Examensarbete i Hållbar Utveckling 70
Fishing the Future
A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the
lens of fishers and key stakeholders’ perceptions
Fishing the Future
A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the
lens of fishers and key stakeholders’ perceptions
Jorge Ueyonahara
Jorge Ueyonahara
Uppsala University, Department of Earth Sciences Master Thesis E, in Sustainable Development, 30 credits Printed at Department of Earth Sciences,
Geotryckeriet, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 2012.
Fishing the future
A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs
through the lens of fishers and key stakeholders’
perceptions
Master thesis in Sustainable Development
Jorge Ueyonahara
Institutionen för geovetenskaper
Uppsala Universitet
TITLE: Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the lens of fishers and key stakeholders‟ perceptions
Jorge Ueyonahara
Supervisor: Associate professor Gloria L. Gallardo Fernández, CSD-CEMUS, Uppsala University
Credits: 30 HEC Level: Advanced E
Course title: Degree Project in Sustainable Development Course code: 1GV038
CONTENTS Abstract ... 4 Summary ... 5 Acknowledgments ... 6 Abbreviations ... 7 1. Introduction ... 8
2. Purpose, delimitation and methodology ... 11
3. Conceptual framework on discourse and environment ... 14
4. Background ... 16
4.1 Chile: country‟s profile ... 16
4.2 The artisanal fisher ... 18
4.3. The benthic resource Loco (Chilean abalon) ... 19
4.4. Historical overview before the arrival of the TURFS ... 20
5. The new Chilean Fishing Law and the AMERB or Chilean TURFs ... 21
5.1 In the light of new challenges ... 21
5.2 TURFs‟ main social actors ... 22
5.3 TURFs‟ application process... 23
5.4 Current situation of the TURFs ... 24
6. Empirical findings ... 25
7. Analysis and discussion ... 31
8. Conclusions ... 36
Epilogue ... 38
Appendix ... 39
References... 40
List of Figures Figure 1. Map of Chile ... 16
Figure 2. Basic port infrastructure for artisanal fishery ... 17
Figure 3. Distribution property rights in the coastal border in cases of private properties ... 18
Figure 4. Loco (Concholepas concholepas) ... 19
Figure 5. Loco extraction (illustration) ... 20
Figure 6. Loco landings and export prices (1957-2010) ... 20
Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through
the lens of fishers and key stakeholders’ perceptions
JORGE UEYONAHARA
Ueyonahara, J., 2012: Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the lens of fishers and key stakeholders‟ perceptions. Master thesis in Sustainable Development at Uppsala University, No. 70, 43 pp, 30 ECTS/hp
ABSTRACT
Overfishing is not an exclusive topic of big fishing industry. Overfishing by small-scale fishers is also happening. The Territorial Use of Rights – TURFs was implemented in Chile to protect the Chilean abalone from overfishing. Through the implementation of the TURFs Chilean abalone are no longer threatened by overfishing. The challenge to protect the resource thus seems to be solved. However, while some problems are solved others persist or new ones arise.
The thesis explores the discourses of the Chilean social actors in regard to the development and challenges of the TURFs. The empirical data is formed by a group of interviews, where social issues such as TURFs accomplishments, resource availability, diversification, tenure issues, access to the coast, lack of infrastructure, competition for the space and future expectations, are milestones arising from the empirical material. These issues are analysed through the lens of fishers and stakeholder‟s perception.
The paper confirms what other studies such as Cereceda and Czischke 2001, Gallardo 2008, Gallardo and Friman 2012, González et al. 2006, and Meltzoff et al. 2002 have found. Fishers organised nationally through confederations, regional federations and local associations have become active social actors in the artisanal fisheries arena. Similarly, it is also corroborated that through good leadership some fishing organisations are diversifying related and no-related fishing activities to secure better living conditions, thus, constantly evolving, encapsulating more and more benthic fishers‟ social and economic needs. The study concludes that the fishers, even though the difficulties and challenges encountered (heterogeneity of the richness of the seabed and different land issues) during the co-management of some TURFs and due to the fact that they are working in the same designated and exclusive place, they have developed a collective sense of permanent attachment and sense of „property‟ or tenure to the water body where the TURFs are located. Due to their development, the TURFs seem to be more than temporary, raising the question of the land tenure and associated infrastructure development where fishers place their activities, especially in rural areas where settlements do not exist.
Keywords: Concholepas concholepas, Chile, environmental discourse, small scale fisheries,
sustainable development, territorial use right for fisheries, TURFs.
Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through
the lens of fishers and key stakeholders’ perceptions
JORGE UEYONAHARA
Ueyonahara, J., 2012: Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the lens of fishers and key stakeholders‟ perceptions. Master thesis in Sustainable Development at Uppsala University, No. 70, 43 pp, 30 ECTS/hp
SUMMARY
It is common knowledge that one of the major problems of the modern world is the depletion of non renewal resources. This can be exhibited in many different ways, such as the extraction of gas, oil and minerals, deforestation, the intense use of agricultural land and overfishing; all of this is done in order to satisfy our consumer needs. We can naively state that depletion only occurs when big enterprises do so. However, the exhaustion of natural resources can be done by small social actors as well. Overfishing by small-scale fishers is a common occurrence today. In order to protect the Chilean abalone from overfishing, the Chilean Government implemented several measures-seasonal fishing limits and a quota system such as the Reproductive Seasons, Global Quota and the Benthic Extraction Regime Measures. Unfortunately these measures were unsuccessful. A few years later, the Territorial Use of Rights – TURFs was implemented. Fishing associations signed a temporal agreement with the fishing authorities for the co-management of benthic resources. Through this measure the Government could stop the overexploitation of the Chilean abalone and they were no longer threatened by overfishing. At this point, the challenge to protect the resource seemed to have been solved. However, while some problems are solved new ones arise.
This thesis explores the diverse discourse of the main Chilean social actors who are involved in the development and challenges of the TURFs, namely fishers, fishing authorities and scientists. The empirical data that support this study is taken from a group of interviews where social issues such as TURFs accomplishment, resource availability, diversification, tenure issues, access to the coast, lack of infrastructure, competition for space and future expectations are explored. These issues are analyzed through the lens of fishers, fishing authorities and scientists‟ perceptions.
The conclusion that the study shows is that the fishers, even though overcoming difficulties and challenges encountered (heterogeneity of the richness of the seabed and different land issues) during the co-management of some TURFs and due to the fact that the fishers are working in the same designated and exclusive place, they have developed a collective sense of permanent attachment and sense of „property‟ or tenure to the body of water where the TURFs are located. Due to their development, the TURFs seem to be more than temporary, raising the question of the land tenure and associated infrastructure development where fishers place their activities, especially in rural areas where settlements do not exist.
Keywords: Concholepas concholepas, Chile, environmental discourse, small scale fisheries,
sustainable development, territorial use right for fisheries, TURFs.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
AMERB Área de Manejo y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos (Management and Exploitation Areas for Benthic Resources)
CONFEPACH Confederación Nacional de Federaciones de Pescadores Artesanales de Chile (National Fishermen's Union Confederation)
CONAPACH Confederación Nacional de Pescadores Artesanales de Chile (Chilean National Confederation of Fishers)
CORFO Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (Chilean Development Corporation Agency)
DOP Dirección de Obras Portuarias (Direction of Harbour Works) FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEPEMACH Federación de Pescadores Artesanales y Buzos Mariscadores de la Provincia del Choapa, IV Región (Federation of Artisan Fishers and Divers of the Choapa Province, Region IV).
FFPA Fondo de Fomento para la Pesca Artesanal (Development Fund for Artisanal Fishing)
MA Management Area
Sernapesca Servicio Nacional de Pesca (National Fisheries Service) Subpesca Subsecretaria de Pesca (Fishing Subsecretary)
SSF Small-scale fisheries
TURFs Territorial Use Right for Fisheries
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1. INTRODUCTION
Fishery is an ancient practice that had its start in inland waters such as rivers, wetlands, ponds and lagoons, long time before people started to cultivate crops or raise livestock. Fishing in open waters came much later and it took several centuries until the marine fishery (fishing in open waters) took over the inland fishery as the larger supplier of fish protein (FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2010).
The fishing sector can be divided into two majors‟ types of fisheries, the large-scale fisheries (industrial, commercial) and the small-scale fisheries-SSF (subsistence, artisanal, commercial). The large-scale fisheries or industrial fisheries land the largest proportion of the globe‟s fish catch and use large technological equipment and vessels, being highly mechanised and technically sophisticated. They usually exploit large stocks of productive areas widely distributed around the globe. In regard to SSF, there is no universal definition, but they embrace artisanal, subsistence and commercial fishers. The majority of the fisheries use traditional fishing gear such as traps, nets, spears, lines and by hand, but some of them use a mechanised methods. Many of the SSFs exploit the same target species of the large-scale commercial but also catch smaller fish stocks and invertebrates such a molluscs or crustaceans (Berkes et al. 2001).
The Fishing sector provides livelihood, jobs and income for millions of people around the globe. According to the FAO (2010), in 2008, about 45 million of people were directly employed in fisheries (large-scale and small-scale fishers). It should also be noted that postharvest activities, which involve buyers, market intermediaries and processors, is also part of the sector. Consequently, the FAO report also estimated that for every person directly engaged in this activity, 3 job positions are created in secondary activities. There is then more than 180 million people working within the fishing sector. In addition, every jobholder supports livelihoods for an average of 3 family members. Thus, 540 million people, about 8% of the planet population are dependent on the fisheries. Therefore, the fishing sector has biological, technological, cultural, economic, social and political aspects (Berkes et al. 2001).
Considering only small-scale fisheries, the population depending on this activity is larger than the one depending on industrial fishing. Out of 45 million people employed in the fishing sector, 35 million are from the SSF. The SSF employ another 84 million people in secondary activities; therefore, more than 110 million people are dependent of the small scale fishery sector. The SSFs are found around the globe, and more than 95% of them live in developing countries. In the majority of cases, they face vulnerable and precarious working and living conditions, where poverty is the norm rather than the exception (FAO 2010). Moreover, small-scale fishers are crucial actors for the livelihood of the coastal communities and for local food security (Gallardo 2008).
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Tuna, for example, has been on the table for thousands of years, but the influence of Japan‟s taste for the fish and health consciousness has increased the demand for tuna in the United States, Western Europe, Australia, and in urban cities in China and Russia. Consequently, the tuna is the world‟s most priced commercial fish and due to high demand for consumption, specially for sushi, leading to exploitation far beyond its sustainable limits (Campling 2008; Courchamp et al. 2006; Mahr 2009; Marsh and Danner 2010; Seafish 2010). A study by Collette et al. (2011) showed that three major species of tuna1 are seriously threatened, therefore, the tuna, as a result of the high demand found in international markets is driving the fishing industry to overfishing, which consequently puts it in danger of extinction.
Even though some species are in decline, other species take over, most of them are from inland production – farming, which gives an increased amount in the total seafood supply (Kent 1997). The decline of capture fisheries is not only due to overexploitation for fishing but also due to anthropogenic influences and climate change. Consequently, coastal areas are also being affected negatively where the natural habitats of some coastal species have been modified or have even disappeared completely (FAO 2010; Gallardo 2008).
The link between atmosphere and oceans is inextricably connected. Climate change alters precipitation, temperature and wind patterns and these changes are reflected in unpredictable ocean currents (PISCO - Partnership for Interdisciplinary Studies of Coastal Oceans 2010). In addition, climate change will bring significant changes to the seas, which are becoming warm. However, this warming is not homogenous around the globe. The combined effects of salinity and temperature minimise the nutrients in the surface layer, which will affect the production processes in plankton and fish population and the interrelation of predators and prey. In general, it is expected that fishes will move towards the poles and some species are expected to migrate to deeper waters to avoid surface warming waters (FAO 2010).
Climate change will also affect coastal communities in several ways including: migration and displacement of human populations, effects on coastal infrastructure due to rising sea levels and salt intrusion, intensity or frequency of storms, waves, floods and alteration in the availability of fish for food (FAO 2010; Nicholls et al. 2007).
Traditionally large commercial industrial fisheries, focusing on larger fish stocks, have received attention from the scientist community; by contrast, only some small-scale fisheries (SSFs) are well studied when, geographically, they coincide with the large stocks used by the industrial fisheries. Thus, most data available are for the large fisheries (Berkes et al. 2001). The majority of the world‟s fishery science has largely been devoted to the assessment of the stocks focusing mainly on countries in the Northern hemisphere. Biology has been the disciplinary focus and, to some extent, economics. As those studies focus on the North, are not useful for the countries in the South where fishery-management is different and depending primarily on small stocks. In addition, those studies have not included social sciences, therefore conventional approaches have not addressed the socioeconomic needs of the fishing communities and the potential advantage of a cooperative way of governance (Berkes et al. 2001).
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As a consequence of the economic globalisation, target marine-life species in industrial fisheries are not the only ones in danger of extinction. Small-scale fisheries have been included as well into the international fishing market, contributing specialty high valued fishing species (Gallardo 2008). High demand of these species can also drive small-scale fishers to overexploit their resources eventually leading to localised species extinction and habitat degradation. The South African abalone is an example of a species in crisis. As a result of its high value price in the 1990s in the international market, mainly in China, droves of abalone were sought and unsustainably harvested. Thus, the combinations of several threats such as the entry of black markets in the fishery, the focus-on short-term gains and lack of coordination of the state, the lack of legitimacy of the fishery management and the influx of the predator coast rock lobster into the abalone ecosystem have affected the previously stable abalone stocks. These several threats turned down the stabilised management system of quotas of the early 1990s that ended up in the closure of the fishery in 2008 to protect the abalone resources (Hauck and Kroese 2006; Raemaekers et al. 2011).
In Chile, locos – Chilean abalone (further information in chapter 4) were cheap, popular and tasty seafood that abounded along the coast. In Asia, for many Japanese and Chinese, abalone is a delicacy that was enjoyed in family meals and served on special occasions. The scarcity of abalones in the Asian market such as Japan and Taiwan, found a perfect substitute in the Chilean locos. Since then, Japan and Taiwan started importing locos in large amounts converting them in scarce and expensive seafood, depriving most of Chileans from their traditional seafood (Long 2003). Because of the high demand in the mid 70‟s, the locos became the single highest value mollusc in Chile and consequently a very important source of income for artisanal fishers. The loco has been caught for decades but due to its high economic value, the stocks of locos began to decline quickly until been “prompted by an overfishing crisis in the loco” (Bonzon et al. 2010; San Martin et al. 2010, 324).
To prevent the overexploitation of species and to provide fishers with a more sustainable and responsible way of subsistence, governments around the world, have opted to empower the fishers to protect, extract and to benefit from resources in area-based catch and share programs. This is the case with Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs); fishers are given exclusive privileges or rights allowed to catch certain species within a specific area. The TURFs have been applied informally and formally in several countries and due to its applicability to successfully manage fishing resources are gaining more attention internationally (Bonzon et al. 2010). Consequently, TURFs have been created to provide a place where coastal fishers can manage fish extraction within their „own‟ sea territory. Examples of this application can be found in Japan, Canada, New Zealand, Peru, and Denmark among others (Bonzon et al. 2010; Gallardo 2008).
The territorial use rights for fisheries refer, according to the theory, to a clearly distinguishable and limited territory. The TURF can be granted to a person or a group of persons (i.e: unions or associations). There are four rights related to the TURFs, the right to: (1) exclusion, which determines or control the access to the area, (2) specification of the kind of use of the territory, (3) generate returns from the extraction of the resources within the territory, and (4) future benefits from the use of the area (Christy 1982).
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and on the other hand, secure the subsistence of the fishers, and find a balance between these two somehow opposed values.
To protect the benthic resources2 from over exploitation, in 1991 Chile implemented the Área de Manejo y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos – AMERB (Management and Exploitation Areas for Benthic Resources), locally known as Management Area (MA); a similar concept to what internationally is known as TURFs (Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries). Benthic resources includes species such as lapa (key-hole impets), erizo (sea urchin), piure (sea squirt), machas (machas clam), seaweeds and the high value loco (see below for further explanation). A decade after the MAs‟ implementation some goals were met, particularly, the conservation of the resources and the improvement of knowledge of hydrobiological resources (Bonzon et al. 2010). AMERBs are given, upon application, but only to fisher organisations. By December 2010, 31,497 artisanal fishers were registered in more than 726 TURFs along the Chilean coast (Sernapesca 2011a). Throughout this thesis, the terms TURFs, AMERBs and MAs will be interchangeable, referring to the same matter.
The implementation of the TURFS in Chile seems to be based on precautionary approach (Gallardo 2008). Such approach considers the uncertainties in the fisheries system, which involves the application of the cautious prediction and the necessity to take action with insufficient information and knowledge. A precautionary approach not only focuses on fishing resources but also includes the protection of the fishing communities as well. The limited focus on fishing resources results in the loss of the real aim of fishery management, which is to achieve long-term sustainable fishing practices that provide food, jobs, economic opportunities and stable communities. Thus, the implementation of a precautionary approach implies the use of risk management to minimise the risk of collapse of fishing communities (Hilborn et al. 2001).
Therefore in light of the 15 years of development of the Chilean TURFs hitherto, this paper will try to analyse how their factual development agrees with their official goals.
2. PURPOSE, DELIMITATION AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the Chilean TURFs in light of their developments hitherto by trying to compare their official goals (law decree) and discourse (fishing authorities) with their factual development. Thus this paper will try to answer the following research questions:
1) Do the fishers‟ practices and perceptions differ from the official goals set by the government, if so how? Is there a contradiction?
2) Are the MA's evolving to something else than the original purpose?
Therefore, the study will focus on the perception of the MAs seen from fishers and key stakeholders‟ perspective in regards of the MAs‟ purpose, achievements and future expectations.
The ambition of this project is to constitute a base for an article on the Chilean TURFs with associate professor Gloria L. Gallardo Fernández and her Chilean colleagues, around the issue of what are the
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MA evolving to and whether their factual development agree with authorities goals, this conforming the framework within which, guided by my supervisor, I developed my questions. For this purpose Gloria Gallardo allowed me to use a picture from PRA tool exercise, email communications and part of her already existing empirical material. This empirical material (set of qualitative interviews) was already transcribed and translated from Spanish into English for its immediate use, which facilitated my work considerably. Thus the empirical material consists of primary sources mainly parts of a series of open-ended and semi-structured interviews, which were analysed through discourses, both as an approach and method (see Chapter 3). The Appendix provides a list of selected questions used as a guide during the interviews regarding the topics discussed in this paper. During the interviews some sub questions arose to clarify a specific argument or to get deeper answer.
The interviews were performed principally within a FORMAS (the Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning) financed project for years 2007-2010 (No. 211-2006-2207), assigned to associate professor Gloria L. Gallardo Fernández. Thus, all these material (marked with *) in this thesis are part of the research material pertaining to her project. The title of Gallardo‟s FORMAS project was “Beyond private and public property. Territorial use rights to fisheries (TURFS) as a sustainable solution to manage threatened sedentary marine resources. The Chilean case”. Some of the interviews were performed in situ together with PhD Eva Friman and are thus shared with another project to which both Gallardo and Friman belong to with other researchers. The interview material carried out by Gloria Gallardo and Eva Friman were in Spanish with a further transcript into English. I have checked both versions. This was a VR financed project for years 2008-2011 (No. 2007-8409) called “Sustainable global patterns of production and consumption: Current problems and future possibilities” Those shared interviews marked with two** is shared material pertaining to both projects.
The interviews represent a sample of some of the major players in the artisanal fisheries sector involved in the MAs in Chile in 2008: government authority through specialised agencies Subpesca and Sernapesca, two scientist from the Universidad Católica del Norte, two representatives of national and regional fishing association and two from MAs members, which are summarised in Table 1. This, in order to get a holistic view of the studied phenomenon, to provide an overview of the MAs‟ situation. For the purpose of this study, part of these interviews have been used.
The following table describes the name of the interviewees and the organisation where they belong
Table 1. Interview list
Organisation Interviewee / email correspondence
1 Subpesca
Alejandra Pinto (National coordinator of benthic resources) - Nov 11, 2008a*, Nov 11, 2008b*
Max Montoya (Responsibility of MA development and normative part) - May 11, 2009 * (email Gallardo/Montoya)
Antonio Gonzáles (Responsibility of MA Regime) - Nov 11, 2008a*, Nov 11, 2008b*
Javier Rivera ((Responsibility of benthic resources and fishing in Northern Chile) - Nov 11, 2008a*, Nov 11, 2008b*
2 Sernapesca
Javier Chávez (regional manager of benthic resources) - Nov 25, 2008*
13 3 UCN. Universidad Católica
del Norte Coquimbo
Jaime Aburto (Marine biologist, consultant) - Nov 26, 2008 **
4 UCN. Universidad Católica del Norte Coquimbo
Wolfgang Stotz (Professor, marine biologist) - Nov 26, 2008a**, Nov 26, 2008b**
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CONFEPACH and Federación de Pescadores
del Elqui
Luis Durán (President of Federación de Pescadores del Elqui, and Member of the environmental council of CONFEPACH) - Nov 23, 2008*
6 MA Punta de Choros Oscar Avilés (FEPEMACH: Federation of Artisanal Fishers and Divers of the Choapa Province, Region IV) - Nov 24, 2008 **
7 MA Huentelauquén
Segundo Tapia (President of MA Huentelauquén) - Dec 10, 2008* Luis Rodriguez (“Alcalde de Mar”, representative of the coast guard in the caleta) - Dec 10, 2008*
Eduardo Alfaro (Secretary) - Dec 10, 2008* Mariano Godoy (MA member) - Dec 10, 2008*
To analyse and evaluate the empirical material, I tried to identify the themes that could answer the research questions. From there I made a narrowed selection in those that best could answer my questions. These became: (a) advantages and achievement of the fishing organisations, (b) challenges and (c) perception of the future. Finally, all these three topics are highlighted as current practices and they are contrasted with the objective set by the government.
The literature review had the aim to get deep knowledge of the artisanal fishery sector in Chile before, during and after the implementation of the TURFs which involved the reading of several scientific articles, get acknowledged of the Chilean fishing law and governmental Chilean websites for updated information. Moreover, for the theory part, books and scientific journals were used to provide the theoretical framework of this paper. Additional readings from artisanal fishery sector and co-management programs in other regions of the world were also consulted. The present thesis has some limitations such as being a desk research, and without the possibility to have first-hand experience of Chile, not being there to collect data and to observe the fishers activities.
Structure of the thesis
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3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ON DISCOURSE AND ENVIRONMENT
This section will introduce the conceptual framework that the author relies on to build the analysis. For the purpose of this study, the work of Foucault and other authors will be introduced to conceptualise the meaning and use of „discourses‟. The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1971, 8) defines the creation and use of “discourses” in his work „Orders of Discourses‟ as follows:
In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality.
In „Archaeology of Knowledge‟, moreover, Foucault (1972) points out that statements are objects that people create, use, modify, mix and recompose; it is also an element that serves diverse interests or resist them. Stuart Hall explains in his work „The West and the rest: discourse and power‟ (1992) that a discourse consists of a group of statements that work together and provide a language for talking about certain topics, for example in the way of representing a specific type of knowledge. Moreover, a discourse is also about the creation of knowledge by using language and is intended for influence social practices. It means that we construct meanings of natural and social phenomena with our vocabulary. Therefore, many persons and institutions can produce discourses (statements and beliefs) that serve the interests of a specific group (Hall 1992).
Hall also adds that statements about moral, political or social issues are not simple to classify as true or false. The facts that we are able to decide the truth or falsehood can be constructed in different ways. Continuing on that, Hall (1992, 293) said “certain descriptions, even if they appear false to us, can be made „true‟ because people act on them believing that they are true, and so their actions have real consequences”. In consequence, the language used to create the discourse has a real effect and the descriptions become „true‟ (Hall 1992, 293).
In summary, Hall (1992, 295) concludes that the:
[Discourses] produce meaningful knowledge about that subject. This knowledge
influences social practices, and so has real consequences and effects. Discourses are not reducible to class-interests, but always operate in relation to power – they are part of the way power circulates and is contested. The question of whether a discourse is true or false is less important than whether is effective in practice.
Environmental Discourses
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Environmental problems are not well-defined and labelled issues such as coral reefs, radiation or pollution to mention some; moreover they are interconnected in several ways. Their complexity is associated with a high number of variables and a diversity of elements that interact in the environment. When an individual or authority makes a decision, they face complex environmental issues because our knowledge of the ecosystems is scarce and limited. As environmental problems occur in the intersection of social systems and ecosystems, the degree of complexity is even higher. When an environmental problem with a high degree of complexity occurs, the number of possible perspectives to analyse it is higher because it is difficult to prove that any of them are wrong. Thus the increase in the number of different perspectives on environmental issues is not surprising (Dryzek 2005). With a more critical perspective, Liu et al. (2007) remarks that coupled3 natural and human system has been examined extensively but the complexity of the coupled system is still not well understood due to the traditional division of social and ecological sciences.
Environmental discourses are not created or used exclusively by social and natural scientists, but also by other social actors who have different values, interests and perspectives which result in controversies. Some of these actors that manage environmental issues are corporate executives, journalists, politicians, lawyers, administrative bodies, rational consumers, and ordinary citizens. Even the adversaries of environmentalism are included in the environmental discourses (Dryzek 2005).
The major actors in society who lead the environmental protection in the society and therefore produce environmental discourses are the scientist community and the politicians. Inspired by the work of Ravetz (1984), Rothman (1980) and Nilsson & Sunesson (1988), Lars Lundgren (cited in Lundgren 2000a, 151) and Sundqvist (2000) said that scientist researchers are not a homogenous group with identical knowledge and expertise; they have different roles, for which they make contributions in general terms by formulating and conceptualising the problem rather than solving it. Moreover, most sciences are increasingly divided into narrow and specific goals and sectors leading to a specialisation. (Lundgren 2000a; Molander 2000; Sundqvist 2000).
An expert, according to Sundqvist (2000, 52) is defined as “a person who has special knowledge and, by virtue thereof, is in demand as an adviser and problem-solver in a political context concerned”. In other words, an expert is a person who is considered competent within a particular area and has acquired the right to communicate about a particular field of knowledge. The demand of particular experts merges when there are political and social issues that are research-dependent and some social actors are in need of a judgment on these issues. Experts are appointed by people in power, but researchers can turn experts themselves by writing debate articles in major newspapers where most of the social actors can be reached, i.e. authorities, businessperson and citizens. Due to their knowledge, those scientists have the privilege to act as authorities within the environmental debate (Sundqvist 2000).
When a researcher chooses to study a problem from a perspective, many other aspects fall out of the study. While scientists try to separate the areas of investigation, politicians have to treat all matters simultaneously. Politicians are in a critical position because they have to formulate goals and choose between different values (i.e. “ecologically necessary” and the “politically possible”) (Lundgren 2000b, 327). Moreover, they are subjected to different expectations and demands from a wide range
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of social actors. Politicians must address, cooperate and reach compromises with several stakeholders. As a result of negotiation and adjustment between different interests, the political language is frequently contradictory and unclear, and it is meant to be that way. The main political goal is to combine different goals and interests so that society does not collapse (Lundgren 2000b).
Researchers contribute with knowledge, but politicians are the ones who decide which problems should be addressed and by which means these problems should be solved (Lundgren 2000b). Societies and politicians in particular are tempted to use scientific language in their environmental discourses due to the high status that is attributed to the use of scientific language. Environmental protection should remain within the scientific field and should not be turned into a “value-free domain” (Lundgren 2000b, 346).
In this matter, Chileans fishery social actors produce their own discourses. One group could be the one consisting of the authorities and scientists; a group with social power and control. They have designed and implemented the legal and formal MA framework which furthermore requires compliance through laws, regulations, norms, guidelines among others in order to protect coastal marine resources from overexploitation. The second group is comprised by fishers; the resource‟ users; a less powerful group. The fishers also produce their own arguments and interpretations under their own realities and knowledge. Thus, in the context of this paper, I will use the discourse analysis approach to study the relationship between the objectives established by the law, authorities‟ and fishers‟ discourses respectively; all in contrast/comparison with the everyday practices.
4. BACKGROUND 4.1 Chile: country’s profile
Chile is a country located in the south west of South America (figure 1) with a coast line of over 18,000 km and an exclusive economic zone encompassing 200 nautical miles of territorial sea. Its population is approximately 17 million inhabitants, of which 89% reside in urban areas. Even though the main Chilean industries are mining (copper), food, beverage, tobacco, agricultural and forestry, the fishing industry provides jobs for more than 120,000 people, who are directly involved, including industrial and artisanal fishers (BCC 2011; CIA 2011; Gallardo 2008; Sernapesca 2011b; Sernatur n.d.).
Along the extensive Chilean coastline there are coves commonly referred to as “caletas” in Spanish, which serve as operational bases for artisanal boats, being place more or less protected from winds and currents. These caletas and their adjacent fishing grounds form the geographical, social and ecological model of artisanal fishery (González et al. 2006). These caletas are located within state and private lands (Gallardo 2008).
Figure 1. Map of Chile
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According to Caballol E., P. Latorre & C. Martinez (2006), the average privately owned land on the Chilean coast is 44% but in central regions (from Region IV to X) the proportion of private ownership land are between 88% to 100% (in Gallardo 2008). Although beaches are public goods, access to the caletas has to be done through private properties when land is private. Many rural caletas are located within private lands, where permission to access, imposed by the landowner, for officials, researchers, merchants, tourists and fishers and their families to the fishing grounds is required. A permission to build fishing and working facilities is also needed; in such situations, even the state cannot build any infrastructure to support the development of the fishers. Other caletas are situated in urban areas where the land is owned by the government or municipality in which cases fishers enjoy some infrastructural facilities, and more important, enjoy tenure security in the form of commodatum (Gallardo et al. 2011). The figure 2 shows the fishing facilities usually associated to a cove but that the coves in private land, do not normally enjoy (created by Dirección of Obras Portuarias - DOP).
Figure 2. Basic port infrastructure for artisanal fishery
Source: Subpesca-Sernapesca-DOP 2008 (pag 11, my translation)
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Figure 3. Distribution property rights in the coastal border in cases of private properties
Source: Gallardo (2008, 59) (originally from Oficina Borde Costero, Subsecretaria de Marina, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional) (minor modification).
4.2 The artisanal fisher
According to Chile's General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture, the artisanal fisher “is a person who acts as a master or crew on a boat whatever remuneration system” (Ley No 19079 1991, Art 2:14). Moreover, the Chilean law requires that the natural or legal person be registered in the Artisanal Fishing Register (Registro Pesquero Artesanal – RPA) (Ley No 20437 2010; Sernapesca 2011c).
The artisanal fishing sector in Chile bases its importance on its role as a supplier of fresh seafood and fish to the national population and contributes significantly to supply resources for the export industries (Cereceda and Czischke 2001). From the employment point of view, this sector provided jobs for 81,157 registered artisanal fishers as of December 2010, and considering that another three job positions are created to attend secondary activities, this implies that more than 320,000 people are dependent on the artisanal fishery sector. Moreover, every jobholder supports livelihoods for three family members, giving a total of nearly 1 million people, which represent about 5% of the Chilean population (FAO 2010; Sernapesca 2011a, 2011b).
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Historically, the loco fisher-divers were self-employed divers who worked in groups of three or four, and migrate from one region to another “following the resources” along the Chilean coast (Gallardo et al. 2011, 468; Gallardo and Friman 2011). They used the migration process and multi-species catching as a strategy for survival (Meltzoff et al. 2002). In terms of education level, there is a great diversity throughout the country among artisanal fishers, which in many cases suffer from a lack of formal education; diverse settings of geographical accessibility; availability of network and lobbying powers (Cereceda and Czischke 2001; Gallardo and Friman 2011).
4.3. The benthic resource Loco (Chilean abalon)
The Locos (figure 4) are carnivorous sea snails and belongs to the benthic specie: marine organisms which live in the bottom of water bodies (Bonzon et al. 2010; North American Benthological Society 2009). The Locos live in rocky, hard ground surfaces or in crevices and rock walls to a depth of 40 meters on average and tend to cluster in order to ensure their breeding and feeding. They can be found in southern Pacific Ocean from Lobos de Afuera Island, northern Peru, to the Strait of Magellanes in, Southern Chile (IMARPE 2003). Its scientific name is Concholepas concholepas, is also commonly referred to south pacific abalone or abalone. In Chile it is known as loco and in Peru as chanque (Dauphin et al. 2003; Gallardo 2008). The time to reach the minimum legal size of extraction of 10 cm, takes around 4 to 5 years, which can vary depending on the location, shorter time is needed in the north while longer in the south due to the temperature of the marine environment (Aquaconsultores 2001 in Mardones 2008).
Figure 4. Loco (Concholepas concholepas)
Source: Cisandina Chile (nd)
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Figure 5. Loco extraction (illustration)
Source: Gloria Gallardo collection
The principal destination of the loco export is concentrated in three Asian countries: Taiwan, Japan and Hong Kong, they hold more than the 80% of the total export (Gallardo 2008). The figure 6 represents the evolution of the landings from 1957 until 2010 and the export value (in US$) from 1987, when data started to be systematised. The production of locos after reached its higher peak in 1980 showed an abrupt decline in the landing after 1981 and up to 1985 leading then government to take several measures to protect the loco such as bans. The sharp increase of export in 1993 denotes the end of the ban and the opening of another system (Benthic Extraction Regime) that started before the TURFs.
Figure 6. Loco landings and export prices (1957-2010)
Source: adapted from Hauck M. and Gallardo F. G. L., forthcoming 2012)
4.4. Historical overview before the arrival of the TURFS
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hired by entrepreneurs and middlemen who took them and their boats across the country on trucks to look for new potential production sites, frequently using illegal fishing methods. The landing of the locos therefore increased dramatically, followed by fluctuations in the catches, some of them revealing great decrease in landings, a situation which was interpreted as overexploitation (Gallardo et al. 2011; Gallardo and Friman 2011).
In response to the rapidly declining loco fish stocks, the fishing authorities implemented a traditional management system, which includes season limits and a quota system (the Reproductive Seasons (1981-1984), Global Quota (1985-1989) and the Benthic Extraction Regime (1993-1997) measures), but with little success. The quotas were continually exceeded by amounts larger than the specified quotas and seasons catch had to be reduced after every season. Even with the enforcement of these regulatory measures to prevent overexploitation of the loco, illegal fishing, in practice, did not stop. In 1988, some fishers, together with marine biologist, instituted informal prototype „MAs‟; they implemented harvest rotation in experimental zones, which the fishers themselves regulated. In 1990 the authorities had implemented a total closure for the locos for 2 years; however, the fishers working in these experimental areas were exempt of this measure (Bonzon et al. 2010; Cereceda and Czischke 2001; Gallardo 2008). The critical situation aggravated by the bans put pressure on the fishing authorities to implement a new system, one which was already proven to be efficient and had obtained support from the scientist community and the benthic fishers: This was the MA system. The authorities had to design and implement a process for the introduction of the MAs which had not existed by tradition. This action required the replacement of a system of individual permits with a new system that would grant fisher organisations exclusive rights to catch benthic resources in determined areas of seabed. Finally, in 1997, the MA system was implemented, just at a time when the failure of the quota system had become evident and the stocks were at a historically low level (González et al. 2006; San Martín et al. 2010). As a consequence of the implementation in the entire Chilean coast, the MA bring the possibility to enforce a regulation in benthic fisheries with catching and landings in remote locations by granting exclusive rights to the fisher organisation to use and protect their resources (González et al. 2006).
5. THE NEW CHILEAN FISHING LAW AND THE AMERB OR CHILEAN TURFS 5.1 In the light of new challenges
The milestone of the fishing law in Chile is Law 18892 from 1989, implemented when the government realised that free access to fishing grounds, combined with the fact that the catch quotas, which had been put in place by law since 1931, had resulted in a race to extract resources. The situation above shows that even the introduction of quotas as a conservation measure for hydrobiological resources is inefficient if open access policy is maintained; a new legal framework was therefore needed in order to achieve the goals of the fishing sector (Historia de la Ley 18892 - Ley General de Pesca y Acuicultura1989).
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The premise of the government in the implementation of the MA system was to partially delegate to the artisanal fisher the responsibility over the management of the resources, creating benefits for the fishers as well as for the government, by maintaining order in the management of this sector (Subpesca 2005).
“The specific goals of the MA in Chile are to:
- Contribute to the conservation of benthic resources
- Contribute to the sustainability of artisan economic activity - Maintain or increase biological productivity of benthic resources,
- Increase knowledge of the functioning of benthic eco-system, generating useful information for management, and
- Promote a participative management” (Gallardo 2008, 93).
From these five goals, three are related to the resource and two to the resource users. However, the TURFs system entails a complex nomenclature of stakeholders, above fishers.
5.2 TURFs’ main social actors
The Fishers and their organisations are the resource users and consequently the key actors of the MAs (San Martín et al. 2010; Gallardo 2008). In Chile, there are several stakeholders involved in the development of MAs and around the MAs, the most important ones are briefly described below, and are grouped according to their social role.
Because the MAs are related to the exploitation of marine resources and to the use of the costal border for fishing practices, there are therefore two different ministries involved in the context of the Chilean MAs.
With regards to the exploitation of marine resources, the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism, through the Fishing Subsecretary authority (Subpesca), is responsible of fishery administration. The function of Subpesca is the promotion of sustainable aquaculture and fishing practices, encouraging the conservation of hydrobiological species by providing policies and regulations for the sector. It has the authority over both industrial and artisanal fisheries. Sernapesca is the National Fisheries Service (Servicio Nacional de Pesca), a governmental authority under Subpesca and its mission is to enforce the law and get catch and compile landing statistics data. Also under Subpesca, the National Fishing Council seeks to facilitate the stakeholders‟ participation at a national level. Under Sernapesca are Regional Directorates (13), Provincial Offices (45), as well as the Institutional Coordination Office in Santiago, the Chilean capital city (Gallardo 2008; Subpesca 2011).
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In addition to the government authority, there are other public institutions with the function to promote and stimulate economic development, among others the Development Fund for Artisanal Fishing (FFPA), Direction of Harbour Works (DOP), and CORFO (Gallardo 2008).
Regarding research bodies at the national level there are the Fishing Promotion Institute (IFOP – Instituto de Fomento Pesquero), the Fishing Research Fund (FIP – Fondo de Investigación Pesquero), and several universities such as Universidad Católica del Norte and Universidad Austral de Chile. In addition, there are private consults firms providing technical support (Gallardo 2008; San Martín et al. 2010).
5.3 TURFs’ application process
To apply, each organisation is required to present a baseline study that includes a detailed map of the area, the type of sea bottom, a description of the target species as well as secondary species, and an estimate of the abundance of the target species. Moreover, they must formulate a management and exploitation plan to be approved by Subpesca (Fishing Subsecretary), and later sign an agreement with Sernapesca (National Fisheries Service). The organisation is required to present yearly follow-up reports of its management performance, which include the survey of the fishing grounds and direct assessment of the abundance of the resources, projecting its future trends. To prepare the baseline studies, the management plans and the annual reports, a certified consultant must be hired. The Chilean state, through different programs and agencies, has been subsidising these studies. A territorial tax, patent or rent is stipulated, as well as the conditions to cancel the privileges over the MAs (in the event of non-compliance with the tax payments or the management plan arises). The MAs are granted for four years, after which the contract can be renewed. The MA cannot be rented or alienated to the benefit of third parties (Gallardo 2008; González et al. 2006; San Martín et al. 2010; Subpesca 1997).
In case of premature termination or resignation of the MA, the fisher‟s organisation cannot reapply for three years, counting from the date of the notification (Ley No 20437 2010). One of these cases can occur when the organisation doesn‟t pay their annual tenure fee, as a result the fishing organisation loses its right (Gallardo 2008).
When two or more fishing associations aspire to get the same territory, an allocation selection process is applied. The criteria for fair allocation according to the fishing law and in decreasing order are: nearness to the required MA, number of members and the age of the organisation (Gallardo 2008; Ley No 20437 2010). Moreover, Max Montoya remarks that the “MAs are established is there is no other alternative use of the desired zone such as tourism, private concessions or others, meaning that those coastal spaces that have not been planned for other activity can eventually become a MA” (Email comm. Gallardo-Montoya 2009*).
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government authorities and the legislative system (Gallardo and Friman 2011). After the introduction of the MA system, the small-scale fisheries started to organise themselves regionally and nationally more deeply, becoming an important actor within the fishery system where their voice and opinions are heard and they have achieved legitimacy in the sector (Gallardo 2008).
5.4 Current situation of the TURFs
Almost fifteen years have passed since the TURFs have been put in practice in Chile in 1997. Despite many challenges, fishing authorities, the scientist community, and leaders of fishing organisations have on average a positive perception of the MAs (San Martín et al. 2010). Among the challenges counts continued illegal fishing, low economic benefit, “one-size-fits-all” approach, and to some degree access and infra structure problems in privately owned land.
Since the implementation of the TURFs, the status of the resources seems to be secured in the MAs giving fishers the incentive to protect their resources in common (Gallardo et al. 2011; Montoya 2006; San Martín et al. 2010). However, fishers continue to practice illegal fishing. The poaching within and outside of the MAs is the result of the fisher's livelihood needs to complement their income. The illegal fishing estimated by González et al. (2006) is around 50% of the total catches of locos. The depletion in open access area, outside of the MAs, is likely to affect in the long term the normal productivity in the MAs since both areas are not biologically separated; the action of one area will affect the other no matter the status of the area (Gallardo and Friman 2011).
The resources extracted from MAs goes mainly for export, and revenues are highly dependable of the fluctuations of the international market. Low economic benefits are likely to affect the balance of the MA system with regards to the social and ecological aspects as well. Price being one of the most important factors for the benefit calculations, and considering its fluctuations since 2000, with a tendency to lower prices, the result is lower revenues for the fishers (Gallardo and Friman 2011; San Martín et al. 2010). Even with the tendency of lower prices, the operational costs of MAs are still high in comparison to income from MAs, including consulting fees, assessment studies and taxes; other costs to take into account are the location and the distance from urban areas to the fishing grounds and availability of the resources (Gallardo 2008; Gallardo and Friman 2011; Montoya 2006; San Martín et al. 2010).
The MA system, which originated and was successful in central Chile, was reproduced along the coast for other regions and resources. Nevertheless, the “one-size-fits-all” approach often neglects geographical and local characteristics, accessibility to the fishing grounds, and availability of resources, among other considerations (San Martín et al. 2010). Among the less positive aspects count for example that the historical diving method and traditional practices and behaviours are declining since the divers, who traditionally dove all year are diving less as all available resources are extracted in a matter of a few days rather than throughout the year (Dietz et al. 2003; Gelcich et al. 2005).
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6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this chapter, the transcripts of the interviews were analysed and the different occurrences were divided into three categories. The first one is related to the accomplishment of the fishing organisations, the second one talks about the challenges of the fishing organisations and their TURFs (richness of the seabed, land tenure and infrastructure issues) and the third one about the future perceptions – future expectations. It is worth to remark, that not all stakeholders have comments over each particular theme.
a) Accomplishment of fishing organisations
The accomplishment of fishing organisation theme will highlight the perception of the different social actors in regards of the organisation and its interaction with other stakeholders within the MA system. In this regard, two issues emerged during the analysis: negotiation power and leadership.
The MAs system brought some advantages and according to the interview they all converge together in the empowering of the fishers through their collective organisation. These well organised and legitimised groups of fishers in some cases have provided important amendments, regarding MAs, to the fishing laws. Thus, an effective organisation on the fishers side, has opened the necessary channels for effective communication with government, Gerardo Cerda said (Interview Sernapesca 2008*). For instance, Jaime Aburto and Wolfgang Stotz (scientists and consultants from the UCN - Universidad Católica del Norte Coquimbo) have a similar view on the benefits of the organisation for the fishers. They highlight that the MAs are strengthening the collective work and organisations, which provide them more attention from the authorities (Interview Aburto 2008**; Interview Stotz 2008b**).
Wolfgang Stotz adds that the formalisation of the MAs brings interaction as second benefit:
… all people are interacting, the authorities, the scientists, the fishermen… we are all talking, we are all interacting, which was not [the situation] before (Interview Stotz 2008b**).
Luis Durán (President of Federación de Pescadores del Elqui and Member of the environmental council of Confepach (National Fishermen's Union Confederation) comments that his fishing federation participate in national instances, for example in the III and IV Region Fishing Zone Council, where the laws for the fisheries are revised. During the meeting they have been participating and their opinions were listened (Interview Durán 2008*).
In the same line, Oscar Avilés from FEPEMACH (Federation of Artisanal Fishers and Divers of the Choapa Province, Region IV) concluded that the “MAs are really local development organisations” (Interview Avilés 2008**), meaning that the potential of the fishing organisations in the social sphere, by influencing fisher members, local communities and local authorities.
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In regards the MA‟s internal organisation and leadership, Luis Durán said that the leader‟s vision and quality of management are essential for the well-functioning of each MA. On a question of the quality of leadership, he says that whether it is hierarchical or democratic “depends on the leader‟s quality, the leader‟s education, and the leader‟s vision of the cove‟s future projections, if they [the fishers] don‟t have future projections or conviction over their people, they are not going to make it” (Interview Durán 2008*).
The MA as a legitimate entity has negotiation power that together with a good leadership can ask and demand to be listened to. Moreover, they can influence other stakeholders, not been seen before.
b) Challenges of the fishing organisations and their TURFs
The challenges of fishing organisation theme will highlight some unexpected outcomes as a result of the allocation of MAs and how these are interpreted by different stakeholders. Six sub-themes arisen during the analysis: low barrier entry, race for places, richness of the seabed, right to access, tenure issues and infrastructure problems.
Max Montoya from Subpesca (Email communication Gallardo-Montoya 2009*) notes that the artisanal fishery presents low barrier entry which make this activity easy too to work with. Unemployed people from different industries find that extraction of marine resources is a good way to receive an income, as an example “due to a decrease in the price of copper, nearly 700 people working with small-scale mining began instead to extract algae”. Max Montoya further notes that if the fishers cannot register to get access to the primary species, they find the way to at least access them:
even if registration remains closed for the main species, there are still some species, called secondary species, of low interest, that have open access. Therefore fishers sign up on these alternative species, not with the intention to operate over them, but to have a way to access main species and operate illegally, which the regulation has no control over (Email communication Gallardo-Montoya 2009*).
In the same line, Wolfgang Stotz (scientist and consultant from the UCN) describes that the application process set the barrier entry to a low level, by allowing entrance to the fishery sector without major obstacles. He said that “traditional fishermen lost their resources against a lot of other people” because many “non-fishers, who work in the city, drive a taxi, or whatever” enter to the fishing system (Interview Stotz 2008b**). Wolfgang Stotz continues that the fact that the system was only to have an obligation to have a fisher organisation brought or brings people together without limitation, and he brings as an example describing a MA in the region, where all the members of one organisation belong to a single family. He says, the MA system:
was too open, so it attracted a lot of people which are now in the system and which should not be in the system (Interview Stotz 2008b**).
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maximum number of MA has a limit which is determined by the capacity of the resource to regenerate itself. However, “No math formula ad-hoc exists in this case”, meaning that there no exist any mathematical model to calculate the carrying capacity of the benthos ecosystem and the number of fishing organisations that should be assigned to work within the system (Email communication Gallardo-Montoya 2009*).
The second challenge covered in this section is the race for places to apply for a MA which reminded Jaime Aburto (scientist and consultant from the UCN) the „tragedy of the commons‟. A concept commonly referred to a race for resources, leading to depletion but in this case the fishers started to struggle to get an MA:
[after the success of some MAs] the race to get resources was transferred from the resource to the areas... the areas started to become that resource [the commons] and [the fishers] started to struggle to get an area, another and another…(Interview Aburto 2008**).
The attractiveness of the MAs created a boom of new fishers as pointed by Wolfgang Stotz, UCN: “Here are today many more fishermen than never before in the history in Chile: people say, well we make an organisation and we ask for an area and all the locos are ours” (Interview Stotz 2008b**). Mariano Godoy from the MA Huentelauquén confirms that there are many fishers per sea hectare, especially in the IV Region (Group Interview Huentelauquén 2008*). As a consequence, the greater the number of fishers the lesser [the] income [of each], “the benefits got diluted among a lot of people. So that makes it difficult to work, said Wolfgang Stotz (Interview Stotz 2008**).
Javier Rivera from Subpesca said that “any MA that is granted will exclude the rest from a [specific area]. [An area] is granted to those [organisations] who manifest an interest for it. Those [organisations] who don‟t express an interest remain out of the system (Group Interview Subpesca 2008b*). Antonio Gonzáles from Subpesca as well, expressed that they envisioned that the already established MAs could embrace those people who were looking for a place to apply. However, this solution would not bring a fair result for the old members who have been already paying union‟s fee from the beginning, as their share of income would become reduced with the entrance of new members (Group Interview Subpesca 2008 a*).
The third challenge that the MAs are facing is the issue of richness of the seabed. Antonio Gonzáles from Subpesca said, when the government established the MA system, “the first fishing organisations that entered voluntarily might have been more benefited because they got to choose the most productive natural banks (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*). As Javier Rivera remarks, “the first [MAs] that enrolled got the benefit, precisely perhaps there exist an equality problem” because “not all the [natural] richness [of the sea] is distributed homogeneously [along] the coastal border (Group Interview Subpesca 2008b*). Antonio Gonzáles continues:
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In addition to that, Jaime Aburto, UCN, said that “in the first years, the first areas worked very well; there was a good price for the resource, basically the loco. Therefore the authority basically made a copy and paste of the model [original well working MAs] in different sectors, but [without considering that] their realities are different” (Interview Aburto 2008**). In the same line, Antonio Gonzáles and Javier Rivera indicate that as a result of the success in some MAs, many other fishers showed interest to also get MAs, but available spaces were occupied for those who did not apply initially, therefore they have to look for remaining locations where not precisely the best spaces are (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*).
Even though the MAs are in essence related with water body spaces, the fishing organisation itself depend on the use of land as well, for the in-land chores such as meetings, storage of fishing tools, unload resources, land boats and other needs. Land and water bodies are crucial elements for the development of the MAs; while the water provides the resources, the land provides the basis for organisation and commercialisation. The land issue results in three connected problems: the access to the fishing grounds, the tenure of land and the opportunities (or lack) for building fishing facilities (Gallardo 2008; Gallardo et al. 2011) which became our fourth, fifth and sixth challenges respectively.
In regards of the fourth challenge, the issue of access to the fishing grounds, some rural fishing organisations located in privately owned land, especially in regions III, IV and VI can create tensions between the fishers and the landowners regarding the access to the coast (fishing grounds), because the latter sets the rules of accessibility. If the MAs are adjacent to a public owned land, the problem of access can be solved “little by little” as in the VIII Region, Alejandra Pinto said (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*). However, the land problem cannot be solved and government cannot help fishers when it comes to private properties. Javier Rivera from Subpesca comments on that:
when (the MAs) are located in state zones, a regularisation of the sectors is sought. Regarding private land, in case the organisation doesn‟t come to an agreement with the private sector, generally there is when the problems start (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*).
Luis Durán (member of Confepach and Federación de Pescadores del Elqui) mentions that in the IV Region, about 70% of the beaches are adjacent to private property and their owners don‟t want the development of infrastructure on their land. If the fishing organisation is located on governmental property, the problem had been solved. However, the issue with private land is complicated and it is a money issue (Interview Durán 2008*), referring to the power of landlords in relation to fishers.
Even though the right to access to the fishing grounds is of great importance for the MA development, Antonio Gonzáles from Subpesca comments that the land access is not an issue that belongs to the MAs:
… it is not related to the MAs, it is related to the organisation. Because it is the organisation that is established in-land. MAs can either be aside or at three hours away from the fishing grounds. The organisation is situated on the caleta (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*).
