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BSR Section 1: Introduction

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T he B alTic S ea R egion

Cultures, Politics, Societies

Editor Witold Maciejewski

T he B alTic S ea R egion

Cultures, Politics, Societies

Editor Witold Maciejewski

A Baltic University Publication

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History Introduction

48

INTRODUCTION

Kristian Gerner

The history of the Baltic Region is multidimensional. It is constructed from different points of departure. On the one hand, there are structures and processes in economy, politics and cul- ture. On the other hand, there are a number of “national” narratives. Structures and processes are constructed from established facts, from events in the past that have formed spatial and temporal patterns, i.e., when these facts are put into interpretative frameworks, theories about correlations, causes and effects. National narratives, on the other hand, are about memory, collective memory, which locates the individual in a community with a shared identity and distinctive boundaries against other communities.

The ideology of the Baltic University Programme is to create a “Baltic” narrative as the basis for the construction of a Baltic identity. This means that past events, processes and struc- tures must be interpreted and presented with a view to their relevance for those peoples who today inhabit what is defined as the Baltic Region. The boundary against what is not Baltic must be defined and upheld. In the present context this means that the Baltic Region must be kept apart from both the national and the European. What is exclusively national and what is universally European of course cannot be avoided or dismissed, but the focus must be on what is Baltic, what is a common past for the inhabitants in the territory “the Baltic Region”. To the degree that structures and processes are influenced by events on the national or European level, these have to be treated as inputs from distinct subparts within the Baltic Region on the one hand and from the external environment, on the other hand.

Once the idea of a Baltic Region is accepted as the basis for the construction of a narration, concepts such as communications, contacts and networks become crucial. This means that migration, trade and warfare come into the focus of attention. Politics and ideology, projection of political and ideological power, belong to the picture. To make the narrative general and comprehensive, collectives rather than individuals have to be treated as the principal actors.

This means that commercial, ideological and political actors such as trade organisations, missionary organisations, social classes, cities and states are treated as agents of competition, cooperation and change. A conflict perspective becomes central and with it concepts denoting aggression and defence, respectively. It must be noted that adaptation in the face of external challenges is one kind of defence and that the action-reaction processes born from such con- frontations are important aspects of historical changes.

If the Baltic Region is defined as a delimited territory, the history of which is characterised as competition and cooperation among collective actors, the Swedish state, which was formed around the year 1000, emerges as the only truly and exclusively “Baltic” collective actor. All other, be it medieval organisations such as those later known as the Vikings, or the Hanse and the Teutonic Order and national states such as Denmark, Russia, Poland, Germany and Holland in the early modern or modern period, had other territorial bearings as well, i.e., con- tinental European or even Asian. “The Baltic Region in History” thus can be constructed with Sweden as the main focus and point of departure. This does not entail that Sweden is depicted as more “important” in a generic sense than other collective actors in the region. However, when it comes to creating long lines in history, it is obvious that the period from the raids of the Vikings in the last centuries of the first millennium to the creation of the modern Russian state under Peter I in the early eighteenth century can be viewed and told as the history of the

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History

Introduction 49

rise of Sweden. This means that other collective actors such as the Hanse, Denmark, Poland- Lithuania, Muscovy and the Dutch can be described as competitors to Sweden.

When it comes to the history of the last three centuries, it is much more difficult to treat the history of the Baltic Region as a coherent and self-contained whole. This is because of the fact that during this period, Russia and Prussia/Germany came to dominate military affairs and the economy to a much larger degree than earlier, at the same time as these powers had their main assets and political ambitions beyond the Baltic Region in the strict sense. During

“the bloody twentieth century”, the history of the Baltic Region is circumscribed by factors and processes of global rather than of local significance, i.e., the definite establishment of a global economy, the mass migrations from all the states in the Baltic Region to the United States, the two world wars, and the Cold War. At the beginning of the twenty first century, the Baltic Region cannot at all be defined as a self-contained entity. Other identities such as gender and generation, citizen or revo-lutionary, all defined in global terms, are becoming central to the individuals.

Concerning the idea of social sustainability in the Baltic Region, history can contribute by fostering the image of a common fate in the sense that people in the region perceive that they have a common collective memory that should serve to create a feeling of unity rather than of enmity. In this perspective, the challenge is from Russia. Only future can show whether the political leadership of Russia will recognise the new political order in the Baltic Region which emerged in 1991 as an irrefutable result of history.

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