Background, structure, modus operandi

upon the radicalisation of the opposition and the escalation of the conflict, especially in Anbar, where a standoff between the Sunni leadership in Falluja and the government turned into an outright siege of the city by the ISF. ISIL was in first instance rejected by the local authorities, but by proving its military value, succeeded to gain control of the city.⁷¹²

During the period from July 2012 to July 2013 ISIL conducted a major terror campaign all over the country, under the name Breaking The Walls.⁷¹³ This series of heavy attacks on a multitude of targets aimed at a liberation of AQI prisoners, and at the domination of the territory that previously controlled by AQI in 2006. Among the targets of the campaign that were particularly attacked by Vehicle Borne Explosive Devices (VBIED) were symbols of the Shia government under Maliki, like the ISF, judges, other government officials, but also Shia neighbourhoods in Baghdad and other cities and towns.⁷¹⁴ The end of the Breaking the Walls campaign was marked by the prison break at Abu Ghraib on 21 July 2013, leading to the escape of 500 or more prisoners, most of them detained on terrorism charges.⁷¹⁵

After Breaking the Walls, ISIL almost immediately announced a new campaign: Soldiers harvest, another wave of heavy VBIED attacks, focused on Baghdad and southern Iraq. ISIL aimed mainly on critical infrastructure like the port of Um Qasr in Basrah.⁷¹⁶

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the military strategy of ISIL is marked by the concept of hybrid warfare it adopts to a high degree: Depending on the situation, it uses either terrorist attacks, guerrilla tactics or conventional manoeuvre warfare. The terrorist attacks are aimed to intimidate security forces and inspire fear and insecurity among the civilian population. The guerrilla warfare tactics are used to attack enemy forces in an indirect way, to weaken and disrupt the adversary.The conventional warfare approach is adopted to attack enemy forces directly, destroy military targets and conquer terrain.⁷¹⁷ In all three forms of warfare, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) plays a great role. Either with or without the use of vehicles as a carrier, and with or without a suicide driver/carrier of the explosives.⁷¹⁸

The Sunni uprising against the Maliki-government was not solely led by ISIL, but also a number of actors contributed to it, like part of the Sunni tribes, clerics, the Iraqi Islamic Party, former Baathists etc. Every group had its own claims.⁷¹⁹ However, after the capture of large parts of central Iraq by ISIL in June 2014, these and other local insurgent groups fell in decline under ISIL.⁷²⁰ As the example of Falluja showed, the opposition against the Shia-dominated central government was heterogeneous and not exclusively supported by Sunni extremists. Because of the superior military capacity of ISIL after its successes in neighbouring Syria and the increasing pressure by Baghdad, it was able to achieve a dominant position in the city, to the detriment of the other groups participating in the insurgency.⁷²¹

712 International Crisis Group, Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian Bargain, Middle East Report No. 150, 28 April 2014, url, p. 15.

713 Lewis, J.D., Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, September 2013, url.

714 Lewis, J.D., Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, September 2013, url, pp. 13-20.

715 Lewis, J.D., Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, September 2013, url, p. 7.

716 Lewis, J.D., Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, September 2013, url., p. 21.

717 Lewis McFate. J. The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria: Countering an adaptive Enemy, May 2015, url, pp. 17-18.

718 Lewis McFate. J. The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria: Countering an adaptive Enemy, May 2015, url, pp. 19-20, pp. 21-23.

719 International Crisis Group, Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State, 14 August 2013, url, pp. 16-23;

International Crisis Group, Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian Bargain, 28 April 2014, url, p. 11.

720 Ohlers, C.A., What to Expect in Iraq After the Liberation of Mosul, 5 May 2017, url

721 International Crisis Group, Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian Bargain, 28 April 2014, url, pp. 14-16.

ISIL is strongly rooted in a strictly conservative interpretation of Islam, with a literal reading of the Quran, with the Sharia as penal system, and a complete rejection of any other interpretations of Islam, like Shia or Sufi. According to Hassan Hassan, an expert on Islamist and Salafi groups and resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, (a think tank in Washington D.C.), the Islamic State has largely borrowed from Wahhabism, and pushes the concept of wala wal bara (loyalty to Islam and rejection of anything that is perceived as un-islamic) and tawhid (the oneness of God) further than other Salafist groups. In areas conquered by the Islamic State, symbols of polytheistic practices (shirk) were systematically destroyed, like Sufi or Shia shrines.⁷²² An important element of the ideology of ISIL is the concept of takfir, the accusation of a Muslim by another Muslim that he/she is an unbeliever, and thus an apostate.⁷²³ Takfirism is heavily used by ISIL as an ideological justification of its actions towards fellow Muslims.⁷²⁴

Although a militaristic organisation in the first place, ISIL took over the local administration in territories where it exerted control over the territory and the population, and more importantly, it introduced its own judicial system, based on a strict interpretation of the Sharia. These ‘Sharia courts’ were – together with the law enforcement of the Sharia police - an important instrument in pushing through the religious agenda of the organisation. As pointed out by Richard Barrett of the Soufan Group in 2014, the enforcement of religious observance is a symbol and also an instrument of the power of the Islamic State. The task of the Sharia police force was the supervision of the Islamic conduct of the population in the areas under control by the Islamic State.⁷²⁵ The same source states that the Sharia courts dealt with religious transgressions, but also with other civil affairs. Either the Sharia police or private citizens had the right to bring forward accusations. In a country, where justice ‘has been partial, sporadic, and subject to corruption’, the Sharia courts enjoyed some popularity, because they were able to avoid those defects.⁷²⁶

According to UNAMI since 1 January 2014, an estimated 30 000 civilians have been killed and another 55 000 injured in the conflict between the Iraqi authorities and ISIL.⁷²⁷ In November 2018 UNAMI released a report documenting 202 mass graves since June 2014, the overwhelming majority of which reportedly contain victims killed by ISIL. Estimates provided to UNAMI range from 6 000 to more than 12 000 victims buried in these sites, with the largest number being located in the governorates of Ninewa (95), Kirkuk (37), Salah al-Din (36) and Anbar (24).⁷²⁸ The report further stated that ‘victims include women, children, elderly and persons with disabilities, members and former members of the Iraqi armed forces and police, and some foreign workers.’⁷²⁹

ISF, with the support of the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, had reclaimed all of the territory that ISIL had captured in 2014 and 2015, and by the end of 2017, ISIL did not hold

722 Hassan, H. The Sectarianism of the Islamic State. Ideological Roots and Political Context, June 2016, url, p. 5.

723 Oxford University, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, Takfir, n.d., url.

724 Atlantic (The), What ISIS Really Wants, March 2015, url.

725 Soufan Group (The), The Islamic State, November 2014, url, p. 30.

726 Soufan Group (The), The Islamic State, November 2014, url, p. 30.

727 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 3.

728 UNAMI/OHCHR, “Unearthing Atrocities: Mass Graves in territory formerly controlled by ISIL”, 6 November 2018, url, pp. 1-2.

729 UNAMI/ OHCHR, “Unearthing Atrocities: Mass Graves in territory formerly controlled by ISIL”, 6 November 2018.

territory under its control anymore.⁷³⁰ In its report from November 2018, DIS and Landinfo note that the organisation changed back to be a more ordinary, traditional insurgent group, concentrating in areas in the Hamreen Mountains, in Hawija, in Diyala and Ninewa provinces, as well in the border areas towards Syria and Iran.⁷³¹ The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted in October 2018 that ISIL retains a small control zone north of Baiji, and support zones in the areas of Daquq, Hawija, Riyadh and Rashad districts (Kirkuk Governorate), ‘as well as in rural areas around Lake Hamrin in the Diyala River Valley’.⁷³²

There are an estimated 15-17 000 ISIL fighters still active in Iraq as of August 2018.⁷³³ According to an UN report, the total number of current ISIL members across both Iraq and Syria is estimated to be between 20 000 and 30 000 individuals, and among them there are still many thousands of active foreign fighters.⁷³⁴ ISW stated in October 2018 that the activities of ISIL in Iraq are limited to small arms attacks, targeted assassinations and suicide vest, but that the group is scaling up the rate of its attacks to as many as four assassinations per week across Northern and Central Iraq. ISIL hasn’t yet returned to the systematic use of VBIEDs which were broadly deployed in 2011-2013.⁷³⁵

The situation remains unstable and ISIL continues to carry out targeted attacks against civilians⁷³⁶ and asymmetric attacks across Iraq.⁷³⁷ A longer-term insurgency situation is developing⁷³⁸, particularly intensely in Salah al-Din, and Diyala.⁷³⁹

Regarding ISIL’s capacity to commit violence, the DIS/Landinfo report notes that although ISIL does not have control of any geographical area in Kirkuk Governorate, ‘there are pockets of ISIS fighters around the governorate, especially in Hawija in Kirkuk Governorate and in the Hamreen Mountains extending over Diyala, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din governorates and the group is relatively more active in the governorate compared to other parts of Iraq.’⁷⁴⁰ The same source assessed that ISIL still has some presence in Ninewa Governorate, concentrated in more remote areas close to the Iraq-Syria border and in the Badoush area between Mosul and Tel Afar. ISIL cells ‘are active during the night carrying out explosions, killings, assassinations and attacks on a regularly basis’, particularly in Mosul and surrounding

730 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2017 - Chapter 1 - Iraq, 19 September 2018, url; UN Security Council, Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2018/770], 16 August 2018, url, p. 2; Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.

731 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.

732 ISW, ISIS's Second Resurgence, 2 October 2018, url.

733 US Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018 – June 30 2018, August 2018, url, p. 3.

734 UN Security Council, Twenty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 27 July 2018, url, p. 5.

735 ISW, ISIS's Second Resurgence, 2 October 2018, url.

736 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 1.

737 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/359), 17 April 2018, url, p. 4.

738 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018, url, p. 2; ISW, ISIS's Second Resurgence, 2 October 2018, url.

739 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018, url, p. 2.

740 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 15.

villages.⁷⁴¹ In Salah al-Din Governorate ISIL operational capabilities are limited by the presence of the PMUs but pockets of fighters operating during the night have still been reported.⁷⁴² In November 2018 the Center for Strategic and International Studies, referring to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), stated that ISIL attacks in the Kirkuk Governorate were estimated to have doubled from 2017 to 2018. Data records on ISIL orchestrated attacks in Kirkuk Governorate peaked in October 2018, and the number of attacks had also increased in Salah al-Din and Ninewa governorates. The source explained that

‘the lack of an official military presence throughout ungoverned space and disputed territories in Kirkuk and Salah ad-Dine provinces have enabled Islamic State militants to operate freely.’⁷⁴³

Numerous sources cited by the DIS/Landinfo 2018 FFM report state that ‘the primary targets of ISIS are the security forces (ISF) and the PMU and to some extent government officials.’⁷⁴⁴ Other sources also state that ISIL continues to focus targeted attacks on members of the Iraqi police, security forces and PMUs⁷⁴⁵, in Ninewa and Kirkuk in particular.⁷⁴⁶

DIS/Landinfo also noted that ‘for the purpose of creating chaos in the Iraqi society other actors such as civilians or people collaborating with the security actors or the authorities can also be targets for ISIS.’⁷⁴⁷ The same source notes that ISIL ‘will use often use scare tactics where the members drive into villages at night time to demonstrate the powerlessness of the authorities and the ISF and to show that the group still exists’.⁷⁴⁸ Furthermore, they explain that ‘the level of violence shows that ISIS still has the capacity to carry out attacks, but on a smaller scale compared to when the group controlled vast territory in the northern Iraq. The authorities often blame ISIS when attacks take place. And in some cases, ISIS does take the blame for the attacks. However, it is not always ISIS who is responsible for the violence.’⁷⁴⁹

ISIL has also been responsible for incidents where civilians have been ‘killed or kidnapped at fake checkpoints’.⁷⁵⁰ ISIL also targeted its attacks against tribal leaders⁷⁵¹ and local mayoral

741 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 17.

742 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 18-19.

743 Markusen, M. B., The Islamic State and the Persistent Threat of Extremism in Iraq, 30 November 2018, url.

744 Markusen, M. B., The Islamic State and the Persistent Threat of Extremism in Iraq, 30 November 2018, url.

745 UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/359), 17 April 2018, url, p. 9; US Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018 – June 30 2018, August 2018, url, p. 20.

746 UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/359), 17 April 2018, url, p. 9.

747 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.

748 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.

749 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.

750 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.

751 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.

officials, such as in Kirkuk and Ninewa governorates in, whom they accused of providing information on their movements to the government.⁷⁵²