T he B alTic S ea R egion
Cultures, Politics, Societies
Editor Witold Maciejewski
T he B alTic S ea R egion
Cultures, Politics, Societies
Editor Witold Maciejewski
A Baltic University Publication
Seventeenth century Sweden was actually a model for eighteenth century Russia. In his dis- sertation, the Swedish historian Claes Peterson showed that Peter I copied the Swedish admin- istrative system and tried to organise the Russian administration accordingly (Peterson 1979).
The Finnish historian Max Engman has given the label the “Stockholm period” to Baltic history in the seventeenth century. However, Engman adds significantly that viewed in a broader perspective the proper label would be the “Amsterdam period”. The Netherlands’
pre-eminence was reflected in the fact that Dutch supplanted Low German as the main com- mercial language (Engman 1995). After the establishment of the Russian Empire of Peter I in the Baltic area the “Stockholm period” was succeeded by the “St Petersburg period”. In the beginning this period too was characterised by Dutch influence. However, it has been argued that the crucial Dutch contribution to Swedish and Russian modernisation was part of a dialectical process where Muscovy played an important role.
In historiography, Russia has been cast in rather a passive role when it comes to modernisa- tion and societal development in general. It is significant that the founding of St Petersburg has been seen as the inauguration of both the “westernisation” and “Europeanisation” of Russia. However, if the perspective is changed it might be argued that Muscovy’s challenge to Swedish supremacy in the Baltic spurred the military, administrative and economic moderni- sation of Sweden in the seventeenth century. Moreover, it has even been argued that Muscovy’s foreign and military policies contributed to the rise of Holland and thus triggered the whole modernisation process in the Baltic Region.
In all his writings, the Soviet Russian historian Boris Porshnev stressed that political, economic and cultural history cannot be understood if the analysis is confined to separate states. Instead, it is necessary to view Europe as a system of states. In 1948, Porshnev pub- lished a book devoted especially to Russia’s place and role in early modern European history.
He described Muscovy’s struggle against the Teutonic Order and thereafter against the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation as a crucial factor for the victory of the bourgeois revo- lution in Western Europe. Porshnev argued that tsar Ivan IV certainly did not consciously act to help the Dutch revolution against the Habsburgs. On the contrary, Muscovy despised the Dutch rebels and fought them diplomatically. However, Muscovy’s pressure on Europe weak- ened the Habsburgs and thus made the Dutch revolution possible. The pattern was repeated during the Thirty Years War. Without Muscovy’s support to Sweden against the Catholic forces, the German Empire would not have been defeated. Muscovy thus contributed to the triumph of “the progressive forces”, i.e., the Protestant powers Sweden and Holland.
4 The Russian
and German Empires
Kristian Gerner
1. Westernisation or the Third Rome
Gothenburg’s geographical location and its original relation to Swedish culture was similar to the role of Peter’s St Petersburg. However, the following history was different. Whereas Gothenburg did not become the capital and was fairly well integrated into Swedish society, St Petersburg became the capital of Russia. Yet, to a certain degree, the new city with its western design and name remained alien in the Russian cultural environment and in the symbolic universe of Russian thinking. According to Lotman’s analysis, the city was viewed both as the victory of reason over the elements and as a break with the order of nature, both as a utopia and as a diabolical illusion. According to the contemporary secularised interpretation of the Bronze statue of Peter I from 1782, Falconet’s famous The Bronze Horseman, the snake under the horse symbolised the hatred, the enmity and the hindrances that Peter had to overcome in order to accomplish his modernisation of Russia.
However, according to Russian religious tradition, the snake was Anti-Christ and in the actual context with the horse and the horseman it symbolised the end of the world. The interpretation said that the Devil had helped Peter
build his city against the order of Nature and thus violated Russia. During the nineteenth century, St Petersburg was still perceived as the antidote to the Russian city Moscow. However, Lotman is keen to add, it acquired a dynamic role and really functioned as the modernising centre of Russia (Lotman 1984).
Peter’s project really was the second Russian empire. The first emerged gradually as a suc- cessor to the Byzantine Empire. Kiev adopted Christianity from Constantinople in 988 and adopted the Orthodox religion. During the fif- teenth century, Moscow, which had succeeded Kiev as the capital, distanced itself from the emper- or and the Patriarch in Constantinople because the latter were viewed as renegades when they reached reconciliation with Rome in an attempt to create a common Christian alliance against the
Ottoman threat. Thus, when Constantinople fell Figure 17. The Bronze Horseman, Peter the Great, from his statue by Stephen Falconett at St Petersburg. Ill.: Uppsala University Library
Parallel cities: Gothenburg and St Petersburg
Long after the actual Dutch flavour had evaporated, Gothenburg remained the most liberal and, as it were, progressive city in Sweden. It attracted, among others, especially Scots and Jews, the latter who were allowed to settle in Sweden in the late eighteenth century. It is appropriate to compare the role of St Petersburg in the economic and cultural develop- ment of Russia with the role of Gothenburg as a powerful external factor in Sweden’s economic and cultural development, especially if the latter city is viewed as an emblem for the role of integrated and assimilated foreigners in general. The great literary scholar Yuri Lotman, originally from Leningrad but who spent most of his career in Tartu in Estonia, has written much on the topic of St Petersburg as a crucial factor in Russia’s history. He has drawn attention to the importance of the fact that St Petersburg was situated at the geographical periphery of Russia. The city was a border zone between European culture in general and the specific Russian traditional culture (Lotman 1984).
to the Ottomans in 1453, it was easy for Muscovy to regard this as a just punishment. Within the Russian church a doctrine evolved which cast Moscow in the role as the third, true and final Rome. The grand duke adopted the title of Caesar, Tsar in Russian. In 1589, the met- ropolitan of Moscow was recognised as Patriarch by the Patriarch in Constantinople. Russia had become a recognised successor to the Byzantine empire. Catholicism in general and the catholic Polish-Lithuanian neighbouring state in particular emerged as the Other, cast in the role as arch enemy.
2. Peter I’s Baltic Empire
Peter I – sometimes called the Great – changed competition with the West into another dimension. He retained the idea of a Russian empire, but his plan was to integrate it with Europe and introduce Western civilisation. This was in the Baroque era, when symbols were highly significant. They carried messages about the political ambitions and aims of the rul- ers and their states. Thus it was highly significant that Peter named the new capital of Russia St Petersburg and that he spelled according to Dutch rules. Saint Peter was the apostle who brought Christendom to Rome, the capital of the original empire. If Moscow had been regard- ed by Peter’s predecessors as the Third Rome, the new tsar announced that Russia was linked to the origin directly. Not only the Dutch spelling but also the design of the new Russian capital, which reminded the visitor of Amsterdam and Venice, main centres of European trade, intelligence and banking, demonstrated that Peter’s ambition was to make his new empire a modern state at the forefront of European civilisation. After having defeated and obliterated the Swedish Baltic empire (but not Sweden as a national state) Peter adopted the Roman title Imperator. This did not signify an ambition to conquer all of Europe but the demand that Russia must be regarded as an equal to the two successor states to Rome in Western and Central Europe, i.e., France, where Louis XIV had adopted the title Augusto Augustior, and the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, usually ruled by members of the Habsburg family. Russia was established as a Baltic empire. The competition from Denmark and Sweden ceased to be a serious threat to Russia, in spite of the Swedish “revenge” wars against Russia in 1741-43 and 1788-90, but in the southern Baltic area a new challenge developed slowly in the form of Prussia. This had to do with developments in 1789-1871 among the successors of the Roman empire in the west, i.e., France and the German länder.
Building a Russian Empire entailed access to the sea and control of the lands to the east of Prussia and Austria, i.e., the lands between the Baltic and the Black Sea. Peter had tried to establish Russia on the shores of the Black Sea but had finally concentrated on the Baltic region. His plans were fulfilled by Catherine II – also called the Great – in the late eighteenth century at the cost of the then enfeebled Ottoman empire. Whereas Peter had built the new Russian capital on the Baltic coast in a territory inhabited by a truly Baltic people, the Finns, which had been under the jurisdiction of the main antagonist in the area, Sweden, Catherine built a new Russian port in a territory traditionally inhabited by a truly Mediterranean and Pontic people, the Greeks, which had been under the jurisdiction of the main antagonist in the area, the Ottomans. The new city was called Odessa.
Its construction was to be supervised by a French aristocrat in Russian service, de Richelieu.
Its design and architecture were as West European as that of St Petersburg. However, approach- ing the Mediterranean from the east through the Black Sea, Catherine announced that Russia now challenged the Ottomans once again by laying claims to Constantinople. After
the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans regarded themselves as the inheri- tors of the empire in direct competition with Moscow. Now Catherine had her grandsons named Alexander and Constantine in order to signal the Russian claims on the heritage from Constantinople.
3. The French episode
The Russian Empire became the politically most powerful state in the Baltic Region as a consequence of the outcome of the Napoleonic wars. In 1809, Russia defeated Sweden and Finland became a Grand Duchy under the Russian tsar. Russia played a leading role at the peace congress in Vienna in 1815. Almost a century after Peter the Great’s proclamation of the Russian empire, it was finally recognised by the Western great powers as their equal.
Copying the model of Alexander the Great, the Russian tsars enlarged the Russian empire in the nineteenth century by conquering the lands of the Southern Caucasus and of Central Asia, finally reaching the Pacific Ocean, where Vladivostok, literally “the Sovereign of the East” was founded in 1861.
However, as Russia extended its empire in the east, it was gradually losing positions in the Baltic area. This was the result of some long-term consequences of the French revolution of 1789, i.e., the rise of Prussia to great power status and the creation of the German Empire in 1871.
The French revolution swiftly developed into a republican project for Europe. Interestingly, the symbols chosen to represent the new republic were taken from the Roman Res Publica.
Official insignia, the names of political institutions and public art and architecture all recalled the original model, and ambitions to establish a new European empire emerged. The identifi- cation with the Roman republic was strong. In April 1792, even before the dethronement of Louis XVI, Robespierre argued against the declaration of a revolutionary war on Austria lest the war should produce “a new Caesar”.
Actually, a new Caesar did enter the scene. In 1804, First Consul Napoléon Bonaparte crowned himself and was anointed by the Pope, adopting the title “Empereur de la République”. Defeating Prussia, he also re-established Poland in the form of a Duchy, Księstwo Warszawskie. The Polish szlachta gladly joined La Grande Armée as Napoléon invaded Russia in 1812. This is the subject of the most famous of all Polish poems, Adam Mickiewicz’s work Pan Tadeusz. It was to inspire generations of patriotic and romantic Poles in their struggle against tsarist Russia in 1830, 1863, 1905 and 1920. In 1999, the greatest Polish film direc- tor ever, Andrzej Wajda, crowned his more than fifty years long carrier with the movie Pan Tadeusz. The whole dialogue was Mickiewicz’s original poem.
4. The anti-absolutists episodes and restoration of autocracy
But back to the early 19th century. Besides exerting dictatorial power, Napoléon made the empire hereditary. Although his legal reforms helped make France a modern state in the era of accelerating capitalist industrialisation and advancing political liberalism, his empire certainly was not a democratic state. However, as a result of direct confrontation with France, with modern French political philosophy and with the French legal system during and immedi- ately after the Napoleonic wars, Russian officers began to nurture the idea of a revolution in
their own country and of a democratic constitution for Russia. The moment came when tsar Alexander I died in December 1825. This caused a minor dynastic crisis. Of Alexander’s two brothers, the older, Constantine, was the heir apparent. However, he had been disqualified by Alexander because of his morganatic marriage, and he refused to become tsar. The revolutionar- ies attempted to use the short interregnum before the Guards swore allegiance to Alexander’s younger brother, Nicholas, to take power by force. The revolt was easily crushed by the troops of the new tsar, Nicholas I. Five of the leaders were sentenced to death by hanging. More than a hundred were exiled to Siberia or demoted to army service in the ranks. However, their ideas were taken over and developed further by a new category of critics of the state, which grew in Russia during the nineteenth century. The revolutionaries of 1825 themselves became known as the Dekabristy. The Bolsheviks, who took power in 1917, recognised the Dekabristy as their predecessors. Senate Square was renamed Dekabrist Square as an act of homage.
After the modernisation spurts under Peter I and Catherine II, respectively, which were consciously meant to make a truly European state of Russia, came the third impulse as a direct consequence of the confrontation of young Russian officers with contemporary West European civilisation. This time it was not a spurt directed from above. It was the start of a long march and mobilisation from below and within Russian society. It would end only with the breakdown of tsarist Russia in 1916-17 and the Bolsheviks’ coming to power. Ideologically, the Russian intellectuals were profoundly influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Among the intellectuals, who now became known as intelligenty, who formed the intelligentsia, different ideological stances developed. The most prominent among them were the Westerners, the Zapadniki, and the Slavophiles, the Slavjanofilii. The former were universalists and wanted to see – or believed that it would come as matter of historical devel- opment – Russia become a modern European state. The latter believed in certain peculiar qualities of the Russian people and believed in a special road to modernity for Russia. In terms of progressive radicalisation in the course of the century, many among the former became socialists and many among the latter populists. There was also a mixture of elements from both strains, first the Narodniks and then the Bolsheviks.
Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881) answered some of the demands in the wake of the shock following defeat against the United Kingdom and France in the Crimean War. Enserfment, which had been abolished in the Baltic provinces in the second decade of the 19th century, was abolished in 1861, and the administrative and judicial structures were changed according to Western models. However, the tsarist autocracy did not manage to promote political input from below but remained resistant to radical demands, especially after Alexander II had been murdered by a populist in 1881. Only after a new military defeat, in 1905, against Japan, did a new wave of reforms hit Russia as a direct consequence of revolutionary upheavals. A parlia- ment, called the state duma, was established in 1906, agrarian reforms were implemented, and the press and literature in general could flourish. On the eve of the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, not only militarily and politically but also culturally, Russia was a leading Baltic power. Then came the war, and Russia was lost to European civilisation for seventy years.
5. Emergence of the modern German empire
The Roman German empire, which had been founded in 962, disappeared as a consequence of the Napoleonic wars. In 1804 the emperor Francis II realised that the end of the empire was imminent and contented himself with creating a new empire from his hereditary lands,
to become Emperor Francis I of Austria. Napoleon dissolved the old German empire formally in 1806. Then Napoleon was defeated. France went through a reconstitution of the monarchy and two minor revolutions in 1830 and 1848. A second republic was proclaimed in 1848.
It was followed by a second empire in 1852, when First Consul Louis Napoléon arranged a referendum, after the outcome of which the Senate declared him emperor as Napoléon III.
In the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian empire was the only empire to border on the Baltic Sea. However, competition between the German and French halves of the old Roman empire were soon to touch the Baltic Region. Prussia, which had been consolidated and reformed as a consequence of the impact of and the reaction to the French revolution and Napoléon’s devastating victory over Prussia in 1806, began to compete with Austria for the role as the leading German state. Prussia at the same time of course remained a Baltic power.
In 1864 Prussia and Austria attacked Denmark in order to reclaim the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. They did so. Two years later, in 1866, Prussia defeated Austria in the battle of Königgrätz and forced the latter state to renounce all aspirations for hegemony over all German countries. The time was ripe for a second German empire.
In 1870, Prussia attacked France. Even before the capitulation of Paris, the German chan- cellor Otto von Bismarck had the King of Prussia, William, proclaimed German Emperor.
The ceremony took place in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace of Versailles on 18 January 1871.
This was a symbolic gesture with the message that the new German Empire was the inheritor of the whole imperial tradition, both the French and the German. The new empire was called the Second Empire. The word in German was Reich. The word is etymologically related to the Scandinavian words “rike” (Norwegian and Swedish) and “rige” (Danish). In the latter languages, the word has the connotation of “state”. However, the German word Reich has the connotation of “empire”. After the ascendancy to the throne of William’s grandson William II in 1888 and his dismissal of von Bismarck in 1890, Germany began to claim recognition as an empire on an equal footing with both the British and Russian empires. In the political language of the 1890s, Germany aspired for “a place in the sun”. Thus in the early twentieth century, the Baltic Region became the arena for competition between Germany and Russia.
For the major part of the century, politics in the Baltic Region became profoundly affected by this. The story came to an end only in 1990-1991 with the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Within the framework of the European Union, Germany emerged as the most powerful state in the region. Russia was still recognised as a military great power, but its ideological, political and economic influence diminished significantly when the Soviet empire was dissolved and Russia lost East Germany, Poland and the three Baltic states.
In the early twentieth century, the German Empire, whose capital Berlin must be consid- ered to be a Baltic city, was at the forefront of industrial, technological, scientific and cultural developments in the world and certainly in the Baltic Region. However, it must not be for- gotten that a second centre of the modernisation process was an outgrowth of west European civilisation across the Atlantic Ocean, i.e., the United States of America. It had a crucial influ- ence in the Baltic Region from the mid-nineteenth century and during the whole twentieth century. Mass emigration to the United States eased social pressure on the states in the Baltic Region, and the resulting networks of contacts with the United States and the latter’s influ- ence in all spheres of society in the region were of profound importance for developments in the twentieth century.
Baltic Empires
The Danish Empire (1150-1220). As early as the Viking Age Danes gained dominance in the Baltic Region, controlling Norway, Denmark, Skåne and Estonia. Tallinn (which means “Danish fort”) was founded by the Danes in 1219. Denmark also controlled several of the large islands in the Baltic Sea. There was much Swedish-Danish dispute over Gotland, which was Danish during several periods until 1645.
The Teutonic Order (1226-1410). German knights advanced eastward in the early Middle Ages. Along the Baltic Sea coast the cities of Danzig (Gdańsk), Königsberg and Riga were founded. Prussia, originally inhabited by a west Baltic peo- ple, was conquered. The eastward expansion was halted by Polish-Lithuanian forces at the battle of Grunwald/Tannenberg in 1410.
The Kalmar Union (1397-1521). A union was formed by Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1397, partially to counteract the Hanseatic League. Though weak, it became one of the largest alliances in the Baltic Region, mostly under Danish leadership. It survived several wars between Denmark and Sweden, but broke apart when Gustav Vasa was successful in separating Sweden from Denmark in 1521.
The Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth (1386-1795). Lithuania was unified under Mindaugas in the 13th century.
Through marriage, a personal union was established between Poland and Lithuania in 1386. This empire was very large, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, including major parts of present day Belarus and Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania entered into a real union in the 16th century. This state was partitioned by Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1772-1795.
The Swedish Empire (1560-1721). The Swedish realm expanded from the 1560s and on. Encircled by its neighbours, Sweden launched wars with Russia, Denmark, Poland, and the German Emperor and gained territories. The Swedish king Gustav II Adolf entered the Thirty Years War and conquered several German ports. Denmark lost Scania (Skåne) and other provinces to Sweden in 1658. This marked the maximal extent of the Swedish empire. The Baltic Sea almost became a Swedish inland water. The emergence of Sweden as a great power was made possible through administrative reforms, and the build-up of an iron and copper industry with the help of Dutch expertise and capital. Almost all areas east and south of the Baltic Sea were lost in the Great Northern War which ended with the treaty of Nystad in 1721.
Russia (1701-1917). The Russian expansion towards the Baltic Sea was led by Tsar Peter I, marked by his decision to build St Peterburg in 1703 as the capital of Russia. After the Great Northern War Russia obtained Estonia and Livonia from Sweden. After agreement with Prussia later in the 18th century, Poland was divided between Prussia, Russia and Austria.
The Vienna Treaty after the Napoleonic wars confirmed Russian control over these areas.
Brandenburg-Prussia-Germany (1660-1918). With Brandenburg as the nucleus, Brandenburg-Prussia was established as an electorate in 1660. In the 18th century Prussia grew to an influential state. Centralisation of the administration (in Berlin), economic reforms, the creation of a professional army were the basis of Prussian power. Prussia took a lion’s share in the divisions of Poland 1772-95. After Congress of Vienna of 1815, Prussia took a leading role in the German unification. The establishment of the Second German Reich in 1871 confirmed Prussia’s hegemony over Austria as the leading German state.
Figure 18. The Baltic Empires – dominating powers in the Baltic Region. Ill.: Ulf Zander
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