Umeå University
Department of Political Science
Does subjective (un)happiness predict religious extremism?
Thesis for a master’s seminar Peace and conflict studies
Umeå University
Spring semester, 2021
Pontus Andersson
Abstract
With religious extremism being a destructive force in many parts of the world, the mission to understand and mitigate it is always actual. The current thesis tries to contribute to the knowledge of this phenomenon by investigating it through a very particular lens – its relation to subjective happiness. This is done through finding the answer to the research question “Does subjective (un)happiness predict religious extremism?”, using various quantitative gamma and chi-squared tests of association, as well as data from the World Values Survey, wave 7.
Although it is hypothesised, based on previous research, that subjective happiness should have either a positive or negative relation with holding religiously extreme views, none of this is proven correct. Instead, a conclusion entirely new to the field of psycho-emotional well-being and political views emerges, namely that religious extremists tend to evaluate their happiness and sense of well-being just as extremely as they do societal and religious matters. This not only disproves the conclusions drawn by certain previous studies, it also provides a whole new perspective as to how to understand the inner worlds of individuals drawn to the ideas of religious extremism, something crucial for successful mitigation of this harmful phenomenon.
Keywords: Happiness, Life satisfaction, Subjective well-being, Psycho-emotional well-being,
Religious extremism.
Content
Introduction ... 1
Purpose and research question ... 1
Disposition of thesis ... 2
Previous research ... 2
Concepts and definitions ... 3
Self-uncertainty and the need for closure ... 6
Significance quests ... 9
Happiness ... 11
Other important aspects ... 15
Conclusion ... 17
Hypothesis ... 18
Theory ... 18
Models ... 20
Method ... 23
Data ... 23
Operationalizations ... 24
Procedure ... 25
Potential sources of error ... 27
Results ... 27
Descriptive statistics ... 27
Analytical statistics... 30
Discussion ... 36
Shortcomings of current research ... 37
Implications and suggestions for future research ... 38
Conclusion ... 40
Data availability and author’s note ... 40
References ... 41
Appendix A – Descriptive and analytical statistics of the main tests of Christians in the Anglo-Saxon world ... i
Appendix B – Descriptive and analytical statistics of robustness tests of Muslims in the IMENA world and Christians in the Latin American world ... iv
Appendix C – Analytical statistics of happiness’ relation with religious extremism for Muslims in the IMENA world and Christians in the Latin American world, split by sex ... xi
Appendix D – Descriptive and analytical statistics of happiness’ relation with religious extremism for Christians in the IMENA world ... xvii
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Introduction
Despite much work having been done in the field of religious extremism, especially in recent decades, the phenomenon still acquires much attention from scholars and policymakers world- wide. This is not particularly surprising given the vast amount of people killed by politically and/or religiously motivated terrorism each year, with a whopping average of 68.7 people killed per day globally during 2019 (Statista, 2021), something naturally sparking a demand for knowledge of the subject.
These figures, and the continuation of wide-spread terrorism world-wide, speak of the cold fact that there is still much to be done in order to comprehensively understand the phenomenon of political and religious violence. To do that, however, it is not sufficient to focus solely on the actual act of violence, as is often the case within terrorism studies. Instead, more attention needs to be given to the ideological framework that underpins such violence and the factors that drive people towards them. Indeed, as some scholars have claimed, “without ideology radicalisation […], most terrorism is unlikely” (Schmid, 2016, p. 29).
To understand what drives certain people to radical ideas it is, in turn, crucial to understand the inner psychological and emotional worlds of these people. Work has been done in this field, with previous studies investigating the psychological and emotional precursors to authoritarian views (Butler, 2000; Duriez, et al., 2012; Hogg & Adelman, 2013; Lyons & Carhart-Harris, 2018; Rast, et al., 2013; Schoel, et al., 2011; Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009), political extremism (Fernbach, et al., 2013; Hogg, et al., 2013; Hogg, et al., 2010; LaFree, et al., 2018; McGregor, et al., 2001; Schmidt, et al., 2005), religious fundamentalism (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Carlucci, et al., 2015), and religious terrorism (Alderdice, 2007; Crenshaw, 2000; Gill, et al., 2021;
Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Kruglanski, et al., 2014; Post, et al., 2009). What is lacking, however, is studies on the psychological and emotional precursors to religious extremism, i.e., holding religiously extreme views without necessarily using violence. Important to note is the significant difference between religious fundamentalism and religious extremism (however difficult to define), and that almost all work on psychological and emotional precursors to religious terrorism focus on what drives certain individuals to the actual
act of violence, rather than to the ideological framework of religious extremism itself.Purpose and research question
This study aims to help increase the understanding of what psychological and emotional factors
drive certain people towards religious extremism through investigating one particular factor:
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subjective happiness. The reason this connection is examined is because of the very limited exploration of this specific element. Although some research has been done regarding the relation between happiness and religiousness (Cohen & Johnson, 2017), happiness and political extremism (Jackson, 2019), and happiness and populist opinion (Nowakowski, 2020), there is, to the best of my knowledge, no research on the relation between subjective happiness and religious extremism. This lack of research gains this study its importance.
The research question for this project is the following: Does subjective (un)happiness predict
religious extremism? The answer to this question is pursued through several association testsusing data from the World Values Survey, wave 7. The sample used consists of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish respondents living in Anglo-Saxon, Latin-American, and Islamic, Middle Eastern and North African countries. Causality is not investigated due to reasons explained in the “Method” section.
By investigating the connection between subjective happiness and religious extremism, this paper takes the implicit stand that religious extremism has to be explained at all, rather than that it is something intrinsic within religion itself, as some scholars would claim (Liebman, 1983).
That is not to say that this paper disregards the conclusion that is in fact religious moderation that has to be explained, rather than religious radicalization, as there is good reason to investigate religious extremism from that end as well. In any case, whether or not one believes that it is in fact religious moderation that has to be explained rather than religious radicalization, there is still a good case for investigating why some people take their faith to the farthest end of the spectrum. In other words, whatever outlook one may have on the basic characteristics of religion, the weight and importance of this study still remains.
Disposition of thesis
The current text commences with a detailed account of previous research, followed by the formation of hypotheses based on this previous research. When the hypotheses and their models have been presented, it is clarified how the experiment is conducted methodologically. After this follows the presentation of the results gathered in the experiment, they in turn followed by a discussion of what they mean and imply for future studies, as well as of the shortcomings of the current research. Following this is a brief conclusion of the study as a whole.
Previous research
There is a lot of previous studies investigating the direct and indirect relation between various
psycho-emotional factors and radical religious and political views. This includes factors such
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as self-esteem (Schoel, et al., 2011; Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009), social anxiety (Carlucci, et al., 2015; Orr & Moscovitch, 2015), self-uncertainty (Hogg, et al., 2010; Hogg, et al., 2013;
Hogg & Adelman, 2013; McGregor, et al., 2001; Rast, et al., 2013), need for personal significance (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Kruglanski, et al., 2014), experience of trauma (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005), need for closure (Hogg, et al., 2013; Brandt & Reyna, 2010), optimism (Sethi & Seligman, 1993), fear of death (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Van Hiel &
De Clercq, 2009), life satisfaction (Carlucci, et al., 2015), and of course – happiness (Nowakowski, 2020; Jackson, 2020; Jackson, 2019). In addition to this there is a large body of research on cultural elements that affect these psycho-emotional factors. These elements include honour versus dignity culture (Harati, et al., 2019), individualist versus collectivist culture (Jasielska, et al., 2018), and living as an individualist or collectivist in an incongruent majority culture (Caldwell-Harris & Aycicegi, 2006). The religious and/or political standpoints investigated in this respect include authoritarianism (Butler, 2000; Duriez, et al., 2012; Hogg
& Adelman, 2013), political extremism (Schmidt, et al., 2005), populism (Nowakowski, 2020), religious fundamentalism (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Carlucci, et al., 2015; Genia, 1996), and participation in religious violence (Alderdice, 2007; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005; Post, et al., 2009). In some studies, the above-mentioned psycho-emotional factors are connected to simply being religious at all (Cohen & Johnson, 2017; Sethi & Seligman, 1993).
This section clarifies the current knowledge of the relationships between above mentioned psycho-emotional and cultural factors and religious and/or political radicalism. Separate sub- sections are used to facilitate the account of this, starting with a subsection on concepts and definitions.
Concepts and definitions
Most concepts included in this study are simple enough to be clarified in the running texts of following subsections. There are, however, two concepts that need special attention. These are the notions of radicalism and religious extremism.
The reason radicalism needs a more detailed account of its meaning is because of its connection to all other religious and/or political concepts included in this study, i.e., fundamentalism, terrorism, authoritarianism, populism, and of course, extremism. In this study, radicalism is described as an umbrella term, encompassing these other concepts.
Connecting all included religious/political concepts in this way is necessary if most of previous
studies are to be relevant. When it comes to research on psycho-emotional factors and
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outstanding political views, the fact of the matter is that it is rather scarce. If we are talking research on psycho-emotional factors and extremism specifically, this is almost non-existent (this is, however, not the case when it comes to violence stemming from extremism, although the focus in these studies is usually on the actual violence). Because of this, research on psycho- emotional factors and other types of outstanding views need to be included in order to construct any type of hypothesis for this study. This is done through the realisation that both authoritarianism, terrorism, fundamentalism, populism, and general extremism are all parts of the wider concept of radicalism. Because of this, research on psycho-emotional factors and the former five of these concepts can all be said to accumulate to the knowledge on psycho- emotional factors and the latter of them. The former five of these concepts are not, like previously stated, clarified in this subsection (although religious extremism, specifically, is).
Instead, these are all defined wherever research on them is accounted for. As they are clarified in the running text of following subsections, it is made clear how they all relate to the below defined concept of radicalism.
In the literature, it is more common to encounter definitions of radicalisation than definitions of radicalism. From these definitions on the former, one may, however, deduct a definition of the latter. Regarding the former, one may find that it is defined as “the process of supporting or engaging in activities deemed (by others) as in violation of important social norms”
(Kruglanski, et al., 2014, p. 69). Drawing from this, one may conclude that radicalism is the end result of radicalization, meaning simply supporting or engaging in activities deemed by others as in violation to important social norms.
This is a rather intuitive definition of radicalism. It does, however, contain the problem of being completely inconsistent over cultural boundaries. According to this definition, radicalism means different things depending on where a particular individual lives. Something deemed radical in one location need not, then, be deemed radical in the next.
An example of a more concrete definition of radicalisation is a definition previously used by the European Union, namely “Individuals or groups becoming intolerant with regard to basic democratic values like equality and diversity, as well as a rising propensity towards using means of force to reach political goals that negate and/or undermine democracy.” (Schmid, 2016, p.
27). Drawing from this in similar means as in the case of previously mentioned definition, one might conclude that if this is a definition of radicalisation, one of radicalism might be
“individuals or groups being intolerant with regard to basic democratic values like equality and
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diversity, as well as looking favourably at using means of force to reach political goals that negate and/or undermine democracy”.
It is obvious to see that the latter definition is more precise than the previous one, and hence more useful if one is to investigate radicalism in different cultural contexts. The problem with the latter is, of course, that it is subjective and only relevant in contexts where democracy, equality, and diversity are viewed favourably. Although this may be the case, a further analysis of what equality, diversity, and democracy actually mean provides a more universal definition of the concept. What equality, diversity, and democracy fundamentally imply for a society – or any specific subculture – is the relief of social control and the empowerment of individuals.
One might therefore say that radicalism contains all ideologies opposing this, i.e., all ideologies promoting social control over individual freedom and peculiarity.
Although above deduction may suffer from its own burden of subjectivity due to the fact that not all societies and/or subcultures value individualism, it is still very telling because of its implication that a radical individual would rather see its community in strict accordance with one’s ideals than in compliance of everyone’s right to independently choose – or not to choose – to follow them. This implies a deep need of control that reaches far beyond matters relevant to one’s own life. Having this need of control, to feel like other people’s individuality need to be restricted in order to make way for your own world view, should be seen as nothing but radical due to its pursuit of authority over people who, to a swindling majority, are complete strangers.
Following the argumentation above, the term “radicalism” is, in this thesis, defined as an
umbrella term for any and all belief systems where the implementation of one’s own values in
the wider society or the own subculture – beyond questions of direct physical harm to others –
is seen as important enough to legitimize the (at least partial) reduction of individual choice and
peculiarity. To make clear that this form of radicalism is about the restriction of individuality
and the promotion of homogeneity, and to clarify beyond doubt that this definition of radicalism
does not include, say, HBTQ rights activists that surely are deemed radical in certain parts of
the world but by no means promote the depression of individuality, above defined concept of
radicalism should be better comprehended as restrictive radicalism. In effect, it is, thus, this
concept of restrictive radicalism that has been defined above. This concept is, however, at times,
in the quest for simplicity, referred to as simply “radicalism” in the rest of the text.
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Moving on to extremism, it is, like previously stated, not defined in its general form in this subsection. Instead, it is, like the other ideological concepts, described whenever it is mentioned in relation to a specific study. Something that needs defining, however, is the concept of
religious extremism. This is, of course, because of the fact that it is this very ideologicalphenomenon that is being investigated in this thesis. Without a proper, universal definition of religious extremism, it is impossible to measure it in any meaningful way in the actual experiment.
According to Liebman (1983), religious extremism may be defined as consisting of three key characteristics, namely; a drive to expand religious law; self-isolation from those elements of society that do not accept extremist norms; and the rejection of cultural forms and values that are not perceived as indigenous to the religious tradition. Regarding religious law, Liebman (1983) continues to say that extremists “seek to extend the scope of religious law to include the public as well as the private realm, and to matters of collective as well as private behavior within that realm”. Drawing from definitions of general extremism, one may also define religiously extremist groups as groups pursuing “high group entitativity, rigid and closed group boundaries, internal homogeneity and pressures toward consensus, orthodox and ideological belief systems, ritualized practices, profound ethnocentrism, hierarchical structure, strong or autocratic leadership, […] radical action agendas aimed at protecting and promoting the group and its identity”, and “powerful or zealous group identification” (Hogg & Adelman, 2013, pp. 448- 449). This thesis employs a combination of these two definitions in its own conceptualisation of religious extremism.
Due to the impulse of religious extremists to expand religious law to include all parts of society, as well as to their strive for internal homogeneity, it is easy to draw the conclusion that religious extremism satisfy the critera of being deemed radical following this thesis’ definition of the concept.
Self-uncertainty and the need for closure
None of the factors presumably related to radical opinion is probably as researched as the one
of self-uncertainty. Self-uncertainty is a rather grim experience in which people feel confused
about who they, as individuals, are. This bewilderment may regard one´s “perceptions, beliefs,
attitudes, values, relationships, and careers; their future and their place in the world; and even
more fundamentally […] their very self and identity” (Hogg, et al., 2013, pp. 411-412).
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Although some uncertainty may be exciting, too much is often described as uncomfortable and aversive (Hogg, et al., 2010). Since people have a fundamental need, at least to some extent, to know who they are (Hogg & Adelman, 2013), too much self-uncertainty is preferably avoided.
There are many ways to avoid this feeling of perplexity. Some individualists may, for example, assert their self-concept through the possession of self-reflecting, material possessions (Morrison & Johnson, 2011). Others, as is more achievable for people of lower income and/or less individualistic values, find decreased self-uncertainty through the identification with a self- inclusive group. Indeed, multiple studies show that self-uncertainty lead people to stronger group-identification, preferably with groups of high entitativity. This is the case even when the group in question holds a low societal status (Hogg & Adelman, 2013).
Why does self-uncertainty affect people this way? Like previously stated, too much uncertainty is often experienced as uncomfortable and aversive (Hogg, et al., 2010). Indeed, people tend to avoid even the thought of uncertainty if possible (Schoel, et al., 2011). Because of this, it is not hard to imagine why a strong identification with a high entitativity group may be pursued. This is especially true if one understands that “Group identification is particularly effective at reducing or protecting against self-related uncertainty”, and that “This is because identification is associated with social categorization of self and others — a process that depersonalizes behaviour and perception of self and other's to conform to group prototypes that describe and prescribe how people (including oneself) will and ought to behave and interact with one another” (Hogg, et al., 2010, p. 1062). In other words, group identification may, in certain cases, work as a quick fix for being lost in the self.
Does this necessarily lead to extremism? The answer is, of course; not in all cases. This self- uncertainty-based group identification does, however, play a part. Like previously stated, the groups people tend to identify with as a response to self-perplexity are high entitativity groups.
Entitativity is similar to perceived unity. It is the property that makes a group ”groupy”, and relies on in-group similarity and proximity, as well as a perceived common fate (Hamilton &
Sherman, 1996; Rast, et al., 2013). Given the definition of this property, it is not surprising that self-uncertain people tend to gravitate towards groups accommodating it. Indeed, even whilst in them, self-uncertain people are prone to try to make their self-inclusive group even more entitative (Rast, et al., 2013).
It is this process, of firstly identifying with high entitativity groups, and secondly making these
groups more entitative, that eventually may lead to extremism. Taken to the far end, high
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entitativity embody “rigid, closed boundaries, internal homogeneity and consensus, orthodox and ideological belief systems, ritualized practices, profound ethnocentrism, hierarchical structure, and emphatic leadership” (Hogg, et al., 2010, p. 1062), properties all included in above definition of extremist groups.
All of the above could be summarized with the following sentence: Some people generally, and self-uncertain people in particular, need cognitive closure. The need for closure may be defined as an individual’s “desire for a firm answer to a question, any firm answer as compared to confusion and/ or ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 2004, p. 6), and it “represents a cluster of psychological expressions including closed mindedness, uncertainty avoidance, the need for coherence, and intolerance of ambiguity” (Brandt & Reyna, 2010, p. 715). It is not un- imaginable that this need may, in certain cases, have a skewing effect on people’s perceptions of community, society, and/or authority. Indeed, regarding the interaction between uncertainty, closure, and leadership, Hogg et al. (2013, p. 412-413) writes
There is considerable evidence that where uncertainty is particularly aversive and closure is strongly desired groups prefer strong autocratic leadership where the attainment of consensus is facilitated by reliance on the leader and where consensus-delaying debate and discussion are discouraged (Kruglanski et al., 2005; Kruglanski et al., 2006; Orehek et al., 2010). Authority can also come from definitive texts that are considered true in an absolute sense—almost all religions and most powerful political ideologies have them. Even scholarly schools of thought can repeatedly refer to a particular body of text as definitive. Those who interpret such texts in an orthodox manner can become highly authoritative and be invested with substantial power as they ground the belief system in a solid and unchanging foundation that is highly attractive to those who seek to manage their uncertainty.
This drive for consensus and clarity need not have been such a problem if the people belonging to high entitative groups simply cared for themselves. Unfortunately, though, it is unrealistic that this deep need for closure would not affect external people. This is because competing narratives and groups feed into the perplexity that self-uncertain people feel. In the cases where this uncertainty is particularly aversive, people tend to isolate themselves from these contrasting views, sometimes at any cost. This can be done through only reading the news media that agrees with your own narrative or by avoiding people who think differently. In certain cases, it can involve devaluing or discrediting people who think nonidentically, and in extreme cases, even the marginalization, rejection, and/or persecution of such people. (Hogg, et al., 2013)
Important to note is that the self-uncertainty-radicalism relationship is not a universal law, true
under all circumstances, as there are certain factors affecting how different individuals react to
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self-perplexity. One of these factors is self-esteem. In a study by Schoel et al. (2011), it was found that self-uncertainty only lead to an autocratic reaction if the subjects suffered from an unstable, low self-esteem. Not stopping there, the study not only found a neutral reaction in the face of uncertainty from people of a stable, high self-esteem, but a pro-democratic one.
This could quite well indicate that neither self-uncertainty nor low self-esteem are sufficient precursors to extremism. Instead, they could function as ingredients that, when mixed together, generate a potential for radicalization. This is not surprising given the fact that low self-esteem, by itself, may lead to similar consequences as self-uncertainty. An example of this is in-group bias, as people with low self-esteem tend to see their own group more favourably (Hogg &
Abrams, 1990), perhaps in order to see themselves – members of that very group, more favourably. In turn, this quest for self-esteem may, in certain cases, lead to the discrimination of out-groups, as this is expected to provide a higher in-group status, thereby gratifying the need of self-regard even more (Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009). The research regarding self-esteem and group psychology is, however, not uniform. An example of this is the find that even though people do indeed feel good about themselves when identifying with a percievably positive group, lowered self-esteem does not reliably motivate people to actually join or identify more strongly with these groups (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). More research is needed to provide clarity in the question.
To completely understand the relationship between self-uncertainty and extremism, one must also understand what factors potentially lead to this heavy sense of self-perplexity. One factor repeatedly mentioned in previous research is that of social anxiety, a condition that has been found to increase individuals’ vulnerability to diminished self-certainty through dishonest and/or inauthentic behaviour during social encounters (Orr & Moscovitch, 2015). This makes it rather unsurprising that social anxiety has been found to correlate with both rightist authoritarianism, dogmatism, intolerance, and prejudice, among others (Carlucci, et al., 2015).
Significance quests
Previous research has found a robust relationship between personal significance quests – as consequences of perceived significance losses – and radicalism. A significance loss in this regard refers to a diminished sense of meaning considering one’s life and/or existence, while a significance quest refers to the pursuit of the re-establishment of this sense (Kruglanski &
Fishman, 2009).
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A significance loss (needed to spawn a significance quest) may be triggered through several means. To be general, it may be triggered by practically anything, depending on personal sensitivities, as long as the triggering factor diminishes an individual’s sense of self-meaning.
One of the much-explored paths to significance loss is the one through the awareness and fear of death. Kruglanski & Fishman (2009, p. 10) say of the matter, in the context of suicide terrorism, that
Recent analysis of human motivations has linked the fear of death with the quest for personal meaning and significance (Greenberg, Koole, & Pyszczynski, 2004).
From this perspective, it is the awareness of our own mortality, the fear of living a life that is insignificant, that motivates people to be “good” members of society.
The ultimate in “goodness” is the sacrifice of one’s self for the sake of the larger group, usually when the group faces a severe perceived threat to its existence.
Putting the group first is highly valued and it brings the promise of immortality by becoming a hero or martyr engraved forever in the group’s collective memory.
[…] Ironically then, the willingness to die in an act of suicidal terrorism may be motivated by the desire to live forever.
According to this statement, death anxiety may spark a significance quest manifested through pursuing “goodness” in the eyes of the community – ultimately through self-sacrifice, if needed – in order to extend the life of one’s ego.
The statement by Kruglanski & Fishman (2009) is not something unfounded on research.
Precisely regarding suicide terrorists, one study found that almost all investigated suicide terrorists had had at least one relative or close friend killed, maimed, or abused by their enemies (Sageman, 2004), events that may work well as death reminders (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009).
More support for above statement can be found if we look beyond the extreme of the extreme
(suicide bombers) and turn our gaze towards regular people. There is considerable evidence,
for example, that death reminders lead to a generally heightened embracement of one’s group
culture and its ideology (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). An example of this is a study of Iranian
students, where death reminders increased the popularity of a student favouring martyrdom
attacks in relation to one who did not (Pyszczynski, et al., 2006). Another example is a study
showing that the reminder of death increased death thought accessibility in an American
sample, only to decrease after the participants were given the opportunity to derogate an anti-
U.S. writer (Arndt, et al., 1997). Both of these examples are good references of how people
yearn to achieve significance through being good members of the collective, especially in the
face of a significance loss due to mortality salience.
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Important to note is that there are, like previously stated, other paths to significance losses.
Examples of these are trauma, feelings of alienation, disenfranchisement, and humiliation and/or ostracism by members of one’s own group (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). It may also be triggered by a tendency to be offended due to a rejection sensitivity, as well as by living in a culture that places high value on honour (Kruglanski, et al., 2014).
In conclusion it should be said that although a sense of significance loss may not be sufficient for adopting radical views, previous research has made clear that it is, indeed, an important factor in certain cases.
Happiness
Defining happiness is not an easy task. In research, measuring it may in fact be near impossible, as doing so runs the risk of reflecting the researcher’s own values more than the actual happiness of the subject (Cohen & Johnson, 2017). Although this may be true, there is not an absence of research on happiness generally, nor on happiness and religious/political views specifically (albeit scarce). After all, despite the difficulties of measuring it, it is nevertheless a factor potentially affecting, among other phenomena, extremism. As a profession, science should thus proceed in the investigation of the subject, regardless of the awkwardness in doing so.
Because of the difficulties defining it, there are many different conceptualizations of happiness.
Since they may vary so much from study to study, the different definitions of happiness are not described whilst presenting previous research. The very concept is, instead, taken as a given.
However, to get a general glimpse into the concept, it can be said that it is usually referred to as “positive feelings such as joy, contentment, and calm” (Cohen & Johnson, 2017, p. 534), or emotional well-being, subjective well-being, a dominance of positive over negative affect, and/or a positive evaluation of one’s quality of life (Jasielska, et al., 2018).
Most of what can be said about happiness and its relation to religious/political opinion is not
proven knowledge as much as intuitive deductions that may be drawn from research on other
topics. It is not unimaginable, for example, that the factors referred to previously in this section
(self-uncertainty, need for closure, low self-esteem, significance loss) may lead to a sense of
decreased happiness. After all, who would want to be confused or think unfavourably of
oneself? And who would want to feel that their very existence holds no significance? The
question that follows is, however, whether or not this presumed unhappiness is relevant to the
actual radicalization of individuals. After all, this relationship, if indeed there is one, might be
nothing but sporadic.
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Fortunately enough there is some research on the direct relationship between happiness and political opinion, the results of which seem to support the idea that the general happiness experienced by individuals do indeed affect the opinions these people hold. One study investigating British adolescents’ attitudes towards Muslim asylum seekers, for example, found that inducing a feeling of happiness increased subjects’ level of tolerance, concluding that “one way to increase positive attitudes toward asylum-seeking young people is to improve general emotional state” (Tenenbaum, et al., 2018, p. 346). Another study, investigating populist voters across Europe, found that people voting for populist parties were significantly less happy than people who did not – concluding that “generalized unhappiness with one’s personal well-being – and not merely dissatisfaction with governments – could have played a lead role in the rise of European populism”, and that these findings point to the deduction that “unhappy feelings” may contribute to the support of what may be deemed “radical change” (Nowakowski, 2020, p. 14).
The populist parties in this study were selected through a previously prepared list of European populists, a list which was guided, however, by the following populism criterion: (1) the party portrays the people as virtuous and homogeneous; (2) the party advocates popular sovereignty;
and (3) the party defines itself against the political establishment. The first and third of these criteria could be seen as aspirations toward internal homogeneity typical of radical groups. The research is hence deemed relevant to the studies of psycho-emotional factors and radicalism.
With regard to the former of these just mentioned studies, since anti-immigration attitudes are a key feature of European populism (Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2015), this research is also seen as accumulating to the knowledge on psycho-emotional factors and radicalism. Combined, these studies provide evidence not only for the correlation of happiness and populism, but also for the direction of the causality – namely that it is the general happiness level that seem to affect populist opinion, although it could work the other way around in combination with this as well. And since populism make up a part of the wider concept of radicalism, one may say that these studies form evidence that lower general happiness may contribute to the development of radical opinion, in its general form, as well.
When it comes to extremism, however, its relationship to happiness seems to be the complete
opposite of that of populism. One study, for example, found that Americans with extreme
political views were significantly happier than Americans with moderate political views,
independent of ideological perspective (Jackson, 2019). Another study, also investigating
American voters, found that ideological congruence with sitting president increased the general
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sense of happiness for people with extreme views, while not affecting people of moderate political views (Jackson, 2020).
Unlike the studies on happiness and populism, above mentioned studies on happiness and extremism draw the conclusion that it is the extreme views that affect perceived happiness instead of the other way around. The causality is thus assumed to be the opposite of that of happiness and populism (Jackson, 2019; Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009). If one gives the causality a slight thought, it would not make much intuitive sense to assume that it would be any other way. After all, why would the happiest person in the world need to seek out extreme ideology, given that this person is so magnificently happy in the world as it is? It would make more intuitive sense that it is the extreme views that increase certain people’s sense of general happiness by providing, for example, a psychological need for certainty and structure. Indeed, this is exactly how the causal mechanism is explained by one of above-mentioned studies (Jackson, 2019). This conclusion also makes intuitive sense due to above referenced literature on self-uncertainty and extremism.
Important to note regarding the two above mentioned studies on happiness and extremism is that extremism was, in both of these cases, operationalised through the self-estimations respondents made regarding their own ideology on a 7-point scale, where a value of 1 represented “extremely liberal” and a value of 7 represented “extremely conservative” (Jackson, 2019; Jackson, 2020). Thus, we know nothing of how these people fit into this thesis’ above definition of radicalism. It is hence possible that these “extremists” were simply extremely sure of their opinion, but not necessarily radical in the sense of pursuing social control over individual peculiarity. Hence, although these studies provide their usefulness in many other ways, they should nonetheless be viewed with certain scepticism with regards to their relativity to this thesis. Nevertheless, since research on happiness and extremism is indeed so scarce, they are worth mentioning in this section.
Also relevant to the studies on radicalism is the study of authoritarianism and psycho-emotional
well-being. This field is, however, rather torn, with some studies revealing a negative
correlation between authoritarian views and depression (Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009) and
others a positive correlation between the two (Duriez, et al., 2012). In both of these cited cases,
authoritarianism was measured with the help of Altemeyer’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism or
RWA scale, which defines authoritarianism as constructed by three characteristics: (1) a strict
adherence to conventional norms and values (conventionalism); (2) an uncritical subjection to
authority (authoritarian submission); and (3) feelings of aggression towards norm violators
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(authoritarian aggression) (Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009). All three of these can be seen as properties working to restrict individual peculiarity and promote interior homogeneity, thereby qualifying this definition of authoritarianism as radical in line with this thesis’ definition of the concept. Because of this, the research cited in this paragraph could also be said to explore the correlation between depression and radicalism. However, since the results are inconsistent, and since depression need not be the opposite of happiness (although they are certainly related), it is questionable how much help the above cited research on authoritarianism and depression actually is in terms of grasping the field of psycho-emotional factors and radicalism. Either way, these studies are still worth mentioning, if nothing else as to provide a sense of how conflicted the field sometimes is.
Another ideological concept worth mentioning in relation to happiness is religious fundamentalism, something one study found to correlate positively with subjective satisfaction with life, although not at all with anxiety nor depression (Carlucci, et al., 2015).
Fundamentalism was in this study measured by the Religious Fundamentalism Scale, or the RFS, which followed the following definition of the concept: “The belief that there is one set of religious teaching that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by evil forces which must be vigorously fought against...and those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with deity” (Carlucci, et al., 2015, p. 23). The fight against
“evil forces” may be seen as a strive for (at least internal) homogeneity, qualifying it for this thesis’ definition of radical.
Another study on the subject found that religiously fundamentalist people were more optimistic than people with moderate beliefs, who were in turn more optimistic than liberal believers (Sethi & Seligman, 1993). Religious fundamentalism was here measured through a questionnaire containing three topics, the answers to which were placed on a scale from 1 to 6 or 1 to 7. The topics were religious influence in daily life, religious involvement, and religious hope. Important to note is that neither of these topics need have anything to do with this thesis’
definition of radicalism. It is therefore not necessary that the study is generalizable to other
forms of outstanding views, such as extremism or authoritarianism. This is the case even though
certain, specific questions are, in fact, relatable, such as for example “To what extent do your
religious beliefs influence whom you associate with?”. Even though this is the case, the study
is still worth mentioning since it need not be certain that it is irrelevant only because its
relevance is not certain.
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Taken together, although subjective life satisfaction and optimism are not the same things as happiness, there is reason to believe they could contribute to it. And since the former definition of religious fundamentalism fits the conceptualization of radicalism, the study it originates from may be said to supply evidence of the correlation between holding radical ideas and increased subjective satisfaction with life.
An interesting experiment also worth mentioning here is one were certain subjects suffering from treatment-resistant depression were given an oral dosage of the psychedelic compound psilocybin to test whether this could have lasting personality trait changes in comparison with a non-consuming, healthy control group. The results found that not only had depressive symptoms decreased for the experiment group, so too had the degree of authoritarian views.
These changes were also persistent over a 7–12-month period (Lyons & Carhart-Harris, 2018).
Authoritarianism was here measured using the so-called Political Perspective Questionnaire, which consisted of 5 items and 5 different answering options for each item, ranging from “1 = strongly disagree” to “5 = strongly agree”. The items included in the questionnaire were the following: (1) “Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional values”, (2)
“People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences”, (3) “Schools should teach children to obey authority”, (4) “The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong”, and (5) “Organizing public meetings to protest against the government should not be allowed” (Nour, et al., 2017). The first, third, and fifth of these can be seen as potentially restrictive towards individual peculiarity, making this definition eligible to being deemed radical in the eyes of this thesis. This study thus provides support to the idea that, firstly, psychedelic substance use may affect political views and, second and most importantly, that depression (which is, of course, related to general happiness) may correlate with authoritative views. This is, naturally, only if these two effects were in any way related to each other, as it is not impossible that they were both independent consequences. Like so often in the field of psycho-emotional factors and radicalism, more research is needed to provide clarity in the question. Nonetheless, it is, without a doubt, a study worth mentioning.
Other important aspects
One important thing to remember when investigating happiness and radicalism is people’s
capabilities of being conscious of and putting words to their feelings, something highly relevant
to the forming of this thesis’ hypothesis.
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It is not obvious that all people with precision can evaluate their own state of mind. If one looks at sex, for example, previous research shows that men and women, generally speaking, have entirely different ways of expressing their feelings. While women are less reluctant to show themselves vulnerable, thereby facilitating the demonstration of feelings such as shame, fear, and sadness, men are much more so, tending to demonstrate more feelings that reflect a sense of power, such as pride and anger, at least when it comes to more aggressive manifestations of the latter (Timmers, et al., 1998).
Also relevant to the expression of feelings is religiously reinforced stigma towards mental illness, something that presents a worldwide obstacle for effective treatment (Peteet, 2019). The most damaging form of this stigma comes from fundamental beliefs, with higher levels of religious fundamentalism being associated with greater preference for religious rather than psychological help seeking (Wamser, et al., 2011). Using religious rather than psychological
“diagnosing” in this way may, at times, lead to things such as depression being seen as a lack of faith, psychosis being seen as possession, and disability being seen as punishment, among other things (Peteet, 2019).
There is also some evidence that people with authoritarian views have more difficulties with the acceptance and expression of inner feelings (Duriez, et al., 2012).
All of the above regarding people’s abilities to put words to their feelings tell of something important to keep in mind, namely that it is hard to fully trust individuals’ assessments of their
own psycho-emotional well-being. This is something research in the current field has to takeaccount of, especially studies measuring subjective factors, such as life satisfaction, subjective happiness, et cetera.
Just like in the case of defining happiness, in the case of measuring it, it is something science ought to continue doing regardless of the awkwardness in doing so. However, one should keep in mind that radicals and men – and especially radical men – may have the inherent source of error of overestimating positive feelings such as happiness and well-being while underestimating negative feelings such as depression, anxiety, self-uncertainty, et cetera.
Another aspect important to mention in order to grasp the full complexity of the field is that of
culture. Regarding this factor it has been found that characteristics such as fatalistic beliefs,
rigid gender roles, and cultural tightness correlate with an increased frequency of terrorist
attacks, as well as fatalities caused by them (Gelfand, et al., 2013).
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On the individual level, culture may play an indirect roll in the formation of radical opinion through its effect on psychological well-being. An example of this is how a sense of self- uncertainty in some cases drives individuals towards self-comparison with other people, and how cultural properties influence this comparison. In so called honour cultures (i.e., Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, North African), for example, people usually tend to compare
“upwards”, partly because of a tendency toward self-criticism and high aspiration. In so called dignity cultures (European, Anglo), however, the comparison tends to be directed downwards, because of a tendency toward self-enhancement. This, in combination with the fact that people in honour cultures are more prone to compare themselves with others in the first place, is telling of why people in honour cultures tend to be more negatively affected by the feeling of self- uncertainty than people in dignity cultures (Harati, et al., 2019).
Another way through which culture affects the psychological well-being of individuals is how the values of these individuals matches that of the wider society, with previous studies showing how being an allocentric in an individualist culture or being an idiocentric in a collectivist culture is correlated with poor psychological health, and even psychiatric disorders (Caldwell- Harris & Aycicegi, 2006).
Lastly, it is worth mentioning in-group bias’s negative effect on well-being (as opposed to its above-mentioned positive effects through increased self-esteem), something that presumably exists because of its ability to draw out emotions such as hostility, anger, and anxiety towards out-group members. In-group bias is, in turn, more prevalent in collectivist cultures than in individualist ones (Jasielska, et al., 2018).
Conclusion
To conclude this section, one may deduce that there are many potential psycho-emotional precursors to forming radical opinion. Just like in the case of violent terrorism (Kruglanski &
Fishman, 2009), it is reasonable to believe that no one single factor is sufficient to produce a radical, or more specifically, an extremist. Instead, it is more plausible that a combination of above and other, previously unknown, factors may work as contributing factors, effective at producing radicalization under certain circumstances.
When it comes to the element of perceived happiness specifically, it is, like previously stated,
relatively underexplored. In addition to this, the research seems to point in different directions
depending on what kind of radicalism one investigates and how one measures it. Important to
note regarding what may seem like contradictory knowledge on populism – which has been
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found to correlate negatively with happiness – and extremism – which has been found to correlate positively with happiness (although keep in mind the questionable definition of
“extremism” in the sources references in these cases) – is that these need not, necessarily, be conflicting. It is not impossible to imagine, for example, that unhappiness may lead one into the path of radicalism and that this path then soothes this unhappiness by providing a sense of clarity and structure. The fact that simply voting for a right-wing populist party is less radical than joining a straight-forward neo-Nazi organization provokes the idea that the relationship between happiness and radicalism may work like an outdrawn process for the people subscribing to these ideologies. Perhaps the results on populism and happiness indicate that it is, to a higher degree, unhappy people who gravitate towards radical ideas, while the research on extremism and happiness indicate that only a certain level of conviction and radicalism is able to provide the benefits of certainty, structure, closure, et cetera, that lead to increased happiness. In this sense, the results of above referred to studies need not be contradictory at all.
As a matter of fact, they present an opening for continued research on the subject, where one might investigate this potential, gradual path towards extremism and why only some follow through. However, this is, of course, only speculation. Nonetheless, it is speculation based on the research accounted for in this section. While this thesis does not investigate this hypothetical path, it is still worth keeping in mind in the formation of the hypothesis.
Hypothesis
Theory
Drawing on previous research, it seems safe to say that the relationship between happiness and religious extremism is probably rather complicated. Hence, whether happiness is positively or negatively associated with religious extremism – if indeed at all – is hard to predict. However, using as ground the work already done in the field, three equally probable hypotheses may be formulated. These are as follows:
H0 = Subjective happiness and religious extremism have no association H1 = Subjective happiness and religious extremism have a negative association
H2 = Subjective happiness and religious extremism have a positive association
Regarding H
0, it would, if proven true, provide evidence to show that religious extremism has
nothing to do with subjective happiness. However, due to authoritarianism (which is a property
related to religious extremism) correlating with difficulties accepting and expressing inner
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feelings, and due to religious fundamentalism correlating with stigma towards mental illness, one should look at a result supporting this hypothesis sceptically, since religious extremists may have a particular difficulty expressing negative affect. If H
0is proven correct, one should hence only draw the conclusion that religious extremism does not have a positive association with happiness, as it may still, in reality, have a negative association with it, with this potential relation covered up by the subjects’ inabilities to express unhappiness.
Regarding H
1, having it proven would provide support to the notion that religious extremists are generally less happy than people who are not religiously extreme. Since religious extremists’ potential difficulties expressing negative affect can only cause the source of error of their overestimating their happiness, having H
1proven would provide robust support that religious extremism has a negative association with subjective happiness.
Regarding H
2, if this is proven true, it would not provide clear evidence for anything, since
there is no way of knowing how grave the over estimation of one’s happiness is of the religious
extremists included in the study. In theory, if H
2is provided support, it is not impossible, then,
that the heightened sense of happiness experienced by these people could be entirely due to
their diminished abilities to recognize and accept negative affect. Because of this, support for
H
2is deemed rather limited in the sense of providing clarity in the matter of happiness and
religious extremism. That does not, however, mean that support for H
2is deemed entirely
useless. What support for H
2would mean, is that either religious extremism does correlate with
an increased sense of subjective happiness, or else do religious extremists have a particularly
hard time accepting and expressing negative affect. This opens up for future research where
clarity in the question may be pursued. Whatever of these two conclusions may be correct, they
would both provide guidance as to how societies may better handle the problem of religious
extremism. If religious extremism does correlate with an actual sense of heightened happiness,
future research should find out why as to more efficiently be able to provide alternative routes
to this increased sense of happiness. If, on the other hand, religious extremism only correlates
with happiness due to difficulty expressing negative affect, this would provide evidence of the
possibility that increasing people’s ability to accept and share their inner feelings may be a
potent tool in order to decrease individuals’ propensity to seek out religious extremism. Finding
support for H
2would be the first step in this increased understanding of religious extremism.
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Models
Models can only be constructed for H
1and H
2. Important to note is that these models take no regard of the difficulties expressing negative affect potentially inherent to religious extremism.
The models thereby assume complete honesty and introspection among subjects.
Regarding H
1(subjective happiness and religious extremism have a negative correlation), the causality may work in either direction. It is, then, equally plausible that unhappiness works as a precursor to religious extremism as it is that religious extremism works as a precursor to unhappiness. In the former instance, this may be the case due to unhappiness giving rise to the desire for radical change, as has been hypothesized by Nowakowski (2020). In the latter instance, this may be the case due to feelings of not being able to live up to the standards propagated by one’s religiously extremist convictions, causing a significance loss due to feelings of alienation, humiliation, ostracism, and the potential trauma caused by these experiences. It may also be due to religiously extreme groups’ functioning as particularly collectivist sub-cultures, causing its members to feel more salient feelings of hostility, anger, and anxiety towards out-group members. Important to note is that the correlation may work in both directions simultaneously, creating a de facto cycle (or spiral) of continuous radicalization and reduction of happiness, with both processes repeatedly affecting each other.
Only the cyclic model is demonstrated below. This is because the other two models (i.e.,
happiness leading to religious extremism and religious extremism leading to happiness) not
only form parts of this cyclic model, but also make up the entirety of it. One should, however,
be aware that there is no reason to believe that the cyclic model is more credible than any of its
parts functioning independently without the existence of its counterpart. The cyclic model of
H
1looks as follows:
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Regarding H
2(subjective happiness and religious extremism have a positive correlation), the causality is a little more complicated. In previous research (see above), when extremism has been found to correlate positively with increased happiness, the conclusion has been drawn that it must have been the extremism that provided the increased sense of happiness through its providing a sense of certainty, closure, structure, et cetera. This conclusion makes intuitive sense, like previously argued, since if one imagines the happiest person in the world, it seems unlikely that he/she would need to seek out extreme ideology since he/she is already so magnificently happy in the world as it is. The deduction has thereby been made that the causality must have gone from extremism to happiness.
This intuitive deduction makes sense as long as happiness and extremism are increasing. But what about decreased happiness? Is it impossible that a lowered sense of happiness could contribute to diminished extremism (which would mean a positive correlation where the causality goes from happiness to extremism)? Although most research seems to point to the conclusion that multiple factors contributing to decreased happiness – and indeed decreased happiness directly – increase the level of radicalism, it is not impossible to imagine that this only holds true as long as the happiness level does not sink too low. It is, in other words, not unimaginable that unhappiness may contribute to radicalization only until a certain level of
Feelings of not fulfilling rigid expectations of
religiously extreme ideology/group (intermediate variable)
Desire for radical change (intermediate
variable)
Religious extremism Happiness
Hostility, anger, and anxiety toward out- group members due to
in-group bias (intermediate variable)
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unhappiness is reached, at which point individuals might lose their sense of radicalism due to apathy caused by this immense sense of unhappiness. This is, of course, only speculation, but it opens a dilemma as the causality going from happiness to religious extremism in the case of a positive correlation between the two, previously deemed unrealistic, suddenly becomes an option under certain circumstances. However, since these gravely unhappy people are likely outliers not representative of the general relationship between happiness and religious extremism, they are not taken into account in the construction of the model. It is therefore assumed that if subjective happiness and religious extremism have a positive correlation, it is religious extremism that acts independent variable, while subjective happiness acts dependent variable. That the causality could go this way does not contradict previous studies, once again due to extremism’s capabilities of, perhaps among others, providing structure, certainty, and closure, as well as self-esteem trough in-group bias. The model of H
2looks as follows:
Important enough to be mentioned again is the potential source of error of religious extremists struggling to recognize and report negative affect. Because of this, the only model proven valid through support for its hypothesis is the model of H
1. In the case of H
2(and, indeed, the case of H
0, although not having a model of its own), on the other hand, any eventual results providing support for its model should be viewed sceptically. See subsection “Theory for elaboration.
Regarding both models, important to keep in mind is the possibility that there may be other, previously unknown factors through which happiness and religious extremism interact with one another. This includes the possibility that they may have a direct interaction, affecting each
Self-esteem through in- group bias (intermediate
variable) Sense of certainty, structure, and closure (intermediate variable)
Religious extremism Happiness
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other, at least partly, even without the existence of intermediate variables. Although these factors and interactions are nothing but hypothetical, and indeed entirely absent in previous studies on happiness and restrictive radicalism, it is nonetheless important to bear in mind that above-mentioned models may not represent the entire complexity of the relation, but merely the aspects known to science at this point in time.
Method
This study employs quantitative tests of association, using both ordinal (ordered, categorical) and nominal (unordered, categorical) data to find the answers to its research question. Although it uses several, distinct cases in its procedure, the experiment does not form part of a comparative study. The inclusion of several cases (to be specific, geo-cultural zones (see below)) is only in the purpose of generalisation and attaining robustness for the results.
Important to note is that the method employed in this study does not investigate causality, but merely association, since causality, due to the complexity of the relation between happiness and restrictive radicalism, is hard to establish through quantitative methods. Also important to note is that this thesis does not investigate the full complexity of the potential relation between happiness and religious extremism as described in above-mentioned models. Instead, once again, it is merely whether there is an association at all that is of interest to this thesis, since clarity of this alone would provide new knowledge to field. Whatever factors may play their part in this eventual association is, hence, left to future studies.
Data
The data used to perform the experiment is the first release of the seventh wave of the World
Values Survey. The countries included form parts of three different geo-cultural zones, namely
the Islamic Middle Eastern and North African world (here-on referred to as IMENA), the Latin
American world, and the Anglo-Saxon world. From IMENA, the countries included are Iran,
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Egypt. From the Latin American world, the countries
included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Peru, and Puerto Rico. From the Anglo-Saxon world, the countries included are
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America. The reason these particular countries
are included is because the aim is to include as many countries as possible from each geo-
cultural zones (so as to obtain a dataset as large as possible), and because these are the only
countries of each geo-cultural zone that the survey has completed, with the current wave still
under construction (World Values Survey Association, 2020).
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