Recruitment by PMUs and affiliated armed groups

The Institute for the Study of War noted in its December 2017 report which outlines the ISF and PMU Orders of Battle in Iraq, stated that the recruitment process within the PMUs is managed by the Popular Mobilisation Commission (PMC) in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior. According to the same source ‘the Central Administrative Directorate manages a

396 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016, url, p. 20; Human Rights Watch, Fallujah abuses test control of militias, 9 June2016, url.

397 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 19.

398 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 5.

399 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Displaced Families Blocked from Returning. 24 June 2018, url.

400 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Displaced Families Blocked from Returning. 24 June 2018, url.

401 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017, url, p. 18.

402 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Yezidi fighters allegedly execute civilians, 27 December 2017, url.

range of issues from the issuance and modification of recruitment forms, medical examinations, and background and security checks, likely through the regional PMC directorates and governorates.’⁴⁰³

According to an Iraq analyst interviewed during the DIS/Landinfo mission to KRI in 2018, recruitment to the PMUs is on a voluntary basis, many joining for economic reasons such as attractive salaries [up to USD 500/month] compared to rest of Iraq. The report notes that there is no draft relating to the PMU.⁴⁰⁴

Discussing recruitment by PMUs at EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017, Joost Hiltermann, Program Director for Middle East & North Africa at the International Crisis Group, noted that ‘militias have no trouble recruiting because they have money and pay well;

there are economic incentives to join.’⁴⁰⁵ Mark Lattimer, Director of the Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, pointed out at the same meeting that ‘most of the members of the Shia militias are Shiite but there are also Sunni, Christian or mixed militias. Service in militias is very attractive for young men because of the possibility to earn a wage where there are few other economic options.’⁴⁰⁶ Gareth Stansfield, Professor of Middle East Politics and the Al-Qasimi Chair of Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter, remarked that ‘Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Brigades have a good level of recruitment, including among the Shiite Turkmen of Tuz Khormatu and Tal Afar.’⁴⁰⁷

Belkis Wille, senior Iraq researcher in the Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch, stated at the same meeting that ‘the problem of recruitment that is “not totally voluntary” concerns mainly the Sunni tribal militias. Young men, sometimes minors, are recruited in camps for displaced persons through tribal leaders; they can also be strongly encouraged by their brothers or their parents, or they may follow in a relatives’ footsteps, or go along to accompany a father or brother to the fighting and become involved that way.

There was a wave of recruitment in the spring of 2016.’⁴⁰⁸

In an April 2017 report Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar noted the popularity of the PMU among the country’s Shia population, resulting in an overabundance of volunteers:

‘A major reason why neither Abadi nor any other leader is able to challenge the PMF groups is because of their broad popularity among Iraqi society. The paramilitary outfits are particularly popular among the country’s Shia population. An August 2015 poll claims that 99 percent of Shia respondents support the use of the PMF to fight the Islamic State. Abadi’s chief intelligence officer has stated that up to 75 percent of men between eighteen and thirty years old living in Shia-majority provinces had signed up to enlist in the PMF by the spring of 2016. Since there are more volunteers than the state needs or can fund, most of these recruits remain inactive and not on the official list of active fighters. As volunteers flocked from all of Iraq’s Shia provinces

403 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017, url, p. 34.

404 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 45, 48.

405 Hiltermann, J., EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 12.

406 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 12.

407 Stansfield, G., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 12.

408 Wille, B., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, pp. 14-15.

to enlist, the PMF recruited roughly ten times more volunteers than the Iraqi security forces.’⁴⁰⁹

International Crisis Group noted in an August 2016 report that Grand Ayatollah Sistani‘s June 2014 fatwa resulted in a massive mobilisation of young volunteers:

‘Iraq’s highest religious Shiite authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued a binding religious edict (fatwa) on 13 June, calling on youths to volunteer in defense of the country. The call to sign up spread by word of mouth across the south and resulted in a massive mobilization of young volunteers (mutatawaeen) in what was later called

“popular mobilization” (al-hashd al-shaabi). […] Joining the hashd was the only way for many youths to earn a salary and benefits for their families if they died. Most who enrolled had been working as day laborers or in the lower public sector ranks, with no possibility of a decent living. Still, while income was an incentive, their motives cannot be reduced to material interest. The hashd attracted many destitute youths in part because recruitment targeted the most densely populated, poorest areas (like Sadr City in Baghdad, Basrah, Diwaniya and Amara) or was done near the frontline (for example, Shula and Hurriya neighborhoods in Baghdad and Karbala). Young men continued to volunteer even when the government or militia defaulted on pay. In 2015, volunteers joined training sessions for reservists that offered no remuneration.’⁴¹⁰

In a March 2016 report Michael Knights, an expert on Iraq with the Washington Institute⁴¹¹, discusses the appeal of the PMUs to Shia youth:

‘Many Iraqis, particularly younger ones, want to try something new, and to reject old institutions. The PMU also offered a military experience that appealed to many young people. Pay and benefits (pension, disability allowances) are not as good as a permanent government job but service is flexible, with recruits able to come and go as they please. Discipline is lax, which suits many young people. The command style of PMU leaders, as previously discussed, is based on their personal characteristics and level of battle experience, which is again highly attractive to young people who are looking for role models, not necessarily for leaders who must be obeyed whether you like them or not. In many PMU units an emphasis on Shiism and the protection of Shia shrines is another attractive feature.’⁴¹²

1.6.1 Forced recruitment

At EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Belkis Wille, senior Iraq researcher in the Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch, noted that

‘forced recruitment in Shiite militia remains very rare, perhaps three or four cases have been reported. In some cases, young Sunni men enlisted in a Shiite militia (Kata’eb Hezbollah).’⁴¹³ In January 2017 UNHCR mentioned allegations of forced recruitment of male residents, including minors, in newly retaken areas of Mosul stating that ‘IDPs fleeing the eastern side of Mosul are forced, also, by tribal militia to join the military offensive through preparing

409 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, pp. 10-11.

410 International Crisis Group, Fight or flight: the desperate plight of Iraq ‘s “Generation 2000”, 8 August 2016, url, pp. 15-16.

411 A think tank committed to advancing US interests in the Middle East: url

412 Knights, M., The future of Iraq’s armed forces, March 2016, url, p. 30.

413 Wille, B., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, pp. 14-15.

meals, carrying weapons or taking up arms. IDPs are reported to be under the risk of being accused or tainted of affiliation with armed groups should they refuse or show reluctance and that one “volunteered” male per family reportedly absolves the family from allegations of affiliation with the armed group.’⁴¹⁴

In a November 2016 report the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that forced recruitment of fighters does not occur in the PMUs but men might face social pressure to join a militia.⁴¹⁵ Despite the popularity of the PMUs and the availability of volunteers the International Crisis Group noted in August 2016 that armed groups (militias and ISIL alike) increasingly try to recruit young professionals whose skills they need. In particular doctors face this type of recruitment:

‘In areas the government controls, its fading ability to enforce the law in a militia-dominated environment compels young professionals to ask militias for protection.

Armed groups (militias and IS alike) in need of their skills, in particular those of doctors, increasingly try to recruit them, either forcibly or by creating professional associations parallel to the state’s.’⁴¹⁶

Describing the December 2014-April 2015 period UNAMI mentions reports of IDP families being barred from entry to Baghdad, Karbala and Babil, except if the men joined the PMUs, noting that ‘large numbers of IDPs made their way towards Baghdad, Karbala and Babil governorates, although many were denied entry unless they had a sponsor resident in those governorates – and there were reports that some families were only being admitted if the adult men agreed to join the PMU.’⁴¹⁷

Reporting on human rights practices in 2015, USDOS also mentioned reports of local councils forcing displaced persons to enlist:

‘On April 21 (2015), the Wasit Provincial Council issued a statement forcing displaced persons between the ages of 18 and 50 to enlist. Shabak IDPs living in Wasit told Masarat that local police confiscated their identity documents and told them they had to enlist in security forces or leave the province. Ultimately, after intervention from human rights activists, a member of parliament, religious authorities, and members of the Wasit provincial council, the decision to forcibly enlist Shabak IDPs was revoked, and local police returned their identity documents.’⁴¹⁸