Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate

Conflict background

From shortly after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 until 2006, Anbar governorate was described as the centre of an entrenched Sunni insurgency against US forces. Towards the end of 2006, Sunni tribes in Ramadi formed a movement, the Anbar Awakening, to partner with US forces against Al-Qaeda and defeated the insurgent group in Ramadi by mid-2007. The Awakening spread to the rest of the

250 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iraq, 24 June 2020, url; Carnegie Middle East Centre, The

Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 3; Al-Monitor, Dangers persist as Iraqi border crossing opens and IDPs return, 31 October 2019, url

251 Arab News, Jordan receives first Iraqi oil for 5 years, 4 September 2019, url

252 The New Arab, Car bomb explosion ends two-year calm on Iraq-Saudi border, 16 January 2020, url

253 Gulf News, Saudi-Iraq border crossing to officially reopen in October, 16 July 2020, url

254 The New Arab, Car bomb explosion ends two-year calm on Iraq-Saudi border, 16 January 2020, url

255 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iraq, 24 June 2020, url

256 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iraq, 24 June 2020, url. See also: Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, pp. 13-14

257 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iraq, 24 June 2020, url; Foreign Policy, A Powerful Iran-Backed Militia Is Losing Influence in Iraq, 22 May 2020, url; Al-Monitor, Dangers persist as Iraqi border crossing opens and IDPs return, 31 October 2019, url

258 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4

259 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4

260 UN Interagency Information and Analysis Unit, Anbar Governorate Profile, November 2010, url, p. 1

261 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 14

governorate and to other parts of Iraq, which led to a drop in violence and a period of comparative calm and stability in Anbar.²⁶²

With the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in late 2011, ISIL started to emerge in Ramadi, Fallujah and various towns in Anbar governorate. By December 2013, clashes between Sunni tribal militias and the Iraqi army escalated after the arrest of Ahmed al-Alwani, a politician from Anbar. On 1 January 2014, ISIL seized control of the governorate’s cities and the ISF largely fled and abandoned their positions.²⁶³ Without a united opposition, ISIL overran police checkpoints and stations throughout Anbar governorate and took control of large parts of it, including Rutba, Qaim, Heet, and the capital, Ramadi.

US military operations resumed following ISIL’s sweep into Mosul in June 2014, with US forces returning to Anbar’s al-Asad air base in late 2014.²⁶⁴

Following a series of protracted battles with US military support, between December 2015 and June 2016, the Iraqi government recaptured Fallujah and Ramadi with ISIL having been weakened significantly.²⁶⁵ The military offensive to retake ISIL territory was formally concluded in November 2017, with the retaking of Rawa, the last town remaining under ISIL control.²⁶⁶

ISIL’s rule and military operations to regain control of Anbar, left civilian areas devasted with

‘widespread destruction of public and private property’²⁶⁷ and led to successive waves of mass displacement.²⁶⁸ Nearly half a million people fled ISIL’s advance between January and May 2014, while a second major wave of displacement took place in 2015/2016 during the military campaign to recapture territory from ISIL. As of June 2020, over 1.5 million people have returned to Anbar governorate,²⁶⁹ where tensions exist between those who fled during the initial advance of ISIL and those who initially remained and fled later on, according to IOM.²⁷⁰

As of November 2018, 24 other mass graves have been discovered in Anbar governorate with many containing the remains of civilians and ISF personnel.²⁷¹ In December 2019, a mass grave was found near the city of Fallujah containing the bodies of 643 Sunni Arab civilians and are believed to be of the Al Muhamdah tribe who disappeared in 2016 after their areas were taken over by Shia militants fighting under the banner of the PMU.²⁷² An investigation was reportedly undertaken by the Iraqi authorities.²⁷³

262 Foreign Affairs, Anbar’s Illusions - The Failure of Iraq’s Success Story, 24 June 2017, url

263 Foreign Affairs, Anbar’s Illusions - The Failure of Iraq’s Success Story, 24 June 2017, url

264 NRC et al., The Long Road Home: Achieving Durable Solutions to Displacement in Iraq: Lessons from Returns in Iraq, February 2018, url, p. 7; Foreign Affairs, Anbar’s Illusions - The Failure of Iraq’s Success Story, 24 June 2017, url

265 Foreign Affairs, Anbar’s Illusions - The Failure of Iraq’s Success Story, 24 June 2017, url

266 NRC et al., The Long Road Home: Achieving Durable Solutions to Displacement in Iraq: Lessons from Returns in Iraq, February 2018, url, p. 7

267 NRC et al., The Long Road Home: Achieving Durable Solutions to Displacement in Iraq: Lessons from Returns in Iraq, February 2018, url, p. 7

268 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, 17 November 2019, url, p. 32

269 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 5

270 IOM, Managing Return in Anbar; Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with Perceived Affiliation, March 2020, url, p. 4.

271 UNAMI/OHCHR, “Unearthing Atrocities: Mass Graves in territory formerly controlled by ISIL”, 6 November 2018, url, p.

9

272 The New Arab, The Iraq Report: Mass graves of Sunnis found as mass protests rage on, 20 December 2019, url

273 Diyaruna, Iraq investigates mass grave near Fallujah, 18 December 2019, url

Armed actors

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and aligned forces

The ISF have the overall responsibility of the security within the governorate through the regional operation commands.²⁷⁴ According to a 2017 ISW report on the Iraqi Order of Battle, regional operation commands in Iraq were reported to act as operational-level headquarters commanding and supervising different ISF units within a geographical area of responsibility.²⁷⁵ Anbar governorate was split between the Anbar Operations Command (AOC), covering Ramadi and Fallujah and the surrounding desert areas,²⁷⁶ and the Jazeera and Badia Operations Command (JBOC) covering most of Anbar governorate, west of Ramadi, including the western Euphrates River Valley, the far western district of Rutba, the Amman-Baghdad highway, and much of the Jazeera and Badia Deserts. The JBOC was reportedly understaffed and therefore relied heavily on the support of local Jughaifi tribal fighters, who laid claim on the Haditha district.²⁷⁷ In addition to the AOC and JBOC, the ISF deployed other Operations Command detachments across the country to Anbar.²⁷⁸

However, some parts of Anbar governorate, particularly along the Syrian and Iraqi border with vast desert areas, are ‘considered hard to control’.²⁷⁹ The ISF predominately consists of units from the army, federal police²⁸⁰ and the mobile Emergency Response Division.²⁸¹ According to media reports from 2018/2019, plans were underway to gradually hand over security control from the ISF to local and federal police forces, including in Anbar governorate.²⁸² Border Guard Units were reported to be deployed in Anbar governorate along the border crossings with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.²⁸³ United States (US) and International Forces

As of March 2020, US forces reportedly continue to hold two military bases in Anbar governorate near the Iraqi-Syrian border, one at Tanf-Walid in Ar-Rutbah district and the other at Ain al-Asad, near Baghdadi district.²⁸⁴ Additionally, US forces were earlier based near the old railway station in Qaim during the campaign against ISIL, but redeployed to a different base in Kirkuk since mid-March 2020.²⁸⁵ Qaim base has been taken over by the ISF since the end of March 2020.²⁸⁶

274 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 14

275 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 12

276 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 14

277 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 18-19

278 Detailed information on the detachments redeployed to Anbar is described in ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 14-24. The report further includes a chart over Iraqi Army Divisions and their areas of operation (Appendix D: Iraqi Security forced Commanders). See pp. 61-62

279 Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url

280 For more details on the units and detachments deployed to Anbar as at May 2016, see: ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 25-26

281 For more details on the units and detachments deployed to Anbar as at May 2016, see: ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 26-27

282 Al-Monitor, As Iraqi army retreats to borders, local police controls cities' security, 1 February 2019, url; Al-Monitor, Anbar governor wants police boosted and military back on bases, 6 September 2018, url

283 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p.12; ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp.

27-28

284 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 16; Niqash, Red Lines In The Sand: In The Deserts of Anbar, US And Pro-Iran Forces Jostle, 13

September 2019, url

285 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 17; Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url

286 Xinhua, Iraqi forces assume full control of military base in Anbar province, 20 March 2020, url

Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs)

Many government-incorporated PMUs as well as militias with closer links to Iran, operate near Qaim close to the Syrian-Iraqi border.²⁸⁷ According to Michael Knights’ 2019 report, the Akashat sub-sector is garrisoned by brigades Allah al-Tawfiya (PMU Brigade 19), Liwa al-Tafuf (PMU Brigade 13), and Saraya Talia al-Khurasani (PMU Brigade 18).²⁸⁸ The Husseibah/Qaim sub-sector was garrisoned mainly by Liwa al-Tafuf (PMU Brigade 13).²⁸⁹ The commander of Liwa al-Tafuf, Qasim Muslih, also headed the PMU Western Anbar Axis, which was the sector headquarters for all PMU operations along the border and in Rutbah. Liwa al-Tafuf and Kataib Hezbollah jointly controlled all smuggling and commercial activities across the border.²⁹⁰

Michael Knights further reported that the Euphrates River Valley leading down to eastern Anbar governorate was predominantly controlled by ISF and Liwa al-Muntadher (PMU Brigade 7) and Kataib Ansar al-Hujja (PMU Brigade 29).²⁹¹ The same 2019 source reported that at the eastern end of this area was the Husseibah border crossing on the Euphrates, facing the Albu Kamal areas in Syria, where PMUs such as Kataib Hezbollah (PMU Brigade 45), Kataib Al-Imam Ali (PMU Brigade 40), and Harakat al-Abdal (PMU Brigade 39) maintained combat forces.²⁹² Kataib Hezbollah (PMU Brigade 45) controlled the road between Qaim and Akashat to its southwest.²⁹³ Qassim Musleh is the head of the PMUs for western Anbar and thus for the Kataib Hezbollah brigades.²⁹⁴ Some Kataib Hezbollah units have been formally incorporated into the government-salaried PMUs, however, most units are not under state control.²⁹⁵

Reports describe that the many security actors, and particularly PMUs operating in western Anbar governorate, often lack coordination among one another,²⁹⁶ ‘lead to confusion’,²⁹⁷ do not pursue a unified security strategy,²⁹⁸ and thus raise concerns and distrust among the civilian population.²⁹⁹ According to media reports, ‘[t]he presence, quantity and relative influence of the various security forces — both those answering to the central government and those answering to others — have long been difficult to clearly establish’³⁰⁰, and further, ‘[c]ivilians have repeatedly complained to Al-Monitor during several visits to the area since its liberation from Islamic State control in November 2017 about

287 Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url; Niqash, Red Lines In The Sand: In The Deserts of Anbar, US And Pro-Iran Forces Jostle, 13 September 2019, url; Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, pp. 3-4

288 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 3

289 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 12; Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4

290 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4

291 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4. See also, Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 12

292 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 3. See also, Al-Monitor, Dangers persist as Iraqi border crossing opens and IDPs return, 31 October 2019, url; Al-Monitor, Iraq's Qaim border open to nonlocal PMU fighting in Syria, 25 April 2019, url

293 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 12

294 Al-Monitor, Qaim residents fearful following conflict between US, Iran-backed militias, 27 January 2020, url

295 Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url

296 Niqash, Extremists At The Intersections: As Security Forces Multiply In Anbar, So Does Danger, 21 December 2018, url

297 Al-Monitor, Anbar governor wants police boosted and military back on bases, 6 September 2018, url

298 Niqash, Extremists At The Intersections: As Security Forces Multiply In Anbar, So Does Danger, 21 December 2018, url

299 Al-Monitor, PMU decree unlikely to shift power balance in Iraq's Qaim, 20 July 2019, url

300 Al-Monitor, Qaim residents fearful following conflict between US, Iran-backed militias, 27 January 2020, url

the dizzying array of security forces, some of whom do not wear insignia of any sort but carry weapons.’³⁰¹

Sunni Tribal Militias

Sunni tribal forces have been mobilised since 2014 in the wake of the fight against ISIS in Iraq and have been incorporated into the PMU. The initiative was partially US-sponsored and the forces are known as the Tribal Mobilization Force (TMF), or tribal hashd in Anbar and Ninewa governorates, which aimed at tribal forces to play a role as local ‘hold’ forces in their areas once retaken from ISIL.³⁰²

As of June 2019, an estimated 10 000 salaried members of the TMF were based in Anbar governorate, according to Anbar tribal forces leader Sheikh Qatari Samarmad al-Obeidi.³⁰³ And further, some 7 500 fighters were enlisted in eastern Anbar governorate, including Ramadi and Fallujah, while 2 500 fighters were based in the western districts of the governorate such as Heet, Haditha and Qaim.³⁰⁴ Of these, one major group is reported to be the Hamza Brigade, led by Rabah al-Mahallawi and made up of members of the Bou Mahal tribe, who have been deployed near Husseibah.³⁰⁵ The other one is the Upper Euphrates Brigade, linked to the Karbuli tribe and led by Musa Karbuli and Assif Ibrahim al-Karbuli. This brigade is reported to have been deployed in Karabla and near the Akkas gas field.³⁰⁶ According to Anbar tribal forces leader Sheikh Qatari Samarmad al-Obeidi, as of June 2019, an additional 4 000 forces in Anbar governorate were previously receiving military training and held administrative orders designating them as official fighters, however, they were not part of the official TMF and did not receive any salaries. These fighters were planned to be incorporated into the TMF and receive salaries from the Iraqi government.³⁰⁷

ISIL

According to the UN Security Council in February 2020, ‘[w]hile the overall level of violence related to ISIL has decreased, the group remains a significant threat and has shifted to insurgent tactics, with attacks continuing in different parts of the country.’³⁰⁸ Security vacuums caused by re-deployments of ISF to anti-government protests, the COVID-19 lockdown, as well as the withdrawal of most US forces from Iraq, have reportedly been exploited by ISIL to gain strength and regroup in parts of Iraq, including in Anbar governorate.³⁰⁹ In remote areas of Iraq, ISIL is reported to continue to mount attacks on official checkpoints, infrastructure and officials.³¹⁰ ISIL operations in the first half of 2020

301 Al-Monitor, PMU decree unlikely to shift power balance in Iraq's Qaim, 20 July 2019, url

302 Derzsi-Horvath, A. et al., Iraq after ISIL: Who’s Who: Quick Facts About Local and Sub-State Forces, GPPi, 16 August 2017, url

303 Diyaruna, Iraq to beef up ranks of tribal forces in Anbar, 19 June 2019, url

304 Diyaruna, Iraq to beef up ranks of tribal forces in Anbar, 19 June 2019, url

305 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 12

306 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 13

307 Diyaruna, Iraq to beef up ranks of tribal forces in Anbar, 19 June 2019, url

308 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4 February 2020, url, para. 4

309 New York Times (The), ISIS Attacks Surge in Iraq Amid Debate on U.S. Troop Levels, 10 June 2020, url; SIPRI, The resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq: Political and military responses, 9 June 2020, url; Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url

310 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4 February 2020, url, para. 4

have been described as an ‘assassination campaign’ by the late Husham al-Hashimi, a leading Iraqi security analyst.³¹¹ The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports in June 2020 that ISIL’s geographical reach and activities have almost doubled since late December 2018 across the governorates of Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din.³¹² The ICG further assesses that the militant group’s attacks have become ‘more assertive’ in spring 2020 and have been primarily focused on a rural belt reaching across Iraq’s centre north, in Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Diyala governorates as well as the western edge of Anbar governorate, along the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian borders.³¹³

According to analysis by Husham al-Hashimi, as of December 2019, ISIL had around 350 to 400 active fighters supported by 400 inactive fighters or ‘sleeper cells’ who mainly deal with logistics in each of their ‘sectors’, including the Anbar ‘sector’.³¹⁴ Small patrols of nine to 11 men operated in various places and carried out attacks. ³¹⁵ According to the ICG, many of these active ISIL fighters are Iraqis and local to their respective areas of operation, however, most of the 200 to 300 remaining foreign fighters in Iraq were based in Anbar, according to estimates by Husham al-Hashimi.³¹⁶ ISIL fighters were able to exploit Anbar’s remote desert terrain, which is difficult to patrol.³¹⁷ ISIL fighters used buried containers as subterranean bases, with some militants reportedly traversing open expanses disguised as shepherds.³¹⁸

Knights and Almeida observed in May 2020 that ISIL maintain active attack cells in the following areas in Anbar governorate: Akashat; the al-Qaim/Abu Kamal border area; Wadi Horan/Rutbah; Nukhayb;

the Rawah-Anah-Haditha corridor; Hit; Ramadi and Lake Razazah; Karmah and southern Thar; and Fallujah/Amiriyat al-Fallujah.³¹⁹