Communication for Development One-year master
Communication in conflict and peace
Reviewing peace theory in the frames of a network society
Julie Arnfred Bojesen
Abstract
The digital revolution has changed how we interact and organize ourselves, how wars are fought and how peace is restored. The nature of conflicts has changed, and so should the theories with which we try to understand conflicts. Communication is power, and understanding power relations in the information era is fundamental to address
peacebuilding. In this paper I investigate which communication plays in power relations and how this can be applied to classical peace theory. I do this by discussing the
elements of Galtung’s classical conflict cycle in light of the network theory. I define power in the networks as communicative power which it is exercised within, between and behind the different networks. The widely distributed internet access and
possibilities to influence others has not only skewed the power relations within the political sphere, but also created effective ways to damage democratic principles and structures through communication. In my discussion, I argue that communication as discursive power can be seen as the source of conflict, because the one dominating the discourse dominates the network. Based on Galtung’s framework, I show how
communicative violence can be structural, cultural and direct. Communication can be used violently to harm infrastructure, mislead and create mistrust, and marginalize actors. Because communication plays a pivotal role in everyday life, I further argue that it can also be seen as a basic human need. To create a sustainable peace, we have to think about peacebuilding across the different networks of society, ensuring access and aiming for a more constructive discourse.
Abstract 1 1. Introduction 4 1.2. Methodology 5 1.2.1. Research problem 6 1.2.2. Motivation 6 1.2.3. Theoretical framework 7 1.2.4. Research design 9
1.2.5. Method and structure 10
1.2.6. Ontology 11
1.2.7. Definitions 12
1.2.8. Limitations 13
1.2.9. Reservations 14
2. Peacebuilding and communication 14
2.1. Peace theory 15
2.2. Power 17
2.3. Communication 20
2.4. Actors 22
2.4.1. Power over the networks 22
2.4.2. Power within the networks 23
2.3.4. Power between networks 24
3. The network landscape 24
3.1. Goals from communication 25
3.1.1. Nature - basic needs 25
3.1.2. Culture - values 26
3.1.5. Structure - interests 26
3.2. Incompatible goals 28
3.2.1. Conflicting goals within the networks 29
3.2.2. Conflicting goals between the networks 30
3.2.3. A fundamental political crisis 31
4. Conflicts and violence in the networks 32
4.1. Communicative violence 33
4.1.1. Structural violence 34
4.1.2. Cultural violence 35
4.1.3. Direct violence 36
5. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding in the networks 37
5.1. Communicative peace 37
5.2. Tolerant networks 38
6. Adding communication power to peacebuilding theory 42
7. Conclusion 43
8. Reflections and perspectivation 46
1. Introduction
Communication can cause immense harm and communication can stall conflicts. "The pen is mightier than the sword," the English author Edward Bulwer-Lytton wrote in 1839. A present-day interpretation of the classical saying is: “The internet can be used to disrupt democracies as surely as it can destabilize dictatorships” (Freedom House, 2018, p. 1).
Digital communication has paved the way for revolutions, the rise of oppressed groups and social changes. Simultaneously, the same mechanisms are (ab)used as means of domination and weapons in conflicts, information war being the most extreme example of communication directed to destabilize societies by augmenting potential tensions, threatening to eventually undermine the structures of trust that hold society together.
In this paper, I will investigate how to combine existing theories to better address conflict and peacebuilding within the frames of the digitalized information society. The complexity of social interaction has increased massively in the globalized world, also regarding conflicts, so to understand dynamics of peace and conflicts today we must be aware of this complexity, but try to identify the basic elements of conflicts in the information era.
Although instant communication has been possible for over a century, the information
revolution is characterized by the sudden drop in costs and increase of capacity when it comes to communication (Nye and Welch, 2014, p. 299). The result is a highly interconnected world, free flow of information and immense possibilities to influence others. This quickly saturated the ways we think and act, and the ways in which we organize ourselves. The information revolution gave us new tools for communication as well as new interrelational conditions for how these tools can be used – challenging the traditional power hierarchies.
In 2014, political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. stated that although possible, it costs states too much to maintain a central surveillance, the result being that a lot of other actors now have power to influence politics (Nye and Welch, 2014, p. 301). It seems like the tides have changed, and that
the diffusion of power has reached a point where the price of increased internet control is worth paying - or that the neoliberal theories (once again) turned out to have insufficient explanatory power. For the eighth year in a row, internet freedom has gone down, as states, politicians and companies increasingly interfere in the digital public sphere, shaping and controlling it to their own benefit (Freedom House, 2018).
In February 2019, a report from Pew Research Center stated that in the 26 countries
investigated, a median of 61% see cyberattacks as a major concern (Poushter and Huang, 2019), and the trust in media (both social and mass) is steadily declining over the years (Edelman, 2019).
Insecurity and instability do not create fruitful environment for social prosperity and protection of rights and freedoms. Peace (or active peacebuilding and -keeping) is crucial for any social development; and in times of information warfare, ‘fake news’, increasing social and
international tensions, limitations of rights, governments using restrictive measures to counter information warfare and cyber threats, and overall declining trust in systems and media, the de-escalation and prevention of conflicts should be addressed through communication.
To understand the background for conflicts to aim for a peaceful coexistence, we have to try to understand conflict and peacebuilding theory in a network reality. This will be my aim in this theoretically driven paper, where I will discuss the basic concepts of power, network, peace and conflict to develop a contemporary take on peacebuilding.
1.2. Methodology
1.2.1. Research problem
In the information age, communication is everything and everywhere. It takes the form of identity or politics, it is about infrastructure or social relations. Communication is used as a weapon and as peaceful mediation, for domination and for participation. Investigating
peacebuilding and conflict in the light of communication saturation requires an understanding of the power structures at play.
To be more specific, my research problem is the following:
How can we theoretically assess conflict and peacebuilding in the information age?
The question springs from the fact that all social theory develops in a certain historical context. When Johan Galtung first developed his peace theory, it was against the backdrop of the Second World War, whereas information warfare and cyber-armament, propagandic discourse and increasing limitations of freedom of speech are political means of today. My point of departure is that communication saturates all spheres of society, and that some actors benefit from more power over the communication than others. The aim is to add communication as an element to peace theory.
My question falls into the category of the “‘Third Wave’ [of peace studies] in which key concepts of peace can be used to delineate important operative distinctions across a vastly diversified range of fields, in recognition of the diffuse and networked configurations of power” (Lynch, 2015, p. 21f).
1.2.2. Motivation
The overall condition for social development is peace. The lack of connection between
academic fields addressing social and political issues which, in my view, are dependent on and constituted by each other, has been the main motivation for choosing this topic. In
Communication for Development, I sometimes miss the discussion of political power, just as political science lacks a sensitivity of human interaction. But “peace studies is about the human condition in general [...]regardless of how the causal chains or circles and spirals, or what not, spin or weave their ways through the human manifold. The consequence of this broader systemic view is that we must aim for transdisciplinarity across all the levels of the human condition“ (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 132), so I will try to make my argumentation fit for more than one aspect of life in the light of the present-day context.
There is still development to achieve across the world. I find it interesting to investigate the processes and challenges of development and social change that also need to be addressed in the Global North. Putting one’s own house in order is important to also maintain the legitimacy of being a role-model (or soft imperialist, depending on which perspective one takes) in regard to implementing development processes in the Global South.
1.2.3. Theoretical framework
To theoretically inspect how to view communication and peace in the interconnected society, I will have to combine several theories. Often, research within Communication for Development touches too lightly upon questions of more political character, but discussing peacebuilding is highly a matter of power. Political science is the study of power, and political structures are defining the frames for what can be done how, and which social change can take place.
In classical peacebuilding theory, power is only mentioned in passing, divided into four types: military, economic, cultural and political (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p.17). How power is enacted in these different manners is not explored. Because I see the use of power as the foundation for conflict and peace, as well as for every other social state, I choose to focus on how power can be understood at a more abstract level, as opposed to Galtung and Fischers’ instrumental categories of power.
Communication is crucial to the distribution of power and thus long-term influence and peacebuilding; therefore, it is timely to try and incorporate power and communication into peace theory.
Simultaneously, in political questions there is not sufficient focus on the role of communication as the background for conflict and peacebuilding, which is problematic when communication and digitalization has changed the relationship across the political as well as social spheres. The role of media in conflicts and conflict-resolution has gained increasing attention since the 1990s, with approaches such as conflict-sensitive and constructive journalism as a tool within the area of media for peacebuilding (Betz, 2012).
Mediation, peace journalism are key tools in conflict transformation and rebuilding communities, but the same mechanism is used negatively in information warfare through misinformation and trolling, with different intentions. Can we see the information society as such under the conceptual arch of conflict and peace?
In peace theory, peacebuilding can be seen as negative or minimalist peacebuilding (avoiding violence) or positive or maximalist peacebuilding (preventing violence by solving the deeper issues behind the conflict). To investigate peace by peaceful means, I will let Johan Galtung's outline of the conflict cycle be the starting point. Within peace studies, one must understand the underlying (potential) conflicts to be able to address them. As conflict is in reality a measurement or test of power, it is also important to discuss the power mechanisms at work.
To go in depth with the investigation of the context of the phenomena, I will base my analysis on Manuel Castells’ network theory, which sees power as communication and discourse - a relational capacity to influence others through “construction of meaning on the basis of the discourses through which social actors guide their action” (Castells, 2009, p. 9). I assess his model critically, also touching the concept of a public sphere and the role of communication in democratic deliberation and social change. This will add a layer of constructive approach,
working as a theoretical basis for the argumentation that active civil participation is the better solution for a society.
In my discussion, I will look at social mechanisms from different fields of communication, including marketing theory. As peace deals with not only politics, but also sociology,
communication and cultural studies, we have to look at it in a broader light. “Rather than risk failure, we may not even attempt complex responses to complex problems at all, thereby reinforcing the tendency toward minimalist peacebuilding, which does not address underlying causes and conditions” (Sandole, 2010, p. 10f). Therefore, I take the risk, using theories from different fields: communication (communication studies), power (political science, sociology), and peacebuilding (development studies) - in my view, exactly what is the strength of
Communication for Development as an academic field.
1.2.4. Research design
To see how we can think about peace and conflict in an interconnected society, I am doing the daring move of writing an inductive analysis. I will investigate the basic dynamics at play in societies - power and communication - and discuss how the concepts interact in a digitalized network society, as well as how they constitute conflict and peacebuilding.
Based on a framework of network theory, I will investigate how communication has created new power relations. The struggles to position oneself in the networks can give us a theoretical approach to conflict understanding in the digital age. I am taking an inductive approach to identify how different theories can be linked to understand the social processes underlying escalation and violence, and further to see how this can add to the classical peace theory. My discussion will, following the nature of an inductive study, draw on actual examples to place my arguments in the present context. I will focus on the collective actors instead of on the
This is an interdisciplinary approach, as I draw on theories from sociology, social sciences, political science, communication, and marketing. In the SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research, interdisciplinary research is defined as an approach that “integrates perspectives and methods from two or more disciplines to investigate a topic or an issue” (Skinner, 2008, p. 448). The classical interdisciplinary research is done in teams of experts from different fields, which is expedient for complex social questions, and would be the optimal method for investigating a subject like information warfare, which touches upon military studies, politics, IT,
communication, sociology, anthropology etc.
Due to the limitations of this project, I can only use my own different skills and implement relevant theories to an extent that is meaningful.
I will divide my theoretical argumentation into sections according to Galtung’s
critical-constructivism which divides peace research into the sections “‘Why did it happen?’ ‘what is it about?’ and ‘how can it be better?’ (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 129). On the other hand, I take into account that the “obsession with causality” in researching public communication (Hamelink, 2015, p. 40) is not necessarily applicable to such a complex process including several . Therefore, I will not set up a causal model - because in reality, questions about communication and peace are fluid or, at best, cyclical. Using the conflict cycle as a skeleton for developing my argumentation, I will try to inspect each element and focus on how they interact.
1.2.5. Method and structure
My intention is to develop a model for thinking peacebuilding that considers the power structures in network society. To get there, I will outline the classical peace theory to identify the main elements of a conflict. I will discuss the concept of power in a network society, and how communication can be seen as defining the society, as well as how the information
revolution changed social and political structures. This will be followed by a discussion applying the results of my argumentation the peacebuilding model, and finally I will discuss how we can
As this is an investigation of a social phenomenon (conflict) unique to the present context, generalizability is not a goal as such. I try to make some general statements about the concepts I am discussing, but seeing that they are defined by the present-day context, my definitions might change over the next few years. “Notions such as trustworthiness, credibility,
authenticity, transferability, and plausibility are often cited as parallel criteria for quality
research” (Miller, 2008, p. 449), and I will put emphasis on thorough argumentation throughout the whole text, to make my analytical points clear. I will not keep myself out of the analysis to appear more objective, as I want to be transparent and credible, and the arguments are influenced by my own bias.
My discussion is based on the ideological viewpoint that in a society, people should have equal rights and possibilities. As democracy is the best model we have to ensure that people have a say in what representatives do with the power they have been given, my analysis will be based on the presumption that ensuring democratic rights for everyone will create a peaceful system. This requires the rights for everyone, including the “enemy”, where Human rights is the best internationally applicable tool for creating basis for peace. The Westphalian state model is not necessarily the most adequate system of political power we have for a society that is not limited to geopolitical boundaries, but it is still the model we are using, and therefore it is not meaningful to discuss other and potential systems of power distribution.
1.2.6. Ontology
The ontological point of departure, in this paper, is (post)constructivist. Social constructions are being discussed as power, communication, democracy and social change. In this paper, it is even arguably said that power relations have changed with the information revolution. Thus, my perception is that hard military, political or economic power is not the only type of dominance, but that discourse and social relations can be equally influential on the world we live in.
On the other hand, I do not fully support the constructivist premise that everything is relative. “Reality cannot solely exist in social – that is human - interaction. [...] We are actually able to follow processes of construction, and to look into the different elements and materials that are part of these construction works. It would make no sense to explain the construction of a building when only looking into the social interactions.” (Knol, 2011, p.4). I assume that there are some objective truths out there - for instance that military power is a real threat and not a matter of perception, and that humans are built in a certain way which allows for generalized assumptions of values, reactions and social processes.
This project - along with the whole field of development and peace studies - is based on a normative framework. Instead of only focusing on what Galtung calls the diagnosis or the “is”, I also focus on the “ought” (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 15).
Thus, I put myself in the post-constructivist category, as I believe that society is an objective result of constructed truths - and that research and discourse is also part of a bigger picture.
1.2.7. Definitions
‘Information revolution’ is another term for the digital revolution, starting in the late 1990s when access to the internet was becoming more common. It encompasses the ‘Web 2.0’ which is the interactive internet with social platforms and networks, where participation is key
(Trester and Tannen, 2013).
I use the term ‘network’ interchangeably about the digital communication infrastructure (internet, social platforms) and in terms of the social relations and how actors relate to each other (Castells, 2009).
‘Democracy’ and ‘democratic’ are disputed concepts, and I do not refer solely to electoral democracy, which is not a fulfilling measurement of the possibilities to participate in the
society. I refer to ‘democracy’ as a societal model where there is the possibility to utter one's point of view publicly towards the ones in power or for public deliberation - and to be heard.
1.2.8. Limitations
Books have been written about each of the topics I will combine in this brief assignment, and a clear aim and limitation is therefore necessary. I will focus on the relations between collective actors from a political perspective. This means a focus on (political) authorities and the
population/civil society as a unity, generalizing the concepts of states, people and democratic dynamics.
I am aware of the huge differences between the level of information saturation, political crises and the implementation of digital networks across the world. I will not go into specificities about models of government, culture, resources and so on, albeit all these aspects are still crucial to the overall problem. Thus, I will not dive into the discussion of the threat of a neoliberal globalized economy and market powers towards democratic and peaceful thought and practice - and thus also on social change and peaceful transformation. The digital divide and the challenge of equal access to communication tools and media literacy will also not be discussed, even though that is a very important factor in discussing active participation and legitimization.
These choices are made to be able to develop a theoretical discussion, where basic
assumptions must be in place and generalized. Topics such as history, economy, technology, social movements, religion, to mention some, are highly relevant in the discussion, and could very well be included in more extensive research of this topic, which I only lay out the basics for here.
1.2.9. Reservations
My own background is from political science, civil society, the Danish foreign ministry, and working in media. My discussion - and reluctance to focus only on social change without addressing the political structures behind - is based on reflections and observations of use of power that I have made. The insistence of connecting different disciplines comes from my diverse experience, and the realization that no social phenomena can be understood solely from a sociological or political view.
Further, I am writing this from my perspective as a Scandinavian based in one of the most digitalized countries in the world. This means that my take on the network society might be different than if it is assessed from other places.
Knowing that the different topics I am writing about are big areas of study, I cannot possibly have gone through and included all relevant literature. I accept the possibility of having overlooked something or reaching arguments similar to those already stated by others.
2. Peacebuilding and communication
“The strongest word in the world is ‘no’,” is a line in a Danish song from 1971 by Jesper Jensen. In this song about resistance towards the oppressors, the message is clear: one single word can make a change against injustice. You just have to say it, embody it. Communication is powerful and consequential in the sense that it can influence and change situations and entire
structures.
Indeed, communication is crucial to ending social injustice. In fact, it is crucial to peacebuilding, to conflict, to politics - to all social interaction. Couldry writes that “media [...] install the world as ‘fact’ into everyday routines, and in ever-changing ways” (2012, p. 1). Communication between actors - including the media - has always shaped the society we live in.
The information revolution has moved much of our life from the physical to the non-physical domain (Knol, 2011). Most things that shapes and constitutes society takes place in the digital sphere, and in this domain, we are connected with more actors than what has ever been possible before. This creates a very different context for understanding conflicts than when peace theory was first developed by Johan Galtung in the 1960s.
In times of a ‘democratic crisis’ (Freedom House, 2019) resonating across all spheres of society, it is time to review how we can understand conflict cycles and peacebuilding in a context of communication and interconnection.
2.1. Peace theory
To address the matter of peacebuilding in a communicated world, we need a brief outline of the classical theory as a point of departure.
In peace studies, there are two perceptions of peace: Negative peace as the absence of
(intended) physical or psychological violence, and positive peace is a constructive state of being that deals “with the underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions of a conflict which might develop, or has developed, into manifest violence.” (Sandole, 2010, p. 9). Thus, positive peace is when structures and cultures support and reinforce peace through justice and equality (Sandole, 2010; Galtung and Fischer, 2013; Hoffmann and Hawkins, 2015).
Conflict arises when two (or more) actors have incompatible goals. Blocked goals lead to othering and polarization between the actors, and if this problematic relation to the other remains an untransformed conflict, the frustration will lead to polarization and ‘othering’, eventually leading to intended harm to other human beings (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 15ff). The goals are defined by the conditions that actors exist and operate within: “Nature is in us, and around us; Culture is in us as internalized values and norms; and Structure is around us as institutionalized, positive and negative, sanctions” (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 16). When the
goals are incompatible, and/or you have violent cultures or structures that allow for harm to be done, you will have outbreaks of violence. An example of actuality is the ‘Yellow
jackets’-movement in France, where the goals of the government (impose new taxes) are incompatible with the goals of the people (paying less taxes). The structures of inequality are allowing for (economic) ‘violence’ towards the working class’ basic needs, and combined with a culture of popular resistance it lead to physical confrontations.
The definition of violence is the use, or threat, of power upon someone to cause sentient beings “any avoidable insult to basic human needs” (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 35), these basic needs being defined as survival, wellness, freedom and identity. The intended harm, physical or psychological, is the violent outcome of untransformed conflicts. Violence, and not conflict, is the opposite of peace. Violence exists in three types: direct violence, executed by violent actors, structural violence indirectly or directly imposed by violent structures, or cultural violence when a violent culture legitimizes direct and structural violence (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 35).
To get from a violent situation to a state of positive peace, conflict transformation has to take place. Conflict transformation should be peaceful, as violence breeds violence, and forcefully suppressing violence will probably not resolve any conflict in the long run. This is, obviously, unique to each type of conflict, and the more complex and institutionalized a conflict is, the more extensive a model for peacebuilding becomes.
Peaceful conflict transformation should focus on the roots and causes of violent behaviour; the conflict itself, the culture, the structures and the actors. The main way of creating peace is mainly through means of communication: through mediation, through journalism and media that promotes a peaceful culture and through an extensive work to reconcile, forgive, rebuild stability and together create a “new reality accommodating all parties in the sense that they find that outcome preferable to the alternatives (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 71). Working for
positive peace is only manageable in the long run to avoid future violence if negative peace through absence of violence is present.
For positive peace, one has to work actively, because “genuine pacifism is transformative and activist, employing nonviolent means of social and personal change to resist oppression, war, and injustice and to promote personal and social moral integrity and radical, peaceful means of transforming conflicts and actors.” (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 8). Peacebuilding can be defined as a long-term approach to avoid future violence. This can be reactive and proactive - although often reactive, as situations develop and the contexts prevailing conflicts are never the same - and is a comprehensive and complex process involving many fields of expertise (Sandole, 2010).
In summary, nature, culture and structure lay the background for an actor’s goal. A conflict develops when actors’ goals are incompatible, and if it is not transformed, polarization and othering will take place until violence breaks out in the shape of insult to the basic needs. Transformation takes place through peacefully establishing negative peace (absence of
violence) and working with the roots of violence to create a more sustainable, peaceful society.
Having the means to start a conflict as well as working with conflict transformation requires an ability to both act and influence. In the next section, I will review the definition of power in an interconnected society.
2.2. Power
Conflicts, hot or cold, are a struggle of power and domination. So is peacebuilding, where the peaceful ways and approaches have to conquer the violent ones.
Manuel Castells defines power as “the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favor the
empowered actor’s will, interests, and values.” (Castells, 2009, p. 10). This mechanism takes place across all social spheres.
Power cannot exist in isolation, as it is implicit in the concept that it is exercised over someone or something. Further, social structures cannot exist without some sort of power relations. Everyone is connected to others in social systems as well as a part of some bigger structural organization or hierarchy. This means that we are all bound to be involved in power
relationships. Interconnectivity and communicative structures constitute networks with
“patterns of contact” or “flows of information” (Castells, 2009, p. 20), and in a digitalized world, everyone with a smartphone is a (potential) node in a network. The internet connects people, and from your phone, you can hypothetically connect with and influence/be influenced by anyone anywhere in the world.
“The most fundamental form of power lies in the ability to shape the human mind. The way we feel and think determines the way we act, both individually and collectively” (Castells, 2009, p. 3). To shape people’s minds, you have to change what they believe and think. In discourse theory, knowledge and communication are intertwined, and discourse is to “look beyond the commu-nication of intentional meaning to all those practices that shape our social behaviours and beliefs” (Nunan et al., 2014, p. 1). Therefore, communication is not only about language transporting information, but discourse takes place within a given context and is shaped by and shapes the context it takes place in, influencing practices and how we perceive the world. It is the discourses that frame the limits and possibilities of action within the networks, and discourses are communication - thus power is discursive, and discourse is power (Castells, 2009).
Castells identifies four different types of power in networks: Networking power, which is the power to include and/or exclude people in the global networks. Network power is the power setting the standards of the network, or the ‘protocols of communication’. Networked power is the power within each network - which is different according to which network we look at, as it
is defined by the networks. Network-making power is the power to constitute and (re)program networks, as well as connecting different networks (Castells, 2009, p. 42ff). If we move this to the non-physical sphere, this is all applicable to the online communication networks.
In network theory, “power in the network society is communication power” (Castells, 2009, p. 53), and this power is distributed across the “entire realm of human action” (Castells, 2009, p. 15). As societies are organized through social (or structural) relations, institutional power makes us organize and interact according to common, shared perceptions and values. There are concentrations of power in some relational structures based on the enforcement of domination - such as the state. The political organization of societies into states is founded on the
acceptance of other actors that states should have monopoly on violence as one type of power. “Power is relational, domination is institutional” (Castells, 2009, p. 15). The internet constitutes the backdrop to the whole network society in shape of the infrastructure for all
communications, and therefore it also constitutes the whole global network, underlying
everything. Political institutions are also networks within the global network, and they are now less isolated, as geography and hierarchy is - in theory -not limiting the network.
Because domination by coercion only creates an unstable power relationship, Castells claims that there is mutuality in stable power relations. This suggests that the subject is accepting the situation and has some possibility or option to resist, and if this resistance develops to be stronger than the acceptance and compliance, the whole power relationship will change and shift (Castells, 2009, p. 3, p. 11).
In political theory it is common to separate the concept of power into soft and hard power. Hard power is the influence on actions through coercion by the threat or use of violence or sanctions (physical, psychological, economical, structural). Soft power is to influence actions through attraction. This power comes from creating a positive image of the actor or persuasive, non-violent measures, which makes others want to collaborate, copy or change (Nye and Welch, 2014; Hayden, 2012), appealing to cultural and value-based elements through public
diplomacy, culture etc. This distinction is useful also in the definition of power in networks, as the communication power can be defined as “hard” in the case of technically excluding actors from a network such as censorship, or simply the control over the networks such as the social platform companies. “Soft” network power with attraction as influence on other actors also is highly important and is what lays the foundation for polarization (“this is better than the other”) but also the foundation of the existence and general function of media, or the common acceptance of ‘protocol of communication’ in any society.
In an interconnected society, power can be seen as influence between, within and behind a network. Hard power - the capacity to coerce through violence or sanctions - and soft power - the capacity to influence through attraction and persuasion - are mostly implemented through communication.
2.3. Communication
Power is the relation between actors. Yet, the power relation is based on communication. In this view, it is almost impossible to separate the two concepts, as they constitute each other. Communication exist in the shape of social media, digital systems, mass media, culture, the internet as well as the interpersonal communication.
In a networked world where everything is based on, deriving from and constituting
communication, we have the same concept - communication - as structure, process, tool, cause and effect. We have defined power as influential capacity, but communication is what
constitutes this capacity. Therefore I find it meaningful to operationalize the concept of communication into two overall categories:
The instrumental aspect of communication is what constitutes the act of communicating. It is the concrete elements that makes distribution of information and messages between two or more actors. Discourse is the backdrop to social and political behaviour - not only the linguistic
discourse, but also how communication creates social and cultural structures. This is the frames for the “space of action” (Couldry, 2012) in which communication - and politics and social interaction - takes place.
Instrumental (concrete) Discursive (abstract)
● Infrastructure (Networks and technical equipment) ● Process (flow of information between A and B) ● Tool (distribution of messages and information) ● Language
● Norms
● Culture and language ● Relations
● Influence on others
Table 1.1. Operationalization of communication.
The instrumental communication is what gives actors the possibility to use power, and the discursive communication is the use of power and the socially constructed effects hereof. The latter shapes the former and vice versa, and they are not mutually exclusive, but overlapping, as they are aspects of the same phenomenon. The instrumental aspect is necessary for the discursive aspect to take place. This distinction can be linked to direct and indirect use of power.
In the light of the power definition, both aspects of communication are necessary to understand the effects. The weight on each of the communication aspects varies in the different uses of power. Excluding someone from the network addresses the instrumental communication - either if it is to speak another language or disconnecting them from the internet. When it comes to network power, the objective is to influence actors, potentially to change the discourse of the network. In social media campaigns (e.g. #MeToo), the message, the platform and the language are the instrumental aspect, and the normative change in addressing sexual harassment is the discursive aspect of communication. It should be noted that the aspects are not exclusive, and they are both always present.
In conclusion, we can see communication as the basis for any power relationship. The
instrumental communication and the discursive communication are two aspects of the same phenomenon, but can shed light on how power is used.
2.4. Actors
In network theory, every node in a network is an actor. In the communication perspective, one can regard everyone with instrumental communicative power as an actor, but as power
relations are defined by reciprocity, the ones receiving communication or subject to discourse are also actors. In the communication networks, actors do not need to be factual, but can be constructed and still have power - artificial intelligence is for instance taking up place as fictitious actors with a very real power to influence, such as chatbots.
Actors can be individual or collective, institutional or actually networks themselves, depending on which type of communication power you look at. Anyone taking part in communication can be considered an actor. Social issues, though, should keep the focus on human actors, as they are (so far still) the ones who control the non-human actors.
Actors can be individuals, but also people organized in groups or communities where they represent one ‘voice’. Actors are those who influence the networks, either in the sense of influencing the overall discourse and way of communicating, or through legal framework or concrete digital infrastructure.
2.4.1. Power over the networks
In the communicative network society, the power is concentrated on those who control the networks (Castells, 2009), because they have the influence to manage both the instrumental and the discursive communication. States and political entities (such as international
done, how and which social change takes place. It is worth noting the circularity in the fact that companies owning the networks also have strong influence on politics - and thus the legal framework. This very important discussion will not be addressed here.
2.4.2. Power within the networks
Within the communication networks, there is hypothetically complete freedom in the space of action. But this is only hypothetically, because the networks also create a hierarchical or inequal structure in the sense that some actors have more power than others.
In regards of the online networks, conceptualized as social media platforms, there are two overall capitalistic mechanisms which give actors power: The model in which the ones that ‘sell’ most [content adapted to the trends and discourses online], ‘get’ most [hits, likes, visibility, influential capacity]. As well as the psychological bias that you as an information consumer always wants more of the same, or the information that confirms your position/pleases you. This – the internet algorithms and the social network culture - creates a positive feedback loop which reinforces the power to influence actors with strong capital. That gives actors most able to adapt to the network reality in terms of the instrumental communication, most discursive impact.
This communicative capital, in the Bourdieusian terms of power, is thus the power to influence. In a network society, the ones who better communicate and take their turn changing or
reinforcing the discourse, are the ones making an impact. The operationalization of this capital is visibility. Without audience, no one can hear you scream.
New tools will reproduce the existing social divides (Eimhjellen and Ljunggren, 2017) - or create new ones. Therefore, digitalization has not created more equality - now there are other factors that give power and social capital. All in all, the communicative capital is what positions some actors above others within the networks, and this capital is not equal to or defined by political
2.3.4. Power between networks
There are actors that connect or create bridges between different networks. They are often defined as gatekeepers (Castells, 2009; Sandholm, 2015), as they have the power to create networks and open doors of connection. These are per definition actors that represent different networks. An example is influencers (bloggers, instagrammers, youtubers) who represent themselves as individuals within a network of like-minded people, but also represent the commercial interests of companies (Sandholm, 2015). Politicians online are another
example, as they represent the political interests of the authorities, but they are also individuals and citizens, thus connecting different networks. The same goes for NGOs who represent the interests of some people and talk on behalf of others in the public and political spheres. Most actors are gatekeepers as they all take up a position in several networks. The media is key here, because they are the main gatekeepers communicating between networks.
In the following I will focus on the collective actors, and not discuss the individual aspect as such.
3. The network landscape
Communication happens in a 'space of action' (Couldry, 2014). This space is publicly accessible, and the space where interactions take place. Earlier, the capacity to influence - the
communication power - was concentrated on political and economic actors who could control which information and what messages were distributed to the wide audience.
With the expansion of the internet, this power is diffused through the network structures, as so many more actors have the possibility to take an influential position and use their relational capacity actively (Weiss et al., 2013). This creates a whole new reality for many aspects of civic
life. As far as the question of power and politics is concerned, it brings up new problems to investigate, theoretically and practically.
3.1. Goals from communication
Actors’ goals come from “basic needs derived from Nature, values from Culture and interests from Structure” (Galtung, 2007, p. 16), so we have three aspects from which conflict could potentially derive from.
In the following I will investigate the role of communication in the framework of nature, culture and structure and the potential conflicting goals.
3.1.1. Nature - basic needs
In peace theory, Nature is defined as the basic needs or drives that we as humans have. In the network society, the traditional naturalistic perception of survival does not necessarily apply.
For instance, many vital functions have been digitalized (and increasingly so). Banks, healthcare, jobs are now more than ever relying on communication and interconnection. The information revolution has made it possible to live off of communication (selling information, handling and managing information, producing information, distributing information). It is also a way to obtain vital remedies - for instance through apps used in agriculture. In this view, it is in many ways crucial to survival. Important information and warnings, as well as keeping in touch with family and loved ones, is an elementary need for most people.
Raising the level of abstraction from Galtung’s original model, I have argued that actors can also be political entities in a network society, and for a political entity (or even system, taking the discursive viewpoint), to survive, influence is vital. Any socially constructed part of society relies on communication to keep existing.
3.1.2. Culture - values
The goals can also derive from Culture, which defines the values of actors. With the information revolution, values have somehow been challenged, as actors suddenly were exposed to so many more different positions through extensive communication.
In one way, this has paved the way for much more interaction and collaboration than possible before in very many spheres - culture, travelling, trade - creating acceptance and tolerance.
On the other hand, political tensions are increasing across the world, and polarization,
nationalism and populism is on the rise. This can be seen as a counter-reaction to the increased globalization and interconnection. Excluding concepts of nation, territory, nations and
culture/religion are growing stronger, identity politics and geopolitics - and increasing conflicts - being a reaction to increased fluidity, interconnection and globalization (Hylland Eriksen, 2014).
Specifically related to value is the question of how to communicate in an global network. There are strong positions on freedom of speech conflicting with rights to integrity. A good example is the Muhammad cartoons controversy in 2005, when the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published satirical drawings of the Prophet, creating a diplomatic crisis with several Muslim countries (Wikipedia, 2019). Another point related to this is the criticism of the Western bias in the communication networks as well as in the international politics.
3.1.5. Structure - interests
The Structure defines actors’ interests. The internet dominates all spheres of communication and is now where everything goes on, challenging classical structural divisions such as time, place, status and power. Many theories about power and communication are based on the premise that there is a civil body of citizens responding to the political powers as separate entities (and in functional democracies, the political powers respond to their citizens). Seeing the power of communication from this perspective, the mass media is entirely dominating
these power relations, and the audience is a passive recipient who can be influenced by whoever is in the dominant position.
The information revolution, the technology and accessibility has made instant communication possible, giving each person possibility the power to communicate with the rest of the world. Everyone is trying to find their place in the new communicated network-based reality, relating to each other as active consumers of information. The key word in the ‘Web 2.0’ is participation (Trester and Tannen, 2013). With the internet, the communication is no longer a one-way process, as we actively participate and contribute with our own information as well as select content on a much more specified level than with the classical media. We are constantly
presented to information from the internet, and we constantly participate in what Castells calls “mass self-communication” (2009).
In marketing theory, the change in how people relate to communicated content has long been the central topic. ”Consumers are turning away from the traditional sources of advertising: radio, television, magazines, and newspapers. Consumers also consistently demand more control over the media consumption” (Mangold and Faulds, 2009, p. 360). People actively chose to consume information by people they identify with online (Kenvold, 2014). The result is that in the constructed networks such as social media, users who possess a high level of
credibility through the acknowledgement of other users (for instance through likes and followers or peers), have the power to shape opinion (Sandholm, 2015). We consume
information based on preferences, and we communicate with whom we choose to include in our network.
The increased possibilities of interaction, the possibilities to engage - and make a bigger resistance to power as well as disengage - in the society has skewed the power balance. Going from being mostly passive recipients of communication to being more selective and outspoken, citizens take a more powerful position vis-a-vis the communicator/authority, as well as use their own influential capacity towards other consumers.
The goals deriving from the structure are interests related to connectivity and ability to communicate. For political actors, the interest is to have support, either through
communicating with citizens or through shaping the structures - and excluding others. The overarching interest in a network society is communication through connection.
The structure is defined by the communicative networks themselves as well as the legal framework - and discursive elements. This construction is favourable to networks such as the neoliberal market, but it is not suitable for political hierarchies nor for geographical limitations.
3.2. Incompatible goals
What we can draw from the above discussed is that in the information age, the power to communicate and influence is fundamental to the nature, structure and culture from which goals derive. Because communication plays a crucial role across all three categories, it
drastically increases the chance of incompatible goals. Conflicting goals of any origin can play out within the networks, between networks and behind networks. Within networks there will either be interests in being connected, disconnected or to participate and influence.
The communicative power is the core means of policy-making and society. All social interaction happens through some sort of communication. We act according to discourses that majority agrees on, and social change happens when someone (successfully) challenges the discourse. That means that the overarching goal is the power to communicate - for whichever objective that might be. This can be compatible with other actors wanting the same, but if the goal is to dominate the discourse (and thus the structures of the network), this can only be achieved by one actor at a time1.
There can only be one dominating discourse within the networks. Influence on the discourse is connected to the instrumental aspect of communication, and anyone with the necessary
equipment and skills to distribute and receive information can potentially have goals conflicting with others.
Societies are always organized with some sort of political power distribution, in general states with a type of representative power, who have an influence on the other types of power (cultural, economic, social). Because we are dealing with different types of power in the different types of networks, we have conflicting goals across many spheres.
3.2.1. Conflicting goals within the networks
In regard to politics, the premise of classical understandings of power - as well as about media and communication - is that there is a hierarchical relationship between the actors. Noam Chomsky’s classic Manufacturing Content critically questions the role of media, based on
discourse theory: “The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988/1994, p. 1). This deterministic view building on marxist perceptions of people as a mass and not as individuals, sees the capacity to influence in the hands of mass media, and whoever ruling over it. The government (or the moneymakers) will decide what and how to tell the people, thus shaping the general discourse. If you were of a different opinion, you would be subject to the general discourse and may have to adapt to it.
In political theory, the public sphere is the communicative space where public deliberation takes place - and ideally is listened to by politicians. This is what ensures the sovereign power the “normative legitimacy [along with the] political efficacy of public opinion” (Fraser, 2007, p.1). The political legitimacy comes through the possibility to participate in the debate, and shape an informed opinion based on media-made deliberation. Because the power-holders are
critique have been shared of this theory since Habermas first presented his ideas in the 1960s. Among others that the model is discriminatory and not applicable to the modern, international societies, where politics as well as political subjects are not defined by nation states (Fraser, 2007). Yet the concept is still in use, and that is because it is a useful ideal. If people are not heard, the powerholders lose credibility, and thus trust in that they deserve to hold their position of power crumbles. The public sphere is also a space for citizens to exchange ideas, organize and enact their political rights.
The audience has not always had the possibility to engage in the public debate, nor to choose which networks to be a part of. Couldry uses the metaphor “supersaturation” about media in society, which “would mean the unstable, non-equilibrium state when social life is filled with media contents at every level owing to [spatial and temporal] pressures” (Couldry, 2012, p. 5-6). This statement is also true when applied to the participatory media which spreads the power out through the network society, moving it away from the conventional media. In the information age, the public sphere is not traditional newspapers, but one can call the whole internet a public sphere, as it is information accessible by everyone. It is harder for the
authorities to influence the citizens and maintain control over the networks of relations - and it remains now easier for outsiders to challenge the established structures.
As a consequence, there are underlying struggles conflict within the networks to shape the discourse, creating an unstable situation in established political systems.
3.2.2. Conflicting goals between the networks
International relations have traditionally been based on the separation between states and between authorities and citizens. Today, the lines are blurred by the interconnectivity, as networks are not limited to political borders. The goals of one state is bound to be incompatible to the goal of other states as well as their civil society - and vice versa. Many of the interests of one state - for instance geopolitical or economic - have an impact on others in the bigger
In Fraser’s discussion of the problem of the public sphere in a transnational political reality, she argues that the traditional power theories do not suffice, as they are based on the concept of isolated (and homogenous) nation-states: “The challenge [is] to create new, transnational public powers [and] to make them accountable to new, transnational public spheres” (Fraser, 2007, p. 16). When it comes to structural questions such as political models, there are
conflicting discourses between the people and their authorities, but also across between international actors. Because power is relational, and all actors are included in different networks, it is advantageous for a state to influence others to follow their discourse. This way, there is less risk of being challenged from within or externally through civil or political foreign actors.
Based on the nature of the nation-states, international political goals can be more easily achieved from within the enemy’s network. If there is a possibility to intervene with the electorate or create political unrest. In hybrid warfare, “the essence of information
confrontation focuses on this constant information struggle between adversaries,” (Iasiello, 2017, p. 52) with the goal to dominate people outside one’s political borders.
There are also examples of where international conventions conflict with the local interests and create new issues (e.g. the Danish debate about withdrawing from the Human Rights’
conventions (Ingvorsen, 2018)).
3.2.3. A fundamental political crisis
I propose that in an interconnected network society, the power divisions have shifted: There are no longer geographical borders for civil participation and/or political influence, and there is no clear division between the actors: civil society, governments, companies and organizations. All the lines are blurred, as the fluidity that came with the postmodern society and information revolution (see Bauman, 2000) also saturate the spheres of power. There are different
the discourses controlling the networks and gatekeepers have the possibility to influence the discourse across networks.
There is a struggle of who has the dominating discourse - and thus it is a question of power. When several actors have as the goal to hold the power in the communicative networks, the tensions cut across different networks and constellations. Power of communication as a goal is incompatible if there is more than one actor holding it - and in a digitalized network society, very many actors claim it.
Thus, there is a fundamentally existential conflict for power in the political sphere between authorities and political subjects, where the power-holders are challenged by the sudden access to influence by other actors. Simultaneously, the borderless communication networks connect everyone and thus - on a philosophical, but also existential level - challenges the nation-state. This is used in international conflict between states and other political actors. This is some sort of circular, multidimensional issue, where communication and discourse are being used for violent means which potentially damage a lot of people in the long run.
4. Conflicts and violence in the networks
The result of the power diffusion is a crisis of positioning within the states. Political actors are trying to reclaim their control over their subjects, either by adapting to the new network realities (“Twitter politics”, and the ‘personification’ of political and public figures), or trying to take over the public sphere by coercive means, limiting the free flow of communication through censorship and increased control of the internet.
Simultaneously, more traditional struggles for power take place in the shape of geopolitical conflicts. The contemporary geopolitical conflicts are (mostly) rooted in identity politics (religion, soft imperialism, history, ethnicity), which is a question of culture and values – and therefore a question of discourse.
4.1. Communicative violence
Any tool can be a weapon in the wrong hands. The digital revolution and all the possibilities it gave for giving a voice to the oppressed, for facilitating civil engagement and activism, and for the spreading of knowledge, are also being used for other, anti-democratic, “anti-dialogue” and less progressive goals.
Communication is a double-edged sword, just like the networks are. Terrorism is the example of communication and networks used for the worst kind of violence: The threat of violence (Webel and Galtung, 2015, p. 8).
Recalling the four types of power in networks (networking power, network power, networked power, network-making power (see p. 18-19)) in light of Galtung’s definition of violence as unnecessary harm to people’s basic needs, one could argue that abuse of these communicative powers is violence. Power is omnipresent and not necessarily oppressive, so the distinction between power and violence are the words unnecessary and abuse. This is a wide (and, one could argue, not objective) definition, as it spans from psychological torture to cyber-bullying and terror.
If we also include the right to communicate on the list of basic needs, violence can be for instance using network power or networking power to create a violent discourse and culture, network-making power to program networks to do harm to people’s integrity or individual freedoms, or abusing networking power to keep certain actors out against their will.
In a study of Russian warfare, following tools were identified:
“[P]ropaganda (black, gray, and white); intelligence (specifically information collection); analysis (media monitoring and situation analysis); organization (coordinating and steering channels and influencing media to shape the opinion of politicians and mass media); and other combined channels. In terms of influence operations, Panarin identified information warfare vehicles such as social control; social maneuvering;
information manipulation; disinformation; purposeful fabrication of information; and lobbying, blackmail, and extortion” (Iasiello, 2017, p. 52).
These means of communicative violence play with the different network powers, especially attempting to influence the discourse within networks. It is difficult to separate the three categories of violence in communication, because they constitute each other, but let’s give it a try:
4.1.1. Structural violence
In terms of violent structures, this is relatable to the network itself as well as the discourse. Critical deliberation can be limited because of algorithms building on positive feedback
combined with the self-selective behaviour when we as consumers of information choose what we take in. This is creating so-called echo-chambers of communication where our opinions gets reaffirmed, which in the end radicalize and polarize (Bauman, 2016). The positive feedback mechanism is abused by powerholders, because politicians get their support from the people, and more radical politicians get their votes from feeding into these echo-chambers (and/or extracting knowledge about the voters as in the case of Cambridge Analytica).
It is also one of the mechanisms that is abused internationally in information warfare. As an example, Russia is trying to enhance political divisions through the use of trolls and
misinformation with the goal to destabilize countries within the EU (e.g. Ukraine) (Lucas and Pomerantsev, 2016). This is a way to use the structures of networks to undermine networks from within.
As it is written in an analysis of information warfare, “the broad nature of these activities views offensive information campaigns more as influencing agents than as destructive actions, though the two are not mutually exclusive. Simply put, the information space lends information
external audiences through tailored messaging, disinformation, and propaganda campaigns” (Iasello, 2017, p. 51).
4.1.2. Cultural violence
A violent culture is a culture that allows for structural and direct violence. It refers to the subconscious attitudes, values and norms of actors, which in the network reality are based on the underlying discourse shaping behaviour. The self-selective participation and information consumption in many networks reinforces the actor’s original point of view and attitudes (Kenvold, 2014). This can support polarization and othering if one is not exposed to different positions and perspectives.
The bubble-mentality can eliminate the trust towards other actors. This has been pointed out as a key factor in the Brexit referendum (Allen, 2016). In the case of decreased trust in
institutions, it can ultimately allow for violent outbreaks. Polarization makes dialogue difficult. Public deliberation and disagreement is positive in a democratic society, as it is where change and progress takes place (see Mouffe, 2013). Debating and disagreeing also makes people feel ownership over politics and societal issues (Mouffe in Evans et al., 2001), as long as it doesn’t break the foundations of the system. “This is the basis of my distinction between the
‘adversary’ and the ‘enemy’. The adversary – with whom one has an agonistic relationship – is someone with whom one agrees about the principles underpinning the organization of society, but with whom one disagrees about their Interpretation” (Mouffe in Evans et al., 2001, p. 12). Othering and polarization exist in all social areas, but only exposing oneself to like-minded people and opinions, and rejecting different arguments, can reinforce the divisions.
As for the question of the elementary discourse in the network society, there is also a challenge in the anonymity of the communication networks. The information revolution blurs the line between war and politics and who is actually exercising power over whom, not only
anymore, and one cannot assume that it will be the ‘last resort’ for actors to position
themselves - either internationally and nationally. In addition, actors do not always know who is being violent towards them, and politically this is difficult when trying to avoid conflict (or fight back, if that is the intention), and for citizens one does not know who is violating one’s rights or needs.
4.1.3. Direct violence
Cyberattacks can damage infrastructure or destroy, distort and abuse information, with very severe consequences. Censorship is another use of hard communication power, controlling the access to information as well as the sharing of opinions. An example is the Ukrainian
government’s prohibition of the Russian social network vKontakte within Ukraine after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Coynash, 2018). Instrumental use of communication as direct violence always has a discursive aspect as well: When attacking or impeding vital
communicative infrastructure, the abstract effect is damaged trust in other actors - challenging the basic premise for any relation, and thus the network society itself.
There are also other kinds of violence that are not instrumental, but still used directly towards other nodes in the network. “As information is generally regarded as a soft power, it may be most effectively implemented in times other than force-on-force military conflict where, depending on its intent and objectives, information can be used to inform, persuade, threaten, or confuse audiences.” (Iasiello, 2017, p. 60). Whilst these words are written specifically about information warfare, it might as well be true in other situations of exercising power, such as politics in general. Castells does not address the illegitimate intrusion into a network, although this falls under direct violence.
There is a ‘grey zone’ in use of non-coercive communicative measures, such as means of attraction (Hayden, 2012) that influence subjects negatively in the long run. Negative media coverage could be a suggestion, because it might change the behaviour and mind of the
We have to be clear on our moral philosophy on the discussion of violence. Ignorance - for instance unwillingly spreading untrue information, or lack of capacity to identify it - can be as damaging as intentional dissemination of lies and mistrust. Addressing human actors, who per definition will err, I think it is meaningful to let the intention be defining for what is violent behaviour.
5. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding in the networks
Conflict is composed by two elements: Crisis and opportunity (Galtung, 2013). Now it is time to return to the opportunities for peaceful change.
Just like the network and communication power can be used for damage, it can also be used for good, and it is shaped by the actors using the power. Because social relations and discourse are fluid and non-linear concepts, the peacebuilding elements should not be seen as separate initiatives.
5.1. Communicative peace
Positive peace is achieved through peaceful conflict transformation which deals with the causes and conditions that could pave the way to unproductive confrontations. We have now seen how power in the communication networks can be the root and means to exercise violence. The underlying causes for conflict is a struggle for power in the form of influence. To create positive peace and a society that promotes “social and moral integrity” (Webel and Galtung, 2007), we have to think across structures, cultures and actors in the network.
Galtung identifies three categories of peace: Direct Peace is the combination of positive and negative
peace, the absence of violence and the presence of cooperation; Structural peace is the absence of exploitation and a structure and presence of equity and equality; Cultural peace is the absence of justification and violent culture, and the presence of a culture of peace and dialogue (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 30f). Depending on the specific situation, the initiatives regarding mediation, dialogue and reconciliation from classical peacebuilding theory are useful to apply.
To get to the point of conflict transformation, Mitchell suggests the following: Change leaders; change leaders’ and followers’ minds; changing strategies, policies and behaviour; or changing parties’ environments (Mitchell, 2005, p. 16). In terms of avoiding direct violence such as cyber-attacks and misinformation, this has to be solved on a political level.
“Goals are positively coupled (harmonious, compatible), negatively coupled (disharmonious, incompatible), or decoupled, if pursuit of one is productive, counterproductive or indifferent to pursuit of others” (Galtung, 2007, p. 16). The overall objective of peacebuilding would be then to make actors see that their goals can be modified into compatible - through changing the context and, in the end, the discourse.
Peaceful transformation requires a change of behaviour for all the actors involved in conflicts. As networks are made up of actors, these actors should influence the structures and cultures, also within the communicative sphere. The reason is that one cannot count on political powers (decision-makers) to be working in people’s best interest - and there are reasons to maintain such skepticism. Structures are based on an underlying discourse, and they will slowly adapt if the discourse persistently changes.
5.2. Tolerant networks
Nothing indicates that the complexity of social interaction will decrease; therefore, the overall focus in peacebuilding should be on the balance of communication power. In Mouffe’s agonistic
