Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate

Conflict background

Sources have described Sulaymaniyah as ‘relatively stable’ security wise since 2003.¹⁵⁹² On 17 July 2019, shooters attacked a restaurant in Erbil, killing a Turkish diplomat and two Iraqi civilians.¹⁵⁹³

Following the US-brokered agreement that put an end to the Kurdish civil war in 1998, Sulaymaniyah came under the control of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), while Erbil and Dohuk came under the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).¹⁵⁹⁴ According to Lecturer Farhad Hassan Abdullah, since 2005 attempts have been made to unify the two Kurdish administrations under one government based in Erbil.¹⁵⁹⁵ The September 2017 KDP-led independence referendum backfired, resulting in a reaction from the Iraqi central government, causing the loss of territorial control over most disputed territories retaken by Baghdad, and as the ICG observed ‘forced the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan’s two main political parties to consider rebuilding their partnership and jointly re-engaging with Baghdad’.¹⁵⁹⁶ National and regional parliamentary elections followed in 2018, reaffirming the KDP’s and PUK’s ‘dominance’ in the KRI.¹⁵⁹⁷ Despite announcing in March 2019 a four-year political agreement allowing for the formation of the KRG cabinet and a set of joint positions on a number of issues¹⁵⁹⁸, journalist Bekir Aydoğan warned in April 2020 however of a ‘near-breakdown of cooperation’ between the KDP and the PUK.¹⁵⁹⁹

Armed actors

Peshmerga and Asayish

The security forces of the KRI are the Peshmerga, having 14 infantry brigades and two support brigades, the Asayish internal security unit, in addition to KPD and PUK-controlled militias.¹⁶⁰⁰ Most of these forces’ members are either affiliated with the KDP or with the PUK, to which they answer

1591 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 6 May 2020, url, para.

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1592 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 2; IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part II – Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, pp. 55, 57; IOM, Reasons to Remain (Part 2): Determinants of IDP integration into host communities in Iraq, 18 April 2019, url, p. 12

1593 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August 2019, url, para. 26

1594 Hassan, F., PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk, May 2018, url, p. 3; USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish Sun:

The hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url, p. 5; Century Foundation (The), Kurdish Nationalism at an Impasse, 29 April 2019, url; Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018 cited in EASO, Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq, Security situation, March 2019, url, p. 149; LSE, The Iraqi Kurds’ Destructive Infighting: Causes and Consequences, 15 April 2020, url

1595 Hassan, F., PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk, May 2018, url, p. 3

1596 ICG, After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted Independence Bid, 27 March 2019, url

1597 ICG, After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted Independence Bid, 27 March 2019, url

1598 CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 116^th Congress, Updated 17 July 2020, url, p. 25

1599 Knights, M. (Middle East Research Institute), Iraqi Kurdistan: Priority Issues for international mediation, 10 July 2020, url. See also Aydoğan, B., The Iraqi Kurds’ Destructive Infighting: Causes and Consequences, 15 April 2020, url

1600 US, USDOS, 2017 Country Reports on Human Rights– Iraq, 20 April 2018, url, pp. 11-12

directly.¹⁶⁰¹ The leadership of each brigade, however, comes from both parties ‘to decrease the unit’s allegiance to one political party’.¹⁶⁰²

According to the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) reporting in August 2017, there were approximately 48 000 PUK commanded Peshmerga fighters. PUK-affiliated units are typically divided according to regular units (Division 70) and Deja Terror (Counter-terrorism Forces).¹⁶⁰³ Peshmerga and Asayish forces from Sulaymaniyah governorate continued to conduct security operations to pursue ISIS members.¹⁶⁰⁴

The Peshmerga were active in Kifri and Kalar District as of 3 December 2019.¹⁶⁰⁵ Iraqi state forces

The UN Secretary General reported in February 2020 that ‘Iraqi security forces continued their action against ISIL cells’ and military operations took place in areas along the border between Diyala and Sulaymaniyah governorates.¹⁶⁰⁶ According to a Commander in the Peshmerga forces, frictions between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga forces can occur in disputed territories.¹⁶⁰⁷ On 6 July 2020, there was a gunfire exchange between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga when Iraqi forces entered into Kafri District in Garmyan, following a reported kidnapping.¹⁶⁰⁸

Turkish state forces

In recent years, Turkey has set up military bases in key areas including Sulaymaniyah.¹⁶⁰⁹ The PUK is working on normalising its relations with Turkey, for example, by trying to close the headquarters of the organisations affiliated to the PKK in Sulaymaniyah.¹⁶¹⁰ In July 2020, the Turkish Consul General announced that Turkish army military operations will continue in the Kurdistan region until the end of the presence of the PKK.¹⁶¹¹

PKK

Founded in the 1970s, the PKK launched an armed struggle against the Turkish government in 1984 calling for an independent Kurdish state in Turkey, which it continued to date.¹⁶¹² The PKK is on the

1601 ICG, Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, inviting conflict, 12 May 2015, url, pp. 8-11; USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, April 1 2019- June 30 2019, 6 August 2019, url, p. 45

1602 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, April 1 2019- June 30 2019, 6 August 2019, url, p. 45

1603 GPPi, Who’s Who: Quick Facts About Local and Sub-State Forces, 16 August 2017, url

1604 Shafaaq, A joint operation starts between Peshmerga forces and the international coalition to pursue ISIS, 5 March 2020, url; Shafaaq, Peshmerga reinforcements between Diyala and Kurdistan, 22 June 2020, url; Shafaaq, The Anti-terrorism forces arrests two ISIS members, 23 July 2020, url; ISW, Iraq Situation Report: July 8-14, 2020, url

1605 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url

1606 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 21 February 2020, url, para. 23

1607 Shafaaq, A clash between Peshmerga and an Iraqi force near Garmyan, 6 July 2020, url

1608 Shafaaq, A clash between Peshmerga and an Iraqi force near Garmyan, 6 July 2020, url

1609 Shafaaq, American report: Turkey has set up 13 military bases in Kurdistan region, 12 September 2019, url

1610 Middle East Online, The Iraqi Kurdish parties and the PKK, 1 October 2019, url; Bas News, PKK-Affiliated Party Opens Anonymous Offices in Sulaymaniyah, 26 March 2019, url

1611 Nina News, Operations Until The End Of The PKK, 20 July 2020, url

1612 BBC News, Who are Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) rebels?, 4 November 2016, url

European Union’s list of designated groups which have been involved in terrorism¹⁶¹³, as well as being listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey¹⁶¹⁴, the United States¹⁶¹⁵, and Australia.¹⁶¹⁶

The PKK has developed its territorial presence and control over mountainous areas along the Turkish and Iranian borders, including along the border between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates as well as Iran.¹⁶¹⁷ Local officials interviewed estimated in 2016 that as many as 650 communities in remote villages might have lived under PKK control in total in KRI, although some of the villages have been evacuated due to the conflict.¹⁶¹⁸ The reported presence of PKK fighters has also been a cause of tension with Turkey.¹⁶¹⁹ From these areas, the PKK has launched attacks on Turkish forces, to which the Turkish Air force has retaliated with regular raids.¹⁶²⁰

ISIL

During the ISIL conflict, Sulaymaniyah did not see any direct military operations within its boundaries.¹⁶²¹ ISIL control of swaths of northern Iraq however resulted in large-scale displacement, violence, and destruction in the governorate.¹⁶²² Internal ISIL threats in KRI continued to exist in 2018 although the KRI was largely untouched by ISIL violence.¹⁶²³ ISIL has benefited from a support zone around the Halabja Mountains close to the Iranian border.¹⁶²⁴

Ansar Al-Islam (AAI)

Ansar Al-Islam (AAI), had previously controlled a number of villages in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja which the Peshmergas took back in 2003 with support from US forces.¹⁶²⁵ Since late 2016, AAI have used the Halabja Mountains close to the Iranian borders as a base for operations into Iran.¹⁶²⁶

1613 EU, Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1341 of 8 August 2019 updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2019/25, 8 August 2019, url

1614 Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url

1615 US Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, n.d., url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url

1616 Australia, Australian National Security, Listed terrorist organisations, n.d., url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url

1617 Quesnay, A. and Beaumont, R., The Return of the State and Inter-Militia Competition in Northern Iraq, Noria, 14 June 2018, url

1618 Rudaw, PKK bases in border areas provoke Turkish airstrikes, local mayors say, 14 April 2016, url

1619 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 4; Wing, J., Large Drop In Violence In Iraq November 2018, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 3 December 2018, url; Wing, J., Islamic State Returns To Baghdad While Overall Security In Iraq Remains Steady, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 6 October 2018, url; Wing, J., Violence Slightly Down In Iraq July 2018, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 2 August 2018, url; Wing, J., 649 Deaths, 275 Wounded Feb 2018 In Iraq, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 3 March 2018, url; Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker, n.d. url

1620 Wing, J., Large Drop In Violence In Iraq November 2018, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 3 December 2018, url; Wing, J., Islamic State Returns To Baghdad While Overall Security In Iraq Remains Steady, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 6 October 2018, url; Wing, J., Violence Slightly Down In Iraq July 2018, 2 August 2018, url; Wing, J., 649 Deaths, 275 Wounded Feb 2018 In Iraq, 3 March 2018, url; Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker, n.d. url

1621 IOM, Reasons to Remain (Part 2): Determinants of IDP integration into host communities in Iraq, 18 April 2019, url, p.

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1622 World Bank, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, p. 8

1623 Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018, in: EASO, Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq, Security situation, March 2019, url, p. 149

1624 Brandon Wallace and Jennifer Cafarella: “ISIS’s Second Resurgence”, ISW, 2. October 2018, url; Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018 in: EASO, Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq, Security situation, March 2019, url, p. 149

1625 Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018 in: EASO, Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq, Security situation, March 2019, url, p. 149

1626 Brandon Wallace and Jennifer Cafarella: “ISIS’s Second Resurgence”, ISW, 2. October 2018, url

Reportedly the Iraqi branch of AAI merged with ISIL in August 2014, though in October 2019 the group claimed it had placed two IEDs in Diyala governorate.¹⁶²⁷

Iranian state forces

Iran has tried to take control of the Qandil and Halgurd Mountain areas several times, noting that the IRGC have attacked Kurdish opposition bases inside KRI several times using missiles and artillery fire.¹⁶²⁸ These attacks have resulted in grave material damages, and several civilian residents have been injured.¹⁶²⁹

Kurdish opposition groups and Kurdish insurgents

Forces of all Kurdish parties are reported to be operating in the Qandil and Halgurd Mountains.¹⁶³⁰ In 2017, it was reported that armed groups active in the KRI’s mountainous areas were Kurdish insurgent groups and Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups.¹⁶³¹ Turkish forces have targeted PJAK members for decades¹⁶³², who reportedly have a hideout about 40 km north-west of Kuna Masi.¹⁶³³

Other: Self-Defense Force

In June 2019, a new group called the Self-Defense Forces from the Qandil Mountains was established with the aim of targeting Turkish army bases inside the KRI in response to ongoing Turkish air strikes.¹⁶³⁴