Speechless emissaries or powerful leaders?
A four-dimensional power analysis of the refugee mobilizations in Jordan’s Za’atari camp
Beatriz Bousquet May 2021
Supervised by Trond Ove Tøllefsen, Uppsala University
This thesis is submitted for obtaining the Master’s Degree in Humanitarian Action and Conflict. By submitting the thesis, the author certifies that the text is from her hand, does not include the work of someone else unless clearly indicated, and that the thesis has been produced in accordance with proper academic practices.
Abstract
Refugee camps have long been considered places of extreme population control. Yet the Za’atari camp, created in Jordan in 2012, soon became famous for frequent refugee demonstrations, sit-ins and stone-throwing. This important capacity for mobilization has been linked to the informal leadership network of ‘street leaders’ that emerged a few months after the camps’ creation (Clarke, 2018). This network challenges the representations of refugees as voiceless victims, and questions the ability of aid organizations to foster community empowerment. It also highlights the power implications of regular organizational practices in refugee camps, and showing how NGOs affect their beneficiaries, it is relevant to the discussion of downward accountability. Thus, studying Za’atari’s power dynamics is crucial to identify conditions of refugee empowerment and improve downward accountability frameworks. In this thesis, this analysis of power dynamics is undertaken with the four-dimensional framework developed by Lukes (1974) and following scholars, which has never been used on refugee camps. The first dimension has to do with individual capacity to influence other’s choices, the second with the limits brought by institutional practices, the third with the meanings assigned to behaviors and the fourth with the socialization processes that teach self-discipline. The thesis studies how a four-dimensional analysis of Za’atari camp can capture both the extent of camp authorities’ control on residents and the refugees’ capacity to empower themselves. Through the analysis of organizational, journalistic and academic literature, it identifies dimensions of power exercised by and on the camp’s actors at two moments: the street leaders’ rise, and the difficulties of a governance plan implemented to reestablish control. The thesis shows that street leaders were allowed to emerge due to limits in the camp governance’s first dimension and inability to use the second and third dimension, which street leaders, as part of the community, could yield. Moreover, the governance’s plan to restore control encountered difficulties because it was founded on a restrictive one-dimensional view of power linked to the perception of street leaders as mafia-like bosses, refugees as helpless victims and camps as places of containment and order, limiting the authorities’ third dimension. By identifying new factors that were not present in other studies of Za’atari, the findings demonstrate the relevance of the framework to render the complexity of humanitarian settings and encourages its use on other cases. It also reminds the need for aid professionals to work with their beneficiaries’ agency to provide quality services.
ABSTRACT 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 4
ABBREVIATIONS 5
CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 6
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 6
RESEARCH QUESTION 7
LITERATURE REVIEW 7
RELEVANCE TO ACADEMIA AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION 9
RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN 10
LIMITATIONS 10
THESIS OUTLINE 11
CHAPTER 2 — THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 12
I. LUKES’ THREE DIMENSIONS OF POWER 12
a) The one-dimensional view 12
b) The second dimension 12
c) The third dimension 13
II. A FOUR-DIMENSIONAL VIEW 13
CHAPTER 3 — CASE STUDY AND LITERATURE FINDINGS 15
I. THE CREATION OF AN INFORMAL LEADERSHIP NETWORK 15
a) Description of Za’atari camp’s residents and actors 15
b) The JHCO governance and its effects on residents’ independence 15
c) Presentation of street leaders’ institution 16
II. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNHCR PLAN 19
a) Description and objectives 19
i. Improvement of security 19
ii. Engaging with the community 20
b) The plan’s successes and shortcomings 21
CHAPTER 4 — DISCUSSION 23
I. THE JHCO GOVERNANCE AND THE RISE OF STREET LEADERS 23
a) JHCO’s limited power 23
b) Street leaders’ power escalation 24
i. First dimension 24
ii. Second dimension 25
iii. Third dimension 26
iv. Fourth dimension 27
II. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNHCR GOVERNANCE PLAN 28
a) Objectives 29
b) The effects of integrating street leaders into the management 29
c) Shortcomings in the plan’s conception 30
i. A one-dimensional view of street leaders’ power 30
ii. Representation gap: being a refugee 32
iii. Representation gap: living in a camp 32
iv. Consequences of the representation gaps 33
CHAPTER 5 — CONCLUSION 34
BIBLIOGRAPHY 37
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible without the precise guidance of Trond and the patient advice of Anne, whom all my gratitude goes to.
I was deeply touched by my friends’ and family’s support. This year has been wonderful, but now I kind of miss you.
I would also like to warmly thank my coursemates and friends that have accompanied me throughout this year and made me grow in more ways than I probably realize. I wish you all the best, and hope our paths cross again soon.
And of course, all my tenderness goes to Esther and Jeanne; que serais-je sans vous que ce balbutiement.
Abbreviations
JHCO Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1/2/3/4-D First/second/third/fourth dimension of power
Chapter 1 — Introduction
The beneficiaries of aid have long been understood as neutral and apolitical bodies. This view is at its paroxysm with residents of refugee camps, seen as bare victims devoid of agency (Agier, 2010).
Despite their frequency, refugee camp political action can be surprising to Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and they can encounter difficulties in managing them (Clarke, 2018). This is visible in the Za’atari camp in Jordan, where an informal leadership network has allowed refugee mobilization, demonstrations, roadblocking and boycotts, which camp authorities have struggled to address. It seems like camps are the ideal “concentrated space” where power can be exercised by “a powerful authority [to]
create the conditions for extreme levels of social control” (Clarke, 2018), yet whenever refugees can decide for themselves or empower themselves, whenever the amount of control exercised is not total, camp authorities struggle to predict and control them.
The concept of ‘bare life’ theorized by philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998) may enlighten this tension: it describes how in refugee camps, State powers reduce residents to mere survival, to biological continuity, with no additional dimension, and especially not political. According to Barnett (2011) this active refusal of aid actors to acknowledge the political facet of their beneficiaries is linked to the wish to perceive their work as apolitical, or at least to maintain this appearance. Yet, Malkki (1996) depicts refugees as actors capable of agency, Agier (2011) and Lecadet (2016) show their political resistance to authorities. However, the discourses around power seem polarized in literature, where scholars either insist on refugees’ agency and ability to empower themselves like Malkki and Agier do, or on the extent of the power of camp authorities, that is at the heart of the
‘bare life’ conception. Thus, we lack analyses that show both the refugees’ and authorities’ power, and respect the subtilities of their relationship. In this thesis, such an analysis will be attempted using a four-dimensional model of power that entails personal influence, institutional practices, systems of beliefs and social constraints.
Research objectives
This thesis will apply a four-dimensional framework of power based on Lukes (1974) and Digeser (1992). It will study the power struggles between camp authorities and refugees in Za’atari through the analysis of the difficulties of a United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) governance plan, drafted a year after the camp opened, seeking to regain control of the camp. To do so, we will focus on two moments: firstly, how informal leaders seized power through refugee mobilization (July 2012–March 2013), which will allow us to understand, secondly, how the plan affected camp authorities’
power (2013–2015). This study will shed a light on unmonitored, imposed and sometimes unexpected effects of common organizational practices relating to control in humanitarian settings. The focus on the plan’s difficulties also gives the opportunity of a case where organizations struggled to impose their methods on beneficiaries, and were forced to adapt to a community that empowered itself. As such, it gives precious information on the conditions that can foster community voices and communication relationship with organizations. It shows the importance, for NGOs, of working with the beneficiaries’ agency, risking otherwise to not control them at all. The use of this framework will give a subtler understanding of the degrees of power each actor has, from the authorities’ power, that the ‘bare life’ conception centers on, and the refugees’, which has been studied in terms of agency. It will thus bring a more nuanced understanding of what those two literatures have outlined and show what power relationships can look like.
Finally, the use of a well-known framework that has never been applied to a humanitarian context will interrogate the model’s capacity to render the complexity of intertwined and uprooted actors, with an imbalance between those seen as powerless and others capable of an extreme and rare degree of control. It will also be a test of the framework’s ability to predict the effects of a community empowerment reform, and its appropriateness to humanitarian settings.
Research question
The thesis will aim at answering the research question: how can a four-dimensional analysis of the context and difficulties of a camp governance reform in Za’atari capture both the extent of camp authorities’ control on residents and the refugees’ capacity to empower themselves?
Literature review
Za’atari has been studied in a diverse and relevant literature. Clarke (2018) shows, in comparison with two other case studies, that the dense informal leadership network is
central in the mobilizations. He also gives a detailed account of the perceptions of different actors, as well as the intent and effect of the UNHCR governance plan. Pasha (2020) explores how despite a discourse of resilience and empowerment, camp governance has actively been undermining refugee-led livelihoods and entrepreneurialism, and links it to Jordanian State priorities and the government’s ability to influence UNHCR projects. Gatter (2021) highlights how NGO personnel work to cultivate the vulnerability of residents, drawing attention to the problematic effects that come with some humanitarian projects. In another work (Gatter, 2018), she analyzes how the perception of Za’atari’s governance as a failure affected the construction of other Jordanian camps. Beehner (2015) studies how obsession with security and control prevents camp from becoming engines of growth. Authorities work to prevent turmoil, but refugees tend to rebel from its imposed uniformity, and refabricate a sense of home.
Dalal (2020) explores how after the early stages of co-production and experimental planning of the camp, authorities attempted to geographically regain control of the camp, through planning and demarcations. This thesis will heavily draw on these sources, as they provide material and strong analyses to understand the effects of the governance plan, the origins of the refugee’s mobilization and the narratives present for every actor.
However, this literature focuses on material resources, geographical manifestations of agency and the creation and evolution of informal institutions throughout time. Here, the use of Lukes’ framework will provide us with a systematic analysis of the plan and the powers at stake, allowing us to identify other factors that did not appear in earlier literature, like the impact of representations of refugee camps or the role of cultural institutions, thus unifying the analyses of the actors’ powers in one model.
To do so, we will rely on other literature, starting with insights on humanitarian governance and its relationship to power. Pasha (2020) reminds that in the case of camps, humanitarian actors’ power is not limited to life-saving operations but extends to the management of population, which has consequences on the social and political dynamics of the camp. Drawing from this perspective, we will use the idea that although organizational practices make extreme exercices of power usual in camps, it is not obvious nor natural and must be questionned.
Secondly, we will refer to research on the politicality of refugee camps to understand both the actors’ representations and the realities on the ground. Humanitarians tend to perceive camps as places which spatialize a state of exception, both temporally (they are treated as temporary emergencies although they can last for decades) and legally
(they are “often in legal grey zone” (Turner, 2016)). Resident’s biological needs are taken care of, but portrayed as helpless victims, they are “expected not to make political demands, […] to be […] someone without a past, without political will, without agency.”
(Turner, 2016). This conception of camps as exceptional places where ‘bare life’ is possible allows an understanding of how refugees are barred from a dignified political life. However, Agier (2010) explains it does not fit reality: even with extreme levels of social control, camps can experience leadership and political dynamism. This has been explored in a rich literature: Lecadet (2016) and Holzer (2012) study refugee representation in cases in Benin and Ghana, and how camp authorities dismantle them.
Others have indicated the predominance of non-democratic governance of camps as opposed to the rhetoric of empowerment and participation that the same authorities display (Pasha, 2020), either when authorities actively work to avoid political action in camps (Lecadet, 2016), or when they choose malleable representatives rather than existing community leaders (Omata, 2017). Thus, scholars emphasized the need for a system “designed to foster and support the mobilization processes” rather than fighting them (Clarke, 2018). Finally, academics show the limits of the ‘bare life’ conception not only in its political implications but also because it fails to satisfy refugees’ needs. While they strive for more, the minimal packages they receive allow merely their survival, causing residents to break camp rules (Newhouse, 2015).
Relevance to academia and humanitarian action
The thesis offers a new use of Lukes’ and Digeser’s framework, which had been applied to historical developments (Haugaard, 2020), local community settings (Zaaiman &
Mupambwa, 2021) and employee empowerment reforms (Gordon, 2005), but never to a refugee camp or beneficiaries of humanitarian action. It allows to understand the powers at play, those the beneficiaries can mobilize and those employed by NGOs to control their recipients. It can bring an insight into the discussion around downward accountability frameworks: a lot of research addressed what kind of accountability recipients value from NGOs, and how NGOs could provide it better (Dewi, et al., 2019), but to develop a framework capable of holding NGOs accountable, it is important to understand in what ways they affect their beneficiaries, including in terms of power. Finally, Za’atari teaches important lessons on refugee empowerment and how to achieve resilience. The ultimate ambition of this thesis is to encourage humanitarian actors to recognize and value the
political potential of their beneficiaries and their ability to decide for themselves, so that they strive to create a system “designed to foster and support mobilization processes”
(Clarke, 2018).
Research methods and design
This thesis is a case study of Za’atari camp from its foundation in 2012 to the year 2015 when most effects of a 2013 UNHCR governance plan became visible. It applies the four- dimensional theoretical framework of power relations from Lukes (1974) and Diseger (1992), using various primary and secondary sources, mainly organizational reports and academic literature. The organizational literature, from UNHCR, includes a governance plan as well as meeting minutes and security reports, available on UNHCR’s data portal1 or on ReliefWeb2. I also used journalistic sources as well as a documentary series produced by UNHCR, for direct quotes of camp authorities and refugees. From this material, I identified positions, narratives, profiles, habits, power base, and relationship networks for each category of actors, including the informal leaders, the other refugees, UNHCR and other NGOs, the different policing forces and the Jordanian State. I then linked them to dimensions of power, identifying which were yielded by which actors and how it impacted others. Scholarly sources are limited to those that have worked either on Za’atari and other Jordanian camps, or studied governance, mobilization and power struggles in similar settings or in theory.
Limitations
The principal limit of this work comes from the inability to visit the camp and the absence of primary data from residents themselves. By having to rely on organizational and external sources, I have a higher risk of absorbing their biases or misunderstanding the reality of the ground. Of course, critical thinking and mixing sources from different horizons and theoretical traditions might have helped reduce this possibility, but it still exists. Importantly, distant academic considerations on grossly understaffed and underfunded humanitarian operations should perhaps be taken lightly.
1 Available at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/53. Accessed 23/05/2021.
2 Information service provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs featuring organizational literature, available at: https://reliefweb.int. Accessed 23/05/2021.
Thesis outline
This thesis consists of five chapters, starting with an introductory presentation of the aims and design of the research. The second chapter introduces the theoretical framework used, while the third presents the case studied and the different moments of the camp from 2012 to 2015. In the fourth chapter, a discussion draws on the different dimensions of power and explains how camp authorities lost and tried to regain control of the camp to informal leaders. The last chapter offers some concluding thoughts and answers the research question.
Chapter 2 — Theoretical framework
This part will present the construction of the framework used and how it can be applied, introducing Lukes’ three-dimensional model and adding the fourth dimension. Following Haugaard’s convention (2018), the four dimensions of power will be respectively abbreviated 1-D, 2-D, 3-D and 4-D.
I. Lukes’ three dimensions of power
The four-dimensional theory of power started with Lukes (1974). His review of previous writings on power showed that different definitions are merely covering restrictive aspects of the same phenomenon, which he ambitions to describe in all its dimensions.
He identifies two conceptions existing in literature and adds a third.
a) The one-dimensional view
1-D describes how one subject can influence another to do something they would not have done otherwise. Visible in decisions, it defines relationships between agents. This dimension is used as a proxy of power by Robert Dahl (1961) who identifies the most powerful actors in a city council by observing the influence of their vetoes and proposals in the final decisions: the most powerful actor is the one that prevails the most frequently in the face of conflict. Thus, 1-D is visible when actors use their resources and influence to make others act differently than they would otherwise.
b) The second dimension
Bachrach and Baratz (1963) disregarded this analysis as too restrictive. They demonstrate that power can exist outside of conflict and decision-making, when actors can decide what appears in the agenda of decisions. They name it “non-decision making”, as it prevents others from making decisions or raising grievance on certain issues. This is due to biases in institutional practices and social values that reduce the possibility of actions for certain agents while systematically benefiting others. Thus, in a political council like the one Dahl studies, some actors are not able to raise grievances because certain issues “are organized into politics while others are organized out” (Schattschneider, 1960, cited in Lukes, 1974). Concretely, 2-D is present when institutions reduce the possibilities of
some actors because the issues they mentioned cannot be discussed in it, like if a member of a city council does not propose a motion because it can get them sanctioned.
c) The third dimension
Lukes claims that there is a third dimension of power unfolding along the others. The two-dimensional view is centered around decisions and conflicts. 2-D is more subtle than 1-D as it draws attention to a less visible phenomenon, but it still analyses disagreements that actors acknowledge. Thus, the model fails to explain how actors can be unconscious of their own interests, and not willing to escape domination. Yet this is an important phenomenon in the study of authority, identified by the Marxist concept of “false consciousness”, which is the systematic lack of realization from the dominated classes that they are subordinates. Lukes claims the need for a dimension that explains how the creation of certain needs or opinions can be prevented by the powerful. He studies cognitive patterns and beliefs which influence the subject to display automatic responses and confuse powerful actors’ interests with their own. He shows one can influence and manage the meanings people hold of the world. As Haugaard (2012) explains, social structures have strong coercive ability, because if a subject questions their cognitive patterns and meanings, they will experience ontological unease. To sum up, 3-D prevents a subject from perceiving an issue because of the meaning they place on the world, ingrained in them by social structures. They understand it as the “natural-order-of-things”
(Zaaiman & Mupambwa, 2021), can even “value it as divinely ordained and beneficial”
(Lukes, 1974), and will display automatic reactions. Practically, 3-D is found when the powerful work with meanings and beliefs to “suppress the very formation of views” (Potz, 2012) and when actors have automatic responses to situations because of a “shared belief about how things ought to be done” (Zaaiman & Mupambwa, 2021).
II. A four-dimensional view
Following Lukes’ inquiry, scholars have added a fourth dimension to the model. 4-D is based on Foucault’s work on power, which focuses on the routine and practicalities of the exercise of power, rather than agency and subject-to-subject relationships. The two concepts of subjectification and discipline are particularly interesting to understand 4-D.
Subjectification is the process through which persons are objectified as social subjects and develop an agency of their own, as well as an identity, desires and goals (Digeser,
1992). Discipline is the phenomenon where they learn to follow certain norms. It can be obtained when individuals internalize the judgment of others and normalize their behavior, and can be instrumentalized by the powerful in what Foucault calls the “conduct of conducts”, that is the control of behaviors. These phenomena capture how a person does not exist in a vacuum but is a product of the world around them, and in that way these concepts shape the person’s understanding of reality and constraints their possibilities. When these phenomena are applied in a similar way to a population, it affects their behavior but also deeper characteristics. To capture how these socialization processes can lead actors to a shared ontology (meaning that they have similar fundamental existential proprieties), Haugaard (2012) talks of ‘social ontology’.
This dimension also entails knowledge. Of course, knowledge is embedded in all kinds of power, as it can be a valuable resource providing one with 1-D, or it can affect the meanings behind 3-D. Yet the 4-D makes clear that knowledge is not only a source of power, but also subjected to it. Foucault studies how the knowledge people carry that allows them to understand their day-to-day life is rooted in “an integrated system of socio- cultural and normative assumption” (Zaaiman & Mupambwa, 2021). This knowledge thus has to gain its legitimacy and be recognized as valid for it to be accepted, so it too is subjected to power.
Thus, the 4-D can be found in cases where actors battle for the validity of their narratives, display self-disciplinary actions or affect others’ socialization mechanisms and the shared properties they create.
In this thesis, the camp authorities’ and refugees’ profiles will allow us to associate a dimension of power to their actions. 1-D will be linked to the mobilization of resources and influences to influence others, 2-D to the use of institutional norms to limit others’
behaviors, 3-D to the use of meanings and shared beliefs to frame actions as justified and suppress the formation of grievances, and 4-D is identified when socialization processes are channeled into other norms, or when knowledge is seen as valid.
Chapter 3 — Case study and literature findings
In order to grasp the control exercised on residents and how they can resist it, this chapter will detail the empirical findings relevant to power relationships in Za’atari camp, that will be later analyzed with the four-dimensional framework. It is structured around the two moments studied: first, the plan’s context through the rise of street leaders, and secondly the objectives and results of the plan drafted to regain control of the camp.
I. The creation of an informal leadership network a) Description of Za’atari camp’s residents and actors
The Jordanian Government opened a refugee camp near the village of Za’atari in July 2012 to house Syrians fleeing the conflict which started in March 2011. The camp grew rapidly, with around 120 000 residents in 2013 (UNHCR, 2021), most of them being middle-class, educated Syrians (Beehner, 2015).
Several major actors were present in Za’atari from 2012 to 2015. It was first managed by local charity Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO) and a coalition of organizations. Security was assigned to the gendarmerie, a specialized police force who dealt with serious events, but it only became regularly present after the governance plan.
It was sometimes backed by the paramilitary Royal Badia Forces and later by the British private security firm SIREN (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014). The final major actor is the Jordanian State. It co-manages the camp and shapes it in concrete ways: it is the State’s fear that low-wage Syrian workers would disserve the Jordanian labor market that led to work interdiction (Turner, 2015). Thus, when using the expression ‘camp authorities’, we will refer to the major actors in the camp: the UNHCR or JHCO, policing actors and Jordanian authorities.
b) The JHCO governance and its effects on residents’ independence
The JHCO governance suffered difficulties which limited its control of the camp. Lacking experience and means, stuck with actors with diverging visions (Clarke, 2016), JHCO struggled to control refugees and to coordinate aid and security. In the early stages, refugees participated in constructing the camp as much as organizations (Dalal, 2020).
The camp policing was insufficient, with no regular police force and no monitoring
presence from NGOs which typically conducted distributions outside the main gate. This was due to a limit in means rather than willpower: according to Clarke (2018), the gendarmerie’s use of “heavy-handed” approaches like teargas shows they lack ability, not determination. As a result, no entities were able to “shape the development of the camp as it grew, monitor the daily activities of its residents, or sanction refugees who broke the rules” (Clarke, 2018).
This lack of governance impacted the daily lives of residents, in terms of insecurity and of possibilities. It led to widespread violence, underreported because of the lack of “durable, formalized security apparatus” (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014). It also meant refugees could break many camp regulations, creating an ‘everything-is-possible’
mentality (Beehner, 2015). Refugees did not follow the policy of organizing caravans and tents in a grid pattern and often moved theirs to live closer to acquaintances and relatives or to obey street leaders (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014), resulting in a camp filled with
“improvised cul-de-sacs and spaghetti-like clusters” (Beehner, 2015). They refused to use communal kitchens and bathrooms, preferring to build their private accommodations illegally. They tapped into the camp wires and electrified individual shelters, allowing the development of informal businesses (Kimmelman, 2014), resulting in an everchanging camp in the process of “organic development” (Beehner, 2015).
Although it is determinant, it would be reductive to think residents evaded rules only because they can: they do so because they want or need to. Refugees commonly use illicit strategies because their needs are not addressed in camps (Newhouse, 2015). In Za’atari, informal businesses provide livelihood as few legal positions are available.
Residents also place a meaning behind these acts of insubordination. They refuse to follow guidelines perceived as “degrading or culturally inappropriate” (Clarke, 2016) and shape a life closer to their customs and past experiences (Beehner, 2015). These choices
“[give] refugees a sense of ownership and dignity” (Kimmelman, 2014) and allow the creation of a space shaped by their needs and “socio-cultural beliefs” (Dalal, 2020).
Another element central in the camp’s power dynamics is the emergence of street leaders, which the next part will present.
c) Presentation of street leaders’ institution
Street leaders have a particular profile. Their authority is derived either from former social statuses in Syria (including traditional roles, being the head of a large family or positions
in the armies of the conflict) or their entrepreneur and problem-solving activities in Za’atari (Hackl, 2013). Some of them gain significant resources running informal businesses, smuggling, or diverting aid (Hackl, 2013), so NGOs and other actors consider them as “powerful individuals and organized gangs [that] have imposed their will on sections of the camp, diverting assistance and engaging in criminal activities” (UNHCR, 2013).
They engage in several types of activities which grants them influence over residents. One street leader explains solving “all kinds of problems” by phone calls and visits (Hackl, 2013). Another organizes night patrols with young refugee volunteers to
“keep everyone safe”, and arranges community guards to protect communal facilities. He also coordinates the rotation of the very few legal work positions available to refugees in the camp. Street leaders often provide a caravan that serves as a place for community gathering and socialization, which did not exist elsewhere before the UNHCR plan (Clarke, 2016). In essence, street leaders organize mechanisms that provide what States often secure like common goods, labor scarcity, and security. They gained important power in a few months: camp authorities could not do anything against them (Clarke, 2018) and public spaces were “contested between some of the longer-staying informal refugee leaders and the camp management.” (UNHCR, 2014). Overall, the system has been welcomed by residents (Clarke, 2018), as they bring order to the camp, take care of prosaic grievances and create places for community gatherings, so they are central in empowering residents and giving them tools to resist governance’s control. Yet some residents suffered from their emergence, as some leaders resort to extortion (Clarke, 2018) or marginalize others (Hackl, 2013).
Street leaders play a major part in the mobilizations the camp became famous for, including sit-ins, demonstrations, blockades and stone-throwing. Their apparition correlates with a surge in political events, and their robust informal leadership network with important geographic proximity is specific to Za’atari (Clarke, 2018). The mobilizations also happened, of course, because of a motive: Schön (2020) explains power relationships and being denied access to areas lead refugees to frustration, then resistance. Mobilizations often serve to obtain better living conditions and quality services for residents, and sometimes to comfort the leaders’ position of power or facilitate illicit activities (Clarke, 2018).
Street leaders arose because in the first months of disorganization, the existing institutions were not addressing the problems in the camp (Hackl, 2013). Clarke (2018)
finds the absence of formal leadership networks is a significant factor in the street leaders’
rise by comparing Za’atari to Turkish camps accommodating Syrian refugees at the same time. Those were strictly governed, preventing the emergence of autonomous leaders, and camp authorities designated community leaders. Thus, rather than serving as instruments to community autonomy, they constituted “mechanisms for demobilization” (Clarke, 2018). In these camps, mobilizations and illicit activities were much rarer, and the refugees less autonomous and self-ruling than Za’atari’s. Thus, because refugees were controlled, there was no need for an informal power structure.
We can understand the refugee-organized governance system as an informal institution that grew separately from other camp institutions. Street leaders’ existence is informally regulated and organized: there is one leader by street, and they choose a leader for each district (Clarke, 2018). This informal and hierarchical system has proven to be time-resistant, and the post of street leader has been associated with routinized practices, so it can be understood as an institution. At times, it competes with the official camp institutions, for example when refugees are confused as to who they must refer to (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014). The institution grew separately from the camp institutions, contrary to the Turkish camps where leaders are mere players in the authorities’ system.
In Za’atari, refugees seem to navigate much better this institution they participated in building, and sometimes in a very literal way: a pizza delivery restaurant developed an address system for these chaotic streets that “officials are scrambling to copy”
(Kimmelman, 2014), showing the camp escapes the usual systems which authorities designed for it. However, this institution remains informal, and frictions happen between leaders trying to tarnish rivals’ reputations (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014).
Each actor in the camp has a specific narrative around street leaders, their organization, importance, and motives. The UNHCR developed an ‘Abu Org Chart’, named after what the organization calls street leaders — ‘Abus’, the anglicized plural of the Arabic term for ‘father’, reflecting the organization’s tendency to apply a western gaze on culturally sensitive topics (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014). ‘Abus’ are portrayed as
“widely ineffective, corrupt, and not representative” (Clarke, 2016, quoting a UNHCR note) mob bosses who get paid for protection and obey to twelve ‘super-Abus’ (district leaders), and even to some ‘super-super-Abus’, with corruption between each layer (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014). In a 2013 documentary series produced by UNHCR and Yahoo UK, Kleinschmidt portrays street leaders as unreliable, unreasonable and self-interested, only caring about power and not about advancing refugees (Za'atari: a day in the life,
2013). This suspicion can be explained by common organizations’ difficulties of listening to the whole community (de Torrenté, 2013), and by the refugee camp history of illegitimate self-appointed leaders. Other actors do not agree with this depiction: the Jordanian police speak of ‘presidents of the street’ with no additional layers, and prefer approaching residents directly rather than working with them. SIREN uses the denomination “inherited” from UNHCR (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014), but counts only about six ‘Super-Abus’, and portrays street leaders as respected elders and members of important families. These different narratives pose a difficulty to understand the reality of the camp, but are also a tool, useful for the analysis, that exacerbates the representations actors have of each other and the competition to promote their narratives. In this work, the expression ‘street leader’ was privileged because it is more descriptive and neutral than words used by ground actors, and is the most common in academia.
Having introduced the degrees of autonomy and control residents experienced in the early months of the camp, we will now present the second moment studied in this thesis, when the UNHCR plan attempted to reestablish control.
II. The effects of the UNHCR plan
When UNHCR took over management in March 2013, they attempted to shift the power dynamics in the camp through a governance plan. This part will present the objectives of the plan as well as its results in terms of control exercised on residents.
a) Description and objectives
The plan entails three dimensions: security improvement, engagement with community, and camp restructuration, which we will not study here.
i. Improvement of security
Until 2015, a standard narrative in NGOs and Jordanian authorities was the need to improve security. Vandalism and violence were widespread (UNHCR, 2014) and smugglers and militia elements threatened the host population (Beehner, 2015). The plan framed the focus on security as a way to simplify the work of aid personnel, reduce risks for the population, regulate illegal actions and reduce the powerbase of informal leaders
(UNHCR, 2013). For example, counter-smuggling measures like digging trenches were expected to undermine some street leaders (Hackl, 2013).
The plan involved coordination with a public security organization newly appointed by Jordanian authorities to patrol each district and create neighborhood watch systems with 600 trained residents (Watkins, 2018). Starting December 2013, SIREN trained their staff to form a Community Policing division that would cooperate with
“legitimate” community leaders, i.e., traditional leaders trusted by authorities.
ii. Engaging with the community
The second part of the plan mentions empowering traditional leaders and opening new communications channels to render street leaders unnecessary. Traditional leaders trusted by authorities would participate in “some sort of representative camp committee” (Hackl, 2013), and be more legitimate because, according to UNHCR camp director Killian Kleinschmidt, they “don’t need to scream in order to earn the people’s respect” (Hackl, 2013). The communication channel would be a bi-weekly district gathering where refugees express grievances and negotiate with NGOs.
Engaging with the community should cut down street leaders’ support and create a sense of community linked to public spaces, to address “the lack of community ownership of common facilities” causing vandalism and theft (UNHCR, 2013). It should also improve the relationship and trust between refugees and management through direct contact and better service quality.
However, the plan was implemented in parallel to unofficial reunions with street leaders. In March 2013, Kleinschmidt realized coopting leaders into his ‘Abu Org Chart’
was the only way to restore order (Clarke, 2018). Authorities started consulting them frequently to organize distributions and mediate disputes, and the meetings became the primary forum for negotiations (Clarke, 2018). Yet authorities refused to make this relationship official and definitive, fearing it would only fortify their power, wishing instead to replace street leaders. This serves two purposes: regaining control of the camp and avoiding reproducing unjust power structures.
However, this plan’s difficulties show significant discrepancies between what was predicted and what happened, which we will explore now.
b) The plan’s successes and shortcomings
The camp authorities’ attempts to marginalize street leaders have found little success.
First, the community reunions were only organized as late as 2015 and did not find the legitimacy expected due to the low number of regular attendees (often street leaders). It caused camp authorities to refuse to hold elections in these meetings, so they did not allow new voices to rise or more legitimate leadership to be recognized by camp authorities.
This shortcoming caused authorities to meet with street leaders on a long-lasting basis, reducing contentious events, as street leaders could air grievances, negotiate and secure their position. However, it comforted street leaders as the “most authoritative figures in refugee communities” (Clarke, 2016).
Camp security did not evolve significantly. Involving street leaders pacified the camp as contentious events became rarer from the end of 2013 (Clarke, 2018). Overall security, however, was less affected, and safety perception witnessed mixed trends (SIREN-UNHCR, 2015). The SIREN Community Policing initiative had very positive effects due to their constant presence and eagerness to work with all sides — including street leaders and imams (Watkins, 2018), while accusations of espionage and fears of vigilantism and corruption soon interrupted the neighborhood watch program (Watkins, 2018).
The plan’s difficulties can be explained by an active opposition from both street leaders and other refugees, who benefit from the street leaders’ efficient rule, do not trust camp management and are not used to peaceful dialogue. In other words, the informal institution grew separately from the authorities’ institutions, developed contradictory norms and beliefs, and as such they could not be artificially brought together without concessions.
Thus, the power vacuum created by JHCO governance created opportunities and threats for residents, brought the need for an informal institution of street leaders and allowed it to grow in the camp, separately from the governing institution. It meant that the control exercised on refugees was limited, while they found opportunities to empower themselves. UNHCR tried to reestablish control of the camp through their governance plan, targeting street leaders, insecurity and opening room for direct communication with refugees. However, the plan’s difficulties show this attempt to implement control was hindered by the power refugees had constituted in the meantime. Further reasons for these
shortcomings can be found when understanding what dimensions of power were targeted by the plan or left aside.
Chapter 4 — Discussion
In this chapter, we will apply the four-dimensional model to understand the degrees of power exercised by refugees as well as camp authorities. We will study the two moments presented in the last chapter.
I. The JHCO governance and the rise of street leaders
This part studies the actors’ dimensions of power during the JHCO governance, first briefly focusing on management and second, street leaders.
a) JHCO’s limited power
The authorities’ difficulties to maintain order in the camp, despite their willingness, and their inability to do anything against street leaders (Clarke, 2018), point to limits in their 1-D. Indeed, their lack of resources and influence meant they could not make refugees act as they want. This increases some of the refugees’ 1-D, such as street leaders who gain resources from the disorganization.
The lack of presence of the governance institution meant 2-D did not weigh heavy on them. Because institutions had little regular presence, they could not constrain residents.
Authorities also struggled to exercise 3-D on them. Breaking camp rules allowed residents to shape a life closer to their customs and past experiences, linking this resistance to meaning, interpretation, and identity (Kimmelman, 2014), and thus to 3-D.
Camp authorities did not have enough 3-D to generate meaning that would enroll refugees in their designs, where their plans would be reasonable and legitimate. Neither did they adapt their plans to existing meanings, because governance plans tend to be culturally insensitive and out of touch with the refugees’ needs (Beehner, 2015). Thus, the inability to both use existing meanings and impose new ones condemned camp management to be ineffective in 3-D.
This inability to use 3-D is also visible in JHCO’s lack of legitimacy. Power imbalances and movement restrictions motivated resistance (Schön, 2020), showing some refugees questioned the camp power relationships, and did not consider them legitimate.
As Weber (1921) theorizes, a powerful person’s legitimacy comes from their subject’s belief that they are legitimate. Haugaard (2018) adds that this belief comes from either
giving them “an actual stake in system” or using 3-D to make them misperceive reality.
Here, refugees have no stake in the system as they complain about their lack of power.
Their rebellion shows camp management has failed at justifying its rule, so it is again an example of how their inability to use 3-D leads to refugee independence.
Their original lack of authority probably impacted 4-D as well. The usual control mechanisms were not pushed on residents, meaning that the socialization processes that bring self-discipline were not adapted to the camp’s rules. Thus, 4-D should not be coercive.
In summary, 2-D did not constrain refugees, 3-D could not be used at the advantage of camp authorities, 4-D was not channeled into camp rules, and 1-D was not intense and coercive enough to secure compliance. We will now study the dimensions of power street leaders developed at that time.
b) Street leaders’ power escalation
i. First dimension
Several elements point to street leaders concentrating resources and influences, i.e., 1-D. They can undertake large-scale actions, policing actors use them as informers (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014) and despite their illegitimacy, management is forced to work with them. The leaders’ capacity to mobilize resources to affect their peers’ actions is visible in three main domains: refugee mobilization (Clarke, 2018), dispute-solving, and community organization. This process is dynamic: street leaders’ actions show the importance of their 1-D, but they can also reinforce it. A successful action can strengthen their support or give them more resources, and resolving disputes can secure their place as community leaders and fortify their 1-D.
The origin of their authority, analyzed with Weber’s ideal types of domination system (1921), is also demonstrative of their 1-D. Street leaders’ authority come from the two possibilities: leader’s personality and achievements in the camp; or their inscription in a traditional selection of leaders, like head of a large family or other traditional roles.
Thus, their regime is a mix of charismatic and traditional authority. Traditional authority, linked to 2-D (Potz, 2012), will be analyzed later. For charismatic authority however, 1- D is an appropriate tool: charisma can be translated into resources and influence, widening the spectrum of possibilities for the leader, without being inscribed in an institution or meaning (and as such without benefiting from other dimensions). Charisma
comes from either accomplishments or what is perceived as a “gift”, so it can be obtained through 1-D (for example, a starting capital allowing to generate more resources), as well as 4-D, as we will explore later. Thus, the origin of some street leaders’ authority proves further their extent in 1-D.
Another important concept to understand charismatic domination is the idea of
“charisma of office”, identified as a transitional step between entirely charismatic leadership and the other two ideal types (Weber, 1921). In that case, authority comes from the function itself, from the role leaders fill. The role becomes autonomized into an explicit job description, without relying on the leader and their skills to define it. In brief, charisma is not only applied to persons, but becomes a “property of office” (Clark, 1999).
This prepares the institution to a non-charismatic leadership that does not depend on a leader proving their exceptionality again and again, but instead on institutional methods of selecting this leader, whether it is time-based (traditional ideal type) or rational (legal/rational). Potz (2012) shows that 1-D is less involved in that case, to the profit of 2-D, 3-D and 4-D, so we will mention charisma again later.
ii. Second dimension
2-D exists in most of the street leaders’ source of authority, serving them but limiting their actions. In Weber’s ideal types, traditional roles carry 2-D because they are inscribed in larger institutions that define their outline, and the leaders’ and followers’ possibilities (Potz, 2012). In addition, other types of former social statuses receive their power from traditional institutions, and thus subject to their limitation. For instance, the power of the head of a large family comes from the cultural institution of family. However, some former statuses, including positions in the army or government, are more complicated because they use a legal/rational domination system rather than traditional. Nevertheless, when street leaders take their authority from such sources, they do not rely on legal/rational systems. In Za’atari, they are not promoted by these institutions’
advancement system but by what they represent in social status. Thus, this is closer to a traditional domination system using 2-D. As such, the origin of the street leaders’
authority comes with limitations inscribed in the traditional domination system, which prescribes how they should behave. Yet, this is also in their favor because 2-D defines how others behave and interact with them, encouraging residents to recognize their authority.
Street leaders, as an informal institution, use 2-D. For instance, refugees can be constrained because they think they must contact street leaders to resolve problems (Hackl, 2013). 2-D can also restrain them: the development of activities linked with common goods hints that street leaders have developed norms and understandings of their role. Thus, 2-D is exercised on them and others because institutional norms secure their position of power in the view of residents and camp authorities, and determine what issues can be debated.
While the informality of this institution should reduce the weight of 2-D, the routinization of their position increases it. Street leaders do not wear visible insignias, contrary to other camp institutions, and in the beginning, they chose their “self-assigned duties” (Hackl, 2013). This informality, on top of the everchanging culture Za’atari displays (Gatter, 2021), hint that these roles are not set in stone, so 2-D should not limit them significantly. However, the concept of “charisma of office” shows that as time passes, street leaders’ roles become more and more predominant in their authority. It is not only the leaders’ exceptional qualities or achievements that make them powerful, but also their title. This links charisma of office to 2-D (Potz, 2012): even in this (still) charismatic ideal type, institutional mechanisms that define 2-D are already present and restrain street leaders and other refugees. Thus, while limited by the institutions’
informality, the routinization of their role hints to increased 2-D.
iii. Third dimension
3-D can be exercised on street leaders when actors’ interpretation of reality has a restrictive effect on the formation of needs and grievances and the possibilities of action.
Street leaders’ interpretation of their role and the representation of their functions shared by others can encourage them to act accordingly and not exceed these limits. Like for 2- D, the informal nature of this institution can reduce the effect of 3-D and give street leaders more room for maneuver, but the development of shared norms and beliefs through charisma of office will inevitably impact their range of action.
The development of norms and beliefs can also reinforce the leaders’ position. As shown by charisma of office, their function becoming more and more quotidian, street leaders will fill their role instead of creating it. They have less pressure to prove themselves skilled because their title creates authority. Additionally, charisma of office often makes domination invisible by giving the illusion that leaders serve their subjects
(Heurtin, 2014). Thus, the routinization of power can benefit street leaders through 3-D, first because their title carries authority and makes people comply, and second because their function’s charisma makes residents misperceive reality to not realize they are dominated.
Street leaders’ actions can manipulate 3-D in their favor, to comfort their position of power. In early 2013, protesting became the “de facto channel for refugee communities to air their grievances” (Clarke, 2018). Thus, leaders influenced how residents envisioned communication with authorities. They affected the refugees’ representation, expanding the idea of two opposing communities, and that refugees need to force authorities into negotiation. Thus, street leaders become the only appropriate representatives, comforting their positions.
As part of the refugee community, street leaders use 3-D better. Because residents and management are clearly separated by experiences, nationalities and camp history, 3- D means residents will favor them over camp management. Street leaders share cultural norms, beliefs, and experiences with the rest of the camp, so they will also harness 3-D better than camp management and its culturally insensitive programs. Refugees are in detention, and only have their original norms as referential, so this effect is expanded, and norms are less likely to shift. Street leaders are also central in residents’ sense of community as they usually provide trailers for community gathering (Clarke, 2016).
Even when street leaders are not manipulating 3-D, existing norms and beliefs can be in their favor. The often-traditional regime of their authority depends on shared beliefs and norms that justify leaders’ election and powers, so 3-D backs many street leaders.
Additionally, 3-D is linked to legitimacy, which comes from the subjects’ belief in their leader’s legitimacy (Weber, 1921), obtained through the subjects’ power in the system or their misperception of reality (Haugaard, 2018). Street leaders benefit most refugees, but their recognition also shows 3-D favors them.
iv. Fourth dimension
4-D is often less relevant in the case of local actors in a brief time-period, because it is most visible in a politically and culturally united nation which teaches a heterogenous population self-restrain through mass education (Zaaiman & Mupambwa, 2021). We will not discuss how street leaders use 4-D, because they most likely could not, in a few years,
change a lifelong process of socialization, nor decide how people in the camp internalize the judgement of others or what knowledge is legitimate.
However, they can be favored by 4-D, when their knowledge is recognized more legitimate or when actors’ ontological perspectives support their goals. For example,
“overlapping narratives” where refugees do not know who to turn to between street leaders, policing forces and NGOs (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014) show that street leaders’
discourses can be recognized as more legitimate than other actors’. Street leaders also successfully defined how residents communicate with management, showing their narrative of “us versus them” is validated. 4-D also affects the source of domination in Weber’s charismatic domination. Charisma comes from what subjects project on their leaders: “Leaders are not powerful (as an intrinsic quality): they are made powerful in an interactive process with the less powerful” (Haugaard, 2015). Thus, the process relies on the subjects’ and leaders’ social ontology. Their socialization determines what qualities are sought in a leader. Thus, because street leaders are recognized as charismatic entrepreneurs who solve the camp’s problems, 4-D favors them.
In summary, in the first year of the camp, authorities had a limited 1-D. Their absence reduced the 2-D exercised on residents. They could not use 3-D to frame the camp policies in meanings reasonable to residents, nor channel 4-D into camp rules. On the contrary, street leaders’ use of 1-D made them central in the community and governance, but they also displayed other dimensions. They developed institutional norms and practices binding their and others’ behaviors in 2-D. They also created normative comprehensions of their roles, affecting their and others’ possibilities, and created or mobilized meanings to fortify their positions in 3-D. Finally, 4-D sometimes favored them as their narratives is recognized as true. The next part will describe how these power dynamics evolved in the camp following the UNHCR plan.
II. The effects of the UNHCR governance plan
This part will deal with the second moment studied to understand the effects of the UNHCR plan on the authorities’ and the residents’ power. We will start by detailing the plan’s goals through dimensions of power, follow with what was exterior to the plan, i.e., management’s consultation of street leaders, and finish with a comment on design flaws.
a) Objectives
The plan’s focus is on 1-D. Security improvement translates into strengthening population control and incentivizing them to behave lawfully, which means that camp authorities would increase their 1-D. Improving security should also reduce some street leaders’ 1-D, as smuggling gives them influence and resources. Similarly, the community-reaching should marginalize street leaders; that is, reduce their power base, resources and influence. Thus, the plan seems to mainly target their 1-D.
2-D would also be involved. The institutionalization of the relationship between authorities and refugees, with the start of official community gatherings and community policing division, can constrain the refugees.
3-D might also be affected. The plan’s intended replacement of street leaders by leaders considered more legitimate would reduce the street leaders’ 3-D, in addition to undermining even more their influence. Moreover, the plan attempts to change the way residents communicate with management, which was shaped by street leaders, and to make the relationship more trustful. Thus, this affects the self-image of refugees and the perception of their relationship with camp authorities. In that sense, management hopes to shift 3-D in their interest.
The next two parts will present why this plan faced so many difficulties, through defaults exterior to its conception and shortcomings in its design.
b) The effects of integrating street leaders into the management
Street leaders used their 1-D differently when they started meeting with camp authorities.
They shifted from forceful negotiations, with demonstrations, to peaceful talks: the reunions provide a platform that grants street leaders what they want from management (1-D) so that they do not need to resort to force. Getting street leaders to adopt peaceful communication was a goal of the plan, but it is not a reduction of their 1-D, solely a transformation to an expression of 1-D preferred by camp authorities. It mirrors the other refugees’ 1-D: through demonstrations, they could get what they wanted, and this is now possible mainly through the leaders’ meetings, only changing in form. Finally, becoming the prime channel for refugee demands (Clarke, 2018) might have comforted their influence and increased their 1-D.
These meetings could also subject street leaders to 2-D, or comfort them. Once they were integrated in an institutional setting, with proper methods and practices, one
can imagine their possibilities of actions were constrained. They might be restricted in their demands, as not everything might be discussed in these meetings. For example, the illegal activities some leaders engage in could have been discussed between them but not in the presence of management, as camp director Kleinschmidt works to destabilize smugglers (Hackl, 2013). Thus, their goals involving smuggling might become more difficult to negotiate in the reunions, showing institutional practices constraining their possibilities — in other words, they are subject to 2-D. However, it is difficult to assess to the extent of this phenomenon as no source described it. Additionally, the effect could happen in reverse: even if camp authorities did not wish coopt street leaders into official positions, their consideration for them integrates them into the camp system. Thus, what had been marginal and illegal became organized into politics, so the institutions’ 2-D could benefit street leaders. As such, the effect of the management meetings in 2-D could both constrain or expand their possibilities.
Leaders also gain in 3-D by being integrated in camp management. The camp director’s regular meetings with street leaders confirms they are indispensable to restore control, giving them legitimacy (Clarke, 2018). This affects 3-D as it is central in a leader’s legitimacy, as followers’ perception of reality and their beliefs makes them see the leader as legitimate (Haugaard, 2018).
Thus, some shortcomings of the plan were linked to the integration of street leaders into governance which enhanced some of their dimensions of power. Others are ingrained in the plan’s design, and will be studied now.
c) Shortcomings in the plan’s conception
To understand the flaws in the plan’s design, we will dive into the views that shaped it.
In a last part, we will link those views to the dimensions of power. This will allow us to understand why the plan struggled, illuminating the degree of autonomy it allowed refugees.
i. A one-dimensional view of street leaders’ power
Major problems of the plan were linked to the understanding of the street leaders’ power, and of how camp authorities can undermine this power and transfer it to other refugees.
First, the focus on security and their powerbase shows that camp authorities think street
leaders use mainly 1-D, and the plan neglects 2-D and 3-D. This conception comes from the idea that they are illegitimate mafia-like bosses. In opposition to that, the plan seeks to empower efficient and legitimate leaders, who would be able to use other dimensions (which street leaders presumably lack). In particular, traditional leaders are supposed to bring 2-D and 3-D to a UNHCR-coopted system, and make residents forget two years of local power structures. However, as we saw, this is merely the authorities’ interpretations:
most refugees see street leaders as legitimate and efficient, and the UNHCR has not gained public support, showing that street leaders are able to use other dimension of power or are favored by them. Because the camp governance does not perceive that street leaders yield more than 1-D, they cannot effectively take them down.
This one-dimensional view of the leaders’ power arises from the UNHCR not perceiving street leaders as an institution (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014). Comprehending them as an institution, they would see that from JHCO’s governance, the absence of institution forced the emergence of street leaders, whose mandate was slowly routinized and institutionalized, involving other dimensions of power than 1-D. Thus, when UNHCR wants to impose its new institution with clashing norms, practices and beliefs, they encounter many difficulties. Because of this clash, there is no shared norms and meanings that can allow a use of 3-D, and the UNHCR institution lack the ability to constrain through 2-D, given that an alternative institution can always be resorted to.
The one-dimensional view, visible in management’s comprehension of the third dimension, condemned the plan to limited success. First, the plan does not use 3-D on residents, despite it being central to what UNHCR wants to achieve, as the third dimension can prevent the formation of grievances (Lukes, 1974). Secondly, authorities miscalculate how street leaders use and benefit from 3-D. Contrary to camp authorities, street leaders use the meanings and perceptions of their fellow refugee because they share cultural norms and experiences and contribute to their sense of identity. This explains why they continue to be influent after new voices could emerge, or why refugees content with the existing system did not attend community gatherings. It also explains why street leaders’ replacement by traditional leaders was destined to fail: for many refugees, street leaders are legitimate and already possess the 3-D that cultural conventions grant traditional leaders, and the years passed under their authority only fortifies street leaders’
links to other refugees. Thus, the failure of the plan can be attributed to the camp management underassessing the street leaders’ use of 3-D, and not being able to use it themselves. This is reinforced by two representations at the heart of the project, that affect
