Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate

violence than other disputed areas in the immediate aftermath of the October 2017 takeover by the Iraqi army and Hashd [PMU].’¹¹⁸³

Following the withdrawal of Kurdish Security Forces from the disputed areas, Sunni PMUs took full control of Tuz district’s rural areas, while Tuz Khurmatu was controlled by local ISF and police, who were reported to be mostly of the Shia sect, according to the ICG.¹¹⁸⁴ According to media reports, the central government’s Rapid Response Forces were deployed to Tuz Khurmatu in January 2018.¹¹⁸⁵ According to reports, one of the Badr Organization’s longstanding top commanders established himself as the ‘strongman’ in Tuz Khurmatu, along with his ‘personal militia’ that he formed with local Shia Turkmen, who were reported to be involved in looting and arms- and drugs trafficking.¹¹⁸⁶ The ICG’s assessment in December 2018 was that ‘security dominance by a single group – a minority in the district and even more so in the governorate – is a recipe for continued violent conflict.’¹¹⁸⁷ The UN reported that between 23 and 27 November 2017, ISF conducted the last military offensive in central northern Iraq, aimed at clearing remnants of ISIL from the Jazirah desert expanse, which spans across the governorates of Anbar, Salah al-Din and Ninawa.¹¹⁸⁸ 14 000 km² and 175 villages in the Jazirah and upper Euphrates areas were cleared.¹¹⁸⁹ Following this operation, the Prime Minister of Iraq at the time, Haider al-Abadi, declared final victory over ISIL on 9 December 2017.¹¹⁹⁰ However, despite this declaration, ISIL continued carrying out asymmetric attacks targeting security forces and civilians and causing civilian casualties throughout 2018, including in Salah al-Din governorate.¹¹⁹¹ ISIL was also reported in late 2017 to roam the countryside, attacking villages at night.¹¹⁹² The security vacuum in rural parts of Salah al-Din governorate has enabled ISIL militants to operate and control limited amounts of territory, which has led to an increase in the number of attacks from 2017 to 2018 in the governorate.¹¹⁹³

thousands forced to flee Tuz Khurmatu amid indiscriminate attacks, lootings and arson, 24 November 2017, url; HRW, Iraq:

Fighting in Disputed Territories Kills Civilians, 20 November 2017, url

1183 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url, p. 15

1184 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url, p. 18

1185 Rudaw, Iraq’s Rapid Response Force deployed to Tuz Khurmatu, 13 January 2018, url

1186 Quesnay, A. and Beaumont, R., The Return of the State and Inter-Militia Competition in Northern Iraq, Noria, 14 June 2018, url, p. 3

1187 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url, p. 18

1188 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/42], 17 January 2018, url, para. 25

1189 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/42], 17 January 2018, url, para. 25

1190 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/42], 17 January 2018, url, para. 1

1191 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2421 (2018) [S/2019/101], 1 February 2019, url, paras 14, 35

UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2421 (2018) [S/2018/975], 31 October 2018, url, paras 22, 43, 44; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/677], 9 July 2018, url, para. 20. See also, Flood, D., From Caliphate to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, CTC Volume 11, Issue 8, September 2018, url, p. 33; The Washington Post, ISIS is making a comeback in Iraq just months after Baghdad declared victory, 17 July 2018, url

1192 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url, p. 17

1193 Markusen, M., The Islamic State and the Persistent Threat of Extremism in Iraq, CSIS, November 2018, url, pp. 4, 6

Armed actors

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

The ISF have the overall responsibility of the security within the governorate and predominantly consist of units from the Iraqi army, federal police and to some extent special forces.¹¹⁹⁴ In many of the rural areas the ISF are reportedly sparsely present, particularly since many have been redeployed to contain anti-government protests.¹¹⁹⁵ According to the US-led Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, the ISF do not have a large enough force to control large desert areas, have also been unable to retain control of territory cleared of ISIL in Salah al-Din governorate, and have limited access to ISIL support zones in both Salah al-Din and Diyala governorates.¹¹⁹⁶ In a May 2020 report Husham Al-Hashimi noted the presence of ISF in Samarra, Smarra island and Dhuluiya, Dujail, Ishaqi, Balad, Al-Dour, Tikrit, Al Alam, Baijji, Sharqat, Makhoul, Siniya, Salah al-Din Desert, and the areas around Tuz Khurmatu as of December 2019.¹¹⁹⁷

Regional operation commands in Iraq are reported to act as operational-level headquarters commanding and supervising different ISF units within a geographical area of responsibility.¹¹⁹⁸ Salah al-Din governorate is split between the Salah al-Din Operations Command (SDOC), covering the northern part of the governorate, including Tikrit, Baiji and al-Shiriqat,¹¹⁹⁹ the Samarra Operations Command (SOC) covering Samarra, large parts of the Jazeera desert west of Samarra and southern Salah al-Din governorate,¹²⁰⁰ as well as the Dijla Operations Command (DOC), covering all of Diyala governorate, eastern Salah al-Din governorate and Tuz Khurmatu town, the Alas and Ajil oilfields, and the Hamrin Mountain Range.¹²⁰¹ According to the ISW, the SDOC and SOC did not exist in 2013 and were likely created to support forward operations in the fight against ISIL.¹²⁰² During 2019 and 2020, several sources reported on units operating under the SDOC and SOC having been involved in anti-ISIL military operations of various scales throughout Salah al-Din governorate.¹²⁰³

Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)

PMUs played a significant role in the liberation of areas of Salah al-Din governorate from ISIL, leading or accompanying ISF in the recapturing of Tuz, Tikrit, al-Dour, al-Alam, Baiji, and parts of al-Shirqat districts.¹²⁰⁴ Present in large numbers across the governorate, Shia PMUs exerted control over strategic locations and even areas beyond their official responsibility.¹²⁰⁵ Shia PMUs also developed their own auxiliary forces, by mobilising a local Turkmen PMU that controlled half of Tuz and

1194 Landinfo, Irak: Salah al-Din provins-sikkerhetssituasjonen i perioden juli-september 2018 (Salah al-Din Governorate - Security Situation July-September 2018), 6 November 2018, url, p. 7

1195 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url; Landinfo, Irak: Salah al-Din provins-sikkerhetssituasjonen i perioden juli-september 2018 (Salah al-Din Governorate - Security Situation July-September 2018), 6 November 2018, url, p. 7

1196 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019 – October 25, 2019, 19 November 2019, url, p. 10

1197 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url

1198 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 12

1199 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 22

1200 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 23

1201 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 17

1202 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 12

1203 NINA, Salah Al-Din Operations Command carries out a broad military operation, 27 July 2020, url; The Baghdad Post, Combined force arrests 2 terrorists, finds den in Salah al-Din, 8 May 2020, url; CJTF-OIR, 27 November 2019, url, pp. 1, 3

1204 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 43

1205 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 44

establishing a number of Sunni tribal PMUs in Tikrit and surrounding areas, as well as in Baiji and Shirqat.¹²⁰⁶

According to a 2017 ISW report on the Iraqi Order of Battle, different factions of PMUs operated freely throughout Salah al-Din governorate, including in areas nominally under the Salah al-Din Operations Command (SDOC), Dijla Operations Command (DOC) and the Samarra Operations Command (SOC), with limited or even without any coordination with the respective regional operations command.¹²⁰⁷ Sources stated to DIS/Landinfo during their April 2018 FFM to KRI that there was ‘a substantive proliferation of militias and armed groups that are not under government control’ in Salah al-Din.¹²⁰⁸ According to analysts Michael Knights¹²⁰⁹ and Phillip Smyth in 2019,¹²¹⁰ the PMU militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq was the dominant security, economic and political actor in the northern Baghdad belts as well as in southern Salah al-Din governorate, including Taji, Dujail, and Balad. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq was reported to engage in extortion, intimidation and looting in their areas of control, including demanding

‘protection payments’ from local business owners.¹²¹¹ Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia, Saraya Salam, was reported to exclusively control the shrine city of Samarra, while Camp Speicher, a large and unused military base west of Tikrit, was reported to have been dominated by Kata’ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali, and Kata’ib Jund Al-Al-Imam (PMU Brigade 6).¹²¹² Kata’ib al-Tayyar al-Risali (PMU Brigade 31) exercised control and were most active in Baiji district. Alas oilfield in Tikrit district was controlled by militias, who engaged in diverting oil for trucking to Iran (and the Gulf ports) via the KRI.¹²¹³ The Badr forces reportedly control all areas east of the Tigris River in Diyala, the Jallam desert east of Samarra and Tuz district, as well as Kirkuk.¹²¹⁴

According to reports, militia recruits in Tuz Khurmatu were primarily drawn from the Shia Turkmen community in response to ISIL anti-Shia violence in 2014/2015.¹²¹⁵ Iraqi security expert Michael Knights wrote in a 2019 research paper on Iraqi militias that Tuz Khurmatu and Kirkuk were controlled by the Turkmen PMU Northern Axis led by Abu Ridha Yilmaz al-Najjar.¹²¹⁶ The same source reported in 2019 that local Turkmen militia groups operating in Tuz Khurmatu were implicated in illicit oil extraction and smuggling to Iran.¹²¹⁷ According to a study by GPPi from 2017, ‘Turkmen PMF were at the forefront of many of the significant human rights abuses while they held territory or engaged in operations with Shi’a PMF, including summary executions, kidnappings, arbitrary detention, torture, looting, and the mass destruction of houses.’¹²¹⁸

1206 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 44

1207 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 17, 22, 23

1208 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5 November 2018, [source: an Iraqi analyst], url, p. 18

1209 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4

1210 Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url

1211 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4; Diyaruna, Iran-backed militias in Iraq demand 'protection money', 2 May 2019, url

1212 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4; The Atlantic, Nation Building at Gunpoint, Can Samarra, a Sunni-majority city run by Shia militias, be a test case for fixing a broken Iraq?, 10 May 2019, url; PAX, Human Security Survey Salahaddin, Iraq - 2019, Summary of Key Findings, 2019

url, p. 6

1213 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4; Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url

1214 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, pp. 4-5

1215 IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East - Chapter Four: Iraq, November 2019, url; Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Tuz, GPPi, 16 August 2017, url

1216 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 5

1217 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 5

1218 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 26.

In a May 2020 report Husham al-Hashimi noted the presence of PMUs in Dujail, Tuz Khurmatu, Amirili, east and west Salah-al Din, Tikrit and areas east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din – Baghdad Road, Samarra, Balad, Mutubijaha northeast Ishaqi, Makhould Mountains, Therthar Lake, Shaiat, Baiji, al-Alam, al-Dour, Makhoul and Khanuqa Mountains (South Tikrit), Zawiyah as of December 2019.¹²¹⁹

Sunni Tribal Militias

Few Sunni tribal groups have mobilised their support to the PMU forces within the governorate. An estimated 2 000 to 3 000 fighters have been recruited by PMUs, primarily by the Badr Brigades and the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, in Salah al-Din governorate, which is relatively few, in comparison to Ninewa governorate where an estimated 18 000 have been recruited into a Sunni Tribal Mobilization Force.¹²²⁰ The low number of Sunni recruits in Salah al-Din governorate are mainly attributed to the deep mistrust Sunni tribal leaders feel towards the Shia dominated PMUs.¹²²¹

For example, a major Sunni tribal militia was reported to be Liwa Salahaddin (51^st Brigade), which was based in northern Salah al-Din governorate, mostly in Shirqat, Tikrit and Baiji districts.¹²²² It was reportedly led by Yazan al-Jabouri, the son of Iraqi MP and former Ba’athist insurgent leader Mishan al-Jabouri. The 51^st Brigade was said to collaborate with Iranian-affiliated Shia PMUs and claimed to have received weapons and intelligence support from Iran.¹²²³ According to a GPPi 2017 study, the 51st Brigade enjoyed backing from the PMU when it engaged in illegal activities, such as when ‘there were significant allegations of misconduct against the 51^st Brigade, including looting (notably in Tikrit), robbery, abductions, and revenge killings, as well as smuggling goods to ISIL fighters.’¹²²⁴ However, at times, the 51^st Brigade was also called on to carry out activities at the behest of the PMU, including conducting inspection tours and house searches on behalf of the Shia PMU.¹²²⁵

ISIL

According to the UN Security Council, ‘[w]hile the overall level of violence related to ISIL has decreased, the group remains a significant threat and has shifted to insurgent tactics, with attacks continuing in different parts of the country.’¹²²⁶ Security vacuums caused by re-deployments of ISF to anti-government protests, the COVID-19 lockdown, as well as the withdrawal of most US forces from Iraq, have reportedly been exploited by ISIL to gain strength and regroup in parts of Iraq, including in Salah al-Din governorate in 2020.¹²²⁷ In remote areas of Iraq, ISIL is reported to continue to mount attacks on official checkpoints, infrastructure and against officials.¹²²⁸ ISIL operations in many rural areas in Salah al-Din governorate in 2020 have been described as an ‘assassination campaign’ by the

1219 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url

1220 Gaston, E., Sunni Tribal Forces, GPPi, 30 August 2017, url

1221 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 25.

1222 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, pp. 48-49.

1223 IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East - Chapter Four: Iraq, November 2019, url

1224 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 49.

1225 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 49.

1226 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4 February 2020, url, para. 4

1227 The New York Times, ISIS Attacks Surge in Iraq Amid Debate on U.S. Troop Levels, 10 June 2020, url; SIPRI, The resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq: Political and military responses, 9 June 2020, url; Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url; CNBC, America is ignoring Iraq’s turbulent protests at its peril, security experts say, 14 November 2019, url

1228 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4 February 2020, url, para. 4

late security analyst Husham al-Hashimi.¹²²⁹ The ICG further assessed in May 2020 that the militant group’s attacks have become ‘more assertive’ and have been primarily focused on a ‘rural belt reaching across Iraq’s centre north, in Kirkuk, Salahuddin and Diyala provinces.’¹²³⁰ It is also reported that ISIL has demonstrated its adaptability in the first half of 2020 by gradually having moved from

‘hiding in remote areas to alarmingly establishing a foothold in rural and suburban areas.’¹²³¹

Michael Knights and Alex Almeida have observed a pattern of rising levels of recovery, activity and attacks associated with ISIL since 2019 in Salah al-Din governorate and identified the strongest ISIL operating environment in Salah al-Din government to be the Jallam Desert, from where the group has access to a range of target areas, including Samarra,¹²³² the Alas oilfield, Tuz Khurmatu, and the governorate borders with southern Kirkuk and western Diyala.¹²³³ They have moreover identified the following areas in Salah al-Din governorate as housing active ISIL attack cells: Eastern Thar Thar in Balad district, southern Jallam Desert in Mutaibijah district, Udhaim and northeastern Thar Thar in Tikrit district, Baiji, Siniyah, Makhul, and northern Jallam Desert in Hamrin district, Tuz, Pulkhana, and Zarga.¹²³⁴ The ISW identified the Hamrin Mountains as a favourable support zone for ISIL allowing for links with other support zones in Salah al-Din and Diyala governorates.¹²³⁵ ISIL stored weapons and other supplies in tunnel systems in this area, and its leaders used the area to regroup. The Hamrin Mountains provide for opportunities to launch attacks in areas around Tuz Khurmatu.¹²³⁶

According to Husham al-Hashimi, as of December 2019, ISIL had around 350 to 400 active fighters in the Salah al-Din ‘sector’, who are supported by 400 inactive fighters or ‘sleeper cells’ and mainly deal with logistics.¹²³⁷ Small patrols of nine to 11 men operated in various places and carried out attacks.

In March 2020, ISIL adopted a new approach by activating autonomous sleeper cells to carry out attacks in rural areas south of Samarra and north of Baghdad.¹²³⁸ According to the ICG, many of these active ISIL fighters are Iraqis and local to their respective areas of operation.¹²³⁹