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An Economical & TechnicalStudy of the Participation of aVirtual Power Plant on the SwissBalancing Market

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I , AVANCERAD NIVÅ EXAMENSARBETE ELEKTROTEKNIK 300 HP

STOCKHOLM SVERIGE 2016 ,

An Economical & Technical Study of the Participation of a Virtual Power Plant on the Swiss Balancing Market

WRITTEN IN COLLABORATION WITH SWISSELECTRICITY

ROMAIN BOURDETTE

KTH KUNGLIGA TEKNISKA HÖGSKOLAN

SKOLAN FÖR ELEKTRO- OCH SYSTEMTEKNIK

(2)

TRITA EE 2016:018

www.kth.se

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

BACKGROUND STUDY

(10)
(11)

-

-

-

(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

-

(16)

-

-

(17)

-

(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)

¤

¤

¤

¤

¤

(30)

¤

¤

¤

¤

¤

(31)

¤

¤

¤

¤

¤

(32)
(33)

𝑃

𝑛𝑅+

𝑃

𝑛𝑅−

𝐼

𝑛,𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑏𝑖𝑑

(34)

𝐼

𝑛,𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝐸

𝐼

𝑛,𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝑏𝑖𝑑

𝐼

𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝐸

𝑖+

𝑖−

𝜆

𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐+

¤/MWh

𝜆

𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐−

¤/MWh

𝜆

𝑘,𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝐸

¤

𝜆

𝑘,𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟−,𝐸

¤

𝑈

𝑛

𝜀

𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙

𝜇

𝐸

𝑛,𝑡𝑒𝑟+

𝐸

𝑛,𝑡𝑒𝑟+

(35)

-

-

(36)

𝐼

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑏𝑖𝑑

= ∑ ∑ 𝐼

𝑛,𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑏𝑖𝑑

𝑖=𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑛=𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛

𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜

𝐼

𝑛,𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑏𝑖𝑑

= { max (𝜆

𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑏𝑖𝑑

× 𝑃

𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑

(𝜆

𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑏𝑖𝑑

)) | 𝜆

𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑏𝑖𝑑

< 𝜆

𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑒𝑐

}

𝐼

𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑏𝑖𝑑

𝜆

𝑏𝑖𝑑

𝐼

𝑛,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝑏𝑖𝑑

= ∑ 𝐼

𝑛,𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝑏𝑖𝑑

𝑖=𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑

(37)

𝐼

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑐𝐸

= ∑ ∑ 𝐼

𝑛,𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐.𝐸

𝑖=𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙. 𝑖𝑛

𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟

𝑛=𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛

𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜

𝐼

𝑛,𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝐸

= (1 − 𝜇 ∗ (𝑈

𝑛

+ 𝜀

𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙

))(𝑃

𝑛𝑅+

∗∝

+𝑖

∗ 𝜆

𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐+

+ 𝑃

𝑛𝑅−

∗∝

𝑖

∗ 𝜆

𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐−

)

𝑖+

𝑖

𝜆

𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑖+

𝜆

𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑖

𝑈 𝑛

𝜀 𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙

(38)

𝐼

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟

= ∑ ∑ 𝐼

𝑛,𝑘𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝐸

𝑘=𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛

𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑢=𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛

𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜

𝐼

𝑛,𝑘𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝐸

= ∑(𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦+

(𝜆

𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝐸𝑘,𝑏𝑖𝑑

)

𝑏𝑖𝑑

∗ 𝜆

𝑘,𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝐸

) ∗ 𝑃 𝑛 𝑅+ ∗ 𝑇 ∗ (1 − 𝜇 ∗ (𝑈

𝑛

+ 𝜀

𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙

))

𝜆

𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝐸𝑘,𝑏𝑖𝑑

𝜇

𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙

(𝜆

𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝐸𝑘,𝑏𝑖𝑑

) 𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦

𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦+

(𝜆

𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝐸𝑘,𝑏𝑖𝑑

)

𝐶

𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑛

(𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

, 𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟−

, 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐+

, 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐−

) = 𝑀𝐶(𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

, 𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟−

, 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐+

, 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐−

) + 𝐹𝐶

𝐸

𝑛,𝑠𝑒𝑐+

𝐸

𝑛,𝑠𝑒𝑐−

𝐸

𝑛,𝑡𝑒𝑟+

𝐸

𝑛,𝑡𝑒𝑟

𝐸

𝑛,𝑡𝑒𝑟+

= ∑ ∑ 𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙

(𝜆

𝑡𝑒𝑟 +𝑘,𝑏𝑖𝑑

)

𝑏𝑖𝑑=𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑠

∗ 𝑇

𝑘=𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦

𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛

𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟

∗ 𝑃

𝑛+

𝐸

𝑛,𝑡𝑒𝑟−

= ∑ ∑ 𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙

(𝜆

𝑘,𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟−

)

𝑏𝑖𝑑

∗ 𝑇 ∗ 𝑃

𝑛− 𝑘

𝐸

±

= 𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

+ 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐+

+ 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐−

+ 𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟−

(39)

𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

, 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐+

> 0 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐

, 𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟

< 0

𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

= +1 𝑀𝑊ℎ.

𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟−

= − 1 𝑀𝑊ℎ.

𝐹𝐶 = 𝐶

𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

+ ∆𝐶

𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒

𝑀𝐶(𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

, 𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟−

, 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐+

, 𝐸

𝑠𝑒𝑐−

)

= ∆𝑃

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

(𝐸

±

) − ∆𝑆

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟

(𝐸

±

) + ∆𝐶

𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙

(𝐸

±

)) + 𝐶

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡−𝑢𝑝

(𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

)

∆𝑃

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

= 𝜃

𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

× (−𝐸

𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙

+ 𝐸

𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒

)

= 𝜃

𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

× (−𝐸

±

)

𝜃

𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

∆𝑃

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

𝐸

±

< 0)

𝐸

±

> 0 ∆𝑃

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

< 0

∆𝑆

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟

(𝐸

±

)

= 𝜃

𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟

× (𝐸

𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙

− 𝐸

𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒

)

= 𝜃

𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟

× (𝐸

±

)

𝜃

𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟

∆𝑆

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟

𝐸

±

< 0)

−∆𝑆

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟

> 0

∆𝐶

𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙

(𝐸

±

) = 𝜃

𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙

× 𝐸

±

𝜃

𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙

𝐶

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡−𝑢𝑝

(𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

) = 𝑎𝑏𝑠 ( 𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

𝑃

+

× 1

1.5 ) × 𝑐

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡−𝑢𝑝

= 𝑎𝑏𝑠 ( 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦

1.5 )

× 𝑐

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡−𝑢𝑝

≈ 𝑛𝑏 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝 × 𝑐

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡−𝑢𝑝

𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

𝑐

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡−𝑢𝑝

(40)

𝑀𝐶

𝐺1

= ∆𝐶

𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙

+ ∆𝑃

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

+ 𝐶

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡−𝑢𝑝

(𝐸

𝑡𝑒𝑟+

)

∆𝑃

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

𝑀𝐶

𝐺2

= ∆𝐶

𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙

− ∆𝑆

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟

𝑀𝐶

𝐿1

= 0

∆𝑃

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

= 0

𝑀𝐶

𝐿2

= ∆𝑃

𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟

-

(41)

-

-

-

(42)
(43)
(44)

μ = 10

Portfolio: List of participating units

Simulation Market Data

Forecast method

(45)

Bidding processes

Bid acceptance processes

𝐼

𝑛,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝑏𝑖𝑑

= ∑ 𝐼

𝑛,𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟+,𝑏𝑖𝑑

𝑖=𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑

= ∑ (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒

𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑠

+ ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒

𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠

)

𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠

Delivery calls models

𝑖+

𝑖

𝜆

𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐+

𝜆

𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐−

𝑖+

𝑖

(46)
(47)

𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦

𝜆

𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦

𝜆

𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦

(𝑓) = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑒

−𝑓∗𝑋

⇔ 𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦

(𝜆

𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦

) = − 1

𝑋 ∗ ln ( 𝜆 𝐴 )

≈ 40 €/𝑀𝑊ℎ ≈ 40 €/𝑀𝑊ℎ

Market revenue from the delivery of control energy

(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)

-

-

(54)
(55)

-

-

-

(56)

𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦

𝜆

𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦

𝑓

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦

(𝜆

𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦

) = − 1 𝑋 ∗ ln ( 𝜆

𝐴 )

(57)
(58)
(59)
(60)
(61)
(62)
(63)

-

-

-

-

(64)

-

-

-

(65)
(66)

≤ =

≤ ≤

> >

(67)
(68)
(69)

-

-

(70)

-

-

(71)
(72)
(73)
(74)
(75)

.

(76)
(77)
(78)
(79)
(80)
(81)

XX X

XX XX

XX XX X

X X XX X

X X XX X

X XX XXX XX

X X XX XX

XX X X

X

X

XX XX XX

Bidding Strategy

(82)

XX

XXX X

XXX X

XX X

X XX

XXX XX

XX X X

XX XX

X XX

XX X

X

X XX

X X X X X X

X

X X

X X XX X

Bidding Strategy

(83)

X X X X

XX

XX X

XX X

Bidding Strategy

(84)
(85)

-

-

(86)
(87)
(88)
(89)
(90)
(91)
(92)

𝑥

𝑡

= 𝑐 + ∑ 𝜙

𝑖

𝑥

𝑡−𝑖 𝑝

𝑖=1

𝜙

𝑖

𝑥

𝑡

= 𝑐 + ∑ 𝜙

𝑠.𝑖

𝑥

𝑡−𝑠.𝑖 𝑝

𝑖=1

𝜙

𝑖

𝐴𝑅(3) + 𝑆𝐴𝑅

52

(1) ∶ 𝑥 ̂ = 𝜙

𝑡 1

𝑥

𝑡−1

+ 𝜙

2

𝑥

𝑡−2

+ 𝜙

3

𝑥

𝑡−3

+ 𝜙

52

𝑥

𝑡−52

𝐴𝑅(1) + 𝑆𝐴𝑅

6

(2) ∶ 𝑥 ̂ = 𝜙

𝑡 1

𝑥

𝑡−1

+ 𝜙

6

𝑥

𝑡−6

+ 𝜙

12

𝑥

𝑡−12

(93)

-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 MWh/MW/week

Week αi + (MWh/MW/week)

αi - (MWh/MW/week)

References

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