Foreign Fighters : Trends, Trajectories and Conflict Zones

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(1) . FOREIGN FIGHTERS . Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones. Frank J. Cilluffo | Jeffrey B. Cozzens | Magnus Ranstorp October 1, 2010. .

(2) Abouttheauthors FrankJ.CilluffoisAssociateVicePresidentforHomelandSecurityandDirectoroftheHomelandSecurityPolicy Institute at The George Washington University. Cilluffo joined GW in 2003 from the White House where he servedasSpecialAssistanttothePresidentforHomelandSecurity.ShortlyfollowingtheSeptember11,2001 terroristattacksontheUnitedStates,CilluffowasappointedbythePresidenttothenewlycreatedOfficeof Homeland Security, and served as a principal advisor to Governor Tom Ridge. Prior to his White House appointment,CilluffospenteightyearsinseniorpolicypositionswiththeCenterforStrategic&International Studies(CSIS),aWashingtonͲbasedthinktank. Jeffrey B. Cozzens is President of White Mountain Research (WMR), a serviceͲdisabled veteranͲowned companyprovidingelitecounterͲterrorismandsecurityresearchandadvisoryservicestoselectcorporateand governmentclients.PriortojoiningWMR,Mr.CozzensservedasReligiousExtremismAdvisorattheU.S.Army DirectedStudiesOffice(ADSO),analternativeanalysiscenterthatadvisesseniorgovernmentleaders.Aformer ResearchAssociateattheUniversityofStAndrews(Scotland)CentrefortheStudyofTerrorismandPolitical Violence, U.S. State Department counterͲterrorism analyst, and longͲtime advisor to the homeland security, defenseandintelligencecommunities,Mr.Cozzenshasbeenattheforefrontofconceptualizing,definingand predictingemergingpatternsinterrorismandpoliticalviolencesince2001. MagnusRanstorpistheResearchDirectoroftheCentreforAsymmetricThreatStudiesattheSwedishNational DefenceCollege(SNDC)wherehehasdirectedtwomajorresearchprojectsinthelastfiveyears.Eachproject was funded by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. One examined radicalisation processes and counterradicalisation policies within Europe; the other examined CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,explosives)terrorism.Dr.RanstorphasalsoledaSwedishcabinetstudyonradicalization(2008/9);a SwedishInternationalDevelopmentAgency(SIDA)fundedprojectoncounterradicalizationeffortsinIndonesia (2009); and an Armed Forces Headquarters study on forecasting terrorism in 2018 (2008). His most recent editedbookisUnderstandingViolentRadicalisation(Routledge,2010).In2006DrRanstorpwasinvitedtojoin the European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, an official advisory body on all matters relatingtoviolentradicalisationandrecruitmentofextremistswithintheEU. Aboutthispaper Thispaperisintendedtoserveasaprimeronanemergentthreat.Assuch,itisanoutgrowthofareportby the Swedish National Defence College's Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (SNDCͲCATS) based on a June 2010 conference "The Trajectories of Western Foreign Fighters: Shifts and Implications." Held under the Chatham House Rule, this invitationͲonly event included speakers and participants from the transatlantic intelligence,defense,lawenforcement,andacademiccommunities.Theauthorsgratefullyacknowledgethe contributionmadebymembersofthestaffofbothSNDCͲCATS(inparticularNathanCAForsdyke)andThe GeorgeWashingtonUniversityHomelandSecurityPolicyInstitute(specificallySharonL.CardashandBrianE. Engel).Withouttheirhelp,thispapercouldnothavebeencompleted.TheHomelandSecurityPolicyInstitute wishestothankitssponsorsfortheirgeneroussupport:TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity,ICFInternational, NorthropGrummanCorporation,andRaytheonCompany. Theopinions,conclusions,andrecommendationsexpressedinthisreportarethoseoftheauthorsanddonot necessarilyreflecttheviewsofanyindividualinstitutionorgovernment.. .

(3) PAGE1. FOREIGN FIGHTERS Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones FOREWORDS. . This report FOREIGN FIGHTERS: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones is a very welcome contribution to transatlantic efforts to better understand and contendwiththepresentcriticalterroristchallenges facingboththeEuropeanUnion(EU)andtheUnited States.Itclearlyoutlinestherapidlyevolvingnature and dynamic of the threat posed by expatriate fightersfromandinbothEuropeandNorthAmerica andoffersrelevanttacticalaswellasstrategicpolicy prescriptions. Above all it demonstrates that this is an area where we need to deepen the EUͲUS Transatlantic Partnership in Countering Terrorism and leverage different levels of cooperation and instrumentsinaconcertedfashion.. Itisclearthatterroristtravelisalsoofgreatconcern totheUnitedStatesandwehavemuchtogainfrom enhancedcooperationonthisissue.. With the Treaty of Lisbon now in effect, the EU is better able to further the coherence of its counterͲ terrorism policies, especially with regard to the link between internal Ͳ external policy. A major part of my role is to outline the key counterterrorism challengesfortheEU.InMay2010,inmyreportto theEuropeanCouncilontheimplementationofthe EU Counterterrorism Strategy, I underscored that monitoring terrorist travel should be a key priority fortheEU. Firstly, as demonstrated in this Report, a not insignificantnumberofradicalizedEUnationalsand residentsaretravellingtoconflictareasorattending terroristtrainingcampsandreturningtoEurope. Secondly, the problem needs to be addressed in a comprehensive way, by enhancing the coordination between the relevant agencies within the EU, and taking advantage of the improved possibilities to define integrated policies offered by the Treaty of Lisbon. . GillesdeKERCHOVE EuropeanUnionCounterͲTerrorismCoordinator 22September2010. The United States and the European Union face serious challenges in dealing with the flow of radicalized Westerners travelling into jihadi conflict zones. This report of the Homeland Security Policy Institute and Swedish National Defence College on this subject will be an important contribution to understanding the dimensions of this flow andhow theUSandEUmustfurthercollaboratetoconfront thisincreasingthreat. We saw alͲQaeda and affiliated networks increase their efforts in the 2005Ͳ2006 timeframe in appeals to US and European young Muslims to travel to Pakistan, Yemen, East Africa, and elsewhere for terroristtraining–especiallyintheuseofexplosives. Today, alͲQaeda recognizes that to conduct attacks successfully in the West, it must find radicalized Muslims, including converts to Islam. It needs individuals who understand Western culture; speak fluentEnglishorotherWesternlanguages,andwho canmovecomfortablyinWesternsocieties. Its appeals have been conveyed through radical Imams and other extremists, espousing alͲQaeda’s violent extremist ideology to those residing in the West. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and Najibullah Zazi were examples of those who answered alͲ Qaeda’s call; both plotted to kill hundreds of. .

(4) PAGE2. Americans. AlͲQaeda has had other successes; dozens of young men from North America and Western Europe, especially from the United Kingdom, have found their way to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and the safeͲ havens of Yemen and Somalia. Many have received trainingatalͲQaedaoraffiliatedcampsofthejihadi network. Some Americans have fought in AfghanistanandatleasttwoSomaliͲAmericanshave “martyred”themselvesforalͲShabaabinEastAfrica. Westernintelligenceandinvestigativeagencieshave identified some of the Western jihadist fighters; many,however,havenotbeenidentified. Astronger,morecomprehensiveeffortbetweenthe United States and the European Union is urgently needed if we are to avoid serious attacks in the West. Thwarting terrorist travel is of the highest priority. Yet, more needs to be done. EU passenger data, for example, that flows to the Department of Homeland Security cannot be shared with US intelligenceagencies.Moreprogressisneededifwe aretoreachalevelofcollaborationthatgivesusthe confidenceneededtotrackextremists,whowiththe proper credentials and a ‘clean’ record can travel globally. FOREIGN FIGHTERS: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones is not only a vital addition to our understandingofthisthreatbutwillbeavitalinput into the thinking of policy officials responsible for negotiating USͲEU travel agreements. We must continue our search for ways to interdict travel of individuals determined to do damage to Western interests,eitherintheconflictzonesor,morelikely, hereintheWestafterhavingreceivedtherequisite training. CharlesALLEN FormerUnderSecretaryforIntelligenceandAnalysis, DepartmentofHomelandSecurity; FormerAssistantDirectorofCentralIntelligenceforCollection, CentralIntelligenceAgency 22September2010. INTRODUCTION 1 Westernjihadiforeignfightersandthebridgefigures thathelpinspire,radicalize,andmotivatethempose asignificantthreattothesecurityofWesternstates, andtotheircounterinsurgencyandcounterterrorism missionsaroundtheglobe.Foreignfightershavethe potential to bolster insurgent or terrorist factions withinagiventheatreofconflict,bothoperationally andmotivationally. Foreignfightersandbridgefigurescanboostmorale by lending credibility to the notion that all jihadists arefightingforacallingthattranscendsanyspecific timeandplace.Foreignfightersalsodrawattention (especially from Western media) in ways that indigenous fighters cannot. Thus foreign fighters serve to globalize local conflicts and promote the jihadist narrative. Bridge figures legitimize the actions of foreign fighters and help recreate new recruits among populations living in Western host countries. The present scale of foreign fighter training and activity is significant and increasing. However, the phenomenon is not new. A recent Congressional Research Service report estimates that between 1,000 and 2,000 American Muslims engaged in violent jihad during the 1990s. These individuals foughtinAfghanistan,Bosnia,andChechnya. 2 Yet the phenomenon remains difficult to quantify, and much of the known data is held by Western. 1. ThispaperisanoutgrowthofareportbytheSwedishNational Defence College’s Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies (SNDCͲ CATS), based upon a June 2010 conference, “The Trajectories of WesternForeignFighters:ShiftsandImplications.”TheinvitationͲ only event included speakers and participants from the transatlantic intelligence, defense, law enforcement, and academic communities, and was held under the Chatham House Rule.Itemsinthispapernototherwisecitedmaybeattributedto theunpublishedSNDCͲCATSconferencereport.. 2 Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. 2010. “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.” Washington, DC;CongressionalResearchService.. .

(5) PAGE3. security and intelligence services and thus inaccessibletoacademicresearchers. The insidious potential of Western foreign fighters, the violent histories of some who have returned to the West, and the genuine possibility that Western securityservices’observationsonlytouchthetipofa much larger, undocumented and undetected problem, necessitates a greater understanding of theglobalforeignfighterstrend. What motivates these individuals remains an open question – and there likely is no single answer. A 2010UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacestudyof2,032 foreign fighters found that many were seeking revenge, status, or simply a cathartic and defining experience. 3 Regardless of their motives, the actions of these individuals pose a grave risk to Westerninterestsathomeandabroad.. AbdullahalͲFaisal. TheattacksofSeptember11,2001andJuly7,2005 illustrate the magnitude of the threat posed by foreign fighters. The 9/11 terrorists were led by a core of educated, EnglishͲspeaking extremists who resided for years in the West and trained with alͲ QaedainAfghanistan.The7/7terroristswhostruck London were Britons of Pakistani and Jamaican descent motivated and radicalized by the teachings of jihadists, including Abdullah alͲFaisal, a Jamaican immigrant.Bothcontingentsparticipatedintraining inSouthAsia.. 3 Venhaus, John M. 2010. “ Why Youth Join alͲQaeda.” Special Report236.Washington,DC;UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace. These infrequent eruptions of foreign fighterͲlinked terrorismcatalyzedfarͲreachingeffectsthatchanged the course of Western security and counterͲ terrorismpolicies. 4 To clarify terms, “Western foreign fighters” or simply, “foreign fighters,” refers to violent extremists who leave their Western states of residence with the aspiration to train or take up arms against nonͲMuslim factions in jihadi conflict zones. Most of the foreign fighters discussed in this document participated principally in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the AfghanistanͲPakistan border, in Somalia, and in Yemen.Currently,thesearetheregionsofgreatest concern to Western security and intelligence services.Yet,foreignfightershavealsoparticipated inconflictsinChechnya,Bosnia,Kashmir,aswellas in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Maghreb, and Sahel. As is clear, the use of foreign fighters by global jihadists is no longer limited to a particular conflictzone. 5 The “foreign fighter” label fails to reflect the wide rangeoffactorsanddynamicsdrivingindividualsand groups to engage in foreignfighter activity across a wide spectrum of conflicts and causes. The term hides the complexity of the phenomenon and the fact that many of their actions and effects occur withinWesternhostcountries.. 4 Examples of single events achieving significant effects are extensive. In 2004, the Madrid train bombings are widely regardedtohavedirectlyaffectedtheoutcomeofSpain’snational elections.The2003BaghdadCanalHotelbombingthatdestroyed theUNfieldHeadquartersinIraqresultedinthecompletehaltof UNoperationsthroughoutthecountry.The1983suicidebombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut led to the withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon. Given the ability of a single foreign fighter to have a significant political and propaganda effect, the risk posed by even minimal numbers of experienced and trained foreignfighterreturneestohostnationsissignificant. 5. Bergen,PeterandBruceHoffman.2010.“AssessingtheTerrorist Threat.”Washington,DC;BipartisanPolicyCenter.pp.5Ͳ14. .

(6) PAGE4. Foreignfightersmayintendtofightabroad,butmay instead be radicalized further, trained, and turned back home to attack Western states. This was the casewithNajibullahZazi. Zazi, an Afghan citizen and legal resident of the United States, returned to Afghanistan with the intentionofjoiningtheTaliban.TrainedbyalͲQaeda inWaziristan,includingintheuseofexplosives,Zazi was instructed to return to the United States in January 2009. In September of that year, he was arrested.Zazilateradmittedthatheandtwoformer classmates who had accompanied him to Afghanistan(ZareinAhmedzayandAdisMedunjanin – both US citizens) had planned to attack the New York subway system. The three planned to strap explosives to themselves and bomb the Grand Central and Times Square stations during rush hour oneitherSeptember14th,15th,or16th(2009). 6 ThecaseofAdnanGulshairelShukrijumahprovides additionalillustrationofthepotentialthreat(though not an example of a US resident or citizen who trainedandreturnedtothecountry).BorninSaudi Arabia, Shukrijumah is a naturalized US citizen and spentmuchofhisyouthinNewYorkandFlorida.He lefttheUStojoinalͲQaedainJune2001.Although hestartedoffdoingmenialtasksattrainingcamps, he has worked his way up. Today, he is the senior leader of alͲQaeda’s international operations and is tied to many recent attempted attacks – including Zazi’s. Given his knowledge of the US, this makes himparticularlydangerous. 7 . Turning a foreign fighter toward homelandͲbased attacks maintains the operational security of overseas jihadist networks on one hand, while dramatically increasing the chances for a successful strike in the West on the other. Foreign fighters returningtotheirWesternhostnationsarmedwith operational expertise, jihadist “street cred” based upon their bona fides as mujahideen (those who striveandfightinGod’spath),andthecapacityand intent to orchestrate domestic attacks represents a current and likely growing threat, especially as alͲ QaedaͲlinked factions come under increasing pressureabroad.Thesefighters’familiaritywiththe targetstheyselectaddstotheseindividuals’capacity to cause harm; and if they do not have a criminal backgroundorknownaffiliationwithanyterroristor extremist organization, their soͲcalled “clean skin” alsofurtherstheirabilitytoevadetheauthorities. 8 Althoughthethreatfromforeignfightersisnotnew, itisnowquicklygrowinginsizeandprominence.A fact recently noted by Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman in their report on the current terrorist threat:“Akeyshiftinthepastcoupleofyearsisthe increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the leadership of alͲQaeda and aligned groups, and the higher number of Americans attaching themselves to these groups.” 9 The comments of Bergen and Hoffman have been echoed by U.S. Department of Homeland Security SecretaryJanetNapolitano.. . . 6 Gross, Samantha, David Caruso, and Michael Rubinkam. 2009. “RadicalInfluencesAllAroundNYCTerrorSuspect.”NewYork,NY; ABCNews.Wilson,Michael.2009. “FromSmilingCoffeeVendor to Terror Suspect.” New York, NY; New York Times. Johnston, DavidandWilliamK.Rashbaum.2009.“TerrorSuspectHadBomb Guide,AuthoritiesSay.”NewYork,NY;NewYorkTimes.Marzulli, John. 2010., “Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned RushͲHour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations.” New York, NY; New York Times. Hawley, Kip, Frank J. Cilluffo, and Sharon L. Cardash. 2010. “Stopping Terror In and On Its Tracks.” Washington,DC;TheHomelandSecurityPolicyInstitute. FBI says.” New York, NY; The Daily News. Candiotti, Susan and RossLevitt.2010.“FromdishwashertoalQaedaleadership:Who isAdnanShukrijumah?”Atlanta,GA;CNN.Hirschkorn,Phil.2010. “Who Is Al Qaeda Figure Linked to NYC Bomb Plot?” New York, NY;CBSNews. 7 Alfano, Sean and Corky Siemaszko. 2020. “Adnan Shukrijumah, believed to be the new head of global operations for Al Qaeda,. 8 Basham, W. Ralph, Sharon L. Cardash, Frank J. Cilluffo, and Daniel J. Kaniewski . 2010. “No Longer On AutoͲPilot: Aviation Security and Intelligence Reform.” Washington, DC; The HomelandSecurityPolicyInstitute 9Bergen,PeterandBruceHoffman.2010.“AssessingtheTerrorist Threat.”Washington,DC;BipartisanPolicyCenter.p.1. .

(7) PAGE5. Testifying before Congress in September 2010, Napolitanosaidthefollowingaboutforeignfighters: “In their roles as terrorist planners, operational facilitatorsandoperatives,theseindividualsimprove the terrorist groups’ knowledge of Western and American culture and security practices, which can increase the likelihood that an attempted attack couldbesuccessful.” 10 Likewise, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller recently testified to the following effect: “The fact that Zazi and his associateshadaccesstotheUnitedStatesandwere familiar with the environment here from an operational security and targeting perspective demonstrateshowalQaedacanleverageAmericans. The potential exists for al Qaeda to use and train otherAmericansforadditionalhomelandattacks.” 11 The intent of this paper is to shed light on and contextualizethecomplexandvolatilephenomenon offoreignfighters,whichisofincreasingconcernto Western intelligence and law enforcement communities. Thispaperisnotastrictacademictreatisedesigned to provide clear causal arguments. Given the complexity of this issue, such arguments would be difficult at best. Instead, it is a primer on an emergentthreat,onecraftedinsuchamannerasto provideabasicunderstandingofthechallengesand opportunities at hand – from the perspective of thoseentrustedwithstoppingit.. WESTERNFOREIGNFIGHTERS:ACOMPLEXSYSTEM Western foreign fighters occupy a unique niche in the contemporary landscape of nonͲstate threats. Defined for the purposes of this paper as activists thatleavetheirWesternhomestofight–ortrainto fight – Islam’s perceived enemies, their challenge is asmultifacetedastheirtypology. The population of fighters includes struggling novices, who view trips to the front as rites of passage, and dieͲhard militants seeking mortal combat and martyrdom against nonͲMuslim militaries. 12 The aura of legend, lore and extreme commitment that sometimes surrounds these militants bolsters the radicalization process in a variety of ways, and simultaneously undermines authority in Western Muslim communities. 13 Furthermore, their travels can cement and revitalize key jihadi logistics networks. Even the oftenͲmodest training and indoctrination these militants receive at the front threatens Allied militaries and regional Muslim communities–thelatteroftenbearingthebruntof alͲQaeda’s violence, as we have witnessed in Pakistan,Iraq,andSomalia.. . Numbers on foreign fighters are hard to come by. The data is difficult to collect in the field; many of themostprecisefiguresareheldtightlybyWestern intelligence communities; media reporting is often unreliable; definitions of foreign fighters vary, inhibiting uniform data collection; fighters sometimesleavetheWest,fightortrain,thenreturn withoutpublicity;moreoveritissometimeshardto determine whether certain individuals from. . . 10 Napolitano, Janet. 2010. "Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland." Statement of Secretary Janet Napolitanobefore the United States Senate Committee on HomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairs.Washington,DC;US Senate. 12 GartensteinͲRoss, Daveed. 2009. “Western Recruits in Somalia.”Ontario,CA;NationalPost. . 11 Mueller, Robert S. 2010. Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Washington,DC;USSenate. 13 See, for instance, two of the seminal jihadist works on the concept, obligation, and benefits of emigrating for combat and training: Abdullah Azzam, Defence of the Muslim Lands and ‘Esa alͲHindi’s (nom de guerre of convicted British terrorist and alͲ QaedaͲlinkedforeignfighter,DhirenBarot)TheArmyofMadinah inKashmir(Birmingham,UK;MaktabahAlAnsaarPublications).. .

(8) PAGE6. majorityͲMuslim diaspora communities in the West havetravelledtovisitfriendsandrelativesfromtheir families’countriesoforigin,oriftheirintentionsare moresinister. From a methodological perspective, most of the more rigorous quantitative accounts of Western foreign fighters only observe them within the context of Western plots. Fighting in farͲflung insurgenciesortraininginjihadistcampsoftengoes unseen and thus unaccounted for in such reports. For now, we are left to cobble together imprecise figures that sketch only a rough quantitative compositeofwhatqualitativeanalysestelluscould beamuchmoresignificantissue. Paul Cruickshank quantified one dimension of the foreign fighter threat in his February 2010 report, “TheMilitantPipeline.”Ofthe21postͲ9/11plotsin Australia, North America and Europe, Cruickshank classifies as “serious”—those which were intended tokillatleast10peopleanddidnotrelyexclusively on undercover law enforcement agents to provide explosives – the majority (of the 21 plots) involved 37 Western residents who travelled to Pakistan’s FATA, the central nervous system of global jihadi activism. Other cases cited by Cruickshank involved traininginYemen. Brian Michael Jenkins’s 2010 RAND study, “WouldͲ Be Warriors,” provides a perspective on American foreign fighters. Of the 46 “publicly reported cases ofdomesticradicalizationandrecruitmenttojihadist terrorism” between September 11, 2001 and the end of 2009, Jenkins observes that 13 of these involveforeigntraininganddirection.Aquicksurvey of Jenkins’data shows that it actually includes over 60 individuals who qualify as Western foreign fightersunderthedefinitionusedhere. 14. 14AnalystLorenzoVidino,citingaformerFBIofficial,writesthat during the 1990’s, “between 1,000Ͳ2,000 volunteers left the United States to fight or train with various jihadist outfits throughouttheworld,anumbercomparabletothatofEuropean Muslims who left the continent during the same years.” See, Vidino, Lorenzo. 2009. “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the. A June 2010 Washington Post story noted that “foreign fighters in Somali number 300Ͳ1,200,” including “at least 20 Somali Americans,” among them the rising jihadist media personality and alleged alͲShabaab field commander, Omar Hammami, an Alabama native. 15 Several of these individualshavebecomesuicidebombers–including the first American (Shirwa Ahmed) to hold that distinctioninmoderntimes. 16 In an attempt to arrest what US Attorney General Eric Holder labelled a “deadly pipeline” of money and fighters travelling from the US to alͲShabaab, American officials have stepped up efforts to indict and arrest US residents. 17 In June 2010, Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte, both US citizens, were arrested at JFK Airport. The two were recorded by undercover officers of the New York Police Departmentastheyplannedtotravelabroadtokill Americans. The two were stopped en route to Somalia where they hoped to link up with alͲ Shabaab. 18 Thiswas,infact,theirsecondattemptto jointhefight.In2007,thetwohadgonetoJordan, with the aim of fighting US soldiers in Iraq, but for unknownreasonswerenotrecruited. 19. United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?” Studies in ConflictandTerrorism32.London,UK;Routledge.pp.1Ͳ17 15Elliott,Andrea.2010.“TheJihadistNextDoor.”NewYork,NY; TheNewYorkTimes 16 Hsu, Spencer S. and Carrie Johnson. 2009. “Somali Americans RecruitedbyExtremists.”Washington,DC;TheWashingtonPost 17 Miller, Greg. 2010. “U.S. charges 14 with giving support to Somaliinsurgentgroup.”Washington,DC;TheWashingtonPost 18 U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey. 2010. U.S. v. Mohamed Alessa and Carlos E. Almonte, Criminal Complaint, Magistrate No. 10Ͳ8109 (MCA). Trenton, NJ; US Department of Justice 19Finn,PeterandJerryMarkon.2010.“NewJerseyMenArrested Are Latest From U.S. Tied to Terrorist Groups.” Washington, DC; The Washington Post. Sherman, Ted. 2010. “FBI Followed Every MoveofTwoN.J.TerrorSuspectsforYears,CulminatinginAirport Arrests.”Newark,NJ;TheStarͲLedger. .

(9) PAGE7. In a recent comprehensive openͲsource analysis of American jihadi activism published to date, Congressional Research Service’s September 2010 “American Jihadist Terrorism,” authors Bjelopera and Randol note, “Fifteen of the (40) postͲ9/11 homegrown plots have featured individuals exclusivelyseekingtobecomeforeignfighters …” 20 If weincludethoseplotsfeaturingindividualsindicted for“intendedoractualplottingortrainingabroad”— another of the authors’ categories commensurate with this report’s definition of foreign fighter activity—thenumberjumpsto24. 21 A2010reportfromDanishanalystsMichaelTaarnby and Lars Hallundbaeck notes that at least 25 Americans, up to 40 Australians, perhaps 100 Britons, and maybe as many as 80 Scandinavians (including more than 15 Danes), have fought in Somalia. 22 The Swedish Security Service has officially reported that around 20Ͳ30 nationals have travelled to Somalia to fight for alͲShabaab and less than five have died in battle. 23 This recruitment process is facilitated by the fact that Fuad Muhammed Qalaf (otherwise known as Fuad Shangole) is a SwedishͲ SomaliandasenioroperationalfigureinalͲShabaab.. HISTORICALȱTHEMESȱ Importantȱ lessonsȱ canȱ beȱ identifiedȱ fromȱ historicalȱ precedentsȱ ofȱ foreignȱ fighterȱ activity.ȱȱ Foreignȱ fightersȱ espousingȱ differentȱ causesȱ haveȱ featuredȱ inȱ conflictsȱ rangingȱ fromȱ Spain,ȱ toȱ Afghanistan,ȱtoȱtheȱBalkans.ȱȱAlthoughȱeachȱcaseȱ remainsȱunique,ȱthereȱareȱthemes,ȱstrategies,ȱandȱ tacticsȱthatȱareȱendemicȱtoȱeach.ȱ Rhetoricȱ focusingȱ onȱ defensiveȱ mobilizationȱ hasȱ beenȱ aȱ featureȱ inȱ nearlyȱ allȱ instancesȱ ofȱ foreignȱ fighterȱactivity.ȱȱRecruitersȱconsistentlyȱappealȱtoȱ foreigners’ȱ ideologicalȱ convictionsȱ andȱ seekȱ toȱ alignȱ distantȱ conflictsȱ withȱ anȱ assaultȱ onȱ aȱ commonȱidentity.ȱȱDuringȱtheȱSpanishȱCivilȱWar,ȱ bothȱ Franciscoȱ Franco’sȱ nationalistsȱ andȱ antiȬ fascistȱ republicansȱ framedȱ theirȱ respectiveȱ strugglesȱthroughȱaȱdefensiveȱlensȱandȱappealedȱ toȱ sympathizersȱ onȱ theȱ basisȱ ofȱ aȱ greaterȱ moralȱ duty.ȱȱFiftyȱyearsȱlater,ȱtheȱobligationȱtoȱdefendȱaȱ transnationalȱ identityȱ fromȱ anȱ existentialȱ aggressorȱ wasȱusedȱ byȱ Abdullahȱ Azzam.ȱȱ Inȱ hisȱ callȱforȱsupportȱfromȱMuslimsȱworldwideȱagainstȱ Sovietȱ aggressionȱ inȱ Afghanistan,ȱ defenceȱ ofȱ Islamȱ wasȱ aȱ dutyȱ incumbentȱ uponȱ allȱ asȱ partȱ ofȱ theirȱ religiousȱ obligationȱ toȱ God.ȱ ȱ Inȱ theȱ 1990s,ȱ. Thesamenumberofrecruitsisseeninneighbouring Denmark according to Somali community representatives and the Danish Security and IntelligenceService.However,inDenmark,aSomali individual with alleged contacts to alͲQaeda in East AfricaandalͲShabaabwerewithinsecondsofaxing. 20 Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. 2010. “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.” Washington, DC;CongressionalResearchService.p.26 21Ibid,p.25 22 Taarnby, Michael and Lars Hallundbaek. 2010. “Al Shabaab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia and the ImplicationsforRadicalisationProcessesinEurope.”Copenhagen, DK;DanishMinistryofJustice 23 Stiernstedt, Jenny. 2010. “Svensk misstankt for terrorbrott.” Stockholm,SE;SvenskaDagbladet. similarȱ languageȱ andȱ reasoningȱ wasȱ usedȱ byȱ mujahideenȱ leadersȱ duringȱ theȱ Bosnianȱ Warȱ andȱ theȱfirstȱChechenȱwar.ȱ Inȱ theȱ historicalȱ examples,ȱ thereȱ areȱ importantȱ cleavagesȱtoȱbeȱstudiedȱasȱwell.ȱȱForeignȱfightersȱ whoȱ travelledȱ toȱ Afghanistanȱ inȱ theȱ nameȱ ofȱ ‘jihad’ȱ oftenȱ foundȱ themselvesȱ atȱ oddsȱ withȱ nativeȱ Afghansȱ whoseȱ culture,ȱ geography,ȱ andȱ tribalȱ societyȱ fostersȱ aȱ warinessȱ ofȱ outsiders.ȱȱ Thisȱ lackȱ ofȱ acceptanceȱ ofȱ foreignȱ recruitsȱ wasȱ prevalentȱ duringȱ theȱ Spanishȱ Civilȱ Warȱ asȱ well.ȱȱ Foreignȱ fightersȱ oftenȱ foundȱ themselvesȱ treatedȱ asȱ expendableȱ andȱ theirȱ sacrificesȱ viewedȱ asȱ ‘secondȬrate.’ȱ ȱ Thisȱ contributedȱ toȱ manyȱ returningȱ homeȱ disillusionedȱ withȱ theirȱ ‘cause.’ȱȱ Today,ȱ manyȱ ofȱ theȱ foreignȱ mujahideenȱ fightersȱ whoȱsettledȱinȱBosniaȱnowȱfindȱthemselvesȱ. . .

(10) PAGE8. to death the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in his homeinJanuary2010.. ostracizedȱbyȱtheirȱfellowȱMuslims.aȱ Moreȱ historicalȱ backgroundȱ canȱ beȱ foundȱ inȱ theȱ. The heads of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British Security Service (MI5) have raised concerns about SomaliͲlinked foreign fighters. CIA Director Leon Panetta told reporters that such individuals raise “real concerns about the potential for terrorist activity” and “constitute a potential threat to the security of this country.” With more than100UKresidentsnowfightingtraininginalͲ ShabaabcampsinSomalia,JonathanEvans,the. followingȱselectedȱsources:ȱ x. Kohlmann,ȱ Evanȱ F.ȱ 2004.ȱ AlȬQaidaȇsȱ Jihadȱ inȱ Europeȱ theȱ AfghanȬBosnianȱ Network.ȱ Oxford,ȱ UK:ȱBergȱPublishersȱȱȱ. x. Malet,ȱ. David.ȱ. 2009.ȱ. Foreignȱ. Fighters:ȱ. Transnationalȱ Identityȱ inȱ Civilȱ Conflicts.ȱ Dissertation.ȱ Washington,ȱ DC;ȱ Theȱ Georgeȱ WashingtonȱUniversityȱ. Director General of MI5, recently argued that “it’s onlyamatteroftimebeforeweseeterrorismonour streets inspired by those who are today fighting alongside alͲShabaab.” Evans’ sentiment was echoed by the Chief of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), John Sawers. 24 Evans’ concern was highlightedlessthanaweekafterhisremarksbythe arrestofaBritishcitizenofSomalidescentbyDutch authorities as he attempted travel between LiverpoolandUganda. 25. x. Malet,ȱ David.ȱ 2009.ȱ “Whyȱ Foreignȱ Fighters?ȱ Historicalȱ Perspectivesȱ andȱ Solutions.”ȱ Orbis.ȱ Philadelphia,ȱ PA;ȱ Foreignȱ Policyȱ Researchȱ Instituteȱȱ. x. Moore,ȱ Cerwynȱ andȱ Paulȱ Tumelty.ȱ 2008.ȱ “Foreignȱ Fightersȱ andȱ theȱ Caseȱ ofȱ Chechnya:ȱ Aȱ Criticalȱ Assessment.”ȱ Studiesȱ inȱ Conflictȱ &ȱ Terrorism.ȱLondon,ȱUK;ȱRoutledgeȱ. ȱ. Some British terrorism experts, and a study by the United Kingdom’s Centre for Social Cohesion, point to the fact that “seven of the eight major terrorist plots in the UK included in their cells one or more individuals who had attended terrorist training camps; six of the eight of these had been in Pakistan.” 26. aWolker,ȱ. Martin.ȱ 2007.ȱ “Establishedȱ Muslimsȱ Resistȱ. NeoȬSalafists.”ȱWebsite.ȱBerlin,ȱDE;ȱQantara.deȱ ȱ. . Even in 2007, press reports quoting British government officials suggested “up to 4,000 Islamicextremistshaveattendedterroristtraining. 24 NortonͲTaylor, Richard. 2010. “MI5 chiefs warns of terror threat from Britons trained in Somalia.” London, UK; The Guardian. Hsu, Spencer S. and Carrie Johnson. 2009. “Somali Americans Recruited by Extremists.” Washington, DC; The WashingtonPost 25 2010. “British terrorism suspect arrested at Amsterdam’s Schipholairport.”London,UK;TheDailyTelegraph 26 Clarke, Michael and Valentina Soria. 2010. “Terrorism – the New Wave.” RUSI Journal. London, UK; Royal United Services Institute.pp.24Ͳ31. campsinAfghanistanbeforereturningtoBritain.” 27 MI5’s Jonathan Evans voiced serious concern in September 2010 about a “significant number of British residents. . .training in camps run by the alͲ QaedaͲlinkedalͲShabaab”and“thatasmanyas 100 Britons of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and West AfricanbackgroundshadtravelledtoSomalia.” 28. 27 Leapman, Brian. 2007. “4,000 in UK trained at terror camps.” London,UK;TheDailyTelegraph 28 Gardham, Duncan. 2010. “Britain facing a new wave of terroristattacks,MI5warns.”London,UK;TheDailyTelegraph. .

(11) PAGE9. Further, German officials have noted that there are “hundreds”ofGermanresidents(mostfromTurkish backgrounds) now fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan – primarily with the Islamic Movement ofUzbekistanandtheIslamicJihadUnion.Thereare even growing indications that a German contingent of the Taliban has been formed. 29 The German Federal Police (Bundeskriminalamt or BKA) stated recentlythatthereisconcreteevidencelinking70 individuals to paramilitary training camps in Pakistan’s FATA along the Afghanistan border and that the agency has stopped 26 from going to Pakistansinceearly2009. Similarly,Frenchterrorismexpertsacknowledgethat France is facing the most severe threat from alͲ Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but estimate that there are a total of 30Ͳ50 French nationals in theFATA/Yemenareawith10Ͳ15participatinginthe YemenitheatrewithalͲQaedaelements. 30 In other smaller EU states the pattern seems to suggestfewernumbers.Austriahashadonecasein 2005when5peoplereceivedtraininginFATAwhile the Netherlands have had two cases of individuals going to Chechnya; one case in Iraq; two cases in Kashmir; four arrests in Kenya hailing from the HagueandtwoinYemen. TheU.S.SenateForeignRelationsCommitteenoted with concern in January 2010 that dozens of Americansmaybeinvolvedinextremistactivitiesin Yemen – including Anwar alͲAulaqi (alͲAwlaki), a prominent YemeniͲAmerican jihadi theoretician affiliated in some manner with alͲQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Media reports citing Yemenisecuritysourcesnotethattensof Westerners have been arrested in security sweeps. suspected of some level of involvement with AQAP. 31 Although the exact scale of the problem is illͲ defined, the empirical evidence suggests that a significant number of Western volunteers are attracted to violent extremist milieus like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. The underlying phenomenon and threat these figures highlight poses a grave threat to the security and strategicinterestsofWesternnations. THE“SPIN”MODELANDCOMPLEXSYSTEMS ANALOGY Theframingofthemultilayeredandevolvingnature ofalͲQaedaandtheforeignfightersinitsserviceisa major challenge. The interlocking relationship betweenalͲQaeda“core”,itsaffiliatesandlocalized cells is often not adequately captured by static categories of alͲQaeda’s constituent parts or changinggeographiccentresofgravity.Ausefulway to conceptualize the complexity of alͲQaeda’s interlocking components is offered by Arquilla and Ronfeldt and their adaption of the soͲcalled SPIN model: the notion that alͲQaeda resembles a “segmented, polycentric, ideologically integrated network.” 32 . thisyear,includingUScitizensand Europeans. . . 31 Majority Staff. 2010. “Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A TickingTimeBomb.”Washington,DC;U.S.SenateCommitteeon ForeignRelations. 29 Smith, Nicola and Bojan Pancevski. 2010. “German militants seeninTalibanborderunit.”London,UK;TheSundayTimes 30 Personal communication with JeanͲCharles Brisard and other Frenchintelligencespecialists.. 32DavidRonfeldtadaptedthismodelfromLutherGerlach’sstudy in 1987 which focus on social movements in the 1960’s. See: Ronfeldt,David.2008.“AlͲQaedaanditsAffiliates.”SantaMonica, CA;RAND. .

(12) PAGE10. TheSPINmodelappliedtoalͲQaeda: 33 x. segmentary (composed of many diverse groups, which grow and die, divide and fuse,proliferateandcontract);. x. polycentric (having multiple, often temporary, and sometimesͲcompeting leadersorcentersofinfluence);. x. networked (forming a loose, reticulate, integrated network with multiple linkages throughtravelers,overlappingmembership, joint activities, common reading matter, andsharedidealsandopponents). Morespecificallyitisusefultoapproachtheforeign fighterphenomenonasacomplexsystem:aseriesof interconnectedpartsandprocessesthat,asawhole, ultimatelyexhibittelltaleproperties. In this system, the most notorious characteristics includeextremistcombatandtraininginlocalessuch asSouthAsia,EastAfrica,andtheArabianPeninsula aswellassporadiceruptionsofviolenceintheWest. Like the illͲdefined boundaries of any complex system,aforeignfighter’sagendaisastheoretically open as the besieged ummah (a contested term definingtheglobalcommunityofMuslims). Travel to Pakistan, Chechnya, Somalia, etc. – lands wherejihaditheoreticianslikealͲAulaqiexplainthat fightingisnotonlylegitimatebutalsocompulsory– presentalmostlimitlessoptionsforaspiringWestern mujahideen. The question becomes, how do they choose?. their decisions include their ideological frame, the processbywhichtheyareradicalized,selfͲinterested choicesgoverningriskinactivism,anddiversesocial, financial, and operational constraints. Each and all of these factors play a role in deciding not only where,butalsowhen,how,andwhomtofight. 34 Further,likeanycomplexsystem,externalpressures and events affect regions of foreign fighter activity. Militants ebb and flow to different geographic regions in response to diverse and wideͲranging catalysts. These catalysts can include social and politicalopportunitiesandconstraintsinthecombat areas;increasedordecreasedsurveillanceeffortsin and by the West; multinational intelligence agency cooperation (or lack thereof); and even mundane matters such as weather, travel restrictions, or adequatekit. 35 Even incremental developments can generate disproportional effects in overall processes and evolution. Events such as Pakistan’s Red Mosque siege, which cemented for some Western jihadists theinfidelityofthePakistanistate;theinvolvement of Ethiopian and African Union forces in Somalia; andalͲAulaqi’spresenceandactivitiesinYemen,for instance,appeartobemoreorlessisolatedevents. Yet they also appear to have greatly influenced aspectsofforeignfighterdecisionͲmaking. Finally, even in the dynamic foreign fighter system, the effects of collective memory are apparent. Shifting preferences in combat areas (for example, the apparent surge in Western foreign fighters in EastAfricarelativetotheirdiminutioninIraq)andin operational methods like suicide bombings and targeting decisions amplify or dampen perceptions. The decisionͲmaking that governs Western foreign fighters’ choices for travel are nested within and affectedbyotherchoices.Elementsthatweighinto. 33Gerlach,LutherP.2001.“TheStructureofSocialMovements: Environmental Activism and Its Opponents.” In Networks and Netwars: the future of terror, crime and militancy. John Arquilla andDavidRonfeldt(eds.).SantaMonica,CA;RAND. 34 On a social movement theory approach to understanding framing processes and decisionͲmaking in jihadi activism, see: Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2004. “Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and alͲQaeda’s Struggle for Sacred Authority.” InternationalReviewofSocialHistory.Cambridge,UK,Cambridge UniversityPress.pp.159Ͳ177 35 Rotella, Sebastian. 2009. “AlͲQaeda recruits back in Europe, butwhy?”LosAngeles,CA;LosAngelesTimes. .

(13) PAGE11. andaffectfuturechoices.Inshort,pasteventsand memories of such affect the political and social ecosysteminwhichtheforeignfightersoperate. Examples of past choices affecting current operations are not hard to find. For example, logistical networks that once supported fighters moving between North America and Europe to Afghanistan have also buoyed aspiring mujahideen headedtoothervenues.Alternatively,manyofthe sameWesternextremistsandassociatedonlinefora that previously extolled militancy in Chechnya and Afghanistan, for instance, have used comparable ideological frameworks and methods to promote violence and training elsewhere. When these individualsormeansgrowsilent,recantfromjihadist activities, or become irrelevant, others will harness comparable themes rooted in system history and rise to prominence. These themes are maintained by a “jihadi culture’’ resident in the system—its glue—which can be defined as the shared and perpetually reinforced attitudes, values and beliefs thatconstituteaframeworkforactioninitsideal. 36 Foreign fighters—especially “bridge figures,” which will be defined later in the paper—are among the most eager consumers and progenitors of this culture. INTERCONNECTIONSACROSSTHEATRES Training Foreignfightertrainingisprimarilybasedoverseasin or near conflict zones, though some does occur within Western host nations. For example, training activitieshavebeenobservedintheUK(especiallyin rural areas including Wales and Scotland), designed topreͲscreenandpreparepotentialrecruits.Jihadi traininghasalsobeendiscoveredinCanadaandthe UnitedStates.. 36 Cozzens, Jeffrey B. 2007. “Approaching alͲQaida’s Warfare: Function, Culture, and Grand Strategy. ” In Mapping Terrorism Research.MagnusRanstorp(ed.).London,UK;Routledge. TrainingwithinWesternhostnationsisoftenadhoc and low grade, and frequently with extremely limitedaccesstoweaponryorexplosivematerials(if any).Adhoctrainingoverlongerperiodsconsistsof organizedphysicalexercisedesignedtoestablishan esprit de corps and basic exposure to operating within a relatively disciplined group environment under a leadership figure—all against the backdrop ofextremeideologicallearning. ThiswasthecasewiththeVirginiajihadinetwork.In 2003, eleven men from Northern Virginia were chargedwithprovidingmaterialsupporttoalͲQaeda and LashkarͲeͲTaiba. The men engaged in paintball games as military training in preparation for jihad againsttheWest. 37 Often these leadership and group activities, as shown by Muhammed Siddique Khan and the 2005 London bombers, consists of paintball, whiteͲwater rafting or camping which fuses the group closer together and exposes critical elements of group dynamics to the leader and any potential weakness incommitmenttothecauseandoverallmission. The primary goal of this rudimentary training, however, may be to solidify the radicalization of foreign fighters and to ensure commitment to the groupandthecause.Manyaccountsoflifeinjihadi training camps – including those from the primary sources–supportthisnotion,indicatingthatsocially reinforced religious learning and exercises focused on inͲgroup cohesion represent a large part of the trainingregimen. The exploits of the soͲcalled Toronto 18 cell, which trained in the Ontario woodlands in 2005Ͳ2006 are instructive here. Like many other cells that train in theWest,theimpactoftheexercisesconductedby. 37AssociatedPress.2004.“Two‘Paintball’TerroristsSentenced.” NewYork,NY;FOXNews.Markon,JerryandMaryBethSheridan. 2003. “Indictment Expands Va. ‘Jihad’ Charges” Washington, DC; The Washington Post. US Attorneys' Office, Eastern District of Virginia.2005.NewsRelease.Alexandria,VA;USDepartmentof Justice.Markon,Jerry.2005.“MuslimLecturerSentencedtoLife.” Washington,DC;TheWashingtonPost. .

(14) PAGE12. thegroup–includingobstaclecourses,callisthenics, and multiple trips to a Tim Horton’s coffee shop to escape the cold – were quasiͲcomical. Perhaps the most crucial element of the training was simply spending time together listening to alͲAulaqi’s (originally Yusuf al 'Uyayree’s) “Constants on the PathofJihad.”OnafrigidDecembernightinatent, thislecturehithomeforthegroup,remindingthem of their obligation to fight and die in God’s path, theirstatusasatypeof‘persecutedchosen’,andthe many ways in which the mujahideen find victory in jihad. In so doing, the ideological raison d’être for theplanned“BattleofToronto”wassolidified. 38 Foreign fighter training camps solidify the radicalization process by translating an individual’s rhetoric and intention into action and experience. The camaraderie of a small group under the influence of a leadership figure is a key step in deepening radicalization. This helps prepare the individual to carry out overseasͲ or homeͲbased terrorist acts. The mere act of holding an illegal weaponforthefirsttimeisnotedasbothanactthat enhances selfͲconfidence and as a significant psychological step across legal and personal boundaries. There is a significant capability difference between rhetoric/intention and action. Training – no matter thelevelofsophistication–bridgesthistransition.. JIHADISTȱCONFLICTȱTHEATRESȱ Theȱ Westernȱ foreignȱ fighterȱ phenomenonȱ inȱ jihadistȱ conflictȱ theatresȱ beganȱ principallyȱ asȱ aȱ reactionȱtoȱtheȱSovietȱoccupationȱofȱAfghanistanȱ inȱ theȱ 1980s.ȱ Althoughȱ theȱ clearȱ majorityȱ ofȱ jihadistsȱfightingȱinȱAfghanistanȱduringȱthisȱtimeȱ wereȱ ofȱ Arabȱ origins,ȱ aȱ minorityȱ wereȱ fromȱ Europeanȱ statesȱ andȱ Northȱ Africa.ȱ Theȱ mujahideen’sȱ perceivedȱ victoryȱ overȱ theȱ USSRȱ generatedȱconfidenceȱinȱtheȱjihadistȱmovementȱ–ȱ notȱ leastȱ becauseȱ itȱ ‘demonstrated’ȱ thatȱ Godȱ rewardsȱ thoseȱ whoȱ fulfilȱ theirȱ obligationȱ toȱ defendȱIslamȱandȱMuslimȱlandsȱ–ȱandȱcreatedȱanȱ enduringȱ legacyȱ thatȱ helpsȱ fuelȱ theȱ conflictsȱ inȱ Somalia,ȱ Yemen,ȱ andȱ (again)ȱ Afghanistan.ȱ Inȱ eachȱ ofȱ theseȱ cases,ȱ endemicȱ problemsȱ suchȱ asȱ resourceȱ. shortages,ȱ. lackȱ. ofȱ. governmentȱ. authority,ȱ weakȱ institutions,ȱ andȱ traditionalȱ religious,ȱ tribal,ȱ andȱ ethnicȱ cleavagesȱ haveȱ createdȱungovernedȱspacesȱwhichȱjihadistsȱhaveȱ successfullyȱexploited.ȱ Jihadistȱleadersȱhaveȱwovenȱtheȱpoliticsȱofȱtheseȱ localȱ strugglesȱ intoȱ aȱ globalȱ fabric.ȱ Thisȱ facilitatesȱ theȱ radicalizationȱ andȱ recruitmentȱ ofȱ individualsȱ toȱ whatȱ jihadistsȱ portrayȱ asȱ principledȱ Muslimȱ resistanceȱ againstȱ theȱ imperialistȱambitionsȱofȱWesternȱforces.ȱForeignȱ fightersȱ attractedȱ toȱ theȱ notionȱ ofȱ fightingȱ inȱ. Lifeinforeignandmobileterroristtrainingcampsis not easy – a fact starkly underscored by AQAP’s INSPIREmagazinepublishedinmidͲ2010.Theonline Englishlanguagearticleaimedspecificallyatforeign recruitsofferedsomebasicadvice–bringafriend. INSPIRE noted that language barriers are difficult, butcritical,toovercome;otherwiseindividualsmay feel depressed and lonely. The article noted that language issues can also result in an individual missing out on operational details and make it difficulttoeffectivelyblendintotheenvironment.. 38Teotonio,Isabel.2010.“TheMujahideenin Washago.”Toronto,CA;TheStar. supportȱ ofȱ aȱ transnationalȱ identityȱ groupȱ haveȱ flockedȱtoȱtheseȱareasȱandȱmakeȱupȱanȱimportantȱ andȱ growingȱ segmentȱ ofȱ theȱ jihadistȱ arsenal.ȱ Inȱ addition,ȱtheȱ“IslamicȱMaghreb”ȱregionȱofȱNorthȱ Africaȱ andȱ theȱ regionȱ ofȱ Centralȱ Asiaȱ haveȱ alsoȱ shownȱ signsȱ ofȱ susceptibilityȱ toȱ jihadistȱ forcesȱ bolsteredȱbyȱforeignȱfighters.ȱȱ FATAȱ(FederallyȱAdministeredȱTribalȱAreas)ȱ Mostȱyoungerȱgenerationȱforeignȱfightersȱjoiningȱ theȱjihadȱinȱtheȱFATAȱzoneȱbetweenȱAfghanistanȱ andȱ Pakistanȱ viewȱ themselvesȱ asȱ aȱcontinuationȱ ofȱtheȱheroicȱmujahideenȱresistanceȱagainstȱaȱgreatȱ power.ȱ (Theȱ criticalȱ roleȱ ofȱ USȱ supportȱ toȱ theȱ. .

(15) PAGE13. There are additional motivations behind INSPIRE’s bringafriendsuggestion.Bringingacompanionand friend to the foreign training camps may serve multipleoperationalpurposes.Beingtogetherwith a friend reinforces the focus of the mission and reduces the chances an individual will turn back. Furthermore it helps support group cohesion. Additionally, it is a potentially useful safeguard against a single foreign intelligence operative infiltration (as two individuals may be easily played off each other during random interrogation and security checks). As testified by a BelgianͲFrench group,whoarrivedinWaziristanin2008,theywere “expectingatleastawelcomefor'ourbrothersfrom Europe' and awarm atmosphere of hospitality" but wereinsteadsubjectedtolengthyinterrogationsby alͲQaedaofficials. 39 Even before the publication of INSPIRE’s bring a friend advice, foreign fighters have been observed travellingingroups.ThefiveNorthernVirginiamen (Uman Chaudhry, Ramy Zamzam, Ahmad Minni, Waqar Khan, and Aman Hassan Yemer) who were arrested in late 2009 by Pakistani officials had travelled as a group from the United States in the hopesofengaginginjihadagainstAmericanforcesin Afghanistan. 40 Such was also the case with Najibullah Zazi – who was accompanied by two classmates(ZareinAhmedzayandAdisMedunjanin) when he travelled from the US to Pakistan for terroristtraining. 41 TheDanielBoydgroup,ajihadi faction from North Carolina that trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan allegedly pursued combat inIsraelandthePalestinianTerritories(amongother locations, including a planned attack against the. mujahideenȱagainstȱtheȱSovietȱUnionȱinȱtheȱ1980sȱ throughȱ supplyȱ ofȱ antiȬaircraftȱ missilesȱ andȱ fundingȱ isȱ ignoredȱ inȱ theȱ modernȱ antiȬWesternȱ extremistȱnarrative.)ȱ Inȱ theȱ initialȱ aftermathȱ ofȱ Operationȱ Enduringȱ FreedomȱandȱtheȱoverthrowȱofȱtheȱTaliban,ȱsomeȱ foreignȱ fightersȱ returnedȱ toȱ theirȱ Westernȱ countriesȱ ofȱ origin.ȱ Theseȱ foreignȱ fightersȱ returnedȱ withȱ extensiveȱ combatȱ experienceȱ andȱ anȱ elementȱ ofȱ streetȱ credibilityȱ withinȱ extremistȱ milieus.ȱ AlȬQaedaȱ sufferedȱ heavyȱ lossesȱ dueȱ toȱ targetedȱ operationsȱ thatȱ eliminatedȱ keyȱ leadershipȱ figures,ȱ andȱ hamperedȱ theirȱ planningȱ andȱ communicationsȱefforts.ȱAlȬQaedaȱlinksȱwithȱtheȱ Talibanȱ haveȱ reportedlyȱ deepenedȱ dueȱ toȱ alȬ Qaedaȱ supplyingȱ theȱ Talibanȱ withȱ weapons,ȱ logisticsȱ. andȱ. training—includingȱ. religiousȱ. indoctrinationȱ andȱ useȱ ofȱ armsȱ andȱ explosives.ȱȱ Theȱ deepeningȱ linkȱ isȱ reflectedȱ inȱ aȱ moreȱ asymmetricȱ Talibanȱ strategyȱ thatȱ hasȱ reliedȱ increasinglyȱ onȱ suicideȱ attacksȱ toȱ achieveȱ maximumȱ internationalȱ mediaȱ impactȱ andȱ undermineȱ theȱ localȱ population’sȱ confidenceȱ inȱ theȱauthorities’ȱcapacityȱtoȱprovideȱsecurity.ȱȱAlȬ QaedaȱforeignȱfightersȱalsoȱmarriedȱTalibanȱandȱ tribalȱ daughters,ȱ therebyȱ furtheringȱ bondsȱ betweenȱ andȱ amongȱ theseȱ entities,ȱ andȱ benefitingȱ fromȱ consequentȱ inclinationsȱ toȱ protect.ȱ Directȱ alȬQaedaȱ activitiesȱ inȱ theȱ FATAȱ regionȱ focusȱ largelyȱ onȱ propagandaȱ andȱ limitedȱ operationalȱ support,ȱ whileȱ variousȱ Talibanȱ. . entitiesȱ conductȱ mostȱ insurgencyȱ operations.ȱ TehrikȬiȬTalibanȱ Pakistanȱ (TTP)ȱ isȱ consideredȱ toȱ. 39 Rotella, Sebastian. 2009. “AlͲQaeda recruits back in Europe, butwhy?”LosAngeles,CA;LosAngelesTimes. haveȱ anȱ internationalȱ agendaȱ andȱ strongȱ alȬ. 40 Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. 2010. “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.” Washington, DC;CongressionalResearchService.pp.70Ͳ71. Faisalȱ Shahzad’sȱ failedȱ Mayȱ 2010ȱ attemptedȱ. 41USFederalBureauofInvestigations.2010.“TwoChargedwith Terror Violations in Connection with New York Subway Plot.” PressRelease.Washington,DC;USDepartmentofJustice. Qaedaȱ links.ȱ ȱ TTPȱ claimedȱ responsibilityȱ forȱ bombingȱofȱNewȱYork’sȱTimesȱSquare.ȱȱShahzadȱ testifiedȱ thatȱ TTPȱ hadȱ suppliedȱ himȱ withȱ explosivesȱ trainingȱ andȱ orders.aȱ ȱ Moreȱ recentlyȱ TTPȱ hasȱ reportedlyȱ shiftedȱ toȱ primarilyȱ. .

(16) PAGE14. Marine Corps base in Quantico, VA) offers yet anotherexample. 42. propagandaȱ operations,ȱ aȱ factȱ thatȱ mayȱ reflectȱ delicateȱ balancesȱ reachedȱ withȱ Pakistaniȱ. Yetbeinginagroupmaynotalleviatedifficultiesin adjustment. The same BelgianͲFrench group referenced above describes how in their training camps they felt frustrated and “increasingly cut off, bored,andfedupwiththeprimitivelivingconditions intheirmountainshacks.Theyoftendidnotseemto knowwhattheirnextorderswouldbeorwhere their handlers would take them.” 43 Additionally, the group became more disillusioned when their handlers did not deliver on repeatedly empty promisestofightinAfghanistanandwhentheyhad to partially pay for their travel, training and weapons. Overseas foreign fighter training courses are now often very basic and serve more as a final phase of indoctrination than as a phase of operation preparation. As Peter Nesser notes in one of the more extensive treatment of European foreign fighter training, today’s “second generation” Western jihadis are not necessarily groomed to become the mujahideen’s “special operators,” as theyoncewereinthe1990’s. 44 . governmentȱforces.ȱȱ LashkarȬeȬTaibaȱ(ȇArmyȱofȱtheȱPure,ȇȱabbreviatedȱ LeT)ȱisȱtheȱlargestȱandȱmostȱdangerousȱextremistȱ groupȱ inȱ Pakistan.ȱ Followingȱ theȱ 2009ȱ Mumbaiȱ attacks,ȱtheyȱhaveȱincreasinglyȱadoptedȱaȱglobalȱ jihadistȱ outlookȱ andȱ haveȱ expandedȱ theirȱ operationalȱ focusȱ toȱ conductȱ attacksȱ againstȱ ISAFȱforcesȱinȱAfghanistan.bȱȱȱ Political,ȱ social,ȱ andȱ ideologicalȱ driversȱ ofȱ varyingȱ levelsȱ ofȱ sophisticationȱ areȱ primaryȱ catalystsȱ forȱ foreignȱ fightersȱ engagedȱ inȱ theȱ FATA.ȱ Interviewsȱ. withȱ. Westernȱ. jihadistsȱ. inȱ. combinationȱ withȱ aȱ wealthȱ ofȱ primaryȱ sourceȱ literatureȱ andȱ publicȱ courtȱ transcriptsȱ indicateȱ thatȱ manyȱ believeȱ deeplyȱ inȱ bothȱ theȱ spiritualȱ andȱ temporalȱ politicalȱ benefitsȱ ofȱ fightingȱ nonȬ Muslimȱ andȱ ‘apostate’ȱ forcesȱ inȱ theȱ FATAȱ region.ȱȱȱTheȱregion,ȱsteepedȱinȱjihadiȱtraditionȱasȱ theȱ graveyardȱ ofȱ communistȱ forces,ȱ alsoȱ carriesȱ someȱ degreeȱ ofȱ eschatologicalȱ significanceȱ asȱ Khorosan,ȱ makingȱ itȱ aȱ highlyȱ desirableȱ placeȱ toȱ fight.ȱ ȱ Someȱ wouldȱ alsoȱ argueȱ thatȱ itȱ isȱȱ ideologicallyȱ. “purer”ȱ. venueȱ. forȱ. combat,ȱ. untaintedȱ byȱ theȱ brutalȱ takfiriȱ tacticsȱ ofȱ Abuȱ Musa’bȱ alȬZarqawi,ȱ whoseȱ activitiesȱ wereȱ reminiscentȱofȱtheȱAlgerianȱGIA—aȱjihadiȱfactionȱ thatȱ fellȱ outȱ ofȱ favorȱ withȱ binȱ Ladenȱ owingȱ toȱ. . theirȱ wholesaleȱ excommunicationȱ andȱ slaughterȱ ofȱinnocentȱMuslims.ȱ. 42OfficeofPublicAffairs.2009.“SevenChargedwithTerrorism ViolationsinNorthCarolina.”Press Release. Washington,DC; US Department of Justice. Office of Public Affairs. 2009. “SupersedingIndictmentinBoydMatterChargesDefendantswith Conspiring to Murder U.S. Military Personnel, Weapons Violations.” Press Release. Washington, DC; US Department of Justice 43Robertson,NicandPaulCruickshank.2009.“RecruitsrevealAl Qaeda’ssprawlingspread.”Atlanta,GA;CNN 44Nesser,Petter.2008.“HowdidEurope’sGlobalJihadisObtain TrainingfortheMilitantCauses?”TerrorismandPoliticalViolence London,UK;Taylor&Francis.pp.234Ͳ256. Foreignȱ fightersȱ fromȱ severalȱ westernȱ countries,ȱ especiallyȱ thoseȱ fromȱ Europe,ȱ areȱ extremelyȱ activeȱ inȱ theȱ FATAȱ region.ȱ Germanȱ securityȱ servicesȱhaveȱidentifiedȱ200ȱforeignȱfightersȱthatȱ haveȱ linksȱ toȱ Germany.ȱ 65ȱ ofȱ thoseȱ identifiedȱ haveȱreceivedȱtraining,ȱwithȱ90ȱbelievedȱtoȱbeȱinȱ trainingȱ andȱ 30ȱ involvedȱ inȱ armedȱ hostilities.ȱ Despiteȱ theirȱ activityȱ inȱ theȱ FATA,ȱ foreignȱ fightersȱposeȱaȱgreaterȱthreatȱifȱtheyȱreturnȱhomeȱ withȱexpertiseȱandȱcredibility.ȱȱThisȱwasȱtheȱcaseȱ. .

(17) PAGE15. withȱBryantȱVinas.ȱ Vinas,ȱ anȱ Americanȱ Muslimȱ convert,ȱ wasȱ chargedȱ byȱ USȱ officialsȱ withȱ providingȱ materialȱ supportȱtoȱalȬQaedaȱandȱreceivingȱmilitaryȱtypeȱ training.ȱ ȱ Inȱ theȱ FATA,ȱ Vinasȱ receivedȱ weaponsȱ andȱ explosivesȱ training.ȱ ȱ Heȱ providedȱ alȬQaedaȱȱ withȱdetailedȱinformationȱaboutȱtheȱLongȱIslandȱ Railroadȱ systemȱ –ȱ whichȱ wasȱ thenȱ usedȱ toȱ helpȱ planȱ aȱ bombȱ attackȱ againstȱ theȱ commuterȱ railȱ. . system.ȱȱVinasȱwasȱarrestedȱbyȱtheȱFBIȱbeforeȱheȱ couldȱcarryȱoutȱtheȱattack.cȱ. EricBreininger. Bothȱ theȱ Islamicȱ Jihadȱ Unionȱ (IJU)ȱ andȱ Islamicȱ. Beyond verifying that the wouldͲbe trainee is not a spyforWesternintelligenceagencies,theemphasis inthemajorityofcasesseemstobetopreparethem either as suicide bombers, marginally effective combatants, or occasionally propaganda showpieces.TherolesofEricBreininger,Adam. Movementȱ ofȱ Uzbekistanȱ (IMU)ȱ haveȱ extendedȱ propagandaȱ. activitiesȱ. towardsȱ. Germany’sȱ. mainland.ȱ ȱ ȱ Ericȱ Breininger,ȱ aȱ youngȱ Germanȱ foreignȱfighterȱkilledȱinȱWaziristanȱinȱMay,ȱ2010,ȱ featuredȱ inȱ severalȱ IJUȱ videosȱ whereȱ heȱ appealedȱtoȱGermanȱMuslimsȱtoȱjoinȱtheȱjihadȱorȱ atȱleastȱsupportȱitȱfinancially.dȱ. Gadahn and Omar Hammami illustrate the latter point.Indeed,typicaloverseastrainingissometimes limitedtoonemonthinatemporarycamp.Foreign fightersareoftentrainedinbasicbombmaking,with limited knowledge of materials and methods. This was the pattern of training received by Daniel Maldonado. Maldonado, the first American criminallyprosecutedforjoiningjihadistsinSomalia, told authorities he was given an AKͲ47, uniforms, and then participated in physical fitness, firearms, andexplosivestraining. 45. Followingȱ hisȱ death,ȱ Breininger’sȱ memoir,ȱ Meinȱ WegȱnachȱJannahȱ(MyȱWayȱtoȱParadise),ȱappearedȱ onȱ aȱ numberȱ ofȱ jihadistȱ websites.ȱ ȱ Officialsȱ fearedȱthatȱBreininger’sȱdeathȱandȱaccountȱofȱhisȱ journeyȱ wouldȱ serveȱ asȱ motivationȱ forȱ otherȱ potentialȱ jihadistsȱ toȱ attemptȱ toȱ engageȱ inȱ foreignȱ fighterȱ activity.ȱ ȱ Theȱ IJUȱ andȱ IMUȱ haveȱ provenȱ transnationalȱ agendasȱ linkedȱ withȱ alȬ Qaedaȱ. thatȱ. focusȱ. onȱ. Uzbekistanȱ. andȱ. Afghanistan,ȱasȱwellȱasȱtargetȱtroopȱcontributingȱ nationsȱ toȱ ISAF,ȱ especiallyȱ thoseȱ withȱ troopsȱ. Potentialrecruitsthatpassthroughsuchcampshave very limited ability or time to improvise and adapt information to different scenarios or unpredicted events. This condition has in some instances underminedjihadioperations.Itwasakeyfactorin thefailureofaterrorplotinDenmark.. nearȱ theȱ Uzbekȱ border.eȱ ȱ Theȱ IJUȱ hasȱ alsoȱ beenȱ. In a Danish case, Hammid Khursid, a 22Ͳyear old of Pakistaniorigin,hadspentconsiderabletimein. inȱ activitiesȱ acrossȱ theȱ entireȱ spectrumȱ ofȱ. . linkedȱ toȱ aȱ plotȱ toȱ attackȱ USȱ militaryȱ forcesȱ inȱ Frankfurt,ȱGermany.ȱ Somaliaȱ Theȱ conflictȱ inȱ Somaliaȱ includesȱ actorsȱ engagedȱ warfare,ȱ includingȱ conventionalȱ warfare,ȱ urbanȱ warfare,ȱ insurgency,ȱ rebellion,ȱ actsȱ ofȱ terrorism,ȱ andȱviolentȱcrime.ȱTheȱsouthernȱSomaliaȱconflictȱ. 45 US Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas. 2007. “US Citizen Pleads Guilty to Training to Fight Jihad.” Press Release. Houston,TX;USDepartmentofJustice. zoneȱ containsȱ small,ȱ highlyȱ mobileȱ forcesȱ totalingȱ lessȱ thanȱ 30,000ȱ individuals.ȱ Foreignȱ. .

(18) PAGE16. Pakistan’s Red Mosque during a confrontation with authorities in 2007. He had been radicalized and channelled to Jani Khel in Waziristan to attend one of Abu Ubaid alͲMasri’s mobile training camps for onemonth’sduration. At the Red Mosque, where he spent considerable time sleeping and ‘hanging out’ with his contact facilitatortoalͲQaeda,hehadcopieddownoneof the bomb manuals in Urdu, containing explosives recipes and instruction on how to make a suicide belt. Khurshid showed great proficiency in secure communications in public Internet cafes, having established several ‘deadͲdrop’ Internet accounts which he used to communicate with Muhammed Ilyas Subhan Ali, a wellͲknown Saudi liaison and logistics officer between ‘core’ alͲQaeda and affiliatesandmembersaroundtheworld. WhenarrivinghometoCopenhagenwiththebomb manual, Khursid managed to manufacture some triacetonetriperoxide(TATP)foratestexplosionbut hehadgreatdifficultyimprovisingandreplacinga3 voltlightbulbtobeusedinthecircuitryboardwhen theonehebroughtbackfromPakistanbroke. Limits to improvisation mirrors frustration in some UKcaseswherereturningfightersweredisappointed in training levels as “they only practiced stripping AKͲ47’s.” There are more advanced courses and other UK cases point to opposite experience with muchmoreadvancedtrainingcourses–enhancedin some instances by the fact that there are training campsinsidetheUKforpreͲselection.However,this constitutestheexceptionratherthanthenorm. Foreignfightersgainthemostsignificantexperience, skills, and knowledge during actual fighting in conflict areas. Often, fighting NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or foreign invading forcesisaprincipalreasonforwhytheytravelledto theseconflictzonesinthefirstplace. Foreign fighters seek to “graduate” to this level in order to prove their bona fides, especially with impressionablemembersoftheirextendedsocial. fightersȱ areȱ aȱ relativelyȱ newȱ (yearȱ 2000)ȱ phenomenon,ȱ andȱ makeȱ upȱ lessȱ thanȱ 5Ȭ10%ȱ ofȱ theȱjihadistsȱinȱSomalia.ȱ Theȱ jihadistȱ movementsȱ inȱ Somaliaȱ areȱ dividedȱ intoȱ twoȱ main,ȱ clanȬbased,ȱ factions:ȱ Alȱ Shabaabȱ andȱ Hizbȱ AlȬIslam.ȱ Asȱ inȱ Afghanistan,ȱ Somaliȱ clan/tribeȱaffiliationsȱtakeȱprimacyȱoverȱideologyȱ andȱ religiousȱ factors.ȱ Theȱ jihadistsȱ shareȱ aȱ commonȱagenda,ȱbutȱlackȱrealȱcoordinationȱandȱ evenȱdisagreeȱonȱideology.ȱ Somalisȱ expatriatesȱ holdingȱ foreignȱ passportsȱ areȱpresentȱonȱbothȱsidesȱofȱtheȱconflict—addingȱ aȱ newȱ dimensionȱ toȱ theȱ foreignȱ fighterȱ phenomenon—whileȱ foreignȱ fightersȱ withȱ noȱ Somaliȱ backgroundȱ areȱ fewȱ inȱ number.ȱ Mostȱ foreignȱ fightersȱ areȱ associatedȱ withȱ alȬShabaabȱ (estimatesȱrangeȱfromȱ200ȱtoȱ1000ȱindividuals).ȱȱ Someȱcontendȱthatȱtheȱmediaȱhasȱoverstatedȱtheȱ impactȱ ofȱ foreignȱ fightersȱ inȱ Somaliaȱ andȱ hasȱ understatedȱ theȱ troublesȱ theyȱ faceȱ integratingȱ withȱ theȱ indigenousȱ forces.ȱ Itȱ isȱ arguedȱ thatȱ foreignȱ fightersȱ inȱ Somaliaȱ areȱ generallyȱ characterizedȱ asȱ “jihadistȱ tourists”ȱ byȱ localȱ fighters,ȱ whoȱ alsoȱ questionȱ theȱ foreigners’ȱ fightingȱcapacityȱandȱcompetence.ȱ Yetȱ Jonathanȱ Evans,ȱ Directorȱ Generalȱ ofȱ MI5,ȱ believesȱ foreignȱ fightersȱ withȱ connectionsȱ toȱ Somaliaȱpresentȱaȱrealȱandȱgrowingȱdanger.ȱ Withȱ moreȱ thanȱ 100ȱ UKȱ residentsȱ nowȱ fightingȱ orȱ trainingȱ inȱ alȬShabaabȱ campsȱ inȱ Somalia,ȱ Evansȱrecentlyȱarguedȱthatȱ“it’sȱonlyȱaȱmatterȱofȱ timeȱ beforeȱ weȱ seeȱ terrorismȱ onȱ ourȱ streetsȱ inspiredȱ byȱ thoseȱ whoȱ areȱ todayȱ fightingȱ alongsideȱ alȬShabaab.”ȱ ȱ Evans’ȱ sentimentȱ wasȱ echoedȱbyȱJohnȱSawers,ȱChiefȱofȱMI6.fȱ Theseȱ concernsȱ onȱ theȱ partȱ ofȱ securityȱ servicesȱ areȱ wellȱ founded.ȱ ȱ Accordingȱ toȱ Peterȱ Bergenȱ andȱ Bruceȱ Hoffman,ȱ alȬShabaabȱ “hadȱ managedȱ toȱ plantȱ alȬQaedaȬlikeȱ ideasȱ intoȱ theȱ headsȱ ofȱ evenȱitsȱAmericanȱrecruits,ȱandȱhasȱshownȱthatȱitȱ. .

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