Domination in the name of Democracy?

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Spring Term 2021

Master's Thesis in Human Rights

30 ECTS

Domination in the name of

Democracy?

The means and ends to the European Union’s democracy

promotion

Author: Karin Stångberg

Supervisor: Per Sundman

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Abstract

In recent years we have been able to witness a growing divide in the politics of democracy promotion, research in the field has taken a more critical turn and is proclaiming a legitimacy crisis of democracy promotion. Some of the most prominent critique comes from the field of postcolonialism where authors argue that the desire to intervene and democratise another society should be considered an imperial project. Others argue that the ‘unsatisfactory’ outcomes of democracy promotion should be attributed to an insufficient conceptualisation of democracy and its relation to liberalism.

This thesis aims to engage with some of the critiques brought forward in the discussion on the legitimacy crisis of democracy promotion by focusing on EU policies, specifically concerning the envisioned relation and interaction with recipients of democracy promotion. To gain deeper understanding of this issue the study puts forward the question of what conception of democracy is promoted by the EU in order to understand what the EU brings into interactions with recipients of democracy promotion. This is then followed by the question of whether there any indications that the democracy promotion pursued by the EU may contribute to a relation of domination.

Through the use of textual analysis and ideology critique, the conclusions present support to the claims that the EU’s conception of democracy promotes traditional liberal values, infused with a narrative of universalism to legitimise EU engagement. Further it is concluded that, variations in the EU’s way of phrasing its efforts indicates an ambivalence concerning the role of recipients. The findings of the thesis further support the perception that that the EU is pursuing a strategy to leverage its own normative and political power in the international arena. Examples of a neo-colonial narrative, combined with a lack of self-reflection concerning the EU’s colonial history and current position of power, further supports critiques concerning cultural imperialism. Still, it is also found that, on a policy level, citizens and civil society organisations in partner states are supported and empowered, going against the notion of domination.

Keywords: Democracy promotion, democracy, the European Union, domination, self-determi- nation, cultural imperialism

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1. Introduction

I think we have all more than once heard of the many values of democracy. It has been argued that no famine has ever taken place in a democratic system, democracies tend to avoid war with each other and are more likely to solve internal conflicts in a peaceful manner. Democracies are also widely considered best at promoting and supporting human rights.¹ Given these arguments it is not surprising that the promotion of, and support for, democracy has been at the centre of foreign policy agendas and international politics over the last decades. Democracy promotion as a practice comes under different names and in many different shapes; democracy support, democracy aid, election assistance, civil society support and institution building just to mention a few.

At the same time as we have during the last couple of years witnessed a democratic setback in many parts of the world,² support for democracy promotion has also experienced a steady decline. Perhaps the most notable example of the crisis has been the withdrawn democracy support from the United States under the leadership of former president Donald Trump. While the U.S.

has been stated to abdicate its historical role as one of the leaders of the democracy promotion community another leader still stands strong in its commitments.³ During the year of 2020 the EU adopted a new ‘Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’ covering the years 2020- 2024. In the opening statement for the new action plan we can read that “The European Union (EU) is founded on a strong commitment to promote and protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This is at the heart of its activities, both internally and in its relations with other countries and regions.”.⁴

At the same time as we are seeing a divide in the politics of democracy promotion, research in the field has taken a more critical turn and is proclaiming a legitimacy crisis of democracy promotion.⁵ Some of the most prominent critique comes from the field of postcolonialism where authors argue that the desire to intervene and democratise another society should be considered

1 Zamfir, Ionel. Democracy support in EU external policy, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018, 2

2 Freedom House. 'New Report: The global decline in democracy has accelerated', 2021, Retrieved 2021-04-03 via:

https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated

3 Carothers, Thomas. 'Rejuvenating Democracy Promotion', Journal of Democracy, vol. 31/no. 1, 2020, 115

4 European Commission. Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 2020-2024, 1, Retrieved 2020-10-14 via: https://eur- lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e9112a36-6e95-11ea-b735-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_3&format=PDF

5 Lazarus, Joel. 'Contesting the Hegemony of Democracy Promotion: Towards the Demos', Critical Policy Studies, vol. 8/no.

1, 2014, 41

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an imperial project.⁶ This critique and the current proclaimed crisis within the field of democracy promotion is the starting point from where this thesis takes off. In the following pages I am engaging with some of the recent critiques towards democracy promotion. My primary focus is on EU policies, the envisioned power relations and conditions for interaction with recipients of democracy promotion. The analysis engages with the ways the EU, in its policies on democracy promotion, shapes the conditions for the interaction between promoters and recipients through their conceptualisation of democracy. This question is followed up by the issue of whether there are any indications that the democracy promotion pursued by the EU may contribute to a relation of domination. My intentions are that the findings from this thesis may bring a more nuanced image of democracy promotion and that these findings may be found useful, not only in the overall debate but also for practitioners of democracy promotion.

1.2 The legitimacy crisis of democracy promotion

The perception of democracy promotion as a public good has for a long time been taken for granted by (western) actors.⁷ At the same time as the political practice of democracy promotion appears to be regressing, research in the field has taken a more critical turn and is proclaiming a legitimacy crisis of democracy promotion.⁸ Some say that the idea of democracy promotion is, in normative terms, based on the perception that there is a universal value of and commitment to democracy. However, as some also may argue, when the interaction of democracy promotion comes to involve contestation over political norms, it is no longer clear which entitlements are to be met. Thus, democracy promotion stands the risk of violating the collective entitlement to sovereignty and autonomy in the recipient state.⁹ It has further been argued that despite the considerable amount of literature referring to democracy promotion, it is still not settled what the term must include or exclude.¹⁰ Laurence Whitehead among others argues for a reconcep- tualization of the term to encompass more contextualized practices.¹¹ Some authors go even

6 Slater, David. 'Imperial Powers and Democratic Imaginations', Third World Quarterly, vol. 27/no. 8, 2006, 1378

7 Whitehead, in Hobson, Christopher, and Milja Kurki. 'The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion', vol. 20, London, Routledge, 2012, 20

8 Lazarus, Joel. 'Contesting the Hegemony of Democracy Promotion: Towards the Demos', Critical Policy Studies, vol. 8/no.

1, 2014, 41

9 Poppe, Annika Elena, and Jonas Wolff. 'The Normative Challenge of Interaction: Justice Conflicts in Democracy Promo- tion', Global Constitutionalism, vol. 2/no. 3, 2013, 374

10 Whitehead, in Hobson, Christopher, and Milja Kurki. 'The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion', vol. 20, London, Routledge, 2012, 20

11 Ibid, 21-26

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further in their critique by arguing that the ‘unsatisfactory’ outcomes of democracy promotion should be attributed to an insufficient conceptualisation of democracy and its relation to liberalism.¹²

Following this perception, one of the more frequent critiques aimed towards democracy promotion is the notion that it entails a set of practices and norms that are far from being neutral.

Instead it is argued to emphasise power relations and the ‘othering’ of people from other cultures.¹³ As previously mentioned, some go even further by arguing that the desire to intervene, with the agenda to reorder another society, is to be considered an integral part of an imperial project. Spreading what is considered a particular interpretation of democracy is further highlighted as a foundation to the justification of geopolitical power.¹⁴ Still, scholars who argue that there is a way for democracy promoters to move forward from this critique. For this to be pos- sible, democracy promoters are encouraged to “‘take a clear-eyed view of the factors that are driving the crisis” and adapt their strategies to encompass the critique as well as to the changing geopolitical landscape.¹⁵

1.3 Democracy promotion and the European Union

From the early 1990s and onwards the EU has been actively engaged in the practice of democracy promotion.¹⁶ Since then, a vast amount of literature has emerged on the topic. A majority of the research I find focuses on the impact or effectiveness of EU democracy promotion in certain regions. Another side of the research on EU democracy promotion engages with the

‘European approach’ to democracy promotion on a strategy level.¹⁷ Still it has been argued that

“Scholars have not yet systematically and comparatively analysed the very substance that the

12 Jahn, in Hobson, Christopher, and Milja Kurki. 'The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion', vol. 20, London, Routledge, 2012,

13 Elliott, Cathy. 'Democracy Promotion as Foreign Policy: Temporal Othering in International Relations', vol 1, Lon- don;New York;, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017, 36-37

15 Carothers, Thomas. 'Rejuvenating Democracy Promotion', Journal of Democracy, vol. 31/no. 1, 2020, 115

16 Wetzel, Anne, and Jan Orbie. 'Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance of EU Democracy Promo- tion', European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 16, 2011, 565

17 For example: Lavenex, Sandra, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 'EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Lev- erage to Governance?', Democratization, vol. 18/no. 4, 2011. or Carothers, Thomas. 'Democracy Assistance: Political Vs.

Developmental?', Journal of Democracy, vol. 20/no. 1, 2009

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EU promotes under its democracy promotion agenda.”.¹⁸ Or as put by Schimmelfennig, “Sub- stance has mainly played a role with regard to the consistency, or rather inconsistency, of EU democracy promotion but has not been an important research area in its own right.”.¹⁹ The importance of this issue has been further emphasised by Wetzel and Orbie as they argue that the issue of what the EU promotes must come before evaluations of the results of said democracy promotion.²⁰ The authors address this issue by unravelling the democratic substance of EU democracy promotion with a specific focus on liberal democracy. The potentially liberal un- dertones of the EU’s democracy promotion is a common theme among research focusing on the EU. For instance, Andrea Teti examines the ‘liberal’ conceptual structure of ‘democracy’

in the EU democracy assistance policy after the Arab uprisings.²¹

Even though the perception that the EU promotes a coherent liberal model of democracy is shared by several scholars there are also those who oppose this conceived notion of EU democracy promotion as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ picture of liberal democracy.²² To further complicate the issue of substance in democracy promotion Schimmelfennig argues that “.... substance may not be consequential. In this view, the EU may well have a (liberal) model of democracy, but what- ever the substance emerging from the EU’s policy planning and programming may be, practice is driven by specific interests, available instruments, committed resources, and other factors.

As a result, the substance of EU democracy promotion may be the dependent rather than the independent variable. Rather than shaping the EU’s democracy promotion, substance is being shaped by interests and instruments that have little to do with democracy promotion at all.”.²³ For me, this comment by Schimmelfennig pinpoints a common issue in the field of democracy promotion research. As previously addressed, the practice of democracy promotion is of an

19 Schimmelfennig, Frank. 'How Substantial Is Substance? Concluding Reflections on the Study of Substance in EU Democ- racy Promotion', European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 16, 2011, 727

21 Teti, Andrea. 'Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic Rights in EU Democracy Assis- tance Policy After the Arab Uprisings', Middle East Critique, vol. 24/no. 1, 2015

22 Schimmelfennig, Frank. 'How Substantial Is Substance? Concluding Reflections on the Study of Substance in EU Democ- racy Promotion', European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 16, 2011, 728-729

23 Ibid, 728

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interactive nature.²⁴ Even though negotiations between ‘promoters’ and ‘local actors’ play an essential role in democracy promotion, the power balance and relationship introduced by this interaction has been given little attention.²⁵ What I find to be missing in current research is not simply the study of substance, in the sense of what type of democracy is promoted by the EU.

Instead I find that the issue of substance has been isolated from the interactive reality of democracy promotion. For instance, the potential room left for local actors and recipients of democracy promotion to impact the ‘substance’ is often neglected or overlooked in research. This perspective, I find, is instead limited to the evaluations of specific democracy promotion efforts

1.4 My contributions and the purpose of the thesis

Following this perception, it is my intention with this thesis to focus on the relative power balance between promoters and domestic actors. Thus, my aim is to dive deeper into some of the recent critique towards democracy promotion, as raised by Poppe & Wolff, Slater and others, by focusing on EU policies, specifically concerning the envisioned relation and interaction with recipients of democracy promotion. To address this critique, I have identified two questions that lay the foundation for this analysis.

Firstly, what conception of democracy is promoted by the EU? Through textual analysis I am focusing on how the EU in its strategies and policies on democracy promotion may shape the conditions for interactions with recipients. The purpose of this question is to establish what the EU brings to these interactions. Thus, this question concerns the issue debated among scholars on the ‘substance’ of democracy promotion. It entails the question of what conception of democracy is promoted by the EU. More importantly it also raises the issue of what room this preconceived conception leaves for local actors and recipients of democracy promotion to impact the ‘substance’ in the interaction with the EU. In this sense the question relates to the postcolonial critique that democracy promotion stands the risk of violating the collective entitlement to sovereignty and autonomy in the recipient state²⁶ which leads us over to the second question of this analysis.

24 Poppe, Annika Elena, and Jonas Wolff. 'The Normative Challenge of Interaction: Justice Conflicts in Democracy Promo- tion', Global Constitutionalism, vol. 2/no. 3, 2013, 1

25 Poppe, Annika Elena, Julia Leininger, et al. 'Introduction: Negotiating the Promotion of Democracy', Democratization, vol.

26/no. 5, 2019, 760

26 Poppe, Annika Elena, and Jonas Wolff, 'The Normative Challenge of Interaction: Justice Conflicts in Democracy Promo- tion', Global Constitutionalism, vol. 2/no. 3, 2013, 374

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Are there any indications that the democracy promotion pursued by the EU may contribute to a relation of domination? As is argued by some scholars, the desire to intervene with the agenda to reorder another society could be considered a part of an imperial project.²⁷ It has further been argued that democracy promotion may emphasise power relations and the ‘othering’ of people from other cultures.²⁸ By introducing some theoretical variations to the concept of domination and critically applying them to the EU’s strategies on democracy promotion it is my ambition to engage with this critique. The purpose of this question is to explore whether there is any support to this critique to be found within the EU’s own policies. With this said, I agree with the conception of Carothers that there is a way for democracy promoters to move forward from the current crisis. Hence, it is not my intention to evaluate whether or not democracy promotion is to be considered as inherently good or bad. Neither is it my intention to evaluate democracy as a form of government or discuss whether it may be considered (in)ap- propriate for specific cultures. Instead, my intention is that the findings from this thesis may bring a more nuanced image of democracy promotion and that it is to be found useful, not only in the overall debate but also for practitioners of democracy promotion.

In the following chapters I am introducing the ways in which this analysis has been conducted, starting off with a brief introduction of the methodology before moving over to a presentation of the material selection. The following chapters are devoted to presentations of the theories that have guided the analysis. Before presenting the findings from the analysis, one chapter is spent on explaining how the theories have been used to aid me in my interpretations of the selected material. The results of the analysis have been presented in the four chapters, ‘Justifi- cations and universal aspirations’, ‘Defining democracy’, ‘Empowerment and relational balance of power’ and finally ‘Expected outcomes’. In these chapters, different aspects of the research questions are discussed before combined in the last chapter of the thesis where the final conclusions are presented.

28 Elliott, Cathy. 'Democracy Promotion as Foreign Policy: Temporal Othering in International Relations', vol 1, Lon- don;New York;, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 201, 36-37

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2. Methodology

The following analysis has been conducted through textual analysis. With this I am aware that

“every reader comes to a text with prejudice” and that different readers may interpret the same text differently. For the same reason it is also impossible to know exactly what an author intends to say with a certain text.²⁹ Nonetheless this does not mean that textual analysis does not contribute to a deeper understanding of our world. The benefit of this method is what I have just raised. The findings from textual analysis may shed light on how a specific text might be interpreted by others than the author and thus what impact that text may have when published in the social world. As raised by Esaiasson et. al., meaning is expressed in various different ways such as the spoken word, actions and the written language, leaving traces of social conventions behind.³⁰ Thus, textual analysis is used to shed lights on a hidden agenda or even on how a text stands the risk of coming across in a way that might conflict with the author's initial intentions.

As my aspiration in this thesis is to engage with some of the critique towards democracy promotion, I find textual analysis to be an ideal choice. My interpretations may not be in line with the EU’s intentions but will raise the question of what the publications signal to the outside world. Textual analysis concerns among other issues “thinking that motivates and guides social and political action and interaction”.³¹ Thus, the conceptualisations of democracy in these terms can reveal how conditions are shaped by the EU for the interaction with recipients of democracy promotion. Furthermore, the connection of language with historical and social realities shape us so that our communication never transpires without society's power relations also being en- closed.³² Thus, this conception does not only relate to the question of how the EU’s conception of democracy may shape the conditions for interactions. It also relates to the question of whether the democracy promotion pursued by the EU may contribute to a relation of domination.

Through ideology critique I am further engaging with the material in order to reveal any potentially hidden social functions behind the EU’s policies of democracy promotion.³³ The concept

29 Boréus, Kristina, and Göran Bergström. 'Analyzing Text and Discourse: Eight Approaches for the Social Sciences', Lon- don, SAGE, 2017, 11-12

30 Esaiasson, Peter, Mikael Gilljam, Henrik Oscarsson, et al. 'Metodpraktikan: Konsten Att Studera Samhälle, Individ Och Marknad', vol 5, Stockholm, Wolters Kluwer, 2017, 212

31 Lindberg, in Boréus, Kristina, and Göran Bergström. 'Analyzing Text and Discourse: Eight Approaches for the Social Sci- ences', London, SAGE, 2017, 86

32 Martinson, in Stenmark, Mikael, Karin Johannesson, Francis Jonbäck, et al. 'Filosofiska Metoder i Praktiken', Volume 5, Uppsala, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2018, 242

33 Lindberg, in Boréus, Kristina, and Göran Bergström. 'Analyzing Text and Discourse: Eight Approaches for the Social Sci- ences', London, SAGE, 2017, 87

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of ideology may of course be understood in different ways. For instance, the concept of ideology was used by Karl Marx in relation to the idea that there in every society exists certain dominant ideas, expressed to produce social coherence and promote the interests of the elite.³⁴ Building on the conceptualisations of Marks, John Thompson engages with the notion of ideology through the role that ideas play “in sustaining class domination by encouraging the sta- bilization of actuality and discouraging its transformation.”.³⁵ The method of ideology critique thus concerns “bringing out the true significance underlying [actuality]’, pushing it to ‘go beyond its own confines’...it consists in ‘enabling the world to clarify its consciousness, in waking it from its dream about itself”.³⁶ For me this conception of ideology and ideology critique consequently serves the purpose of assessing whether there are any indications that democracy promotion pursued by the EU may contribute to a relation of domination.

In addition to the conception that every reader interprets a text differently, some of the decisions that I have made concerning the structure of analysis are influential in shaping my interpretations and the conclusions drawn. Firstly, the selection of material shapes the analysis in the sense that other documents written by other authors may be formulated in a way that could be interpreted differently. Not solely because of the traces left by the author of his/her own back- ground but also because the intended reader may be someone else or the purpose of the text may be different. In the next chapter the selected material is presented more thoroughly. Sec- ondly, the theoretical selection shapes the perspective through which the texts are read and interpreted. The analysis of this study is based on several theories mainly focusing on the concept of domination, predominantly based upon the conceptualisations of Iris Marion Young.

The relation between democracy and universality as theorised by David Beetham also plays a vital role in the interpretation of the selected policy documents as well as Amy Allen's depiction of empowerment. However, I will not go into these decisions any further here as they are presented more thoroughly in the following chapters. Following the theoretical presentations one chapter is also devoted to how the theories are being implemented throughout the analysis.

34 Marks, Susan, 'The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology', New York, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2003, 13

35 Ibid, 14

36 Ibid, 25

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3. Material selection

First and foremost, the material selection is limited to focusing solely on the European Union.

The decision to focus on the EU is based on two primary concerns. Firstly, the EU has together with the US, historically been one of the most active promoters of democracy in the international arena and has remained so even during these last years. Secondly, taken together with the strong colonial heritage of EU members, the postcolonial critique towards democracy promotion further motivates this selection.

As previously addressed, the EU has been actively engaged in democracy promotion since the early 1990s. After around 30 years of democracy promotion the amount of EU texts and documents on the topic is vast. In this analysis I am focusing on the material published by the EU since the year of 2009 up until now. In 2009 the EU outlined a new strategy for supporting democracy that was adopted by the Council on 17 November that year. This strategy is still highlighted by the EU as it is said to have initiated a significant shift in the EU democracy promotion with greater coherence and involvement of all stakeholders.³⁷ As this point in time is said to represent a change in the EU’s strategy on democracy promotion I am not including any earlier material. The inclusion of earlier material would enhance the risk of conflicting results in the analysis that would not be representative of the EU’s current policies on democracy promotion. The EU’s commitment to democracy promotion was reiterated in 2012 when the Foreign Affairs Council adopted the Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. After this there have been an additional two action plans adopted by the European Union, the Action Plan for the period of 2015-2019 and most recently the Action Plan for 2020-2024.³⁸ Each year the EU also publishes the ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World’. In these publications the annual progress made by the EU in the area of democracy promotion and human rights support is presented and new challenges are identified. Consequently, these documents make up the primary material of my analysis together with some complementary documents published by the EU on the topic of democracy promotion during this time period. This analysis does not include any policy documents derived from the strategies of EU members. I am aware that the inclusion of these documents could have given other results given how the original policies may have been interpreted on a member

37 European Parliament. Promoting Democracy and Observing Elections, 2020, 1 Retrieved 2021-01-29 via: https://www.eu- roparl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.4.2.pdf

38 Ibid, 1-2

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state level. However, it is my impression that this would also increase the risk of a scattered result which may deviate from the official lines of the Union.

4. Theoretical framework

This analysis is based on several theoretical outsets. My original interest in the issue of democracy promotion sparked from the postcolonial critique of the practice, raised by authors such as Elliott and Slater.³⁹ As the field of postcolonial theory is vast and extensive this analysis is limited to what I consider to be one of the core objectives of the postcolonial perspective, namely the observance of dominance. Consequently, the concept of domination and its attributes make up the theoretical foundation on which this analysis primarily is based on. In addition to this I am including a chapter on cultural imperialism, presented as a sub-theory to domination. The purpose of this is to more thoroughly engage with the postcolonial critique towards democracy promotion. As a contrast to the concept of domination a short chapter on empowerment is also included. However, my theoretical discussion starts with a chapter on democracy and universalism as these are vital concerns found within the postcolonial critique voiced towards democracy promotion. Hence, this perspective is important given the aim of the analysis and the obvious centrality of democracy to the issue at stake.

4.1 Democracy and universalism

In ‘Democracy and Human Rights’ author David Beetham presents some of the recurring issues connected with definitions of democracy. Nonetheless, Beetham contests the perception of democracy as an essentially contestable concept. One of the most common mistakes when ap- proaching the definition of democracy, according to Beetham, has been to confuse the question of definition with whether (or to what extent) democracy is (a) good in itself. Thus definitions of democracy have often been tailored to suit the amount of public participation that the author in question perceives as desirable.⁴⁰ A second issue related to the question of defining democracy raised by Beetham is “identifying democracy with a particular institution or set of institutional arrangements, rather than with the principles they embody or are designed to realize.”.⁴¹ According to Beetham, democracy is to be defined by the principles of popular control and

39 Elliott, Cathy. 'Democracy Promotion as Foreign Policy: Temporal Othering in International Relations', vol 1, Lon- don;New York;, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017 and Slater, David. 'Imperial Powers and Democratic Imagina- tions', Third World Quarterly, vol. 27/no. 8, 2006, pp. 1369-1386.

40 Beetham, David. 'Democracy and Human Rights', Cambridge, Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1999, 2

41 Ibid, 3

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political equality.⁴² The premises for these principles and the justification of democracy are the notions of equal human worth and human self-determination or autonomy. Beetham argues that there are some intrinsic similarities between the justifications of democracy and liberalism with an important exception. In the definition of democracy “autonomy is understood collectively…

rather than individually” as is the case in liberalism.⁴³ According to Beetham the justification for the principles of popular control and political equality are to be considered universal as they may not be invalidated by claims of cultural differences. This conclusion derives from the understanding that “.... the very principle which urges our regard for cultural difference - equal respect for persons and their capacity for creative self-determination - is the same that underpins democracy as a universal value.”.⁴⁴

As stated, Beetham argues that the definition of democracy should be confined to the principles of popular control and political equality. Paradoxically, he also claims that there are some additional components that have proven to be indispensable to democracy at the level of the nation-state. Among these components are: securing freedom of expression, movement and association, an institutional separation of powers and the rule of law, the institution of the representative assembly, the principle of the limited state and finally the premise that there is no final truth about what is good for society. These indispensable components are by Beetham attributed to liberal democracy, arguing that the relationship between liberalism and democracy is one of mutual necessity as well as a source of tension.⁴⁵ Following this reasoning we are faced with a precarious situation. Given that these components are considered indispensable to democracy, it is only reasonable to expect the EU to promote them in their policies. However, by doing so the EU could be critiqued for promoting a liberal agenda, no longer protected from arguments concerning cultural difference.

Still, I agree with Beetham that there should be a way to promote democracy in a sense that respects cultural differences. I further agree that the way in which this can be done is if promoters of democracy focus on the underlying principles of democracy instead of specific institu-

42 Ibid, 5

43 Ibid, 7

44 Ibid 16

45 Ibid, 34-35

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tional arrangements that may be found in political democracies. Based on this principle I interpret Beetham’s conception of universally applicable norms to be those that urge our regard for cultural difference. For democracy, this entails a definition confined to the principles of popular control and political equality. Building on these insights I am in the analysis using Beetham’s conceptualisations concerning democracy and universalism as a guide in the assessment of the EU's definition of democracy and what is promoted by the EU in its policies. The relationship between democracy and collective autonomy or self-determination as described by Beetham is further connected to the understanding of domination, defined as the deprivation of self-determination. In the following chapters the theoretical foundations of domination which the analysis is based upon are conceptualised further. In these chapters I return to the issues of democracy and universalism in order to put them in relation to other parts of the theory.

4.2 Domination

Being dominated, as defined by Iris Marion Young, is understood as the deprivation or restriction of one's self-determination.⁴⁶ A similar definition is used by Susan Marks who states that “...relations of domination exist insofar as individuals, by virtue of their location within a social structure, enjoy unequal capacities to participate in decisions that affect them, pursue ends of their choice and realize their own interests.”.⁴⁷ Domination and the deprivation of self- determination makes out one of the two aspects of injustice according to Young. The other aspect is oppression or the deprivation of self-development. As argued by Young, domination and oppression relate to each other insofar as oppression cannot exist without domination. Dom- ination however, may prevail even if there is no oppression.⁴⁸ Young further states that “Persons live within structures of domination if other persons or groups can determine without recipro- cation the conditions of their action, either directly or by virtue of the structural consequences of their actions.”.⁴⁹

46 Young, Iris Marion. 'Inclusion and Democracy', Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

47 Marks, Susan. 'The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology', New York, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2003, 11

48 Young, Iris Marion. 'Justice and the Politics of Difference', Princeton, N.J, Princeton Univ. Press, 1990.

49 Young, Iris Marion. 'Inclusion and Democracy', Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, 32-33

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The conception of domination used in this thesis builds on the definition provided by Young where being dominated is understood as the deprivation or restriction of one's self-determination or autonomy. The meaning of this being that: “the self-determining entity should be able to set its own ends and be able to act toward their realization, within the limits of respect for, and cooperation with, other agents with whom one interacts and with whom one stands in relation.”.⁵⁰ Self-determination, or the absence of domination, is here understood as the possibility to choose your own goals and being able to act toward their realisation.

As given by the conceptualisations of Beetham there is a strong connection between self-determination and democracy given that “.... the very principle which urges our regard for cultural difference - equal respect for persons and their capacity for creative self-determination - is the same that underpins democracy as a universal value.”.⁵¹ Nonetheless, self-determination should not be reduced to democratic participation. Democratic institutions and practices are not enough by themselves to ensure self-determination as there may still be structural inequalities in the society, reinforcing injustice.⁵² What I am taking with me from this conclusion is thus that the promotion of democracy in itself does not guarantee respect for the self-determination of others.

I interpret this to be the case when, as raised by Beetham, democracy is defined with a particular set of institutional arrangements since such a definition could be insensitive to claims of cultural differences. Consequently, such a definition goes beyond the scope of universality and may impede upon recipients' right to define themselves and their aspirations. Domination in this sense, means that your voice is disrespected or silenced by someone else who takes it upon themselves to speak for you.

However, my understanding is that domination evolves structurally over time as it not only concerns the restriction of self-determination but the transference of it from one party to another. This part of domination I understand to be that which some refer to as “power over”.⁵³ Through interaction with others we have to compromise on our goals and actions as what we want for ourselves is not always possible. Thus, simply stopping someone from pursuing a

50 Young, Iris Marion. 'Self-Determination as Non-Domination: Ideals Applied to Palestine/Israel', Ethnicities, vol. 5/no. 2, 2005, 146

51 Beetham, David. 'Democracy and Human Rights', Cambridge, Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1999, 16

52 Young, Iris Marion. 'Inclusion and Democracy', Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, 33-35

53 Vrousalis, Nicholas. 'Exploitation, Vulnerability, and Social Domination', Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 41/no. 2, 2013, 155

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certain action does not equal domination even if their self-determination may have been in- fringed upon on that specific occasion. In a similar line of thought, compromise does not equal domination. As I see it, relations of domination in this sense are relations where someone else perpetually determines directly or indirectly your course of actions. The consequence of this type of relationship could be a state of dependence where the dominated party is dependent on another party, the opposite being a state of independence. Another potential consequence of domination I understand is oppression as both of these states are based on the premise of someone exercising power over someone else. In addition to these outcomes of domination, I would like to once more raise the important point addressed by Marks. Domination is inflicted upon someone “...by virtue of their location within a social structure…”.⁵⁴ An example of this is domination in the form of exploitation. Exploitation is more specifically defined as a systemic relationship where one party instrumentalises the other’s vulnerability to enrich itself in a way that subordinates the other or as a process through which power is extracted from someone to benefit someone else.⁵⁵ Specific to exploitation as a form of domination I find to be what Vrousalis refers to as the instrumentalisation of other’s vulnerability which relates to Mark's reference to someone's location within a social structure. Hence, in an exploitative relationship the dominant party takes advantage of others’ vulnerabilities making an offer that they cannot refuse. However, the offer made by the dominant party entails an expectation of something in return. That which is expected in return should over time result in the dominant party gaining an increasing power over the other party, or by other words, to enrich itself in a way that subordinates the other. This results in the subordination of the dominated party, the outcome being a state of dependency. Consequently, in a non-exploitative relationship both parties must either keep a constant level of self-determination or the level of self-determination must increase for both parties. Hence, not only is the outcome of domination a state where someone is exercising power over someone else. From my understanding relations of domination also build on the prerequisite of inequalities or the perception of supremacy and inferiority. However, since our world is made up of several social structures we have to consider situations of multiple dominations at various levels. As argued by Rainer Forst, those who are being dominated may be so by their own governments or elites who in turn may be dominated by global actors such as

54 Marks, Susan. 'The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology', New York, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2003, 11

55 Vrousalis, Nicholas. 'Exploitation, Vulnerability, and Social Domination', Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 41/no. 2, 2013, 530

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international corporations and stronger state governments.⁵⁶ Given the issue covered in this thesis I believe the concept of multiple dominations is important to have in mind. Hence, throughout the analysis a conscious effort is made to discuss the issue of domination on multiple levels.

In this thesis the concept of self-determination or perhaps more importantly, the restriction of self-determination, serves as the primary analytical tool to identify indications of domination.

By analysing the EU’s policies for democracy promotion, I am looking for indications that the EU could be impeding upon the self-determination of the recipients. As previously discussed, such an indication could be if the conception of democracy promoted comes with a particular set of institutional arrangements insensitive to cultural differences, limiting recipients' right to define themselves and their aspirations. From the opposite perspective, the concept of self-determination is used in order to analyse what room there is for recipients to express their aspirations. Recipients' self-determination may for instance be expressed through the conceptualisation of democracy or through a demand or request for democracy support.

As previously concluded, relations of domination are relations where someone else perpetually determines directly or indirectly your course of actions, they evolve structurally over time through the transference of power from one party to another. Following this conclusion, I am looking into the relational balance of power between the EU and its partners. As relations of domination are enabled through inequalities or a perception of supremacy and inferiority a sec- tion of the analysis is devoted to the ways that the EU describes itself as well as its partners and their relationship. To assess whether the EU’s strategies on democracy promotion may result in the EU gaining power over recipients, expected outcomes of democracy promotion also make up a primary concern of the analysis.

4.3 Imperialism and cultural imperialism

Imperialism, as a central concept within postcolonial literature, is here understood as a practice that serves to establish and sustain relations of domination. Scholars identify several different types of imperialism such as cultural, political or economic. However, collectively they can all be described within the frames of a special type of dominance system.⁵⁷ Johan Galtung argues

56 Forst, Rainer. 'towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice', Metaphilosophy, vol. 32/no. 1/2, 2001, 160

57 Galtung, Johan. 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8/no. 2, 2016;1971, 81

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that a defining feature of imperialism is a centrist vertical structure where we find universal and world-encompassing aspirations. It is considered an offspring of western civilisations however not limited to west- non-west relations.⁵⁸

David Slater argues that imperial relations are marked by three interwoven elements, invasiveness, imposition and a lack of respect or recognition. By invasiveness Slater refers to processes of penetration in which resources from a state are “continually extracted for the benefit of the imperial heartland”.⁵⁹ However, as Slater argues, invasiveness should not solely be confined to the economical or material. Invasiveness is also a matter of culture and politics when the power of decision is transferred from the subject of imperial penetration to the so-called imperial heartland. The second element raised by Slater could be understood as a consequence of invasiveness. Imposition is when dominant values, modes of thinking and institutional practices are exported from an imperial power to the imperialised society. This is to be interpreted as a project aiming for societal transformation following the imperialist’s preferred route. Lastly, as argued by Slater, imperial relations carry with them a lack of respect for the imperialised society. The imperial intrusions are framed as beneficial to those societies subjected to imperialism in order to legitimise the imperialist’s mission. Hence, Slater argues, there is a pervading lack of respect for imperialised society’s autonomy, dignity, sovereignty and cultural values.⁶⁰ What I have found constant throughout Slater’s description of imperialism and also key to Young’s description of domination is the issue of self-determination, identity and a relational understanding of power. Domination and imperialism both concern the relations between two (or more) groups. As argued by Young, “Group meanings partially constitute people’s identities in terms of the cultural forms, social situation, and history that group members know as theirs, because these meanings have been either forced upon them or forged by them or both”.⁶¹ Fur- thermore, groups only exist in relation to other groups as it is through meetings with others that we become conscious of our own associations and attributes.⁶²

58 Galtung, Johan. '"A Structural Theory of Imperialism"- Ten Years Later', Millennium, vol. 9/no. 3, 2016;1980, 186

60 Ibid, 1371-1372

61 Young, Iris Marion. 'Justice and the Politics of Difference', Princeton, N.J, Princeton Univ. Press, 1990, 44

62 Ibid, 45

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Cultural imperialism is defined by Iris Marion Young as the universalisation of a dominant group’s experience and culture, establishing it as a norm, while at the same time rendering the perspective of another group invisible, marking them as ‘the other’.⁶³ Thus, cultural imperialism can be understood as closely connected to what Slater calls imposition. Significant to cultural imperialism is often a neo-colonial narrative where imperial powers present themselves as “har- bingers of progress” and defenders of certain values, placing themselves in a position of supe- riority. Consequently, everyone else, ‘the others’ are depicted as an aberration from the norm in question.⁶⁴ Contrary to the early constructs of difference within colonial literature, biological stereotypes no longer make out the prime narrative. Instead, ‘the others’ are perceived as help- less prisoners, their minds constrained by a restrictive culture, often inflicted with values of tradition. The imperial subject on the other hand is not regulated nor defined by its culture, but free to choose what to believe and how to behave.⁶⁵ Cultural imperialism I understand as a practice of domination as it infringes upon the self-determination of the so-called ‘others’. I believe that the key to this understanding is the practice of a dominant group placing themselves in a position of superiority while rendering the perspective of another group invisible. Hence, taking a position of authority over the minds of another group limits their ability to set their own goals and aspirations. The consequence being what Slater would call societal transfor- mation following the imperialist’s preferred route. For me, what is important for this under- standing and what makes it a sign of dominance is the practice of diminishing the dominated group’s perspective.

Cultural imperialism serves in the analysis as one type of domination in order to contribute with another layer to the understanding of the ways in which self-determination may be restricted.

By looking for any signs of cultural imperialism in the EU’s policies my aim is to engage with the postcolonial critique towards democracy promotion.

63 Young, Iris Marion. 'Five Faces of Oppression', in Asumah, Seth Nii. 'Diversity, Social Justice, and Inclusive Excellence:

Transdisciplinary and Global Perspectives', Albany, State University of New York Press, 2014, 24

64 Burcar, Lilijana. 'The “Woman Question” and Western Neo-Imperialism in Harold Pinter’s the New World Order', Gender Studies, vol. 15/no. 1, 2016, 199

65 Ibid, 199-200

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As I understand cultural imperialism and how it is referred to in the following parts of this thesis is the universalisation of a dominant group’s experience and culture. Establishing this experience as a norm, while rendering the perspective of another group invisible.⁶⁶ Another key aspect of cultural imperialism I find in the description “placing themselves in a position of superior- ity”. Not only do I understand this position of superiority to be enforced by cultural imperialism, as I see it, the image of superiority is there already from the start. This image of superiority can both be depicted through the self-image and through the description of others. It can also be implied through actions that convey a lack of respect for others. For instance, rendering the perspective of another group invisible is to deprive that group of their self-determination. In order to identify any signs of cultural imperialism within the EU’s policies I am analysing the way that the EU describes itself. Are there any signs of the EU placing itself in a position of superiority? Furthermore, is there room for recipients to speak their mind or are there any signs of the EU trying to silence the voice of the recipient?

What separates cultural imperialism from other forms of domination I believe is the universalisation of a dominant group’s experience and culture by establishing it as a norm. As has been previously argued, norms are to be considered universal when they may not be invalidated by claims of cultural differences. By projecting their own experiences as representative of human- ity as such, the cultural expressions of the dominant group can be made to be conceived as universal. Hence, by bringing other groups into their norms, dominant groups reinforce their claims. Thus “Those living under cultural imperialism find themselves defined from the outside, positioned, placed, by a network of dominant meanings they experience as arising from elsewhere, from those with whom they do not identify and who do not identify with them.”. ⁶⁷ The consequence for the dominated party within imperial relations is a state of restricted autonomy when it comes to setting its own goals and acting towards their own aspirations. However, this may not be obvious from the rhetoric implemented as neo-colonial narratives often are framed to indicate a care for ‘the others’. Hence, we are led to believe that the intentions of the dominating agents are good or in the interests of those who are being dominated. What becomes clear over time is the fact that imperial relations in reality aim to benefit the imperial power. A sign of cultural imperialism in the EU’s policies of democracy promotion is thus if the voice of

66 Young, Iris Marion. 'Five Faces of Oppression', in Asumah, Seth Nii. 'Diversity, Social Justice, and Inclusive Excellence:

Transdisciplinary and Global Perspectives', Albany, State University of New York Press, 2014, 24

67 Young, Iris Marion. 'Justice and the Politics of Difference', Princeton, N.J, Princeton Univ. Press, 1990, 59

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recipients is silenced specifically through universal claims made by the EU, projecting their own norms as representative of recipients. This would both indicate a sense of superiority from the EU as well as an ambition to silence the voice of the recipients.

It could also be considered a sign of cultural imperialism if the EU would be promoting a specific type of democracy, going beyond the principles of political equality and popular control.

From a critical standpoint this would be an indication of an ambition for societal transformation following the imperialist’s preferred route. I agree with Beetham that there should be a way to promote democracy in a sense that respects cultural differences. As previously discussed there is a shared perception among several scholars that the EU promotes a specific liberal model of democracy. Due to the often-discussed ties between liberalism and “the west”, the promotion of a liberal agenda may be perceived as cultural imperialism. As also expressed by Slater, the objective is “to Westernise the non-Western world”.⁶⁸ I agree with Beetham that this can be avoided if promoters of democracy focus on the underlying principles of democracy instead of specific institutional arrangements that may be found in political democracies. Hence, in the following analysis one chapter is fully devoted to the EU’s conception of democracy. More specifically I am looking for whether the definition used by the EU expands beyond the core principles of popular control and political equality. As previously concluded, a definition limited to these principles is to be interpreted as respectful to cultural difference as it shares the premises of equal respect for persons and their self-determination. On the other hand, a definition entrenched with institutional arrangements opens up to the issue of domination as it may be considered part of an imperialist agenda.

4.4 Empowerment

Amy Allen builds on Young’s conception of domination and oppression arguing that what is missing from the analysis is a more positive understanding of power. Hence, Allen adds to the definition the notion of individual and collective empowerment.⁶⁹ With the conceptualisation of empowerment, the objective is to bring back attention to the resistance to oppression and domination found within the agency that dominated and oppressed people still possess. Allen argues that empowerment is what we can find in between a state of injustice and a just society

69 Allen, Amy. 'Power and the Politics of Difference: Oppression, Empowerment, and Transnational Justice', Hypatia, vol.

23/no. 3, 2008, 157

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as she critiques Young’s description of the process as jumping straight from the state of oppression and domination to democracy.⁷⁰ For Allen the interrelationship between oppression, domination and empowerment is crucial as empowerment takes shape within relations of domination and oppression and is thus structured by them. Following this understanding she argues that we must distinguish between emancipatory and transformative (positive) modes of empowerment and modes of empowerment that serve to reconsolidate systems of oppression and domination.⁷¹ Empowerment that serves to solidify systems of oppression and domination could be understood as empowerment that speaks into the narratives of systems of domination. As I understand it, this form of empowerment may be directed both towards the dominated and the dominator. However, the key attribute is that empowerment in this case does not diminish the gap of power between these actors.

I understand the positive mode of empowerment to be somewhat similar to what Aldon Morris defined as “oppositional consciousness”, described as “an empowering mental state that pre- pares members of an oppressed group to act to undermine, reform, or overthrow a system of human domination”.⁷² Oppositional consciousness involves identifying with members of a social group. Identifying injustices done to your group as well as identifying a dominant group, causing and benefiting from the injustices. Opposing these injustices and finally seeing your group as having a common interest in ending these injustices.⁷³ Hence, empowerment by this definition aims toward change and the power of an oppressed or dominated actor to increase in relation to the dominator. Positive empowerment can thus be understood as a strategy to combat domination.

As addressed by Allen I agree that we have to be wary of different modes of empowerment as there are those that may serve to solidify systems of oppression and domination.⁷⁴ For instance, this mode of empowerment may seek to “empower” someone in a way that further cements that

70 Ibid, 164

71 Ibid, 167

72 Mansbridge, Jane. 'Cracking through Hegemonic Ideology: The Logic of Formal Justice', Social Justice Research, vol.

18/no. 3, 2005, 343

73 Ibid, 343-344

74 Allen, Amy. 'Power and the Politics of Difference: Oppression, Empowerment, and Transnational Justice', Hypatia, vol.

23/no. 3, 2008, 167

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person belonging to a dominated or oppressed group and further positions that group's subordi- nate position in relation to others. Positive empowerment on the other hand I understand as the process of taking agency of yourself, your aspirations and actions. For this to be possible we have to be aware of and oppose those structures that aim to limit your self-determination. To assess whether the EU’s democracy promotion contributes to establish or reconsolidate relations of domination I am analysing how the EU depicts empowerment to establish whether this depiction indicates positive or negative empowerment.

As concluded in an earlier chapter, relations of domination must be understood within the frames of ‘multiple domination’. It is often the case that those who are being dominated may be so by their own governments or elites who in turn may be dominated by global actors such as international corporations and stronger state governments. I believe this statement is important to raise as it also enables for multiple frames of empowerment. Given that there may be domination on different societal levels there may also be empowerment on different levels. For instance, empowerment on a state level could be derived from shifts in the global economy.

Such a shift may still leave citizens of the state in a relation of domination with the elite within the state. Hence, in addition to the question of how the EU depicts empowerment I am also looking specifically at the issue of who the EU seeks to empower.

5. Analysis

Before moving on to the analysis I believe it may be helpful to once more reacquaint with the research questions. Firstly, what conception of democracy is promoted by the EU? And sec- ondly, are there any indications that the democracy promotion pursued by the EU may con- tribute to a relation of domination? The discussions of these questions are divided into four chapters of analysis. This chapter is devoted to the presentation of the focus of each chapter of analysis, how they relate to the research questions as well as the theoretical framework presented in previous chapters.

The first chapter of the analysis is named ‘Justifications and universal aspirations’. In this chapter the focus lays on the potential considerations given to the aspirations of the recipients within EU democracy promotion. As previously addressed, self-determination can be understood as the possibility to choose your own goals and being able to act toward their realisation. Hence, the aspirations of recipients must be considered an important aspect of their self-determination.

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In this chapter, the focus lays on the motivations and justifications given by the EU in its strategies of democracy promotion. By analysing these justifications for intervention, I am looking for whether there is a perception that the EU is responding to aspirations of recipients, how these aspirations may be presented as well as whose voices are given room to be heard. Hence, what justifications the EU uses to motivate democracy promotion further gives us an insight to how the EU is shaping the substance of democracy and the conditions for interactions with partners.

In the second chapter I move over to the issue of ‘Defining democracy’. In this chapter I address not only what conception of democracy is promoted by the EU but also what respect there seems to be for the self-determination of recipients. Hence, by looking into the conceptualisations of democracy presented by the EU I am analysing the room given to recipients to shape the democratisation process. I also engage with the issue of who is included in the democratisation process. In this chapter I am furthermore looking for whether the definition used by the EU expands beyond the core principles of popular control and political equality. As previously discussed, a definition limited to these principles is to be interpreted as respectful to cultural difference as it shares the premises of equal respect for persons and their self-determination.

On the other hand, a definition marked by institutional arrangements may contribute to issues of domination like cultural imperialism.

The third chapter of analysis concerns the issue of ‘Empowerment and relational balance of power’. In this chapter one part is devoted to the question of empowerment. As addressed earlier, positive empowerment serves to counter domination. Hence, I believe it is important to dedicate some room in the analysis to whether there are any indications that the self-determination of the recipient is empowered by the EU. As there also are modes of empowerment that solidify systems of oppression and domination I focus on how the EU depicts empowerment to address whether this depiction indicates positive or negative empowerment. Directly following the issue of empowerment this chapter also engages with the self-image of the EU, how the EU describes itself and its relation with recipients. The focus here turns to the relational balance of power between the EU and its partners, the recipients of democracy promotion. Superiority, or the perception of superiority, is a central factor to domination and specifically to cultural imperialism. Signs of the EU taking advantage of a position of power are interpreted as an ambition to gain power over recipients. Thus, the self-image of the EU, here contributes to the under-

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standing of whether the democracy promotion pursued by the EU sustains or establishes relations of domination. A superior self-image combined with an ambition to increase its own power are also interpreted as indicative of negative empowerment as it goes against the conception of redistribution of power.

In the final chapter of analysis, the attention turns to the ‘Expected outcomes’ of democracy promotion. Building on the previous chapter I elaborate on the question of what the EU expects to gain from democracy promotion. This is considered a central issue of the analysis as it relates to the question of how the EU shapes the conditions for interactions with its partners. It is thus an important issue in terms of identifying indications of domination. For instance, if the expected gains of the EU weaken its partners or establishes a state of dependency, it is indicative of domination where one party instrumentalises the other’s vulnerability to enrich itself in a way that subordinates the other. As we see here it is not enough to simply establish whether the EU expects to gain something from democracy promotion or not. In order for it to be a sign of domination there needs to be an indication concerning structural transference of power. Thus, this chapter also explores the issue of how the self-determination of the recipients is expected to be impacted by democracy promotion and whether the expected gains of the EU risk restrict- ing the self-determination of recipients.

5.1 Justifications and universal aspirations

The EU’s devotion to democracy promotion is cemented in article 21 of the Treaty on European Union where it is stated that “The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivis- ibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”.⁷⁵ Building on these premises it is further stated in the ‘EU Action Plan on Hu- man Rights and Democracy’ that “Human rights are universally applicable legal norms. De- mocracy is a universal aspiration”.⁷⁶ Hence, these are the basic conceptions that underpin the motivations for the EU’s external policies on democracy promotion. Claims of democracy as a

75 Consolidated version of the treaty on European Union, 2012, OJ C 326/13, art 21(1)

76 Council of the European Union. EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 2015, 9, Retrieved 2020-10-14 via:

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30003/web_en__actionplanhumanrights.pdf