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(1)

Nobel Symposium

“Money and Banking”

https://www.houseoffinance.se/nobel-symposium

May 26-28, 2018

Clarion Hotel Sign, Stockholm

(2)

Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

V. V. Chari

University of Minnesota

&

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Nobel Symposium

(3)

Financial Factors and Business Cycles

Every major recession preceded by large disturbances in financial markets

Tobin’s critique of Friedman–Schwartz:

Post hoc ergo propter hoc?

Subsequently, therefore consequently?

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(4)

Macro Approach

Build structural macroeconomic model

Discipline parameters to be consistent with key observations about financial and real variables

Use model to evaluate policy

Mark Gertler a leader in applying this approach to financial friction models

Financial accelerator mechanism has been very helpful

(5)

A Popular View of Business Cycles: Financial Accelerator Mechanism

Investment affected by net worth Some shock hits

Unexpected deflation (Irving Fisher)

Sunspot (multiple equilibria, bank runs)

Net worth falls Investment falls Aggregate output falls

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(6)

Key Ingredients in Many Financial Friction Models

Typical firm needs external funds to finance investment

Agency costs induce wedge between internal and external funds Binding collateral constraints

Fluctuations in wedge/constraint affect investment in a big way

(7)

Challenges:

Aggregate Data

(8)

Which Way Do Funds Flow?

Financial friction models working through investment channel

Pipes get clogged

(9)

Which Way Do Funds Flow?

Financial friction models working through investment channel

Problem: In data, flows go other way

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(10)

Does Typical Firm Use External Funds to Finance Investment?

Can firms finance investment without using external funds?

Use data from from Flow of Funds for all non-financial corporations Two series:

Available Funds from Current Flows =Revenues − Wages − Materials

− Interest Payments − Taxes Gross Investment =Capital Expenditures

Available funds do not include current stocks of financial assets

(11)

Available Funds and Gross Investment, US Non-Financial Corporations

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016

percent

Available Funds / Non-Financial Corporate GDP Capital Expenditures / Non-Financial Corporate GDP

Source: Flow of Funds average = 21.29

average = 17.32

Firms can finance investment without using external funds

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(12)

Does Typical Firm Use External Funds to Finance Investment?

No, for aggregate of US corporations

In aggregate, firms have funds from current operations to finance investment

Punchline: Even in deep recessions, if firms cut back on dividends and stopped accumulating financial assets they can comfortably pay for investment

(13)

How Do the Models Work?

In models, internal rate of return  external cost of capital

Firms desperate for external financing to invest in profitable projects Firms jealously guard internal funds

Managers of firms with profitable projects never pay dividends, never accumulate financial assets: di,t =0 for all constrained firms i

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(14)

What Does the Data Look Like?

Managers have excess funds from operations to pay dividends, accumulate financial assets

In the aggregate firms do not seem to be constrained

(15)

Challenges:

Disaggregated Data

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Do Disaggregated Data Show Different Pattern?

Begin by analyzing investment and available funds across size classes Use data from corporate income tax returns

Data available by asset size classes

Can each size finance investment internally?

(Available Funds)i,t> (Investment)i,t

Or, do some sizes need to obtain funds from other sizes?

(Available Funds)i,t< (Investment)i,t, for some i

(17)

Available Funds and Gross Investment by Asset Class

Funds do not flow across size classes

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(18)

Is There Hope for Models with Financial Frictions?

Yes, There Is Some!

(19)

Financial Flows across Firms

How important is this channel?

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(20)

Funds Flow across Firms

How much would investment fall if no firm can invest more than available funds?

Use data from COMPUSTAT

Compute available funds for each firm, each time period AFit= Available funds for firm i in period t

Iit= Gross investment by firm i in period t

(21)

Available Funds and Investment

Use of external funds to finance investment

EF = 1 T

T

X

t=1

P

i[(Iit− AFit) |Iit>AFit] P

iIit

How much investment falls if firms lose access to external funds

EFD = 1 T

T

X

t=1

P

i[(Iit− AFit) |Iit>AFit,dit =0]

P

iIit

How much investment falls if non-dividend-paying firms lose access to external funds

In models, prototypical firm that uses external funds pays zero dividends

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(22)

Available Funds and Investment

If all firms lose access to external funds, investment falls by 29.34%

If “constrained” firms lose access to external funds, investment falls by 8.27%

This is exceptionally extreme exercise

(23)

Fraction of Investment Financed Externally

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016

percent

Use of External Funds for Investment Use of External Funds for Investment by Constrained Firms

Source: COMPUSTAT

average (EF) = 29.34

average (EFD) = 8.27

Individual firms do use external funds to some extent

“Constrained” firms account for a small fraction of investment aggregate

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(24)

Does Typical Firm Use External Funds to Finance Investment?

No, for aggregate of US corporations In disaggregated data

Publicly held firms: 71–92% of investment financed internally

Privately held firms (Amadeus): only 10% of investment financed internally

Reallocation channel promising for privately held firms Needs models with heterogeneous firms

(25)

How Might Financial Frictions Work?

Financial frictions affect privately held firms Changing dividends affect consumption of owners

Note, if individual publicly owned firm changes dividends, consumption of owners unaffected

Need large firms to be affected indirectly: Spillovers?

See Shourideh & Zetlin-Jones for best effort to date

Input-output structure, working capital also possibilities worth exploring

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(26)

Can Signaling Models Save the Day?

Managers may be reluctant to cut dividends for fear of sending adverse signals

Problem 1: In data, much of the gap between available funds and investment consists of accumulation of financial assets. No signaling issue here

Problem 2: Behavior documented here is about responses to aggregate shocks, not idiosyncratic shocks. Signaling less plausible with aggregate shocks

Usual response: Don’t take constraints too seriously. Metaphor for some other story

(27)

Key Assumptions that Give Models Quantitative Bite

Entire capital stock has to be refinanced every period

Think of a firm that does not plan to access financial markets for investment

Why should it care about financial markets?

If only investment has to be externally financed, quantitative effects likely minor

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(28)

Credit Spreads and Wedges

Are credit spreads in the data informative about wedges in the model?

In model, wedges are gaps between firms’ internal rate of return and rate at which households are willing to provide funds

In data, households and mutual funds hold most of the debt and make portfolio decisions

Usual finance model says credit spread due to default risk

What’s the connection between default risk and firms’ internal rate of return?

(29)

Are Banks Special?

(30)

Are Banks Special?

Banks have lots of short-term debt

More so than pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies Diamond-Dybvig: Technology differences for short- and long-run projects, liquidity shocks

Popular story: Incentive problems in managing financial assets can change risk easily. Need short-term debt to discipline managers

(31)

What Do Bank Do in the Data?

Mainly in the land trading business

Do we really need overnight paper to fund 30-year mortgages?

Seems like a crazy financial system

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(32)

Mortgage and Agency- and GSE-Backed Securities to Bank Credit

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

1947-01 1957-01 1967-01 1977-01 1987-01 1997-01 2007-01 2017-01

percent

Source: Flow of Funds

(33)

Bank Loans N.E.C to Bank Credit

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

1947-01 1957-01 1967-01 1977-01 1987-01 1997-01 2007-01 2017-01

percent

Source: Flow of Funds

Loans to businesses is small

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(34)

Securities to Bank Credit

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

1947-01 1957-01 1967-01 1977-01 1987-01 1997-01 2007-01 2017-01

percent

Source: Flow of Funds

(35)

Mortgages and MBS Held by Bank-Like Entities to Total Mortgages

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

percent

Source: Flow of Funds

Entities other than banks hold most mortgages

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(36)

Summing Up

Great deal of progress in developing models of financial frictions Move toward quantitative models deserve tons of applause Financial factors and frictions undenyably important

Spillovers, input-output structures, working capital channels worth pursuing

Frictions in existing models still look like metaphors for unmodeled stories

When metaphors conflict so much with data

Time to model the unmodeled stories or change horses

(37)

Summing Up

Great deal of progress in developing models of financial frictions Move toward quantitative models deserve tons of applause Financial factors and frictions undenyably important

Spillovers, input-output structures, working capital channels worth pursuing

Frictions in existing models still look like metaphors for unmodeled stories

When metaphors conflict so much with data

Time to model the unmodeled stories or change horses

V. V. Chari Challenges for Macro Models of Financial Frictions

(38)

Summing Up

Great deal of progress in developing models of financial frictions Move toward quantitative models deserve tons of applause Financial factors and frictions undenyably important

Spillovers, input-output structures, working capital channels worth pursuing

Frictions in existing models still look like metaphors for unmodeled stories

When metaphors conflict so much with data

Time to model the unmodeled stories or change horses

(39)

Appendix

(40)

Available Funds and Capital Expenditures

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016

percent

Agg Available Funds to Agg Sales Agg Capital Expenditures to Agg Sales

Source: COMPUSTAT average = 11.93

average = 11.93

In the aggregate, COMPUSTAT firm can finance investment internally

References

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