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Mitigation
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Colorado River Water Conservation District Glenwood Springs, Colorado November 13, 1984
"In . my opi nion, the co-operation we have received from the Eastern Slope up to date is in reality more of a gesture than a real, bona fide, sympathetic effort to assist ~he western part of the state in the development of its resources and the conservation of its water supply."
-- Frank Delaney, Glenwood Springs, January 11, 1936
"It has come to be generally recognized that the only fair and businesslike way to sell water is through meters. In Denver, however, the arguments in favor of the introduction of meters have at this time somewhat less force than in other cities.. . . When meters are installed in Denver, as they surely will be later on, at some time . when their installation would postpone some large expense for new construction, an entirely new schedule of meter rates will be essential."
-- Engineering Report for Denver Water Board, August 15, 1922
"But I cannot help remember what happened to the Owens Valley in California, when a rich and powerful area goes after the water in an arid country."
-- N. H. Meeker, Gunnison, December 15, 1935
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"I believe I have .. finally.. convinced Tipton [Royce, Denver consulting engineer] that Denver has to appear in need of water at al l times and that if we have an~bundance of storage, our position is weakened in the camp of our opposition," Glenn Saunders 1 counsel 1 D.~n.ver Water Board.
-~ Grand Junction Daily Sentinel, August 11, 1957
"Our Beautiful Fountains
"The way to appreciate Denver's fountains -- pleasantly gurgling and flashing in the sun . . . . "
-- Editorial, Denver Post, September 11, 1984
"To Forge a Water Mandate for All of Colorado"
1979 Colorado Water Convention
"Tpat the diversion of this quantity of water from the Colorado River watershed will not interfere with or encroach upon the present or future irrigation along the Colorado River and tributaries within the State, with the protection provided in the Green Mountain Reservoir."
-- Senate Document No. 80, 75th Cong, 1st Session, 1937
-INTRODUCTION
The concept of compensatory storage is one that has been likened to extortion by some, fairness by others. It can be expensive for the provider; critical for the beneficiary.
At a recent water meeting, a Denver resident said metropolitan area entities could not afford one acre foot of compensatory storage for every acre foot transverted. Regardless of total charges to the importing basin for providing compensatory storage, those charges can never reach the cost to the basin of origin -- Western Colorado cannot be fully compensated for the taking of more water. Additional transmountain diversions represent the transfer and conversion of a Front Range problem into a Western Colorado injury. In a new transversion, even with equal compensatory storage, the water taken across the divide cannot be replaced. Forevermore in Western Colorado river channels will be that much lower, . riparian habitats wi·l l be that much drier, pumps will have to work that much harder, drought protection will be that much weaker, economic development will be that much more limited. Compensatory storage affords control and ability to more carefully, effectively and precisely utilize what remains. Those who question the price of compensatory storage are urged to first consider the price paid by an area that is methodically dewatered.
This report describes some of the impacts of transmountain water diversions; some of the promises made by the Front Range and state to Western Colorado, and broken; and, an example of what happens when one basin takes from another without consideration.
TRANSVERSIONS WITHOUT COMPENSATION -- THE IMPACTS
" ... In spare moments, ever since the meeting at Grand Junction, which you attended last summer, I have given this subject [transmountain diversion] some thought. The more I think of it the more I am convinced that we of the Western Slope should enlist the support the the Lower Basin States to develop the Colorado River Basin as a whole and not piecemeal; in other words, to accept the suggest ion of Mr. Wallace of Utah and ask that a comprehensive survey be made, with a view o~ ascertaining all of the possibilities and tabulating the resources of the Basin, and work to a definite objective just as the Tennessee Valley authority is doing."
"It seems to me that these transmountain diversions have reached a point where much of the scenic beauty of the Western Slope and its attractions to tourists, hunters and sportsmen are bound to be destroyed by the diversion of waters which make our fishing streams. From this standpoint alone, I feel that Western Colorado is about to lose millions of dollars. Personally, I know of no means of preventing that result, except as suggested above."
"I have read your letter with a great deal of interest. A moment's consideration of what happened in the Owens Valley in California is the most forcible application of the dangers inherent in any transmountain diversion project ... . "
-- Frank Delaney letters, 1935
What of the fears of transmountain diversions? What is the story of Owens Valley? "Not only was i t the most savage water war in United States History; it provided an early warning of a disturbing modern trend the inability of outlying communities to protect their identity and their way of life from being swallowed by Megalopolis." That was the way an American Heritage author put it.
The actions of Los Angeles in grabbing Owens Valley water more than 200 miles away were swift and complete. Now, Owens Valley's fate as a colony of Los Angeles is sealed. The valley will grow or change only as Los Angeles expressly allows it, because the city of angels controls most of the land and
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--virtually all of the water in Owens Val·ley. On the other hand, the dewatering of Western Colorado by Denver and other Front Range interests has been gradual. Instead of Denver swiftly dispatching Western Colorado to its destiny, the process has been drawn across the past 60 years and may not end for another 20 or 30 years.
William Mulholland, the Los Angeles engineer and driv~ng force behind both the Los Angeles [Owens Valley] and Colorado River aqueducts, said, "If you don't get the water, you won't need it.'' His message was clear. Those communi ties that aggressively develop their water resources, like Denver and Los Angeles, will need those resources. Those that don't develop their resources, won't need them and usually won't be aware of the resulting lost economic opportunities.
But, how will the water be be shared? much is shared? left of How will the the
Colorado River? How shortage, the injury
California estimates that 4.1 million acre feet [maf], rather than 7. 5 maf will be available for the Upper Basin in 1990. This would leave 2.1 maf as Colorado's share, rather than the accepted 2 .85 maf. With the completion of Rangely Reservoir and assuming completion of the Dallas Creek and Dolores projects, Colorado depletions from the basin will total 2,006,000 acre feet. Also, Colorado's share of main stem storage is calculated at 270,000 acre feet. Furthermore, there are nine Western Colorado projects that are aggressively be.ing pursued by Western Colorado interests. The nine, which include several projects authorized by Congress total 715,600 acre feet. While all of these projects may not be constructed, there are many, many other smaller projects designed for municipal, industrial and agricultural purposes that will be built. Thus, while California believes Colorado's share will come to 2.1 maf, and Colorado believes i t ' s share will come to 2. 85 maf, 2. 276 is already depleted and anticipated projects would make it 2. 992 maf. Most significantly, those numbers make 1!Q provision for special depletions resulting from oi 1 shale development, other natural resource development, major recreational developments or major additional transmountain diversions.
The impacts, the injuries, some sustained for many years, some the following:
some subtle, some obvious, yet to be suffered, include
1. Transmountain water diversions exaggerate the extremes of nature in the basin of origin. As an example, in the drought water year of 1977, when only 1, 852,000 acre feet were measured on the Colorado River at the Utah state line, transmountain water diverters took 523,377 acre feet, a number equal to 28.3% of the measured flow. In the wet water year
of 1983, when 8, 033,000 acre feet were measured at the state line, transmountain water diversions had dropped to 426,712 acre feet, a number equal to 5.3% of the measured flow. Relative to the total flow, the amount taken by transverters was five times more in a dry year than i t was in a wet year.
2. Because of the re-use factor across a couple of hundred river miles in Western Colorado, the diversion of one acre foot from the basin headwaters has the effect of taking three acre feet from the entire basin. That is, while every step of the more than 200 main stem miles in Western Colorado offers an opportunity for partial re-use, the total effect is about three acre feet. Thus, in 1978, when transmountain diverters took 634,760 acre feet across the divide, that had the impact of removing the use of l, 904,280 acre feet from the basin.
3. There are thresholds with regard to air and water quality standards, sewage treatment and water filtration costs,
endangered species mitigation and the like. Beyond these
thresholds, any project development becomes more expensive, and beyond that, projects cannot be developed at all. The building toward these thresholds by transmountain diversions is a major factor in the cost and feasibility of projects proposed by and for Western Coloradans. In effect, transmountain water diverters have, with impunity, increased the burden on Western Coloradans. Specifically, the removal of major quantities of the basin's purest waters from its headwaters brings about a wide range of impacts in the basin, including but not limited
to: decreased crop production, diminished fisheries, increased water treatment costs, a poorer range of recreational experiences,
increased capital costs for water and sewer plants, and more.
4. Although the transmountain diverter is a major user of Colorado River water [recent range: 28.3% to 5.3% of state line flow] and many transmountain diversions are junior to Western Colorado rights, the transversions, once transverted, are physically immune from helping to meet a compact call.
5. The economic impact due to water shortage in Western Colorado is staggering. The impact is, of course, greatest on the region itself, but reaches Denver and other parts of the state and the nation. At some point in t he future, Western Colorado will play a key role in meeting the nation's energy supply, if it has not been entirely crippled by water shortages. Denver serves as the capital, service and supply center, and corporate headquarters for much of the activity in Western Colorado. Indeed, much of the state's production of new wealth: minerals, forest products, crops, and livestock, is produced
in Western Colorado with a related economic benefit to "refiners and handlers" in Denver. While it is in Denver and Colorado 1
s interest to make sure that Western Colorado 1 s economy remains
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viable and is not crippled by dewatering, the impacts will be severe in Western Colorado where the top three industries: agriculture, recreation/tourism and mining depend heavily on adequate water supplies.
6. Tourism, aesthetics, riparian habitat and virtually all living things in Western Colorado suffer on a scale that increases as transmountain diversions increase without adequate compensatory storage. In this regard, a dying riparian habitat, diminished tourism, a deteriorating quality of life -- all living things on the western slope -- would seem better served by healthy streams, perhaps better served by utilization of water in the lower basin, rather than Eastern Colorado. The primary difference between use of Western Colorado water in Denver as compared with San Diego, is that in the latter, the water passes through Western Colorado.
7. One of the primary purposes of the Colorado River Compact of 1922 and the Upper Colorado River Compact of 1948 was to assure some opportunity for slower developing states, to provide some protection to those not developing as rapidly as others. Ironically, though Colorado is a Colorado River basin state only by virtue of its western slope, that portion of the state is not afforded the same protection by the rest of the state that the state is afforded by compact.
8. Since the days of the company towns, extractors of mineral or natural wealth have come to expect to pay their way. Virtually every major developer of any sort in Western Colorado has provided impact mitigation, compensation or an offer of sharing in the burdens and benefits, except Denver, and to a lesser degree, Colorado Springs, Aurora, Twin Lakes and Pueblo. In this regard, more consideration has been shown Western Colorado by multi national corporations and a Utah power cooperative, among others, than the Queen City of the Plains, Colorado's Capital. To mitigate impact of a coal mine near Rangely and a power plant in Utah, Deseret Generation and Transmission made a lump sum payment to Rio Blanco County and Rangely totaling near $17 million. Yet, the impact of the Deseret operation doesn't compare to the more than three million acre feet taken from Western Colorado by Denver. Through direct contributions, oil shale trust fund, mineral leasing monies and severance taxes, energy and mining companies from Exxon to Westmoreland, Union Oil to Energy Fuels, have contributed tens of millions of dollars to slope towns and counties for roads, hospitals, schools and a wide range of other projects to obviate the impacts of the projects. However, all of these energy and mining companies combined do not negatively impact man and all other living things in Western Colorado as much as the region's dewatering. And for that, save Northern Colorado and the Southeastern water conservancy districts, there has been no mitigation of any sort, whatsoever.
9. Most significant are the little, personal impacts, the bottom lines to all of the above. Those impacts are the return of Western Colorado to a region in which the young must leave because there are no economic opportunities because there is no water to float such opportunities. The impact is oppressively high water and sewer rates on the one hand and widespread social and economic stagnation on the other. And,
the bottom line may look like another conversion. It may look like the conversion of what was a naturally dry San Fernando Valley and what was a naturally lush Owens Valley.
'I
-A HISTORY OF PROMISES
Compensatory storage, or consideration of one basin by another, is not a new concept. Indeed, it is older than all of the conservancy districts in the state of Colorado and at least half as old as the state itself. It began with years of informal, friendly negotiations between people from Western Colorado and Northern Colorado as a result of the latter's desire to build what became the Colorado-Big Thompson. History was made on June 11, 1937 when Charles Hansen, Moses E. Smith and
Thomas A. Nixon, representing the Northern Colorado Water Users Assn.; Silmon Smith and Clifford H. Stone, representing the Western Slope Protective Assn. ; and, A. C. Sudan, representing Grand County, signed off on letters of submittal to Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes in a package that became Senate Document No. 80, the birth of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project and the formal adoption of the concept of compensatory storage by the U. S. Congress. Before and after, directly and indirectly, by leaders throughout the state and Denver, the promise of compensatory storage, of consideration to one basin by another, has been made.
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After lengthy negotiations, in 1968, the entire state of Colorado joined in support of the Colorado River Basin Project Act, which would enable both Arizona and Colorado to use substantially more of their compact share of Colorado Rivers water. Arizona received the massive Central Arizona Project, which was not to deliver water until five projects in Western Colorado were completed. The five, at that time, were sized to some 700,000 acre feet, an amount sufficient to provide for many of the needs and impacts in Western Colorado, including those caused by Denver's transmountain diversions. It offered Western Colorado a protective balance. In the late seventies, in an act believed unprecedented in Colorado water history, a member of the state's congressional delegation voted to kill her own state's water projects. The congresswoman, representing Denver, voted to kill Western Colorado projects.
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"At the request of Glen Saunders, Mr. Frank Delaney and I met with Saunders and Fischer in this [River District]
office last Friday. Mr. Saunders professed a strong desire to see the early development of an oil shale industry in Western Colorado. He stated that Denver was well aware that a dollar spent in Western Colorado resulted in two dollars being spent in the Denver area. He further stated that Denver was prepared to cooperate with Western Colorado in planning for and bringing about the development of water resources to facilitate the
expected expanding economy of Western Colorado."
Secretary - Engineer Phil Smith, report to the board
"I fully realize the intensities of feeling that, over the years, have been engendered ~n both sides of the divide over water problems. However, I cannot refrain from urging that we make further efforts to find common ground between the
Western Slope and Denver.
"We in Denver feel that we have a genuine stake in continuing welfare and prosperity of the Western Slope and we believe that Denver's welfare and growth are of importance to you. We all know that you and we have mutual cause in the prosperity, the welfare and the growth of the whole state of Colorado.
"If there is any way by which we could sit down together to achieve better understanding of our varying points of view and perhaps evolve a new approach to the solution of our common problems, that effort should be made because the importance to our people of the decisions we are making in these matters.
"On behalf of the Denver Water Board and the City government, I pledge to you our most sincere efforts toward such a goal."
-- Telegram, Denver Mayor Quigg Newton to CRWCD, Dec. 19, 1953
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In 1953, the Colorado General Assembly passed House Bill 457 directing the Colorado Water Conservation Board and the Colorado Conference Committee to establish the requirements of an oil shale industry. In part, the statute directed: "The studies so to be made shall include analyses of the extent to which water may be transferred from one watershed to another within the state without injury to the potential economic,_ development of the natural watershed from which water might be diverted for the development of another watershed."
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But nothing compares to the depth and involvement of the two-year saga of 1935 and 1936. It was a saga that involved three Colorado governors, two state attornies general, one popular lieutenant governor, two Denver water lawyers, and pioneering leaders in water from every corner of the state. There was no state water board at the time such responsibilities fell to the State Planning Commission, a blue ribbon panel from around the state with Edward D. Foster as director and John T. Barnett of Denver, former Colorado Attorney General, as chairman. At the request of the planning commission, Governor Ed Johnson called a statewide meeting of approximately 300 water users and officials for June 3 and 4, 1935.
At the meeting, an advisory panel of 17, seven from Western Colorado, seven from Eastern Colorado and three from the San Luis Valley was appointed. Chairman was George Corlett, former lieutenant governor. Included on the panel was Judge Clifford Stone, who was to become the first and long time director
-"12. That to effect such a result and protect and insure the growth of Western- Colorado, every plan for transmountain diversion projects shall · incorporate and include as an integral part of the cost thereof to be borne by the
proponents, compensatory storage equal to the amount to be
diverted, if made before the detailed survey herein provided for is completed, to be used not to make good direct
appropriations now perfected, but for the future needs and
development of Western Colorado."
On February 27 and 28, 1936, another statewide water conference was held, this time in Grand Junction. Denver attorney Malcolm Lindsey described the process used before: "First, a declaration of policy was prepared for the state in regard to the vexatious subject of transmountain waters. This was done by means of the Delaney resolution [resolution no. 1] which provided that in the construction of any major transmountain project construction should not be begun until after a complete
survey had been made to include all necessary data to show the
effect upon existing Western Slope rights and probable future development of the Western Slope and a comprehensive plan had been prepared to include compensatory storage in the amount shown by such survey to be sufficient. This was a great step
forward in that i t was an agreement by the state as a whole upon a sound policy as to transmountain development."
All members of the original committee of 17 present plus replacements for those absent were appointed to a new resolutions committee with Lindsey as chairman. In the evening session, "Mr. Paul P. Prosser, Attorney General, discussed the
need for abandoning 'slope consciousness.' He congratulated
the people who were aiding in doing away with sectionalism in Colorado and expressed the belief that the state can make no progress as long as one part is arrayed against another."
"Mr. Teller Ammons, City Attorney of Denver [and later governor of Colorado], brought greetings from Mayor Stapleton. Leaders of thought in Denver, he said, realize that Denver cannot grow and prosper except as the state grows and prospers. Her own water needs for the present and immediate future are cared for, and these leaders are anxious to aid in the development of the rest of the state." Others spoke, then Lindsey, as chairman of the committee, read 11 resolutions, each was read,
and each was adopted, including no. ll: "WHEREAS, the Water Resources Advisory Committee on June 15, 1935, passed a
resolution, known as the Delaney Resolution [Resolution No.
1] adopting a declaration of principles as to transmountain diversions,
"BE IT RESOLVED, that this Conference does hereby approve said Resolution and the principles announced thereby."
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"12. That to effect such a result and protect and insure the growth of Western- Colorado, every plan for transmountain diversion projects shall · incorporate and include as an integral part of the cost thereof to be borne by the proponents, compensatory storage equal to the amount to be diverted, if made before the detailed survey herein provided
for is completed, to be used not to make good direct appropriations now perfected, but for the future needs and development of Western Colorado."
On February 27 and 28, 1936, another statewide water
conference was held, this time in Grand Junction. Denver attorney
Malcolm Lindsey described the process used before: "First, a
declaration of policy was prepared for the state in regard to the vexatious subject of transmountain waters. This was done by means of the Delaney resolution [resolution no. 1] which provided that in the construction of any major transmountain project construction should not be begun until after a complete survey had been made to include all ne.cessary data to show the effect upon existing Western Slope rights and probable future development of the Western Slope and a comprehensive plan had
been prepared to include compensatory storage in the amount shown by such survey to be sufficient. This was a great step forward in that i t was an agreement by the state as a whole upon a sound policy as to transmountain development."
All members of the original committee of 17 present plus replacements for those absent were appointed to a new resolutions committee with Lindsey as chairman. In the evening session, "Mr. Paul' P. Prosser, Attorney General, discussed the need for abandoning 'slope consciousness.' He congratulated the people who were aiding in doing away wi tb sectionalism in
Colorado and expressed the belief that the state can make no
progress as long as one part is arrayed against another."
"Mr. Teller Ammons, City Attorney of Denver [and later
g.overnor of Colorado], brought greetings from Mayor Stapleton.
Leaders of thought in Denver, he said, realize that Denver cannot grow and prosper except as the state grows and prospers. Her own water needs for the present and immediate future are cared for, and these leaders are anxious to aid in the development of the rest of the state.'' Others spoke, then Lindsey, as chairman of the committee, read 11 resolutions, each was read, and each was adopted, including no. 11: "WHEREAS, the Water Resources Advisory Committee on June 15, 1935, passed a resolution, known as the Delaney Resolution [Resolution No. 1] adopting a declaration of principles as to transmountain diversions,
"BE IT RESOLVED, that this Conference does hereby approve said Resolution and the principles announced thereby."
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A few months later, John T. Barnett, chairman of the
-Colorado State Planning Commission and former -Colorado Attorney General, issued an extraordinary three-page statement. He reviewed the commission's statutory authority in water resources, highways,
l and use and so forth, and said that "Under the act creating
i t.. i t must serve the whole state, not any particular section.
Its plan for development must be comprehensive, must tend to
promote the interests of the state and must not harm any section
or industry." He then reviewed the water resources procedure:
"In each instance, the members of this advisory committee were
selected by the delegates from the respective districts, so
i t may be seen that i t is truly a representative
committee ... . Every resolution was adopted by the unanimous consent
of the committee. All differences had been compromised to the
satisfaction of the entire committee. Every section of the
state was represented adequately in the plan."
''On receipt of the advisory committee's report, the
Planning Commission considered i t in detail and adopted it by
unanimous vote, giving i t the authority of an official plan
for present and future development. As I have said, i t had
been considered first by the conference of more than 3001 then
by the advisory committee of 17, and last by the Planning
Commission, and in each instance had been given unanimous
approval."
"Because of the pressure for diversion of surplus
waters from the Western Slope to the valleys of the Platte,
the Arkansas and the Rio Grande 1 probably the most important
part of the plan is that contained in what is known as the Delaney
Resolution 1 which establishes the basis upon which the Planning
Commission will approve such diversions as being beneficial
to all river basins involved . . . . At the second statewide
conference, held at Grand Junction on February 27th and 28th
of this year 1 a resolution again was adopted by unanimous vote
of the entire conference, approving the Delaney Resolution as
the basis for trans-mountain diversion."
But now there are manifest attempts upon the part
of certain individuals to insist upon petty departures from
the program established by the Delaney Resolution and reaffirmed
at Grand Junction. The insistence of these people is jeopardizing
Colorado's right to enjoy the waters of the rivers which originate
along the continental divide and may lead to the most serious
consequences -- consequences which will halt all present plans
for development, nullify the sincere and thoughtful work of
the Commission and its advisory commit tee and conceivably lead
to the confiscation of our waters by users in other states, so that progress and development in Colorado will be at an end."
"Our danger and our need are real, as is our opportunity to safeguard the present and prepare for the future. But the
dangers we face within our state are no less serious than those
that threaten us from outside. Colorado will make no progress
toward expansion and growth through her water resources until
a plan has been agreed upon by those actually affected and that
plan has the united support of all our people in both public and in private life."
WILL DENVER BE TO WESTERN COLORADO
WHAT LOS ANGELES IS TO OWENS VALLEY?
The only difference between what Sherman did to Georgia and what Los Angeles did to the Owens Valley, is that Georgia recovered. While many areas have been plundered in time of war and peace, boom and bust, few areas have been so permanently devastated as the Owens Valley, where the very lifeblood was snatched from its aorta, its arteries, all of its capillaries. While a more complete account, "The Dewatering and Colonization of Owens Valley, California" is contained in the appendix, following are some haunting, perhaps foreboding parallels between Owens Valley and Western Colorado.
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P
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R A L L E L S
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1. Presidential Intervention. In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt's influence was cited as the key factor in Congress approving a project that would take Owens Valley water to Los Angeles, rather than the original reclamation project designed to use water in the Valley. In 1907, responding to a request from Denver interests, Roosevelt withdrew a reclamation reservation in Gore Canyon, Colorado, eliminating a major obstacle to the Moffat Road. In the former, the effect was to remove the last stumbling block to the Los Angeles diversion and ki 11 forever any real water conservation project in Owens Valley. In the latter, the effect was to facilitate the Moffat Road and its water tunnel, and quite possibly kill through diminished feasibility, use of Gore Canyon for storage by Western Coloradans.
2. Conservation Standards. Los Angeles, though notoriously wasteful with its water, forced conservation-minded customers in the Owens Valley onto meters. Denver, which takes substantial amounts of water from Western Colorado, where most cities and large towns are fully metered, has approximately 89,000 unmetered households.
3. Federal Landlord. A majority of the land in Owens Valley and Western Colorado is federally controlled. While environmental quality and reserved rights issues have been prominent in recent years, during the first six decades of this century, the formative years of major water diversions, federal land "management" was minimal. Indeed, the vigilance, protectionism and concern for future value would likely have been far greater on a privately owned tract than with federal
control, which in those days, was probably more conducive to such projects.
-4. History. The Paiutes were pushed from Owens Valley around 1863 and the first white settlers moved in. The Utes were pushed from much of Western Color_ado around 1880 and white settlers moved in. There was major silver and lead mining in
Owens Valley from 1868 to 1877, a tungsten boom in the mid-1950s and tungsten is still being mined today. There was major silver and other metal mining in the 19th century's last half in Western
Colorado, a uranium boom in the mid-1950s and metallic and
non-metallic mining still ebbs and flows.
5. Water Reprisals, Leverage. Los Angeles cut off water to Lake Diaz, a small recreational lake in Owens Valley after residents filed suit against the city. Denver has offered Summit County a nominal 3, 000 acre feet of water per year in return for Summit's support of a Denver project that would take substantially more than that from the region. In both cases, the carrot or hammer to local areas was water originating in
those areas.
6. Characteristics. ''Owens River Valley geographically is more of a Nevada valley than one of California," wrote Henry Osborne in Scientific American more than 70 years ago. Similarly, Western Colorado, geographically and perhaps politically and culturally as well, may have more in common with Eastern Utah than the Front Range.
7. Tokenism. The OWens Valley was given Lake Crowley, but is, for all practical purposes, dewatered. Western Colorado
was compensated with Ruedi and Green Mountain and may get a
reasonable facsimile of Azure, but i t appears likely that total compensatory storage will shrink in relation to the amount
transverted.
8. Blame Agriculture. By 1928, Los Angeles had sucked Owens Lake dry. An engineer for L. A. Water and Power, said, however, that the city did not change the lake's destiny. If not for the city, he said, th·e farmers would have sucked the lake dry to irrigate crops. In Colorado, cries over increased transversions for cities have been met with the issue side-stepper that agriculture takes some 90% of the state's water and
irrigation efficiencies should be focused upon rather than city transversions.
9. Unique Geology, Tourism. The Owens Valley touches or encompasses the highest and lowest points in the continguous 48, Mount Whitney and Death Valley. Western Colorado contains many 14,000 foot peaks, canyons, desert flats and valleys. Both are beautiful and contain or adjoin many unique geologic features. Mining and ranching is nominal in the Owens Valley where the
only industry to speak of is tourism, which began with an organized effort in the 1940s. Western Colorado was economically depressed and stagnated in the early-1950s when Club 20 began the first organized tourism promotion in the region's history
and now, tourism is one of the region's top industries. Both
Owens Valley and Western Colorado have developed ski areas;
both serve as playgrounds for people from areas exporting their water.
10. Citizen Committees. There was an association
of Owens Valley residents in the 1940s; there is a Concerned
Citizens of Owens Valley today. Western Colorado's roster is
legion and includes a protective association, a group of
high-country vigilantes in the 1950s and an advisory council
now.
11. Napping Locals. All land and water rights were
secured for the Los Angeles aqueduct in Owens Valley before
anyone from Owens Valley knew who had done i t and what the real
purpose was. The first written acknowledgement of the
ramifications of the Moffat water tunnel to Western Colorado
yet discovered follow the holing through of that tunnel by several
years.
12. Dewatering As Growth Control. Some long time
Owens Valley residents were quoted as expressing, in retrospect,
gratitude for the dewatering because i t eliminated the population
crush that would have surely otherwise come to the once lush
valley. In Western Colorado, there are groups and individuals
who fight water projects designed to benefit the region with
substantially greater vehemence than projects that dewater the
region.
13. Justification. When Roosevelt sealed the fate
of Owens Valley, he cited, "the infinitely greater interests
to be served." An L. A. Water and Power official said, 11 It
comes down to a question of benefiting 3 million people in Los
Angeles or 15,000 in Owens Valley. 11 Across the past 50 years,
the same premise has been used by Denver.
14. Agricultural Decline. Owens Valley once produced
prize winning apples, grain, corn, watermelon and a range of
other crops no longer produced there. Western Colorado is famous
for its peaches, apples, cherries, pears and more. That Mesa
County will never see another half-million-bushel-year on peaches
again cannot be laid directly at the door of Denver. However,
Denver has dewatered some lands directly and general reduced
the available water supply. Every major water user, particularly
those extracting water from the basin, are direct contributors
to occurrences such as an oil shale company drying up one ranch
and a domestic water district drying up two others, to obtain
adequate water supplies in the basin.
15. Environmental Constrai.nts. California is the
birthplace of the organized environmental movement and a pioneer
in environmental law. Despite some successes by Owens Valley
interests in court, there has been no stopping or slowing Los
Angeles. Indeed, the water level in the unique and
environmentally acclaimed Mono Lake, north of Owens Valley,
is now being lowered by Los Angeles. Colorado, itself an
environmentally aware state with a governor to match, has offered
little resistance to environmentally devastating transmountain
water diversions.
-16. Ethics, Officialdom. J. P. Lippincott, the U. S. Recl~mation Service engineer, who was supposed to be working on a reclamation project for the Owens Valley, was instead conspiring with Los Angeles and reputed to be on its payroll simultaneously. Lippincott later, openly joined the L. A. staff and served Denver as well, analyzing prospective transmountain diversion projects for the Queen City. State and federal officials have been accused of complicity with Los Angeles; certainly there is no record of agencies from either level rising to Owens Valley's defense. George Bull, who conducted several major, benchmark studies for Denver's western water gathering effort, in the 1930s served as acting director of the Colorado Public Works Administration, apparently a funnel for federal WPA money. The position was key because a rush was on statewide to obtain water project financing. Mills Bunger, a senior engineer for the Bureau of Reclamation, was in fact a transmountain water diversion promoter while at the Bureau and after. Dr. Elwood Mead, commissioner of reclamation; Dr. Charles Lory, president of Colorado Agricultural College; and, M. C. Hinderlider, state engineer, were just a few more state and federal officials whose positions dictated impartiality, but whose motives and practices were questioned as being favorable to Front Range interests.
17. Economic Limi tations. Essentially, tourism is the only industry in Owens Valley. There will be no other industry or significant growth or change in Owens Valley without the express permission of Los Angeles because that is the only place the water for such can come from. In an interview this year, a Kodak official gave an assured water supply as one of the main reasons for the company's move to Windsor. A Stauffer Foods official, in discussing that company's selection of Utah over Grand Junction for a major food processing plant, cited adequate water supply as a major consideration. Some 25 years ago, Crown-Zellerbach proposed a paper mill for Grand County. The county favored the project, which seemed assured, until Denver obfuscated the issue of adequate water supplies for operations from Green Mountain Reservoir.
18. Media Rol e. The role of the Los Angeles Times owners in the Owens Valley affair was at least key, if not predominant, since some give Harry Chandler of the Times complete credit. The Los Angeles Times is the flagship of Otis Chandler's Times-Mirror Company, which now owns The Denver Post.
19. Expansion v Conservation.
A
California Department of Water Resources report was cited as saying that one brick in every toilet in Los Angeles would be enough to save Mono Lake. Additional efficiencies, such as improved plumbing devices, more careful irrigation and more dry-climate plants, were also cited as perhaps modestly rewatering Owens Valley. Denver has some 89,000 unmetered households and the Queen City's own reports dating back to 1922 indicate a savings of 33% with metering of domestic users.20. Continuum. Los Angeles confederates began. moving
on Owens Valley around 1903. Construction began in 1908 and
was completed in 1913. As need increased so did diversions.
Despite augmentation from the Colorado River aqueduct, a second Owens Valley aqueduct was constructed and once surface water draining was complete, ground water was pumped from the valley. Currently, Los Angeles is reaching further north, past the Valley,
to Mono Lake. Denver engineering studies conducted beginning
around the 1910s drew first aim at the mountains and included
jealous passages on Los Angeles' accomplishments. The Roberts
Tunnel was being considered before the Moffat Tunnel was completed
and less than 30 years separate first delivery of water from
each. Now, Two Forks looms.
-APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIXAPPENDIX
THE DEWATERING AND COLONIZATION OF
OWENS
VALLEY,
CALIFORNIA
"The Owens River, once a robust stream, deep with the snow waters of the Sierras, was but a trickle in a dry stream bed, the cottonwoods dead along its bank.
"Water, mused the priest, water was one of God's greatest gifts. With it, the pioneers had turned this strip of land between two gigantic ranges into a garden. Deprived of water, the valley and its people with i t were perishing."[!
"They [The Los Angeles Times Chandlers] did not so much foster the growth of Southern California as, more simply, invent it. There is water because they went and stole water. The city is horizontal instead of vertical because they were rich in land, and horizontal span was good for them, good for real estate. There is a port because they dreamed of a port. They had settled in a garden of nature, and where nature failed they and their friends provided. If God had not been sufficiently generous in giving this paradise adequate water, then Harry Chandler and a few of his cohorts would simply go and rape the Eden of the Owens Valley some 230 miles away of its water, and the water would turn arid valleys into a prosperous urban garden. Who is to say that the history of the West and the history of California would be better if Harry Chandler had been someone who thought the law applied to him, and the Owens Valley, rather
than Los Angeles, had prospered?
"The rape of the Owens Valley, for what happened was nothing less than that, is the story of a very shrewd, very rich power elite in a major city determined, in its desperate
need for more water, to let nothing stand in its way, particularly the water rights of a separate, distant, smaller community. For that was the key to Los Angeles's growth -- water. The climate was wonderful, land was plentiful, the only limit imposed by nature was water; i t was thus a powerful political issue. 'If you don't get the water, ' William Mulholland, the city's water superintendent, used to say of additional sources of supply,
'you won't need i t . '
''Little of the acreage in that valley was irrigated,
most of i t was wasteland, but the land that did have water was like the Nile Valley, rich and lush. At the turn of the century there was a move made to develop the entire valley and make fertile the barren land. In 1902 the U. S. government under Teddy Roosevelt, increasingly interested in land development, created the Bureau of Land Reclamation with the specific idea of reclaiming otherwise useless land, particularly in the Southwest. By good fortune for Harry Chandler and his
colleagues, a man named J. B. Lippincott, who was to become
one of the great double agents of all time, had done considerable
work as a water consultant for the Los Angeles city government,
and he was well acquainted with the city's power brokers. In
June 1903 he and an engineer named J. C. Clausen began surveying
the Owens Valley with the ostensible idea of capturing the spill
from the Owens River and using that water to irrigate the
surrounding land, creating a new rich and fertile development
region for small farmers and homesteaders. Lippincott and Clausen
began approaching local farmer.s about relinquishing their water
rights; they were seen as friends and benefactors; most of the
local farmers and ranchers, hearing that a huge government project
was in the air, cooperated. Clausen was clearly cornmi tted to
the redevelopment of the Owens Valley, he thought the project
a natural, but Lippincott had other ideas. Quietly he had begun
talking with his powerful friends in Los Angeles about the idea
of bringing the Owens water to the city by means of a
two-hundred-mile-long aqueduct.
"Meanwhile, even as the Owens farmers slept on, a
syndicate which included General Otis and Harry Chandler
and a few of their friends -- began to make some crucial land
purchases. First, in October, 1903 they took an option on a
16, 000-acre ranch in the San Fernando Valley. The option was
relatively inexpensive and a few months later, cutting the
original owner of the ranch in on the deal, they bought the
spread, paying only $500,000 for i t . The land went cheap because
i t lacked water. There would soon be other comparable deals,
one for a ranch of 46,000 acres. It was all very hush-hush.
Harry Chandler told a few friends that something was up, he
couldn't tell them all about i t yet, but they ought to get in
on it. Which they, of course, knowing him, knowing how good
his word was, did.
"It was all of a piece, wonderfully synchronized.
On July 28, 1905, Lippincott, against the angry opposition of
his engineer, Clausen, recommended dropping the Owens
redevelopment plan and suggested that the federal government
instead yield the water in the area to the city of Los Angeles.
The California reclamation chief ruled for Lippincott and Los
Angeles. The next day the Los Angeles Times broke the secrecy
embargo on the entire story and bannered the possibility of
new water for the city. The next step was a bond issue to pay
for the land and water rights. Supported by all important
factions in the city, i t passed by a margin of 14 to 1.
"The two pieces of land in the San Fernando Valley,
purchased by the Chandler syndicate for about $3 million, were
estimated to be worth up to $120 million when i t was over. The
largest shareholder was Harry Chandler. He held onto the choicest pieces of real estate, and this landholding became the basis
for the vast Chandler fortune. He gradually became the largest
every deal large and profitable, and enemy of all those who might oppose or try to regulate his enterprises. At the time of his death, his estate was worth an estimated half a billion."~ Author Peg Stegner gives credit for masterminding the scheme to Fred Seaton, former head of L. A. Water and Power and mayor of the city when the scheme began. Stegner claims Eaton himself acquired water rights while posing as a reclamation
agent. Working with him was his successor at Water and Power, William Mulholland, though it seems clear Seaton's motivation was money; Mulholland's was water for the city. Stegner also
gives substantial credit to J. B. Lippincott and claims that he was on the payroll of Los Angeles and the U. S. Reclamation Service at the same time.~
* * *
The Owens River Valley lies about 225 miles due north of Los Angeles between the Sierra Nevadas and the White and Inyo mountains. The Valley, about 100 miles long and 15 to 20 miles wide parallels and is near the Nevada border. The Valley is bounded by deserts and 14,000 mile peaks including Mount Whitney. It encompasses the small towns of Lone Pine, Big Pine, Independence and Bishop; nears Death Valley and- reaches toward the environmentally acclaimed Mono Lake to the north. While the federal government is the major land holder in the Valley,
Los Angeles Water and Power owns and controls most of the water and private land. A quarter of the Valley was once under
cul ti vat ion producing prize apples, pears, alfalfa, corn, watermelon and grain.
* * *
From its intake in Owens Valley, at the foot of Mount Whitney, highest point in the United States, the aqueduct passes
over foothills across the Mojave Desert and into Los Angeles. The aqueduct goes through 142 separate tunnels totaling 53 miles
in length. There are 12 miles of inverted steel siphons, 37 miles of open lined conduit, 24 miles of open unlined conduit, and 97 miles of covered conduit. Aqueduct water empties into
28 storage reservoirs along its route and at its terminus. In addition, water is pumped to more than a dozen water storage tanks within the city.~
For two years, engineers sought the most feasible
route and another 14 months was used in preparation for
construction. And, when construction began in October, 1908,
it moved swiftly along the 235 miles, from elevation 3,812 in
Owens Valley, the intake, to elevation 1,461 in San Fernando Valley, the outlet.~
While the outlet was at 1,461 in the San Fernando
Valley, the system was built to provide a gravity flow thoughout
with power generation to boot. Elevation of Los Angeles City
Hal l was 276 feet . Sections of steel plating were carried to
the job site on specially bui 1 t wagons drawn by 12 to 50 mules
carting the plates between seven and 35 miles to canyon bottoms.
For six years, some 4, 500 men worked directly for Mulholland, directly for the city, building the massive aqueduct and the
ancillary rail, phone and road systems~. The project required
1, 300 barrels of cement [7 and 15,596 feet of steel plating that ranged in diameter from 8. 5 to 11 feet and in thickness from
a quarter- inch to 1 1/8 inch~. Mulholland brought the project
in on time and on the $24.5 million budget and predicted that
power generation would repay the cost within 20 yearsiD.
* * *
of the Los Angeles thirst and viol.ence
the aqueduct was started. Los Angeles
built a second aqueduct, began pumping Both expansion
ebbed and flowed since took the Owens River, ground water and has
the violence .. .
reached onward toward Mono Lake. And,
"As Owens Valley water came down the aqueduct, thirsty
Los Angeles rejoiced. But angry farmers were buying dynamite
and cleaning guns . . .. Vi rtual ly overnight, Los Angeles moved
from water famine to water flood. The San Fernando Valley was
transformed from a grain-ra1s1ng community dependent on
intermi tten rainfall to an empire of truck gardens and orchards
-- one of the richest agricultural communities in the nation.
In 1915 practically the entire valley joined the city. With
their sure supply as a lure, the Los Angeles boosters were abl e
to annex one community after another to create the biggest
municipal area in the world" [10.
"The situation was still in this unsettled state last May when a section of the aqueduct was damaged with dynamite
and a little later a Los Angeles attorney was kidnapped and
ordered to leave the valley. Then, on November 16[1924], a
raiding party of Owens Valley ranchmen seized the aqueduct at
a point a few miles north of Owens Lake, opened the waste gates
and turned the water into the Owens River at an estimated loss
of $15,000 a day." On the 20th, the raiders went home. '"In
seizing the aqueduct,' says the editor of The Inyo Register
[Bishop] , 'the citizens of the valley only invoked the law of
self-defense. The city of Los Angeles,' i t asserts, 'has
temporized for years, making promises only to gain time for
further undermining communities and making good boasts of securing
property at half price. '" [11
"At the height of the water war, on May 27, 1927,
Owens Valley farmers blew up a 450-foot section of No Name siphon.
The repair bill came to $500,000. When dynamiters struck again
at another spot the following night, the ci ty sent in armed
"Los Angeles has maintained an almost feudal control
over the Owens Valley since i t secretly began buying the water
rights more than 70 years ago. In a rebellion in the 1920s, vigilantes clashed with posses of L. A. detectives armed with Winchester rifles and orders to 1
shoot to kill' anyone caught
near Owens Valley's aqueduct. The detectives won ... When L.
A. city officials decided they needed more of the Owens Valley water, they announced plans to double the amount pumped out of valley's streams and underground reservoirs. They told tenants on Los Angeles-owned land that they would not automatically
be allowed to renew their leases and said they doubted that
the city would be able to continue feeding water into a small recreational lake.
"The valley's residents fought back with court
action and violence. They won a court order temporarily forcing Los Angeles to reduce the amount of water i t pumps out of the valley. When Los Angeles locked the gates through which water flows to Lake Diaz, angry Owens Valley dwellers took welding torches to the gates and forced them open. And the day after the aqueduct spill gate was blown up --which a sheriff's deputy conceded was done by a valley resident -- a stick of dynamite tied to an arrow was fired into a Los Angeles fountain named after William Mulholland, the engineer who designed the Owens Valley aqueduct and pipeline system. Valley dwellers are openly bitter about the renewal of the decades-old feud."[l3
At different times through the saga, a Molotov cocktail was tossed at the L. A. Water and Power office in Independence, armor-piercing bullets have been used on L. A. pumps, windows smashed on L. A. cars and trucks and bags of cement poured into meter pits installed by Los Angeles as a reprisal against residents. The metering of Owens Valley residents is significant because: 1) L. A. studies showed such installations to _be economically impractical; 2) Los Angeles' flagrantly wasteful use of water was widely known [ In the 1976-77 drought, L. A. refused to institute any conservation measu-res until forced by a court order and still wound up with half the savings rate of the rest of the state.] and; 3) the Department of Water and Power, in preparation of the installation and operation of meters, sent mock bills to Owens Valley residents totaling a frightening
10 times the actual bills they would be receiving.U4
*
*
*
"'We are a colony of Los Angeles, 1 a rancher told
us. 'Less than 2 percent of our valley [and 1 percent of their water] belongs to us. We pay rent to the Department of Water and Power, even for our stores and churches. There is more Los Angeles land here than down there in the city. '" D.5
Colony? Economic limitations? "Because its natural bounty of water is claimed by Los Angeles, Owens Valley has limited facilities for permanent occupancy." U6 "Where before there had been alfalfa fields waving like a green canopy to the very base of the Sierras, now there were barren wastes .... The railroad tracks that had carried the cars of Owens Valley produce to Los Angeles were rusty threads in a wilderness . .. . ~vens Valley was abandoned to its fate by the national and state governments."[ 17
"'They have no reservation or hesitation concerning the complete destruction of a scenic resource,' one resident stated." Another resident; one who fled the devestation decades earlier, and later returned, said, "For two years after I came back, I couldn't pass our old ranch without crying. Now we fight the same old problem. The city built its damnable second aqueduct, and it's pumping underground water to fill it. They've dried every spring in the valley floor. They 're destroying vegetation. There are rare species in this valley. Instead of fighting for a ranch, we're now fighting for the survival of plant and animal communi ties." U8
* * *
And, so it goes. The Owens Valley Affair, now in its 8lst year, intermi ttenly involving the taking of more water, spurring more violence, more devastation and more court battles.
FOOTNOTES Owens Valley
1. Stone, Irving, "Desert Padre." Saturday Evening Post, May 20, 1944, p. 10.
2. David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 94, 95, 114-117.
3. Stegner, Page. "Water and Power, The Owens Valley Water War." Harpers, March 1981, p. 63.
4. Van Norman, H. A. , "How Los Angeles Keeps Its Water Pure." The American City, June 1929, p. 117.
5. Osborne, Henry Z., "The. Completion of the Los Angeles Aqueduct." Scientific American, November 8, 1913, p. 365.
6. Heinly, Burt
the Los Angeles Aqueduct."
pp. 5, 6, 17.
A., "Construction and Completion of The Engineering Magazine, April 1913,
7. Willey, Day Allen, "Los Angeles 200-Mile Conduit Water Supply." Scientific American, June 19, 1909, p. 471.
8. Heinly, Burt A. , "An Aqueduct Two Hundred and Forty Miles Long." Scientific American, May 25, 1912, p. 476.
9. Osborne, op. cit., p. 371.
10. Nadeau, Remi, "The Water War." American Heritage, December 1961, pp. 31, 35.
11. Literary Digest, "California 1
s Little Ci vi 1 War." December 6, 1924, p. 15.
12. Nadeau, op. cit., p. 34.
13. Steele, Richard and Barnes, John, War Over Water." Newsweek, October 4, 1976, p . 47.
14. Stegner, op. cit., pp. 61, 62, 66.
"California:
15. Morgan, Judith and Neil, "California 1 s Parched
Oasis." National Geographic, January 1976, p. 102.
16. Phinizy, Coles, "Giant Playground." Sports Illustrated, August 12, 1963, p. 39.
17. Stone, 1oc. cit.
18. Morgan, op. cit . , pp. 109, 115.
REFERENCES
Compensatory Storage
1. Letter from Frank Delaney, Glenwood Springs, to D. W. Aupperle, Grand Junction, January 11, 1936.
2. Harry T. Cory, Dabney H. Maury, Herbert S. Crocker,
"Report of Engineering Board of Review to Board of Water
Commissioners," Denver, Colorado, August 15, 1922.
3. Letter from N. H. Meeker, Jr. , Gunnison, to Frank Delaney, Glenwood Springs, December 15, 1935.
4. Appendix A, minutes, Colorado River Water Conservation District, August 15, 1957.
5. Editorial, Denver Post, September 11, 1984.
6. Club 20/Water for Colorado, brochure, Colorado Water Convention, September 29, 1979.
7. U. S. Congress, Synopsis of Report, Colorado-Big Thompson Project I Plan of Development and Cost Estimate Prepared by the Bureau of Reclamation I Department of the Interior, 75th Congress, lst Sess., June 15, 1937. Washington: Government
Printing Office.
8. Letter from Frank Delaney, Glenwood Springs, to Rep. Edward T. Taylor, Washington, D. C., May 11, 1935.
9. Letter from Frank Delaney, Glenwood Springs, to N. H. Meeker, Jr., Gunnison, December 27, 1935.
10. Nadeau, Remi. "The Water War." American Heritage, December, 1961, pp. 31-35+.
11. Morgan, Judith and Neil, "California's Parched Oasis.'' National Geographic, January, 1976, pp. 98-127.
12. Halberstam, David The Powers That Be. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.
13. Hamburg, Donald H., "Impending Disaster: Additional Transmountain Diversions." Address to Water Law Section, Colorado Bar Association, 84th Annual Meeting, Colorado Springs, September 30, 1982.
14. U. S. Geological Survey, transmountain diversions from Colorado River Basin in Colorado and main stem, Utah-Colorado
15. Edward Currier, professional engineer, telephone interview, Grand Junction, September 10, 1984.
16. U. S. Congress, Public Law 90-537, 90th Cong.,
S. 1004, September 30, 1968.
17. Editorial, Denver Post, February 21, 1981.
18. Appendix F, minutes,
Conservation District, July 20, 1964.
Colorado River Water
19. Minutes, Colorado River Water Conservation District,
December 19, 1953.
20. Eaton Shale Company and Cities Service, Continental,
Pacific Western, Shell, Sinclair, Standard of California and
Union of California oil companies, "Presentation to the Colorado
Conference Committee and the Colorado Water Conservation Board as to Water Requirements of an Oil Shale Industry," September 24, 1953.
21. Colorado State Planning Commission, Elected
Officials. Yearbook, 1951 to 1955. State of Colorado, Denver.
22. Corlett, George M., chairman, "Report of Water
Resources Advisory Committee to the State Planning Commission,"
Denver, June 15, 1935.
23. Letter from F. C. Merriell, Grand Junction, to
Edward T. Taylor, Washington, April 1, 1940.
24. Colorado Planning Commission, minutes, Statewide
Water Conference, Grand Junction, February 27, 28, 1936.
25. Barnett, John T., "Trans-mountain Diversion: A
statement by Hon. John T. Barnett, Chairman The Colorado State
Planning Commission," 1936.
