Political - Institutional Considerations in the
Arab Transitions
Raj M. Desai
Georgetown University and the Brookings Institution
Arab Spring 2.0 Conference Stockholm School of Economics
June 1, 2012
Outline
• Collapse of the Arab authoritarian bargain
• Democratic vs. economic performance:
prospects for the Arab transitions
• What is to be done?
– Modernizing the state
– “Programmatic” political parties
– Organizational platforms for pro-reform
constituencies
The authoritarian bargain
-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Polity Index
Percent of GDP
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
(left axis)
DEMOCRACY SCORE (right axis)
INSTABILITY
The “revised” bargain for Arab states
Social Contract 1.0
• Statist economic development
• Redistribution through broad- based subsidies and public- sector employment
• Centralization of control over political organizations (with some exceptions)
• Highly restricted electoral choice
Social Contract 2.0
• Significant devolution of economic control to cronies
• Selective transfers to
particular groups (military, civil service)
• Limited decentralization of interest organizations + patronage
• Expanded political franchise + selective repression
Income vs. well-being
$7 182
$7 759
$8 407
$8 892
$9 154
$9 489
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
7000 7500 8000 8500 9000 9500 10000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 GDP per
capita (PPP)
$4 762
$5 158
$5 508
$5 904
$6 114
$6 367
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
4000 4500 5000 5500 6000 6500 7000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 GDP per
capita (PPP)
TUNISIA EGYPT
Voice and accountability
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Libya Saudi ArabiaDjiboutiTunisiaYemenAlgeriaOmanEgyptSyriaIranIraq W. Bank & GazaLebanonMoroccoBahrainKuwaitJordanTurkeyQatarUAE
Percentile Rank
25th-50th percentile 10th-25th percentile 0th-10th percentile
2000 2009
Well-being in Arab states
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Percentage
2007 2010
Post-transition performance
70 80 90 100 110 120
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
GDP per capita
Years after transition
57 countries 46 countries
Democracy vs. economic performance
• Arab Barometer survey of Egyptians in June-July 2011 vast majorities want “democracy”
– But 80% think the economy is the greatest challenge
– And 64% think that “the most essential characteristic” of democracy is “low inequality” or better services
– 6% think elections are important
– 3% think the “right to criticize rulers” is important
• This is not to suggest that elections are unimportant
• But . . . if the economies do not deliver (better
services and greater opportunity), democracy fails
Institutional weaknesses?
• Understanding that institutional reforms should focus principally on those areas that will
support (make credible, irreversible) economic reform, what are the areas of concern?
• Three areas for attention
– State weakness and low capacity
– No broad-based political organizations
– Constituencies that should demand (and cement)
reforms are weak
Modernizing the state
• The “revised” contract relied on
– Personalized or “de-institutionalized”
bureaucracies, political parties, and militaries – Restrictions on organizational capacity of any
single body (to prevent threats to incumbency) – Large amounts of executive discretion
• Without institutionalized organizations new
leaders cannot make credible commitments
Programmatic political parties
• Institutions characterized by reliance on leader, absence of lower level initiative, restraints on member coordination.
– Arab ruling parties are creatures of the ruler party age the same as ruler tenure
– Other non-democracies = parties are 12.5 – East Asia = 29 years older
• Main problems
– Incipient parties, whose promises may not be credible to citizens, may turn to narrow, clientelist appeals
– One possible exception most groups lack the
organized support + resources that Islamists command
Pro-reform constituencies
• Historical evidence suggests that economic and political reforms are consolidated when
constituencies emerge that do not owe wealth to rulers
• In Arab states
– The “natural” constituencies for reform (women,
youth, small entrepreneurs, informal sector workers) have no institutional platforms for civic-political
engagement
– Without the inclusion of these groups, any reforms will be subject to continuous negotiation and
renegotiation with rulers
Can donors help?
• Assistance is needed in professionalizing the civil service and the military
• Scaled-up support for constitutional reform, party-building, external financing, training, and support for labor unions, entrepreneurial associations, etc., also needed
• But, political conditionality, in the absence of extremely strong incentives, does not usually work
• Budget support may trade off effective services vs. further entrenching “insiders” and excluding “outsiders”
• A “regional” assistance program (through existing regional
development agencies or through a revised multilateral regime) could use innovative instruments to encourage local ownership and provide support for political and economic reforms
Thank you
Origins
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Egypt Lebanon Jordan
Percent of respondents favoring Strong economy Good democracy
The Arab “governance” picture
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Failing Nonperforming Semi-performing High performing
Number of Arab countries
Governance percentile rank
Productivity
80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
Value-Added per Employed Worker (1991 = 100)
East Asia & Pacific South Asia
Eastern Europe & Central Asia High-Income OECD
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America & Caribbean Arab World
Sources of corruption
1 2 3 4 5 6
Qatar Egypt Algeria Libya Syria
Average score Regulatory capture
Budgetary leakage Bribery in trade
Procurement bribery Judicial bribery
Governance ranking
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
YemenLibyaIraq Djibouti W. Bank & GazaSaudi ArabiaLebanonMoroccoBahrainTunisiaKuwaitAlgeriaJordanTurkeyOmanQatarEgyptSyriaUAEIran
Percentile Rank
90th-100th percentile 75th-90th percentile 50th-75th percentile 25th-50th percentile 10th-25th percentile 0th-10th percentile
