The imitation game
An analysis of Russian and Anglo-Saxon strategic narratives in connection to military intervention abroad
By: Frida Granath
Supervisor: Ann-Mari Sätre
Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES) Master's thesis 30hp
Submitted: 21/5 2021
Abstract
This study focuses on the similarities and differences between Russian and Anglo-Saxon strategic narratives in relation to the interventions in Syria 2015 and Libya 2011. The aim is to investigate the imitation theory further as it has been described by Krastev and Holmes (2019) and if it is possible to claim that the Russian regime has used imitated strategic narratives from the United States and the United Kingdom as a soft power tool in the Syrian intervention. By using narrative analysis, 12 speeches made by Putin, Medvedev, Lavrov, Camron, and Obama have been
analyzed in order to find similarities and differences between Anglo-Saxon and Russian strategic narratives in connection to interventions in countries affected by the Arabic Spring. The results show indication of imitation from the Russian side regarding themes such as the United Nations and people’s right to choose their own governance.
Keywords: imitation theory, strategic narratives, soft power, military intervention, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Libya, Syria.
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 1
Research questions ... 2
Russian foreign policy transformation since 2007 ... 2
International factors for Russia’s change in foreign policy ... 3
Domestic factors for Russia’s change in foreign policy ... 5
Imitation theory ... 7
Method, and materials ... 11
Epistemology ... 11
Narrative analysis ... 12
Materials ... 17
Timespan ... 20
Analysis ... 21
The United States and The United Kingdom ... 21
The intervention in Libya ... 21
Cameron’ first speech ... 22
Cameron’s second speech ... 24
Cameron’s third speech ... 25
Obama's first speech ... 26
Obama's second speech ... 28
Obama's third speech ... 31
Russia ... 34
The Russian intervention in Syria ... 34
Putin’s first speech ... 34
Putin’s second speech ... 37
Medvedev’s speech ... 40
Lavrov first speech ... 43
Lavrov’s second speech ... 45
Lavrov’s third speech ... 47
Results ... 49
Conclusion ... 53
List of references ... 55
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Introduction
“A prudent man will always try to follow in the footsteps of great men and imitate those who have been truly outstanding, so that, if he is not quite as skillful as they, at least some of their ability may rub off on him.” (Machiavelli, 1995, p.18)
The quote above was written by Machiavelli in his now classical book The Prince, and even if it is now over 500 years old, the interest in imitation and how it is used to gain political influence is still a subject open for discussion. In 2019, for example, Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes came out with a book called The Light that Failed, in which they claim that one reason for the anti- liberal movements in former socialist and communistic states are connected to the fact that we are living in the Age of Imitation which started at the end of the Cold War. Instead of trying to find a democracy that was fitted for post-planned economy states, the countries just imitated already existing western democracies, something that we now, 30 years later, can see the consequences of. (Krastev & Holmes, 2019, p.75)
One country in particular that Krastev and Holmes put focus on in their book is Russia and the Putin regime, and how they have justified their military actions. The authors make the claim that Russia’s political leaders have started to use western narratives from other conflicts in order to justify their own actions, showing examples of the similarity between American narratives in connection to the intervention in Libya and the Russian narratives in connection to the military actions in Syria. Claiming that Putin and his regime are using imitation of western narratives as a way of legitimizing and motivate their own actions.
Their theory is relevant since the understanding of how states motivate their actions, and the relationship between states is essential in international relations. However, Krastev and Holmes's book is popular scientific and does therefore not provide any data for their claims, but their theory is in line with the findings from at least one another scholar named Rotaru (2019), who was able to show similarities between Russian narratives in Ukraine and Western in Kosovo.
Nevertheless, that is just one case, and to be able to say something generalizable more studies are needed.
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This thesis will therefore focus on the imitation theory and Russian imitation of western narratives, but with a focus on Syria. Is it possible that the Russian regime used western
narratives from the intervention in Libya in order to justify their actions in Syria as Krastev and Holmes describe in their aforementioned book (Krastev & Holmes, 2019p.112), or is this possible that the imitation of western narratives in the Ukraine conflict was an isolated event?
Research questions
This thesis will focus on the imitation theory in international relations and if it is possible to see traces of imitation of Anglo-Saxon narratives from the Libyan intervention 2011 in the Russian narratives used in connection to Syria 2015. My hypothesis and questions are therefore as follows:
Hypothesis: The intervention in Syria was an imitation of the West's actions in Libya, in line with Krastev and Holmes's theory.
1. What narratives, images, and imaginaries (worldviews) were deployed by the Russian state in order to legitimize an intervention in the Syrian civil war?
2. To what extent did the narratives used by the Russian state in order to legitimize an intervention in the Syrian civil war match with the ones used by the West to legitimize the intervention in Libya?
Russian foreign policy transformation since 2007
This thesis will focus on what strategic narratives Russia’s regime used to legitimize their intervention in Syria 2015, if these narratives could be seen as an imitation of the narratives used by the United States and the United Kingdom in connection to the intervention in Libya 2011.In order to fully understand the reason behind the Russian intervention in Syria and why Russian leaders might have used European and American narratives in order to legitimize their actions, a background regarding Russia's foreign policy is needed. In this part of the text, I will further analyze what has happened with Russia's foreign policy since 2007 and what domestic and international changes can be seen as reasons behind this shift.
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In February 2007, Vladimir Putin held a now-famous speech in Munich, that would change Russia's relations with Western countries and Western countries' relationship with Russia forever.
In the speech, he made several accusations towards the United States and European countries for what he saw as misuse of power and hypocrisy. Putin made clear that Russia would no longer be passive in the international arena and would from now on start to protect their own interests abroad. In his concluding remarks, Putin said the following:
We very often – and personally, I very often – hear appeals by our partners, including our
European partners, to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs.
In connection with this, I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to do so. Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy (Kremlin.ru, 2007).
A year later, the war in Georgia broke out (2008), followed by the war in Eastern Ukraine (2014), the annexation of Crimea (2014), and the Russian intervention in Syria (2015).
However, it was not only the speech in 2007 that was the reason behind Russia's new foreign policy, even if it is possible to view it as a starting point. During the years before and after, many things changed in the international arena that might also have an important effect on the Russian regime and their policy choices. In the section below, I will look further into different
explanations of what happened in the international arena and how one can understand the Russian regime's reaction to it.
International factors for Russia’s change in foreign policy
During the period 2000-2013, many former Soviet republics started to distance themselves from Russia, and some of them even joined NATO and the European Union. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are, for example, three cases of former Soviet republics that went from communism to democracy and membership in both NATO and the European Union in less than fifteen years after the Soviet Union collapsed. This democratic development was, however, not something that was not well received by the Russian regime.
Giles (2018) describes how Russia’s leaders always assume that the West and especially the United States are plotting against them and that Russia, therefore, needs to act before the West
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does. The fact that states like Estonia and Latvia join NATO or the European Union is hence not a sign of the will of the people in these countries. Instead, it is a sophisticated way for the West to gain more influence over former Russian territory, push their borders closer to Moscow and eventually invade Russia. The former Soviet republics are therefore seen as buffer states, and if they fall under western "control," Russia will be easier to invade. The same goes for Syria. If the West helps the opposition to remove Assad from power and get a western friendly government, why would they not do the same in Russia? It is, therefore, better to strike first and secure influence over states than let them fall into Western hands.
The Russian regime's interpretation of the West as an aggressive demagog has made some scholars like Mearsheimer (2014) and Sakwa (2015) to argue that the biggest burden for increasing aggressive behavior from Russia lays on the West, the NATO expansion, and the enlargement of the European Union. With NATO and the EU starting to knock at Russia’s borders offering memberships and close cooperation to both Georgia and Ukraine, Russia had to act in order to save its security and sovereignty.
This is something that Allison (2015) and Bukkvoll (2016) oppose. They both admit that the NATO expansion and the EU enlargement might have been triggering factors for Russia but that the Russian government might have intervened in any case. The Russian government, for
example, has always seen Ukraine as a part of the country, and therefore wanting it back already when the USSR collapsed, so the "aggressive West" might just have been a pretext for the war and not the real reason behind the action. Way (2015) also mentions the fact that the Putin regime has always supported autocracy and that the interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria might therefore have happened even if the democratic movements in these countries did not have support from the West. Russia is, for example, endorsing autocracy in many Central Asian states as well, even if they are never likely to join NATO or the EU.
If the threat from the West is just a pretext in order to find legitimization for their own actions, then another explanation is needed to understand why Russia choose to intervene in Ukraine and Syria. That explanation might have less to do with events in the international arena as one first thinks. Russia's more aggressive behavior in international relations might also be connected to
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domestic factors such as the elections in 2011-2012. In the next section, I will further describe what happened during these years and why it is important to understand Russia's foreign policy transformation.
Domestic factors for Russia’s change in foreign policy
During the years 2008-2011, Russia had been ruled by President Dimitri Medvedev, and Vladimir Putin had had the role of prime minister in Medvedev's government. During the years with Medvedev in office, many hoped that Russia would move in a more liberal direction. Hence Medvedev was promoting the country’s economic modernization and political liberalization before he was elected, something that gave rise to great expectations among the people. However, the values that Medvedev promoted never became policy, and with the elections at the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012, it has been argued that Russia moved in an even more authoritarian direction. (Gel’man 2013 p.5).
Many scholars have defined Russia’s regime as a case of electoral authoritarianism. This type of authoritarian regime's aim is to keep itself in power and meanwhile keep up the façade of being somewhat democratic to the outside world but also towards the citizens. The problem with the 2011 parliamentary election was that Putin's party "United Russia" did not get a clear majority in the Duma despite all the sophisticated rigging. Instead, they officially ended up at 49.3 percent of the votes, an indicator of the real result being even lower, something that lead to nationwide demonstrations since the people did not trust the vote turnout (Gel'man 2013, p.7). The timing for the demonstrations just three months before the presidential elections in March 2012, but the Russian regime at crossroads, they could continue with the more "light" version of election fraud or tighten the thumbscrews even more and guarantee a great victory for Putin, they choose the latter option. Putin won the election with 63 percent of the votes, according to the official record, and he was ready for a third term as president. (Gel’man 2013, 8-9)
Nevertheless, the victory came with a significant cost because even if the regime had won the election, it was now evident that people did not accept the regime's manipulation. To keep power and win back voters, a new strategy was needed, and that strategy was conservatism. 2012 has therefore been known as the Russian regime's conservative turn, and with the new direction, the
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focus was put on the "traditional values" said to be unique for Russia and the opposition's lack of will to defend these. The goal was to portray Russia as the last bastion for the protection of a
"traditional lifestyle," and the regime started to rail against decadent, atheistic, gay cosmopolitans in the West. (Greene & Robertson, 2017, p.90) (Baar & Solik, 2020, p.180)
This new strategy worked, and Putin's popularity numbers started to rise, and with the
EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and the start of the ongoing separatist war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, the regime gained even more support (Levada Center, 2021). Hence, the events fitted perfectly into the narrative of Russia and its people being brought together by traditional values, a sense of patriotic duty, and encirclement by a hostile West. (Greene & Robertson, 2017, p.91).
Historically former Russian regimes have also used wars and victories as a propaganda tool, the Soviet victory in the second world war probably being the most known one, but also the war in Afghanistan during the '70s and '80s has been seen as a way of redirect the citizens attention from the problems at home and concentrate on the victories in war. (Kalinovsky, A. 2009, p.70). The intervention in Syria could, together with the war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, therefore be a way of giving the people something to celebrate and feel pride in instead of focusing on the problems and the lack of democracy in Russia.
The elections in 2011-2012, the new conservative ideology that came as a result, is therefore probably the biggest reason for the new, more offensive Russian foreign policy. The arguments regarding the "aggressive West" might be one component of the narratives in this new
conservative agenda, but that might have less to do with the actual threat and be more connected to the regime's will to cling on to power.
There is no doubt that these conservative narratives worked in a national context with a more significant victory for Putin in the 2018 presidential election. He won with a 76.7% share of the vote (Roth, 2018). However, is it possible that other narratives were needed in order to convince the rest of the world that the regime was acting in accordance with international law when they intervened in Syria and annexed Crimea? Is it even possible that the Russian regime chose to
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imitate some old successful narratives from western states and reused them in their own
campaigns for the interventions in Syria and Ukraine instead of reinventing the narrative wheel?
There are some indications that this might have been precisely what the Putin regime chose to do, and in the next section, I will further describe the imitation theory in international relations and what indications there are of Russia using this type of strategy in the international arena.
Imitation theory
In international relations research, the assumption that successful states will be copied by less successful has been expressed by several scholars even if few have researched the matter more in-depth. The offensive realism thinker John Mearsheimer wrote, for example in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, that "since the security benefits of hegemony are enormous, powerful states will invariably be tempted to emulate the United States and try to dominate and control their region of the world" (2001.p 213.). The neorealist scholar Kenneth Waltz wrote something similar in his book Theory of International Politics “if some [states] do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside.” (p.118, 1979). In their books, Mearsheimer and Waltz do not look at the subject more thoroughly, though, but one that has done it is Goldsmith.
In the book Imitation in International Relations (2005), Benjamin Goldsmith looks at Russia and Ukraine and tries to find evidence of imitation of the West in their foreign policy. Goldsmith also finds this type of tendency in his study, even if he calls it "learning from other states" rather than imitation or emulation. He also finds that states seem to be more interested in imitating others' successes, than learning from others' failures. (ibid. p.112)
The problem that occurred when the East started to imitate the West and their success was that it led to a feeling of being somehow morally and humanly inferior. The former socialist countries who view themselves as Europeans needed to accept that the West had the right to evaluate if they were copying them good enough via institutions like the European Union and NATO. This evaluation process led to a feeling of lost sovereignty and, in the long run, an authoritarian backlash in the former socialist states, like Poland and Hungary. Since, they got tired of never being "good enough" in the Western eyes. (Krastev and Holmes, 2018, p.118).
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This theory of imitation with regards to the former socialist countries is further described in Krastev and Holmes's book The light that failed from 2019. In the book, they explain how the liberal revolution in Europe and the world failed and what possible reasons there is behind this failure, and they claim that the copying of the West is the biggest reason for the backlash. They write:
“The origins of Central and Eastern European illiberalism are therefore emotional and pre- ideological, rooted in rebellion against the 'humiliation by a thousand cuts' that accompanied a decades-long project requiring acknowledgment that foreign cultures were vastly superior to one's own. Illiberalism in a philosophical sense is a cover story meant to lend a patina of intellectual respectability to a widely shared visceral desire to shake off the 'colonial' dependency; an inferiority implicit in the very project of Westernization.” (ibid, p.75)
What is interesting with Krastev and Holmes's book is that they view Russia as the "odd one out"
in the post-communist countries. Russia, according to them, did not follow the same path as the other former East socialist states. For a brief period in the '90s, it was looking like the country would try to copy the West and implement democracy and market economy, but with the election of Vladimir Putin, this prediction was shown to be false. Instead, he and his government choose a different path, only putting up a Potemkin façade of democracy but, in reality, working to restore Russia's status as a global superpower and a potential regional hegemon. (Krastev and Holmes, 2019, p.89)
After the controversial elections in 2011 and 2011, the Putin regime put down the Potemkin façade towards the rest of the world entirely and stopped acting like they wanted to be like the West. Instead, they discovered the potential of using western narratives in order to legitimize their own foreign policy choices. In connection to the war in Ukraine, they, for example, used narratives similar to the ones used by NATO in Kosovo, referring to independence and people's right to choose to break free from one state and create their own. (ibid p.90). The reason behind this strategy is by Krastev and Holmes described in the following way:
One version of wartime imitation involves […] holding up a mirror in which the enemy can observe the immorality and hypocrisy of its own behavior. Such mirroring is an ironic and aggressive way
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of imitating a rival's objectives and modes of conduct. The aim is to rip off the West's liberal mask and show that the United States, too, contrary to its carefully crafted image, plays in the
international arena according to the rules of the jungle. (p.91)
This type of behavior can, according to Krastev and Holmes, and as mentioned in the quote above, be seen as a form of aggressive imitation. Russia does not want to become like the West or imitate them to get their acceptance as some easter European states have done. Instead, they want the ability to gain the same type of power and influence that some of the Western countries have. They, therefore, act as a distorting mirror of the West, using the same narratives but for actions that the United States and the European Union condemn, and this has, according to Krastev and Holmes's been a successful recipe for creating a narrative that works in order to convince people that Russia is doing the right thing, and if their actions are called unmoral or illegal, they can always respond with reference to something the United States has already done even if the American case only has a few similarities to the Russian (Krastev and Holmes, 2019, p 90-91)
What is important to notice here, though, is that Krastev and Holmes do not present more
evidence for their claims than observations they have made, their book and papers with imitation as a theme are there for only a theoretical framework that would need more empirical evidence.
Rotaru (2019), however, did study the subject more in-depth, and he was able to find many similarities between the Russian regime's narratives around the Crimea annexation and the Western leader's narratives around the NATO intervention in Kosovo 15 years earlier. (Rotaru, 2019, 110) Not because the Putin administration liked the Kosovo intervention but because it was perfect for creating a whataboutism-narrative, if the US could choose to intervene in order to give a part of a country's sovereignty without acceptance from the international community, why could not Russia do the same?
Rotaru (2019) also mentions how this imitated narrative worked as a way of silencing the West and making their criticism less powerful, since they would need to argue against their own statements and believes in the Kosovo case. So, in this case, the imitation also worked as a two- edged sword, because if the West kept quiet, the Russian regime's narrative would win, and if
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they started to criticize, the Russian leaders could easily respond with an accusation of double standards. (ibid 2019, p.11)
One could, of course, argue against the imitation theory in international relations. Goldsmith's method for his project was, for example, quantitative, using interviews with key actors in each country's administration as the independent variable and foreign policy outcome as the
dependent. The problem with this is that it is hard to turn people's life histories and in-depth interviews into numbers, and it is even harder to prove that the same person would bring the same result in a different situation. The statement "if you add a George W Bush as president in a
country with all his life experience and believes you will get a war in Iraq," cannot be proven to be true or false since you cannot test to put him into other contexts or another environment than the exact he was in during 2003.
The same can be said about the politicians in Russia and Ukraine in Goldsmith's study. Of course, their knowledge of and will to copy the West might have been a reason for their policy choices, but it is impossible to prove this with mathematic formulas. The most valuable result from
Goldsmith's book is, therefore, the evidence of imitation, not the method he used to find who was most likely to copy.
Krastev and Holmes (2019) have interesting theories regarding imitation in the international arena, especially with relation to Russia and the comparison they make between Russia's intervention in Syria and the West's intervention in Libya. They, for example, write that:
American support for the 2010-12 Arab Spring and especially the NATO-led military intervention in Libya confirmed the Kremlin's darkest fears that the United States is a revolutionary power with which Putin's Russia could not peaceably coexist. The path it chose was surprising, however. To subvert Western hegemony, Russia did not abandon but refashioned, redirected and weaponized its strategy of imitating the West. (p.112)
However, the problem, as mentioned above, is that they have not made an in-depth study of any of the narratives regarding the Russian interventions in order to support their claims. Even if they are famous political scientists with a long experience in the field and even if they can see that the
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narratives are similar by just reading them, they do not have a traditional study to back up their claims, something that makes it hard to reject or confirm their findings.
Rotaru’s (2019) findings are in line with the imitation theory, and he has done a traditional study of the subject which has been published as a peer review article, but he has only studied the narratives in one case, the Russian annexation of Crimea. To be able to confirm or reject that the Russian regime actually is mimicking the West, more studies are needed, considering that it is still possible that the similarities are just a coincidence.
Especially since Goldsmith's study is a bit outdated and based on a method that is hard to replicate, Krastev and Holmes examples and theories are interesting, but hence their book is popular scientific it is hard to make any definitive conclusions for their observations and Rotaru’s findings are interesting and based on a good scientific method, but it is just based on one case.
My thesis about Russia’s intervention in Syria, and the narrative connected to it, can therefore give a deeper understanding of the imitation theory, if it is a useful but a bit forgotten tool in the international theories toolbox, and if Russia really is an aggressive imitator, or if there has been something else going on in the creation of Russian narratives connected to their interventions that other scholars have missed.
Method, and materials
When it comes to the choice of method for a thesis, there is a lot of different things one needs to take into account. What is the goal of my study? Is it to describe or to explain? How many sources will I use, and how can I analyze them as transparently as possible? What potential problems are connected with my choice of method, and what type of risks are connected to it? Is it possible that an essential aspect of the subject studied will not be covered with the method I first planned to use, etc.? In this chapter, I will further describe how I have answered these questions and illustrate how this study will be conducted.
Epistemology
The first thing to cover in a study, though, is which epistemological standpoint one will follow, and in this case, I will use interpretivism or antipositivism as my epistemological standpoint. My
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claim is, therefore, that no science is entirely objective, and my aim is, therefore, to understand rather than to explain. My focus will hence be on the how and not on the why. (Bryman 2012, pp.28). The reason for my choice can best be understood by a quote from Bryman (2012) where he describes interpretivism:
"It is predicated upon the view that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action." (p.30).
This means that I see the positivistic epistemology as a bit too influenced by the natural sciences, it would, of course, be possible to count words in this case and see how frequently they appear in the speeches analyzed, but that would not give an understanding of the context and the metaphors that are used by the politicians.
Human speech is therefore hard to convert into numbers, and instead of trying to fit a round lid on a square-shaped box, I will have an epistemological standpoint that I see as more fitting in order to understand human interaction and nature. This, however, does not mean that my study will lack a precise method or that I will not describe how I analyze the speeches. Instead, it means that I need to be extra transparent regarding every text interpretation how I come to every conclusion. Otherwise, my research would not be useful nor trustworthy (Bryman 2012, pp.47).
In order to be able to do this, a method is needed, and in the next section, I will describe my method and how I will use it.
Narrative analysis
The speeches I will analyze cannot just be read and then described by me as a researcher. Instead, this process needs to have a transparent and coherent structure. Hence, I need to use a method that makes it possible to structure and compare different texts in order to make my findings as valid as possible. In this thesis, I will therefore use narrative analysis as a method. When one thinks of narratives, it is easy to assume that it is only related to personal stories and a method mainly used when analyzing interviews with people or focus groups, but narrative analysis can be used when one wants to analyze written texts and speeches as well. (Bryman, 2012 p.584).
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Something that makes narrative analysis extra interesting is that it put focus from 'what actually happened?’ to ‘how do people make sense of what happened?'. (ibid. p.582) That is an important aspect of my research in this study, I will not try to cover what "actually" happened in Syria or Libya. Instead, I will further examine how politicians verbally reacted to these events in speeches and how they legitimize their own actions in relation to these events.
Another aspect of narrative analysis is that it provides the option to analyze texts more in-depth.
Instead of just focus on the words written or said, a researcher can look further into how actors choose to frame different themes, how the text is structured, and what contextual nuances there might be. Because the same statement can mean something different depending on which actor says it, in which context it is said, and the time period it is stated. If the United States president would, for example, declare war on Germany in 2021 with the same words used in December 1941, this would, even if the words are the same, mean something completely different in another context. Therefore, it is essential to be able to look at more parameters than just words.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, I also want my study to add more to the understanding of imitation in international relations, and since the latest study of Russian narratives in comparison with Western is Rotaru's from 2019 and hence he based his study on a narrative analysis, my choice to use narrative analysis will give the possibility to add one more case to the
understanding of Russian narrative imitation, something that hopefully can reject or confirm his findings.
However, there are many variants of narrative analysis, and they differ depending on the study's assumptions, its scientific premises, the definition of the term 'narrative,' and if the narrative is used as a method or as an analytical tool. Every study that uses narrative analysis must therefore choose a definition of the “word narrative," which is defined on whether the narrative is an object of analysis or a method or both. For example, a narrative analysis can describe 'what' and 'how,' meaning either a story with beginning, action and end or a discourse expressed by the actor’s studied (Robertson, 2017, p. 221).
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In this study, narratives will be both an object of analysis and method. Since I will analyze politicians' narratives in speeches in order to understand how they motivate intervention abroad, but I will also use narrative analysis as a method, when it comes to the "what" and "how" my study will focus on the "how" meaning that I will study different discourses and not compare how the politicians structure their speeches and if there is a similarity in this structure.
In order to study narratives, a structure is, as mentioned before, needed and in this thesis, I will use a framework for narrative analysis invented by Roselle, Miskimmon, and O'Loughlin. (2014).
In their research, they have focused on strategic narratives, meaning the narratives states use as a soft power tool to convince citizens and politicians in their own, but also in other states, that they are acting just, according to the international law and in line with sound moral principles. Before describing strategic narratives more in-depth, a definition of soft power is needed. Since strategic narratives are a type of soft power "weapon."
Soft power as a term was first described by Joseph Nye in a book called Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power published in 1990, and in that book, he writes the following about soft power:
When one country gets other countries to want what it wants might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants" (p.166).
This means that soft power is making other states wanting the same as you, without using military force. Roselle et al. (2014), on their hand, describes soft power in the following way:
If people believe, for example, that the promotion and protection of human rights are essential, desirable, and right or proper, it is more difficult to legitimize actions perceived to be in conflict with that consensus." (p. 72).
Soft power is, therefore, a way to gain the privilege of setting the standards of what is morally right and wrong in the international arena without using hard force. A historical example of a soft power campaign could, for example, be the cold war, where the Soviet Union and the United States tried to convince the world that their own political system was the morally and
economically superior one.
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How do you get someone to want the same thing as you do or convince them that your
interpretation of the world is the right one? What can a soft power "weapon" be in more concrete terms? According to Roselle et al. (2014), strategic narratives are one of the tools a state can use in order to gain influence since they provide a way of telling the story of what the world looks like and how it should develop. (p. 74). Different states use different tactics for their strategic narratives, and in the case of Russia, a strategic narrative regarding the United States could, for example, be "the morally deprived west" and for American strategic narratives regarding Russia could, for example, focused on "the violation of sovereign Ukrainian territory."
Although examples are a good way of describing a phenomenon, a clear structure is needed in order to analyze them. Roselle et al. (2014) do provide a structure with four criteria one can use in order to understand and analyze strategic narratives, and they are character/actors,
setting/environment/space, conflict or action, and resolution or suggested resolution. This is the structure I will use, and in the section below, I will describe each criterion more in-depth:
1. Character or actors. Actors are those who have agency and are depicted as necessary to the narrative. States, non-state actors, great powers, natural powers, rogue states, terrorists, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), and MNCs (multinational corporations), etc. In the case of Russia in Syria and the West in Libya, actors can, for example, be the governments in each state, the UN, the terrorist, the people in Libya or Syria, etc.
2. Setting/environment/space. What constitutes the stage? Where is action taking place? In terms of international relations and foreign policy, setting refers to how the international system is described and how it is said to work. What makes the intervention in
Syria/Libya right or wrong? What factors and events motivate an intervention, and which does not? What international treaties are referred to, and what part have Russia/the West to play in this environment?
3. Conflict or action. Who does what to who or what, and what reactions and interactions follow from that? This criterion highlights the importance of temporality – as narratives are quite often structured to address past, present, and future. This may also point to the identification of perceived dangers and by whom and how this danger should be
confronted. It is also related to setting/environment. How is the friend or foe? Who are in
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danger, the people or the regime? Is it terrorists that are the main threat, or is it the government? What will happen if we do not act?
4. Resolution or suggested resolution, meaning the presentation of action to resolve a conflict or disruption to the status quo. A bombing of strategic places is necessary to save human rights in Libya, or the Assad regime needs to be protected; hence the option is chaos. (Roselle et al., 2014:75-76)
A historical example of a successful strategic narrative is, for example, the American "war on terror." After the 9/11 attacks, the American government managed to convince the world of a clear enemy, the "terrorist" or the "Talibans" (actors), the liberal world in danger (setting), the Talibans are gaining influence in Afghanistan, and this is a danger to the world as we know it (conflict/action), we need to invade Afghanistan to protect our way of living and defeat the terrorists (resolution).
With that said, this thesis focus is not on the American war on terror but the Russian intervention in Syria and the possibility to find traces of imitation between western speeches regarding Libya and Russian speeches regarding Syria, and if one can draw the conclusion that Russia’s regime uses imitated western strategic narratives as a soft power tool against the West. Therefore, all speech analyzed will be in English since I want to investigate further if the speeches transcribed to English and published on the official government webpages have narratives similar to the ones used by Western politicians and if they, therefore, might be aimed at an audience in the West more than the population in Russia.
Another reason for my choice of sources is that my Russian language skills are not that proficient, and therefore I will not be able to look at speeches made in Russian that are more directed to the Russian population. This is, however, not a significant problem in this case since I want to study narratives aimed at a non-Russian audience. However, in a larger study and with better language skills, it would be possible to compare narratives used "inside Russia in Russian"
and "outside Russia narratives" and see if there are differences.
In conclusion, I will use transcribed speeches and analyzed them with the help of Roselle et al.'s (2014) four criteria, and in order to make it more transparent and systematic, I will use a coding schedule (see figure 1). In this schedule, I will, with a couple of sentences, summarize the main
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narratives for each criterion in every speech. This schedule will, however, not be the complete analysis of each speech. I will also provide an in-depth analysis of each speech with quotes in my analysis chapter.
Coding schedule
Narrative analysis Text 1 Text 2 Text 3 Text 4 Text 5
Character or actors
Setting/environment/space Conflict or action
Resolution or suggested resolution
Figure 1
Materials
In order to use my method, materials are needed to make the analysis possible. In this thesis, I will use official and transcribed speeches made by Obama, Camron, Putin, Medvedev, and Lavrov. All speeches have been collected as transcripts from each politician's administration's official webpage. The reason for the choice of texts is that I want to be able to compare strategic narratives from both Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom since the sources from each country need to be as similar as possible. By using the same type of sources from the same type of web pages, the similarity will be more significant, compared with interviews made by journalists, for example. When a person is interviewed in a newspaper or on television, there is always a risk that the journalist tries to create his or her own narrative by leaving some questions and answers from the final edited version or deliberately ask questions with a particular political angle. By only using speeches as analyze objects, this risk disappears.
In the case of Russia, I will analyze two speeches made by Putin, one made by Medvedev and three made by Lavrov. The first speech by Putin was held on the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, the 22 of September 2015, and the second one was held at the Valdai International Discussion Club, the 22 of October 2015. Both speeches were collected as transcripts from the
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president’s official webpage (kreml.ru). The speech made by Medvedev was held at the Munich Security Conference, the 13 of February 2016. This speech was collected as a transcript from the Russian government's official webpage (government.ru). The first speech by Lavrov was held on the 30 of September 2015 at a UN Security Council meeting in New York, the second one was held at the Mediterranean Dialogues Conference, Rome, the 11 of December 2015, and the third one was held the 1 of March 2015 at the 31st session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. All Lavrov’s speeches were collected as transcripts from the foreign ministry official webpage (mid.ru)
What is essential to notice with the Russian speeches is that they do not only contain policy regarding Syria. They are instead focusing on a variety of different international policy areas, covering everything from trade to nuclear treaties. The reason why they were selected is the lack of speeches only focusing on Syria. The small number of English speeches on the official web pages during the timeframe I have chosen is also the reason behind the decision of including Medvedev and Lavrov in the analysis and not only Putin. In order to have the same amount of text from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, this was also necessary, and hence they were and are in the same government, the line of argumentation will most likely be similar.
Another factor that is important is that these six speeches were the ones that could be found on the government webpages during the timespan I will be looking at, so for that period, I will be analyzing all longer speeches Putin, Lavrov, and Medvedev made with reference to Syria.
In the case of the United States, I have picked three speeches on the Libyan theme made by Obama, the first made in the White House on the 23 of February 2011, the second one was held in the White House on the 18 of March 2011, and the third one was held at the National Defense University, Washington, DC on the 28 of March 2011. All speeches were held during or indirect connection to the interventions in Libya reflecting the timespan for the Russian speeches in connection to Syria and were collected as transcripts from the Obama administration's official webpage (obamawhitehouse.archives.gov)
In this thesis, I have also chosen to include three speeches made by David Cameron, who was the prime minister in the United Kingdom during the period of the intervention in Libya. The first
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one was held to the House of Commons on the 28 of February 2011, the second one held outside Downing Street on the 19 of March 2011, and the third one held to the British Parliament on the 21 of March 2011. All speeches were collected as transcripts from the British government’s official webpage (gov. the UK)
The inclusion of the United Kingdom in this thesis is motivated by the fact that the world is no longer as bipolar. Therefore, more actors need to be taken into account than only Russia and the United States when looking at different global events. The UK is, therefore, a suitable actor to include. Since they are one of the United States' key allies and a permanent member of the UN security council.
The reason for my choice is also based on the fact that Russian leaders quite often use vague formulations such as "the West" or "the winners of the cold war." These formulations are often assumed to be a reference to the United States, but there are more Western countries and more powers on the international arena now, and to avoid falling into the old Cold War dichotomy, I think it is wise to compare Russian narratives with a broader number of western leaders than just the president of the United States.
The inclusion of a third country is also a good way of adding something that in statistical studies is called a "control variable." The similarities to the United States, if it is found, could still be coincidence and not a pattern, but by adding one more Western country and see if the same type of narratives can be found there or not, the likelihood of the findings being correct is more significant. What is important to notice here, though, is that this is still not a statistical study, and hence this is not a control variable in the classical sense, but it can still give an indication of the connection is found of what type of narratives the Russian politicians tend to imitate, it could for example also indicate that they prefer to imitate narratives form just one Western country. My aim is, as mentioned before, also to add one more case to Rotaru's (2019) findings, and since he analyzes narratives from more western countries than the United States, my choice to include the United Kingdom will make my findings more comparable to his (ibid, p.109).
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However, it would, of course, been even more ideal to analyze speeches from more western leaders than just two. With speeches from Merkel and Sarkozy, the number of strategic narratives would probably be more extensive, and the results would have been even more solid.
Unfortunately, the time and space are limited in this type of study, and therefore I choose only to include two Western politicians, that have made their speeches in a language that I can
understand fluently. During more ideal conditions, it would, of course, be better to add more politicians and cases but with this limitation, I will still be able to say something about Russian imitation of strategic narratives from the Anglo-Saxon world.
Timespan
For my analysis of the narratives connected to the Russian intervention in Syria, I will study speeches from the period 1 of January 2015 to the 14 of March 2016. The choice of timespan is based on the fact that before 2015 the Russian regime had been quite reluctant to an intervention in Syria, and the low interest in Syria is also shown in the low frequency in the references to the country in the years
before 2015 in the 10.000 Kremlin publications the Putin decoder has analyzed (see figure 2). The rise in 2015 implies that the campaign for the
intervention started or at least became more active in 2015. Hence the Russian regime started its intervention in September that year
and ended around 2016 with a sharp decline in frequency. The reason for the decline in 2016 is probably connected to that Putin, on the 14 of March 2016, declared that the intervention has largely achieved its objective and started to withdraw Russian troops from Syria (MacFarquhar &
Figure 2
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Barnard, 2016). However, Russia's involvement in Syria did not end in March 2016, as figure 2 also shows in the frequency of the word in 2017 and 2018. Russia is still militarily involved in Syria but to cover all years of the involvement is once again not possible with reference to the time and space limit, and the strategic narrative covered will also be similar to the Western hence the speeches are made in direct connection to the first months of the involvement.
In the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, I have chosen a timeframe in more direct connection to the intervention in Libya stretching from the 23 of February to the 28 of March 2011. The most ideal would have been to use a time frame as large as the Russian one, but that would have ended up in more speeches than what is possible to analyze in a master thesis.
Instead, I decided to only look at speeches just before and right after the intervention. These speeches should, however, cover most of the strategic narratives Obama and Camron used to legitimize the intervention in Libya since they are only focused on Libya and why military action is necessary.
Analysis
All speeches have been sorted by country, person, and time period, from the oldest speech by each person to the most recent. In the case of Russia, the sorting is also based on the hierarchy within the government, so the analysis begins with Putin's speeches, then Medvedev's, and finally Lavrov's.
The United States and The United Kingdom The intervention in Libya
There is more than one version of the NATO invention in Libya and the reasons behind the action. Some claim that it was a perfect example of the R2P system in the United Nations and others that the NATO countries intervened without having accurate information about what was going on in the country. Hence this thesis focus is a comparison between Russian and Western narratives in relation to interventions. I will not try to evaluate what really happened in Libya or what type of interpretations are the most correct. Instead, I will just give a quick resume of the conflict in Libya as it was portrayed in Swedish media.
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In early 2011, two successful, nonviolent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt during the period that would later be called the Arab Spring inspired activists in Libya. In mid-February 2011, the Libyan civilians, therefore, took the streets and started a nonviolent protest against the Libyan leader Qaddafi. Qaddafi and his regime, who had oppressed his people for more than 40 years, responded to the protests by ordering the military to shoot at the protesters and killing thousands of civilians in just three days. This brutal government violence forced the peaceful protesters to take up arms in self-defense and launch a rebellion, and by early March, the rebels controlled half the country. Qaddafi again retaliated with violence and started to bomb and kill civilians, and in ten days, he pushed the rebels back to Benghazi, Libya's second-largest city and the rebel's last stronghold.
There, Qaddafi explicitly threatened to attack civilians and deployed his troops close to the city, and prepared for a mass killing. On the 17 of March 2011, the UN Security Council responded by authorizing Resolution 1973 to implement a no-fly zone over Libya and giving all necessary means except occupation troops to protect Libya's civilians from Qaddafi's forces. On the 19 of March, the United States, together with some of their allies, intervened in Libya, bombing the Qaddafi government strategically important places but avoiding using ground forces. (Ohlsson, 2019, the 5 of May).
Cameron’ first speech
This speech was held in the British Parliament on the 28 of February 2011.
Character or actors
The United Kingdom is portrayed as a country that has taken a leading role in the protection of civilians in Libya.
The Libyan citizens
Colonel Qadhafi’s regime they are the ones responsible for the violence against civilians in Libya.
The UN security council
23 Setting/environment/space.
North Africa and the broader Middle East are now at the epicenter of momentous events. History is sweeping through this region. Libya is now a country in crisis, and it is unsafe. The UK has therefore helped its citizens to leave the country. Nevertheless, the Qaddafi regime is still using military force against the Libyan people, and there is now a risk for a severe humanitarian crisis.
The UK has imposed sanctions on the Libyan regime and is urging Qaddafi to step down. The Libyan people are demanding their human rights, and that is something that they have the right to claim and get. Since what they are demanding is something universal and not "western." What is happening now in the Middle East is a window of opportunity.
Conflict or action.
Even if the UK, together with its allies, has imposed sanctions against Qaddafi and his regime, the violence has not stopped now the UK is "We will look at each and every way of stepping up pressure on this regime'." (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011) The Libyan regime is therefore illegitimate and has lost the consent of its people. The real danger now is a
humanitarian crisis, but there might also be a risk for British citizens if the violence continues. In the broader picture it is also a conflict between dictatorship and democracy, as shown in the following quote :
“but it is not for us to dictate how each country should meet the aspirations of its people, we must not remain silent in our belief that freedom and the rule of law are what best guarantee human progress and economic success. Freedom of expression, a free press, freedom of assembly, the right to demonstrate peacefully: is basic rights. And they are as much the rights of people in Tahrir Square as Trafalgar Square. They are not British or western values - but the values of human beings everywhere.” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011)
Resolution or suggested resolution.
There is now time for action, and it is a window of opportunity. Carmon states that "Of course there have been many disappointments in the past. But those of us who believe in democracy and open societies should be clear: this is a precious moment of opportunity". (Foreign &
Commonwealth Office, 2011) The UK, together with its allies and with the support from the UN, will therefore continue to put pressure on the Qaddafi regime and send humanitarian aid in order
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to prevent a humanitarian crisis. They will also support the people's will to freedom since "they want the same freedom as you have in Brittan."
Cameron’s second speech
This is a shorter speech held on the 19 of March 2011 outside 10 Downing Street, London.
Character or actors
The British forces are taking action over Libya to save the Libyan people.
The United Nations supports the international coalition Brittan is a part of in the Libyan intervention.
Colonel Qadhafi was portrayed as the man responsible for the violence in Libya.
The Libyan citizens are the group Qaddafi is oppressing.
Setting/environment/space.
British forces have now taken action over Libya as a part of an international coalition. They are acting in order to prevent Qaddafi from killing his own people since the ceasefire he spoke about has not been implemented. Instead, he has continued to use military force against the Libyan people. The international coalition the UK is a part of has the backing of the United Nations Security Council and also of the Arab League and many others.
Conflict or action.
Hence this is a shorter speech the conflict is not as straightforward as in the longer speeches.
Nevertheless, it is circling around Qaddafi's murdering of his own people and the international community's reaction to it. Cameron is motivating the legal grounds with the intervention with
"And legal because of the clear mandate provided by the UN Security Council Resolution."
(Cabinet Office, 2011a) to that this military operation the UK is thus just, legal and necessary, showing that there might be political forces in his own country that opposes the UK’s
involvement. He also ends the speech by saying; “But I believe we should all be confident that what we are doing is in a just cause and in our nation’s interest.” (Cabinet Office, 2011a) Once again, trying to convince the listers that they are doing the right thing.
25 Resolution or suggested resolution.
Continue to support the international coalition acting in Libya with military means. Cameron, for example, states that "(…) it is right because we believe we should not stand aside while this dictator murders his own people" (Cabinet Office, 2011a), indicating that the UK will continue the operation until the people in Libya are safe.
Cameron’s third speech
This speech was held on the 21 of March 2011 in the British parliament.
Character or actors
The United Kingdom is portrayed as a protector of human rights and an initiative taker in the protection of the Libyan citizens.
The Libyan citizens the ones being oppressed by Qaddafi.
Qaddafi is portrayed as a dictator who uses violence against his own people in order to stay in power.
The UN is portrayed as the provider of international law and norms.
Setting/environment/space.
Qaddafi has tried to push down peaceful protest for democracy and human rights with violence.
With the support from UN Resolution 1973, the UK, together with its allies, has implemented a no-fly zone over Libya and has bombed Qaddafi's strategic military targets. By doing so, they have prevented a massacre in Benghazi and stopped Qaddafi from bombing his own people.
Cameron justifies the actions in the following way :
“It was necessary, legal, and right that he should be stopped - and that we should stop him.
Necessary because, with others, we should be trying to prevent him from using military violence against his own people. Legal because we have the backing of the United Nations Security Council.
And right because I believe we should not stand aside while this dictator murders his own people.
And the Arab League and many others agree.” (Cabinet Office, 2011b)
26 Conflict or action.
Even if the UK, together with its allies, has been able to stop Qaddafi's attacks against civilians in Benghazi, there are still signs that he is now arranging his forces to attack the civilian population, but in other parts of the country. The UN has tried to give him ultimatums and red lines, but this has not worked. Cameron says that “The United Nations gave Gaddafi an ultimatum and he completely ignored it. To those who say we should wait and see, I would say we have waited and we’ve seen more than enough.” (Cabinet Office, 2011b)
The risk now is, therefore, more aggression from Qaddafi. Cameron is concerned by this scenario and states that:
“If Gaddafi’s attacks on his own people succeed, Libya will become once again a pariah state, festering on Europe’s border, a source of instability, exporting terror beyond her borders. A state from which literally hundreds of thousands of citizens could seek to escape, putting huge pressure on us in Europe."(Cabinet Office, 2011b)
Meaning that if this continues, Qaddafi is no longer only a threat towards his citizens but also towards Europe.
Resolution or suggested resolution.
The UK's focus will be on maintaining the no-fly zone and protect the Libyan population. They will not tolerate attacks on civilians, and those who support such attacks will be held accountable for their crimes. Cameron states that" Now is the time for those involved in the Gaddafi regime to desert him. To put down their arms, walk away from their tanks, and stop obeying orders from someone who has brutalised his own people” (Cabinet Office, 2011b) The UK will also support the International Committee of the Red Cross to deploy three medical teams and urged the United Nations to lead international pressure for unfettered humanitarian access within Libya. He also makes it clear that the Libyans should be free to choose their own destiny.
Obama's first speech
This speech was held on the 23 of February 2011 from the White House.
27 Character or actors
The United States is a country that is fighting for all people’s freedom and human rights.
The Libyan citizens are the ones being oppressed and have been denied their rights.
The Libyan government are the oppressors who are terrorizing their own people.
The UN security council is portrayed as essential to legitimize decisions.
Setting/environment/space.
The situation in Libya is with escalating violence, and the Libyan people as a group that has had their rights are taken from them, and he exemplifies this with a quote from a Libyan man who says, "We just want to be able to live like human beings." The ones preventing them from doing so is the Libyan government, and they are also then referred to as the ones responsible for escalating violence. Obama, for example, states that:
“Like all governments, the Libyan government has a responsibility to refrain from violence, to allow humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, and to respect the rights of its people. It must be held accountable for its failure to meet those responsibilities, and face the cost of continued violations of human rights.” (The White House, 2011a)
He also mentions the international community and the United Nations in the speech as the ones that need to act against the brutality of the Libyan government. The United Nations is also seen as the grant for that the actions against the regime are in line with international law, even if it is not referred to explicitly instead, Obama makes implicit indications of this. For example, Obama states that "Yesterday a unanimous UN Security Council sent a clear message that it condemns the violence in Libya, supports accountability for the perpetrators, and stands with the Libyan people” (The White House, 2011a). This quote shows that the United Nations and the Security Council is an essential factor for the Obama government hence that they find their opinions and decisions necessary.
At this point, there is no clear indication of what the next step against the regime is going to be instead Obama states that “This is not simply a concern of the United States. The entire world is watching, and we will coordinate our assistance and accountability measures with the
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international community.” (The White House, 2011a), indicating that the United States will wait for the international community’s approval before taking any action.
Conflict or action.
The Libyan government is oppressing its people, their human rights, and their ability to "live like human beings." The United States, together with a large group of other countries and
organizations, are condemning this way of acting and are doing what they can to make it stop and give the Libyans their human rights back. In a broader sense, the speech also contains traces of a battle between good and evil or civilized or uncivilized. Obama, for example, refers to the Americans that are working for the US state in Libya as "the very best of our country and its values" (The White House, 2011a), meaning that the Libyan government does not have the same good values as the American does, and in the end, he also says that “the United States will continue to stand up for freedom, stand up for justice, and stand up for the dignity of all people”
(The White House, 2011a) something that their Libyan counterpart does not do.
Resolution or suggested resolution.
The resolution at this stage is to consult other countries and organizations in order to find a possible way to end the human rights violations in Libya. Obama refers to the UN Security Council but also members of his government that travel around the globe to talk with politicians in other countries. The resolution is at that point, future away from an intervention; hence the information is limited, and there is not yet consensus among the United States allies on how to act.
Obama's second speech
This speech is held on 18 March 2011 from the White House.
Character or actors.
The United States is portrayed as a protector of human rights and democracy all over the world.
The Libyan citizens are the victims of this conflict. They are denied their rights.
Qaddafi is the oppressor, and he is responsible for the escalating violence in Libya.
The UN security council is portrayed as essential to legitimize decisions.
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The US allies, other countries agree on the need for action in Libya.
Setting/environment/space.
In contrast to the first speech, it is no longer the Libyan state that oppresses its people, and it is Qaddafi. He has not stopped using violence against his own people even if the international community has criticized him and imposed sanctions against Qaddafi and the people close to him. Instead, the violence has escalated with attacks against hospitals and peaceful
demonstrations, and if the situation is left unchecked by the United States and their allies, there is a risk that Qaddafi "commit atrocities against his people," and Obama also states the following in relation to Qaddafi "Instead of respecting the rights of his own people, Qaddafi chose the path of brutal suppression. Innocent civilians were beaten, imprisoned, and in some cases killed.". (The White House, 2011b)
Later, Obama also mentions that Qaddafi can be a threat to the rest of the world. Hence he has historically sent monetary support to terrorists that have acted against American citizens.
Qaddafi's actions are not just a terrorist threat, in any case. It can also lead to an indirect threat towards the United States and their allies; hence the escalated violence in Libya might lead to a destabilization of the whole region. If the region is destabilized, it could, for example, lead to migration from Libya to other states nearby, something that will be negative for the United States and their allies; hence migration would put pressure on already weak states.
In the speech, it is also clear that the international community has started working together and that they have created a couple of red lines, that if crossed by Qaddafi, will lead to military intervention from the international community in Syria with support from the UN and he ends the speech by saying:
“ [...] I have taken this decision with the confidence that action is necessary, and that we will not be acting alone. Our goal is focused, our cause is just, and our coalition is strong.” (The White House, 2011b)
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Once again, Obama empathizes that America is not acting alone and hence the cause is just. This is not an action the United States is taking part in for financial gain. Instead, it is an action for what the international community finds just.
Conflict or action.
Qaddafi is oppressing and killing his own people and is by doing so violating their universal human rights and the Libyan people's right to choose their own destiny. The United States, together with its allies, have tried to send a clear signal to Qaddafi that this way of acting is not acceptable and have, via the UN Security Council, imposed implemented sanctions, an arms embargo, and enforced a no-fly zone over Libya. This was done in order to protect the Libyan people but also other citizens of the world, both in the region where allies to the US could be destabilized, but Obama also mentions that Qaddafi has sponsored terrorists that have acted against American citizens also citizens of other states. Obama also states that if the international community does not work against Qaddafi, “The democratic values that we stand for would be overrun," meaning that this, in the end, is a conflict between freedom and oppression." (The White House, 2011b) Meaning that in the future, this is a battle between democracy and tyranny, and if the international community ignores and puts their focus on other matters, there is a risk that democracy can be overrun in more countries. Something that in the end would threaten American democracy in the end.
In this speech, Obama is also continuing to refer to different partners and allies as a way of showing that America is not alone in this fight, and both France and Brittan are mentioned as essential supporters for the American cause. He states:
"[…] the United States is prepared to act as part of an international coalition. American
leadership is essential, but that does not mean acting alone -– it means shaping the conditions for the international community to act together." (The White House, 2011b)
The mentioning of supporting countries is also a way of legitimizing the United States' actions;
they are not the only ones finding what Qaddafi is doing terrible and see the need to act. Other countries are doing it as well.
