This did not only cause a strong debate amongst the member states but also caused a debate amongst the citizens of the member states, showing national and sovereign narratives which resulted in racial and cultural tensions. So, in conclusion, the migration crisis started a lot of turmoil around Europe. Member states were in a

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clash of arguments since some, such as Greece, had to deal with more refugees and asylum seekers than the rest of the member states (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:5).

Moreover, the crisis which started as a humanitarian crisis of aiding people in need turned into a large debate that often followed the narrative of racial and cultural tensions. The EU had clear governance problems, because of the member states' final say in asylum policies, and because of the different geopolitical outcome of the crisis. Making member states which had borders surrounding the Mediterranean the migration crisis a severe problem, whereas some member states did not have the same acute problem since their borders were further away.

3.3.3 Eurobarometer

The Eurobarometer will be used to gather information about the EU citizens satisfaction towards the EU. When referring to the Eurobarometer, what is meant is the Standard Eurobarometer of Public Opinion. The Standard Eurobarometer of Public Opinion is a statistical foundation of the public’s perception of the EU, issued by the European Commission two times every year. However, throughout the study, it will mostly be called Eurobarometer for short. In the Eurobarometer, some questions are asked which can be used as a guideline to get an overview of trust in EU institutions.

The statistical information in the level of trust for the EU amongst the member states will be used in getting the context of how the public view is before the act of the response and after. The questions stated in the Eurobarometer cannot be seen as a direct indicator of Euroscepticism but can be used as a tool for seeing Eurosceptic tendencies. Moreover, the Eurobarometer often differentiates the answers from the citizens depending on their nationality. Which also provides vital information on the differences of trust between the different member states. Not only does it show which member states trust the EU institutions more than others but can be used as an indicator of which member states the Eurosceptic mechanism can be more related to than others. Thus, allowing for a comparison of the crises themselves (which crisis affected the trust levels of the member state the most).

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4 Analysis

The analysis will include three different stages during every response to the crises.

First, a short look at how the European citizens view the EU before the response.

This provides a crucial perspective of how some values which can be seen as Eurosceptic differs from the start of the response until a time after the response was taken into action. Thereafter, a short presentation of the responses themselves will take place, to get an overview before conducting the process analysis. The process analysis will then follow, ending in a look at the Eurobarometer to compare Eurosceptic tendencies before and after the response. Each response will be presented from the earliest to the latest, followed by a concluding summary.

4.1 Europe 2020

4.1.1 The European Citizens view of the EU in 2010.

Before looking deeper into the mechanism which can be identifiable as part of rising Euroscepticism, a short look into some general questions asked to the European citizens is relevant. General being the keyword, as there are no direct questions that give a black on white answer regarding Euroscepticism in the Eurobarometer. The first one being:

“Generally speaking, do you think that (the country of the participant) membership of the European Union is/would be a good thing?” (Eurobarometer 2010a:134).

Although it might be a vague question regarding being able to account for Euroscepticism, referring to Di Mauro & Serricchio (2015:46) definition of

Euroscepticism, the European Citizens mistrust in European institutions is a form of Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, 49% of the people answered yes (Eurobarometer 2010a:134). A relatively low number, 29% answered neither good nor bad, meanwhile, 18% think that the EU is bad for their country (ibid.). Between the member states, there are however some notable differences. The United Kingdom is the only country that has a more negative opinion about the EU than a positive one, which means that the rest of the member states have more positive views of the EU than negative. However, there are some clear down spiraling effects compared to earlier Eurobarometer’s, notably Greece, Germany, and Estonia, where the negative

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opinions have increased so much as double digits (Eurobarometer 2010a). It is stated in the Eurobarometer that it probably has to do with the economic crisis (ibid.). To make it more in direct connection with EU institution’s, 45% of the citizens state that they trust the European Parliament, 41% trusts the European Central Bank, 39% trusts the Council of the European Union and in general, 42%

tends to trust in the European institutions (Eurobarometer 2010a:134). Also, a decreasing percentage compared to the last two years of this period (2008 and 2009). So, in context, the same year in which the Europe 2020 strategy gets introduced there is a decline in trust for the EU and its institutions.

To get a picture of how the trust is disputed over the member states, the figure below shows the level of trust in the various member states, with a percentage showing how many tend to trust the EU:

Figure 1: EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2010.

(Eurobarometer 2010b:185) As one can see in the figure, Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Denmark’s citizens have the highest level of trust, being the only member states with a percentage over 60% (Eurobarometer 2010b:185). France and Germany on the other side only having a percentage under 40%, and the UK have the lowest percentage of trust, thus being the outlier, having a catastrophic low trust in the EU, with only 20% who tends to trust the EU (ibid.).

68 65 61 61

57 56 55 54 54 53 52 52

50 50 47 45 4443 43 42 42 42 41 40 39 37 20

0 20 40 60 80

EE SK BG DK BE RO HU LT MT NL LU PL FI CZ SI PT IE SE ES CY EL IT AT LV FR DE UK

Tend to Trust the EU (%)

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4.1.2 Europe 2020 - a strategy to strengthen the European economy.

Europe 2020 is chosen because of its more general nature, as it is a strategy that came as a direct response to the economic crisis and provides an overall agenda that covers the whole decade from 2010-2020, focused on all the member states and EU’s institutions. The strategy, Europe 2020, set out three core priorities: Smart growth, sustainable growth, and inclusive growth (European Commission 2010:3).

However, before going forward, a critical point must be addressed towards Europe 2020. Since it has no direct focus to be followed as it is a general strategy, the results presented in the analysis regards to Europe 2020 must be seen on a general level as well. This means that identifying mechanisms within Europe 2020 would be impossible to trace with perfection since it is affecting all the member states and all the EU institutions. Nevertheless, identifying general mechanisms of Eurosceptic tendencies would be a good starting point for the rest of the thesis.

At the time when Europe 2020 was introduced in 2010, it was described as a

‘moment of transformation’ for Europe, the strategy was issued to address several key issues and challenges. Issues and challenges such as globalization, resources, and the ageing of the population to name a few (European Commission 2010:3).

The point of Europe 2020 was to address these challenges ahead of time, providing a common strategy that enables the member states and the EU to collectively meet these challenges, where the ultimate result would be a fixed market and a smart, inclusive, and sustainable European economy (ibid.).

The strategy is presented with a clear set of priorities and headlines. The priorities presented are smart growth, sustainable growth, and inclusive growth, defined by the strategy as:

Smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation. Sustainable growth: promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy.

Inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion (European Commission 2010:3).

The priorities then include additional in-depth priorities within each headline. Smart growth for example is further broken down into three categories; innovation, education, and digital society (European Commission 2010:10). Innovation is presented as a vital point, showing comparable numbers where Europe is behind the

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likes of Japan and the USA. Where the issue is described as a lack of private investments as well as a lack of spending in research and development, which the strategy aims to address (ibid.).

Education is presented as another vital point within the frame of smart growth. The highlighted problem with education is the level of education in comparison with the USA and Japan, where the EU is currently lacking. Along with a problem of pupils who tend to leave their education too early (European Commission 2010:10).

Moreover, smart growth focus on the fact that the overall education level in the EU does not match the labor market’s needs (ibid.).

Digital society lifts the issues of Europe falling behind in internet speed, which is seen as pivotal in knowledge, distributions of goods, and various services (European Commission 2010:10). Furthermore, it includes the demand for information and communication technologies, a market that has a large economic forefront, where Europe should be more active in seeking success (ibid).

Sustainable growth is also divided into three sub-sections, including competitiveness, combating climate change, and clean and efficient energy.

Competitiveness gives remarks about the high levels of trade within the EU and the lead EU currently has in the market for green technologies. Also adding that the EU should ensure its lead with resource efficiency and competitiveness within the EU as well as outside the EU to increase productivity to stay on top (European

Commission 2010:12).

Combating climate change points to the challenge where Europe needs to reduce its emissions in a faster fashion in the 2010-2020 period than the decade before to reach the environmental goals set. To reach this, it is suggested that the EU should continue to improve the use of resources and to use technological advancements to improve emissions in all sectors of the economy (European Commission 2010:13).

Another vital point is clean and sufficient energy, which includes the goal to increase reusable energy solutions, thereby reducing the use of oil. Not only in the sense of the environment per se but also to ensure energy security by introducing more renewable energy. At the same time, it will also boost the economy as

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renewable energy solutions are estimated to create more jobs (European Commission 2010:13).

Inclusive growth is categorized in three headlines as well: employment, skills and fighting poverty. Employment addresses the issue of the current high unemployment rate due to the crisis, but also the notion of a shrinking workforce, raising the problem of the low employment of women and older workers (European Commission 2010:16).

Skills highlight the future shift in the job market, where it is estimated that high qualification jobs will increase by the end of 2020, meanwhile low skilled jobs will decrease (European Commission 2010:16).

Fighting poverty marks that 80 million is at risk of poverty before the crisis began, giving the indirect notion that the number of people in poverty probably increased during and after the economic crisis. Which makes it an issue which needs immediate attention. Furthermore, unemployment is again a focal point in this section, as poverty and unemployment go in conjunction in many ways (European Commission 2010:16).

With the set priorities, smart growth, sustainable growth and inclusive growth, Europe 2020 also includes ‘headline targets’ which addressed the goals these priorities should be striving for. These are:

75 % of the population aged 20-64 should be employed. 3% of the EU's GDP should be invested in R&D. The "20/20/20" climate/energy targets should be met (including an increase to 30% of emissions reduction if the conditions are right). The share of early school

leavers should be under 10% and at least 40% of the younger generation should have a tertiary degree. 20 million less people should be at risk of poverty (European Commission

2010:3).

The Commission suggests that these headlines should be included in the member states national targets. Marking that necessary commitments must be done by both the EU as well as the member states (European Commission 2010:3-4). Thus, the Commission suggests dividing the responsibility for the strategy amongst different EU institutions, giving the ownership to the European Council, having the

Commission the responsibility of monitoring the strategy and facilitating policy exchange, and the European Parliament to have the role of getting the EU citizens

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on board and co-legislative initiatives towards the goals (European Commission 2010:4).

As shown, what Europe 2020 strategy involves is a wide spread of different actors.

This comes naturally, because of the international and supranational guidance and decision making of the EU (Silander 2019:8). This could be of concern in this thesis since the broad topics and wide position of the different actors cannot all be

included. However, as noted earlier, this can be used in a positive manner. Noting that there cannot be an in-detail analysis of Europe 2020, at least using process- tracing, it leaves Europe 2020 as an exceptional response to highlight general mechanisms of Eurosceptic tendencies. Thus, following the priorities taken in Europe 2020, allows for a broader overview of the mechanism resulting in

Euroscepticism due to the response. Not only in a broader sense of concrete actions taken by the EU or the member states but also as a starting summary of what to expect during the 2010-2020 period.

4.1.3 Europe 2020 and an increase in Euroscepticism.

First, it is important to note that because of the broad spectrum of Europe 2020, there is no possible way to cover all ten years of the active strategy. Although it was a response to the economic crisis, it also acts as a pinpoint of interest for the rest of the decade. Therefore, following Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013:18), identifying interlockings parts and processes will be brought down to minimal sufficient evidence for the cause and outcome. In this case, a minimal sufficient mechanism that can explain why the economic crisis led to increasing Euroscepticism within the frame of Europe 2020. Thus, due to the broad timeline of Europe 2020, processes and entities can jump back and forth.

It seems fitting to start the processing tracing by focusing on entities that cover most of Europe 2020. That means processes that can be applied to all three priorities, smart growth, inclusive growth, and sustainable growth.

Starting with sustainable growth, which includes the focus on a greener and more energy-efficient Europe (European Commission 2010:14), a possible problem occurs immediately when looking into the statements done by the Commission. The

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problem being the intervening actors, the outgoing mission of the EU institutions and member states to work with each other to reach the same goals.

In Europe 2020 the Commission sets demands on both the EU’s effort as well as the effort needed from the member states to reach the set goals of becoming a greener EU (European Commission 2010:14). A problem with this, as Nilsson (2019:225- 229) lifts, is the sheer intervening parts that must work together, being the supranational goal and the initiatives taken by the EU that must work with the member states socioeconomic status as well as international infrastructure.

Furthermore, the practical part which the supranational legislation controls are only up to 50%, the rest is controlled by the member states themselves (Nilsson

2019:228).

This makes a peculiar situation since supranational policies are issued as a unit within the EU. For example, the Paris agreement, which is a global agreement concerning the environment. The problem however is that a large responsibility is left for member states to issue their own policies to reach the collective goal. The result is a supranational goal set by the EU where the EU is dependent on the member states internal success, thus decreasing member states own authority and decision making meanwhile leaving accountability to the member states to issue policy changes to reach the goals (Nilsson 2019:228). What it inevitably ends up to is that member states, because of the differences in priorities and economical stance, separates from one another. Where some member states are more active in the climate issue than others, resulting in a position where it is relatively easy for the EU to set up common goals, but leaves it to the member states to take concrete action (Nilsson 2019:238). Thus, creating a chain of events just by the supranational nature of the EU. A chain of events that begins with Europe 2020, with a reasonable environmental goal to achieve, but quickly snowball to more commitments such as the Paris agreement. Even though most member states have accepted the challenge, it does create a situation where some of the member states are forced to adapt to EU policy changes taken within the set strategy of Europe 2020 (Nilsson 2019:228).

Therefore, this can be identifiable as a strong advocator for Euroscepticism. As it makes it easy to point fingers towards the EU for having too harsh commitments

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towards the member states. Which in a political national arena can undoubtedly create a fracture towards the EU and the national interest in the given member state.

Similar challenges and results can be seen in the smart growth priority from Europe 2020. Especially concerning research and development, wherein the strategy, spending on research and development is a strong focal point. The narrative that is driven is that Europe needs to invest more in innovation to create a competition with the USA and Japan (European Commission 2010:10). In the context that Europe 2020 is a response to an economic crisis, more investments were perhaps not the most viable cause of action. As Haglund-Morrissey (2019:166) points out, barely any investments came through at all. The initial goal set for the Lisbon strategy, which Europe 2020 advocated forward, was that 3% of the GDP should be going towards research and development (ibid.). In context, the USA had 2.6% and Japan 3.4% in 2010 (European Commission 2010:10). However, in Europe, the investment was at 2.04% in 2014, therefore showing a clear miss of the target (Haglund-

Morrissey 2019:166). The answer to why the investment did not come through was due to the divergence between the member states, where the Western states who came clear of the economic crisis a bit easier had followed through, but the east and south countries within the EU had enormous effects on their research and

development investments because of the crisis (ibid.).

Investments were not the only things that were deemed as a problem. The

Commission took further steps to improve the research and development situation by encouraging and pushing member states to improve policies within the frame of innovation. Not with great success though, and the EU was receiving a lot of

critique on pushing the issue further, being claimed on putting too much pressure on the member states which did not fulfil the desired level of improvement (Haglund- Morrissey 2019:173).

The research and development situation are like the situation with sustainable growth. The economical backlash created by the economic crisis which the Europe 2020 strategy in its core is an answer to, instead put the member states in a situation where some could not take appropriate action towards the common goal. Therefore, dividing member states due to their financial capability. Creating a snowball effect

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where some member states improve more and more, meanwhile, the catch-up becomes greater for those left behind. As a result, dividing the entities and actors, creating a gap easy for those with the political interest to increase Eurosceptic tendencies to thrive.

Inclusive growth might be the one focus in Europe 2020 which, at least with the results in hand, was the hardest one to include. Having to deal with the problem of the future labor market which will involve a higher demand on education, along with fighting poverty, especially during an economic crisis (European Commission 2010:16). To deal with the problem of having a workforce with a lower level of education than optimal, Europe 2020 sets out to attract labor migrants. The aim is to attract high skilled workers and researchers in an attempt to decrease the gap between the current workforce and the labor markets demands in the near future (Parkhouse 2019:221). However, this aim quickly changed focus when the

migration crisis later showed up, as the discussion changed attention to asylum and refugee policies. Nevertheless, one of the hardest parts when discussing

unemployment and labor migration is that a lot of real political power from the EU is taken away, leaving the member states fully responsible for taking concrete action (Parkhouse 2019:217). Another problem that occurred is the intra-EU situation where it becomes hard to get a clear picture of how the labor migrants are being divided. Mostly because of the various differences between the member states, where some member states become more attractive for highly skilled labor migrants than others. Creating a situation where migrants laborer’s might be increasing within the EU borders, but only increasing in some member states (Parkhouse 2019:216). Thus, the solution creates a gap between the member states again.

4.1.4 Summary Europe 2020

When presenting the empirics surrounding Europe 2020, there are identifiable processes that can be traced for gaining a mechanism that holds a minimal

explanation for the increase of Euroscepticism. Going from Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013:176) requirement of what defines a mechanism, a mechanism is created by parts that by themselves are not dependable of causing the outcome, but together

Euroscepticism: A result of too much European Integration?: A process-analysis of Euroscepticism in times of crisis.