Kabul city

2. Regional description of the security

After President Ghani and the National Unity Government were sworn in, and ahead of the final security transition between the international military forces of ISAF and the ANSF at the end of 2014, Kabul city saw a spike in insurgent attacks during October and November 2014 with 10 suicide attacks in these months, decreasing to five such attacks in the following two months. (²²⁰) The London-based private security company (PSC) Edinburgh International (EI) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) also noticed a similar spike in suicide attacks in November 2014. (²²¹) The capital saw 31 suicide attacks in 2014, compared to 18 the previous year. IED attacks in the city also decreased from 18 in the October to November period to 5 in December 2014 and 2 in January 2015. (²²²)

Several attacks targeted ANA vehicles and buses in October 2014, killing many soldiers and several civilian bystanders. (²²³) On 16 December 2014, all public transportation of ANSF personnel was suspended because of the high pace of militant attacks on these targets in the capital. Of the 10 attacks on ANSF transportation in the capital, six happened in the last three months of 2014. (²²⁴) According to Edinburgh International: (²²⁵)

Desiring to maintain the pace of high profile attacks in the city yet failing to inflict major damages to Kabul’s secure ISAF or international facilities, militants are instead increasingly turning towards softer targets where heavy casualties can be inflicted with minimal expenditure. Attacks on ANSF transport vehicles have historically proven an attractive target for this reason, with roadside IEDs or single SVEST bombers able to deliver the same impact as the more meticulously planned complex attacks.

From 1 January to 13 September 2015, Kabul city saw 217 security incidents, including 68 explosions (roughly two-thirds IEDs and one-third suicide attacks). There were between one and four suicide attacks every month from January to July, and six in August. Table 1 provides an overview of the nature of the security incidents: (²²⁶)

Violence targeting individuals 37

Armed confrontations 15

Explosions 68

Security enforcement 50

Non-conflict related violent incidents 40

Other violent incidents 7

Total security incidents 217

Table 1: Security incidents by type, Kabul City (1 Jan - 13 Sep 2015)

Highprofile and often complex attacks have also targeted Afghan and international officials. At the end of November 2014, Edinburgh International noticed a 300% increase in attacks on expatriates in Kabul in the preceding month. (²²⁷) Additionally, highprofile locations were targeted with suicide bombs and IEDs. (²²⁸) The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation ACCORD has compiled all major incidents that occurred in Kabul for the past few years. Insurgents continuously carried out high-profile attacks in Kabul, e.g. against several buses transporting army personnel and a NATO convoy in October 2014; the vehicle convoy of a prominent female MP;

the police headquarters; a compound housing foreign workers known as the Green Village; another army minibus;

US soldiers; a British embassy vehicle; an NGO compound and a foreign charity project in November 2014; a French financed school and another bus carrying army personnel in December 2014; a vehicle of the European Police Training Mission (EUPOL) in January 2015; a Turkish diplomatic vehicle in February 2015; the Uruzgan province chief of police and a member of parliament from Paktia in March 2015 and a NATO convoy in April 2015. (²²⁹)

(²²⁰)  UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 27 February 2015, pp. 4-5.

(²²¹)  Edinburgh International, Kabul Security Analysis: 2015-2016 Forecast, 1 June 2015; ISW, The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan’s Security, March 2015, p. 19.

(²²²)  UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and securityl, 27 February 2015, pp. 4-5.

(²²³)  Tolonews, Suicide attack targets ANA vehicles in Kabul, 1 October 2014; Tolonews, Suicide attack on ANA kills and wounds dozen, 2 October 2014; Tolonews, 16 killed, dozens wounded in Kabul over one week, 2 October 2014; Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 soldiers killed in fresh suicide attack on ANA bus, 2 October 2014.

(²²⁴)  Edinburgh International, Afghanistan Weekly Security Report 18 December 2014, 18 December 2014.

(²²⁵)  Edinburgh International, Afghanistan Weekly Security Report 18 December 2014, 18 December 2014.

(²²⁶)  For more information on the source of the data and the methodology, see introduction.

(²²⁷)  Edinburgh International, Afghanistan Weekly Security Report 27 November 2014, 27 November 2014.

(²²⁸)  UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 10 June 2015, p. 4.

(²²⁹)  Tolonews, One foreign national injured in IRD attack in Kabul, 27 November 2014; ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, updated on: 31 August 2015.

Following the announcement of the Taliban spring offensive Azm on 22 April 2015, May saw another spike in high-profile attacks. In its statement, the Taliban declared that targets would be ‘foreign occupiers especially their permanent military bases, their intelligence and diplomatic centres’, and also threatened government officials and Afghan security forces. (²³⁰) In May 2015 Kabul city saw two attacks against government buses carrying employees of the Attorney General, two attacks against hotels for foreigners, another EUPOL vehicle near the international airport and the Ministry of Justice. (²³¹) No high-profile attacks occurred in the first three weeks of June 2015, (²³²) but in the last week attacks followed against the Parliament building, a NATO convoy and a police headquarters.

Another NATO convoy, a building used by Afghanistan’s intelligence service and a police car were attacked in July 2015. Almost all of these attacks caused significant collateral damage among civilian bystanders. (²³³)

Another wave of attacks hit Kabul in August 2015. On 7 August, three attacks resulted in 368 victims. Fifty two were killed and 316 injured, of whom 355 were civilians; 42 of the civilians were killed and 313 injured. UNAMA counts the 28 killed and 29 injured, all police cadets, in the second attack as civilians, as they did not take part in any hostilities.

The first attack was a detonation of an explosive-laden truck in the area of Shah Shahid, the second targeted a police academy. The third attack targeted a base for US Special Forces in the Qasaba area, outside the city centre and did not include any civilian casualties. (²³⁴) AAN analyst Kate Clark analysed all three attacks: the first and most deadly was the detonation of an explosive-laden truck in the densely populated area of Shah Shahid. Homes and shops bore the brunt of the blast; 15 civilians were killed and 283 were wounded. Two aspects were atypical of this attack:

there was no obvious military target and the timing – in the middle of the night – led her to suggest that it may have been a premature explosion. The fact that the two other attacks later that day clearly targeted military installations, a police academy and a US Special Forces base, support the speculation that the bomb-truck was meant to strike later that day in a coordinated attack against high-profile targets. Nevertheless, that day was one of the worst days for civilians in Kabul since 2001. (²³⁵) Three days after this deadly string of attacks, insurgents targeted the entrance of the international airport and later in August 2015 another NATO convoy, killing three US private contractors, but also nine civilians and wounding 60 others waiting outside a nearby hospital. (²³⁶)

Other specific targets of insurgent attacks include a shoot-out at a Sufi mosque in March 2015 and the targeted killing of the Paktia prosecutor outside his home in Kabul in May 2015. (²³⁷)

In October 2014, three missile attacks occurred inside the city, without any casualties reported but still worrying residents. (²³⁸) Another such rocket attack was thwarted by police in August 2015. (²³⁹)

According to the analysis of Edinburgh International: (²⁴⁰)

attacks in the capital Kabul have traditionally served two purposes. In the first case, militant activity has aimed to physically weaken the power of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) traditionally achieved through the assassination of state officials and supply routes. More commonly however, extremist networks have sought to use the publicity generated by attack in Kabul to win symbolic propaganda victories […] While the security services continue to improve and develop their capability to counter such tactics (a recent attack on a foreign guesthouse in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighbourhood was put down without military or civilian casualties by the country’s Quick Reaction Force on 26 May 2015), the sheer scale and ingenuity of militant aggression within Kabul’s central districts has meant that an underlying threat is unlikely to be entirely removed at any point in the near future.

(²³⁰)  Roggio B., Afghan Taliban announces new spring operations, 22 April 2015; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Statement by the Leading Council of the Islamic Emirate regarding the inauguration of Spring Operations called ‘Azm’ (Resolve), 22 April 2015.

(²³¹)  ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, updated on: 31 August 2015.

(²³²)  Edinburgh International, Afghanistan Weekly Security Report 18 June 2015, 18 June 2015.

(²³³)  ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, updated on: 31 August 2015; Germany:

Federal Office for Migration and Asylum, Information Centre Asylum and Migration Briefing Notes (20 July 2015), 20 July 2015 ; United States Department of Defence, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 26.

(²³⁴)  UNAMA, PRESS STATEMENT: UNAMA calls on Anti-Government Elements to cease attacks in civilian areas, 8 August 2015; Clark K., The triple attack in Kabul:

A message? If so, to whom?, 10 August 2015.

(²³⁵)  Clark K., The triple attack in Kabul: A message? If so, to whom?, 10 August 2015.

(²³⁶)  ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, updated on: 31 August 2015; Pajhwok Afghan News, Kabul airport suicide attack leaves 5 dead, 16 hurt, 10 August 2015.

(²³⁷)  ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, updated on: 31 August 2015.

(²³⁸)  Tolonews, Kabul residents critizise govt over rockets attack, 31 October 2014.

(²³⁹)  Pajhwok Afgan News, Police claim thwarting possible rocket strike in Kabul, 23 August 2015.

(²⁴⁰)  Edinburgh International, Kabul Security Analysis: 2015-2016 Forecast, 1 June 2015.

According to the same source, police district 9 is one of the most volatile districts within the city, because of the presence of the largest ISAF installations in the city and the main road towards Jalalabad. (²⁴¹) Other central districts – district 2, district 4 and district 10 – are also prone to insurgent attacks because of the density of ministries, embassies and other foreign presence. (²⁴²)

In March 2015 ISW stated: ‘In these attacks, militants focused on targeting Afghan government and Western interests, including foreign military and diplomatic personnel, Afghan security forces, and western NGOs’. (²⁴³)

Although many insurgent attacks happen without consideration for collateral damage to civilians, according to analyst Fabrizio Foschini the choice of these targets appears to indicate that AGEs are somehow looking for legitimacy for their actions. (²⁴⁴)

In 2015 from January to August, 126 Kabul civilians were killed and 717 injured. A large part of these civilian casualties resulted from the string of attacks in August 2015, most notably the one in the Shah Shahid neighbourhood. (²⁴⁵) According to an assessment of several sources by the UK’s Home Office the surge of terrorist attacks in Kabul in mid-May 2015 alone led to at least 26 deaths and more than 80 injuries. (²⁴⁶)

Displacement

In the UNHCR Monthly Updates on Conflict Induced Displacement, Kabul is in this reporting period not mentioned as a province of origin for conflict-induced IDPs, only as a province of arrival of certain IDP movements from other provinces. IDPs originate mostly from neighbouring provinces such as Kapisa, Wardak and Logar. In Kabul province, the majority of IDPs from Kapisa settle in Kabul city and in the district of Surobi. (²⁴⁷) In late November and early December 2014, UNHCR registered more than 1,000 families or more than 6,000 individuals in Kabul city who were fleeing military operations and insurgent harassment in Tagab, Kapisa. (²⁴⁸) In February 2015 another 107 families, or 652 individuals, did the same (²⁴⁹) In April 2015, joint assessment teams identified 266 families or 1841 individuals in Kabul city and in neighbouring Baghrami districts. These families were displaced between December 2014 and April 2015 from Kapisa, Wardak, Logar and Parwan. While general insecurity triggered their displacement, the possibility of improved access to services in Kabul city played a role in the choice of the place of displacement. (²⁵⁰) In May 2015, UNHCR stated: (²⁵¹)

Although the province experienced a significant number of incidents, Kabul remained a main destination for the displaced families from the Central Region, largely due to the perception of a better security situation and the hope to find better coping mechanisms. During the reporting month, a joint assessment team […]

assessed 454 IDP families in various urban districts of Kabul city. They were displaced from various districts of Logar province in January 2015, as well as from rural areas of Kabul province. The families were largely living in rented houses and had access to basic services available in Kabul. Yet, the high living costs and the lack/

very low income of the families have been raised as their major concern. Reportedly, most of the children were working to contribute to the families’ income.

Apart from internal displacement due to the conflict in Afghanistan, Kabul city saw large flows of Afghan refugees returning to Afghanistan after fleeing Pakistani military operations in FATA, and unregistered Afghans being expelled by Pakistan since December 2014, when a military school in Peshawar was attacked by the Taliban. The Washington Post reported in August 2015 that more than 82,000 unregistered Afghans had been ‘pushed out’ of Pakistan since January 2015, along with about 150,000 Afghans deported from Iran over the same period. Many of them arrive in Kabul and try to survive doing daily labour. (²⁵²)

(²⁴¹)  Edinburgh International, Afghanistan Weekly Security Report 27 November 2014, 27 November 2014.

(²⁴²)  Edinburgh International, Kabul Security Analysis: 2015-2016 Forecast, 1 June 2015.

(²⁴³)  ISW, The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan’s Security, March 2015, pp. 17-18.

(²⁴⁴)  Foschini, F., Striking at Kabul, in 2013: the attack on the traffic police HQ, 21 January 2013.

(²⁴⁵)  Anonymous source specialized in security in Afghanistan, emails and briefing, July - September 2015.

(²⁴⁶)  United Kingdom: Home Office, Country Information and Guidance - Afghanistan: Security and humanitarian situation, 15 August 2015, p. 23.

(²⁴⁷)  UNHCR, Conflict-induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update, January 2015; UNHCR, Conflict-induced Internal Displacement – Monthly Update, June 2015.

(²⁴⁸)  UNHCR, Conflict-induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update, December 2014.

(²⁴⁹)  UNHCR, Conflict-induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update, February 2015.

(²⁵⁰)  UNHCR, Conflict-induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update, April 2015.

(²⁵¹)  UNHCR, Conflict-induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update, May 2015.

(²⁵²)  Washington Post, As the US pulls back, more Afghans descend into joblessness, 17 August 2015; RFE/RL, Afghan Refugees Again on the Run – This Time From Pakistan, 30 August 2015.

Actors in the conflict

The Taliban shadow governor for Kabul is Hafiz Mohibullah, affiliated to the Taliban’s Quetta Shura. (²⁵³) In Kabul, certain analysts refer to a Kabul Attack Network involved in many of the highprofile attacks. This is a network of combatants from the Haqqani Network, HIA, Taliban, al Qaeda and LeT. (²⁵⁴) According to the ISW: (²⁵⁵)

[t]here has been a slight escalation in the complexity of Kabul attacks in 2014, matching Haqqani Network signatures, suggesting their continued involvement. The Haqqani Network’s ratlines to Kabul lead from its sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where the senior leadership plays an important role in selecting targets and creating an overall strategy for spectacular attacks in Kabul. Interviews with captured insurgents in Kabul in early 2015 indicate that many of them have been radicalized and trained in the tribal areas, allegedly by Haqqani operatives. Haqqani commanders serve as the key figures in the ‘network of networks’ that the Kabul Attack Network uses to move suicide attackers, weapons, and bombmaking materials into the capital from the surrounding provinces.

[t]he escalation of violence in Kabul is likely linked to the increase of Taliban activity in the periphery. As ISAF troops closed their forward operating bases and pulled back to provincial capitals in the transition to Resolute Support, the insurgency was able to operate with greater freedom of movement and consolidate pre-existing strongholds in areas around Kabul. The insurgency maintains safe-havens in areas abutting three major highways leading into Kabul. The Taliban can funnel weapons, funds, and fighters from these areas and along the highways in order to support operations in Kabul. The Taliban’s ability to reinforce the Kabul Attack Network is made easier by an ineffective ANSF presence around the capital. With their limited capabilities, Afghan forces are reportedly struggling to maintain an adequate level of security on the roadways leading into Kabul.

In a meeting with lawmakers on December 17, 2014, NDS chief Rahmatullah Nabil said that the ANSF can monitor only four of the 26 access points into Kabul. He added that more than 100 armed groups were active in Kabul. (²⁵⁶) As for the threat of IS committing any attacks in the capital, Edinburgh International notes: (²⁵⁷)

Emerging threats, including the ISIS phenomenon may also serve to raise the risk profile within the capital from 2016 onwards, though so far the effectiveness of such groups has yet to be proven within the capital, with ISIS-affiliates more concerned at present with intra-militant feuds against the Taliban and other extremist factions in rural Nangarhar, Farah and Zabul than targeted attacks on international organizations.

(²⁵³)  UN Security Council, Letter dated 18 August 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 26 August 2015, p. 20.

(²⁵⁴)  CMFC, The Kabul Attack Network, July 2011; Roggio, B., Taliban continue to launch suicide assaults in Kabul, 29 March 2014; ISW, The Taliban Resurgent:

Threats to Afghanistan’s Security, March 2015, p. 18.

(²⁵⁵)  ISW, The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan’s Security, March 2015, p. 18.

(²⁵⁶)  Pajhwok Afghan News, Over 100 armed groups in Kabul, NDS, 17 December 2014.

(²⁵⁷)  Edinburgh International, Kabul Security Analysis: 2015-2016 Forecast, 1 June 2015.