Partnership without Membership

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Introduction

Sweden’s neutrality policy can be traced back to the early 1800s, when the vulnerable geographical position in-between the two superpowers of Russia and Germany influenced a policy aiming to remain neutral. Since then, the neutrality policy has influenced all major security political stances taken by Sweden. When the First World War broke out, Sweden declared neutrality. The same was done when the Second World War commenced. During the Cold War Sweden once again found itself in a difficult position, in-between the newly founded North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet Union, which motivated a continued neutrality policy. Sweden stuck with its policy doctrine until the Berlin Wall fell, together with the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order.

Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has developed to become one of NATOs closest partners. Sweden has participated in all major NATO led operations and has become an important partner through joining NATOs Partnership for Peace. Due to its profound cooperation, Sweden has reached a “golden status” amongst NATO’s partnership countries (Petersson 2018, 74). The latest step for deepening the cooperation with NATO was taken in 2016, when an agreement regarding Host Nation Support (HNS) was ratified by the Swedish Riksdag. The agreement is a framework agreement aimed to further cooperation between Sweden and NATO, by providing a framework for future NATO led operations on Swedish territory. By incorporating the requirements of the agreement into Swedish law, it can be argued that Sweden institutionalized its cooperation with NATO.

Sweden has a long-standing neutral identity and history of pursuing a foreign policy aiming for neutrality, but manages to justify a continued profound cooperation with NATO. It can be argued that Sweden found itself in a difficult position following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, which was stated to be “the greatest challenge towards European peace and security since the end of the Cold War” (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2015). Due to this, it can be assumed that Sweden had to make trade-offs between the long-standing identity of neutrality and a geopolitical context where international cooperation on security issues was deemed necessary, when deciding to ratify the agreement regarding HNS. This case indicates a trade-off between different security political stances, making it interesting to analyze how the different stances were used to motivate a deepened NATO cooperation. From a role theoretical perspective, this thesis will therefore examine what security political roles, based on both identity and Sweden’s position within the international system, the government conceptualized for itself and how these were used to frame the agreement regarding HNS.

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The role theoretical approach has been chosen due to its ability to capture how both longstanding identity and systemic factors impact policy behavior. The approach assumes that states conceptualize roles for itself; based on expectations from the surrounding environment, its position within the international system and its self-image. A distinction between roles stemming from different sources is often made, where over-encompassing meta-roles are distinguished from context-specific roles related to specific policy issues or geographic areas. By distinguishing between Sweden’s different security political roles, it will be possible to conduct an analysis regarding what roles where most prominent in the framing of the agreement regarding HNS. The role theoretical approach assumes that roles constrain policy makers when deciding on policy behavior, but that the ultimate decision is made by the individual policy makers. This motivates the incorporation of a framing approach in order to analyze how a policy maker used the different roles to motivate Sweden’s deepened cooperation with NATO.

Purpose and research questions

The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the Swedish policy behavior of deepening the cooperation with NATO, more specifically Sweden’s decision to ratify the agreement regarding HNS. The analysis is deemed interesting to conduct due to Sweden having a historical identity of pursuing a neutrality policy, but at the same time being able to motivate a profound cooperation with the single most important defence alliance in the region. It is assumed that systemic factors, such as being an EU member, forces Sweden to make trade-offs between its longstanding neutrality and contemporary security political considerations, making it interesting to examine how different security policy roles were used to motivate the case of HNS.

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cooperation with NATO and its members without having to join the alliance. The partnership includes military exercises, consultation and furthering interoperability between NATO and national forces. When the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created in 1997 Sweden joined that forum to. EAPC can be understood as the political framework of the PfP and works as a political forum for developing the cooperation between NATO members and PfP-partners. Since joining the PfP and EAPC, Sweden has participated in all major NATO-led operations, for example in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and joined the Strategic Airlift Capability together with Finland and ten NATO members. As a result of Sweden’s extensive cooperation with NATO, Sweden was rewarded the Enhanced Opportunity Partner status in 2014 together with Finland, Australia, Georgia and Jordan. The status is sometimes understood as a “golden card”, awarded to partners who have contributed significantly to NATO operations and who the alliance wants to continue pursue a deep cooperation with (Petersson 2018, 74).

Host Nation Support and Swedish security policy doctrine

The Memorandum of Understanding regarding HNS was signed by the former Swedish center-right government on September 4th,_{2014. The changes in basic law necessary for ratifying the agreement}

were passed by the Swedish Riksdag on May 25th,_{2016, following a bill introduced by the}

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non-alignment policy, since it does not entail that Sweden is obliged to let NATO pursue operations on Swedish territories, due to mutual agreement being necessary prior to any such operation.

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systemic factors is made, it is deemed important to use a theoretical framework that highlights these differences. In its second part, the analysis will focus on how Peter Hultqvist as a policy maker used roles to frame the issue of HNS, which is why a method of framing is added to the role theoretical approach. Since the process connecting role conceptions to policy behavior has been contested within role theory, it might be useful to include a method from another theoretical approach to get a more comprehensive understanding of how roles are used in real-life politics. Using framing as a method can therefore be seen as emphasizing the importance of the policy maker’s agency in the process connecting role conceptions to policy behavior, which is already stressed as a central component by many role theorists (Aggestam 2004, Brummer & Thies 2015, Elgström & Smith 2006, Breuning 2011, etc).

Role theory in international relations

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implies (Harnisch et al 2011, 8). Role expectations can therefore be understood as the role prescriptions that the surrounding environment, both the domestic and the international, impose on the state.

A role conception can be understood as stemming from the role beholders perceptions regarding its self-image and the role expectations imposed by the surrounding environment (Elgström & Smith 2006, 6). Aggestam defines role conceptions as “a cognitive construct which evolves more or less in

correspondence with concepts of self in foreign policy” (2004, 66). Role conceptions act as guide lines

for the actor’s foreign policy behavior by providing an understanding of the structure the actor is situated in and what behavior that is expected because of it (Aggestam 2006, 20). This relates back to the role theoretical approach of conceptualizing both policy makers and states as situated actors, where the policy maker “interprets and defines for himself the rights, duties, privileges and appropriate

forms of behavior associated with his positions and relationships in society” (Holsti 1970, 329). Besides

being influenced by its position within a structure, the sociological understanding of a role conception emphasizes the influence that a state’s identity, history and culture have on a role conception. The more socialized and institutionalized a role conception is witin a state, the more permanent it is assumed to be (Holsti 1970).

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simultaneously with the role conception (2004, 69). It can therefore be assumed that a more over-encompassing role, socialized into a state’s identity, should have a more constraining effect on policy makers than a context-specific role. A context-specific role can be understood as roles related to specific issue areas or to a geographical region (Bengtsson & Elgström 2011, 114). These can be understood as more precise due to them being conceptualized for specific issues or regions.

Even though role theory manages to conceptualize the interrelation between agent and structure within foreign policymaking, it has been critiqued for suppressing domestic contestation regarding role conceptions. Cantir and Kaarbo critiques role theorists for “black-boxing” national role conceptions by assuming national consensus regarding the nation’s different roles (2012). The result is that domestic processes, such as discrepancy between the elite and the masses and contestation amongst the elites, have been left undertheorized. A distinction between vertically-contested and horizontally-contested roles is made, where vertically-contested roles reveals a discrepancy between the elite and the masses whilst a horizontally-contested role reveals disagreement amongst the political elite (ibid, 6-8). Understanding domestic contestation regarding role conceptions would further the understanding of inconsistency between role conceptions and role performance (ibid, 17), as well as a more comprehensive understanding of how roles emerge. Aggestam notes how role contestation often result in foreign policy change. By elaborating on the domestic processes of role contestation, one may therefore be able to further understand the inconsistent nature of foreign policy behavior (2004, 68).

How different roles impact policy behavior

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Framing

Framing is an analytical approach that can be found within many of the social sciences. Within sociology and political science, frames and framing processes have been used to analyze subjects like policy making and social movements. Framing can be understood as an “approach that focuses on how messages are created” (Hallahan 1999, 206) but it also captures the psychological processes necessary for shaping messages, such as how people examine information and perceive the world around them (ibid, 306ff).

Framing can be understood as dynamic processes of reality construction. In accordance with this, Hallahan conceptualizes framing as processes of including, excluding and emphasizing information when creating a message, meaning that framing can be understood by analyzing how information is portrayed in, for example, an argument (1999). Benford and Snow captures the dynamic aspect of framing by stating that collective action frames contain two features: the different tasks of framing and the dynamic processes which create the frames (2000, 615).

Benford and Snow state that framing within the field of social movements have three main tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing (ibid). Diagnostic framing can be understood as defining what the problem is, which may be done in several ways. One example from the research on social movements is creating injustice frames and distinguishing “who the victims are”, whilst another is defining what the source of the problem is. Prognostic framing aims to articulate a solution to the perceived problem and motivational framing aims to engage people in collective action, for example by creating vocabularies of motive (Benford & Snow 2000, 616ff).

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Methodology and research design

This chapter will explain the research design used to conduct the analysis. It will include a discussion regarding the choice of analyzing Sweden’s agreement regarding HNS with NATO, choice of material, how the analysis is limited to match the scope of this thesis and a methodological discussion regarding validity.

Selection of case

This thesis will seek to analyze Sweden’s agreement regarding Host Nation Support with NATO. HNS can be understood as “an operational tool to outline conditions under which a Host Nation is receiving the sending nations’ military troops” (Otzulis & Ozoliņa 2017, 79). Signing and ratifying the agreement regarding HNS requires a change in Swedish basic law in order for Sweden to be able to provide HNS according to NATO’s requirements. Implementing the agreement can therefore be understood as institutionalizing the cooperation with NATO and making it a part of Swedish law. What this entails is that future NATO operations on Swedish territories will be much easier to conduct, due to a framework already being in place.

Magnus Petersson argues in his chapter of The European Neutrals and NATO: Non-alignment,

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Due to these considerations, this thesis takes the form of a critical single case study. The objective of describing national role conceptions and their manifestation in real-life politics makes it a descriptive

study. It could be argued that a comparative case study could be conducted to reach the same

objectives, since Sweden is not the only neutral, European country who pursue a deep cooperation with NATO without being a member in the alliance. Alongside Sweden, Finland pursue a deep cooperation with NATO and it has been argued that both countries contribute more to NATO operations and objectives than some of the NATO members do (Petersson 2018, 86). The decision to conduct a single case study was made due to it allowing to make a more profound description of different role conceptions and their manifestation in real-life politics than a comparative case study would do. The decision to analyze Sweden instead of Finland in a single case study was made due to Sweden’s neutrality being grounded in history and a longstanding identity, whilst Finland’s neutrality is better understood as a consequence of systemic factors. Finland’s neutrality is based in the FCMA treaty, where Finland reassured the Soviet Union that possible aggressors would not be allowed to pass over Finnish territories. The policy was neutral in the sense that Finland fostered profitable relations with both the East and the West, rather than becoming a part of the Soviet bloc (Forsberg 2018, 100-102). It is therefore argued that Sweden’s longstanding neutrality is more interesting to examine as a meta-role than Finland’s, since it is assumed to be much more institutionalized into Swedish political culture than Finland’s neutrality.

Limitations

A common method used for discerning national role conceptions is looking at policy makers and government representative’s own understanding and conceptualization of the roles of their state. Due to this method being used in the first part of the analysis, the material used for distinguishing the national role conceptions will be limited to statements and bills regarding security policy presented by the contemporary government. Due to the government being elected in 2014, this limits the material to the years of 2014 to 2016. An important element of a meta-role is how it is an institutionalized part of a state’s history and identity, which is why a historical approach will be necessary to conceptualize the meta-role. To avoid summarizing Sweden’s entire security policy history, academic research will be used to capture the historical component of the meta-role.

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based on systemic factors, more specifically Sweden’s position on the international arena. They are context-specific in the sense that they only relate to security issues, whilst the meta-role can be understood as more over-encompassing. The first context-specific role will refer to Sweden’s position as a small-state affected by its surrounding environment, placing great emphasis on how regional instability affect role conceptions, whilst the second refers to Sweden’s role as an EU member.

The second part of the analysis will be limited to focus on statements and speeches made by Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist, due to him being the main government representative in the question regarding HNS. The analysis will focus on statements and speeches made between the bill being introduced in early 2016 and July 2016, when Hultqvist held speeches at the NATO summit in Warsaw. Including the speeches held after the bill passed legislation is not deemed problematic, due to the assumption that policy behavior is a dynamic, constant process rather than ending with a specific policy decision. Due to Hultqvist and the government introducing the bill, it can further be argued that they did not change their position regarding the HNS after it passed legislation.

Discussion regarding validity concerns

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The first part of the analysis requires distinguishing Sweden’s national role conception, where a distinction is made between the meta-role as a neutral actor, Sweden’s role as a small-nation state and Sweden’s role as an EU member. Discerning role conceptions is often done through an inductive method by analyzing central domestic actors and how these perceive and define roles (Aggestam 2004, 77). It is argued that this method is the best way to capture how role conceptions contain “interests,

world views and triggers expectations” (Aggestam 2004, 66) of policy makers, which highlight the

sociological understanding of role conceptions as cognitive constructions. By analyzing how the Swedish government expressed itself regarding the “commitments, duties, functions and

responsibilities” (ibid, 78) of Sweden’s behavior related to security policy, it will be possible to outline

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The second part of the analysis will be using a framing approach to capture how Hultqvist used the different role conceptions to frame the agreement regarding HNS. As noted in the theory chapter, framing can be conceptualized as reality construction. By highlighting and emphasizing parts of information, policy makers can make some information appear highly salient whilst understating something else. The agency-centered approach therefore goes well with the inherent assumption in role theory that policy makers ultimately decide upon what role to choose in a specific situation. The second part of the analysis will therefore consist of distinguishing which of the frames that Hultqvist used in the discourse regarding the HNS. The diagnostic frames are discerned by identifying how he defined the problem, for example who he perceived to be the source of the problem or who the main victims were. The prognostic frames are distinguished by identifying expressions about why the HNS is perceived to be necessary or how it is to solve the perceived problem. Prognostic framing can also include refuting other solutions, which is called “counterframing” (Benford & Snow 2000, 627). In the case of the HNS, a counterframe could for example be to oppose a NATO membership.

Selection of material

The first part of the analysis will use academic literature and official statements to discern Sweden’s role conceptions, meaning that both first hand sources and secondary sources will be used. Official statements, such as different Statements of Government Policy regarding Foreign Affairs and bills regarding the direction of Swedish security policy will be used to inductively capture the role conceptions and expectations that the contemporary government ascribe themselves and Sweden as an international actor. Important to note is that joint statements by the government will be used, rather than by individual policy makers. This entails that expressions regarding role conceptions are officially agreed upon by the entire government, rather than by Hultqvist himself. Due to this being Sweden’s official position, it is deemed more interesting since it was believed to capture the general Swedish meta-role better than statements by an individual policy maker would. The academic research is, as stated above, used to capture how longstanding and profound Sweden’s meta-role is. To avoid possible bias, it is deemed important to use different secondary sources confirming the same information when discerning Sweden’s meta role.

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framing paradigm have analyzed framing in text as well, but due to the scope of this thesis it is deemed necessary to limit the number of objects to analyze.

Analysis

The analysis of this thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of the analysis will distinguish three of Sweden’s national role conceptions. It will also distinguish diagnostic and prognostic frames related to the three role conceptions. The second part of the analysis will identify and describe how government representative Peter Hultqvist used the different frames in the discourse regarding HNS. The analysis will then be concluded with a general discussion.

Distinguishing Sweden’s roles

The meta-role as ‘Neutral’

The Swedish meta-role as a neutral state has a longstanding history that can be traced back to, at least, the First World War. The role can be understood as originally stemming from systemic factors, such as Sweden being a small nation with a vulnerable geographical position, but has become more socialized into Swedish identity and political culture during the following decades. During the 1960s, the neutrality policy became part of a wider foreign policy doctrine where pursuing a neutral foreign policy was understood as inherently good (Dalsjö 2010b, 203). In the Statements of Government Policy

regarding Foreign Affairs for 1950, the foreign policy aiming for neutrality was stated to be useful not

only in the event of war, but also as a mean to further Swedish interests during peace time (ibid, 213). Both parts of the doctrine can be connected to the same goal of securing Swedish independence (Bjereld & Möller 2015, 6). Independence can be understood as a state being able to “maintain and

develop its society according to its own values” (ibid, 6) during peacetime and not being violated by a

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arena rapidly changed due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order. Sweden was no longer caught in between the two blocks, and the likelihood that Sweden would be drawn into a conflict was deemed small. A change in foreign policy was further motivated by Sweden deciding to join the European Union’s predecessor in 1995, since neutrality was incompatible with a membership. Since being introduced in 1993, the military non-alignment has become an institutionalized part of the Swedish security policy doctrine. In contrast to a declaration of neutrality, military non-alignment entail that Sweden will not undertake mutual defence obligations, which can be understood as being able to independently decide when to partake in military action. During the 1990s, this was conceptualized as “no one else defends Sweden, and we only defend Sweden” (Prop. 91/92:102, 8). This perception of Sweden as a lone-standing state has evolved during the following years. Instead of basing the non-alignment on a perception of Sweden as a lone-standing state and expecting isolationist behavior as a consequence, the contemporary objective is stated to be to secure Sweden’s political autonomy and sovereignty by ruling out policy options that might constrain foreign policy behavior in future situations. This is expressed as: ”Sweden’s security policy’s main objective is to ensure the

country’s independence and autonomy” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 7). The objective of not restricting

security policy has been an ambition of the neutrality policy since the 1950s, and can thus be understood as an institutionalized part of Sweden’s meta-role (Andrén 2002, 97). During the 1990s, the objective was used to motivate opting out of a NATO membership: “by such membership, Sweden

would lose its freedom of action in foreign and security policy issues” (Bjereld & Möller 2015, 10). A

contemporary expectation regarding policy behavior stemming from the commitment to secure independency is that the defence should be able to prevent and handle conflicts and war, to

“guarantee Sweden’s political autonomy and independence, and the country’s territorial integrity”

(Prop. 2014/15:109, 52). The government contemporary with the case of HNS state that “our non-participation in military alliances serves us well” (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration

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Prognostic frame The HNS would be motivated as a solution if it is deemed to ameliorate Swedish independence and political autonomy by not being put in a situation where Sweden by itself can’t decide on military action. Due to a NATO membership being non-compatible with the meta-role, counterframing could be used where the feasible HNS is used to oppose a NATO membership. The agreement regarding HNS would probably be framed as a solution where Sweden would maintain its policy options open whilst also gaining military capacity or intelligence to avert a possible military assault.

The context-specific role as ‘National Security Protector’

This role conception stems from Sweden’s position in the international system as a nation state, which is affected by its geographical position. Due to the decreasing stability in the region as a result of the Russian annexation of Crimea and Russian acts of aggression, this role is assumed to put Swedish national security in the foreground when stating expressions regarding Sweden’s role as a regional actor. Thus, this role becomes apparent in expectations for Sweden to act in accordance with perceived security based interests. “The Russian aggression towards Ukraine constitutes the biggest challenge towards European peace and security since the end of the Cold War”, Wallström expressed in the Statement of Government

Policy regarding Foreign Affairs 2015. The Russian annexation of Crimea is thus perceived by the Swedish government as threatening the sustainable peace in Europe and Sweden’s proximity. “It is not

possible to distinguish military conflicts in the immediate area that would only affect one country” (ibid)

expresses a perception regarding Sweden’s security as deeply integrated with its approximate region. Even though the expressed concerns relate to the security in the region, the policy commitments stemming from the perceived insecurity are mostly centered around ameliorating Sweden’s own security. It is argued that the decreased security motivates a change in Swedish security doctrine, focused on the national security dimension (Prop. 2014/15:109, 9). This can be conceptualized in statements such as “the worsened security policy situation entails changed requirements on the

Swedish defence capability” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 1). The government thus expresses commitments

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as well as Sweden’s own security (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2016). In the bill regarding Sweden’s security policy for 2016 to 2020, it is stated that “the Swedish defence capability’s

main objective is the security of Sweden’s own territory, but should also be regarded as part of a bigger security and stability community in Northern Europe” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 1). The statement highlights

Sweden’s perception of its own security as its main responsibility, but also how interrelated the security of the entire region is. An expectation regarding policy behavior stemming from this perception regarding Sweden’ security is that “the government deem that Sweden’s bi- and

multilateral defence- and security political collaborations should be deepened” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 1) as a mean to secure the region and ameliorate Swedish defence capabilities. Diagnostic frame The role as ‘National Security Protector’ can be understood as a pragmatic role with ensuring Swedish security as its main objective. Due to the perception of Sweden as deeply integrated in its approximate area, a security threat towards either would be perceived as a problem. Due to the contemporary situation of Russian aggression, the most plausible problem formulation would be of Russia as the source of a decreasing regional and Swedish security. Due to the regional security situation, Russia can be understood as the main aggressor or source of the problem, making Swedish security the main victim. Prognostic frame The ‘National Security Protector’ would motivate the HNS as an effective solution to the perceived security problem. This could be done by arguing that the HNS would strengthen Swedish military defence or act as an assurance that NATO would step in to support Sweden in case of armed conflict. It could also be argued that it would not only ameliorate Sweden’s own security, but also the stability throughout the region, which in turn reflects back on Swedish security.

The context-specific role as an ‘EU member’

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affected, and in some matters replaced, by the values inherent in the European integration. This can be conceptualized by the statement that “the European security order must be safeguarded” (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2016), which in its context can be understood as an expression of safeguarding the EU’s “common values and principles” (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2016) as well the European security. The Swedish solidarity declaration have also changed Swedish security prioritizations. The declaration state that “Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected.” (Foreign policy declaration 2016). A concrete policy consequence stemming from the solidarity declaration can be found in the bill where it was first introduced, where the former government state that Sweden has to be able to militarily support an EU member or a Nordic country, which entails higher operational requirements on the Swedish National Defence (Prop. 2008/09:140, 6). In the bill regarding Swedish security policy from 2016 to 2020, this is expressed as “the solidarity declaration imposes requirements on Swedish prerequisites of receiving and contributing with assistance, which might be military” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 8). Besides expressing a responsibility

of ameliorating Swedish interoperability, Sweden also expresses expectations regarding the EU’s security policies. For example, when expressing concerns about the regional security, Sweden emphasizes “the importance of a strong European cooperation with the EU as its core” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 35). An expectation regarding policy behavior following from this perception is that “the

government deem that EU as a security political actor should be strengthened” (Prop. 2014/15:109,

35). The role also entails a commitment of conceptualizing the EU as a political unit, rather than Sweden as an independent actor, which is expressed as: “Effective cooperation within the European Union is a prerequisite for peace and prosperity. […] Internal divisions must be counteracted.” (Foreign policy declaration 2016). The EU and NATO are closely linked to each other. When it comes to security policy, EU is mostly involved in military and civilian education whilst NATOs main objective is the collective military defence of Europe. They will continue to be important partners, due to the EU abandoning its earlier ambition of retaking this responsibility from NATO (SOU 2016:57, 15-17). The government expressed that “the expansion of NATO has fostered security in Europe” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 36). The role as ‘EU member’ therefore entails a duty to be able to cooperate with NATO in order to be able to fulfill the solidarity declaration. An expression regarding this commitment is that “it is continuously prioritized to

participate in activities that aim to improve the interoperability between allies and partners” (Prop.

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Distinguished role conceptions and frames

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challenge the European security order, the security in the Baltic region as well as breaching international law (Sveriges Riksdag 2016, Hultqvist 2016d). The risk of incidents in the Baltic Sea region is stated to have increased due to Russian aggression in the region (Sveriges Riksdag 2016). The reoccurring perception expressed by Hultqvist is that the annexation is a demonstration that Russia is not afraid of using military operations in order to reach their political goals. Hultqvist stated that “in

the long term, threats of military attack can’t be excluded” (Sveriges Riksdag 2016) which can be

understood as perceiving a Russian threat towards Swedish national security, making the frame stemming from the role as ‘National Security Protector’ prominent. When speaking at the Lennart Meri conference in Estonia, a forum for discussing foreign and security policy from the perspective of Northern and Eastern Europe, Hultqvist mostly used the frame stemming from the ‘EU member’ role by stating that “the annexation and the Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine is the greatest

challenge to the European security order since the Second World War” (Hultqvist 2016c). This shows

how interrelated European and Swedish national security is perceived to be, making a distinction between the two diagnostic frames difficult to discern. It is simply not possible to distinguish whether the Russian aggression in Ukraine is seen as a threat towards the EU as an entity or towards Sweden as a nation embedded in the international system. A reoccurring pattern is that Hultqvist does not refer to statements made in the Foreign Policy Declarations such as the unlikeliness that only one state is to be attacked. He highlights the vulnerability of solitary states, both Sweden and in the Baltic Region, rather than the EU as an entity. One statement expressing the frame stemming from the ‘National Security Protector’ is that “we see an increased Russian interest not only in the Baltic States, but also

in Sweden and Finland” (Hultqvist 2016b). For this reason, the frames stemming from the role as

‘National Security Protector’ seem most prominent, although the solidarity declaration and European values such as “European security order” inherent in the role as ‘EU member’ is mentioned as threatened as well.

Besides mentioning Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine as a perceived security threat, Hultqvist also mentions aggressive Russian actions directly related to Sweden and the Baltic Region. Acts mentioned are Russian air planes flying in densely trafficked airspace without using transponders and disrupting civilian work (Sveriges Riksdag 2016). These statements can be understood as highlighting the perceived threat against the Baltic Region, and are therefore understood as diagnostic framing stemming from the role as ‘National Security Protector’. This frame is highlighted by expressions such as: “A regional crisis in the Baltic Sea area would be a common concern for all countries in the region,

including Sweden” (Hultqvist 2016a). Hultqvist does not explicitly mention the Swedish independence

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How is the HNS framed to solve the perceived problem?

The prognostic frame stemming from the meta-role is assumed to perceive the HNS as a mean to sustain Swedish political autonomy. Sustaining political autonomy can be understood as acting in a way that creates, rather than constrains, opportunities for future behavior. Since a NATO membership is framed as constraining Swedish security behavior by binding Sweden to a mutual defence obligation, the HNS can be understood as a counterframe to this position. Rather than binding Sweden to any such obligation, the HNS is stated to create policy options since “we do not promise each other

anything in beforehand, but we create the opportunity” (Sveriges Riksdag 2016). A NATO membership

is also expressed to change Sweden’s basic stance within security policy (military non-alignment), creating a problematic situation in the region. The HNS on the other hand is framed as creating opportunities in case of conflict, crisis or a catastrophe within the region (ibid). The HNS is believed to create opportunities and ameliorating Swedish political autonomy by providing an administrative framework that will simplify future military exercises. From the meta-role, this is framed as promoting political autonomy due to it “creating freedom of action to act in a nascent crisis situation or crisis” as well as signaling capabilities that could be used if deemed necessary (ibid).

Using the role as ‘National Security Protector’, Hultqvist frames Sweden’s main security political objective during the following years to be “increasing the operational capability and the collective

capability of the total national defence” (ibid) This is to be done through a bigger financial investment

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support. He states that: ”the Memorandum of Understanding regarding HNS with NATO that the

Parliament is to take a stand on is an important part in creating the legal prerequisites and strengthening Sweden’s capability to live up to that commitment” (Sveriges Riksdag 2016), using the prognostic frame as ‘EU member’ to show how the HNS increases Sweden’s opportunities of being a loyal EU member. But rather than framing a deepened NATO cooperation as a mean to ameliorate the EUs unified security, Hultqvist reoccur to frame NATO presence as important for “our part of Europe” or “our region” rather than for the EU, showing that the frame stemming from the ‘National Security Protector’ is more widely used than the frame stemming from the ‘EU member’ (Hultqvist 2016d).

General discussion

When discerning the three role conceptions as conceptualized by the government, it became quite clear that all three to some extent were affected by the increasing regional instability. All three perceived the Russian acts of aggression and the decreasing stability in the region as problematic, and it can thus be argued that Sweden’s national security is a goal inherent in all three roles. The ‘National Security Protector’s ambition of increasing Swedish security can be understood as an objective of the meta-role to, since a military assault can be understood as the ultimate violation of a nation’s independence. The biggest difference between the two is therefore the meta-role’s emphasis on securing Swedish political autonomy and independence in times of peace, whilst the ‘National Security Protector’ rather focus on national security in case of a conflict, crisis or assault. Since terms related to the meta-role were not used by Hultqvist in the diagnostic framing of the problem, it can be concluded that the meta-role was not used as a frame to diagnose the problem. The role as ‘EU-member’ was less explicitly mentioned in relation to the perceived security threats, but due to the solidarity declaration and Sweden’s pledge to assist a fellow EU member in case of emergency, it is inherent in expressions regarding European or regional security. Another feature inherent in Hultqvist’s framing was a perception of Sweden as part of the international community, rather than as an isolated nation state. This is expressed in statements such as “A regional crisis in the Baltic Sea area

would be a common concern for all countries in the region, including Sweden” (Hultqvist 2016c). All

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