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Targeting by KRG Forces

1. Targeting by state actors and affiliated armed groups

1.2 Sunni perceived to be ISIL collaborators or sympathisers

1.2.3 Targeting by KRG Forces

Sources interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo during a 2018 fact-finding mission to KRI noted that

‘Kurdish security forces have full control over the KRI and there are no Iraqi federal security forces operating inside the KRI.’188 The report further assessed that ‘security forces in the KRI are also targeting suspected ISIS affiliates who are often Sunni Arabs’ whereas the PMUs and ISF don’t have the capacity to operate in Kurdish areas.189

In its World Report 2018, Human Rights Watch observes the battle against ISIL afforded KRG forces the latitude to carry out serious abuses under the guise of fighting terrorism.190 Human Rights Watch reported that ‘the judicial systems of both the federal Iraqi and the KRG authorities are prosecuting thousands ISIL suspects under their respective counterterrorism legislation, primarily for membership in or providing support to ISIS.’191 Human Rights Watch added that ISIL suspects are being held in ‘overcrowded and in some cases inhumane conditions’.192

In a December 2017 report Human Rights Watch expressed its concern about government forces detaining suspects ‘with little real evidence or grounds’. Besides widespread arbitrary detention of ISIL suspects, there are ‘numerous allegations of torture in the course of security forces’ interrogations’.193 Human Rights Watch has documented allegations of torture by KRG forces holding ISIL suspects. For instance, out of 19 child ISIL suspects held by the KRG and interviewed by Human Rights Watch, seventeen said that Asayish forces tortured them in order to extract confessions.194 Furthermore, Human Rights Watch described the prosecution

185UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retaking of Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 36.

186 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 7.

187 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Investigate abuses in Hawija operation, 28 September 2017, url.

188 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 23, 24.

189 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 24-25.

190 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Iraq, 18 January 2018, url.

191 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Iraq, 18 January 2018, url.

192 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Iraq, 18 January 2018, url.

193 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 21.

194 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 51.

of ISIL suspects in Kurdish courts as flawed, relying exclusively on an expired counterterrorism law and based on confessions and written witness testimony.195

During a fact-finding mission to the KRI in September and October 2015 Public Aid Organization (PAO)/Kurdish Human Rights Watch (KHRW) informed the Danish Immigration Service that the Kurdish authorities generally view Sunni Arabs as part of ISIL until the opposite is proven. Even Sunni Arabs who have lived in KRI for a long period of time might experience difficulties crossing border checkpoints or checkpoints inside KRI.196

Disputed territories under de facto Kurdish control (up until October 2017)

Areas of the disputed territories of Iraq, including Kirkuk, came under Kurdish Peshmerga control during 2014 and up to October 2017, KRG ‘de facto’ controlled some of those areas.

However, as a consequence of a Kurdish referendum on independence on 25 September 2017, the ISF in cooperation with the PMUs took back control of most of the disputed areas on 16 and 17 October 2017, which had previously been under control of the Kurdish Peshmerga.197 Therefore, this section deals with examples from the areas prior to the loss of Kurdish control and regaining of ISF presence in the disputed territories.

Concerning the actions of KRG-government forces, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in Iraq mentions in a June 2018 report retaliatory attacks by Kurdish security forces and associated Peshmerga and Yazidi armed groups, against Sunni Arab civilians and property following the recapturing or territory from ISIL.198 In a December 2017 report Human Rights Watch noted that since 2014, units of the KRG have carried out mass destruction of civilian property in areas recaptured from ISIL.199 In a November 2016 report Human Rights Watch reported on the demolition of buildings and homes by Kurdish security forces in seventeen villages in Kirkuk and four in Ninewa between September 2014 and May 2016. In a further 62 villages satellite imagery provided evidence of destruction after Kurdish security forces recaptured them. KRG President Massoud Barzani informed Human Rights Watch in July 2016 ‘that the KRG would not allow Sunni Arabs to return to villages that had been ”Arabized” by former President Saddam Hussein’ considering that they are rightfully Kurdish lands.200 The Human Rights Watch report further remarked that ‘such territorial claims lend credence to the belief of many Arabs that KRG security forces may have carried out demolitions for the purpose of preventing or dissuading Arabs from returning there.’201 Human Rights Watch explained that in the 'disputed areas', and in several cases in KRI, there are examples of Arabs arrested on suspicion of being ISIL members and deported.202 In 2015, Human Rights Watch observed that in Kurdish areas there is ‘a steady stream of people being arrested on the suspicion of being ISIS supporters’, despite a ‘striking absence of reports of

195 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, pp. 36-40.

196 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April 2016, url, p. 27

197 US, CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, 4 October 2018, url, pp. 1-2, 10-12.

198 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 9.

199 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 19.

200 Human Rights Watch, Marked with an ‘X’. Iraqi Kurdish forces’ destruction of villages, homes in conflict with ISIS, November 2016, url, p. 3.

201 Human Rights Watch, Marked with an ‘X’. Iraqi Kurdish forces’ destruction of villages, homes in conflict with ISIS, November 2016, url, p. 3.

202 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April 2016, url, p. 31.

suspected IS fighters in the prisons throughout KRI’.203 UNHCR informed the DIS that the possibility to seek protection from the authorities in KRI and other Kurdish controlled areas in case of harassment based on religious and/or ethnic affiliation depends on the personal connections of the person in question.204

In a November 2016 report Amnesty International reported that since mid-2014 hundreds of thousands of IDPs have found shelter in Kirkuk, ‘raising fears among Kurdish leaders and residents about the impact of the population movement on the demographic composition of the governorate’.205 Following a surprise attack by ISIL on Kirkuk Governorate on 21 October 2016, Arab IDPs and Arab residents of the governorate suffered a backlash. The authorities in Kirkuk demolished the homes of hundreds of Sunni Arab residents of Kirkuk and Arab IDPs were displaced to camps or expelled from Kirkuk Governorate.206

Discussing the security situation in the disputed territories in 2016, UNHCR informed the Danish Immigration Service that, generally speaking, young single men faced higher harassment rates based on their religious or ethnic affiliation than other profiles, stating that

‘a Sunni Arab with no connections would potentially face a higher risk of harassment.’207 Human Rights Watch informed the Danish Immigration Service that the Asayish and the Peshmerga forces rounded up suspected ISIL supporters or members in Kirkuk, and there are concerns about their due process rights and a general suspicion of Sunni Arab Iraqis. The source further stated that ‘there are reports from 2014 that several dozens of Arab men have been assassinated around Kirkuk, allegedly by Kurdish forces or Shia militias.’208

The following are examples of treatment of local population by KRG forces in disputed territories under de facto Kurdish control up to October 2017.209

Ninewa

 Since regaining control of Zummar, west of Mosul, in late October 2014, Peshmerga and associated forces conducted ‘retaliatory attacks’ against Sunni Arab civilians in the sub-district after retaking control from ISIL and causing ‘scores’ of Sunni Arab families to relocate to Mosul or Syria.210

 On 22 April 2015, Peshmerga members expelled Sunni Arab residents from the village of Sahl al-Malih, southern Zummar sub-district and set fire to their homes, accusing them of supporting ISIL.211

203 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April 2016, url, p. 39.

204 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April 2016, url, p. 51.

205 AI, ‘Where are we supposed to go?’. Destruction and forced displacement in Kirkuk, 7 November 2016, url, p.

8.

206 AI, ‘Where are we supposed to go?’. Destruction and forced displacement in Kirkuk, 7 November 2016, url, p.

5.

207 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April 2016, url, p. 29.

208 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April 2016, url, pp. 33-34.

209 Perceived ISIL affiliation is not necessarily explicitly cited as the reason for the committed abuses in the examples cited.

210 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April 2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 27.

211 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April 2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 30.

 In mid-November 2015, at least 156 Sunni Arab families from three villages (al-Golat, Aeiashat, and Neaineea'a) were displaced by military operations conducted by Kurdish security forces to liberate Sinjar district. Whilst some of them were captured by ISIL, others were stopped by Peshmerga forces as they attempted to access safe areas. Between 5 and 16 February, Peshmerga prevented food items from reaching the families, alleging that they were infiltrated by ISIL elements. A number of villagers died.212

 On 14 January 2016, Peshmerga forces destroyed more than 20 houses belonging to Sunni Arab families in Der Um Toutha village, Wana sub-district, Tal Kaif. After the area was retaken by Peshmerga in February 2015, villagers were forcibly displaced and Sunni Arab families were barred from returning.213

 On 17 April 2016, Asayish ordered 26 families (317 individuals), all Sunni Arabs from Aski Mosul town, Huthema and Tal Thahab villages, to prepare to leave the areas the following day for security reasons. On 18 April, they were relocated to the Garmawa IDP camp (Dohuk Governorate). Leaving this camp was reportedly only allowed with written permission of Asayish.214

 The KRG placed restrictions on the movement of goods into and out of the district of Sinjar, thus limiting the access to food, water, livelihoods, and other fundamental rights of the local Yazidi population, Human Rights Watch reports in December 2016.215

 Between 28 August and 3 September 2017, Asayish security forces allegedly carried out mass executions of alleged ISIL fighters in their custody. Approximately 30 were killed and buried in a mass grave in the village of Bardiya, Ninewa Governorate.216 Kurdish authorities denied the allegations.217

Kirkuk

 On 8 February 2015, Peshmerga members allegedly destroyed a number of villages in south-west Kirkuk to prevent ISIL from using them as a base from where to attack Kirkuk.218

 On 2 and 3 August 2015, Peshmerga forces allegedly destroyed civilian houses and government buildings in Dibis district, Kirkuk. In Mullah-Abdullah sub-district, Kirkuk similar destruction took place.219

 On 9 October 2016, Kirkuk authorities (including Peshmerga, Asayish, and Police) forcefully evicted between 3 000 and 4 000 residents of Qara Tapa village, Kirkuk Governorate. Houses were reportedly burnt and destroyed.220

212 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 25.

213 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 21.

214 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 16.

215 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: KRG Restrictions Harm Yezidi Recovery - Disproportionate Limits on Goods Entering, Leaving Sinjar, 4 December 2016, url.

216 Human Rights Watch, Kurdistan Regional Government: allegations of mass executions, 8 February 2018, url.

217 Human Rights Watch, KRG Response to war crimes Allegations in Iraq falls short, 5 April 2018, url.

218 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April 2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 29.

219 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015, 11 January 2016, url, p. 26.

220 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 5.

 On 21 October 2016, in Qutan Village in Pajwan sub-district of Kirkuk district, Peshmerga forces evicted residents. KDP Asayish forces transported the detained residents to Laylan camp a couple of days later and completely or partially demolished all the houses in Qutan village, except for six belonging to Turkmen families.221

 On 24 October 2016, KDP security forces evicted approximately 30 families of Qush Qaya Village, in Pajwan sub-district of Kirkuk.222

 In November 2016 Peshmerga destroyed houses, buildings and even entire villages in the territories they recently conquered. Human Rights Watch mentions 17 villages in Kirkuk and 4 in Ninewa governorates, specifically the sub-district of Zummar.223 Diyala

 On 16 August 2015, Peshmerga forces demolished an unknown number of houses and structures in Sunni-inhabited areas in Jalawla, Diyala Governorate.224