Governmentality in the battle against
climate change
Governmentality regimes in the Global North and the
Global South
Tomas Vörlund Rylenius
International Relations
Dept. of Global Political Studies Bachelor programme – IR103L 15 credits thesis
Thesis submitted [Spring/2021]
Abstract
Climate change is the worst long-term security issue humans has ever faced. The discourse around the problems and solutions connected to it are predominantly coming from the Global North. On the other hand, it is the Global South who are experiencing the impacts of a changing climate, in the form of floods, droughts, heatwaves, and lack of food, water, and energy. This asymmetrical relationship has rendered the Global South the vulnerable subjects in the current governmentality regime of climate change. Through a governmental lens, this paper analyses the similarities and differences in how climate change as a security and IR issue is problematized, and especially what solutions are seen as viable, across and between the North-South divide. This understudied relationship and its implications, is in this paper exposed and tackled. It shows that the Global North are slowly shifting the responsibility of coping with climate change away from the large GHG emitters, and on to the individuals in the Global South that are worst affected by the consequences of a changing climate. The recently updated NDCs within the Paris agreement supports this view and make up a key part of this paper.
Abbreviations
CCS – Climate change strategy
CCPI – Climate Change performance index
CRI - Climate risk index
GHG - Greenhouse gas
IPCC – Intergovernmental panel on climate change
NDC – Nationally determined contributions
QCA – Qualitative/Quantitative content analysis
SAR - Second assessment report
TAR – Third assessment report
UN – United Nations
Table of contents
Innehåll
1. Introduction ... 1
2. Literature review and theoretical framework ... 4
2.1 Governmentality within the climate change – security nexus ... 4
2.2 Securitisation and risk management ... 6
2.3 Resilience as Governmentality ... 7
2.4 Governmentality in the Global South and Global North ... 9
3. Research design ... 10
3.1 Selection criteria ... 11
3.1.1 Case selection ... 11
3.1.2 Data selection - documents ... 13
3.2 Content analysis ... 15
3.3 Operationalising the data ... 16
3.4 Methods in the field ... 16
4. Results ... 17
4.1 Three different dimensions ... 18
4.1.1 Geographical dimension ... 19
4.1.2 Temporal dimension... 21
4.1.3 Global comparison of keywords ... 22
4.1.4 The NDCs within the Paris agreement ... 24
5. Discussion ... 25
5.1 Governmentality within climate change across the North- South divide ... 25
5.1.1 Mitigation and Adaptation, power and knowledge ... 26
5.2 The Paris agreement ... 28
5.3.1 Resilience and subjugation ... 29
5.3.2 Risk, resilience, and the Governmentality regime ... 30
6. Conclusion ... 31 7. Bibliography ... 34 8. Sources ... 36 9. Appendix A ... 40 9.1 Data ... 41 9.1.1 NDCs ... 41
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1. Introduction
Climate change is a threat to all of humankind and is often portrayed through apocalyptic language and images. It is a security threat on a scale we have never seen before, and threatens not only populations, but even entire states from being erased from existence. Especially states in the Global South which have so far been the worst affected, and are predicted to be even more affected by the consequences of climate change in the future (Eckstein et al, 2019). On the other hand, the discourse and governing of the issue has predominantly been shaped by actors in the Global North, and it is states in the Global North that are argued to do the most to battle climate change (Burck et al, 2020: 14-15). However, since the impact of climate change is not affecting the Global North to any significant degree, but almost exclusively the Global South, the viewpoint of the Global South is a key factor. The way in which this problem, and the solutions to it, is portrayed will have major impacts on societies across the globe, as well as within the IR debate about power relations (Boas, 2014; Methmann and Oels, 2015; Schäfer et al, 2016; Von Lucke, 2018; Weiqiang, 2017). This puzzling relationship will be analysed and discussed in this paper through these three researchable questions; First, what are the
similarities and differences between the Global South and Global North in how they govern Climate Change? Second, Has the discourse shifted or remained the same over time? And
thirdly, how has the Paris agreement influenced the production of governmentality regimes
within climate change?
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climate change. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature through a comparison of the discourse between the states argued to do the most to battle climate change, and the states that are most affected by climate change induced catastrophes. Moreover, the paper at hand will investigate the similarities and differences in how these states have framed this issue in the recently updated NDCs of the Paris agreement, which will provide a unique, and remarkably up-to-date picture of the discourse.
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between mitigation, how to deal with the causes, and adaptation, how to deal with the consequences (Oels, 2011: 21), two key words that will be analysed in this paper. Moreover, the SAR highlighted that if adaptation options were widespread and became too central to the discourse, mitigation actions would be seen as less important.
This dichotomy has been central to the governmentality regime of climate change and is still today a key part of the discourse. The work of the IPCC is generally argued to have “…strongly influenced the heuristic framework for policy responses in the realm of mitigation and adaptation” (Oels, 2011: 22). The IPCC had this impact due to the nature of the problem they are investigating, an issue that affects the entire globe. Problems of this nature cannot be solved by one state here or there, instead, any solution must come through cooperation, especially in the shrunk world we live in today, where everyone is interdependent on everyone else (Stripple and Bulkeley, 2011: 29). It was in fact the political negotiations on the basis of the first IPCC report that led the UN to implement the UNFCCC (Oels, 2011: 22). This is evidence of both how strongly the IPCC influenced the problem formulation, and also how it is an issue which from the very start was seen to be in the need of global cooperation through the UN. Today, this collaboration has been even more institutionalized, especially after the signing of the Paris agreement where almost all states in the world signed up to battle climate change together (UNFCCC, 2016). This background of the governmentality of climate change will be further developed in coming sections and the similarities and differences between the Global North and the Global South will be highlighted.
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2. Literature review and theoretical framework
This section will emphasize, firstly, how the governmentality – security nexus provides a more comprehensive explanation of security issues then other approaches to security issues, most notably securitization theory. Secondly, I will discuss how the discourse about climate change, with the perspective of governmentality in mind, is best understood through the logic of risk, and not as one of extraordinary measures. Thirdly, I will map out the key theoretical underpinning in this paper, resilience, as the newest form of governmentality within climate change. Lastly, I will briefly discuss how the literature in the field has failed to provide a comprehensive picture of the differences and similarities of governmentality within climate change between the Global North and the Global South, while most of them do acknowledge that this is needed.
2.1 Governmentality within the climate change – security nexus
Governmentality is a critical approach to investigate the ‘art of governing’, basically how an issue is made manageable. This approach does not take the mode of government for granted in any way, instead it allows for a critical, historicized, examination of the governing process. This way of viewing issues makes it possible to see governmentality regimes within a specified field by connecting the governing of issues with the governance of the actors (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2011: 28-30).
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Within the climate change – security nexus, governmentality offers a more critical and profound account of events and discourse than the most utilized approach, securitization theory. While securitization theory is an ample approach when identifying the shaping of an issue, it does not offer the same explanatory power, especially when considering the astonishingly lack of extraordinary measures taken in the battle against climate change (Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2011; Oels, 2013; Schäfer et al, 2016; Trombetta, 2019). Climate change as a security issue has mostly been studied through the lens of securitization theory, with a focus on investigating how successful the securitisation has been. Scholars have either attempted to explain how the securitisation could be seen as successful, or just been satisfied with claiming their research have not yielded any results that are instances of a successful securitisation framing of climate change. An instance of the latter is Schäfer et al (2016) who is investigating news coverage of the securitisation of climate change to see where the discourse has the strongest voice, and comes to the conclusion that it is more prominent in the West than in the Global South, a rather straight-forward account of events. Other scholars have, on the other hand, argued that “…the fact that climate change is discussed at all at the international level is an effect of successful securitisation, and that there are measures taken, however small…” (Von Lucke et al, 2014: 858). These competing accounts for the securitisation of climate change seems to boil down to what is considered extraordinary measures. The answer to this question has been debated extensively in the field (Corry, 2012; Oels, 2013; Von Lucke et al, 2014; Von Lucke et al, 2018). The lack of extraordinary measures against an issue that is facing the entire humankind, be it climate change or a pandemic, has never been as clear as it is now, in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. When we have seen what extraordinary measures look like, the closing of entire societies, curfews, a rapid transition to the digital workplace, huge relief pay-outs from governments, etc., it is abundantly clear that no such measures have taken place in the battle against climate change.
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relations and a dominant regime within a certain issue area. Secondly, is how the art of governing has expanded with time. What, centuries ago, started out as the governing of territory, has evolved with time and is today the governing of populations, as well as more abstract parts of society, such as ideas or nature. Simply put, governance is ever-expanding into new areas of everyday life (De Roeck, 2019: 161; Dillon, 2007: 42). Lastly, Foucault emphasizes how knowledge is produced, what constitutes as knowledge, and who is able to deem what knowledge is accessible. Knowledge, in tandem with the ever-expanding governance, is how discourse and what constitutes as normal is defined for populations all over the world (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2019; Lövbrand and Stripple, 2011; Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2011: 18; Oels, 2013: 200-201). These three characteristics are vital when examining the governmentality within the climate change – security nexus and will feature throughout the paper.
Diving deeper into the differences, and possible platforms of cooperation, between governmentality and securitisation, I will in the next section explain how climate change is better understood utilizing the logic of risk compared to the logic of security.
2.2 Securitisation and risk management
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The differences between a logic of security and a logic of risk should on the other hand not be overstated. Methmann and Rothe (2012) analysed the discourse about the securitisation of climate change and, as most scholars have been keen to point out, found that on a rhetorical level climate change has been constructed as an enormous security threat, but there has not been any significant action taken that would constitute as extraordinary measures. They further this argument by highlighting that the most prominent political action taken has been a technocratic solution focusing on the governing of carbon emissions (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 324). This is one example of where there is a successful securitisation of climate change on a rhetorical level, but when it comes to action, governments have instead defaulted into incremental measures, which are best understood as risk management, thereby the exceptionality of securitisation and the routines of risk management are working in tandem when it comes to the issue of climate change. Other scholars have reached similar conclusions, most notably De Roeck (2019), Oels (2011), Oels (2013), and Von Lucke (2018). If we combine these two logics instead of treating them as inherently different, we will not get bogged down in an academic debate about what extraordinary measures are, or ought to be, we can instead focus our attention to how these logics have manifested themselves in the real world of coping with climate change, as mitigation, adaptation, and resilience. With this understanding of how securitisation and risk management are working in tandem, and that the action taken to battle climate change are mostly through technocratic routine efforts, best understood as risk management, I have now established a baseline for how this paper views climate change as a security issue. I will now turn to how the discourse have recently been shaped by risk management.
2.3 Resilience as Governmentality
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how much disturbance a system can endure and still maintain equilibrium (Methmann and Oels, 2015: 54), ecological resilience as explained above, or transformational resilience, which “… is not only about ‘being robust to disturbance but also [… about] the opportunities that emerge, in terms of self-reorganization, recombination and the emergence of new trajectories’ (Bourbeau, 2013 quoted in Methmann and Oels, 2015: 54). This constitutes a discursive development, but more importantly, does this discursive shift constitute new political action? This remains a debated question within the field, but scholars argue that a Foucauldian approach through governmentality shows the greatest promise of finding any type of increase in political action (Methmann and Oels, 2015; Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2011; Oels, 2013). This is where resilience comes into play because it shifts who is responsible for making sure that climate change does not destroy our way of life. Thereby creating a governmentality regime that highlights the importance of resilience over other efforts.
Resilience as a concept has been taken from the adaptability of ecological systems and into the realm of politics where it is “…related to the way that societies adapt to externally
imposed change” (Joseph, 2013: 39). Furthermore, resilience is a concept that, viewed through a governmentality lens, is able to show how the small incremental measures are affecting the governing of a political space, in this case that of climate change (Joseph, 2013: 41; Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 337). As Joseph (2013) further argues, resilience is a mode of governing that is shifting the responsibility from the state to the individual. Linking this conceptualization of resilience to that of power, explained in first section of this part, and putting this in the context of climate change,
“Resilience is sold as a strategy of empowerment because it offers affected populations
the ‘free choice’ of whether or not to migrate. However, resilience simultaneously denies them any choice about the reality of climate change itself, it hides the policy option of emission reductions, and robs people of the vision of a world in which they would be secure from the impacts of climate change” (Methmann and Oels, 2015: 52).
This understanding of resilience seems to enter debates around the power structure between the Global North and Global South, which is something I will discuss in more detail in the following part. Furthermore, it shows how the Global North are creating a governmentality regime which renders the Global South subjects without any real agency to shape their own understanding of the problem and solutions to climate change. For now, let’s stay with how resilience has manifested itself as a key concept in the battle against climate change.
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created, the Paris agreement, resilience play an important role. Article 7 of the agreement states that
“Parties hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive
capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2” (UNFCCC,
2015: 25)
Highlighting the importance of becoming resilient. Additionally, in article 2 it is emphasized how important it is to “…adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience…” (UNFCCC, 2015: 22). On the other hand, the word resilience itself is merely used nine times in the Paris agreement, compared to adaptation and mitigation, which are used 85 and 50 times, respectively, so can one really say resilience plays an important role here? The importance of resilience does not, to the same extent, lie in how many times it is mentioned, compared to adaptation and mitigation since it is a development of adaptation, it is what it implies. As argued by Methmann and Oels (2015: 61-63), resilience has three major political implications; resilience takes away the rights of climate refugees, since this is not an official status and acceptable reason to migrate (Methmann and Oels, 2015: 52); resilience shifts the responsibility of dealing with climate change from those that contribute to it the most to those that are affected by it the most, basically from the Global North to the Global South; and lastly, governing through resilience presupposes that climate change is unavoidable, and as argued in the SAR if adaptation options are widespread and become too central to the discourse, mitigation actions will be seen as less important. The governmentality regime this creates leaves no room for discussions of how those mostly affected by climate change can live without being affected, instead it presupposes the inevitableness of climate change and thereby limits the options to how actors can adapt and become resilient.
2.4 Governmentality in the Global South and Global North
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this paper. Throughout the paper thus far, it is clear that most scholars argue that there exists an asymmetrical relationship between the Global North and Global South (Boas, 2014; Methmann and Oels, 2015; Oels, 2011; Oels, 2013; Schäfer et al, 2016; Von Lucke, 2018; Weiqiang, 2017). Even though many scholars have argued this, surprisingly few have made this the main focus of their research (Von Lucke, 2018: 416), and even fewer have done a multi-national research design, which can reveal broader trends. Schäfer et al (2016) is one of the few exceptions, they have investigated the securitization of climate change in media across nine countries. Some of the most interesting findings of this research is about the difference in the intensity and scope of the securitization of climate change between the West and the rest. The West, in this paper meaning Australia, Canada, New Zeeland, United Kingdom, and USA, together with Singapore and Thailand securitized climate change to a higher degree than India and South Africa. Furthermore, the West focused more on energy security, while the rest focused more food and water security (Schäfer et al, 2016: 90).
This article is very interesting because it is one of the few that points to any differences in the discourse on climate change as a security issue, with empirical evidence. What it does not contribute with, is an analysis of the discourse on an institutional level since they are investigating newspaper articles, and while such a focus can reveal much about the overall discourse, it cannot claim to be the official view of that particular state. What has not been provided in Schäfer et al (2016), or any of the scholars mentioned in this section, are works that investigate and compare the official discourse between the Global North and Global South on an institutional level within the discourse on climate change. As previously mentioned, that is what this paper will contribute with, an overview of the similarities and differences of the governmentality of climate change between the Global North and the Global South. Such a perspective is of great importance to analyse the governmentality regime that is seemingly rendering the Global South subjects without any real agency in the governmentality of climate change.
3. Research design
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governing, governance, and governmentality that exists within the discourse. Furthermore, previous research has revealed one thing that is missing in the field, a broader picture of how, and especially if, the discourse around climate change differs between the Global North and the Global South.
In terms of data, I will in this section lay out what data I will analyse, why that certain data, how I will analyse it, as well as demonstrate why my method of choice provide the best possible avenue for answering my questions. This section will consist of three interrelated parts. Firstly, I will argue in favour of the data I have chosen, thereafter, I will specify how this data will be processed into tangible results and knowledge, and lastly, I will showcase how this process, in comparison with previous methods in the field used, will provide the most coherent answers to my questions.
3.1 Selection criteria
3.1.1 Case selection
Before diving into the data, I wish to remind the reader of the questions I have set out to answer in this paper, namely, what are the similarities and differences between the Global South and
Global North in how they govern Climate Change? Second, Has the discourse shifted or remained the same over time? And thirdly, how has the Paris agreement influenced the production of governmentality regimes within climate change?
As discussed throughout the paper, the issues have manifested themselves as Global North vs. Global South, where the Global North are dominant in shaping the discourse, and the frontrunners in terms of who is doing the most to battle climate change. Meanwhile, the Global South, and especially Southeast Asia, are the ones who are affected the most by climate change induced disasters. Therefore, I have chosen states from this premise, and relied on the widely renowned indexes of Germanwatch to choose what specific states to include. In Germanwatches most recent CRI (2019), they are highlighting the important correlation between climate change and extreme weather events, something I will in this paper refer to as ‘climate change induced disasters’. “People all over the world are facing the reality of climate change – in many parts of the world this is manifesting in an increased volatility of extreme weather events” (Eckstein et al, 2019: 5). This correlation is of vital importance since it allows for a measurement of something inherently difficult to measure, who is mostly affected by climate change, and it’s very diverse effects.
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term effects I will focus on since it gives me insight to what states have been battling the issue since the turn of the century, and therefore ought to have a somewhat clear idea of what the problem is and what possible solutions might be. According to this index, those states worst affected are, in order of who is most affected to the one who is the least, in the top 10, Puerto Rico, Myanmar, Haiti, Philippines, Pakistan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Thailand, Nepal, and Dominica. For starters, Puerto Rico is not a completely autonomous state, and are therefore not in control of the efforts taken to battle climate change within, or outside, their own geographical location. Furthermore, Puerto Rico does not have their own NDC within the Paris agreement, something I will explain the importance of in a latter part, I will for these two reasons omit them from my analysis. Haiti does also, unfortunately, need to be omitted because their official documents are only uploaded in French, the problem of which I will explain in the next section. This leaves me with the eight states worst affected by climate change induced disasters since the turn of the century, all of which are, unsurprisingly, located in the Global South.
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actor. The EU will for these reasons be included in my analysis, which leaves me with the ‘top 9’ from the CCPI.
3.1.2 Data selection - documents
Having established which states will be analysed, I will now turn to what data from these states that will be part of my analysis. As discussed in previous sections, the most common political action taken in the battle against climate change is of a technocratic nature, following a logic of risk (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 324). This means that the data I focus on from the selected states needs to convey this. The most logical starting point for me was the Paris agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), since it conveys both of these points in general, it is a framework agreed upon because of the risk that climate change impose upon humans, and it is resting on science to set specific targets and suggest solutions, an inherently technocratic solution. Besides this, there are two reasons that I view as particularly important, firstly, the Paris agreement is the baseline in which practically all states anchor their efforts to battle climate change, in their NDC, and secondly, the most recent update of data from the signatories of the Paris agreement, was made as recently as 2020-12-31. Thereby, most states in the world have a concrete climate policy laid out in their NDC, which has been updated very recently, conveying their most recent strategies for how to battle climate change in the post 2020-era (UNFCCC, 2021). I have therefore chosen to look at all the NDCs from my chosen states, but as discussed previously, all states that are members of the EU have a combined NDC, which means I will examine the EUs NDC which will represent the views of Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Denmark, Latvia, and the EU itself.
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of my selected states in my analysis.
Moreover, having a larger dataset with documents from different years has added benefit of allowing me to study the temporal dimension of the issue as well. On the other hand, the collection of these documents is not as straight forward as the NDCs which are collected in a database. The documents which I will analyse will therefore not be exactly the ‘same’ documents from every state, but will be the ones most closely corresponding to what I am looking for, as well as being in the proper language.This multi-pronged approach to the data selection decreases the risk that correlations found are of a spurious nature, which is the best argument in favor of data triangulation. “… Triangulation is a strategy that can be used both in terms of data collection and data analysis” (Lamont, 2015: 138). My method is not one of method triangulation, or a triangulation of different types of data, it is instead a triangulation of data created in three different contexts, for three different reasons, but all about the same issue. Here I need to emphasize some restrictions that my research has, and some rather serious downsides. Due to my language skills, I will not be able to process any documents that are in any other languages than English or Swedish, and even though Sweden is one of the states within my analysis, if I were to try and translate the words that I will argue convey a certain meaning, elaborated in the operationalisation part, the closest translation might not convey the same inherent meaning. For example, the word mitigation, a key word in my paper, would in Swedish be ‘lindring’ or ‘lindrande’ or maybe “förmildrande”, which are not words that are typically used in the field of climate change within the Swedish discourse the same way mitigation is used in the English discourse. On the other hand, if I am only examining documents in English to make sure I examine exactly the same word, states that have other languages than English as their firsthand language might not translate all their documents, some states does not translate any, such as Haiti, whom have all their official documents in French. This is a problem for two reasons, firstly I will have to exclude those states that do not have any documents in English. Secondly, I might have to settle for documents that are not exactly what I am looking for, but the closest thing that is in English.
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I would not be able to include the Global South to the extent that I have, which is key to further our understanding of the security issues within climate change, as well as to connect how the issue is governed to existing governmentality regimes.
This procedure has narrowed down my data to 42 documents that will be analysed. Having established precisely what documents to analyse, I will in the next section explain how these 42 documents will be analysed.
3.2 Content analysis
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anchor my research design, especially within Methmann and Oels (2015), Methmann and Rothe (2012), and Oels (2011) as well as Oels (2013).
3.3 Operationalising the data
How my data will be operationalised refers back to my discussion about resilience as governmentality. I will rely especially on the understanding of the discourse, laid out by Methmann and Oels (2015), Methmann and Rothe (2012), and Oels (2011). Oels (2011) highlighted the dichotomy between mitigation and adaptation, as well as how focusing on adaptation might reduce the will to mitigate in the political realm. Furthermore, she mapped out how both of these terms have had a key role in the climate change debate since the early 90s. Methmann and Rothe (2012) further those arguments in their discursive analysis of each of those terms, while also connecting this debate to that of security and showcasing the language used in the Security Council when debating these issues (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 334-336). Methmann and Oels (2015) are adding the relatively new term of resilience to this debate and especially the transformational characteristic of it.
From these contributions I have operationalised my data in the following way, firstly, I will search for the word mitigation, and inflections of this word, in the documents selected, which will reveal the similarities and differences of mitigation efforts across the North – South divide. Secondly, I will search for the word adaptation, and inflections of this word, in the same documents, which partly shows if states are focusing more on adaption or mitigation, and partly if there is a difference across the North – South divide in their focus. Thirdly, I will search for the word resilience, and inflections of this word, again in the same documents, which in turn will reveal which states have highlighted this the most, bearing in mind that “[t]he core of resilience is to empower the poor to deal with the consequences of climate change” (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 334). The results of this process, and how I have coded this material into visualized graphs presented in the next section, is presented in Appendix A.
3.4 Methods in the field
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of focus on the Global South in academia, they have not remedied this. Others have, who also might be slightly outside my field of research, instead specifically focused on the Global South, but on individual states, with the exception of Von Lucke et al (2018), and on the discourse within those states (Boas, 2014; Schäfer et al, 2016; Trombetta, 2019; Von Lucke, 2018). All of these contributions have added to the broad literature of discourse within the security of climate change, but none of them have provided an overview of several states that can help with highlighting the similarities and differences across the North – South divide, which is what this paper has set out to do. It is therefore logical that my data consists of more documents, more pages, but less depth than those before me. QCA as a method is the best approach for this, partly because it allows me to treat several thousand pages of data in a systemic manner, and partly because it is inherently connected to my theoretical framework. Furthermore, it has as its main focus to investigate “the role of discourse in enacting, reproducing, and resisting social power abuse, dominance, and inequality” (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 339), which is exactly what I will examine. Because of all these contributions, I have a strong theoretical ground beneath me when analysing my data, which will aid me in drawing inferences from my data to previous research.
This section has established what data I will analyse, why that certain data, how it will be analysed, as well as demonstrated why my method of choice, although differing from other within the field, is the best approach to provide the overview of similarities and differences of governmentality in the climate change debate across the North – South divide. The next section of this paper will implement this method on my data and present the results with visualization tools.
4. Results
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governing the climate change question. Furthermore, the rare example of data about this, in Schäfer et al (2016), seemed to substantiate this interpretation. My findings do tell a similar story, mostly about the major differences in the focus on mitigation, but within resilience the focus is actually higher across the Global South states than it is within the Global North, something that I did not expect, but can also point as to how resilience is already constituting a key part of the current governmentality regime within climate. Furthermore, this is the case because of the shifting focus from those who to do the most harm to the climate, to those that are mostly affected by climate change (Joseph, 2013: 38-39).
Moreover, since the nature of the problem is impossible to deal with for one state within its national borders, but must be through cooperation across several states, regions, and the entire world, I expected neighbouring states to have a similar understanding of the problem and solutions. This is not apparent in my results though, it seems as though every state goes about their own business, with their own formulations, even within the EU which has an unmatched level of cooperation in the world.
This section will be structured in the following way, first I will present my results according to a geographical dimension to showcase similarities and differences with a geographical lens on. Second, I will present the results through a temporal lens, to highlight differences over time. Third, I will break down the results according to keyword and compare them globally, before focusing specifically on the NDCs of each state in the Paris agreement.
4.1 Three different dimensions
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4.1.1 Geographical dimension
Figure 1 visualizes how many times each of my keywords, mitigation, adaptation, and resilience, are mentioned, per page, in the Global South. This data is collected from 1542 pages, across 24 different documents, with the earliest document being from 2001, which is Dominica’s national disaster plan, and the rest of the documents from the period 2007-2020. The diagram is structured with the state worst affected by climate change induced disasters the last 20 years in the bottom, Myanmar, going upwards to the eighth worst affected, Dominica. Figure 1 shows that in general, states in the Global South focus more on mitigation and adaptation than on resilience, with the exceptions of Myanmar and Dominica. Worth to note here is that both Myanmar and Dominica have such remarkable graphs about resilience due to
their respective national climate strategy, which are both very recent, 2017 and 2020 respectively. The importance of the temporal dimension will be brought to light in the next section. Furthermore, the average score of the CRI states reveals that, even though by a slim marginal, mitigation is the least mentioned word, resilience in the middle, and adaptation the most.
The CCPI states, which consists almost exclusively of states in the Global North, have rather different scores, as shown in figure 2. This figure consists of data from 1595 pages, across 18
0,35 0,57 0,79 1,53 0,41 0,64 0,24 0,2 0,62 0,8 1,03 0,93 1,41 0,9 0,37 0,9 0,17 0,82 1,62 0,3 0,37 0,18 0,51 0,22 0,74 1,28 0,64 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 Myanmar Philippines Pakistan Vietnam Bangladesh Thailand Nepal Dominica Average
Figure 1. CRI states
Resilience Adaptation Mitigation
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documents, from the period 2012-2020. As is evident in the graphs from the CCPI states the average difference in focus is much larger than for the CRI states. Noteworthy here are the
remarkable graphs from Finland and the United Kingdom, which very much pushes up the average scores. Similar to Myanmar and Dominica, the focus on adaptation and resilience for Finland and the United Kingdom comes from their national climate strategy, written in 2014 and 2013 respectively. Moreover, mitigation has scored very low across the board, with the highest score being from the one state that is clearly a part of the Global South, Morocco.
The difference between the CCPI and CRI states is rather striking, especially when examining mitigation. In Figure 3 we can see the difference per word when summarizing all pages from
0,33 0,06 0,13 0,11 0,06 0,8 0,21 0,56 0,29 0,28 3,8 0,25 0,24 0,1 0,81 1,06 1,63 0,96 0,74 1,07 0,3 0,11 0,66 0,04 0,07 0,25 2,59 0,1 0,98 0,57 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 Finland Sweden Portugal Latvia Denmark Morocco United Kingdom China European Union Average
Figure 2. CCPI states
Resilience Adaptation Mitigation
0,16 0,92 0,59 0,54 0,7 0,69 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Mitigation Adaptation Resilience
Figure 3. Keywords globally
CCPI states CRI states
Figure 2. Number of words per page for the CCPI states. Source: Appendix A
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the CCPI and the CRI states. This graph is highlighting some interesting things. Firstly, both the CCPI and the CRI states talk mostly about adaptation, even though the CRI states have the slimmest possible marginal of adaptation over resilience. Secondly, the biggest difference between the CRI and CCPI states are within mitigation, where the CCPI states score extremely low compared to the other words. Thirdly, the CRI states have very even graphs, meaning that they speak about all of these aspects in an even way compared to the CCPI states, which have large differences all over. To further highlight some of the significant information gathered I will now turn to the temporal dimension.
4.1.2 Temporal dimension
As highlighted in the previous part, the differences between the CCPI and CRI states are rather significant, but what was also briefly mentioned was the differences in timespan in which the documents analysed were authored, which was a much shorter, and recent period for the CCPI states than for the CRI states. This may of course be significant when interpreting the results, I have therefore added Figure 4 to show how much each word was used globally, not divided into CCPI and CRI states, but all together.The data in this graph is very diverging and needs to be explained in more detail to not jump to any conclusions about these graphs
.
This data is fromthe same documents as in the previous part of course, but since data was more available in some years than others it is important to note this. For example, the data from 2015, and 2020 are quite reliable since these were the years when the Paris agreement was signed, and when it was
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 Wo rd s p er p age Year
Figure 4. Key words historicized globally
Mitigation Adaptation Resilience
* Data is gathered from only 1 document. ** Data is gathered from only 2 documents
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updated, meaning that most states submitted at least one documents each of these years. Furthermore, I have added some extra notes below figure 4 to explain what years and data that one ought to carefully interpret. Despite these disclaimers, it is important to add a temporal dimension to the results because of the ever-changing discourse about climate change, and the importance of historicizing it when analysing through the lens of governmentality (Stephan et al, 2011: 66). The results from this table seems to further substantiate my findings in previous tables, that mitigation is the least used out of my keywords, with the exception of early documents from only one source, which is Dominica from 2001 and Vietnam for 2007. One more key point from this table which is not directly apparent when looking at it is that the data from 2019 are only from CCPI states, and only from their respective climate change strategies. This can help explain the overall low scores that 2019 has. I will now turn to my third way of visualizing my results, by looking at all actors examined but dividing it word for word.
4.1.3 Global comparison of keywords
This part is breaking down the results by word, with all actors examined in the same figure, but
divided according to word. Figure 5, which is about mitigation, shows that over half of all the times mitigation is mentioned throughout my 3137 pages of documents examined it comes from only 5 states, all of which are located in the Global South. These are of course the same numbers presented in start of this section but visualized as how they compare to all states. The same goes for figure 6 and figure 7, which highlights adaptation and resilience, respectively. Figure 6
Vietnam; 1,53 Morocco; 0,8 Pakistan; 0,79 Thailand; 0,64 Philippines; 0,57 China; 0,56 Myanmar; 0,43 Bangladesh; 0,41 Finland; 0,33 European Union; 0,29 Nepal; 0,24 United Kingdom; 0,21 Dominica; 0,2 Portgual; 0,13 Latvia; 0,11 Sweden; 0,06 Denmark; 0,06
Figure 5. Mitigation
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shows that states from the CCPI are more often utilizing adaptation, but that it is more evenly
distributed between states from the Global South at Global North than it is for mitigation. Figure 7 shows a very mixed picture of where the word resilience features the most. It also shows that
it varies extremely per state how much it is emphasized, even between states in the same regions.
The results presented in this part have partly substantiated the arguments by previous scholars about the difference within the governmentality of climate change, especially about the focus of mitigation. On the other hand, that the CRI states score higher than the CCPI states within resilience is quite remarkable, but at the same time seems quite logical considering the shift in
United Kingdom; 2,59 Myanmar; 1,27 Nepal; 1,28 European Union; 0,98 Thailand; 0,74 Portgual; 0,66 Vietnam; 0,51 Philippines; 0,37 Finland; 0,3 Morocco; 0,25 Bangladesh; 0,22 Dominica; 0,2 Pakistan; 0,18 Sweden; 0,11 China; 0,1 Denmark; 0,07 Latvia; 0,04
Figure 7. Resilience
Finland; 3,8 United Kingdom; 1,63 Vietnam; 1,41 Morocco; 1,06 China; 0,96 Pakistan; 0,93 Bangladesh; 0,9 Nepal; 0,9 Myanmar; 0,71 Denmark; 0,81 European Union; 0,74 Philippines; 0,57 Thailand; 0,37 Sweden; 0,25 Portgual; 0,24 Dominica; 0,17 Latvia; 0,1Figure 6. Adaptation
Figure 6. Number of words per page per state. Source: Appendix A
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focus, from those who to do the most harm to the climate, to those that are mostly affected by climate change (Joseph, 2013: 38-39). Adaptation is the one category where the CCPI states score higher than the CRI states, although maybe not to the extent that one would imagine. These three categories will be further analysed in the next part, where I will connect my results to the discussion had in the literature review, but for now let’s look at the results connected to my third research question, about the interpretation of the Paris agreement.
4.1.4 The NDCs within the Paris agreement
The NDCs submitted through the framework established with the Paris agreement, are supposed to highlight the efforts the state will make to battle climate change.
“In their NDCs, countries communicate actions they will take to reduce their Greenhouse Gas emissions in order to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement. Countries also communicate in
the NDCs actions they will take to build resilience to adapt to the impacts of rising temperatures.” (UNFCCC, 2021)
The NDC is therefore exemplary to analyse for the words mitigation, adaptation, and resilience. In figure 8 I have highlighted each state’s usage of these words within their own NDC, except
for the states that are included in the EU (Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Latvia, Denmark) because they do not have their own submissions, but a collected one under the EU banner. This is partly problematic because it is more difficult to make comparisons between states, but on the other hand, what I am mostly interested in is the difference between the Global North and the Global South and I can still make that comparison with no problems. The Global South scores
2,33 4,83 1,48 2,6 1,35 1,38 0,45 0,61 0,26 0,81 0,31 0,61 1,76 0,4 3,34 3,5 1,55 3,74 0,65 2,38 1,27 2,5 0,26 1,06 0,59 1 2,44 0,52 0,55 1,83 0,26 0,4 0,12 1,25 0,32 2,17 0,16 0,25 0,19 0,17 0,63 0,18 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 8. NDCs
Mitigation Adaptation Resilience
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significantly higher than the Global North within every category. I will return to these extraordinary results in the discussion part.
5. Discussion
The research questions this paper has set out to answer are; What are the similarities and
differences between the Global South and Global North in how they govern Climate Change?; Has the discourse shifted or remained the same over time?;how has the Paris agreement influenced the production of governmentality regimes within climate change? The results
highlighted in the previous section does not show a conclusive picture, but it does come a long way to answer these questions of the similarities and differences in the governmentality of climate change between the Global South and the Global North. The specific words through which I have structured my research design, mitigation, adaptation, and resilience, each tells us something different about what the problems and solutions to the wicked problem of climate change as a security issue are. How each of these words is utilized tells us much about how climate change is being governed across the North – South divide, as well as historically all over the globe. Moreover, it highlights the focus of the current governmentality regime within climate change. This section will interpret the results utilizing governmentality as the theoretical framework and connect this to the debate taken up in the literature review about the security vs. risk interpretation of climate change.
I will first of highlight the similarities and differences between the Global North and Global South in the governing of climate change, both geographically and historically. I will then focus on the Paris agreement and the difference in focus between the Global South and the Global North. Thirdly, I will discuss the subjugation of the Global South through resilience and the current governmentality regime. Lastly, I will re-iterate my findings in the conclusion and discuss possible future research engagements within this area.
5.1 Governmentality within climate change across the North- South divide
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there exist major differences or if there is a more homogenous governmentality regime within climate change. Although, to make sense of the results presented, I will now turn back to my early discussion of governmentality, and the three key insights from Foucault, power, knowledge, and the expansion of governance. These three insights are key to contextualize the results within the climate change – security nexus and can tell us more than who used what word the most.
5.1.1 Mitigation and Adaptation, power and knowledge
Foucault’s notion of power, that power is not simply utilized through coercion and domination, but also in a productive manner, through consent and freedom (De Roeck, 2019: 161; Methmann, 2010: 350), and its close ties to knowledge creation, must here be re-emphasized and utilized when highlighting the results. This conceptualization of power and knowledge, together with Oels (2011) extensive discussion about mitigation and adaptation is a good starting point to interpret my results.
Mitigation, which is where the largest differences in my results occur, is one of the two focal points of the early discussions about how to deal with climate change, the other being adaptation. The IPCC argued during the 90s about the danger of having a to one-sided focus on adaptation since it might leave mitigation efforts seem irrelevant (Oels, 2011: 21). Furthermore, adaptation was argued to be a last resort kind of solution, this was especially true for developing states who argued, to deaf ears, “…that climate change was a problem of overconsumption and wasteful lifestyles of industrialised countries” (Oels, 2011: 21). Despite these warnings, the TAR (IPCC, 2001) changed the connotation of adaptation, from being a last resort, to something positive, and that some levels of climate change are inevitable and needs to be adapted to (Oels, 2011: 23). The TAR thereby paved the way of a governmentality regime in which mitigation efforts were less and less important.
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adaptation measures, which is the most utilized strategy for both the Global North and the Global South, one must wonder why this shift from mitigation to adaptation has taken root? Especially in the Global South, who saw this problem as one of overconsumption and wasteful lifestyles in the Global North (Oels, 2011: 21) This is where the conceptualization of power and knowledge within governmentality can help us with understanding this.
The CCPI states are almost exclusively from the Global North and, as highlighted earlier, it is the Global North that has dominated the agenda-setting within the climate change discourse (Boas, 2014; Boas, 2015; Von Lucke, 2018; Schäfer et al, 2016). With this trend of focusing on adaptation over mitigation being so apparent in the Global North, it is likely it will become even more dominant in the Global South as well. The Global North in general, and especially the CCPI states, are holding the power to shape the discourse, they are argued to have the most knowledge in how to battle climate change and they are therefore the agenda-setters, and are also the ones producing the governmentality regime in which all states live. The specific states that are in the CCPI are there because they are argued to understand climate change issues and solutions the best. It is not so that the Global North are dictating exactly what needs to be done, but they are the dominant powers within climate change collaborations and are shaping the knowledge through which the world views the problem and the solutions. Moreover, this creates a situation where it becomes near impossible to distinguish if the Global South are living in a governmentality regime produced by the Global North, if they create their own but mimicking the Global North so they melt together into one, or if they have produced another governmentality regime in which they are emphasizing what they view as important. This is how the knowledge-power nexus works through a governmentality understanding, and this leaves the Global South with little agency to shape the discourse towards more mitigation measures, which is what they argued for in the late 90s.
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5.2 The Paris agreement
Figure 8 is showing the difference between all the states, except the ones within EU, in what they focus on within the Paris agreement. This figure is especially interesting since it is the only category of my analysed documents in which the states submit something from the same instructions. The Paris agreement does not specifically say what should be included in the NDCs, but it is about the interpretation of this document, and especially how the states view in what way they can fulfil their obligations to the agreement. One could assume that that the results here would be similar, since the NDCs are what make up the Paris agreement, and the goal of the agreement is to “…limit global warming ‘below 2° C’ relative to preindustrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels” (Laudari et al, 2021: 2), but the results differ immensely. The Global South are four times as much mentioning mitigation, five times as much adaptation, and four times as much resilience, as the Global North. What is the Global North focusing on in their NDCs? It does not seem to be, at least not to the same extent as the Global South, the key questions that the NDCs are supposed to cover, about how to mitigate, adapt, and become resilient. Furthermore, in line with previous results, it is adaptation that is the most used word overall, for both the Global South and the Global North, and resilience the least used word. This further strengthens previous research about how adaptation measures have risen to the top and thereby pushing down the importance of mitigation (Oels, 2011; 21).
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settle this, figure 4 is highlighting the years of when what word was used the most, and it also reveals that 12 out of my 42 documents analysed are from before the Paris agreements implementation and can therefore not have been ‘tainted’. This still means that the majority of my data is from the post-Paris era and my results are therefore probably heavily influenced by the agreement.
The current governmentality regime is thereby closely connected to how the Paris agreement is interpreted, and what this agreement focus on. As previously discussed, it is highlighting the importance of adaptation over mitigation, and arguably, a shift towards resilience. I will in the next part delve on the resilience that seems to be a tool of subjugation for the Global North.
5.3.1 Resilience and subjugation
Between the dichotomy of mitigation and adaptation, my results are largely according to expectations. When it comes to resilience it is a bit more complicated, I expected to see much focus from the Global North on this keyword but were highly unsure of how much the Global South would have bought into the discourse dominated by the Global North.
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figure 7.
Resilience is further argued to be a more contemporary conceptualization of adaptation in the literature (Methmann and Oels, 2015; Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2013), but the data I have produced does not support this argumentation. Resilience seems to be a bit all over the place. Although, as highlighted in figure 4, it is difficult to make any major conclusions from my data through the temporal lens. What can be said about resilience, especially from the two years where I have the most data, 2015 and 2020 because of the Paris agreement and its update, is that the trend is more towards resilience than away from it. Such an interpretation is also in line with previous research about climate change and resilience (Crossweller and Tschakert, 2020; Joseph, 2013; Methmann and Oels, 2015; Methmann and Rothe 2012; Oels 2013). Furthering this discussion, I will now dive deeper into why the lack of mitigation and increase of resilience is a problematic development for the Global South, and how this can be interpreted as the Global South mimicking the governmentality regime produced by the Global North.
5.3.2 Risk, resilience, and the Governmentality regime
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Global South through their dominance in the power – knowledge nexus within climate change Methmann and Oels, 2015; Methmann and Rothe, 2012). This is a possible outcome that was warned about already in 1995 by the SAR (IPCC, 1995), that a too one-sided focus on adaptation, which is a form of resilience, would render mitigation efforts seem unnecessary. Furthermore, this governmentality regime shifts the responsibility of coping with a changing climate from those who are harming the environment the most, to those who are affected by it the most (Joseph, 2013: 38-39). This argumentation is supported with the results highlighted in the previous part, where it was apparent that mitigation efforts are far less important for the Global North than for the Global South. That resilience is trending upwards is a further cause for concern for the Global South, it will further exacerbate their lack of agency within the actual problem, that we as a planet are harming the environment, and further increase the understanding of climate change as an inevitable problem that we all must learn to live with. That it is the Global South who are driving the increase in resilience measures forward may seem backwards in my line of argumentation. Although, as previously highlighted, the dominance in the knowledge – power nexus leads to the production of a governmentality regime which becomes the standard of how to cope with climate change that all states live by. As my results show, the Global South has mimicked the discourse produced in the Global North, and developed it themselves to a point where they are arguing for measures which restricts their own agency and freedom.
6. Conclusion
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ones argued to do the most to battle climate change.
Through governmentality I analysed how my selected states deals with climate change as a security issue, if they are focusing mostly on mitigation efforts, adapting to a new reality, or transforming their societies through resilience. I have throughout the paper argued that the efforts are best understood through a logic of risk, and not through extraordinary measures which is the most studied theoretical perspective. From my results, and according to expectations from previous literature, it is clear that the Global South focus more on mitigation efforts than the Global North, and the reverse when it come to adaptation. This point has previously been brought up by scholars in the field (Von Lucke, 2018: 432; Methmann and Oels, 2015: 63-64), but never empirically backed up the way it is done in this paper. Moreover, this paper has provided a historicized view of climate change as a security issue. I set out to view how the discourse has changed over time and I have found that the usage of resilience is trending upwards, this was also according to expectations from previous literature. What was against expectations, was the extent to which the Global South focus on resilience overall, and especially in their NDCs.
The results found in this paper suggests that resilience is trending upwards, mitigation downwards, and adaptation remains the most sought-after strategy. The differences in the discourse between the Global North and the Global South are quite big, but at the same time everyone is focusing more on adaptation efforts than anything else, and the trends seem to follow the governmentality regime produced by the Global North about the importance of resilience and adaptation. This may be problematic because the lack of mitigation efforts will harm people in the long run. Depending on how far away the governmentality regime will move from mitigation efforts, this can result in even more harmful consequences for the Global South. It might go so far that the Global North stop taking any accountability for their responsibility in the increasing levels of climate change, and focus solely on adaptation and resilience efforts, which would lay all the obligation to manage climate change induced disasters on those who are affected the worst by climate change (Methmann and Oels, 2015: 64). Such a development, which seemed highly unlikely in the 90s when the IPCC argued for the importance of mitigation efforts, is increasingly becoming a reality.
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As for the Paris agreement, it seems as it has become so central to the current governmentality regime within climate change that it has influenced all other documents as well, meaning that the results within each state’s NDC is very close to its overall scores. With these answers to my questions, I am satisfied with what this paper has brought up, but there are many areas surrounding this question that need further examination. Especially about the knowledge production within the area.
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