Uneven Playing Field: Understanding Abiy Ahmed Manipulation of Democracy in
Ethiopia
Henrik Bratt
Uppsala University, Department of Government Development Studies C, 2019/2020
Supervisor: Johanna Nilsson Word count: 12 131
Page count: 34
2020-01-01
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Abstract
This study seeks to investigate how prime minister Abiy Ahmed have affected democracy in Ethiopia since he assumed office in April 2018. Ethiopia is a hybrid regime identified with having both democratic and autocratic elements and the country have been internationally acknowledged for its recent democratic progress. The case study is conducted with a structured qualitative textual analysis in the form of a qualitative content analysis. Information have been collected according to a coding frame based on the concept of an uneven playing field and of how an incumbent party benefit from promoting gender equality. The results show that the playing field was initially slightly leveled and the oppositions ability to more equally compete for power with the government was improved. However, as the opposition was empowered and ethnic conflict arose in late 2018 the government under the lead of Abiy Ahmed returned to repressive tactics used under previous regimes to manipulate the playing field. The government is trying to remain in power by once again limiting democracy. Yet, the study concludes that the playing field has overall been leveled but the fruitfulness that Ethiopian democracy once promised under the rule of Abiy Ahmed seems to have vanished.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction... 3
1.1 Purpose and Research Question ... 4
2. Theoretical Background ... 5
2.1 Weak Democracies and Hybrid regimes... 6
2.2 Uneven Playing Field ... 8
3. Theoretical Framework ... 11
4. Methodology and Material ... 12
4.1 Case Study – Why Ethiopia ... 12
4.2 Structured Qualitative Textual Analysis ... 13
4.3 Material ... 16
4.4 Reliability, Validity and Limitations ... 16
5.1 Leveling the Playing Field ... 18
5.2 Manipulation of the Playing Field ... 20
5.3.1 Media ... 23
5.3.2 Resources ... 24
5.3.3 Law ... 25
5.3.4 Gender Equality ... 26
6. Conclusion ... 27
7. References... 29
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1. Introduction
Prior to April 2018, Ethiopia used to be known to the world for two main, and very different, reasons. First, for their skyrocketing economy, listed as one of the fastest growing economies, that do not produce oil, in the world with an average annual GDP growth rate of close to 10%
(Trading Economics, 2019). Ethiopia is also notorious for their flawed democracy, especially for repeated violations of human rights which was brought to light, to the public, in 2011 when two Swedish journalists were imprisoned on charges of terrorism. This event received heavy international attention and engaged several important international actors, such as the EU, USA and Great Britain who all put substantial diplomatic pressure on the country (SVT, 2012).
However, as the country is still known for the former reason, the latter seems to have completely vanished from the language of international media. Instead, it has been replaced with promising words about the country and most specially about the reformist prime minister, Abiy Ahmed.
Since 2018, Abiy have been praised from the international community for his democratic reforms (LA Times, 2019).
Abiy Ahmed succeeded Hailemariam Desalegn as prime minister in April 2018 who resigned after country-wide protests. The protests were anti-governmental and the discontent with the previous leader dates back to November 2015 (Guardian, 2018a). The discontent back then were also of anti-governmental nature and the protestor claimed more political right. By August 2016, at least 500 protestors had been killed and Desalegn declared “state of emergency” in October which enabled him to take control over the military (Al Jazeera, 2016). Some argue that due to the public discontent of the government, the new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had no choice but to bring some change to the country to satisfy the need for democracy and freedom of the people (Ezega, 2019). It initially worked and in support of his reforms and rule, “tens of thousands” people showed up for a support rally in June 2018, numbers that were “unseen in recent years in the east African nation” (Independent, 2018).
The reforms are many but some include that he released all journalists detained in jail by the end of his first year in power (AI, 2019b), made his cabinet gender equal (Guardian, 2018b) and removed previous bans on several opposition parties, media outlets and internet websites (Freedom House, 2019). Most notably did he receive the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, mainly on the basis of finally settling the more than 20 year old dispute between neighboring Eritrea but also for “significantly increasing the influence of women in Ethiopian political and community
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life” and that he has “pledged to strengthen democracy by holding free and fair elections”
(Nobelprize, 2019).
Levitsky and Way (2010) argue in their article Why democracy needs a level playing field that many democracies lack democratic competition. Democratic competition is deeply undermined because the government (the incumbent party) has access to media, to resources and to the law and systematically rejects the opposition access to these instances, creating an uneven playing field. In an uneven playing field, the opposition cannot compete on the same conditions as the incumbent party and even though an election is assessed as free and fair, just like Abiy Ahmed wants to achieve in Ethiopia, the opposition will most likely lose. Hence, Levitsky and Way argue that the playing field needs to be leveled in democracies (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Other research shows that the incumbent party in flawed democracies benefit from improvements made on gender equality at the expense of the opposition, a strategy used to further skew the playing field (Dunno and Kreft, 2018; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016). Many of the reforms introduced when Abiy assumed office clearly strengthened the opposition and a leveling of the playing field did, perhaps, occur. However, much has happened since then.
Ethnic conflict has been present in Ethiopia (NY Times, 2019; LA Times, 2019) and violence erupted in the streets of Addis Abeba in October 2019 which resulted in over fifty casualties (NY Times, 2019). Ethnic conflicts have also emerged in many Ethiopian regions and by December 2018, 2,9 million people were displaced from their homes, the highest number of any country in the world (LA Times, 2019). The main reason behind the turmoil in the country is the significant amount of reforms implemented (NY Times, 2019; LA Times, 2019) that have
“empowered the opposition” (NY times, 2019) and given the people more freedom. The liberalization of media has allowed hate speech to circulate which has spurred ethnic violence (LA Times, 2019) and twitter was used to mobilize protesters in October. The popularity of Abiy Ahmed decreased in relation to these events (NY Times, 2019). The government is drafting an anti-hate speech law in order to address this issue which is deemed by the UN to seriously threaten freedom of speech since it would silent critics of the government and inhibit political discussion (UN, 2019).
1.1 Purpose and Research Question
The period that followed the appointment of Abiy Ahmed has been very intense and is interesting to study from a democratic point of view. The playing field has experienced a huge
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transformation wherefor the purpose of this thesis is to provide an understanding of these events. Has the playing field really changed to the good and if not, how has the internationally praised, recipient of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, Abiy Ahmed, accomplished this? Therefor my research question follows:
"How has the playing field changed in Ethiopia since Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in April 2018?"
2. Theoretical Background
The idea of democracy has its roots from ancient Greece during the fifth century B.C, but the democracy we experience today with complex institutions is very different from what it initially was. Democracy is desirable since “it tends to produce the best feasible political system, or at any rate the best state” in comparison with other types of governance. One, if not the most central reason for this is that democracy is founded upon the idea of equality which Robert Dahl calls “the Idea of Intrinsic Equality” (Dahl, 1989; 85). The idea of intrinsic equality is that decision-making regarding the collective, in democracies, not only considers all people but their say is of equal importance. The fundamentals of democracy are hence inherently good.
However, due to the popularity of democracy and to increase the legitimacy of their regime, many nondemocratic states claim to be democratic (Dahl, 1989).
In the 1970´s and 80´s, democracies in Africa were close to non-existent and due to this deficit, many countries were mis-labeled as democratic even though they at maximum were semi- democratic. Most of these semi-democracies did carry out multiparty elections, in some cases even one-party states were labeled democratic, but the democratic process was so skewed that the ruling party stood no risk to lose an election (Diamond, 1999). By the very start of the 90´s, a wave of democratization struck the entire African continent and is referred to as “the third wave of global democratization” (Huntington, 1991). By the beginning of that decade, only three democracies existed in Africa, but by 1997 close to all African countries had held competitive and multiparty elections (Diamond, 1999). Multiparty elections “became routine”
(Van de Walle, 2002) and a new trend of politics was witnessed in the continent. Even though these elections experienced a shortfall of several key democratic features, hope for a democratic future in Africa rose when electoral competition, or at least the looks of it, was introduced to the many of its autocratic states (Diamond, 1999; Van de Walle, 2002). According to Richard Jospeh, confirmed by Larry Diamond, this transition took an unfortunate turn and resulted in
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the birth of pseudodemocracy (hybrid regimes) in the continent. Hybrid regimes are characterized by manipulating the electoral process (Diamond, 1999) and operating against the opposition (Diamond, 1999; Van de Walle, 2002) We will return to hybrid regimes in the following section. Since democracy did not flourish in Africa in the 90´s to the extent it promised, in 2009 only two countries have had regular multiparty elections (Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009), Diamond rather refers to this era as “the retreat away from democracy in Africa” (Diamond, 1999).
2.1 Weak Democracies and Hybrid regimes
Hybrid Regimes is a term, with many sub-groups, used to classify the governance of states all over the world (van de Walle, 2002; Diamond, 2002; Boogards, 2009) and are in abundance found in Africa (van de Walle, 2002; Diamond, 2002). To commence, the more overarching definition of hybrid regime will be defined before the different sub-groups of electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism and defective democracy are addressed. A hybrid regime is an “in-between state” (van de Walle, 2002: 69) which has a combination of both “democratic and authoritarian elements” (Diamond, 2002: 23). It is important to press that a hybrid regime is not a regime in transition from democracy to authoritarian or vice-versa but rather a “regime type of their own” containing both elements (Boogards, 2009; 415).
Two classical approaches on hybrid regimes are defective democracies and electoral autocracies. These two approaches has been criticized by Matthijs Boogards of focusing “on a single root concept” where only one side of the scope of liberal democracy and dictatorship is covered making the concepts incomplete and full of confusion (Boogards, 2009; 400). Lauth is behind the work done on defective democracies where the focus is on democracy and not authoritarianism. The concept is based on a comprehensive scoring system and measures if the three most important components of democracy - freedom, equality and control - is fulfilled.
These components is in turn measured by democratic indicators such as horizontal accountability and different institutions like decision- and rule-making and legal guarantees. A country is considered a functioning democracy if all three components are fulfilled and deemed as a defective democracy (authoritarian) if it is lacking in one aspect (Boogards, 2009).
Electoral authoritarianism, including “competitive authoritarianism” coined by Levitsky and Way, instead focuses on the concept of authoritarianism and claims that hybrid regimes “are not even minimally democratic” (Boogards, 2009: 406). This type of regime is argued to be the most common type of governance in developing countries and is characterized of having
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multiparty elections. However, the government is systematically manipulating the electoral process by deeply, and in most cases totally, eliminating chances for the opposition to win an election. Perhaps, the best definition used by many scholars, a simple one but vastly sharp, is that electoral autocracies are dictatorships disguised as democracies (Diamond, 2002; Boogard, 2009). The opposition is greatly impaired by the incumbent party in such regimes and a wide- used term for this is opposition weakness (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; Randall and Svåsand, 2002).
Opposition weakness is a general trend observed in sub-Sahara African democracies (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; Randall and Svåsand, 2002) and the weakness of political parties are by many scholars considered as one of the main problems with politics in the region. Opposition weakness is argued to inhibit the process of democratization (Randall, and Svåsand, 2002) along with the view that it is a distinct indicator of an “imperfect democratization” (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; 109). The opposition is weakened in connection to the ruling autocratic regimes effort to maximize their own power, hence the trend is a product of autocratic procedure. Typical for countries suffering from this phenomenon is that the opposition parties within the country are very small in size. This is most notably seen in the legislature where the incumbent party enjoys a persuasive majority of the seats in relation to the seats occupied by the opposition. Political parties in Africa are in general very poor (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009) which have a negative effect on opposition parties but not on incumbent parties.
Incumbent parties are not affected since they can acquire resources from the state budget. With an advantage of resources, incumbent parties can easily outcompete the opposition (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Opposition weakness is also noticed because the opposition usually consists of newly formed parties (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009) and experiences a limited access to media outlets, which further skews the power relationship between the incumbent and the opposition (Randall and Svåsand, 2002).
To continue, the only reasonable way for the opposition to obtain power from a strong regime is through the legislature, i.e. elections are important. However, the legislature in sub-Sahara African countries is in general “institutionally weak” (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009). Power is usually concentrated to the president which has further implications on the legislature. For instance, when the incumbent party lost majority in the legislature in Malawi, president Mutharika responded by limiting the decision-making capacity of the institution to remain in power. Rakner and van de Walle summarizes, in a very straightforward manner, the core of the issue: “the strong presidency and the authoritarian legacy of many African countries tend to
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weaken parties generally and especially oppositions”, i.e. hybrid regimes deliberately skews the power relationship between the incumbent party and the opposition in Africa (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; 113). Hence, the manipulation of the electoral process is a strategy that hybrid regimes resort to to increase their power and make sure that they will not draw the short straw in the following election.
2.2 Uneven Playing Field
Levitsky and Way (2010) describes the phenomenon of an uneven playing field and argue that many autocracies do not suffer a democratic deficit because of fraud connected to the electoral process but rather that the current government of these countries systematically abuse the opposition parties which has great limitations on democratic competition. The game is considered to be rigged and it is nearly impossible for the opposition to win. Levitsky and Way highlights that an uneven playing field is established by the incumbent’s party’s unequal access to resources, to media and to the law. Important to notice is that the incumbent party benefits in all democracies, however the authors argue that the advantages which the incumbent party in well-established democracies experience, such as patronage and corruption, solely have an impact on the quality of democracy in the country (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Whereas an uneven playing field “undermines democracy itself” since it affects the oppositions ability to
“organize and compete for power” (Levitsky and Way, 2010; 58).
First, the incumbent party usually has, for several reasons, greater access to resources in comparison to the opposition. This could be because the incumbent party uses state resources to finance re-election campaigns and operating expenses of the ruling party. Partisan use of resources is another example where the incumbent party can use public buildings and equipment but also employees of the public sector such as bureaucrats, doctors and teachers.
Lastly, in the same way that the incumbent party can favor businesses that supports them, they can also penalize enterprises that financially support the opposition. This can be done by sabotage or by blacklisting. Second, in many African countries the state has either monopoly on the media or is the only one who has the ability to reach out to a national audience. State- run media is usually the most dominant source of news which tend to be biased towards the government. In cases where private media exists, they are generally, to some degree, controlled by the state. The uneven access to media has great implication during election campaigns where the incumbent party is favored since government representatives get more airtime and media coverage tends to be negative towards the opposition. Third, the incumbent party, via bribery
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and intimidation, “not only controls the judiciary, the electoral authorities, and other nominally independent arbiters but “they also deploy them systematically as partisan tools against opponents” (Levitsky and Way, 2010; 60). Therefore, they can easily manipulate legal cases to their favor to imprison rivals and opposition on vague or trumped-up charges (Levitsky and Way, 2010.
In the end, many opposition parties collapse since they compete in an uneven playing field where they are abused in media and by the law and their resources are insignificant in relation to the incumbent party. These autocratic governments manage to eliminate the opposition without using obvious fraud and abuse and can hence maintain a respectable international reputation (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Opposition tends only to survive if they are based on
“unusually strong organizations, identities, or core constituencies” otherwise they usually disappear since members join the ruling party which can offer patronage and a more riskless political future (Levitsky and Way, 2010; 62). To illustrate the democratic shortcomings of an uneven playing field, Levitsky and Way use an example of four Latin American electoral autocracies where the playing field is considered level. These countries are put in comparison to four similar countries in Africa, with “roughly similar political-rights and civil-liberties scores” provided by Freedom House, but where the playing field is uneven (Levitsky and Way, 2010; 62). In the case of Africa, the incumbent parties have won 15 out of 17 elections whereas in Latin America incumbents have lost 13 out of 18 elections. An uneven playing field undoubtedly favors the incumbent party for getting re-elected and these examples therefore clearly show that the playing field plays a vital role for democratic competition (Levitsky and Way, 2010).
Levitsky and Way explain several different approaches of how the opposition can compete under an uneven playing field to beat the incumbent party, for instance by joining the incumbent party to gain access to resources and media and then switch back when they have developed public support. However, the authors clarify that such an approach does not level the playing field and democratization will not be achieved. For democracy to flourish from an electoral autocracy, active measures are required “to widen access to resources and media, such as guaranteed public finance for political parties and regulations to strengthen independent media”
(Levitsky and Way, 2010; 67).
The article of Levitsky and Way illustrates how many states experience a democratic deficit of an uneven playing field. However, the article was published in 2010 and many articles have been published in this field of research since. A growing body of research argues how
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incumbent parties in hybrid regimes strategically make improvements on gender equality as a tool to increase its support and to further skew the playing field. Hence, this dimension will be added as a fourth component to the concept to fully grasp all perspectives of an uneven playing field.
Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg (2016) argue in their article Gender Equality Reforms on an Uneven Playing Field: Candidate Selection and Quota Implementation in Electoral Authoritarian Tanzania that this have been done in Tanzania. The incumbent party, due to an uneven playing field, can strategically design and implement a gender quota law which the party will benefit from. This law has been praised from the international community and the incumbent party is perceived as “progressive and gender equal” even though the law is tailor- made to give the party an “electoral advantage” over the opposition. The law, if implemented, will most likely result in a “democratic loss” (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2018: 481-482).
Daniella Donno and Anne-Kathrin Kreft (2018) continue to discuss how dictatorships, more specifically institutionalized party-based regimes, benefit from promoting women´s rights.
Party-based regimes are different from personalist regimes such as monarchies and military regimes since the party engages in mobilizing the citizens to gain support in elections and exercises power over the regime-leader. Party-based regimes, in contrast to personalist regimes, are more closely linked to society and benefit from a broader “support coalition” (Donno and Kreft, 2018: 721). It is highly effective for a party to widen its support coalition by promoting gender equality to “secure women´s loyalty” since it results in increased support and more votes for the incumbent party (Donno and Kreft, 2018: 721). This strategy has been conducted by the NMR in Uganda, a party that has experienced a strong support from women because they consistently legislate on issues related to women´s rights, such as domestic violence and marriage rights. Improvements on women´s right is also a safer way to increase the support coalition in contrast to improvements on coordination good. Coordination goods includes provision of clean elections and different forms of rights and freedoms, including speech rights and press freedom, which are dangerous for the survival of the regime since it empowers the opposition (Donno and Kreft, 2018). The advancement on women´s right that the incumbent party benefits from, relevant for this essay, is concerning the political right “to be represented in government” (Dunno and Kreft, 2018: 722). Kreft continues by stating that it is helpful to promote women´s “interests to maintain stability and keep unrest at bay” (CS, 2019)
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3. Theoretical Framework
As of 2011, Ethiopia was a hybrid regime (Freedom House, 2011) and a more recent study categorized them as authoritarian (EIU, 2019). The country has had five regular, some considered multi-party (however questioned to what extent), elections since 1995 (Guardian, 2015; Journal of Democracy, 2019) why this text argues that Ethiopia is an electoral authoritarian regime. Hence, the country will be tested against the four categories of an uneven playing field to find out if the playing field has been manipulated since April 2018 and how this was achieved by Abiy Ahmed.
The three categories of media, resources and law of an uneven playing field will be used and applied to Ethiopian democracy in accordance to the article of Levitsky and Way. The focus of media will mainly be on how freedom of speech has transformed during the rule of Abiy Ahmed and its impact on the playing field. Attention is also put on access to information and if there is any difficulty or interference for private media outlets to carry out their work. The focus of resources is to find out if opposition parties and media outlets somehow are denied financial funding. For decades, the previous regimes have legislated in favor of the incumbent party wherefore they have access to laws which can be used to deeply undermine the opposition. In regards to the law, research has been conducted to find out if the incumbent party abuses the law to make the playing field uneven. Research has also been conducted to find out if the government controls the judiciary and other democratic institutions which are supposed to be independent in a democracy, a strategy which, according to Levitsky and Way, many flawed democracies employ to establish an uneven playing field. The last category of the framework of gender equality reforms and quota legislation will be applied in accordance with the articles of Donno and Kreft and Bjarnegård and Zetterberg. Focus will be if the government under the lead of Abiy Ahmed has implemented gender equality reforms or made any laws on the issue which potentially have skewed the playing field and strengthened the incumbent party.
The different possibilities to examine media, law, resources and reforms of gender equality in an uneven playing field are gigantic. Limitations are needed and have been implemented so that data have been collected in a reasonable quantity, in line to conduct a systematic research within the frame of a Bachelors thesis. Likewise, the goal was to examine all four categories of an uneven playing field which also have been conducted. However, due to several reasons, the sections of media and the law has been covered to a greater extent than the sections of gender equality reforms and resources. Ethiopia has for several decades been criticized for its
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imprisonment of journalists and politicians and their restrictions of media. This has resulted in major media coverage and the engagement of NGO´s and other actors of the international arena.
Hence, for natural reasons, more information and research of media and the law exists than on resources in connection to an uneven playing field in Ethiopia. Of course, there is a shortage of domestic news and information reporting since media have been restricted for a long time. Yet, plenty international reports of the country exists from trustworthy organizations such as the UN and Human Rights Watch. Much information about the current situation in the country can also be accessed from Ethiopian news outlets with the “liberation” of media during the rule of Abiy Ahmed.
4. Methodology and Material
This section will cover methodology, material and why a case study of Ethiopia was selected.
The section will also cover aspects of reliability and validity along with the limitations of the paper.
4.1 Case Study – Why Ethiopia
Ethiopia is a typical example of a hybrid regime, more specifically an electoral authoritarian state. The ruling party EPRDF has been in power since 1991 and the country held its first multi-party election in 1995 (UN, 1995). Since 1995, Ethiopia has held regular election with a five-year span in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 (Journal of Democracy, 2019). Ethiopia has a multi-party system, however some of the elections since 1995 have been considered flawed in terms of competitiveness and multi-partyism (Guardian, 2015). The ruling party of EPRDF has never lost an election and in the election of 2010, the coalition won all but one seat to the legislature. EPRDF managed to win all seats in the following election (Journal of Democracy, 2019). From the outcome of all five elections held in Ethiopia it becomes evident that the opposition is small in size which indicates that opposition weakness is present in the country.
Hybrid regimes are distinguished that they, systematically and as a tactic, deliberatively create an uneven playing field to weaken the opposition to continue to stay in power. The uneven playing field is created by the abuse conducted by the government through their access to the media, to the law and to resources and through their ability to make gender equality reforms.
What is interesting with Ethiopia is that the playing field, prior to Abiy Ahmed assumed
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office in April 2018, was vastly uneven. For instance, some opposition parties were by law illegal, freedom of speech was limited and private media was strictly controlled by the state (Freedom House, 2019). As of today, Abiy Ahmed has been praised for the reforms
introduced with his presidency (LA Times, 2019). He, for instance removed the ban on all opposition parties, improved the media climate in the country and had by the end of the year released all politicians and journalists from jail, reforms all in line of leveling the playing field (Freedom House, 2019). This, however, is not the entire truth of the saga. The prime minister has continued to imprison journalists with the Anti-Terrorism Proclamtaion (AI, 2019a; AI, 2019b), has made gender equality reforms (Guardian, 2018b) and is currently in the process of legislating a new anti-hate speech law – considered by the Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner as a threat to freedom of speech (HRW, 2019c; UN, 2019). The question is then, has the playing field really changed to the good and if not, how has the international praised, recipient of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, Abiy Ahmed accomplished this? The best way to gain an understanding of this is to plunge into the events of this period of time with an in-depth case study.
4.2 Structured Qualitative Textual Analysis
The method used in this thesis is a structured qualitative textual analysis in the form of a qualitative content analysis. Coding is essential to qualitative content analysis and the method is used to locate patterns in material (Boréus and Bergström, 2017). In such an approach nothing is “counted or measured” but qualitative data is collected and inserted to the different classifications of the coding frame (Boréus and Bergström, 2017; 24). A coding frame is a preferable approach to help organize, classify, and systematize data found in a qualitative research. A coding frame is created inductively in qualitative research which entails that the frame evolves over time while collecting data (Benaquisto 2008; Boréus and Bergström, 2017).
During this process, the different categories are developed, refined and later turned into a final product (Benaquisto, 2008). During the phase of collection of data, systematic research of the coding units (key concepts) have been conducted, containing: press freedom, access to media, financial funding, imprisonment of journalists, opposition weakness in legislation and gender equality reforms and legislation. Favorable with qualitative content analysis is that the exact mention of the coding unit is not needed. It is enough for that the examined material to be discussed in order to be categorized and integrated as a result. However, which will be discussed
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in the section of reliability, validity and limitations, this type of research requires “authorial intervention” and can negatively impact the reliability of the results.
Coding Frame:
Media Direct influence on
Freedom of speech – ATP, disinformation and hate in media
Indirect influence on Freedom of Speech - safety of journalists and self-censorship
Access of the public to a variety of media outlets
Resources Interference in financial funding of media
Interference in financial funding of opposition parties
Law Government
Imprisonment of dissidence
Opposition weakness by legislation of the incumbent party
Governmental control over
institutions, ought to be independent in a democracy
Gender Equality Gender equality reforms
implemented
Gender equality legislation implemented
To commence with media, in the code of Direct influence on Freedom of Speech. Reports of laws, especially the ATP and Hate Speech and Disinformation Proclamation, have been reviewed to find out if they directly limit or promote freedom of speech. In the code for Indirect influence on Freedom of Speech focus has been to locate how journalists experience the media climate in the country. If they can write about anything they want, especially pieces critically to the regime, without repression or fear of it. Their perception of the situation is important as it has implications on self-censorship. The code is also based on the legislature of the country, on how laws are designed but also how they are imposed by the government. Are they vague?
With vague laws, uncertainty arises about what is illegal or not which also have implications for self-censorship. Harassment and imprisonment of journalists are also essential aspects for self-censorship. Research has also been conducted to investigate if Abiy have imprisoned journalists during his rule or made laws to protect journalists. In the code of Access of the public to a variety of media outlets focus has been on internet access, ban on private media outlets and the spread of news across the country. Information has been attained from news articles with testimonies from Ethiopian journalists and from reports from organizations like the UN, Human Rights Watch and Freedom House. Research to analyze if Ethiopian media report differently of
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the incumbent and the opposition would be very interesting for opposition weakness in this case study but such research was simply beyond the scope.
With the coding of resources, Interference in financial funding of media and Interference in financial funding of opposition parties the focus has mainly been to find out if opposition parties and media corporations have perceived the government of financially obstructing them.
Perceptions have been the only way to investigate this matter since it is hard, if not impossible, to attain information about government spending in a closed regime like Ethiopia and actual evidence that the government deliberatively have obstructed the opposition.
In regard to the law, information about actual abuses of the law performed by the government is hard to attain. However, data will be collected in instances when the incumbent party uses existing laws to exercise power over the opposition and media. In the code of the Opposition weakness by legislation of the incumbent party and Imprisonment of journalists and politicians focus has been on legislation. In the former, research have been conducted to find out if the law is designed to weaken the opposition and in the latter if laws exist that legitimate imprisonment of journalists and if that have occurred under the current government. In the code of Governmental control over institutions, ought to be independent in a democracy emphasis has been to review if the judiciary and electoral authorities are independent or controlled by the government. Levitsky and Way highlight the importance of independence of these institutions to achieve a leveled playing field.
The research conducted on gender equality is fairly straightforward. In the codes of Gender equality reforms implemented and Gender equality legislation implemented I have reviewed legislation and reforms introduced after Abiy Ahmed assumed office in April 2018.
Important to observe is that most of the codes are integrated to one another and the purpose of the coding frame is to simplify and clarify how all four categories of the playing field is treated in the essay. For instance, the codes of “Direct influence on Freedom of Speech” and Imprisonment of journalists and politicians are closely connected. However, the latter focuses on how the incumbent party can abuse its access to the law whereas the former focus if and how media is restricted in the country. Ultimately, to develop a clear structure of the framework, a distinction was made on Freedom of Speech since it is a broad concept containing many different aspects.
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4.3 Material
In terms of material a wide selection of news articles has been reviewed to gain an understanding of the current situation in the country. The news articles are mainly international publications but some domestic are also used. To compliment the news articles, reports from big internationally recognized organizations such as the Humans Rights Watch, Freedom House and the UN has also been used. Major focus is put on the writing of David Kaye, a United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, who visited Ethiopia in February 2019 and conducted an extensive report on the country. Ultimately, several scientific papers have also been used, mainly to provide the theoretical framework which the thesis is based upon.
4.4 Reliability, Validity and Limitations
The selection of a case study over a Large-N cross-case study has its pros and cons. Authorial intervention is one of those examples. In a Large-N cross-case study the authorial intervention is low since it requires a more determined design, set on beforehand, with very precise variables.
With low authorial intervention the results are more reliable since they can only be interpreted in a restricted amount of ways making such study more confident (Gerring, 2006). In contrast, case-studies require greater authorial intervention but are at the same time very closely engaged to the case where “lightbulb moments” mainly occur (Gerring, 2006; 40). The researcher gets a greater insight to the case and can test several hypotheses and identify important aspects of the issue, which cannot be done with large-N cross-case study. Case studies are good to identify casual mechanism but cannot be used to disprove or confirm a hypothesis (Gerring, 2006).
More specifically, a case study does not represent a large phenomenon and therefore lacks external validity but instead, thanks to the in-depth insight of the case, has good internal validity. Casual effects, causality, can only be established by Large-N cross-case studies and not by case studies. However, Large-N cross-case studies are bad at explaining the correlation between X and Y, a so-called casual pathway. Where case studies are bad at establishing casual effect, they “may allow one to peer into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural cause and its purported effect. Ideally, they allow one to “see” X and Y interact”, i.e. they are good at explaining a casual pathway (Gerring, 2006; 45). The explanatory part that case studies provide gives the research fullness, often referred to as depth.
Large-N cross-case studies are not perceived to have good depth since their explanatory strength are very basic, however, their applicability to a larger population make them very
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broad. To conclude, case studies can, to some extent, provide “casual arguments restricted to a small set of cases”, and results from a case study of France can better be applied to Europe than to the entire world (Gerring, 2006; 48,49).
The trade-off between case studies and Large-N cross-case studies are evident and since it is a trade-off, one aspect can only be fulfilled at the expense of the other. The selected design of case study, which offers good depth and good internal validity, is a viable approach to answer the research question of how Abiy Ahmed have manipulated the playing field in Ethiopia. The approach is limited in the sense that it cannot provide external validity, breadth and casual effects. The results are additionally not as confident as in a Large-N cross-case study, slightly decreasing the reliability of the study. Evidentially, this is not a paper of a generalizing nature.
However, case studies are good at developing breadth and casual pathway which can provide useful information and arguments to other cases, like a case study of France can be used in argumentation concerning Europe. Ethiopia is an example of a very typical regime noted in the world, especially in Africa, and therefore there exists much to learn from this case. By understanding how the playing field in Ethiopia is manipulated, we do not automatically know how other hybrid regimes function, but we can gain a greater understanding about the nature of this issue and better make sense of their respective process.
Problems of reliability can best be avoided by analyzing multiple sources at the same time by switching back and forth. This reduces the risk that data are coded differently over time between sources (Boréus and Bergström, 2017) and have been taken into consideration when conducting the research. A problem with validity when coding is that a coding unit can be used in a text for several different reasons, that might be in contrary to each other. To increase validity manual coding can hence be required (Boréus and Bergström, 2017). In this thesis, the coding unit of imprisonment of journalists could not only be present in the reviewed literature as the actual imprisoning of journalists but also as the releasement of imprisoned journalists. To fully understand the change in the playing field, both aspects are of importance. Data has thus been collected manually to ensure that it is correctly categorized in the coding frame to increase the validity in the study.
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5. Results and Analysis
This chapter will cover how the playing field has both been manipulated and leveled during the rule of Abiy Ahmed. The results will be discussed in connection to the theoretical framework and the four categories of an uneven playing field. The different codes found in the coding frame is central for the discussion.
5.1 Leveling the Playing Field
One of the first actions that Abiy Ahmed took when he assumed office in April 2018 was to release journalists and bloggers from prison. These people were mostly convicted on false grounds legitimized under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP) from 2009. As of January first, 2019, reports show that there were no journalists imprisoned in the country (AI, 2019b).
Another reform introduced with Ahmed is that the previous ban of up to 300 hundred websites was removed and the citizens of Ethiopia gained access to media outlets that had been forced out of the country (DW, 2019). In August 2019, a new law was introduced which states that
“political parties are under the obligation to cooperate with the media and refrain from obstructing the work of journalists” (UN, 2019).
Ethiopia remarkably improved their score in the World Press Freedom Index and moved from place 150 to 110 in the world (AI, 2019b; RSF, 2019b). The index is based on a questionnaire and collects data on several different topics, for instance on pluralism of ideas represented in media, media independence, self-censorship along with abuse and violence against journalists.
Despite huge improvements, the situation of press freedom within the country is still labelled as “difficult”, the second worse category out of five (RSF, 2019a). Ethiopia also improved their score in the survey provided by Freedom House called “Freedom in the World 2019” and now has a score of 19/100 in contrast to previous year with a score of 12/100 where 100 is considered the most free. The country is still labelled as “not free” and the increased score is partly thanks to the many reforms of the abolishment of media restrictions implemented by Abiy Ahmed (Freedom House, 2019).
The reforms implemented by Abiy have also strengthened the opposition as they have “allowed political groupings greater freedom to operate” (Freedom House, 2019). By law, the previous regime had banned opposition parties as Ginbot 7, OLF and ONLF on the accusation that they were “terrorist organizations” and imprisoned many of its members. Abiy freed many of these
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members along with hundreds of other political prisoners and granted amnesty for “thousands of individuals charged with treason and other crimes against the state, most of whom had been released earlier in the year” (Freedom House, 2019). Thanks to these reforms, the opposition can more openly meet with decreased fear of repression wherefor Freedom House consider that the opposition stands a greater chance of increasing their support and can more fairly compete in the upcoming elections in 2020 (Freedom House, 2019).
Abiy Ahmed has publicly expressed that he strives for making the country a “multiparty democracy” (HRW, 2019b). In line with this vison, Abiy appointed judge Birtukan Midekssa as head of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, NEBE. Midekssa is a former opposition leader and has been imprisoned by previous regimes on several occasions. Most importantly, she is completely independent from the incumbent party and her appointment will increase trust to the institution which for a long time has been criticized for being controlled by the ruling coalition (HRW, 2018). Another government body that on repeated occasions has been criticized for operating on the behalf of EPRDF, especially during political trials, is the judiciary. However, steps have been taken by Abiy “toward increasing the independence of the judiciary” who nominated the women´s activist - Meaza Ashenafi, who later was appointed, as head of the Supreme Court. (HRW, 2019b). She claims that Abiy Ahmed supports her vision of making the judiciary more independent (Freedom House, 2019).
The United Nations Special Rapporteur David Kaye reports that the Ethiopian Broadcast Authority (EBA) is currently under the supervision of the parliament instead of the government – an important reform during the rule of Ahmed. The institution previously functioned as a tool for the government to control media but now has a different purpose. In order to address issues of disinformation in the country, the EBA will observe media outlets and update them on
“professional ethics”. A Media Proclamation is also under review which would “decriminalize defamation” with punishment of a substantial fine and establish an autonomous media authority
“free from political influence” (UN, 2019). Members of the opposition have also directly been appointed by Abiy Ahmed to the Ethiopian Press agency and to the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (HRW, 2019a). Human Rights Watch reports that a change is witnessed in the country as people more openly speak about sensitive topics in common areas which was highly unthinkable just a few years ago (HRW, 2019a)
During the rule of previous regimes, laws have heavily been used to inhibit freedom of expression including the ATP, the Freedom of Mass Media and Information Proclamation and the Computer Crime Proclamation. The Freedom of Mass Media and Information Proclamation
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grants the government the right to issue media licenses, to make corrections in writing and overwhelming power to sue media outlets for defamation. The Computer Crime Proclamation can be used by the government to remove and to depress regime-critical comments online. Abiy Ahmed has promised to both dismantle the Freedom of Mass Media and Information proclamation (HRW, 2019a) and the ATP (Al Jazeera, 2019).
5.2 Manipulation of the Playing Field
Only little over a year after the initiative of releasing journalists from prison, the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation was put to use again in June 2019 when the Editor-in-Chief of a private News Channel in Ethiopia was arrested. In July, another journalist was also arrested in accordance to the ATP (AI, 2019b) along with a professor who wrote a regime-critical book (AI, 2019a). In response to ethnic uproar in October 2019, allegedly caused by posts on social media the government is in the process of legislating a new anti-hate speech law and other media laws.
Berihun, a journalist at the Ethiopian newspaper Berera who was recently released from prison, criticize the actions taken by Abiy by claiming that he “criticize media as either hate- and ethnic based or as mainstream” when it “should be up to professional institutions to judge media conduct” and that he is not “media friendly” anymore (DW, 2019). He continues by commenting that he has stopped using twitter since he is scared that the government will use his posts against him. The case against him still remains open which has great implications for self-censorship for him and among journalists of private media (DW, 2019). Journalists who report on issues critical of the government are still harassed by the police and in a report from HRW two journalists were attacked and beaten without any interference from close-by police officers (HRW, 2019a). Similar information from the Committee to Protect Journalists shows how journalists are endangered to attacks and arrests in the country. A spokesperson from the Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia stresses that the government cannot only improve the conditions in the country but also must protect the journalists and the human rights organizations who work with these issues (CPJ, 2019) and Reporters Without Borders suggests that journalists need more “legislative protection” (RSF, 2019b)
David Kaye reports that the government is lacking in regards of provision of “access to information” (UN, 2019). The government fails to adequately inform journalists and the public on several different areas, for instance there are not sufficient online information databases along with a general lack of communication from government officials towards journalists and
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media. Kaye expresses the unwillingness of the government to address these issues and foremost criticizes the systematic shutdowns of internet under public protests, actions that are
“undertaken without constraint under law or policy” and condemned “under international human rights law” (UN, 2019). Internet access is low in the country which has great implications on freedom of expression and access to information, however a vision exists to significantly increase these numbers in a five-year period. Regions in the country lack a wide range of media outlets, for instance in Bahir Dar where the only printed news is provided by the government (UN, 2019).
The government can with the ATP surveil citizens without “any evident judicial authorization or oversight” (UN, 2019). This is not in accordance with the standards of human rights law which requires surveillance to “be constrained by law and subjected to independent, preferably judicial, oversight” (UN, 2019). The law is still in use even though the government, under Abiy Ahmed, has expressed that it will be repealed (UN, 2019). An election law is also under review in the parliament, where the incumbent party – EPRDF- has 100% of the seats, that suggests that in order to create a political party, 10,000 signatures are to be needed instead of the current 1,500 signatures. The law would make it harder to create a political party and the opposition claims that it hinders them to fairly compete in the upcoming elections of 2020 (AN, 2019).
Ethiopian journalists are not unfamiliar to these types of events and describe it as a pattern where progressive changes are initially made every time the country experiences a regime change. However, soon enough, the government begins to limit democracy once again in an attempt “to put the lid back on what it opened” (Al Jazeera, 2019).
Ethiopia and the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed have been internationally recognized and praised for the radical reforms implemented since he was appointed to office in April 2018 (LA Times, 2019). He did not only receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for solving the border conflict with neighboring Eritrea but he has also made several changes promoting gender equality.
Including appointing women to half of his cabinet posts, appointing a woman as president and for the first time ever to appoint a woman as the head of Supreme Court and as defence minister in the country (Guardian, 2018a; Independent, 2019). No laws on gender equality have been legislated during the period of research.
To address the increasing amount of disinformation and hatred spread through social media that spurred the uproar in October 2019, the government has proposed a Hate Speech and Disinformation Proclamation. Kayes mentions that legal steps are partially important to stop such activity, however, he conveys that the proclamation is not in line with The International
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which by law prohibits "advocacy of national, racial and religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence"
(UN, 2019). Hence, he believes that this proclamation will only further increase ethnic tensions and result in more violence (UN, 2019). The proclamation was approved by the government in November 2019 and is now “before parliament” (HRW, 2019d).
Concerns exist that this proclamation can effectively be used by the government to silent its critics and greatly inhibit political discussion (UN, 2019). This is in line with the concerns expressed by Laetitia Bader, Senior Researcher at the Human Rights Watch, who is pessimistic towards the upcoming elections in May 2020. She believes that an open debate might not be allowed on sensitive issues and concludes that the proclamation will be a threat to freedom of expression in Ethiopia (HRW, 2019c). Issues concerning the proclamation also arises in concern to its vagueness. Officials would be able to, with extreme discretion, “determine whom to investigate and prosecute” which would result in “an almost certain inconsistency in approach and a potential wave of arbitrary arrests and prosecutions.” (UN, 2019). Ultimately the proclamation would also “criminalize the dissemination of disinformation” which Kayes argues limits freedom of speech. From present examples in countries such as Italy and Singapore, similar laws have been used by the government for the purpose to “undermine public debate and the free flow of information” (UN, 2019).
Even though the ban on private media has been removed, private news- channels and papers are struggling financially. A journalist reports how companies are afraid to advertise in media because of the government projects uncertainty. This leaves private media profitless and the same journalist have a salary of barely 180 euros a month. (DW, 2019). Abel Wabella and Eskinder Nega, Ethiopian journalists, witness of similar stories. They claim that the government is very popular and businesses are scared to be affiliated with critical publications seen as anti- governmental. Many private media outlets have gone out of business, for instance the paper Addis Zeybe, run by Wabella, due to the lack of advertising (CPJ, 2019). Reports from the group leader of the Oromo Liberation Front claims that their offices have been shut down by the government, data which is confirmed by several Ethiopian human rights groups (NY Times, 2019).
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5.3 Discussion
5.3.1 Media
Concerning direct influence on Freedom of speech, in June 2019 the government under the lead of Abiy Ahmed, for the first time during his rule, imprisoned a journalist with the ATP. A continuation of several imprisonments of journalists have followed since the first incident and the law also enables the government to surveil on their citizens. To continue, the government drafted and approved the Hate Speech and Disinformation Proclamation which for the moment is before parliament in direct response to the ethnical conflict that arose in the country. The law has been criticized for deeply inhibiting freedom of expression and speech and concerns have risen if a public debate will be allowed in the upcoming election in 2020. The design of the proclamation enables the government to efficiently silence dissidents and is similar to laws implemented in other countries to limit freedom of speech. The law is very vague which means that the government can use the law quite freely to investigate and arrest people. The arrests with the ATP and the willingness to legislate a law which would limit freedom of speech offers a negative picture of the current vision of Abiy Ahmed´s regime. The use of the ATP has inhibited freedom of speech and un-leveled the playing field and there is not much to speak against the fact that the Hate Speech and Disinformation Proclamation, if implemented, will most likely be used to further manipulate Ethiopian democracy.
However, some improvements have been achieved concerning freedom of speech as all journalists and hundreds of politicians were released when Abiy seized power. Yet, no current laws have been legislated to the matter which pose concerns for journalists and has a negative indirect influence on freedom of speech. Journalists must be cautious since they currently can only rely on the “good will” of Abiy and his government (CPJ, 2019). The main difference between legislation and the willingness to open up media is that the latter is not permanent.
Hence journalists are not fully protected and the reforms, as of now, only reflect the current vision that Abiy´s government represents (CPJ, 2019). The results show that journalists still need to be cautious of what they write for at least three reasons. First, they are exposed to violence and arrests wherefor protection in laws are needed for their security. Secondly, many old cases against journalists are not yet dropped wherefor insecurity of the future exists.
Concrete laws, without any vagueness, are needed to protect journalists so they are not in danger in a regime change or if the government dismisses the current democratic vision. Thirdly, the ATP is still active and is used to imprison journalists. The law also enables the government to
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surveil citizens without approval from the judiciary which further raises concerns for the safety of journalists. These three examples all show how journalists are still vulnerable in Ethiopia which projects self-censorship and negatively influences freedom of speech.
Access of the public to a variety of media outlets was initially improved as one of the first reforms introduced with Abiy was that he removed a ban on hundreds of websites and many exiled news outlets returned to the country. Private news outlets started to flourish around the country offering the citizens alternative news sources aside from the ones provided by state-run media. The new law which states that political parties have to cooperate with journalists and cannot hinder their work is another important reform which increased the access of the public to a variety of media outlets. However, access of the public to media have several shortcomings.
To commence, internet access is overall low in the country and a wide-range of media outlets cannot be accessed in all parts of the country. Most appalling is that the only printed news that could be accessed in Bahir Dar was provided by the government. On top of this, reports have shown that the government not only lacks in the ability to cooperate with media and journalists.
They have also shown an unwillingness to address this issue and at times of public protests, the government have resorted to shutting down the internet without any notion nor justification to the law. The reforms implemented on paper looks like the playing field was greatly leveled but in reality, due to current circumstances in the country and by actions taken by the government, the outcome has not been as promising. Instead a rather negative trend is experienced where the government abuse their position of power. Levitsky and Way articulate that regulations are needed to strengthen private media to achieve a leveled playing field. There is a lack of such laws in Ethiopia and therefore implementation of reforms to allow private media are arguably not worth much when the government simultaneously counteracts it.
5.3.2 Resources
Interference in financial funding of media and opposition parties are aspects which, mentioned in the methodology section, are hard to examine wherefor the section of resources is inadequate.
No data were located on government interference in financial funding of opposition parties.
Yet, the information found reveals that private news outlets are financially struggling because a huge uncertainty exists for companies to be affiliated with regime-critic publication. This have left many news outlets going out of business since they cannot attract advertisements.
Journalists also have low salaries. The outcome is not very unlikely since the government recently has side-tracked from their democratic path which in turn has sent out a message to
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investors to be more cautious. Evidently, this is an effect caused by the government which has resulted in an un-leveling of the playing field, something the government has not done much to fix.
5.3.3 Law
In regard to government imprisonment of dissidence, the previous repressive regime had for decades used the ATP to imprison politicians and journalists on politically motivated and trumped-up charges. Only in the first year in power, Abiy Ahmed had released all imprisoned journalists and a considerable number of politicians. He has also promised to repeal the ATP.
These are all actions which clearly signal that Abiy has taken distance from the procedures of previous regimes and that he will not further abuse the law. However, as the opposition started mobilizing and tensions in the country grew, Abiy arrested several journalists in 2019 with the ATP. In the aspect of government imprisonment of dissidence, Abiy has played a vital role of initially leveling the playing field but later, with the use of the law, to manipulate it.
Levitsky and Way highlight that an uneven playing field is recognized when the government is in control over the judiciary and electoral authorities, institutions ought to be independent in a democracy, and systematically use them to weaken the opposition. Critics have for the past decade claimed that the Ethiopian government is controlling the judiciary, EBA and NEBA.
Abiy Ahmed has expressed his concern for this and implemented some reforms to address this issue. The initiative to separate these institutions from the government includes the actual success of putting the EBA under control of the parliament, a huge and important transition to making media more independent. Actions have also been taken to make the NEBE and the judiciary more independent with the appointment of new managers to both institutions. The playing field has been levelled in the aspect that the EBA is independent from the government, however, it is too early to make a statement if the judiciary and the NEBA have become more independent. For instance, Ashenafi has merely promised to make the judiciary more independent but as of now, the actions taken by Abiy are important first steps in a positive direction. On the contrary, the prime minister has been criticized for making changes only to legitimize his regime and this might be an empty reform without any actual effect other than to manifest progression.
Opposition weakness by legislation of the incumbent party has for long been present in Ethiopia under the rule of previous regimes. A change was at first witnessed with Abiy Ahmed as he
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implemented many reforms strengthening the opposition. He removed the terrorist ban on several opposition parties and increased their ability to more openly gather. Reforms which Freedom House considered to substantially improve the conditions for the opposition to more fairly compete in the election of 2020. Though, as the situation in the country got worse and the opposition were empowered a new election law was introduced before parliament. This law would arguably decrease the oppositions ability to compete in the upcoming election of 2020 as it would be harder to form a political party. The government has evidently changed path from implementing reforms to increase competition to legislating laws limiting it. Evidently, the government has returned to some repression used by previous regimes to skew the playing field by weakening the opposition.
5.3.4 Gender Equality
No gender equality legislation has been implemented during the period of research, nevertheless the government has implemented some punchy gender equality reforms. On a first glance, the gender equality reforms implemented look harmless and nothing entails that it would have an impact on the power structures between the incumbent and the opposition. They solely appear as a triumph for gender equality rather than for an un-leveling of the playing field and an increased opposition weakness. There has been turmoil in the country since October 2016 with substantial mistrust towards the government. However, governmental support was increased when Abiy assumed office. Even though it is impossible to know the motives behind actions of Abiy Ahmed we know that implementing gender reforms is a strategy performed by many dictatorships to both uphold stability in the country and to increase governmental support.
According to Donno and Kreft, party-based regimes sustain their power from elections and their survival is based upon a big support coalition. This type of regime benefits from promoting women´s rights since such improvements attract women to support the incumbent party, i.e.
broadens the support coalition. One reason why Ethiopia increased its score in the index provided by freedom house was “due to the appointments of women to a number of senior government posts” (Freedom House, 2019). If this action was merely a stunt to further skew the power relationship between the incumbent party and the opposition, an increased score of the index does not automatically imply that the playing field has been levelled. Intentionally or not, the playing field was in fact un-leveled in this aspect.
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6. Conclusion
The results and discussions presented contribute to an understanding of how democracy in Ethiopia has been affected during the period of April 2018 to early January 2020. Change in the playing field can be observed in relation to two major events during this period of time and this paper has argued that Abiy Ahmed and his regime have been the key factor behind this outcome. Firstly, the playing field was initially leveling in direct response to when Abiy assumed office and introduced several reforms. Secondly, a change in attitude and behavior was witnessed from the government when ethnic conflict arose throughout the country by the end of 2018. The change in behavior, Abiy’s manipulation of democracy, has resulted in an un- leveling of the playing field
The findings conclude that the overall change in the playing field is positive, it has to some extent been leveled. It is impossible to ignore the fact that the reforms have strengthened the opposition and improved the conditions for private media. The attempt to make institutions independent from the government is also a promising initiative by the prime minister. However, for four main reasons the democratic progress is not as fruitful as portrayed in media. Firstly, the “liberation” of media has its limitations. Mainly because access to information is not optimal and freedom of speech is not perfect as journalists are subject to violence and harassment which projects self-censorship. The government is involved in this tactic which is unacceptable in a democracy and should instead legislate to protect journalists. This is supported by Levitsky and Way who stress that regulations are needed to support private media. Secondly, private media are struggling financially which is a direct consequence of the actions performed by the government. Thirdly, the government abuses its access to the law and continues to imprison dissidents on politically motivated and trumped up charges. Lastly, it is likely that the gender equality reforms are just plain window dressing in an attempt to legitimize the government and increase its support.
The most alarming development is that much indicates that the government is switching to an autocratic path, metaphorically expressed that they are trying “to put the lid back on what it opened” (Al Jazeera, 2019). Future research should cover this transition and more specifically analyze the playing field in relation to the upcoming national elections in May 2020. This essay is limited to how the playing field has been changed during the rule of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Focus has been on the opportunity for the opposition to compete on equal terms with the incumbent party and this essay has proposed that the reforms of making the cabinet gender
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equal could be a strategical move to increase the support of the incumbent party. However, this do not entail that the reform is inherently bad and future research should investigate if this reform has had any effect whatsoever on gender equality in the male-dominant country. The argument of symbolic representation, covered in the article of Pär Zetterberg Engineering Equality?: Assessing the Multiple Impacts of Electoral Gender Quotas is a good starting point for such research.
