Decentralizing hydraulic society
Actor responses to institutional arrangements in Vietnam
Pham Thi Bich Ngoc
Linköping Studies in Arts and Science No. 577 Department of Water and Environment Studies
Linköping University Linköping 2013
Linköping Studies in Arts and Science No. 577
Within the Falculty of Arts and Science at Linköping University, research and doctoral training is carried out within broad problem areas. Research is organized in
interdisciplinary research environments, doctoral studies mainly in research institutes.
Together they publish the series Linköping Studies in Arts and Science. This thesis comes from the Department of Water and Environmental Studies at the Tema Institute.
Distributed by:
Department of Water and Environmental Studies Linköping University
SE - 581 83 Linköping Sweden
Pham Thi Bich Ngoc
Decentralizing hydraulic society -
Actor responses to institutional arrangements in Vietnam
Cover design by Dao Thi Ngoc Bich
Edition 1:1
ISBN 978-91-7519-669-5 ISSN 0282-9800
©Pham Thi Bich Ngoc
Department of Water and Environmental Studies 2013
Printed by LiU – Tryck, Linköping, 2013
Abstract
Irrigation decentralization has been launched worldwide with high expectations of improved governance, efficiency, and productivity through democratic processes. However, there is widespread recognition that decentralization is, in reality, unlikely to bring about these positive outcomes. Poor implementation is widely blamed for these failures, but the current study argues that this is only partially true. Decentralization is usually treated as a technical way of power transfer that can be evaluated through quantitative indicators. Much attention goes to searching solutions to constraints during implementation while less emphasis is on understanding of contexts, processes and the consequences of institutional changes. The common approach mainly focuses on local water users’
organizations but gives insufficient attention to the cross-level interactions between involved actors, their responses to reforms, and power relationships. This approach answers the question: what should be done, but not: why do constraints/limitations occur and why are such contradictory results obtained? In this way the approach itself diffuses some of the challenges in reality and the root of problems leading to surprise consequences and failures during implementation.
In this study, two irrigation systems in Vietnam were selected to examine the emerging decentralization processes, actors’ responses to the institutional changes, as well as the main options, challenges and constraints to decentralization. My ambition is also to further understand why constraints occur and have counter-productive effects. A mixed methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative methods, and cross-case analysis are applied. The database was built systematically, based on previous experience in this field, and participatory fieldwork.
Decentralization is regarded as a power-laden process involving not just local organizations, but also state agencies, local authorities at different levels, state irrigation companies (IDMCs), and farmers.
The study describes how institutional arrangements for decentralization have effects on the dynamics and relations of power between actors in multi-level governance, resulting in impacts on autonomy, accountability, participation, and incentives of involved actors.
The analysis shows that the legal framework and several well-intended efforts for decentralization have been launched. However, outcomes in terms of power transfer and actors’ performance are not those expected. The current institutional arrangements have created major constraints: (i) imbalanced power relations, (ii) new resource allocation mechanisms creating dependency among actors, (iii) passiveness, vested interest and privilege within state agencies and IDMCs, and (iv) free-riding behavior and distrust among farmers. Prevailing conditions defy policy intentions by finding a new version of a centralized power structure at provincial level, in which power of state agencies and IDMCs are reinforced. Unexpected effects emerge on the autonomy, accountability, participation, and incentives of all involved actors.
Decentralization of irrigation systems is a complex process, not merely a technical transfer of power.
It is hard to achieve even with policy in place. All the complexities and implications of irrigation need to be thoroughly considered, with the dynamics in society included. Evaluations of decentralization based on production and economic terms are not enough. Impacts of institutional arrangements on power relations between actors, on their incentives, maneuver room in multi-level governance, and ability to comprehend and influence processes, need to be assessed thoroughly. Essential roles remain for central government when irrigation management is decentralized.
Key words: accountability, actors, autonomy, incentives, institutional arrangements, irrigation management, participation, power relations, Vietnam.
Sammanfattning
Decentralisering av bevattningsjordbruk har lanserats över hela världen med höga förväntningar på förbättrad styrning, effektivitet och produktivitet genom demokratiska processer. Men det är allmänt erkänt att decentralisering i själva verket knappast är tillräckligt för att åstadkomma dessa positiva resultat. Dåligt genomförande har allmänt fått bära skulden för svårigheterna, men den aktuella studien hävdar att detta bara delvis är sant. Decentralisering behandlas vanligtvis som ett tekniskt sätt för maktöverföring som kan utvärderas genom kvantitativa indikatorer. Mycket uppmärksamhet går då att söka lösningar på begränsningar under genomförandet medan mindre tonvikt ligger på förståelse av sammanhang, processer och konsekvenser av institutionella reformer. Fokus är främst på lokala vattenanvändarnas organisationer så att alltför lite uppmärksamhet riktas till gränsöverskridande samspel mellan berörda aktörer, deras anpassningar till reformer och maktrelationer. Detta tillvägagångssätt svarar på frågan: vad som bör göras, men inte: varför restriktioner/begränsningar uppstår och varför sådana motstridiga resultat uppnås? På så vis skymmer själva tillvägagångssättet några av de utmaningar som i verkligheten utgör grunder för de problem som leder till överraskande konsekvenser och misslyckanden under genomförandet av decentralisering.
I denna studie har två bevattningssystem i Vietnam valts ut för att undersöka framväxande decentraliseringsprocesser, aktörernas svar på de institutionella förändringar, liksom de huvudsakliga alternativ, utmaningar och hinder som finns för decentralisering. Min ambition är också att ytterligare förstå varför begränsningar förekommer och har kontraproduktiva effekter. En blandad strategi som kombinerar kvalitativa och kvantitativa metoder används för att studera gemensamma drag i fallstudierna. Databasen byggdes systematiskt, utifrån tidigare erfarenheter på detta område, och deltagande fältarbete. Decentralisering betraktas som en maktrelaterad process som involverar inte bara lokala organisationer, men också statliga myndigheter, lokala myndigheter på olika nivåer, statliga bevattningsbolag (IDMCs), och bönder. Studien beskriver hur institutionella arrangemang för decentralisering har effekter på dynamik och maktförhållanden mellan aktörer inom flernivåstyre, något som resulterar i att autonomi, ansvarsutkrävande, deltagande, och incitament för de berörda aktörerna påverkas.
Analysen visar att det rättsliga ramverket och flera välmenande insatser för decentralisering har lanserats. Men utfallet, vare sig i termer av maktöverföring eller aktörernas prestationer, är inte de förväntade. De nuvarande institutionella arrangemangen har skapat stora begränsningar: (i) obalanserade maktförhållanden, (ii) nya resursfördelningmekanismer som leder till nya beroendeformer mellan aktörer, (iii) passivitet, egenintresse och privilegier inom statliga myndigheter och IDMCs, och (iv) snålskjutsbeteende (”free-riding”) och misstro bland jordbrukarna. Rådande förhållanden går emot politiska intentioner genom att en ny version av en centraliserad maktstruktur på provinsiell nivå skapas genom att makten hos statliga myndigheter och IDMCs förstärks. Oväntade effekter uppstår då för autonomi, ansvar, delaktighet och incitament för alla inblandade aktörer.
Decentralisering av bevattningssystem är en komplex process, inte bara en teknisk överföring av makt. Den är svår att uppnå även med policy på plats. Alla komplikationer och konsekvenser av bevattning för den dynamik som ingår i samhället måste noga övervägas. Utvärderingar av decentralisering som bygger på produktion och ekonomiska termer är inte tillräckligt. Konsekvenser av institutionella arrangemang för maktrelationer mellan aktörer, för deras incitament, manöverutrymme inom ett flernivåstyre, och förmåga att förstå och påverka processer, måste bedömas noggrant. Viktiga roller återstår för staten när bevattningsjordbruk decentraliseras.
Nyckelord: aktörer, ansvar, delaktighet, decentralisering, incitament, institutionella arrangemang, konstbevattning, maktrelationer, självständighet, Vietnam.
Acknowledgements
First of all, I gratefully acknowledge the funding support from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Vietnam and its Agricultural Science and Technology project (AST). I also thank my employers in Vietnam; the Vietnam Academy for Water Resources and its Centre for Participatory Irrigation Management for providing me support during the last four years.
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Hans Holmén at the Department of Water and Environment Studies (Tema V), Linköping University and my co-‐supervisor, Prof. Magnus Jirström at the Department of Human Geography, Lund University. Thank you both deeply for your supervision and encouragement during my study period. I would like to thank Prof. Lotta Andersson, Dr. Hans Bertil Wittgren, Dr. Anna Jonsson, Dr. Anna Bohman at Tema V, and Dr. Håkan Tropp at the Stockholm International Water Institute for their helpful suggestions on the draft thesis. My special gratitude goes to Dr. Anne Jerneck in Lund University for her thoughtful comments in my final seminar.
I greatly appreciated spending my study at Tema V, Linköping University because of its special interdisciplinary and academic environment. Thank you to all staff and doctoral students at Tema V for your friendship and support over the last four years. Many thanks go to Dr. Åsa Danielsson, Susanne Eriksson, Kerstin Sonesson, and Ian Dickson for all administrative arrangements and logistic support. I am also grateful to staff of AST project in Vietnam, especially director Nguyen The Hinh, and accountant Nguyen Ha Linh for their administrative arrangements in Vietnam. Huge thanks go to Michele Evelyn Steele for her highly professional editing and proof-‐
reading of the thesis text.
I would like to thank colleagues, friends and stakeholders in Vietnam who have supported me, participated in the interviews, and provided valuable inputs to this research. I would not least like to express my gratitude to Mr.
Nguyen Xuan Tiep who spent time and assisted me in field surveys. My special thanks are for the irrigation and drainage management companies in Tay Ninh and in Quang Tri provinces; the irrigation and drainage management enterprises in Nam Thach Han, Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts; the cooperatives and farmers in four districts; Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts (Tay Ninh), Trieu Phong and Hai Lang districts (Quang Tri).
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their sweet encouragements and great support over the years. I could not complete my doctoral study without their support. My heartfelt gratitude goes to my father -‐ Pham Ngoc Tam, my mother -‐ Nguyen Thi Tram, and my sister Ha and brother Hien for supporting me in spirit. I am especially grateful to my husband, Anders Hjort-‐af-‐Ornäs and my daughter, Dao Thi Ngoc Bich who have stayed next to me in the whole journey. Anders, thank you so much for your patience and the great support in all aspects of life. You are a person I always come to talk with and test my ideas. Your intellectual challenges and comments are valuable contributions to this thesis. Thank you, Bich for your help with layout, graphics, and computer problems. I am particularly indebted to her for the cover page.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract... iii
Sammanfattning...iv
Acknowledgements ...v
List of figures ...x
List of tables ... xii
Acronyms and abbreviations ...xiii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...1
1.1 Solutions, understandings, and dynamics in water institutional reforms ... 1
1.1.1 Institutional reforms as solutions to water crises...1
1.1.2 Debates around institutional reforms: solutions and understanding ...3
1.1.3 The central arguments in this study ...6
1.2 Objectives and research questions ... 8
1.3 Scope of study ... 9
1.4 Outline of study...11
CHAPTER 2: POWER TRANSFER AS A PROCESS: INTENTIONS, APPROACHES, AND RESPONSES ... 13
2.1 Good governance as a means for decentralization ...14
2.1.1 Driving forces of decentralization... 14
2.1.2 Forms and definitions of decentralization ... 16
2.1.3 Debate about conceptual definitions and assumptions of decentralization ... 18
2.1.4 Governance and “good” governance ... 20
2.2 Irrigation decentralization: forms, complexities and implications ...23
2.2.1 Community-based irrigation management ... 25
2.2.2 The private sector and privatization ... 27
2.2.3 States’ roles in irrigation management... 28
2.2.4 Dynamic process and powers in a co-management form... 33
2.2.5 Decentralization from polycentric perspectives... 35
2.3 Decentralization’s outcomes and assessment methods...37
2.3.1 Disappointing outcomes and risks of decentralization ... 37
2.3.2 Poor implementation and a cause of failures ... 39
2.3.3 Quantitative assessments... 42
2.4 Conceptual framework for assessing irrigation decentralization...45
2.4.1 Institutional analysis ... 48
2.4.2 Incentive and capabilities in responding ... 50
2.4.3 Power exercise and power relations ... 53
2.4.4 Accountability and transparency ... 57
2.4.5 Stakeholder participation and interaction ... 61
2.5 The analytical framework...64
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY, DATA FORMATION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES ... 69
3.1 Designing research methods...69
3.1.1 A mixed methods approach with a multiple case study ... 69
3.1.2 Selection of case studies... 72
3.2 Framework and methods to collect data ...75
3.2.1 Data sources ... 75
3.2.2 The resource base available for the study on interactions... 78
3.2.3 Secondary data and the legal documents... 81
3.2.4 The interviews... 82
3.2.5 In-depth interviews with key informants... 88
3.2.6 Target group discussions ... 89
3.2.7 Participant observations... 91
3.3 Procedures in organizing and processing data ...92
CHAPTER 4: MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT... 95
4.1 Irrigation for productivity and food security...96
4.1.1 Irrigation investmentand its contributions to agricultural productivity... 96
4.1.2 Water challenges and the sector development strategies...101
4.2 Multi-‐level irrigation governance ...105
4.2.1 State management agencies...107
4.2.2 State-owned irrigation and drainage management companies ...110
4.2.3 Local irrigation management organizations...113
4.3 Irrigation management in two selected cases ...120
4.3.1 Nam Thach Han irrigation system...120
4.3.2 Tay Ninh irrigation system...126
CHAPTER 5: INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE IRRIGATION SECTOR ...131
5.1 Vietnam’s transition in Doi Moi process...132
5.2 Public administrative reforms and decentralization in irrigation...136
5.3 Democracy, participation and decentralization of irrigation services...139
5.4 Financing irrigation...147
5.5 Renovation of state-‐owned irrigation management enterprises ...151
5.5.1 The equitization process ...151
5.5.2 Financial mechanisms...154
5.6 Summary...157
CHAPTER 6: POWER RELATIONS AND ACTORS’ DECISION MAKING ...161
6.1 Cross-‐level interactions between state management agencies...162
6.1.1 Coordination in inconsistent and overlapping mandates...163
6.1.2 Institutional setting and capacity at district and commune levels ...171
6.1.3 Power at district- and commune-level state agencies...173
6.2 Interactions between the state management agencies and state irrigation companies ...177
6.2.1 Mobilization and use of resources...178
6.2.2 Operation and maintenance of irrigation systems ...179
6.3 Interactions between the state management agencies and cooperatives...182
6.3.1 Organization and personnel management ...182
6.3.2 Mobilization of financial resources ...184
6.4 Interactions between state irrigation companies and cooperatives ...185
6.4.1 Mobilization and use of resources...186
6.4.2 Operation and maintenance of irrigation systems ...188
6.5 Interactions between cooperatives and farmers...192
6.6 Power and the dynamics of decentralization...194
CHAPTER 7: ACTORS’ AUTONOMY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND PARTICIPATION ...199
7.1 Financial autonomy...199
7.1.1 Irrigation and Drainage Management Companies ...200
7.1.2 Cooperatives ...209
7.2 Accountability and transparency ...212
7.2.1 State irrigation management companies...213
7.2.2 Cooperatives ...215
7.2.3 Mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing accountability...219
7.3 Farmers’ participation in decision-‐making...222
7.3.1 Dominating patterns of interaction ...227
7.3.2 Communication, information sharing and transparency...228
7.3.3 Motivation of farmers in participation...230
7.3.4 Culture and passive attitudes...231
7.4 Reflections on the assessment of actor performance...233
CHAPTER 8: ACTORS’ RESPONSES - INCENTIVES, WILLINGNESS AND CAPABILITY...237
8.1 Trade-‐off between decentralization and contradictory interests...237
8.2 Privileges and vested interest in the new transformed companies ...241
8.2.1 Organizational adjustments bring internal power concentration...241
8.2.2 Attitude and incentives in the mechanism for public utility...243
8.3 Resources, capabilities, scales affecting incentives and accountability ...244
8.3.1 Economics of scales, income, incentives and accountability ...246
8.3.2 Capability to mobilize and access resources ...251
8.4 Linking up: Responding to decentralization ...257
CHAPTER 9: DECENTRALIZATION POLICY CONTEXTUALIZED – CHALLENGES FOR IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT...259
9.1 The study issues in the global debate context ...259
9.2 Study findings reflecting on research questions ...261
9.3 Reflecting the research findings to theoretical approaches ...267
9.4 Study’s implications for implementing decentralization...269
9.5 The study implications for future study...273
REFERENCES...275
APPENDIXES...297
Appendix 1. Questionnaire forms...297
Appendix 2. Stakeholder interviews ...305
Appendix 3. Organizing and processing data collected...307
Appendix 4. List of policies...312
Appendix 5. Mandates and authorities of key actors in irrigation management...316
List of figures
Figure 2.1. Simple framework for assessing irrigation decentralization 47
Figure 2.2. Detailed framework for assessing irrigation decentralization 64
Figure 2.3. An analytical framework for cross-‐case analysis of irrigation decentralization
66
Figure 3.1. Locations of two case studies in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri province, Vietnam
74
Figure 3.2. Framework for collecting data 75
Figure 3.3. Triangulation of data from a multiple source 76
Figure 3.4. The fieldwork process to collect data 77
Figure 3.5. Target group discussions with participatory techniques 90
Figure 3.6. Study of legal documents for analyzing irrigation decentralization
93
Figure 4.1. Yields of paddy rice in six regions of Vietnam and three cropping seasons
100
Figure 4.2. Cross-‐level interactions in irrigation management 106
Figure 4.3. Cross-‐level interplay among state management agencies 108
Figure 4.4. Typical model of irrigation co-‐management between IDMCs, IMEs and local organizations
110
Figure 4.5. The typical structure of agricultural service cooperatives 116
Figure 4.6. General layout of the Nam Thach Han irrigation system 121
Figure 4.7. Organizational structure of Quang Tri IDMC 123
Figure 4.8. Proportions between two financial sources in cooperatives in Nam Thach Han
125
Figure 4.9. General layout: Dau Tieng reservoir and irrigation canals in Tay Ninh
127
Figure 4.10. The organizational structure of Tay Ninh IDMC 128
Figure 5.1. The implementation of water fees policies in the past and at present
149
Figure 5.2. Driving forces for irrigation institutional reforms 158
Figure 6.1. Relations between involved actors 161
Figure 6.2. Participation and influences of cooperatives in Tay Ninh and Quang Tri
189
Figure 6.3. Irrigation infrastructure in the Tay Ninh system 190
Figure 6.4. Positions of actors under the existing institutional arrangements
195
Figure 7.1. Increased revenues of IDMCs for the period 2007-‐2010 201
Figure 7.2. The change of irrigated area in the studied IDMCs 203
Figure 7.3. Proportions of expenditures of IDMCs 205
Figure 7.4. The state budgets for subsidizing water fees in 2009, 2010 and 2011 during a period 2008-‐2010
208
Figure 7.5 Proportion of expenditures for irrigation service in Nam Thach Han
211
Figure 7.6. The performance of IDMC’s staff is assessed by interviewed farmers and cooperatives
214
Figure 7.7. Institutional capacity and performance of the cooperatives are assessed by the cooperatives themselves
216
Figure 7.8. The performance of the cooperatives is assessed by farmers 217 Figure 7.9. The participation by farmers: Views from farmers and local
organizations
226
Figure 7.10. Farmers’ attitudes about participation 232
Figure 8.1. Number of households joining cooperatives in Tay Ninh 251
List of tables
Table 2.1. Different types of irrigation decentralization 24
Table 2.2. Expected outcomes and impacts of irrigation decentralization
42
Table 2.3. Groups of indicators for assessing outcomes of IMT 43
Table 2.4. Approaches for assessing decentralization from three different processes
46
Table 2.5. Power exercise by actors 56
Table 3.1. The number of questionnaire interviews 84
Table 3.2 Main contents in the three sets of questionnaires 86
Table 3.3. Key informants and key information discussed 88
Table 4.1. State-‐owned irrigation companies at different regions 112
Table 4.2. Main characteristics of each type of local organizations 115
Table 5.1. Grassroots Democratization in Vietnam 141
Table 5.2. Water fees regulated in three different policies in Quang Tri and Tay Ninh provinces
150
Table 6.1. Mandates and authority of the state management agencies in legal documents
166
Table 6.2. Structure of cooperative management boards in Chau Thanh district
183
Table 7.1. Financial balance from irrigation service in 2011 of 13 cooperatives in Nam Thach Han irrigation system, Quang Tri province
210
Table 7.2 Financial balance from irrigation service in 2011 of 21 cooperatives in Chau Thanh and Trang Bang districts, Tay Ninh province
210
Table 7.3. The previous assessments on main outcomes and impacts of
irrigation decentralization in Tay Ninh and Nam Thach Han 234
Table 8.1. Organizational structure of cooperatives in Nam Thach Han 247
Table 8.2. Organizational structure of Cooperatives in Tay Ninh 247
Acronyms and abbreviations
AC Agricultural Cooperative
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFTA Asian Free Trade Area
ASIAN Association of South East Asian Nations
APEC Asian-‐Pacific Economic Cooperation
CBNRM Community-‐Based Natural Resources Management
CDD Community-‐Driven Development
CECODES Centre for Community Support and Development Studies
CIEM Central Institute for Economic Development
CPC Commune People’s Committee
CPR Common Pool Resources
CPP Commission on People’s Petitions of the Standing Committee for the
National Assembly of Viet Nam
CSO Civil Society Organization
DANIDA Danish development assistance programmes
DARD Department of Agricultural and Rural Development
DFID Department for International Development of the United Kingdom
DONRE Department of Natural Resources and Environment
DOF Department of Finance
DOLISA Department of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs
DPI Department of Planning and Investment
DPC District People’s Committee
DWR Department of Water Resources
ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
FR The Front Review of the Central Committee for the Viet Nam
Fatherland Front
ICWE Dublin Conference on Water and Environment
IDMC Irrigation and Drainage Management Company
IME Irrigation Management Enterprise
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMT Irrigation Management Transfer
IPSARP Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural
Development
IT Irrigation Team (Irrigation Groups)
IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management
JICA Japan International Cooperation Program
GDP Gross Domestic Production
GoV Government of Vietnam
GSO General Statistics Office
GMS Greater Mekong Sub-‐region
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
MARD Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MONRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOLISA Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs
MPI Ministry of Planning and Investment
NGO Non-‐Government Organization
NWRC National Water Resources Council
NRM Natural Resources Management
ODA Overseas Development Agency
O&M Operation and Maintenance
PAR Public Administration Reform
PIM Participatory Irrigation Management
PPC Provincial People’s Committee
PPP Public-‐Private Partnership
SAC Structural Adjustment Credit
SEDS Socio-‐Economic Development Strategy
SOE State-‐owned Enterprise
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US United States
VAWR Vietnam Academy for Water Resources
VFF Vietnam Fatherland Front
VND Vietnam Dong
VN GWP Vietnam Global Water Partnership
VWRAP Vietnam Water Resources Assistance Project
WB World Bank
WCED World Commission on Environmental and Development
WGF Water Governance Facility
WUA/WUO Water Users’ Association/Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
WWAP United Nations World Water Assessment Programme
1 sao = 500 m2 1 USD = 20,000 VND (October 2012)
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Solutions, understandings, and dynamics in water institutional reforms
1.1.1 Institutional reforms as solutions to water crises
Water crises have become a major global concern because the world’s water resources are under pressure in many places. Water scarcity generally emerges for several reasons with two dominating changes building pressure: limited availability of water sources due to ecological changes with environmental causes, and dramatic increases in water demand due to significant increases in the world’s population, urbanization, and new human activities for economic development (FAO, 2005; Shivakotti et al., 2005; Sachs, 2008). The water crises have been lifted to the fore in much of the international debates as a consequence of ineffective management and investment, inappropriate institutions, and limited capacity (Saleth & Dinar, 2004; UNDP WGF, 2013). These criticisms have been associated with the “patronage” management paradigm that highlights supply-‐driven approach, technical solutions and infrastructure investment, and centralized management. The main concerns referred to the shortcomings of government bureaucracies in monitoring and enforcement, in accessing information at local level, and in conflict resolution. An overly bureaucratic hierarchy generated high cost for management and monitoring, in combination with top-‐down management that led to ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and inequity in water allocation and management (Shivakoti et al., 2005). As a net result, widespread problems, such as poor performance, low return on investment, an inadequate and degraded infrastructure, and insufficient state budgets, have been major unsolved issues in the water sector in many countries (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004).
An outcome from the search for improved solutions of water crises is a new paradigm with demand-‐based approaches that shifted attention more to economic solutions, and decentralized management (Plummer &
Slaymaker, 2007). Water reforms have then been launched on a worldwide scale since the 1990s as a response to the international initiatives on water1 and to the pressure from international lending banks and many bilateral and multi-‐lateral donors (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004; Molle et al., 2009). This is when key issues in water sector reforms came to include policy and institutional reforms, integrated water resources management (IWRM) at river basin scale, public participation, and decentralization (Perret et al., 2006). Water governance, emerging as one concern from the broad governance concept introduced after the Washington Consensus, gives an emphasis on linkages, partnerships, and processes between and within state and non-‐state entities such as private sector, civil society at all levels (e.g. farm, system, and basis levels) in decision-‐making (Tropp, 2007). Efficiency, autonomy, participation, accountability, transparency, integrity, and equity in water management are all treated as general principles for “good” governance (Roger & Hall, 2003).
A corresponding paradigm shift in irrigated agriculture, a dominating water use sector in many agriculture-‐based countries, has followed. Among the major challenges relating to water shortage is an increasing demand for improved agricultural productivity and food security for a growing population (FAO, 2005)2. Agricultural diversification, modernization and market-‐orientated crop cultivation in the situation of globalization and
1 The concept of “Sustainable Development” was raised at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm Conference) in 1972 in response to the concerns about the degradation of the human environment, over-exploitation of natural resources and the consequences for economic and social development. It was re-launched by the Brundtland Commission in 1987, realizing that environment and development are intertwined and highlighting development should
“meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations” (WCED, 1987). Water reforms towards Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) have been embarked as a response to the key international initiatives: the Dublin Conference on Water and Environment in 1992 (ICWE 1992), the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio with the Agenda 21 (UNCED 1992), the Second inter-ministerial World Water Forum at the Hague in 2000
2Population in the world is estimated to increase by about 50% over the next 50 years. Therefore, food production needs to increase double (GWP website). Irrigated areas in Asia account for about 60% of the world’s area. About 82% of a total water source is used for agriculture. The population accounts for about 50% of the world’s population. Recently, irrigation systems in the region provide water for about 41% of the total cultivated areas (FAO, 2012: 47)
high international market competition add to these pressures (WB, 2008).
The whole irrigation farming practice has been brought policy-‐makers under pressure to deliver reforms that improve efficiency and productivity.
Following the consequential policy changes that move power from central bureaucratic agencies to lower-‐level government or non-‐state entities, decentralization of irrigation management has been launched globally to transfer responsibilities in management and finance in irrigation systems from a state irrigation agency to water users’ organizations or private sector. The primary aims are to bring decision-‐making in irrigation management closer to water users and to shift payments in operation and maintenance (O&M) to water users (Molle et al., 2009). As a result, expected outcomes emerge on improved irrigation performance, increased cost recovery, and reduced the state financial budget (Garces-‐Restrepo et al., 2007).
1.1.2 Debates around institutional reforms: solutions and understanding
The shift of power and the forms for exercising it at local water users’
organizations are known as the concepts of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) and Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM), respectively. The transfer responsibility of water allocation and management to private companies/enterprises (e.g. in England, Australia) or to farmers (e.g. in Argentina, New Zealand) is also implemented under a form of privatization (Saleth & Dinar, 2006). The processes are combined and have been adopted worldwide as cornerstones for the decentralization efforts in the irrigation sector (including Vietnam). In spite of having a long list of benefits and expectations in theory, decentralization in practice does not achieve the expected goals (Merrey et al., 2007; Mukherji et al., 2009b).
Earlier experience and empirical studies underscore how difficult it is to make decentralization work in practice. The processes are assessed as incomplete (Vemillions, 1997), and their outcomes are very mixed (Mukherji et al., 2009a). In fact, many established water users’
organizations (WUOs) under the IMT/PIM process ceased to function as soon as the external support from donor-‐funded projects closed (Bandaragoda, 2006). None of the tested forms of decentralization (i.e. the devolution, privatization, decentralization, partnership) have brought about the expected outcomes (Meinzen-‐Dick, 2007).
In many instances, water institutional reforms have even been seen as the
“ceremonial and cosmetic” processes because they have been implemented in incomplete and fragmented institutions, and at policy level only (Saleth
& Dinar, 2006). One area of controversy in the literature is around the concern why many cases have failed. But no comprehensive conclusion has as yet been drawn from these debates (Callejo & Cossio, 2009). In much of the previous research (cf. Burman, 2001; Saleth & Dina, 2004; Sengupta 2005; Barker & Molle, 2005; Bandaragoda, 2006; Garces-‐Restrepo et al.
2007; Mukherji et al., 2009a), poor implementations are often seen as a main cause for reforms’ failures. Examples include poor preparation and an improper legal framework, a lack of capacity and limited participation of stakeholders, strong interventions of donors, a lack of political commitments, and resistance of the powerful actors. Policy recommendations for achieving effective decentralization, therefore, put the emphasis on enabling legal frameworks to empower and enhance capacity within local organizations, and to set up a mechanism for public participation (WB, 2008).
However, with experience from limited outcomes in many donor-‐funded projects (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004), the question of what should be done to maintain long-‐term success with decentralization, and even how it should be implemented, seems to remain unanswered. In actual fact, there is also no consensus among the researcher and donor communities about the proper form of water governance (Plummer & Slaymaker, 2007). A widespread application of decentralization in public sectors and natural resources management today is associated with the ambition to achieve good governance, efficiency, and development. This representation of decentralization as intrinsically good has become a global mantra over the last decades. However, this concept needs to be challenged since decentralization in practice does not always achieve the expected goals and is not always efficient in affecting economic of scale and overall coordination even through having a long list of benefits and expectations in theory (cf. Litvack et al., 1998; Campos & Hellman, 2005; WB, 2008).
In a broader debate around water reforms than irrigated agriculture, the concepts of decentralization and governance have been heavily criticized
with regards to their inconsistent definitions, misleading assumptions and shortcomings in applications (Cohen & Peterson, 1997; Plummer &
Slaymaker, 2007). Governance is associated with a critique of ideological presumption of neoliberal economic policies about democracy and development based on a free market economy and private sectors as a means of achieving economic growth (cf. Gunnarsson & Holmén, 1995;
Mehrotra, 2006). In spite of emphasizing partnerships between state and non-‐state entities, and processes in social, economic, political domains, two application consequences of governance have been questioned—a lack of socio-‐political context and an over-‐emphasis of legal arrangements. “A social engineering approach” and a widespread application of blueprint models in many donor-‐funded projects focus more on administrative and technical aspects than social and political contexts (Merrey et al., 2007).
Institutional reforms place an emphasis on formal institutions and legal frameworks (i.e. laws, policies, and organizational restructure), but informal organizations and institutions (i.e. customary behavior, norms, incentives of actors, social relations, traditions and the process of cultural changes) are usually ignored (Sokile et al., 2005; Saleth, 2005; Molle et al., 2009). There is also a widespread lack of attention to the dynamics in institutional evolution and power structure in multi-‐level interaction processes (Saleth & Dinar, 2004; Clement 2010; 2013). Consequently, these limitations create a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of social organizations and incentives of actors in collective actions (Cleaver 2002).
In my reading of the literature, this has brought research communities and donors to focus on global reform trends with prime attention to searching solutions to constraints during implementation and less emphasis on understanding contexts, dynamic processes, and the consequences of institutional changes. In my opinion, the main focus of many researchers, practitioners, and donors is on what should be done but not on why constraints/limitations occur and why such contradictory results are obtained. It would be a reason why there is a lack of critical evaluations by many donors of the applications of blueprint models (Plummer &
Slaymaker, 2007) and of the failures of many cases (Mollinga & Bolning, 2004). As for its research focus, the current study is intended to illustrate how necessary both aspects; solutions and understandings are to the implementation of sustainable decentralization. My suggestion is that
